COMPILIATION OF CASE DIGESTS FOR CRIMINAL LAW II TITLE TWO

UMIL VS. RAMOS (Ima)

FACTS:
- Petitioners pray for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, ordering the respondents to produce the bodies of the persons named,
saying that the persons detention is unlawful as their arrests were made without warrant and, that no preliminary investigation was first
conducted, so that the informations filed against them are null and void.
- Respondents assert that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the petitioners as they have been legally arrested
and are detained by virtue of valid informations filed in court against them.
- Said arrested persons are the following:
(A) Rolando Dural:
- One fine day, the RIOU-CAPCOM (Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command) received confidential information
about a member of the NPA liquidation squad being treated for a gunshot wound at a hospital. It was later found out that the wounded
person was actually Rolando Dural, responsible for killing 2 CAPCOM soldiers just the day before. In view of this verification, Dural was
transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified
by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the 2soldiers seated inside
the car. Because of this POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION, he was charged with the crime of "Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of
Persons in Authority in the RTC.
(B) Amelia Roque & Wilfredo Buenaobra
- It all started when Constantinos (another NPA member) house was placed under military surveillance, pursuant to a search warrant
issued by the RTC of Pasig. A search of the house was consequently conducted. When apprehended at Constantinos house, Wilfredo
Buenaobra admitted that he was an NPA courier and had with him letters to members of the rebel group.
- Various articles, including grenades and live ammunition were also found in Constantinos house. For these, Constantino could not
produce any permit to possess. So he was brought to the CIS Headquarters for investigation, where he admitted that he was a staff
member of the executive committee of the NUFC and a ranking member of the CPP.
- Also found on Buenaobra was a piece of paper containing a telephone number of Florida M. Roque, sister of Amelia Roque. Acting on
the lead provided as to the whereabouts of Amelia Roque, the military agents went to the given address the next day. It was found that
Amelia Roque was a member of the National United Front Commission, in charge of finance, and admitted ownership of subversive
documents found in her sisters house. She was also in possession of ammunition and a fragmentation grenade for which she had no
permit or authority to possess. Her sisters house, just like Constantinos was found to be another safehouse for the rebel group.
(C) Domingo Anonuevo & Ramon Casiple
- Both are admittedly members of the standing committee of the NUFC and, when apprehended in the house of Renato Constatino,
they had a bag containing subversive materials, and both carried firearms and ammunition for which they had no license to possess or
carry. Both were then charged with violation of PD 1866.
(D) Vicky Ocaya
- During a search of a house believed to be occupied by the head of the CPP-NPA, Ocaya arrived in a car. Subversive documents and
several rounds of ammunition were found in her car, for which she could produce no permit or authorization to possess. Charged with
violation of PD 1866. Rivera, on the other hand, was released from custody.
(E) Deogracias Espiritu
- Respondents aver that he was lawfully arrested without a judicial warrant of arrest since he had just committed an offense that
afternoon, during a press conference at the National Press Club.
- Espiritu is General Secretary of PISTON, an association of drivers and operators of public service vehicles in the country. He was
heard through tri-media urging all drivers and operators to go on nationwide strike, to force the government to give in to their demands.
- His rousing speech: Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila, at hindi tayo titigil hanggang hindi
binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto nating pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin at and pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na si Ka
Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na. (Hehe.)
(F) Narciso Nazareno
- One fine day ulit, a Romulo Bunye was killed by a group of men. One of the suspects was Ramil Regal, who, upon questioning,
pointed to Nazareno as one of his companions in the killing. So, he was arrested without warrant.
ISSUE: Whether the persons detained were illegally arrested or deprived of their constitutional right to liberty, warranting their release
on habeas corpus.
RULING: NO ON ALL COUNTS.
- The Court finds that the persons detained have NOT been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right to liberty,
and that the circumstances do not warrant their release on habeas corpus.
- The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed had
freshly committed or were actually committing an offense when apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were clearly
justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue of valid informations filed against them in court.
(A) Dural was clearly not arrested while in the act of shooting the 2 soldiers. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of the
offense, since his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified. However, he
was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of
Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection
therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. Also, Dural was already found guilty in
the criminal case abovementioned. During the promulgation of this decision, he was already serving the sentence imposed upon him by
the trial court. Thus, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to him.

(B) The arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, without warrant, is also justified. The contention of respondents that
petitioners Roque and Buenaobra are officers and/or members of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP was not
controverted or traversed by said petitioners. The contention must be deemed admitted. As officers and/or members of the NUFC-CPP,
their arrest, without warrant, was justified for the same reasons earlier stated vis-a-vis Rolando Dural. The arrest without warrant of
Roque was additionally justified as she was, at the time of apprehension, in possession of ammunitions without license to possess
them.
(C) The arrest of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, without warrant, is also justified under the rules. The petitioners' (Anonuevo
and Casiple) claim that they were unlawfully arrested because there was no previous warrant of arrest, is without merit The record
shows that Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunition in their person when they were
apprehended.
(D) Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagranti delicto so that her arrest without a warrant is justified. Ocaya had with her unlicensed
ammunition when she was arrested. No preliminary investigation was conducted because she was arrested without a warrant and she
refused to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rule of Court, as
amended. Ocaya and the others arrested claim that the firearms and subversive documents were actually planted by the military
agents to justify their illegal arrest. However, no evidence supported this claim.
(E) Yes, lawful arrest. Respondents averment is correct. (See FACTS, under E)
(F) The arrest of Nazareno was effected by the police without warrant pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court after he was
POSITIVELY IMPLICATED by his co-accused Ramil Regala in the killing of Romulo Bunye, and after investigation by the police
authorities. So, lawful arrest.
Notes:
- In all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court judge, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, of if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus
will not be allowed.
- The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized in law. The occasions or instances when such
an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
People vs Burgos (Krish)
FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Davao del Sur RTC convicting Burgos of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms
in Furtherance with Subversion.
On May 13, 1982, at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, one Ruben Burgos y Tito was arrested without any warrant (warrant of arrest or
search warrant) because he kept, possessed, carried and had in his possession one unlicensed caliber .38 homemade revolver which
he used in the performance of his subversive tasks such as the recruitment of new members to the NPA and collection of contributions
from the members.
Evidence of the prosecution
> Masamloks testimony: One Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities on May 12. He said he was
asked to contribute one chopa of rice and one peso per month as his contribution to the NPA and was forcibly recruited by Burgos
as member of the NPA, threatening to kill him and his family with the use of the firearm if he refused.
> Event - day of the arrest: The following day (May 13), a joint team of PC-INP units was dispatched to arrest Burgos. Through the
help of Burgos brother Pedro, the team was able to locate him in his field, plowing. He was called to his house by the team and
was asked about his firearm. At first, the accused denied the possession of such. But when the team questioned his wife, she
pointed to a place below their house where a gun was buried in the ground. After the recovery of the arm, Burgos likewise pointed
to the team subversive documents which he allegedly kept in a stock pile of cogon which was at around 3 meters away from his
house. When confronted with the firearm after it was recovered, Burgos readily admitted that it was his and it was issued by Nestor
Jimenez (alias Pedipol), allegedly team leader of the sparrow unit of the NPA. As testified by the in-charge of firearms and
explosives, NCO Headquarter, Philippine Constabulary, Digos, it was shown that among the list of licensed firearm holders and of
those applying for the licensing of the firearm, the name of Burgos was not in both.
Contention of the defendant-appellant
> Burgos version: Burgos said that from his farm, he was brought by military personnel to the PC Barracks at Digos. There, he was
investigated by soldiers about the firearm. They wanted him to admit that the firearm was his. Because of his refusal, he was
tortured and mauled several times. It was only until he was told that they will salvage him if he refuses to accept ownership of the
firearm that Burgos said yes. After his admission, he was made to sign his affidavit for the prosecution.
> Brgy. Captain from the place where Burgos resides declared he was not personally aware of any subversive activities of Burgos
and that he can attest to Burgos good character and reputation as a law abiding citizen of his barrio, being a carpenter and a
farmer thereat.
> Urbana, the wife of Burgos, testified that Masamlok and one Pedipol went to their house on May 10 while Burgos was not in there
and left the firearm temporarily for them to claim later.

The records of the case disclose that when the police authorities went to the house of Burgos for the purpose of arresting him, they did
not have any warrant of arrest or search warrant with them.
The trial court justified the arrest of Burgos without any warrant as falling under the exceptions where arrests may be validly made
without a warrant (see Rule 113, sec. 5 of the present Rules of Court).
ISSUE(S):
1. WON the arrest of Burgos was lawful when there was no valid warrant.
2. WON the search in the house of Burgos was lawful without valid warrant.
RULING: SC said the trial court erred.
1. NO. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an
offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v.
Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety
from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the appellant's wife.
At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document. Neither was he committing
any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and
fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any
exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by
the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically
provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full
protection.
2. NO. In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been
committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission
of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the
accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the
subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful. If an arrest without warrant is
unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a
poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.
Consequently, the need to go through the process of securing a search warrant and a warrant of arrest becomes even more clear [sic].
The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search and seizure which transpired
afterwards could not likewise be deemed legal as being mere incidents to a valid arrest.
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be searched simply because he failed
to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de
Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to
make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770).
Milo vs. Salanga (Sidney)
TOPIC: ARBITRARY DETENTION
KEYWORD: BRGY CAPTAIN
FACTS: On the 21st day of April 1973, accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, with the aid of some other private persons, namely
Juan Tuvera, Jr., Bertillo Bataoil and one Dianong, maltreated one Armando Valdez by hitting with butts of their guns and fists blows
and immediately thereafter, without legal grounds, with deliberate intent to deprive said Armando Valdez of his constitutional liberty,
accused Barrio captain Juan Tuvera, Sr., Cpl. Tomas Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat, members of the police force of Mangsat,
Pangasinan conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lodge and lock
said Armando Valdez inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours.
Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the proofs
adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to support the filing of the information. Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S.
Milo filed an opposition thereto.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain is a public officer who can be liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention.
RULING: The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the detention of persons
accused of a crime. Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of the law, the judges or mayors.
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants (who were later named barrio captains and now barangay
captains) were recognized as persons in authority. In various cases, the Court deemed them as persons in authority, and convicted
them of Arbitrary Detention.
One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges and
mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this crime. A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would
show that they are similar to those of a barrio captain except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the
same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact
that even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the
arrest of petitioner Valdez.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private respondent Tuvera, Sr., can be held liable for Arbitrary Detention.
Astorga vs. People (Nica)

FACTS: On October 28, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information against Benito Astorga, Mayor of Daram, Samar, as
well as a number of his men for arbitrary detention. The complaint alleged that the accused (astorga), in his capacity as a public officer,
detained Elpidio Simon, Moisesdela Cruz, Wenifredo Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias (DENR Employees), without any
legal grounds for nine hours. The detainees were a teamspecially sent to the island of Daram, Samar to conduct intelligence gathering
and forest protection operations in line with the governments campaigh against illegal logging. It was during there investigation that the
team encountered Mayor Astorga, who, they conversed with to gather information. The latter refused to believe the claims of the
detainees that they really were on the island to accomplish a mission given to them by DENR, he called for armed reinforces and
brought the team to his home in Daram, where they were allegedly detained for 9 hours before they were finally allowed to leave.
During the trial, SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cincopresented their testimonies, the rest, however, executed a Joint Affidavit of
Desistance. Regardless, the court still rendered a judgment finding the accused guilty of arbitrary detention and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor as minimum to one year and eight months of prision correccional as maximum.
In the present petition for review, the petitioner (accused)
claims that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of arbitrary detention
based on mere speculations, surmises, and conjectures and notwithstanding the affidavit of desistance executed by the 5 complaining
witnesses.
ISSUE: Was the team actually detained?
RULING: Yes. Prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention (See People v. Cortez, People v. Acosta) is that the
curtailment of the victims liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the victims person. If the acts and actuations of the
accused can produce such fear in the mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the extent that the victim is compelled to limit
his own actions and movements in accordance with the wishes of the accused, then the victim is, for all intents and purposes, detained
against his will.
In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas, the witnesses and the complainants were not
allowed by the petitioner to go home. Their refusal was quickly followed by the call for and arrival of almost a dozen reinforcements, all
armed with military-issue rifles, who proceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed at the complainants and the witnesses. It was not
just the presence of the armed men, but also the evident effect these gunmen had on the actions of the team which proves that fear
was indeed instilled in the minds of the team members, to the extent that they felt compelled to stay. The intent to prevent the departure
of the complainants and witnesses against their will is thus clear.
SC denied the petition, upholding Astorgas conviction.
Stonehill vs Diokno (Flo)
FACTS: Petitioners, who have prior deportation cases pending, and the corporation they form were alleged to committed "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code, to which they were served 4
search warrants, directing any peace officer to search petitioners persons and/or premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences for: books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets
and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
The items allegedly illegally obtained can be classified into two groups: (1) those found and seized in the offices of aforementioned
corporations, and (2) those found in petitioners residences.
Petitioners aver that the warrant is illegal for, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be
seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
accordance with law x x x.
Respondent-prosecutors invoke the Moncado vs Peoples Court ruling: even if the searches and seizures under consideration were
unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein.
ISSUE: Validity of the search warrants.
RULING: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et. al., reversing the Moncado doctrine. Though Stonehill et. al. are not the proper parties to
assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation and thus they have no cause of action (only the officers or
board members of said corporation may assail said warrant, and that corporations have personalities distinct from petitioners
personalities), the 3 warrants issued to search petitioners residences are hereby declared void. Thus, the searches and seizures made
therein are made illegal.
The constitution protects the peoples right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides:
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
In the case at bar, none of these are met.
The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners committed a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. As no specific violation has been alleged, it was impossible for the judges who
issued said warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed or committed violations of the law. In other words, it would be a legal heresy, of the
highest order, to convict anybody of a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code, as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.
General warrants are also to be eliminated, as the legality or illegality of petitioners transactions is immaterial to the invalidity of the
general warrant that sought these effects to be searched and seized: Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.

The Court also holds that the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures is, in the language of the Federal Supreme Court: x x x If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used
in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such
searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.
The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.
Burgos vs Chief of Staff (Yani)
TOPIC: [ Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally obtained, Art. 129 ]
FACTS: Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of Metropolitan Mail and We Forum
newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the
articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the same
address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.
RULING: The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a typographical error and
immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to
search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo,
ruling that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant,
but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the
agent of the owner. In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries
were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible
to seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the
statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.
Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description
and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the
said items.
Galvante vs Casimiro (Ron R.)
FACTS: In the afternoon of May 14, 2001 at Sitio Cahi-an, Kapatungan, Trento, Agusan del Sur, private respondents confiscated from
petitioner one colt pistol super .38 automatic with serial no. 67973, one short magazine, and nine super .38 live ammunitions. The
confiscated materials were covered by an expired Memorandum Receipt dated September 2, 1999. Petitioner filed against private
respondents an administrative case, docketed as Administrative Case No. IASOB-020007 for Grave Misconduct, before the Internal
Affairs Service (IAS), Region XIII, Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG); and a criminal case, docketed as OMB-P-C-020109-B for Arbitrary Detention, Illegal Search and Grave Threats, before the Ombudsman. Stating in his affidavit complaint in both
cases:
1. That sometime on May 14, 2001 I left my house at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon after having lunch for Sitio Cahi-an, Brgy.
Kapatungan, Trento, Agusan del Sur to meet retired police Percival Plaza and inquire about the retirement procedure for policemen;
2. That upon arrival at the house of retired police Percival Plaza, together with Lorenzo Sanoria, Delfin Ramirez and Pedro Ramas who
asked for a ride from the highway in going to Sitio Cahi-an, I immediately went down of the jeep but before I could call Mr. Plaza, four
policemen in uniform blocked my way;
3. That the four policemen were [private respondents] PO1 Romil Avenido PNP, PO1 Valentino Rufano, PNP both member of 142nd
Company, Regional Mobile Group and PO1 Eddie Degran PNP and PO1 Federico Balolot PNP members of 1403 Prov'l Mobile Group,
all of Bunawan Brook, Bunawan, Agusan del Sur; who all pointed their long firearms ready to fire [at] me, having heard the sound of the
release of the safety lock;
4. That raising my arms, I heard [private respondent] PO1 Avenido saying, "ANG IMONG PUSIL, IHATAG" which means "Give me your
firearm," to which I answered, "WALA MAN KO'Y PUSIL" translated as "I have no firearm," showing my waistline when I raised my Tshirt;
5. That my other companions on the jeep also went down and raised their arms and showed their waistline when the same policemen
and a person in civilian attire holding an armalite also pointed their firearms to them to which Mr. Percival Plaza who came down from
his house told them not to harass me as I am also a former police officer but they did not heed Mr. Plaza's statements;
6. That while we were raising our arms [private respondent] SPO4 Benjamin Conde, Jr. went near my owner type jeep and conducted a
search. To which I asked them if they have any search warrant;
7. That after a while they saw my super .38 pistol under the floormat of my jeep and asked me of the MR of the firearm but due to fear
that their long arms were still pointed to us, I searched my wallet and gave the asked [sic] document;
8. That immediately the policemen left me and my companions without saying anything bringing with them the firearm;
9. That at about 2:30 p.m., I left Mr. Percival's house and went to Trento Police Station where I saw a person in civilian attire with a
revolver tucked on his waist, to which I asked the police officers including those who searched my jeep to apprehend him also;

10. That nobody among the policemen at the station made a move to apprehend the armed civilian person so I went to the office of
Police Chief Rocacorba who immediately called the armed civilian to his office and when already inside his office, the disarming was
done;
11. That after the disarming of the civilian I was put to jail with the said person by Police Chief Rocacorba and was released only at 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon of May 16, 2001 after posting a bailbond;
12. That I caused the execution of this document for the purpose of filing cases of Illegal Search, Grave Misconduct and Abuse of
Authority against SPO4 Benjamin Conde, Jr., of Trento Police Station; PO1 Ramil Avenido, PO1 Velantino Rufano, PO1 Federico
Balolot and PO1 Eddie Degran.
Ombudsman Investigation & Prosecution Officer Dennis L. Garcia issued in OMB-P-C-02-0109-B, the October 30, 2003 Resolution
dismissing the case for lack of probable cause and hence, this petition on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the Ombudsman is correct for dismissing the case
RULING: Yes. It is noted that the criminal complaint which petitioner filed with the Ombudsman charges private respondents with
warrantless search, arbitrary detention, and grave threats.
The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The conduct of a warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not
penalized under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) or any other special law. What the RPC punishes are only two forms of searches:
Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally obtained. - In addition to the liability attaching
to the offender for the commission of any other offense, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period and a fine not exceedingP1,000.00 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall procure a
search warrant without just cause, or, having legally procured the same, shall exceed his authority or use unnecessary severity in
executing the same.
Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. - The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed
upon a public officer or employee who, in cases where a search is proper, shall search the domicile, papers or other belongings of any
person, in the absence of the latter, any member of his family, or in their default, without the presence of two witnesses residing in the
same locality.
Petitioner did not allege any of the elements of the foregoing felonies in his Affidavit-Complaint; rather, he accused private respondents
of conducting a search on his vehicle without being armed with a valid warrant. This situation, while lamentable, is not covered by
Articles 129 and 130 of the RPC.
The criminal complaint for arbitrary detention was likewise properly dismissed by public respondents. To sustain a criminal charge for
arbitrary detention, it must be shown that (a) the offender is a public officer or employee, (b) the offender detained the complainant, and
(c) the detention is without legal grounds. The second element was not alleged by petitioner in his Affidavit-Complaint. As pointed out by
private respondent Conde in his Comment and Memorandum, petitioner himself identified in his Affidavit-Complaint that it was Police
Chief Rocacorba who caused his detention. Nowhere in said affidavit did petitioner allege that private respondents effected his
detention, or were in any other way involved in it. There was, therefore, no factual or legal basis to sustain the criminal charge for
arbitrary detention against private respondents.
Finally, on the criminal complaint for grave threats, the Solicitor General aptly pointed out that the same is based merely on petitioner's
bare allegation that private respondents aimed their firearms at him. Such bare allegation stands no chance against the wellentrenched rule applicable in this case, that public officers enjoy a presumption of regularity in the performance of their official function.
The IAS itself observed that private respondents may have been carried away by their "enthusiasm in the conduct of the arrest in line of
duty." Petitioner expressed the same view when, in his Affidavit of Desistance, he accepted that private respondents may have been
merely following orders when they pointed their long firearms at him.