CASE P3-3 Euro Disney Euro Disney A ‘chael Eisner, CEO and Chairman of Walt Disney, was used to celebrations. He and his team had been recognized numerous times since taking over ‘the company leadership in 1984, Most notably, Bisner and his team were responsible for Disney’s growth from a $2 billion to $22 billion dollar enterprise. But now with disappointing 1992 year-end and 1993 peak season financials for the new Euro Disney Theme park, celebrating would have to wait. Euro Disney revenue and profit during this timeframe was well below expectations (see Exhibit 1). This sub- standard performance was a first for Fisner and the only time one of his ventures was, unsuccessful. A lot was at stake due to Disney's 49 percent equity position in Euro Disney SCA, the operating company that offered the remaining shares to the public. Several banks also invested in the park by extending construction loans totaling $3.5, billion, Attendance at the park fell significantly below expectations and never met the 11 million tourists estimate developed in the original business plan (see Exhibit 2). isner was preparing for an upcoming meeting with a prominent independent consult- ing firm specifically hired to analyze the issues surrounding the Euro Disney taunch. Fisner prides himself on attention to detail and his leadership skills, which guided the Euro Disney opening in April of 1991 and the very successful theme park introduc~ tions in Florida, California, and Tokyo. Having previously gained the confidence of ‘the Disney board and shareholders, Fisner was determined to identify and correct the Euro Disney issues, Troubling to Eisner, though, was the fact that he and his tear fol- lowed the same formula used in the previously successful theme park launches. This fact sustained his belief that extemal forces beyond his control were the major cause of the problems. Exhibit2 Annual Attendance Figures ‘ase rps by Katya Woodbury Zan, Dota Canal Labin Seo f Bsn ase Urveiy, Deconer 2010 Reprint wi emirEuro DisneyA 543 Bisner and his management team were thought to be unstoppable. The saying around the office was that everything they worked on “tured to gold.” Tokyo Disney, for example, one of the newest of the theme parks, records more attendance per year ‘than Disneyland in California and Disney World in Florida combined. Tokyo Disney consumers, as well as the newer Hong Kong Disneyland consumers, enjoy the United States-based themes and attractions and seem to inject themselves tight into the fun, fantasy, and magic. With continued global expansion as 2 key stratcgic imperative for 8. the theme parks, Bisnet was determined to make Euro Disney an even more expansive rt and successful operation than the previously opened theme parks. Eisner was directly involved with every detail and decision made regarding the development and execu- tion of the Euro Disney launch. Driven to maintain Disney’s successful and quality ‘mage, Fisner needed to stay intimately involved in sorting through the issues. Original Business Plan Expectations as Bound like a classic novel, Eisner flipped through the 30-page Euro Disney business ro plan reviewing the research, financial assumptions, and estimates. He was pleased c. with the amount and level of detail provided in the plan, The location assessment was 5 2 perfect example of the plan’s thoroughness. As with all real estate investment, the location selection was an important decision, and over 200 European locations were assessed priot to making the final decision to locate the park east of Patis. Consistent with previous theme park location strategies to build near a major city, Euro Disney was expected to draw from a wide geography and benefit from the proximity to Paris, the number one European tourist destination (see Exhibit 3), ‘The business plan also outlined European vacation trends, which on average reflected two to three weeks ‘more vacation time than Americans. As a result, the plan assumed European tourists ‘would spend more days at Euro Disney than the other theme parks. Coordination withthe French government was also cited as a major initiative. Even with the close proximity to Paris, it was necessary to build transportation infrastruc- ture to facilitate convenient park access. The French government invested lnundreds ‘of millions of dollars to develop rail connections from other major European cities, for example. The opening of the Channel Tunnel in 1993 was also built into the atten- ‘dance figures and was expected to increase UK tourist attendance. Attendance is a major variable that can make or break theme park projections. Tokyo Disney provided additional learning to Eisner’ team on how to operate a theme park in 2 cooler and rainier environment than California or Florida. Like Tokyo Disney, Euro Disney incorporated covered waiting areas and walkways to minimize toutist expo- sure to the elements and to maximize length of stey. Other learning incorporated from a separate Tokyo Disney assessment included the appeal and acceptance of American themes and references embedded in the Disney attractions by non-Americans. Main Exhibit 3 Disney Theme Parks: Proximity to Major Cities, Des eee rom apa cominCASE P33 Euro Disney Street U.S.A., Frontierland, and Michael Jackson’s Captain EO 3-D movie were fea- tured attractions transferred to Euro Disney. Euro Disney Chairman Robert Fitzpat- rick, a United States citizen, indicated that “it would have been silly to take Mickey Mouse and try to do surgery to create 2 transmogrified hybrid, half French and half American.” Communication did take a hybrid approach, as French and English were the languages used on park signage and by the staff. In Tokyo, English was the pre- dominant language. Eisner decided to took more into the Tokyo Disney file to uncover additional learning end perhaps understand why Euro Disney was less successful Tokyo Disney The Oriental Land Company (OLC), in partnership with Disney, opened Tokyo Dis- ney in 1983. A success since the gates opened, Tokyo Disney attracts 90 pervent of its tourists from Japan, Foreigners traveling to Japan also visit the attraction, as buses {20 straight to the theme park from the Narita airport. Competitor theme parks struggle to keep pace with Tokyo Disney and have been introducing new rides and entertain- ment to stave off the abrupt and continual declines in attendance. For the most part, ‘Tokyo Disney is described as a copycat of the Disney parks in California and Florida. ‘Some localization has been included, such as traditional Japanese food on some of the restaurant menus and the inclusion of Japanese on some signs and lines ‘spoken by some of the attraction actors. Hamburgers and fried chicken are common fare within the park and seem to be accepted, even though it is common for Japanese traveling for an extended trip to bring box lunches called obento. Disney does not allow obento into the theme park and conceded by allowing families to eat obento on benches set up ‘outside of the park. Totally engrossed in this American fantasy experience, Japan has more than accepted Mickey and his friends as evidenced not only by the strong park attendance, but in spite of the cold and rainy weather and by the magnitude of licensed ‘goods seen on lunch boxes, book bags, and T-shirts. Coordination with labor officials has been positive, and Tokyo Japan, which is managed and owned by OLC, works well with the Disney management team in securing investment funds. Having reviewed the recent results and the original business plan for Euro Disney, Eisner was prepared to direct the consulting firm and charge them with identifying the causes of the problems and more important, provide solutions to address those issues. ‘He gave them three weeks to report on their findings. Euro Disney Problems Revealed With the short timeframe given, the cross-functional consulting team identified four central themes that characterized the Euro Disney problems. The four central themes identified were: 1, Management 2. The environment 3. Marketing and consumer issues 4. Financial debt and interest charges Sitting on the other side of Eisner at the conference room table, the consulting team indicated that, given the depth and severity of the issues, they needed more time and ‘money to develop more specific and actionable recommendations. Management Management issues were extensive and found to be interrelated with several ofthe other issues. The consultants outlined the management’s approach, decisions, and practices asEuro DisneyA 545 the major issues. The main issue was the inconsistency of the overall Euro Disney vision ‘and how that vision integrated into the overall Disney vision. The top management team for Euro Disney believed the competitive frame of reference for Euro Disney was Euro- ‘pean Cathedrals and monuments, Other direct and indirect competitors and venues were not scriously considered as a part of the broader competitive frame. Other European theme parks, for example, had a better perceived price valuc. Instead of a carbon copy transplant of American Disney, the European entry needed a distinct positioning and relied too heavily on the success of the parent Disney brand (ranked number seven over all in a list ofthe best global brands) and the other Disney theme parks. In-depth interviews with French government officials, members of the financial community, labor, and transportation representatives revealed significant tension and disdain with the Euro Disney team. This tension spanned across the entire project from development to actual implementation. The Euro Disney team, consisting primarily of United States-based executives, skewed the operations and internal decision making to standardized offerings versus considering recommendations made by local officials and industry partners, which would have allowed maximized local appeal and capital- ized on local markct opportunities. Local advisers, for example, did not recommend the location northeast of Paris and proposed other ways to structure the financial deals 50 ‘as not to ineur such a high debt profile. While Fitzpatick cautioned against reinventing Mickey, more of a hybrid approach in the Euro Disney introduction may have increased attendance and length of stay. The unwillingness of the top management team to incor- porate ideas from local talent and constituencies reflected poorly on Disney’s manage- ‘ment style and this lack of cooperation was detrimental to the park's success. Environment ‘The impact of weather pattems on attendance was another highlighted issue. Euro Disney average temperatures arc approximately nine degrees lower than Tokyo Dis- ney, where the average high temperature between Tokyo Disney and Euro Disney ‘have a difference as much as 20 degrees lower than Disneyworld in Lake Buena Vista, Florida (see Exhibit 4), Minimal and slow development of other entertainment entities around Euro Disney was another market issue affecting length of stay. Euro Disney needed complementary attractions and destinations to entice vacationers with several ‘weeks of vacation to travel and stay in a city outside of Paris. ‘Labor issues, such as the train strike that occurred on opening day, often occur in France and were not factored into the business plan. Labor groups objected to the non- negotiable dress code, where no facial hair or eye shadow was allowed but the wearing of underwear was required. The lack of negotiation with labor exacerbated the situation and helped to maintain the tension with Euro Disney management. Coordination with Exhibit 4 Location Climate for Disney Theme Parks ‘al fon: Meto Osan Eaocne Dovlopmest Conmsce: NOAA, Nao! Wear Servi worsen gies, ‘camer; wa ether or National Wen Services,546 CASE 3-3 Euro Disney labor unions was especially important during this recessionary period in France and ‘ost of Europe. Operating in a recessionary period also called into question the price value relationship, which was at risk and led into the consumer and marketing issues, Consumer Marketing Issues Analysis reflected that a majority of consumers who visited Euro Disney came pri- marily from France (45 percent). England, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands cumulatively aecount for another 50 percent, at roughly 10 percent each. Spain made up the balance. While this broad attraction was consistent with the busi- ness plan expectations, the depth of appeal was sub-optimized, with only French and Engtish communication and language-oriented staff. The lack of consumer segmenta- fion beyond Europeans transcended into a lack of understanding of consumer needs, habits, and expectations. The lack of accommodations for lunch and inadequate park ing for the heavily used tour buses are just a few of the consumer issues that proved troublesome for Euro Disney. Most offensive was the decision to prohibit alcoholic beverages in the pack. In a culture that drinks wine with meals, French travel editor Pierre Amalou said, “That’s unreasonable.” In response to the long lines for tides, and especially for food, Amalou indicated that “For the French, lining up is like being back in the war.” The consultants hypothesized that the French/European ethnocentric orientation did not allow for fall enjoyment of the United States-centric attractions (ie., Frontierland) even though other popular American imports such as Coca-Cola and Hollywood movies were experiencing success. Financials The complexity and depth of the financial issues required that the consulting, firm bring in an investment banking firm to help truncate the major issues and to make recommendations given the short tumaround time required by Eisner. Major restrac- turing was going to be necessary in light ofthe findings: = Key assumptions upon which financial projections were based were overly optimistic and did not assume a balanced risk profile. Financial projections relied too heavily on contributions from the hotels and office parks surround ing Euro Disney. ‘= The deal structure was based primarily on new debt offerings reflecting liberal policies and high leveraging that was typical of practices in Europe. Although Euro Disney had been working to restructure, unrealistic deadlines had been set that did not allow for complete and adequate analysis to fully address the financial concems. ‘= External factors that were present when the deals were developed were not factored into the business proposition. Europe was in a multi-year recession, the French realestate market was in a slump, and major fluctuations existed between the various European currencies, particularly the French franc. i = Related to not understanding the market, pricing structures within the park | ‘and as compared to competition and other Disney properties were overpriced. ! Hotel rooms near Euro Disney cost US$340, as nich as a four-star hotel in the center of Pars. Pricing was highlighted as an issue that would continue to be problematic given the continued strength of the European currencies versus the French frane and the United States dollar. Europeans were lured to the United States as they were able to buy more, enjoy the year-round warmer Florida ‘weather, and the many attractions contained within the Orlando area elWhere to Begin? Eisner knew there would be much to do. He had already organized teams to work on solutions to the identified problems. An investtnent banking team had been retained to develop an immediate debt restructuring which was need by March 31, Rumors began to circulate that Euro Disney might declare bankruptey. While restructuring was one of the short-term and immediate needs, Eisner also wanted to work on other short-term issues and take aggressive steps on the longer-term issues, such as marketing and the environment, The press was relentless, especially the English media, which Bisner admitted he “was not prepared for.” Action plans needed to be put quickly in place— no later than the end of March—so he could directly address the media, build local relationships, and save Euro Disney. What did Disney do wrong in its planning for Euro Disney? 2, What recommendations would you make to Disney to deal with the problems of Euro Disney? 3. What lessons can we lear from Disney’s problems with Euro Disney? 4, What social/cuttural models might assist Disney with better understanding the France/European environment? 5. What might be the cultural universals that Disney should continue to leverage as they expand their theme parks? What might be the associated risks? Euro Disney B ‘Taking responsibility for management issues, Eisner made several changes within the Euro Disney management team. He placed several Europeans in top positions, with Philippe Bourguignon as the new Euro Disney Chairman. Bourguignon reviewed first ‘year fiscal numbers which reported losses of US $920 million, due to the following ‘three factors: = Lower than projected per capita spending by visitor = The park’s overleveraged financial position, in which it paid 1.7 billion francs to service 20.3 billion francs debt and 1m The absence of real estate revenue ‘These “sound bites” were repeatedly provided to the press by Euro Disney spokesman Jacques-Henri Eyraud. Michael Eisner, chairman of Walt Disney Co., which owns 49 percent stake in Buro Disney, gave a “D” grade to the European theme park for its poor performance. This poor grade also seemed to signal to some that Eisner was beginning to distance himself from the issues Euro Disney continued to face. In an annual report, Bisner stated the following to shareholders: ‘We certainly ae interested in siding Euro Disney SCA, the public company that bears cour name and reputation, We will dealin good faith... Bu in doing so, I promise all shareholders ofthe Walt Disney Company that we will take no action to endanger the health of Disney itself Disney typically projects 20 percent growth in annual earnings and retum on equity over a five-year period. Disney was able to make its earnings target, driven by suc- cessful film features and licensing extensions for these properties, but missed the ‘return on equity promise driven by the $350 million charge taken for Euro Disney. An Euro Disney B 547CASE P33 Euro Disney overhaul in the financial structure was expected by spring of 1994, Furo Disney could not afford tho interest charges for fiscal 1993, which were approximately US $tmil- lion per day. Banks involved in the restructuring would not comment, but an analyst of ‘a major investor indicated “there's evidently a bit of pressuring going on.” Pressure was definitely being felt by other Euro Disney executives, stakeholders, and parent company Disney. Bourguignon responded quickly by reducing operating costs driving efficiency, and by beginning to tackle some of the marketing challenges. Merchandise offering and inventory was lowered from 30,000 to 17,000, magnetic cards replaced meal vouchers in Euro Disney Hotels, and food offerings were consoli~ dated from 5,400 to 2,000. Supply chain operations were decentralized, with decision making authority given to lower-level managers. Additionally, stafF cuts were identi- fied for the end of 1993 and into 1994. Environmental market concerns seemed to be improving as the European econ- ‘omy was rebounding, the Channel! Tunnel opened, and a TGV high-speed train was planned to go directly to Euro Disney from major European hubs without having to change trains in Paris, In addition, the fiftieth anniversary of the Normandy invasion raised hopes for higher attendance in 1994. Improved economic conditions coupled with the debt restructuring were expected to build Euro Disney profitability. Major negotiations were still necessary, as the Buro Disney team needed to convince parent Disney of the need to reduce management fees (35 percent of gross revenue), incen- tive management fees of 30-50 percent of pretax cash flow, and royalties of 5 percent on food and 10 percent on admission. Given these initial plan agreements, the parent company had been profiting since the park opened, even when Euro Disney was oper- ating at a loss. The restructuring sought to reduce these fees to facilitate Buro Disney changes and fortify the park's financial condition and build overall profitability. Restructuring Plan Agreement Parent company Disney agreed to eliminate management fees and royalties on ticket fees for five years. Disney also purchased underutilized assets and leased them back to Disney at favorable rates. Nogotistors with the banks forgave 18 months of interest payments and postponed principal payments for three years. Another component of the restructuring was to secure agreement from Disney shareholders for the rights to raise money to eliminate debt. The right was approved on June 8, 1994, ‘The financial bailout provided by the banks and parent company Disney helped to give Euro Disney some breathing room. With the financial and environmental issues moving ahead, Bourguignon and his team also enacted significant changes tothe mat- keting plan strategies. Most significant was the renaming of the theme park to Dis- neyland Paris. This repositioning grounded the theme park to the French capital and reinforced its proximity to this major city. In the midst of questionable press, a posi~ tive press event occurred when Michael Jackson and Lisa Marie Presley visited Dis- neyland Paris on their honeymoon. Also, at the end of 1994, admission process were reduced by 22 perceatt for the 1995 peak season. This was important, es attendance dropped in FY ending 1994, to 8.8 million (see Exhibit 5), Exhibit 5 Annual Attendance FiguresDisneyland Paris 549 Exhibit 6 Euro Disney Profit and Loss Results from the restructuring and operational changes improved Disneyland Paris's performance and generated a profit for FY ending 1995 (see Exhibit 6). Discussion Questions 1. Do you agree with the restructuring plan? What else should have been considered? 2. What else does Euro Disney/Disneyland Paris need to do to sustain profitabil- ity and remain in the black? 3. Should the name of the park be changed? What are the related benefits and risks? ‘What can be done to make better use of underutilized resources (such as hotels) while increasing the profitability of well-pattonized facilities? 5. Did Disney understand the regulatory and labor environments in France and in the BU? 6. What management structure and skill sets would you recommend to Bisner to implement and sustain a Euro Disney turnaround? 7. Should Disney enter into another market with a theme park? Why or why not? ‘Which market would you recommend and why? Disneyland Paris C ‘The initial restructuring and bailout plan proved beneficial over the next few years ‘but was difficult to sustain in light of new direct competition from European theme parks and aggressive measures by existing attractions such as Six Flags Europe. The ‘mid-1990s represented a continued recessionary period for Europe, which continued to affect real estate values, particularly in France. In order to remain competitive, Disneyland Paris continues to find itself caught between the need to expand with new properties and attractions and the need to live within a reasonable debt structure and investment profile. The importance of a “sccond gate” strategy was demonstrated with ‘the expansion of Disney attractions and entertainment destinations in the United States and Jepan. Length of stay and attendance increased when the destinations offered multiple attractions and hotels. In an attempt to raise cash, Euro Disney spokesman Tacques-Henri Eyraud stated the desire “to sell one or more hotels in order to ease debt burdens.” Difficulty selling hotels caused Euro Disney to reduce hotel room prices to stimulate higher occupancy rates. This strategy eventually scemed to pay off, 8 hotel occupancy rates climbed to 72 percent, higher than other hotels in France, which ‘were experiencing occupancy rates between 59 and 63 percent. In 1996, Euro Disney reported a net profit of $40 million for its FY, which ended September 30. While Dis- ney would not confirm, the profit gains seem to be driven by the hotel sector. Newly promoted Philippe Bourguignon, now Euro Disney's chief, attributed the strong results to efficient cost controls. By the late 1900s, Disneyland Paris was excited by the ben- efits expected from the formalization of the European Economic Union. As a unifiedpe peeennmenten 550 case P33 Euro Disney region consisting of 11 countries, easier border crossing and currency standardization were expected to bolster Disneyland Peris attendance. ‘The beginning of the new decade was troublesome for Disney. Eisner and Disney President Robert Iger did not receive bonuses in 2001, as the company posted a net loss of $158 million. This loss was the result of a failed dot-com venture, the clos- ing of several Disney retail stores, and theme park declines. Travel across the theme parks was down after the September 11 terrorist aitacks in New York City and sub- sequent terrorist acts in parts of Europe. Airline travel declined significantly during this time period, and the multiplier effect was felt throughout the interrelated indus- tries. While the industries were expected to rebound, these occurrences suppressed the robust growth desired and needed by Disneyland Paris, With the opening of Walt Disney Studios Park and convention centers outside of Paris, Buro Disney was hoping to increase performance by leveraging the successful Disney film equities and busi- ness sector. Industry analysts suggested Disney needed to develop new rides to better compete, Other speculations are thatthe two French-based Disney theme parks would cannibalize each other without unique offerings and entertainment experiences. Long term strategic plans reflected even more Disney France expansion, given the large amount of acreage owned by Faro Disney SCA. The land mass was larger than any other Disney property. Unofficial reports indicate potential investments of three new ‘major attractions to be unveiled between 2006 and 2008. To expand, though, Euro Disney would need another infusion of cash, investment, and strong partnerships. Par- cent company Disney's stake in Euro Disney was now down to 39 percent-from the initial 49 peroent. While top management at the Disney Company has made strides in improving its arrogant and culturally insensitive image, there was a lot of unrest within the internal ‘management ranks. Eisner was losing many of his soldiers to other top positions in lucrative entertainment venues, Preferring to remain anonymous, some of the former executives indicated there was not enough “room at the top” for them and Eisner, regardless of how much they contributed to the company’s growth, ‘Even with the management turmoil and coverage in the press regarding the need for ‘more objective governance among the Disney board, Eisner maintained his plans and ‘dreams to continue theme park global expansion. The opening of Hong Kong Disney jn 2005 was just one of these dreams come true. Forecasts for the venture in China were mixed, although Disney management was confident about the opportunity. The sheer size of the population, relaxed visa restrictions on mainland Chinese visiting Hong Kong, and the strong presales of Disney paraphernalia and tickets were offered as positive indicators for success. Pessimists cautioned that Hong Kong Disneyland may face similar cultural issues to Disneyland Paris. For example, popular American artists such as Britney Spears were not popular in Hong Kong. Other American icons such as KFC (Kentucky Fried Chicken) have expanded into Hong Kong, but have ‘amena which is 85 percent Chinese food. The ease with which Disney enters and thrives in this new environment, culture, and population, may not be as simple as Disney management believes. Disney Nods to Chinese Culture ‘The Hong Kong government has a 57 percent stake in the park. Based on the size of the property, Hong Kong Disneyland is posed to be the largest theme park of all of the Disney parks, overtaking Disneyland Paris in expansion potential. While a majority of the atiractions are based on the American themes and designs, Disney hired a Feng Shui expert to help in designing the park. The Hong Kong Disneyland Hotel does notReferences 551 have a fourth floor, as the number four sounds like the word for death in Chinese and is therefore considered unlucky. The hotel ballroom was designed to be 888 square ‘meters, because the number eight is @ lucky number. Main Street, 2 popular compo- nent of all Disney parks, bas 2 Chinese restaurant. Interestingly, many of the designs to incorporate the Chinese culture are not always immediately visible but are subtly incorporated into the park’s architecture. Discussion Questions 1. How should the Disney parks differentiate themselves from the competitive threat posed by the growing number of European amusement parks? 2. What target marketing strategy should be pursued in the face of the changing. ‘competitive environment? What branding strategy decisions are relevant? ‘How would you contrast the Euro Disney launch to the Hong Kong Disney- land launch? ‘5. Will Hong Kong Disneyland be successful? Why or why not? ‘6. What should be the decision criteria for expanding into additional theme parks ‘and attractions versus fortfying existing theme parks and attractions? 7 References Disney doesn’t rule out closure of Euro Disney. (3 January 1994). The Wall Street Journal (Eastern edition), Aé. Geofltey A. Fowler and, Merissa Marr, (16 June 2005). Disney's china play; its new hhong kong park is a big cultural experiment; will ‘main stret” translate? Wall Street Journal, pp. B.1-B.1. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/3990016207 accountid=13044, Haberman, C. (5 October 1986). Disneyland carves out a magic kingdom in hearts of Japanese (Final edition, C). Chicago Tribune [New York Times News Service, pre- 1997 full text}, 16. ‘Hamey, A. (18 August 2005). Magic for the middle kingdom. Financial Times ‘(Condon Ist edition), 19, Jefferson, D. J. (13 April 1992), Buro Disney opens with much hoopla and a train sirike—attendanee appeared low, but the crowds seemed pleased by attractions. The Wall Street Journal (Eastern edition), C1. Koranteng, J.(17 December 2001). Euro Disney preparing to unwrap $600 mil Walt Disney Studios Park. Amusement Business, 113(50), ABVINFORM Global, 12. Koranteng, J. (2005, January). Euro threesome gear up for °05. Amusement Business, LIQ), 10. Larsen, P. T. (13 February 2004). Star pupil takes aim at old school management ‘taining, Financial Times (London Ist edition), 26. Mahar, M. (20 June 1994), Not-so-magic kingdom. Barron's, 74(25), 29-34. ‘Meyer, M., & MeGuire, S. (5 September 1994), OF mice and men, Newsweek, 124(10), 40. Michaud, P. (6 December 1996). Euro Disney’s hotel sector drives company’s profits. Hotel and Motel Management, 211(21), 4.