Villarica, Maria Carina S.J.

Gumabon v Director of of the Bureau of Prisons case digest

Facts:
The petitioners were charge of complex crime of rebellion with murder
and other crimes and they were sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua,
they served for more than 13 years.
They are invoking their right of the writ of habeas corpus contending
the Hernadez doctrine. The petitioners also contend that each of them had
already served more than the maximum penalty that could have been
imposed upon them.
Issue: Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy
for the petitioners invoking the Hernandez doctrine
Held: Yes.
The court held that It being undeniable that if the Hernandez ruling
were to be given a retroactive effect petitioners had served the full term for
which they could have been legally committed, is habeas corpus the
appropriate remedy? The answer cannot be in doubt. As far back as 1910
the prevailing doctrine was announced in Cruz v. Director of Prisons. Thus:
"The courts uniformly hold that where a sentence imposes punishment in
excess of the power of the court to impose, such sentence is void as to the
excess, and some of the courts hold that the sentence is void in toto; but
the weight of authority sustains the proposition that such a sentence is void
only as to the excess imposed in case the parts are separable, the rule
being that the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas
corpus unless he has served out so much of the sentence as was
valid." There is a reiteration of such a principle in Director v. Director of
Prisons where it was explicitly announced by this Court "that the only means
of giving retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused ...
is the writ of habeas corpus." While the above decision speaks of a trial
judge losing jurisdiction over the case, insofar as the remedy of habeas
corpus is concerned, the emphatic affirmation that it is the only means of
benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of a favorable decision
holds true. Petitioners clearly have thus successfully sustained the burden of
justifying their release.

The court granted their petition for habeas corpus and they ordered
the release of the petitioners.