Vivarium

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15
1977

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VIVARIUM

AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
FOR THE
PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE
MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE

VOLUME XV 1977

$J%

E. J. BRILL - LEIDEN

23:22:00 PM

VIVARIUM
AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE
AGES AND RENAISSANCE

editors

advisory
committee
publishers
published

vivariumis devotedin particularto the profane side of

and theintellectual
lifeoftheMiddle
mediaevalphilosophy
Ages and Renaissance.
C. J. de Vogel,(Utrecht)- L. M. de Rijk,(Leyden)- H. A.
- J.
G. Braakhuis,(Nijmegen)- F. F. Blok,(Amsterdam)
IJsewijn,(Louvain).
oftheEditorialBoard: Prof.L. M. de Rijk.
Secretary
All communications,
exceptthoseofa businessnature,should
be addressedto C. H. Kneepkens,KatholiekeUniversiteit,
Erasmuslaan40, 8.26,Nijmegen,The Netherlands.
- Tullio Gregory,
Marie-Therse
d'AJverny,
(Paris-Poitiers)
(NewYork)- JanPinborg,
(Rome)- Paul OskarKristeller,
- AlbertZimmermann,
(Cologne).
(Copenhagen)
E. J. Brill,Leiden,The Netherlands.
Twiceyearly,MayandNovember;ca 160pagesyearly.
submittedto vivarium should preferably
Contributions
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and doublespaced,exceptforlong
shouldbe typewritten
Adequatemargins(1inch)should
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be placedeitherat thefootofthepage or at theend ofthe
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freeof charge.
receive25 off-prints
Contributors

23:22:00 PM

CONTENTS OF VOLUME XV (1977)

. . KNEEPKENS
Nijmegen

The Relatio simplex in theGrammatical

Tracts of the Late Twelfthand Early
Thirteenth
Century

L. a. Kennedy
Windsor,Ontario

The Soul's Knowledgeof Itself: An unto St. Thomas

published Work attributed

Aquinas

31

E. p. bos
Leiden

An Unedited Sophism by Marsilius of

'
*
Inghen: Homo est bos

46

E. j. ASHWORTH
Waterloo, Ontario

Chimeras and Imaginary Objects: A

Study in the Post-Medieval Theory of
Signification

57

L. m. de rij
Leiden

On Ancient and Mediaeval Semantics

and Metaphysics

81

h. a. G. BRAAKHUis

The Views of William of Sherwoodon

Some Semantical Topics and Their
Relation to Those ofRogerBacon ...
hi

Nijmegen
arpad p. ORBN
Utrecht

Anonymi Teutonici commentum in

Theodoli eclogame codice Utrecht
, U.B.
editum
22
(5)

book review

143
159

23:22:00 PM

VivariumXV, i (1977)
The Relatio simplex in the Grammatical Tracts of the Late
*
Twelfth and Early Thirteenth Century

C. H. KNEEPKENS

I. Introduction
several thirteenthcentury treatises on syntax there appears a
In fairlyelaborate and systematized doctrine concerningthe relatio
and the relative nouns and pronouns.1An importantpart of the
discussion on this subject was devoted to the distinctionbetween the
relatiopersonalis and the relatiosimplex, and to the various types of
the latter. The grammariansof that period spoke of a relatiopersonalis,
when the antecedent and its relative supposited forthe same appellatum, and of a relatiosimplex, when the antecedent and its relative did
not supposit forthe same appellatum.
However, the originand the early developmentof the relatiosimplex,
and consequentlythe distinctionin the relatiobetweenrelatiopersonalis
and simplex, must not be looked for in the writingsof grammarians.
Certain rules in connectionwith the proper use of the relatives in the
proposition the logicians of the early twelfthcentury found in Priscian's Institutionesgrammaticae,compelled them to adapt an improper,
but figurativelinguistic usage, the relatio indifferensor simplex, in
their discussions, esp. on universais. They were used to illustrating
this kind of relatiowith the example ' mulierquae damnavit, salvavi ,
in whichthe antecedentand the relative each denote a different
person,
viz. Eve and Mary, but the relative refersto the antecedent in its
connotative or general meaning.2
The grammariansof that period did not pay much attentionto this
* I wishto expressmythanksto Prof.L. M. de
Rijkand Mr.H. A. G. Braakhuis
fortheirusefulcomments
and criticisms.
I am also indebtedto MrsDeborah
Gil and to Mr E. Kellermanwho wereso kindas to read the paper and to
correcttheoffences
I committed
againstEnglishgrammar.
1 For a morecomprehensive
discussionofthenotionoftherelatiosimplexand
itsfirststageofdevelopment,
see mypaper"MulierQuaeDamnavit,Salvavi*:
A Noteon theEarly Development
of theRelatiosimplex,in: Vivarium,XIV
1-25.
(1976),
pp.
2 Cf." MulierQuae", p. 4.
I

23:22:11 PM

distinctionin the relatio, which was, in fact,based upon semantic considerations. Generally, they accepted only the relatio personalis.3 In
the third quarter of the twelfthcenturythe attitude of the grammarians to the relatiosimplex altered drastically,and in several grammatical writings of that time we find it used rather frequently.This
interestresulted in the incorporationof this semantic distinctioninto
the doctrineof the relatives and the relatioin general,that formed,in
its turn, a part of their doctrine concerningsyntax.
In the presentpaper I shall discuss some of the texts that are exemplary with respect to this stage of developmentof the relatiosimplex.
II. The Grammatical Treatises of the Late Twelfth and Early
Thirteenth Century
'
'
A. The Glose Promisimus
In the Glose 'Promisimus', a reportatioon the Priscianus maior,
, Bodl.
dating from the 1170s and preserved only in the MS Oxford
Laud . lat. 67,4 the glossator makes frequentuse of the notion of the
relatiosimplexin orderto explain the meaningof Priscian's statements,
but he does not deal with the distinctionbetween the relatiosimplex
and the relatio personalis in a systematic way. So we have to piece
togetherhis view of it fromseveral parts of the gloss.
The glossatorspeaks of a relatiopersonalis, when the antecedentand
its relative both stand forthe same thing {de eodem)tand in that case
there is a correct grammatical usage, as can be gathered from the
followingstatements:
[f.23rb]'Marcus,idestTullius . . . sed nota quod relatiofactaperid non
est personalis;cum enimper nomenagiturde re,perrelatiuumagiturde
ipso nomine'.
[f.86va]'Licet enimper hoc relatiuumqui et eius antecedensnumquam
proprie agaturniside eodem.. .'.
The relatiosimplex stands in opposition to the relatiopersonalis, and
is actually not a real relatio:
[f. 35vb]'Et ideo dicimusquod ibi est simplexrelatio,sicut 'mulierque
saluaui. Et simplexrelationonest relatio,sicutmeusintrindampnauit,
secusestprimepersone,nontarnenestprimepersone'.
3 Ibid.,pp. 12-15and p. 18.
4 Fora description
oftheGlose
oftheMS, and forthecontents
, see R. W. Hunt,
II. TheSchoolofRalphofBeauvats,
Studieson Priscianin theTwelfth
Century,
in: Mediaevaland RenaissanceStudies,II (i95)> PP- I"56>esp-PP- 1 S(l->
A Contribution
totheHistoryofEarly
and L. M. de Rij, LogicaModernorum.
1
Terminisi
II,
,
255-262.
1967),
pp.
(Assen
Logic
2

23:22:11 PM

The glossatorspeaks of this kind of relatio,when the auctoreslet the

antecedent and its relative stand fordiverse things.This always takes
place translative:
[f.86va]'Tamenaliquandoapud auctoresperilia (sc.perhocrelatiuum
qui
et eiusantecedens)
ut in OuidiiFastonim
de diuersisagitar,sed translatiue,
'ex ueropositumpermansit
, que deuse campoprospicit
Equirrianomen
ipse
suo' (Ov.,Fast. II, 859-60)'.
The differencein acceptance between the antecedent and its relative
in one and the same propositioncan be furtherdiversified:
1. The relative and its antecedent each stand fora differentthing(res)
of the same maneries:
[f. 27ra]'Sed nimisest simplexista relatio.Nam cum aliis simplicibus
relationibus
per relatiuumagaturde rebus eiusdemmanerieisaltemde
saluaui et item'quas
quibus per antecedens,ut 'mulierque dampnauit,
Boreespiritusaufertleuis recreat(/) Zephirusfrondes'(Both.,Cons. I,
M. 5. 20.)'.
2. The relative refersin alia significationeto its antecedent:
autem ipsa prc>nuntiatiopropter
[f. 27ra]'potestas (sc. litterarum)
quamet figure et nominafacta sunt ( = Priscian,I, 8). Nonmutantur.
Sed nimisest simplexrelatio. . . Hic non sic; sed cum pronuntiatio
pro
modo pronunciandi
accipiatur,hoc relatiuumquam in alia significatione
ad eum refertur,
scilicetin qua accipiturpro ipso pronunciato,
idestelemento1
.
[f.39vb]'quamquamdixi quod F est muta quamuisantiqui romanorum
etc. EAM(= Priscian,I, 46),id esthancfiguram
F primm
uau representaba^ Et est simplexrelatio,cumpriusF acciperetur
proutrepresentat
ph,
quod
quidemdixit.Per earnueroreferatur
uau, sicut
proutrepresentauit
'manus
clauis confixesunt',per manuscorporales
mee,que uos fecerunt,
manusintelliguntur,
perquespirituales'.
3. The antecedent stands for the res, and the relative stands for the
:
noun, i.e. is accepted materialiter
[f.23rb]'Marcus,id est Tullius. . . sed nota quod relatiofactaperid non
estpersonalis.Cumenimpernomenagaturde re,perrelatiuum
agiturde
'
ipsonomine.Quod patetin hocexemploalba, id estcandida'. Si id referret
resilliusdictionisad quamrefertur,
potiusdeberetponiin pluraliquam in
singulari.Sed refertnomenet non res. Est enimsensus:Alba, id nomen
candida*.
significat
4. The antecedent stands for the noun itself (materialiter),and the
relative forthe res of the antecedent:
[f. 23rb]'...id nomensignificatcandida. Et simileinuenitur'ex uero
positumpermansit
Equirrianomen,que deus e campoprospicitipse suo
(Ov.,Fast. II, 859-60): perqueagiturde resui antecedentis,
perantecedens
uerode ipso nomine'.
3

23:22:11 PM

5- The relative and the antecedent both stand forthe same maneries:
[f. 48rb]'Magistersic legitnomenest pars orationis que unicuique
nec ponitur
(= Priscian,II, 22), ut que simplicemfaciat relationem
" ;
"
m, sicutdicitur'hocnomen Socrates estpars
propteraliquodnominatori!
. Non dico sinehacparteorationis
oratio'
orationis
sinequa nonestperfecta
scilicetsinenomine
"Socrates"
, sedsineillaparteorationis
que ipsumest,
'
sed aliterest in hac 'pars orationis
quod
que unicuiquepropterrelatiuum,
nonproaliquo appellatorum
ponitur,sed promanerie'.6
[f.24'b] 'littera est minimauox, id est minoromnibusuocibuslitteratis
sed simplicem
relationem
aliis a se. Dicimusquod se nonfacitpersonalem,
ad maneriem,
scilicetestminor[f.24]omnibusuocibuslitteraet refertur
tis aliisa se, id est a littera'.
relatio,
[f. 29vb]'qua caret aspiratio (= Priscian,I, 16). Simplexest
ait 'qui in eis nullusest' (Priscian,
tractansde articulis
sicutalibiPriscianus
XII, 26); perqui fitsimplexrelatioad hocnomensensus'e
B. RobertBlund
In the Summa in arte gramatica,preservedonly in the MS London,
BM Royal, 2 D XXX,1 ff.79ra-94vband I03ra-i06vb, by the English
master Robert Blund, who flourishedin the last quarter of the twelfth
century,8we finda systematictreatmentof the relatioand the relatives
in five chapters:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

De
De
De
De
De

relativis(f. 8gva)
constructionrelativorum(f. gorb)
hoc pronomine'sui* (f. 90va)
relativisnominbus(f. 9irb)
relativisjyroj>rietatum
(f. 92ra_b).

6 Cf.De Rijk,LogicaMod. II, 1, p. 256. The relativequeheremakesa simplex

*
ofthemaneries
,
becauseit doesnotreferto an appellatum
parsorationis'
relatio,
In
De Rij's
itself.
maneries
the
for
but to parsorationis
consequence,
standing
thegrammarians
used to
no 8 on p. 528 needsa partialcorrection:
Statement
or
a
clause
of
relative
case
in
the
relatio
a
of
(co-ordinate
only
simplex
speak
As maybe concludedfromRobertBlund'sstatement(cf.below,
subordinate).
'
p. 20) in the case of homoestspecies',theywouldhave spokenofa suppositio
thistype
the
simplex.In fact, ' exampleRobertadducesherein orderto illustrate
is homoest dignssimacreatura'
of supposition,
, the same as we findin the
A Contribution
Fallacie parvipontane
(ed. L. M. de Rijk, LogicaModernorum.
totheHistoryofEarly Terminist
Logic,I (Assen1962),p. 56222)as an example
ofthesecondkindofunivocation.
For the insertion
of thisrelatiosimplexin this category,cf. below,pp. 17
and 2.
7 For a detaileddescription
oftheMS, see De Rijk,LogicaMod. II, 1,pp. 22-5.
8 Thequestionoftheidentity
treatedbyDe Rijk,
ofRobertBlundis extensively
listedtherea noteon a Master
LogicaMod. II, 1, pp. 255-257;to theliterature
,
Abbey
RobertBlundby A. B. Emdenin hisDonorsofBookstoS. Augustine's
OxfordBibliographicalSociety. Occasional Publicationno. 4,
Canterbury,
Oxford1968,p. 21, can be added.
4

23:22:11 PM

In order not to go beyond the scope of this paper, I will limit my

remarksto the firstchapter,De relativis.9 This is subdivided into three
sections:
1. De relatione{Quid sit relatio?, f. 89)
2. De speciebusrelationis(<Que species relationis?, f. 89va)
3. De varietatibusrelativorum(f. 8gvb).
AD i : De relatione.In this section Master Robert starts with the
'
definitionof relatiotaken fromPriscian, XII, 16: Relatio est antelate
and not with the one which often occurs in
cognitionisrepresentation
'
later tracts: Relatio estantelaterei representation10
Since, however,this
definitiondoes not hold forall kinds of relationes, Robert proposes to
'
define relatio as follows: Relatio nil aliud est quam secunda cognitio'.
Next therefollowsa discussionon the meaning of the adjective secunda
in this definition,wherebysecunda is explained with the phrase 'quasi
secundaria, id est socialis et exigitiuaconsortii'
AD 2 ' De speciebusrelationis.There are three main divisions of the
relatiointo species given by Robert:
*
{ ecleptica:'qui legit,disputt
i. relatio<
'

'Socratescurrit
et
non-ecleptica'Socratescurrit,
qui disputtor
'
si
ve
absoluta
(
ipse
disputt
'
siveinvoluta:'idemestgramaticum
et musicum
/
currit
'Socrates,
' qui
I coniuncta:disputt
I
'Socratescurrit,
qui
disputt'
]
, intrasumpta
'
'Socratesuidetse*
[
J
i
1 disiuncta
:
' Socrates
1
utipse
studet,
J
explicitasive'
proficia
I
inplicita
evoluta
I
/ coniuncta
:
'si Socratescurrit,
'
1
' (= inmediata)ipsemouetur
<
extrasumpta
/ disiuncta
:
'Socratescurrit
et
'
^
I personalis
(= mediata) ipsemouetur
3. relatio
( simplex
For thetext,see AppendixA.
10E.g. in the worksofMasterPonciusand of Peterde Isolellis,in theSumme
Metenses(cf.De Rijk,LogicaMod. II, i, p. 480),or withthevariantrecordatio
in PeterofSpain's Tractatus
(ed. De Rijk,Assen1972,p. 185),and in Lambert
ofAuxerre'sLogica(ed. F. Alessio,Firenze1971,p. 235).
S

23:22:11 PM

Robert speaks of a relatiopersonalis,when the antecedent and the

relative both stand for the same appellatum,and of a relatiosimplex,
when they do not. The relatiosimplexis subdivided into seven species:
1. The antecedent and its relative both stand fordifferent
appellata of
inuenit
dialeticam',
the same maneries,e.g. 'homoinuenitlitter
as, qui
'
dum
mulierque damnauit, saluaui } 'Bor
quas spiritusaufert,mitis
;
Zefirusreuehatfrondes*
2. The antecedent and its relative both stand for the maneries, e.g.
'
homo est dignssima creatura, cui soli competituti ratione';
3. The antecedent stands for the maneries, and the relative for an
appellatum of that maneries, e.g. 'homo est dignssimacreatura, qui
'
as , serpens est callidissimumanimalium, qui uenit ad
inuenit litter
mulierem';
4. The antecedent stands for an appellatum, and the relative for the
'
maneries; e.g. homoinuenit litter
as, qui est dignssima creatura;
the
res
for
stands
antecedent
The
(= appellatum), and the relative
5.
'
for the noun itself (materialiter)
, e.g. homo est Socrates,
nomenappellatiuum';
6. The antecedent stands for the noun itself { materialiter
), and the
Socrates';
relative forthe res, e.g. 'homoestnomen, 5m [quod MS]
used
are
relative
equivoce, e.g. 'cams
7. The antecedent and its
'
latrabile, qui etiam est ceruleus', manus mee clauis confixesunt, gw
wosfecerun.
The subdivisionof the relatiosimAD 3: De varietatibusrelativorum.
the
,
plex is followed by a list of the sixteen varietatesrelativorum
sixteenmain combinationsthat can occur in a r^a^'o-proposition.They
are derived fromthe fourways of acceptance of a noun in a relatio:
1.
2.
3.
4.

ad agendum de manerie
ad agendum de re = de appellato
ad agendum de nomine
nuncupative.

So when the antecedent stands for the maneries, the relative can
stand forthat maneries, or a rss of that maneries, or the noun [materialiter),or can be used nuncupative,etc. Apart fromthese sixteen varieties, there are also nine derived varieties:
When the antecedent stands for a res, the relative can stand for:
I. a. res eadem, e.g. 'homoest Marcus, qui est Tullius
6

23:22:11 PM

'
b. res alia terminoretentoin eadem significatione,e.g. mulierque
damnauit,saluaui ;
'
c. res alia in alia significatione,e.g. canis hic latrai, qui etiamnatat
in mari ;
'
2. a. maneries eadem, e.g. homoest Socrates, gw s dignssimacreawra';
'
habundat in
b. maneries in equivoco, e.g. canis hic latrai,
'
mari ;
Socrates, g'wo[qui MS] deriuaturab
3. a. nomen idem, e.g.
humo*;
b. synonymumeius nominis,e.g. 'owo Socrates, quod apud Gre'
cos est nomencommune;
uocatur*
.
4. a. nuncupative, e.g. 4'stes Socrates,
When the antecedent stands for a maneries, the relative can stand
for:
1. a. maneries eadem, e.g. 'Aowo
dignssima creatura, parent
ceteraanimando! ;
b. maneries in equivoco, e.g. (canis est amicissimum animal, qui
*
etiam habundatin mareBritannico ;
2. a. res eiusdem maneriei, e.g. lhomoest dignssima creatura,
Socrates
b. res in equivoco, e.g. 'cam's habundatin mari, qui etiamhic latra;
3. a. nomen idem, e.g. 'Aowo dignssimacreatura, gwaderiuaturab
'
humo ;
b. synonymumeius nominis,e.g. 'owo
dignssimacreatura, quod
est
nomen
commune*
Grecos
<
>
;
apud
4. a. nuncupative, e.g. '
dignssima creatura, g^o animal
rationalecensetur'.
When the antecedent stands for the noun itself (materialiter)
, the
relative can stand for:
1. a. nomen idem, e.g. 'Aowo
nomenappellatiuum, gwo deriuatur
'
ab humo ;
b. synonymum eius nominis, e.g. 'homo est nomen appellatiuum,
Grecosest <nomen> commune*
'
gw
2. a. res, e.g. ' Aowo s nomenappellatiuum, s Socrates*;
3. a. maneries, e.g. 'homo est nomenappellatiuum,
dignssima
*
creatura;
'
4. a. nuncupative, e.g. Socratesest nomenproprium, gm iste uoeatur'
7

23:22:11 PM

When the antecedent stands nuncupative, the relative can stand for:
1. a. nuncupative, e.g. 'iste uocaturSocrates, qui et Ule uocatur';
2. a. res, e.g. 4'steuocaturSocrates, w >ss'; 11
'
3. a. maneries, e.g. animal rationaleuocatur homo, s dignssima
'
creatura;
a.
s nomen pronomen idem, e.g. 'iste uocatur Socrates,
4.
prium*;
'
b. synonymumeius, e.g. animal rationaleuocaturhomo, quod apud
'
Grecosest nomencommune
So there are 25 varieties, and in only two of them is the relatio
personalis found: when the antecedent and its relative both stand for
the same res, and when the antecedent and its relative both stand for
the same nomen.In the other 23 cases we have a relatiosimplex. But
this numbercan be enlarged,accordingto Master Robert; and he gives
'
an example taken fromthe Gospel of St. John: "diabolus est mendax
et pater eius",12 id est mendacii' where the relative eius refersto the
noun mendacium, implied in the adjective mendax. This kind of relatio
simplex will be called in later tracts 'ad agendumde appellato nominis
.13
coniugaticum suo antecedente*
Master Robert ends this section with the remark that as there are
14 and relationes
demonstrationes
simplices,there are also appositiones
simplices, e.g. 'tuncflos Hesperie, Latii nunc sola iuuentus concidi' ;15
terras;16
adiectionessimplices, e.g. 'mundus globatusetc. circumcurrens
11The readingoftheMS is uocatur
.
12Joh. 8, 44. Note Robert'sexpression:'nontarnen
inpossibleestalias inuenire*
, see below,p. 20.
13See below,p. 22.
14Abailardmadethesamekindsofobservation
withregardto thedemonstracf.mypaper "MulierQuae", p. 6. On f. 86vb,Robertmakesa
tivepronouns,
: 'Demonstrationum
betweenthedemonstratio
distinction
simplexand personalis
de qua
alia personalis,
alia simplex.Personalisest quandoea resdemonstratur
et de manerie
demonstratur
agitur.Simplexdiciturquando aliquidspecialiter
albedinemSocratisdicatur'hie colorestin Platone
agitur,ut demonstrando
Rome' et aliuddemonstratur
'hecherbauenditur
color.Similiter
id esthuiusmodi
et hic 'qui super
manerie.
de
Similiter
et
de
alio
res
agiturquia
quia
specialiter,
fitper hoc pronomen
te pedibusambulaui.Cum personalisdemonstratio
ego
et personaliset simplexperhoc pronomen
tu,magistamenidoneefitsimplex
terciepersone'.
demonstratio
pronomine
16Lucan.,Phars.II, 196-7.
ie Cf. Mart. Cap., VIII, par. 814 (ed. Dick, p. 43o12*15):
'mundusigiturex
is the
isdemquetotisin sphaeraemodumglobatur[globatus
quattuorelementis
;
variantreadingin the MSS traditionA L R1 b and in the editioprinceps)
terramin medioimoquedefixamaeterniscaeliraptibuscircumcurrens
quadam
rationediscrimint'.
8

23:22:11 PM

comparationessimplices, e.g. 'NerineGalatheathimomichidulcioryble ;17

and suppositionessimplices.This does not mean the (logical) suppositio
'
simplex of the type homo est dignissima creatura', where per nomen
, but the suppositiosimplexthat runs like
agiturde aliquo indeterminate
the relatiosimplex, and that can only be explained by means of a relatio
'"
", id estfiunt
simplex, e.g. the word dies in the example dies crescunt
maioresquam ipsi fuerint, quam ipsif id est quam dies'. And the appositio,adiectioand comparatiosimplexmust be understoodin the way.18
In the section De relativisproprietatumi
Robert Blund deals with the
relatiosimplexagain. He denies that the relativaproprietatum
can cause
a relatiopersonalis, since in a relatioby a relativumproprietatisthere
always is a transitusad appellationemalteriuspersoneet ad aliam qualitatem.Therefore,in the case of a relatioby a relativumproprietatiswe
always have a relatiosimplex.1*
C. An AnonymousSUMMA DE RELATIVIS
Closelyrelated to the text of Robert Blund is the anonymousSumma
de relativis, preservedin the MS Bern, Bong5x9, ff.i3r-i39v (formerly
a part ofthe MS St.-Victor,Paris, JJJ17).20The Summa must be dated
17Verg.,. VII, 37.
" the
18Add to these"simplices
reciprocatio
simplex:f. 9ovb'Reciproceponitur
et in personali.In personaliquando
dupliciter:in simplicireciprocatione
prorsuseadem personasignificatur
agens et paciens. In simpliciponitur,ut'
'
ut "inperterritus"
apud Priscianuminueniturprepositiosibi preponitur,
XIII, 7). Alitertarnensuperhocquandoquedicebamushiepronomen
(Priscian,
ibi poniin simplicitransitione
does notstandin opposi(N.B. simplextransitio
tion to personalistransitio,
but to reciprocatio)
, censentes,ut esset sensus:
sibi,id estalii prepositioni.
Prepositio
preponitur
Quia tarnenhocnonexprimit
ilia locutio,prioriut potioriadheremus
ut aliqua reciprocatio
sentencie,
simplex
dicaturquemadmodumet aliqua demonstratio
et aliqua relatio,ut supra
diximus,simplexest. Et earnsimplicemdicimus,quia non transitab eadem
sibi' quam 'prepositio
specie.Nonenimaliudest'prepositio
preponitur
preponitur
'
prepositioni
19MS f. 92rb:'Relatiuaproprietatum
et cum
semperad appellatiuareferuntur
eis idem significant
nec transitmappellationisexcludunt,ut cum dicitur
'Socratesest albus et talis estPlato', idemintelligitur
ac si diceretur'Socrates
estalbuset Plato estalbus' et ipsa transitm
appellationisnon excludunt.Fit
enimtransitus
ad appellationem
alteriuspersone,
sedetiamad aliamqualitatem.
Vnde nobis uideturquod semperrelatiuaproprietatum
simplicemfaciunt
relationem'.
20For a description
ofthewholeMS, see H. Hagen,Cataloguscodicum
Bernensium,Bern1875,pp. 433-437;a detaileddescription
ofthepartoftheMS that
interalia containsthis Summa,and its historyare given by E. Pellegrin,
Manuscrits
de Vabbayede Saint-Victor
etd'ancienscollgesde Paris la BiblioVaticaneet Paris, BEC, 103
thquemunicipalede Berne, la Bibliothque
de
(I942) PP- 69-98,esp. pp. 76-79,and E. Pellegrin,Essai d'identification
9

23:22:11 PM

after Robert Blund, but earlier than the tracts edited by Fierville.21
Since it refersseveral times to the views held by Robert Blund, here
called R. Lincolniensis,whose Summa can only be traced in England,
we may suggest an English originfor this Summa, too.22
The composition of this Summa is looser than Robert Bluns. It
startswith a general expositionon the relatio, and gives as a definition:
'
Relatio est antelatesignificationisrefietitio'ascribed to Priscian. Next
Robert's observationsare repeated, i.e. the need foranotherdefinition:
'Relatio nichil aliud est
', and the meaning of
quam secunda cognitio
secunda in the latter definition.The author goes on to the second part,
De speciebusrelationistquite abruptly,and gives the followingscheme:
l implicitasiveinvoluta(= intrinseca)
relatio<
personalis
<
( explicitasive evoluta(= extrnseca)
( simplex
The author speaks of a relatiopersonalis, when the antecedent and
its relative both stand for the same appellatum,or both for the same
noun (materialiter)
, and of a relatiosimplexin the other cases. A subdivision of the relatiosimplexis made into the relatiosimplexper relativum substantiaeand the relatiosimplex per relativtimproprietatis.
The relationessimplicesper relativumsubstantiaeare dealt with first,
and here we, in fact, get the third section of Robert's chapter De
relativis,viz. De varietatibusrelativorum.The author says that a word
can be used in three differentusages in a proposition:
1. ad agendum de re sive de appellato proprie
2. ad agendum de manerie
3. ad agendum de nomine.
Master R. Lincolniensis,he argues, adds a fourthusage, viz. when a
word is used nuncupative, but this seems to him to be quite different.
When the antecedent stands forthe res (= appellatum)tthe relative
can be used in eight ways according to the author, in orderto cause a
relatiosimplex, but in fact he lists ten ways: the nrs 1. b., 1. c.; 2. a.,
2. b. ; 3. a., 3. b. ; and 4. a. already dealt with by Robert Blund in his
deBerneetde Paris, in:
desbibliothques
dansdesmanuscrits
disperss
fragments
de l'Institutde Rechercheset d'Histoiredes Textes,
Bulletind'information
no 9 (i960), pp. 24-25.
21Cf. Unegrammaire
Pans 1886,
latineinditedu XIIIe sicle
, d. Ch. Fierville,
pp. 60-69and pp. 186-190.For thetextoftheSumma,see Appendix.
22Cf.De Rijk,LogicaMod. II, i, p. 257.
IO

23:22:11 PM

section about the varietatibusrelativorum.To these seven kinds, three

othersare added:
1. the kind already mentionedin Robert Blund's Summa: ad agendum
'
de appellato nominisconiugati,23e.g. diabolus est mendaxcuius ipse
'
est pater ;
2. the relative stands for the res that is only secondarilysignifiedby
the antecedent, e.g. ' non mea scripta legant, qui sum sumotus ad
Istrum';24
3. a relativumsubstantiaeis used in stead of a relativumqualitatis, e.g.
'
nos genus ignauum quod tectogaudet et umbra'25
For those cases in which the antecedent stands forthe maneries,the
same possibilitiesforthe relative are listed as in Robert's Summa. The
same holds for the cases in which the antecedent is used materialiter
positum, with the exception that unlike the author's own statementin
the section on the relatiopersonalis, mentionedabove, in the proposition wherethe antecedentand its relative both stand forthe same noun
{materialiter
), here a relatiosimplex is said to occur. The five ways in
which,accordingto Robert Blund, the antecedentis used nuncupative,
are then appended.
Next there followsa discussion on a few cases where the relativum
substantiaedoes not referto a single word, but to a clause. This is
followedby a section where the question what the relative qui refers
to in the example 'ego sum dignus qui regam rem publicam , is dealt
with as well as a number of other questions of the same kind.
The section on the relativaproprietatumstarts with the division of
the relativaproprietatuminto:
1.
2.
3.
4.

relativa qualitatis :
relativa quan titatis :
relativa numeri
:
:
relativa ordinis

quahs talis
quantus tantus
quot tot
quotus totus.

Whereas the relativa substantiaehave the function of referringto

substantive nouns or words used substantially, the relativaproprietatumin their turn referto adjectival nouns or words used adjectivally
in the proposition.Like Robert Blund, the author of the Summa states
that the relativaproprietatumcause a relatiosimplex:26In the proposi23See above,p. 8.
24Cf.Ov., E.P. 3, 4, 91.
25luv. 7, 105
26Cf.above,p. 9, n. 19.
II

23:22:11 PM

'
tion Socrates est albus; talis est Plato*, the predicate term albus has a
double function: it denotes (.significai, id est appellai) the substance,
and it links (:significai, id est copulat) the quality [albedo). The whiteness of Socrates, however, is not identical to the whitenessof Plato,
but the same in specie. So the antecedent and its relativelink the same
in specie quality to differentpersons. Thereforewe have to speak of
a relatiosimplex.And the same holds for the other kinds of the relativa
. The Master of the Summa mentions one exception,howproprietatum
ever: when the antecedent and its relative both concern the same
'
persona. In fact this happens only in propositionsof the type Socrates
estalbus ettalis dicituresse*. Here we have a relatiopersonalis, according
to the author.
The discussion of the relationesper nomina relativais followedby the
section about the pronominalisrelatio, to which the author applies the
same procedure as to the nominalis relatio: First a discussionof the
pronoun and the pronominalisrelatioin general,and next of its species.
The relationespronominalisare divided into the relatiopersonalisand
the relatiosimplex. The author speaks of a relatiopersonalis, when the
antecedent and its relative both stand for the same person [persona),
or when they both stand forthe same word [materialiter).The discussion of the relatio simplex is not so extensive here as in the section
about the nominalis relatio.The author only lists the followingcases:
1. when the antecedentstands forthe maneriesor its own significatum
,
and the relative pronoun forthe same maneriesor significatum
, e.g.
*
'
substantiaest quiddam et ipsa est genus ;27
'
2. when the relative pronounstands fora celatumqualitatis, e.g. nescio
'
quid sit amans, at tamenillud eram,28id est illius modi ;
3. a. when the antecedent stands for an appellatumtand the relative
, e.g. fuideoAnchipronounstands forthe word itself[materialiter)
sidemtid est Eneam' ;
b. when the relativepronounrefersmaterialiterto a clause significa*
tivepositat e.g. troposneten,29id est homoueni .
'

Next the author discusses questions about constructionsof the type

Socrates uel Plato curritet ipse mouetur
', and makes a remark on the

27IsagogePorphyrii,
Aristoteles
Boethii,ed. L. Minio-Paluello,
4. 22 (Translatio
Latinus, I 6-7,Bruges-Paris
1966,p. Q19).
28Cf.Ov., Her. ii, 32.
29v0p)7ro<;
S^9ev12

23:22:11 PM

demonstratiosimplex and the adiectio simplex, but he leaves the investigationsinto them to a diligensingenium'He ends the Summa with
a listingof the adverbiarelativa.
The attention the grammariansof the late twelfthcenturypaid to
the relatiot fits well into the general pattern of a growinginterestin
syntax since the middle of that century,an interestthat resultedinter
alia in a numberof treatisesespecially devoted to syntax (e.g. Robert
Blund's Summa in artegramatica, the Summa of Master R., quoted by
Master Hugutio,30and Master Hugutio's Summa itself,Peter of Spain
'
31
{non-papa)'s Absolutacuiuslibet and Master Nicolaus De grammatica
etde omnigenereconstructionum
.32)The relatiosimplexis now integrated
in considerationson the relatio, the relatives and their application in
the proposition.
The view that the relatiosimplex, in oppositionto the relatiopersonalis, owes its originto an improperlinguisticusage, which means that
it is a figura (cf.The Glose 'Promisimus't Robert Blund, and the author
of the Summa de relativis),33is still retained. But an importantchange
with respect to the previous period exists in the fact that the distinction relatiosimplex- personalis is not yet considered as an apt tool in
the discussions on the universalia, but that it has been transferredto
the fieldof the newly developed theoriesof meaning, the result of the
interactionof grammarand logic duringthe twelfthcentury: Equivocation and univocation, the distinctionin the meaning of a common
noun betweenthe significatioand the appellatio, the meaningof a noun
in the proposition34have become constructivefeaturesin the grammatical doctrine about the relatiosimplex. This does not mean that the
30For thesemastersand theiractivities,see M. Grabmann,Mittelalterliches
Geistesleben
I, Mnchen1926,pp. iio-iii, andL. M. de Rijk,SomeNewEvidence
on Twelfth
in:
CenturyLogic: Albericand theSchoolof Mont Ste Genevive,
IV (1966),pp. 1-57,esp. pp. 18-19.
Vivarium,
31Cf. R. W. Hunt, Absoluta.The Summaof PetrusHispanus on Priscianus
minor
II (1975),pp. 1-23.
, in: Historiographia
Linguistica,
32Thistractis preserved
in twoMSS (Douai,.. 52 and Valenciennes,
..
der Sprachtheorie
im Mittelalter,
Bei397)> *- J- Pinborg,Die Entwicklung
trge.. XLII, 2, Miinsteii. W. 1967,pp. 329 and 336 (C 6).
33See for the Glose above,p. 2, forRobert Blund's Summa below, 19:
p.
'et hic etiamduplexintercidit
et figuraquod
figura,figurascilicetrelationis,
hoc nomencanis poniturpro eius sinonimo',and forthe Summade relativis
below,p. 29: 'cauendumautemin talibusne extendatur
figura'.
34Cf.above,pp. 6, 10. For the development
of the theoryof meaningin the
twelfth
century,see De Rijk, Logica Mod. II, 1, and J. Pinborg,Logikund
Semantik
im Mittelalter.
Ein berblick,
Stuttgart
1972,pp. 43-76.
I

23:22:11 PM

grammarianssimply adopted here the theoriesof meaning as they occur in the tracts of early Terministlogic. Their point of departure in
this respect remained the relatio propria = personalis,and their criteria were either that both extremes of the relatio must,denote the
same appellatum (= res = persona) or the same word, notwithstanding the general acceptance that in the latter case we are also dealing
. So one would feel
with a translatio,viz. the translatiogrammaticorum
inclined to admit that in each case where the extremesof a relatiodenote the same (thing), the medieval grammarianused to speak of a
relatio personalis. But there appears to be an important exception:
When the extremesdenote the same maneries,they counted it as part
of relatiosimplex.
An innovation that obviously originatesfromRobert Blund is the
introductionof the fourthway of using a noun in a proposition,viz.
nuncupative,in this context. In a foregoingsectionofhisSumma Robert
argued that a noun used nuncupativeneitheris used significativenor
materialiter
, but takes a middle position: construed with a vocative
verb it is a nota nominationis:
'Nobis placet quod nomenpropriumcum uerbo uocatiuo nec ponitur
sed mediumhabemusponi,scilicet
nec ponitursignificatine,
materialiter
in oratione,ut nota sit
nuncupatiue.Presentatenimse nomenproprium
et dicimusproprieponi,nontarnensignificatiue
nominationis;
ponitur'.35
The Master of the Summa de relativishas problemswith it and cannot accept it in the same way as the otherthreeusages of a noun in a
proposition:
'Quarto modo poniturdictio nuncupatiuesecundumR. Lincolniensem.
Videturtamenquod hie modusdiuersussit ab aliis ponendimodis.Vnde
.38
alias determinabitur'
That the nuncupativeuse of a word caused troublesto othergrammarians, too, appears fromthe Quaestionesgrammaticalesthat are extant
in the MS Mnchen, BS Clm ij2io (s. Xllex ?/IH), ff.I04r-i24v:
collectionof questions about the meaning of adverbs, prepositions,and
about deviant constructions [Inc. : <C>irca
significationemaduer.
.
uarie
biorum multe et
emerguntquestiones .). Expounding the example 'hoc est nomenquod uocabunteum} (Jer. 23, 6) the author points
to the fact that if we have here a relatiopersonalis, i.e. ad terminm
*
1
1
discretum
, the propositions ego uoco te hoc nomen and ego uoco te hoc
9
nomine both ought to be correct. In that case we should have an
36MS London
, BM Royal2 D XXX , f. 83^.
se See below,p. 21.
14

23:22:11 PM

accusativusinstrumentalisand an ablativus instrumentais,which is incorrect.The solutionto this problemlies in the distinctionin the relatio
between:
1. the relatiopersonalis: when the relative refersto what is supposited
by the antecedent,and in the same way;
2. the relatiogeneralissive simplex, of which several species occur:
a. when the antecedentsupposits forthe maneries, and the relative
'
refersto unum de manerie, e.g. serpensest callidioranimantibus
ceteris
, qui decepitEuam' (cf. Gen. 3, 1) ;
b. when the antecedent supposits for unum de manerie, and the
'
relative refersto the maneries, e.g. hoc enimfacit articulusapud
Grecos, qui apud nos non reperitu
r' (cf. Priscian, XVII, 132) ;
c. when the antecedent supposits for something,and the relative
refersto the same thing,but alio modo,e.g. 'hoc est nomenquod
uocabunteum ; here the relative quod is used alio modo = nuncupative?1
By the time we come to the tracts on relatives in the middle of the
thirteenthcenturythe question of the nuncupativeuse of a word in a
relatiohas disappeared.
For lack of editions of grammatical texts, it is hard to trace in how
far the other " simplices", - except for the demonstratio
simplex that
still occurs in companion of the relatio simplex in the Resolutio octo
partiumorationisof the fifteenthcenturyscholar JohannesVersor3837For thetextofthisquaestio,
see AppendixC.
38For thedetailsofhislife,cf.Ch. H. Lohr,MedievalLatinAristotle
Commentaries.Authors:Johannesde Kanthi- Myngodus,
in: Traditio,XXVII (1971),
and therelatio(personalis
and
pp. 290-291.Versordeals withthe demonstratio
simplex)in thechapteron thepronounofhis Odo partiumorationis
explanatio
accomodatissima
resolutio
ed. Heidellutulentissima,
(- Octopartiumorationis
berg1489 apud FriedrichMisch,aies 1318): 'sciendumprimoquod relatio
et demonstratio
non sunt modi significandi
pronominis:sed sunt quedam
accidentiasiue quedamproprietates
modmdemonstrationis
et
consequentes
referentis.
sicutenimvita que rsultatex vnionecorporiscumanimanon est
animanec corpus: ita demonstratio
et relationonsuntmodidemonstrantis
et
referentis.
et ideo non ponunturab autoreinteraccidentiapronominis.
Unde
relatioest antelate reirecordatio.
Et est duplexscilicetsimplexet personalis.
refert
idemin spetieet nonin numerocumsuo
Simplexest quandorelatiuum
antecedente,
sicutibi mulierdamnauitque saluauit.Sed relatiopersonalisest
refert
idemin numerocumsuo antecedente,
vt Sortescurrit
quandorelatiuum
et ille disputt,sciendumsecundo quod duplexest demonstratio:
scilicetad
sensumet ad intellectum.
Demonstratio
ad sensumest quando demonstratur
res que subijcitursensuivt visuivel auditui.Demonstratio
ad intellectum
est
quando res absens demonstratur
per aliquod signumin intellectuexistens.
Demonstrationum
alia simplexalia personalis.Demonstratiopersonalisest
IS

23:22:11 PM

have survived Robert Blund and his follower,the Masterof the Summa
de relativis,but surely, in the case of Robert's suppostilo simplex, it
must have been too hard a job to compete against the "real" suppositio
simplex.
AppendixA
RobertBlund, Summain artegrammatica
, cap. De relativis
MS London,M Royal2 D XXX, ff.8va-orb
>
<7 De relatione
hic ordotransiget.
tractatum
Primo
De
relatiuis
relatiua
<A>d
pergendum.
diceturquid sit relatio;secundoque speciesrelationis;terciode uarietatibus
Relationemsic describitPriscianus:Relatioestantelate
relatiuorum.
cognitionis
satis conueniensest circaspeciesquas includit.
descriptio
representation
et
Est enimrelatioin qua non anteceditcognitio,ut 'idemestgrammaticum
: Relationilaliud
demusdescriptionem
relationis
Et ideosufficientem
musicum'.
Sed nondicitursecundarespectuprimein ordine
estquamsecundacognitio.
sibisufficiens
et noneconuerso.Diciturenimprimacognitioquasi principalis,
id est socialiset exigitiua
Secundadiciturquasi secundaria,
exigitiuaconsortii.
ut si dicatur'Socratescurri,hoc nomenSocratesfacitprimamnoticonsortii,
est.
consortii:Sibi enimsufficiens
et non-exigitiuam
ciam,id est principlem
Cum sequitur'et ipse mouetur
' relatiuumfacit secundamnoticiam,id est
consortii
consortii.
socialemet exigitiuam
alterius,cum
Ekigitenimrelatiuum
*
'idem
etmusicum
est
et
hie
sumi
non
Similiter
se
[hoc
MS]
gramaticum
possit.
per
non
dicitur
Vnde
id
est
socialem.
facit
relatiuumsecundam
noticiam,
congrue
et
'idemestgramaticum'
, sed consortium
exigit,ut dicatur'idemestgramaticum
tumin
diciturexigitiuaconsortii,
relatiomultipliciter
musicum
' Et huiusmodi
distinctasunt:
secundumquod predicamenta
tumin accidentibus
substantiis,
ut 'Socrateset Plato uidentidem',in qualitatibus,ut 'idemest
In substantiis,
' in
ettricubitum'
ut 'idemestbicubitum
etmusicum
;
; quantitatibus,
gramaticum
in ordinem.
in relatiuis'idemestpateretfilius*
; et sicperpredicamenta
relationis
>
<II De speciebus
alia non.Ecliptica
Relationisdue suntspecies,alia eclipticasiue dependens,
antecedens
et subintelligitur
relatiuumsinesuo antecedente
quando profertur
ille et congrue
et congruepotestapponi,ut 'qui legit,disputa. Subintelligitur
dicitursiue absout si dicatur'ille qui legit,disputa.Non-ecliptica
apponitur,
'
ut 'Socrates
luta quandonilomninosubintelligitur,
currit,
, Socrates
qui disputa
legitetipse disputa.
Item. Relationumalia inplicitasiue inuoluta,alia explicitasiue euoluta.
ut 'idem
Inplicitaest que relatiuumincluditet inplicatcumsuo antecedenti,
' Sic enimpotestexplicari:Aliquidest gramaticum
etmusicum
estgramaticum
vt Socratedemonstrato
id quod supponitur.
personaliter
quandodemonstratur
de ipso dicituristehomocurrit.Et diciturdemonstratio
personalisa persona:
Sed demonstratio
eo quod res in propriapersonademonstratur.
simplexest
Sed demonstratio
simplex
quando aliud supponituret aliud demonstratur.
et habetfieriquando res
et aliud demonstratur
est quando aliud supponitur
et pro eadem re in spetiesupponitet non in numero,vt hec
demonstratur
herbacrescitin ortomeo'.
39Prise.,Inst.gram.XII, 16.
16

23:22:11 PM

siue inuolutamrelationem
interinplicitam
et idemest musicum.Et interest
et
et
antecedens,sed subintelgitur
eclipticam:In eclpticaenimnon profertur
sine omnisubauditioneet nil
apponipotest.Implicitasiue inuolutaprofertnr
'
deest ad perfectionem.
Incongrueenim dicituraliquid idemest gramaticum
et musicum'.Explicitadicitursiue euolutaquando profertur
primamfaciens
et sequiturrelatiuumrecordationem
facienssiue cognitionem
cognitionem
'
etipsedisputt'.
iterans,ut Socratescurrit
alia extrasumpta.
Rursus.Explicitarum
MS] alia intrasumpta,
[inplicitarum
in eademsimplici
cumsuo antecedente
quandoponiturrelatiuum
Intrasumpta
ut ipse proficia
; non enimut
oratione,ut 'Socratesuidetse', 'Socratesstudt,
facitalteriusorationis.
Extrasumptaquandopeceditantecedenset
principium
faciensalteriusorationis,
ut 'Socratescurrit
sequiturrelatiuum
quasi principium
.
etipse mouetur'
alia disiuncta.Coniunctaquandoantecedens
alia coniuncta,
Intrasumptarum
ut 'Socratesqui currit,disputt
et relatiuuminmediateconiunguntur,
'; uel
ut 'Socrates
Idemenimest
inmediate
currit,
disputt*.
qui
coniungi,
intelliguntur
' et 'Socrates
'Socratescurrit,qui disputt
qui currit,disputai'.Disiuncta,ut
ut 'Socratesuidetse', 'Socrates
coniunguntur,
quandoaliquo mediointercedente
utipseproficia.
studt,
similisest diuersitas.Quedam enim mediata,quedam
Extrasumptarum
Mediataquandoilludquod orationes
inmediata.
coniungit,
inter[f.
89vb]ponitur,
ut 'Socratescurritet ipse disputt'.Inmediataquando illud quod orationes
.
ut 'si Socratescurrit
, ipsemouetur'
coniungit,
pecedit,
Personalisquandoantecedens
alia simplex,alia personalis.
Item.Relationum
ut quandoanteceponiturproaliquoappellatoet proeodemponiturrelatiuum,
facitde aliquo et relatiuum
de eodemrecordationem
densprimamcognitionem
facit,ut 'Socratescurrit,
qui disputt'.Simplexquandononpro eodemsumitur
antecedens
et relatiuum.
Simplicisautemseptemsunt[dicuntMS] species.Primaest quandoantecedenssumiturpro aliquo appellatoet relatiuumpro alio, ut si dicatur'homo
inuenitliteras,qui inuenitdialeticam'
, ut in Theologia'mulierque damnauit,
saluaui etc. Et tale inuenitur
apud Boetium'Boreedumquas spiritusaufert,
mitisZefirusreuehat
frondes'.*0
Secunda speciesquando antecedens relatiuumponiturpro aliquo
cui soli
creatura,
appellato,sed utrumque
pro manerie,ut 'homoestdignssima
' uel 'dominari
ceteris
animantibus'
.41Et tale ait Priscianus
uti ratione
competit
,42
in tractatupronominis
'hocostendit
sensus,qui nullusin eis repperitur'
Tercia speciesest quando per antecedensagiturde manerieet relatiuum
poniturpro aliquo appellato,ut si dicatur'homoest dignissimacreatura,
qui
inuenitliteras'.Et hictale inuenitur
animai,qui uenit
'serpensestcallidissimum
ad mulier
em'43
Quartaspeciesest quandoeconuersoaccidit,quandoantecedenssumiturpro
ut si dicatur'homoinuenitliteras,
promanerie,
qui
aliquoappellatoet relatiuum
estdignissima
Et apudPriscianum
taleinuenitur
creatura'.
'arttculus
hicdiscernit
'44
apudeos,qui apud nosnoninuenitur
Quintaspeciesest quando per antecedensagiturde re, per relatiuumde
40Both.,Cons.I, M. 5. 20.
41Cf.Gen.i. 28.
42Cf.Prise.,Inst.eram.XII, 26.
43Cf.Gen.3, i.
44Cf.Prise.,Inst.gram.XVII, 132.
17

23:22:11 PM

. Similiter
nomine,ut si dicatur'homoestSocrates,
quodestnomenappellatiuum'
id estTullius'. Sensusest: id estTullius:hocnomenMarcus,
hic 'Marcuscurrit,
id est hocnomenTullius,id estsignificat
quod illud.
de re,ut si
Sexta econuersoquandoperantecedensde nomine,
perrelatiuum
dicatur'homoestnomen,qui [quod MS] estSocrates'.Et tale apud Ouidium
Fastisinuenitur
'exueropositum
permansit
Equirrianomen,
que[quodMS] deus
e campoprospexit
ipsesuo'.*6
Septimaspeciesest: In equiuocationeconsiderato,ut si dicatur'canis est
'manusmeeclauis
Et talein Theologiareperitur
latrabile, qui etiamestceruleus'.
. Cumenimdiciturmanusconfixe
sunt,intelligitur
sunt,queuosfecerun
confixe
de manibuscarnalissubstantie.Sed cum diciturque uos fecerunt,
intelligitur
de Diuina Potentia.
relativorum
>
<27/ De varietatibus
incidere
possint,quadamartisuia
Que uarietatesalie circarelatiuipositionem
est.Via autemhec ex hoc consideretur
quod nomenquatuormodis
querendum
poniturin relatione:ad agendumde manerie,ad agendumde re,ad agendum
de nomine,quandoetiamponiturnuncupatiue.
Quando poniturantecedensad agendumde re, potestsequi relatiuumad
potestsequiad agendum
agendumde re,potestsequi ad agendumde manerie,
Et sic quatuormodis
de nomine,potestetiamsequi,ut ponaturnuncupatiue.
relatiuipositio.
uariabitur
Si ponaturantecedensad agendumde manerie[reMS], potent similiter
quatuormodisuariarirelatiuum.
admittere
Sed itemsi antecedensponaturad agendumde nomine,relatiuum
potestquatuoruarietates.
uariaripoteritrelatiuumquatuor
Si etiamantecedensponaturnuncupatiue,
modis.Ex quibus cum predictissedecimprodeuntuarietatesrelatiui.Et hee
:
suas subdiuisiones
habebunt,que ita claruerunt
Agaturper antecedensde re - de re hic dicimusagi quod priusdiximusde
- , perrelatiuumpotestagi de re,sed de re eademuel alia. Si de
appellat[iu]o
ita potestagi de re quod teneaturrelatiuumin eadem
relatiuum
alia, per
in equiuocum.Potest agi de
cum antecedentiuel transferatur
significatione
eadem re, ut si dicatur'homoestMarcus,qui est Tullius'.De alia [alio MS]
ut 'mulierque damnauit,saluaui,
terminoretentoin eadem significatione,
ut 'canis
et apud Boetium,ut supra diximus.De alia in alia significatione,
hiclatrai,qui etiamnatatin mari'
de re,perrelatiuum
potestagi de eademmanerie
Agaturitemperantecedens
uel de maneriein equiuoco.De eadem maneriesiue in eadem significatione,
De manerieinequiuoco,
creatura'.
quiestdignssima
[f.90ra]ut 'homoestSocrates,
in mari'.
ut 'canishiclatrat,qui habundat
potestagi de nomine,sed de
perrelatiuum
Agaturitemde reperantecedens,
nomineeodemuel de sinonimoeius. De nomineeodem,ut 'homoestSocrates,
ut 'homoestSocrates,
ab humo'.De eiussinonimo,
quod
quod[qui MS] deriuatur
uocatursinonimum
hic
nominis
Alicuius
.
commune'
est
nomen
Grecos
quodapud
est cumeo.
cumqueeiusdemsignificationis
Aliquandoetiamper antecedensagiturde re et relatiuum[reliquumMS]
. Et tale apud
ut 'isteest Socrates,qui ille uocatur'
potestponi nuncupatiue,
ut 'quicquides,id uere,care,uocaris,aue' **Et in
OuidiumDe Pontoinuenitur,
id est inique
libroEpistularum'nonegosumtantiquodnoncenseris
inique',*1
45 Ovid.,Fast. II, 859-60.
Ovid.,E.P. IV, 13,2.
Ovid.,Her. VII, 45.
18

23:22:11 PM

quod tu non censeris,id est quod tu non uocaris,quasi dicit: Non uocaris
iniquus.DicebaturenimipsepiusEneas. Et sic octo modisuariaturrelatiuum,
agiturde re.
quandoperantecedens
de manerie,
Rursus.Agaturperantecedens
potestagi de eadem
perrelatiuum
ut 'homoestdignssima
manerie<uelde manerie)inequiuoco.De eademmanerie,
cui parentceteraanimando*.De maneriein equiuoco,ut 'canis est
creatura,
.
siue domesticum
amicissimum
animal,qui etiamhabundatin mariBritannico'
de reeiusdem
de manerie,
potest
agi
perrelatiuum
Agaturitemperantecedens
ut 'homoestdignssima
maneriei
uel de re in equiuoco.De re eiusdemmaneriei,
'
habundatin mari,
canis
creatura,
qui est Socrates'.De re in equiuoco,<ut>
latra
.
etiam
hic
qui
perrelatiuum
potestagi de nomine,
Agaturetiamde manerieperantecedens,
sed de nomineeodemuel de eius sinonimo.De eodem,ut 'homoestdignssima
ab humo'. De eius sinonimo,ut 'homoest dignssima
creatura,
quod deriuatur
commune'.
est<nomeny
creatura,
quodapudGrecos
itemperantecedensde manerie,relatiuumpotestponinuncupatiue,
Agatur
Et ita septem
ut 'homoestdignssima
creatura,
quodanimairationalecensetur'.
modisuariaturrelatiuum
quandoperantecedensagiturde manerie.
Rursus.Agaturde nomineperantecedens,
potestagi de nomine
perrelatiuum
De nomineeodem,ut 'homoestnomen
eodemuel de eiussinonimo.
appellatiuum,
'
ab humo'.De eius sinonimo,ut homoestnomenappellatiuum,
quodderiuatur
Et taleinuenitur
est<nomen
> commune'.
apud Boetiuminlibro
quodapudGrecos
diuisionum'canis in lingua barbarafortesimpliciter
dicitur,quod apud nos
intercidit
.48Et hicetiamdupliciter
figura,figurascilicetrelationis
multipliciter'
Nonenimhocnomen
et figuraquod hocnomencanisponiturproeiussinonimo.
canisest apud barbaros.
per relatiuumpotestagi de re. Hic
Agaturitemde nomineper antecedens,
sed tantum
non diuiditur,quia non peceditnomenin aliqua significatione,
'
materialiter
qui est Socrates'.
ponitur,ut homoestnomenappellatiuum,
Agaturitemperantecedensde nomine,perrelatiuumpotestagi de manerie,
'
ut 'homoestnomenappellatiuum,
qui estdignssimacreatura
[Nec agi de manerie.Hic diuiditurpropterrationempredictamMS] De
nomineitemquando agiturper antecedens,et relatiuumpotestponi nuncuqui isteuocatur'.Et sic quando per
patiue,ut 'Socratesestnomenproprium,
antecedens
agiturde nomine,relatiuumquinqumodisuariatur.
relatiuum
Rursus.Ponaturantecedens
ponipotestnuncupatiue,
nuncupatiue,
ut 'isteuocaturSocrates,qui et Ule uocatur'.Per relatiuumetiampotestagi
'
item
de re,ut 'isteuocaturSocrates,
qui ipse est [uocaturMS]. Per relatiuum
'animal
rationale
ut
rei
de
uocaturhomo,qui estdignssima
manerie,
potestagi
creatura
' Nec agi de manerieuel agi de re hicdiuiditur,
quia nomencumuerbo
determinansnon poniturin aliqua significatione.
uocatiuo nominationem
sedde nomineeodemueleiussinonimo.
Potestitemperrelatiuum
agide nomine,
De eiussinonimo,
De eodem,ut 'isteuocaturSocrates,
quodestnomenproprium'.
'. Et his
ut 'animairationale
uocaturhomo,quodapud Grecosestnomencommune
et
relatiui
cum
collectis
uarietatibus
quinqu
uiginti
exaugent
predictis
quinqu
uarietates.
In ilio octonariouarietatumquando per antecedensagiturde re, quoquo
modo uarieturrelatiuum,una sola inueniturpersonalisrelatio,quando per
antecedenset relatiuumagiturde eadem re. Relique septemsimplicessunt.
In ilio septenarioquando agiturde manerie,nulla personalis,sed omne
simplices
reperiuntur.
48Both.,De divisione,
PL 64, 879A.
19

23:22:11 PM

In quinarioquando agiturde nomine,una sola inuenitur

personalisrelatio,
etperrelatiuum
agiturde eodemnomine.Relique
quandoscilicetperantecedens
quatuorsimplicessunt.
In alio quinarioquando poniturnomennuncupatiue,nulla nisi simplex
inuenitur
relatio.Earumautemexemplainducenti
patebunt.
Ex predictislicetcolligeretreset uigintispeciessimplicisrelationis.
[f.90rb]
si quis hoc consideret
est alias inuenire,
Non tarneninpossibile
quod ad nomen
Tale est illud
subiectifitrelatioad formam
pertinens.
positumin designatione
'diabolusest mendaxet patereius',49id est mendacii.Econuersopotestforte
accidere.Augebitur
ergonumerusrelationum.
de quibusdictumest,
et relationes
Nota quod sicutquedamdemonstrationes
sed et quedamapposimiliter
et quedamsuppositiones,
simplicesinueniuntur,
Non dicimus
sitioneset quedamadiectioneset quedametiamcomparationes.
ut
ubi pernomenagiturde aliquo indeterminate,
hicsimplicem
suppositionem,
'homoest
*,sed simplicemsuppositionem
que habetse ad
dignssimacreatura
modumsimplicisrelationiset que non nisi simplicirelationeinterueniente
id est fiuntmaioresquam ipsifuerint,
quam
potestexplicari,ut 'diescrescun,
'
ipsi,id estquamdies.Simplexappositiofit,utapudLucanumtuncflosHesperie,
concidi
Latii nuncsolaiuuentus
,50quasi flosHesperieoccidittunc.Hoc dicimus
est
sola iuuentusLatii, id est flosLatii nuncsola
flos
nunc
pro antiquis.Qui
relationem
illa simplex
ut persimplicem
iuuentus.Hoc dicimuspro modernis,
'mundus
etc.
ut
in
adiectio
fit,
astrologia
globatus
Simplex
explicetur
appositio.
in modum
terras*
.51Cumdiciturmundusglobatus
circumcurrens
spere,intelligitur
de firmamento.
de totalimachina.Cumdiciturcircumcurrens
terras,
intelligitur
Et hec dicitursimplexadiectio.Fit enimin transituAppollinis,cum hic ad
totalemmachinam,hic ad firmamentm
respiciathoc nomenmundus.Fit
62
simplexcomparatio,ut Virgilius'Nerine Galatheathimomichidulcioryble*.
Aliterenimdiciturthimumdulceet aliteranimal.
Appendix
AnonymiSummade relativis
53
MS Bern,Burgerbibliothek
5J9,ff.I3T-I3r
(De relatione
>
Relatio
relatio
et que et quotspeciesrelationis.
est quid sit
<C>onsiderandum
antelate
Relatio
est
a
Prisciano:
sic
describitur
repetition
significationis
igitur
descriptiosatis conueniensest circa speciesillas quas includit.Sed hec
descriptionon conuenitomnirelationi.Est enimquandoquerelatio,ubi non
minus
etdisputt'.Et quia hec descriptio
ut hic 'idemcurrit
anteceditconnitio,
: Relatioigitur
relationisdemusdescriptionem
sufficiens
est, nos sufficientem
Sed secundanon diciturrespectuprime
nichilaliud estquamsecundacognitio.
in ordine,sic nec primadiciturrespectusecunde.Cum enimdiciturprima
cognitio,secundacognitio,primaet secundanon notantordinem.Sed prima
id est nonexigitiuaconet per se sufficiens,
cognitiodiciturquasi principalis
facitprimam
curri
sortii.Verbigratia.Cumdicitur' Socrates
, hecdictioSocrates
Joh.,8, 44.
60Luc., Phars.II, 196-7.
51Mart.Cap.,De nuptiis
, VIII, 814.
62Verg.,Eel. VII, 37.
63I inspectedthisMS onlyin microfilm.
64Cf.Prise.,Inst.gram.XII, 16.
20

23:22:11 PM

de re,id est principlem

et nonexigitiuam
consortii.
Cumadditur
cognitionem
'etipsemouetur*
id estsecunda, ibi hocrelatiuum
ipsefacitsecundamnotitiam,
consortii.
consortium
riam,id estsocialemet exigitiuam
Exigitenimrelatiuum
cumperse suminonpotest.Similiter
cumdicitur'idemestgramaticum
alterius,
idemfacitsecundamcognitionem,
etmusicum',
id estsecundariam
et exigitiuam
consortii.Quare non congruedicitur'idemest gramaticum
sed desideratur
'
ut dicatur'idemestgramaticum
' Similiter
etmusicum
cumdicitur
consortium,
mouetur'
'is qui currit,
id
, utrumquerelatiuumfacitibi secundamcognitionem,
est secundariam,
et exigitconsortium.
Vtrumqueenimibi determinatur
per
reliquum.Sed obicitursic: Hoc relatiuumis facit secundamcognitionem
:
respectuqui; ergoqui facitprimamcognitionem
respectuis ; quod sic refellitur
<J)especibusrelationis}
Priscianusdicit: Relationumalia inplicitasiue inuoluta,id est intrinseca
,
alia explicitasiueeuoluta,id estextrnseca.
Intrinsecarelatioest, ubi aliqua dictioin orationeposita inplicatin sua
sui relati cum significatione
sui antecedentis.
significatione
significationem
Verbigratia.'Idem sedetet disputt*
relationem.
, idemfacitibi intrinsecam
huiusdictionisaliquidcum
Inplicatenimin sui significatione
significationem
suo relato.Vndesic explicatur:Idem sedetet disputt,id est aliquidsedetet
disputt.
Extrnsecarelatioest, ubi profertur
relatiuumfacienssecundamnoticiam
cum suo antecedentefacienteibi primamuel saltemsocialemcognitionem.
Et notandumquod hec dictioidem non diciturrelatiudictio,quia faciat
intrinsecam
sed quia facitextrinsecam
ut cum dicitur
relationem,
relationem,
etidemdisputa.Si enimob hocdiceretur
relatiuadictio,quia facit
'aliquidcurrit
intrinsecam
relationem,eadem rationedeberenthec dici dictionesrelatiue
Ista eniminplicantsignificationem
sui relati
qualiscumque.
quisquis,quicumque,
cumsignificatione
antecedentis.
alia simplex,alia personalis.Personalisrelatioest
Extrinsecarum
relationum
et suum antecedenspro eodemsumuntursiue pro eodem
quando relatiuum
'
, mouetur*
, siue pro eodemnomine,ut 'troposest
appellato,ut homoqui currit
Grecum
'
homo
uocabulum,
quodinterpretatur
Simplexrelatioest quandorelatiuum
[relatioMS] et suumantecedens<non>
Sed simplexrelatiomultipliciter
dicitur.Aliquandoper
pro eodemsumuntur.
relatiuumsubstantie,aliquando per relatiuumproprietatis,
ut quis, qualis,
quantus.Videndumest ergode istisspeciebussimplicisrelationisque fiuntper
relatiuum
substantie.
substantiae
(De relatione
simpliciquaefitperrelativum
>
In pimisergosciendumquod tripliciter
habetdictioponi in oratione:Aliquando ad agendum,scilicetde re siue de appellatoproprie;aliquando de
manerie;aliquando de nomine.Quarto modo poniturdictio nuncupatiue
secundumR. Lincolniensem.
Videturtamenquod hic modusdiuersussit ab
aliisponendimodis.Vndealias determinabitur.
Posito ergo antecedentead agendumde re siue de appellatoocto modis
ut fiat[f. i36v] simplexrelatio.Positoantecedente
ad
potestsequi relatiuum,
agendumde re siuede appellato:
[i] aliquandoponiturrelatiuumad agendumde alio appellatoantecedentis
in eademtamensignificatione,
ut 'mulierquedampnauit,
saluaui,id est mulier
dampnauitet muliersaluauit.Et apud Boetium'et quas oreespiritusaufert,
21

23:22:11 PM

Et apud Ouidium'qui coloralbuserat,nuncest

mitisZefirusreueitfrondes'.56
albo'.5*
contrarius
ad agendumde alio appellatoantecedentis
in alia
[2] aliquando ponitur
inuenitur
in
ut 1canisestlatrabilehic,qui natatin mari' . Similiter
significatione,
'
clauisconfixe
sunt'.Per antecedens
enim
Tehologiamanusmeequeuosfecerunt,
perrelatiuumde
agiturde manupassibili,id est de manucarnalissubstantie,
Diuina Potentia,que nos creauit.
[3] aliquandoponiturrelatiuumad agendumde appellatonominisconiugati
cuiusipseestpater'.51
ut 'diabolusestmendax,
cumsuo antecedente,
ad agendumde re alicuiusdictionisintel[4] quartomodoponiturrelatiuum
'meusseruusestcuiusereemptus
est'.58
ut apud Priscianum
lectein antecedente,
meiintellecti
inhocpossessiuo
cuiusagiturde rehuiusgenitiui
Perhocrelatiuum
meus.Sed de hocdubiumpotestesse,an dicendasitsimplexan personalis.
Quod
hoc relatiuum
uideturquia eandempersonamquam refert
enimsit personalis,
meusintrinsecus.
uidetur
hocpossessiuum
cuius,significat
Quoduerositsimplex,
et de alio persuumantecedens.
Cum
quia prorsusde alio agiturperrelatiuum
duas significat
enimpossessiuum
personas,alteramscilicetextrinsepronomen
nonutramquesupponitlocutioni,sed illamtantum
cus et alteramintrinsecus,
personamscilicetpossessionis.Et quia de hoc
quam significatextrinsecus,
iccircoin questione
dubiumesse potest,an dicendasit simplexan personalis,
'non
meascriptalegas,
Ouidium
ut
relatio
Similis
inuenitur,
apud
relinquatur.
ad Istrum'59
qui sumsumotus
[5] aliquandoposito antecedentead agendumde re poniturrelatiuumad
ut 'Socratesest homo,qui est
agendumde maneriein eadem significatione,
Dei', qui, id est cuiusmanerieres.
[-ussic semperMS] creaturarum
dignissima
'hocdiscernit[ur
inuenitur
Similiter
] articulus
apudGrecos,
qui
apud Priscianum
qui,id est que speciesdictionis.
apud Latinosnonest',60
ad agendumde maneriein alia significatione
[6] aliquandoponiturrelatiuum
ut 'canis latrat hic qui habundatin mari'.
antecedentesiue in equiuocatione,
ad
relatiuum
agendumde nomineeodemuel de antece[7] aliquandoponitur
dente tamquammaterialiter
posito [positaMS], ut 'homoest Socrates,qui
ab humo'.Et in Euangelio'raboni,quodinterpretatur
deriuatur
magister'.*1
[8] aliquandoponiturrelatiuumad agendumde sinonimosui antecedentis,
ut 'homoestSocrates,
apud Grecos',quod[qui MS], id
quodestnomencommune
Et appellamusnomensinonimum
estcuiussinonimum.
quodcumquenomenest
cumalio siueponaturuerumnomensiuenon.
eiusdemsignificationis
ut
R. poniturrelatiuumnuncupatiue,
[9] nonomodosecundummagistrm
. Simileinuenitur
'homoest,qui ipse uocatur'
apud Ouidium'qui quodes, uere,
care,uocaris,aue',*2quod es uere,kare,et es,uocariscarus.
substantie
prorelatiuoqualitatis,ut ibi
[10] decimomodoponiturrelatiuum
'nosgenusignauumquodtectogaudetet umbra'
, quod,id est cuiusmodigenus.
Et apud Ouidium'quodtu nonesses,iureuir illa fuit',quod,id est qualis tu
et
non esses.Vbi enimad qualitatem[quandamMS] relatiuumibi refertur,
65Both.,Cons.I, M. 5. 20.
66Ovid.,Met.II, 541.
57Joh.VIII, 44.
68Prise.,Inst.gram.XVII, 194
69Ovid.,E.P. III, 4, 91.
eo Cf.Prise.,Inst.gram.XVII, 132.
61 Toh.20, 16.
a Ovid.,E.P. IV, 13,2.
63Ovid.,Her.IX, 106.
22

23:22:11 PM

nott qualitatem.Item apud eundem'non ego sum tantiquod non cenceris

inique,quodid est qualis tu non censeris.Similiter
inuenitur
inique',**
poni
illuderam',85id est
relatiuumapud Ouidium'nescioquid sit amans,at tarnen
id est amans.
illiusmodi,
ut fiatsimplexrelatio
Ita ergodictumsit quot modispotestponirelatiuum,
ad agendumde re.
[f.I37r]positoantecedente
ad agendumde maneriepotestponirelatiuum
Positoantecedente
:
ut 'homoestdignssima
manerie,
creaturarum,
[1] tumad agendumde eadem
cui parentceteraanimalia', 'eademherbaque crescitin ortomeo,crescit
in orto
tuo' et 'hoc[hec MS] f^xt piperquod[queM S] uenditur
uenditur
Rome'.
hic,
Et aput Priscianum'hocarguitsensus,qui nullusin eis inuenitur'
ad agendumde maneriein equiuoco,ut 'canisest
[2] tumponiturrelatiuum
in mari'.
domesticum
siue amicissimum
animal,qui habundat
'
[3] tum poniturad agendumde re illiusmanerie,ut homoestdignssima
creaturarum,
qui estSocrates'.
'
in mariBritannico,
[4] tumad agendumde rein equiuoco,ut canishabundat
qui ethiclatrai',
'
[5] tum ad agendumde nomine,ut homoestdignssimacreaturarum,
quod
deriuatur
ab humo'.
'
ut homoestdignssima
creaturarum,
[6] tumad agendumde sinonimo,
quod
estnomencommune
apudGrecos'.
'
secundum
ut homoestdignssima
Robertm,
[7] tumnuncupatiue
magistrm
scencetur'.
creaturarum,
qui animairationale
Et ita septemmodispotestrelatiuumponi, ut fiat simplexrelatioposito
ad agendumde manerie.
antecedente
Positoueroantecedente
ad agendumde nomine,relatiuum
potestponi:
, quod
[1] tumad agendumde nomineeodem,ut 'homoestnomenapellatiuum
ab humo'.
deriuatur
'
ut homoestnomenapellatiuum,
[2] tumad agendumde eiussinonimo,
quod
nomenest commune
. Et simileinuenituraput Boetiumin libro
aput Grecos'
Diuisionum[deriuacionum
MS], ut 'canisfortein barbaricalinguasimpliciter
dicitur
'67 Ibi per hoc nomencanisagiturde
dicitur,
quodaputnosmultipliciter
eiussinonimo,
quo utunturbarbari.
ad agendumde re,ut 'homoestnomen
[3] tumponiturrelatiuum
apellatiuum,
qui est Socrates'.Simileinuenituraput Ouidium'ex ueropositumpermansit
Equirrianomen,
que[quiMS] deuse [estMS] campoprospicit
ipsesuo',**
Equirria,
id est hoc nomenEquirria,que[qui MS], id est quos ludos.
[4] tumponiturad agendumde manerie,ut 'homoestnomenapellatiuum,
qui
estdignssima
creaturarum'.
secundummagistrm
ut 'homoest
Robertm,
[5] tumponiturnuncupatiue
nomenapellatiuum,
uocatur'
.
qui animalrationale
Et ita quinqumodispotestponi relatiuum,ut fiatsimplxrelatioposito
antecedente
ad agendumde nomine.
Positoautemantecedente
secundumRobertm
:
nuncupatiue
[i] tumpotestsequirelatiuum
nuncupatiue
positum,ut 'isteuocaturSocrates,
.
qui etilleuocatur'
e4 Ovid.,Her. VII, 45.
66Ovid.,Her. XI, 32.
ee Cf.Prise.,Inst.gram.XII, 26.
67Both.,De divisione
, PL 64, 879A.
8 Ovid.,Fast. II, 859-60.
23

23:22:11 PM

ad agendumde re,ut 'isteuocaiurSocrates,

[2] tumpotestponirelatiuum
qui
etipseest'.
*
uocaturhomo,
[3] tumponiturad agendumde manerie,ut animalrationale
um*
ereaturar
.
qui estdignissima
[4] tumponiturrelatiuumad agendumde nomine,ut 'isteuocaturSocrates,
quodestnomeneius'.
ut 'animalrationale
uocaturhomo,
[5] tumad agendumde nominesinonimo,
nomen
Grecos
'
est
commune
quod
aput
ut fiat simplexrelatioposito
Et ita quinqumodispotestponirelatiuum,
antecedente
nuncupatiue.
Ita ergohabemusquot modispotest[poni]fierisimplexrelatioposito[posita
ad agendumde re siue de maneriesiue de nominesiueetiam
MS] antecedente
nuncupatiue
positosecundumRobertm.
(De relatione
quaefitad orationem}
ubi relatiuum
refertur
uarietatespotestinuenire,
Preterpredictasrelationum
ad orationem
aliquam,positamuel subintellectam.
aliquam,nonad dictionem
sed alicuiusdictionis
Non tarnenrelatiuum
orationis,
significatum
semperrefert
in ipsa oratione.Verbigratia.'Ego desidero
essebonus,
intellectum
significatimi
'
quod tu desideras Hie triplexpotestassignarirelatio,' ut ego desideroesse
essebonum,tudesideras; uel 'quod,id est me
bonus,quod,id est me desiderare
esse bonum,tu desideras*',
uel 'quod,id est cuiusmodiesse [est MS] bonum,
tu desideras
' Simileinuenituraput Ouidium'hec ego dumstulte[stluteMS]
meditor
captusamorepotes'.**
que uestra[uera MS] libidoest,esse peregrino
amore.
essecaptusperegrino
ad hanc orationem
Ibi hoc relatiuumque refertur
In hac enimorationeintelligitur
libidouel aliquidtale et illudrefertur
perhoc
amoreest libidouel ad libidinem
relatiuumque. Capi nimperegrino
spectat.
Et sequiturrelatiuumin feminino
genere,cumpociusdeberetsequi in neutro
sequiturin femininogenerecum quo ingenere.Quia tamensubstantiuum
iccircoin feminino
transitiue
construitur,
genere.
Et simileinueniturin multislocis, ut aput Ouidium'et quod nuncratio,
Itemaput Catonem
Et alibi 'seminituo,qui estXristus'.11
impetusantefuit'.19
In hac orationequod
metuit
mortem
, quoduiuit,perditid ipsum'.12
[f.I37vl 'qui
uiuitintelligitur
spaciumuiuendisiue tempusuiuendiuel aliquidtale. Et illud
refertur
per hoc relatiuumid [in eo MS]. Similiteret hie 'in eo quoddidici
ad hancorationem
eo refertur
iudiciaiusticietue'.73Ibi hoc relatiuum
quodego
didicietc.In hac enimorationequodegodidicietc.intelligitur
disciplinasiue
eo.
doctrinauel aliquidtale. Et illudrefertur
perhoc relatiuum
eo ibi refertur
eteo amplius'.Hoc relatiuum
'decern
current
Similiter
homines
numeruset illud
ad hanc orationemdecernhomines.In ea enimintelligitur
nonnumerans.
refertur
eo,sed numeras,inquam,numeratus,
perhocrelatiuum
Est enimnumerasqui numerat[quo numeratur
MS] aliqua; est numerasquo
ilia relatio'decern
currunt
homines
id est multitudo.Sic intelligitur
numeratur,
eteo amplius',id est eo numeroampliornumeras,id estea multitudine
amplior
hecrelatio'decern
annosuixiteteoamplius'.
currit.
multitudo
Similiter
intelligitur
decern
annosinqua intelligitur
Hoc enimrelatiuum
eorefertur
ad hancorationem
numerassiue multitudoannoram,uel si placet,spacium.Et illudrefertur
per
hoc relatiuum
eo.
Ovid.,Her. I, 75.6.
70Ovid.,R.A. 10.
71Galat., Ill, 16.
12Cato,Dit. I, 22, 2.
73Psa. 118,7.
24

23:22:11 PM

Item. In Theologia'cumuenitDominusin pauper

culam,mulierobtulitduo
minuta
.74Ibi hocrelatiuum
ad hancorationem
, quodestquadrans'
quodrefertur
duominuta,
in qua intelligitur
pondusuel aliquidtale. Et illudrefertur
perhoc
relatiuum
quod.
Item.Dupitarepotestad quidfia<t>hecrelatio'egosumdignusqui regamrem
' Videturenimquod ibi fiatrelatioad hoc adiectiuumdignus,quia
puplicam
ibi perilludrelatiuum;ergoad illudfitrelatiouel nonfit
ipsumdeterminatur
relatioad aliquid.Sed quodnonfiatibirelatioad dignus,
uideturperaliudnomen
[autemMS] adiectiuumibi adiectiuepositumet proptersignificatione<m>
refert
et nonqualitatem;ergo
qualitatistantum.Relatiuumergosubstanciam
relatiuum
non[nomenMS] refertur
ibi ad illudadiectiuum.
Ideo dicuntquidam
homouel aliquodsubstantiuum
hocsubstantiuum
; et ad
quodibisubintelligitur
illudfitibi relatio.Quodsiuerumest,congruepotestdici 'egosumdignus,qui
, siuecongruedicitur'egosumhomo,qui currit'
regatrempublicam*
Aliidicuntquod nonponituribiqui relatiue,
sed prohac causaliut.Cumenim
dicitur'egosumdignus,qui regam[regatMS] rempuplicam',<id est ut regam
rempublicam).Sed licetibi ponaturqui prohac coniunctione
[coniugione
MS]
nominiset non significationem,
sed coniuncut,habettarnenconstructionem
tionis,sicutpersimilepotestostendi'egomeditor
tacitus',id est tacite;'incedo
habentconstructionem
', id est supine.Ibi illiduo nominatiui
nominis,
supinus
sed aduerbialem
tamensignificationem.
Nobisautemnon ita uidetur,quia relatiuadictiosupponitpersonamuerbo
personaliter
positoet est casualisdictio;ergoin ui casualisibi ponitur;ergo
ibi habetsignificationem
casualisdictionis.Dicimusitaquequod hocrelatiuum
ad hoc pronomen
qui refertur
egoa quo etiamibi euocatura terciapersonaad
relatiuinominissemperad propinquius
primam.Sed licetsit quasi proprium
referri
ad remocius,
nontamenhoc
[refertur
MS], sit[siMS] relatiuipronominis
relatiuum
ut dicatursic 'ego
qui potestponiprimoloco postsuumantecedens,
', quia hoc relatiuumqui habetinplicitam
qui regamrempuplicam,sumdignus
huius causalis coniunccionisut, qua determinatur
ibi hoc
significationem
adiectiuumdignus.Et propterillam determinationem
faciendamcirca adiectiuumponendum<est>relatiuum
cumilio adiectiuo.Que quidemdeterminatio
nonfieret,
nisicumilio adiectiuoponeretur.
Et quia aliqua dictiointelligenda
ad subiectum
[substantiuum
MS] que tamenin subiecto[substantiuo
MS] poni
nonpotest,per multasimiliapotestostendi.Verbigratia.'Isti incedunt
bini' .
Ibi hoc distributiuum
bini partimintelligitur
in subiecto[substantiuo
MS],
Distribu
tionesibi nottcircares oppositaslocutioniet
partimad predicatum.
secundumhoc refertur
ad subiectum;ordinemuero incedendo,ordinemdico
secundumpartes numeratasatendendum.
Et in hoc aduerbiale<m>inplicat
et sic ad uerbumintelligitur
circaquod facitdeterminacionem
significationem
ordinisincedendouel modi [modoMS] incedendi.Quod nisi poneretur
post
uerbum,nonea<n>demibi faceretdeterminacionem.
Eodemmodo,ut dicitur'ibisreginaperurbes*
,75reginanottibi substantiam
et ritumsignificai.
Et in hoc habetaduerbialem
[f.1381"]
significationem
quam
contraitex tali iunctura.Nam si sic diceretur
'tureginaetc.',nonritumsigni'
ficarei.Eodem modoet in predictaconstructione,
scilicetegosumdignus,qui
substantiam
et causamnott.
, hocrelatiuum
regamrempublicam'
qui significat
Est enimsensus: Ego sum dignus,ut ego [qui ut MS] regamrempublicam,
Similiter'isteestdignus,qui regatrempublicam ut ille regatrempublicam.
Et quia relatiuumcontraitsignificationem
causalis coniunccionisab hoc
adiectiuodignusetc.,ideo ponendumest cumeo et nonsineeo.
74Marc. 12,42.
7*Ovid.,Her. XV, 333.
25

23:22:11 PM

huiusdictionis
constructions
<JDe
'qui*y
habetponihecrelatiuadictioqui et queet quod
Et notanumquod tripliciter
ut 'hic qui currit,ueniatad me'. Ibi
in oratione.Aliquandoenimdiscretiue,
currentis
ad noncurrentem.
enimnottdiscrecionem
Aliquandocopulatiue,ut
nondiscremecum'.Ibi solamnottcopulationem,
'Socratesqui currit,
loquitur
cionemSocratisad Socratemnon currentem.
[facitibi uero]Aliquandocausa.7eEst enim
liter,ut hic 'qui [que MS] aera caperepossuntesse deoscredun
sensus:Hominescredunt,scilicetDedalum et Icarum,esse deos, qui, id est
'
quia, ipsi possuntcapereaera. Eodemmodoet hic poniturcausaliteregosum
ad
sum
'. Nam nott quid
, qui regamrempublicam
dignus,scilicetad
dignus
rempublicam.
regendam
relatiuiin oratione}
<jDe positione
relatiuoaliquid,nonut eo et alio
Itemnotandumquod interdum
premittitur
uel aliis fiat,sed ut locum habeat sequensrelatiuum,ut aput Priscianum
' "bonus"eius
est"melior" '77 Et aput Catonem'conciusipsesibi
comparatiuum
etc78Ibi premittitur
hoc adiectiuumconcius
; substantiuetamenponitur,ut
locumhabeat sequens relatiuum.Similiterin Salterio'filii hominumdentes
hecoratiofiliihominum
Ibi premittitur
eorum
armaetsagitte
,
[sacitteMS] etc.'.79
in ipsis
nostrorum
ut detlocumsequentirelatiuoeorum.Et alibi 'diesannorum
causa sehec oratioannorumnostrorum
annis'80 Ibi premittitur
septuaginta
locum
habeat
ut
uel
dictio
solet
relatiui.
Similiter
oratio,
premitti
quentis
ut ibi 'superbooculoet insaciabili
factaad intellectum,
sequensdemonstratio
hec oratiosuperbooculoet insaciabili
cordecumhocedebam
'81 Ibi premittitur
facta ad intellectum
per hoc
corde,ut locum habeat sequens demonstratio
suo hunc',S2
cumproximo
secreto
hoc.Eodem modoet hie 'detraentem
pronomen
hec oratiodetraentem
etc.,ut locumhabeat sequensdemonstratio.
premittitur
non uaga sit et
facta ad intellectum
Cum enim[nominisMS] demonstratio
incerta,oportetsemper,ut ex aliquoanteprolatodeterminabitur.
relativis
<De nominibus
proprietatum}
estde nominibus
nuncdicendum
Ita dictumestde nominerelatiuosubstantie,
relatiuarum
Dictionum
relatiuis
proprietatum
ergo
proprietatum.
[nominis
MS]
alia est relatiuaqualitatis,ut qualistalis,alia quantitatis,ut quantus/tantus,
ut quotusjtotus.
alia ordinis,
alia numeri,
ut tot/quot,
ad
Sed notandumest quod sicutnomenrelatiuumsubstantiehabetreferri
nominasubstantiuauel substantiueposita uel ad pronominaproprieposita
si proprieponantur,habent
[ponanturMS], ita nominarelatiuaproprietatum
referri
ad nominaadiectiuauel ad alia adiectiueposita,ut 'Socratesestalbus;
id est apellat,
substantiam,
talisestPlato'. Ibi hoc adiectiuumalbussignifcat
id est copulat,scilicetalbedinem.Eandemqualitaqualitatemetiamsignificai,
talisquodsequitur,
tem,id esteandemspeciemqualitatis,copulathocrelatiuum
relatiue.Sed quia antecedenspertinetad copulandamalbediet eam signifcat
ad copulandamalbedinem)Piatoniet sic
nemSocrati[piatoMS], <relatiuum
relatiuum
diuersarum
ad copulationem
qualitatum[qualiterMS] pertine<n>t
76Ovid.,Met.VIII, 219-20.
77Prise.,Inst.gram.
78Cato,Dist. I, 17, 2.
79Psa. 56, 5.
80Psa. 89, 10.
81Psa. 100,5.
82Ibid.
26

23:22:11 PM

et suum antecedens,ideo diceturibi fierisimplexrelatio.Et ubicumquein

fit
talibus,ubi relatiuumet suumantecedensad diuersaspersonaspertinent,
diuersiscopulare.
simplexrelatio,quandononpossunteandemsingularitatem
Vbi nomenrelatiuumet suum antecedensadiectiuumad eandempertinent
'
diceturibi fieripersonalis
relatio,ut Socratesestalbusettalisdicitur
personam,
esse'.
Idem non
de aliisque suntrelatiuaquantitatisuel numeri,
ut
'Socratesestintelligendum
bicubitus
et tantus[talisMS] estPlato'. Ibi hoc relatiuumtantus
quantitatisque priuscopulataest perhoc adieccopulateandemsubstantiam
Eandemsubstantiam
tiuumbicubitus.
[autemMS] dicoquantitatis[quandoMS]
et totidem
seden.Ibi hoc
specie,non numero.Similiter'duo hominescurrunt
totidem
relatiuum
copulateundemnumerum
quemet suumantecedens
copulat.
Eundemnumerum
dicospecie,nonnumero.
Interdumetiamrelatiuumproprietatis
refertur
ad orationemaliquam,non
dictionem
inquafquam]orationeintelligitur
aliquam,positamuelsubintellectam
aliquodadiectiue[f.i38v]significatum
quodrefertur
perrelatiuum
proprietatis,
ut 'isteesttalis quodfacilepotespersuadere
illi stulticiam'
. Ibi hoc relatiuum
ad hanc orationem
talisrefertur
Uli stulticiam
, in
quodfacilepotespersuadere
hoc adiectiuesignificatum
stultus
; et illudrelatiuesignificatur
qua intelligitur
talis.
perhocrelatiuum
Interdum
etiam[estMS] ad se inuicemreferentur
huiusmodi
relatiuaproprie'
esttalis,qualisestPlato'.Ibi talisqualispertinent
ad qualitatatum,ut Socrates
teminfinite,
id estita ad qualitatemquodad nullamspeciemqualitatis.Similiter
'tantusest Socrates,quantusest Plato'. Ibi tantuset quantuspertine[a]nt
ad
'totsuntista,quotsuntilla'. Ibi relatiuapertinent
infinite.
Similiter
quantitatem
ad numerum
id est ita ad numerum
infinite,
quod ad nullamspeciemnumeri.
Item. Ista nominatalis,tantus[qualis talis MS], totet totusrelatiuasunt
ut si demonstratione
dicam'talisestPlato' uel 'tantusest
<et> demonstratiua,
Plato'. Hec autemnominaqualis,quantus,quot,quotusinterrogatiua
sunt et
infinita
et relatiua.
ut 'qualisestSocrates
V uel'quantusestSocrates
V etsicdeinceps.
Interrogatiua,
Et tunchabentconstruicum uerboindicatiuimodi. Quando autemsuntinM 5] habentconstrui,
ut 'nescioqualis
finita,cumuerbosubiunctiui
[substantiui
sit Socrates'uel 'quantussit Socrates'.Similiter'istequeriuel 'dubitaiqualis
sit Socrates'uel 'quantussit Socrates'et ita de ceteris.Quandoautemrelatiua
et construuntur.
sunt,cumomnibusmodiseque conueniunt
relatione
(De pronominali
>
Ita dictumest de nominibus
relatiuissiue substantiesiue proprietatis.
Nunc
de pronominali
relatione
dicendum
est.In primisergonotandum
quoniamomne
ut ait Priscianus,83
ex relationeuel demonstratione
id
pronomen,
diffinitur,
est ex demonstratione
uel relationecrtampersonamsignificat,
id est rem
Cumenimita inuentum
sitpronomen,
aliquamincerta[m]
personali
proprietate.
ut confusese habeatad omnemremsignificandam
quantumad ipsamuocem,
necinstitutum
sitad hancuel ad illamremsignificandam
siuepronominandam,
id est ad pronominandam,
sed ad significandam,
substantiamindeterminate,
ex demonstratione
uel relationedifinitur,
id est difinitesignificat,
id est prohancremex demonstratione,
si hanc[hecMS] demonstret,
uelilla<m>,
nominat,
si illa<m>demonstret.
Similiter
ex relationesignificat,
id est pronominat,
hanc
rem,si suumantecedens
eandem,uel illam,si suumantecedenseandemsignificat. Sic omne pronomenab infintateet confusioneoriginalireduciturad
83Prise.,Inst.gram.XVII, 60.
27

23:22:11 PM

certitudinem
uel ex relatione.Cum enim
accidentalemex demonstratione
habeatab institutione
ad remquamlibet,
incertain
ex relatione
pronunciationem
uel demonstratione
homoilliusrei crtamhabetpronunciationem.
Distinguendum enim intersignificatum
pronominiset pronominatum,
quomodointer
et apellatumnominis.Significatenim pronomenintellectum
significatum
solummodoet pronominatsubstantiaminfinitequantumad institutionem.
ex antecedente,
id est ex
Definit[iu]euero omnemrem habet pronominare
relationeuel demonstratione.
Et quia id habetpronomen
ex institutione,
unde
hanc uel illamremsignificat,
uel relatione,dici potest
id est demonstratione
ex institutione,
id est ex quodamquod
quoniamhancuel illamremsignificat
habetex institutione.
Ad nullamtamenrempronominandam
siuesignificandam
inuentumfuit.Confusetamenpronominare
pro significare,
pronominatum
pro
significatum
accipimus.
certampersonamtripliciter
Sed notandumquod pronomen
dicitur.
significare
Nam diciturinterdumsignificare
personamcertam,quia significatcertam
id est rem aliquam in certapersonaliproprietate.
personalemproprietatem,
Interdum
quam; interdum
significat
aliquampersonamdeterminando
significat
quam,sed determinando
quoniameadem
personamaliquamnondeterminando
<sit> personeper aliam dictionemsignificate;secundumquod diciturin as: Propriumest pronominis
signatione
proprionominiponiet
propriipronominis
certassignificare
id est rem
personas,id est certampersonalemproprietatem,
id estpersonamdeterminando
aliquamin certapersonaliproprietate,
quamuel
determinando
quoniamsit e<a>dem personeper aliam dictionemsignificate
relatiuum
certam
significare
[significata
MS]. Secundumhoc diceturpronomen
certampersonalem
etipsumdisputt*
, quia ibi significat
personam'aliquidcurrit
et alio modo,quia determinat
quoniameademsit personeper
proprietatem,
aliamdictionem
Determinat
enimquodproeademrealicuiatribuitur
significate.
actus currendi.Et in similibus
actus disputandi,pro qua priusatribuebatur
similiter.
relationum^
(De variatione
pronominalium
relationum.
Pronominalium
Nuncdicendumestde uariacionepronominalium
alia simplex,alia personalis.
ergorelationum
relatiuum
Personalisquandoperantecedenset per <pro>nomen
agituruel de
in urbemetipseretsfit',uel de eodemnomine,
eadempersona,ut 'homoducitur
sic'.
etilluddeclinatur
ut 'musaestnomenapellatiuum
ad <a>gendum
In simplicirelatione
aliquandoponiturantecedens
pronominali
de maneriesiue de significato
suo et relatiuumad agendumde eodem,ut aput
'substantia
id est hecmaneriessiue
Porfirium
estquid<>am etipsa estgenus',**
hoc significatum
est quiddamet ipsumest genus.
substantia
poniturprocelatoqualitatis,utaputOuidium
Aliquandorelatiuum
pronomen
id est illiusmodi,
id est
'nescioquid sit amans,at [f. I39r]tamenilluderam',95
amans.
et
Aliquandoponiturantecedensad agendumde aliquo suorumapellatorum
relatiuumad agendumde suo antecedentetamquammaterialiter
[naturaliter
id
id estEneam'.Ibi perhocrelatiuum
(andern,
MS] posito,ut 'uideoA (rischisi
[naturaliter
MS] ibi esset
agiturde suo antecedentetamquammaterialiter
positum.Cum enimibi ipsumponaturad agendumde aliquo suorumapelibiprosignificat
et hocuerbumponitur
quantumad significationem,
lat[iu]orum,
Accusatiuusautemsequens,scilicetEneam,
non quantumad constructionem.
84Porf.,I sag. (translatio
Boethii)4. 22.
85Ovid.,Her. XI, 32.
28

23:22:11 PM

MS]. Et est sic exponendumquod dicitur

[naturaliter
poniturmaterialiter
hocid quod hocnomenEneam;
id estEneam' : Ibi significat
'uideoAnchisiadem,
ethecdictioEneamnonpossetponiibisub[cumMS] accusatiuocasucumuerbo
Ideo autemponituribisubaccusatiuo
ibimaterialiter.
nisiponeretur
sustantiuo,
casu, ut uideatursub similicasu posse exponereprecedentem
accusatiuum,
et hec relatio'raboniquodinter
scilicetAnchisiadem.
Eodem modoexponitur
ibiponiturmaterialiter
cumhocuerbo
.8eHoc nomenmagister
magister'
pretatur
.
interpretatur
ad orationemsignificatiue
Aliquandopronomenrelatiuumrefertur
positam.
Peripsumtamenagiturde illa tamquammaterialiter
[naturaliter
MS] ibi esset
id esthomoueni. Ibi hoc relatiuumid refertur
neten,
posita,ut hic 'tropos
' et de ea
ad hanc orationem'troposneten
per relatiuumagiturtamquam
Est autempro significat
materialiter
ibi ponitur.
[naturaliter
MS] poneretur.
Oratioque sequitur,scilicet'homoueni,similiter
materialiter
et sic
ponitur
est: troposneten,
id scilicet[sequiturMS] oratio'troposneten'
intelligendum
idemquod hec oratio'homoueni.Quodsi
[id esthomouenit],id est: significat
demonstratiuum
scilicet
hoc,loco huius relatiuiid, fieret
nomen,
poneretur
ibi demonstratio
ibi hecoratio'troposneten,
ad intellectum
et demonstraretur
hocest[id est MS] homo
tamquamessentibi positauerbaGrecatroposneten,
ueni. scilicet'troposneten,
id esthomoueni, id estsignificat
idemquod
hecoratio'homoueni. Dicuntautemquidamquod hec oratioid estponiturin
tali locutioneprohac coniunctione
scilicet.Et sic hec dictioid nonponituribi
ut 'uideoAnchisiadem,
id est
relatiue,quia etiam ponituribi significatiue,
scilicetEneam.Cauendumautemin talibus
Eneam',id est uideoAnchisiadem,
ne extendatur
illudestEneam',
figura,ut si quis dicat 'uideoAnchisi<ja)dem,
dicaturergolocutionesoloecisticaet nonfiguratiua.
Tanta enimibi est improprietasquod uix tollerandaest,quantominusextendenda.
ex multis
Quod autemhoc uerbumestita ponaturpro hoc uerbosignificat
locis habemus.Ait enimAugustinus'cumadiciturignotum
statim
uocabulum,
Et itemin Apocolipsi'habentes
queritur
quidsit',S7id est quid significet.
filas
aureasplenasodoramentorum
,88id est que signifique suntorationessanctorum'
cantorationes
sanctorum.
Retinettamenhocuerbumsuntconstructionem
uerbi
licetsignificationem
suam ibi nonretineat.Sicut hoc participium
substantiui,
natus retinetconstructionem
in hoc loco
participiiet non significationem
'natusloue'89
constructionibus
'Socrates
Queriautempotestad quid fitrelatioin huiusmodi
uel Plato curritet ipse mouetur',
'isteuel Ule curritet ipse mouetur'
. Magister
Robertusdicitquia fitrelatioad hanc orationem
Socratesuel Plato. Hec enim
oratioSocratesuel Plato supponitpersonamhuicuerbocurrit,
nontamenhanc
uel illampersonam,
sed personamindeterminate
pro Socrateuel Platone.Non
tamenSocratiuelPlatonieiusdempersonesignificatio
determinatur
[reiterminaturMS] ibiperrelatiuum
contrait
sua accidentia
sequens.Non <enim>relatiuum
ab illa oratione,sed ab alteroillorumnominatiuorum,
qui ibi ponuntur.Sicut
persimilepotestostendi'isteetilia suntalbi'. Ibi hoc adiectiuumalbi innititur
huicorationiisteetilia. Genustamencontraitab alteroistorumnominatiuorum
isteet ilia, sciliceta nominatiuodigniorisgeneris.Quidam dicuntquod hec
oratioSocrates
uel[etMS] Platoequipollethuicalter'o)istorum
et ex ea intelligiturista.Et sicin hac orationeSocrates
uel[etMS] Platointelligitur
hicnominatiuusalteret ad iliumfitibi relatioet sic ibi fitrelatioad aliquidintellectum,
88Joh.20, 16.
87 Ubi?
88Apoc.5, 8.
89Ovid.,Met.I, 673.
29

23:22:11 PM

nonad aliquidpositum.Sed secundumhoc huiusmodi

orationeseclipticesunt.
Similiterdubitationemhabet hec constructio'Socratesuel Plato est albus*,
scilicetutrum<re>feratur
ad hancorationem
'SocratesuelPlato' uel ad alterum
istorumnominatiuorum
uel etiamad aliquidsubintellectum.
Idemsic dicendum
est de hac adiectionequod [quia MS] dictumest de relationepronominali.
Suntet alie forterelationes
simplices
perpronomina
quas diligentes
inquisicionis <est>inuestigare.
Sicut autemrelatioalia simplex,ita et demonstradoquedamsimplexest,
adiectionesetiam simplicesest inuenire,quas diligentiingenioinuestigandas
relinquimus.
relativist
(De adverbiis
De aduerbiisrelatiuisnunc dicendumest et breuiter.Aduerbiorum
ergo
ut tuncquando; alia loci,
[f. I39v] relatiuorum
quedamsuntrelatiuatemporis,
tantum
ut tociens
ut ibi ubi; alia quantitatis,
ut quantum
; alia numeri,
quociens.
Appendix
Anonymi
Quaestiones
grammaticales
MS Mnchen
,BS Clm17210,/f.H5v-ii6r
EUM.Ex qua sic: estlocutiocongruaet
est NOMEN
quod UOCABUNT
discretum;
ergorelatiuo
perfecta,in qua fitpersonalisrelatioad terminm
'
remotoconuenienter
dicetur'egouocotehocnomen'
, sicut uocotehocnomine*
,
uel causa sicut per ablatiuum,
ut per accusatiuumnoteturinstrumentum
alia generalis.
alia personalis,
Solutio: [f.n6r] quod relationum
Personalisest illa quando relatiuumrefertilludquod supponitur
per suum
antecedenset eodemmodo.
Simplicissiue generalismultesuntspecies.
nonrefert
maneriem
manerieetrelatiuum
supponitpro
Quandoqueantecedens
'
ceteris
, qui
illam,sed unumde manerie,ut hic serpensestcallidioranimantibus
habeturhoc
deeepitEuam*; 90quando<que>econuerso,ut in Priscianominori
: 91 Hoc nomen
enimfacit articulusaput Grecos
, qui aput nos non reperitur'
nonrefert
articulussupponitdiscreteprouno et relatiuum
illud,sed maneriem,
ut qui, id est pars; quando<que>ueroantecedenssupponitpro aliquo et relatiuumnon refert
illudeodemmodo,sed alio modo,ut hic 'hocestnomenquod
92
uocabunteum': Hic suppositiofitpro hoc nomineJohannes
, et si hoc nomen
Relatiuumuero quod
Iohannes ponereturibi, non teneretursignificatiue.
positum.Et talis est sensus:Hoc est
sequitur,refertillud ueludsignificatiue
nomenquod uocabunteum, scilicetIohannem,quod nomen,id est quem
'Iohannemuocabunt
Iohannem,uocabunteum.Sicutergodiciturconuenienter
eum'.
dicitur'quoduocabunt
eum' ita conuenienter
90Cf.Gen.3, i.
91Cf.Prise.,Inst.gram.XVII, 132.
92Jer.23, 6.
Nijmegen
Katholieke Universiteit

30

23:22:11 PM

VivariumXV, i (1977)
The Soul's Knowledge of Itself
An unpublishedWorkattributed
to St. Thomas Aquinas

L. A. KENNEDY

F. Pelster has discoveredan unpublished disputed question which is

apparentlya workofSt. Thomas Aquinas : whetherthesoul,whilejoined
to the body, knows itselfthroughits essence.1 It is found in a manuscript in the Bodleian Library: Ms. Laud Misc. 480, ff.I93r-i95r.
The argumentsin favour of its authenticityare quite strong:
(a) The manuscriptcontainingthis disputed question is fromthe late
thirteenthcentury.
The
(b)
question is foundamong a large numberof disputed questions
fromAquinas's De PotentiayDe Anima, De SpiritualibusCreaturis,
and De Virtutibus.
There
is also in this manuscriptanother disputed question not dis(c)
covered until this century,on the immortalityof the human soul.
This question (whose genuineness now seems beyond doubt) has
also been found in two other manuscripts.2
The
(d)
question on the soul's knowledge of itself makes an unmistakable referenceto St. Thomas's Summa Theologiae(the firstthree
objections are quotations, unfinished,fromthe Summa, and the
reader is referredexplicitly to the Summa for their completion).
(e) Pelster has pointed out that the answergiven in the disputed question is substantially the same as that found in the other texts in
which St. Thomas deals with this matter, as, for example, in
Summa ContraGentiles(III, 46), Summa Theologiae (I, 87, 1), and
De Ventate (VIII, 6, and X, 8). He has also shown that the same
terminologyis used; the same philosophical distinctions;the same
quotations fromAristotle.In particular,objections 20 and 21, with
theirsolutions,are almost identical,word forword,withthe eighth
1 F. Pelster,Eine
ungedruckte
Quaestiodes hl. Thomasvon Aquin berdie
Erkenntnis
derWesenheit
derSeele,in: Gregorianum,
36 (1955)618-625.
A. Fries,ThomasunddieQuaestiode immortalitate
animae,in: Divus Thomas
31 (1953)18-52.
(Freiburg),
31

23:22:22 PM

and ninth objections of the Sed Contra of De Ventate, X, 8, and

their solutions.
It seems unneccessaryto repeat herein detail the comparisonsdrawn
by Pelster between this disputed question and certainly authentic
works of Aquinas dealing with the same matter.The reader must simply be referredto Pelster's article. It seems quite clear that the work
is either a genuine disputed question of Aquinas or one put together
by an early disciple, using St. Thomas's doctrine,method, and even
words. Indeed, the question is so Thomistic that A. Dondaine has suggested that it might be simply notes made by Aquinas in preparation
forDe Ventate,X, 8.3
Concerningthe decision whetherto attributethis disputed question
to Aquinas or a disciple, it seems more reasonable to accept it as an
authentic work of St. Thomas. This is what Pelster does :
Man darfwohlsagen,dass aus derganzenQuaestionachFormund Inhalt
derVorliebefr genaue Bestimmung
mitder Klarheitder Darstellung,
derberlegenen
derangewandten
Ruhe,derGeistdesAquinaten
Begriffe,
Nach allem trage ich kein Bedenken,die Frage mit
hervorleuchtet.
Sicherkeit
demHeiligenzuzuschreiben.
This judgment of Pelster is followedgenerally.4The text, however,
is not in a polished state, and the clarity of presentationhe lauds is
lacking in a few places, forexample in the fifthparagraph of the body
and in the answer to the second objection; the answer to the fifteenth
objection, besides, is lacking in precision.
Dondaine's suggestion,also, is incojrect. It is true that the disputed
question and the De Ventate have many thingsin common, but they
are also differentin many ways. Also, the disputed question in the
Bodleian manuscriptwas composed much later than the De Ventate,
X, 8 (1257-58), since it refersto the Prima Pars of the Summa Theolo5
giae (1266-78).
Pelster considers this disputed question important because of its
unpolished state (it is our only text of an actual determinatioby St.
Thomas). It gives us much-needed informationabout how disputed
questions took place. It seems that the Magister proposed the initial
brief argumentspro and con. St. Thomas praises the response of the
Bachelor beforesummingup the argumentand answeringall the objections. The second and seventh objections also contain referencesto
the replies of the Bachelor.
3 BulletinThomiste,6 (1940-42)112.
4 J. A. Weisheipl,
Friar Thomasd'Aquino(NewYork,1974)361-3635 For thedatingsee ibid.,p. 367.
32

23:22:22 PM

It should be pointed out, however, that this question is important,

as well, forthe additional informationit gives us concerningAquinas's
teachingabout the soul's knowledge of itself.It is a valuable new text
of St. Thomas on this topic.
The two classical opinions concerningthe soul's self-knowledgewere
those of Aristotleand St. Augustine. Aristotlesaid that "mind is itself
thinkablein exactly the same way as its objects are".6 This was interpreted to mean that, since the mind needs species to understand its
objects, it needs a species to understanditself.Aristotlealso said: "To
the thinkingsoul images serve as if they were contentsof perception....
That is why the soul never thinks without an image".7 This text was
also interpretedto mean that the soul does not understanditselfunless
a species is present.
St. Augustine, on the other hand, taught in many texts that the
mindknowscorporealthingsthroughthe senses, and incorporealthings
(including itself) through itself.8 This could be interpretedto mean
that it knows corporeal things by means of species and itselfwithout
species. This Augustinindoctrine,interpretedin this way, was taught,
forexample, by Matthew of Aquasparta about this time: "... [anima]
semetipsam,sua interioraet ea quae in eius interioribussunt directo
9
aspectu potest cernereet intuere. ..."
St. Thomas Aquinas tries to reconcile Aristotle and St. Augustine
by insistingon two principles:
(1) The soul does not know itselfthroughits essence directly,but by
means of a species. This species, however,is not a species of itself
but a species of some other object.
(2) The soul knows itself through its essence indirectlybecause, by
reflection,in all of its acts it is aware ofitself.Its habitual presence
to itself,and its ability to act wheneverit wishes, are sufficientfor
it to be said that the soul knows itselfby its essence by habitual
knowledge; but this knowledge is always indirect.
6 De Anima,III, 4; 43<(J. A. Smith
translation).
7 Ibid.,III, 7; 43^14-17.
8 For example:"Mensergoipsa sicutcorporearum
rerumnotitiasper sensus
corporiscolligitsic incorporearum
per semetipsam.Ergo et se ipsam per se
Series Latina,
ipsam novitquoniamest incorporea."CorpusChristianorum,
vol. L (1968)296.
9 Questiones
de Fide et de Cognitione(Quaracchi,1957) 34- These
Disputatele
questionsweredisputedabout 1278-79.See ibid.,p. 7*. Matthew'sfulldoctrine
ofthesoul'sself-knowledge
is in q. 5 de Cognitione,
ibid.,pp. 292-316.
33

23:22:22 PM

When Aquinas says at the beginning of the objections that there

are two "principal solutions" to the objections,it is the two principles
used in his reconciliationof Aristotle and St. Augustine that are the
principal solutions.These principlesof Aquinas have been examined in
a great number of works in this century.It would be too ambitious a
project to review this literaturehere.10It must sufficeto publish the
newly-foundwork of Aquinas.
This work is found in only the one manuscript,Ms. Laud Misc. 480,
of the Bodleian Library, Oxford. This is a parchment from the late
thirteenthcentury,19.3 cm. X 14 cm., with two columns to the page.
The firstpart of the manuscript contains the CompendiumTheologie
Hugonis de Riveliti (ff.1-103)and Quaedam de sanctis variis (ff.103iiov). The second part contains disputed questions (ff.-197). All
but threeofthese questions are undoubtedlygenuineworksofAquinas.
The three exceptions are:
(1) The one we are dealing with.
(2) The one on the immortalityof the soul, already referredto.
(3) A question concerningthe human intellect's knowledge of singulars. This question is definitelynot the work of St. Thomas. Its
structureis differentfrom that of Aquinas's disputed questions;
it lacks the clarityof Aquinas's writing;and it refersto St. Thomas
by name (f. 178).
The order of presentationis as follows:
De Sfiiritucdibus
Creaturis,art. 1, 3, 8, 10.
De Potentia,I, 1, 3 ; II, 1 ; III, 4, 6-9, 13, 16, 17; V, 1, 3, 5-8; VI, 1, 4,
9, 10.
De Anima, art. 1, 4, 7-11.
Utrumanima humana sit immortalis.
De Anima, art. 14, 21.
Utrumintellectusintelligatsingulare.
De Anima, art. 15.
De Virtutibus,art. 8, 10.
De Sfiritualibus Creaturis,art. 4, 2, 6, 11.
De Anima, art. 16.
10An excellentstarting-point
is the pair of articlesof B. Romeyer,Notre
de Philosciencede l'esprithumain,d'aprssaintThomasd'Aquin,in: Archives
del'Esprithumain,
connaissance
sophie,I (1923)32-55,and SaintThomasetnotre
ibid.,VI, 2, (1932) 1-114.
34

23:22:22 PM

Utrumanima coniunctacognoscatseipsam per essentiam

De Anima, art. 17.
De Potentia, III, 12, 10.
At least the second half of the manuscriptcomes fromthe Benedictine Cloisterat Seligenstadt am Main, as is indicated on f. nir.11
I93rb

10

i93va
15

20

SEIPSAMPER
QUERITURUTRUMANIMACONIUNCTACOGNOSCAT
ESSENTIAM.12
Et videtur quod sic. Dicit Augustinus 9 De Trinitate quod "mens
seipsam etc".13
Preterea, angelus et anima etc.
In oppositum est Philosophus in tertio De Anima 14qui dicit quod
intellectusintelligitetc., sicut patet in Summa.15
Ad questionem istam responsum fuit, et bene, quod questio querit
duo. Primo, utrum anima sit illud quod cognoscitur.Secundo, utrum
sit illud quo cognoscitur.Primo modo non querit questio sed secundo
modo. Et sic anima non cognoscitseipsam per essentiam. Huius assignat talem rationem: sicut se habet materia prima in generepossibilium
sive sensibilis nature, sic se habet intellectusnoster in genere in/tellectualis nature, prout dicit Commentator3 De Anima;16 sed materia
prima sensibilissic se habet quod ipsa in pura est potentia et nihil agit
nisi per formam supervenientem; sic intellectus noster in statu vie
nihil intelligens,nec se nec aliqua de mundo, nisi per formamvel per
speciem intelligibilemsupervenientem;etc.
Circa veritatemhuius questionis sunt due sollemnes opiniones. Una
est dicentium quod anima in statu vie directe seipsam per seipsam
intelligitet nullo modo per speciem intelligibilemab aliis acceptam.
Horum fuitratio ista : unumquodque cognosciturab anima secundum
quod presens est ipsi anime; et ideo res materiales et sensibiles non
intelligit nisi per species et similitudines eorum; sed res spirituales
12 generepossibilium]
grossibiIim

19 questionis]
qisnis

11For a fullerdescription
ofthemanuscript,
see F. Pelster,op. cit.
12The writerof
themanuscript
has corrected
someofhis ownmistakesin the
courseofhiswork.The corrected
textis givenin thesecases,withno indication
oftheoriginalerror.
13IX, 3.
14Aristotle,
De Anima,III, 4; .
15The threearguments
are fromSt. Thomas,SummaTheoloeiae
, I, 87 1.
16Averroes,
Commentarium
deAnimaLibros(Cambridge,
Magnumin Aristotelis
Mass.,1953)III, comm.5, 11.27-32.
35

23:22:22 PM

25 intelligitsine talibus speciebus ; anima est res immaterialiset per suam

essentiam est presens intellectui; ergo directe intelligit seipsam per
essentiam suam.
Istorum ratio non valet. Propter quod notandum est quod intelligere
dicit quamdam accionem, sed non quamcumque, quia duplex est actio.
30 Quedam est actio que transit in rem exteriorem,ut calefactio transit
in rem et substantiam calefactioni subiectam. Alia est accio que non
transitin rem exterioremsed manet intra,ut videre, prout dicit Philosophus : Videmus enim intus suscipientes,nihil extra mittentes.17Iste
acciones aliquo modo diffrant,aliquo modo conveniunt. Diffrant
35 quia calefactio est quid distinctuma calefacienteet a materia subiecta
igni calefacienti, sed res visa secundum speciem coniungiturvidenti.
Sed tamen conveniunt in hoc quod principiumutriusque accionis est
formaipsius agentis. Et ex hoc ad propositumdico quod intelligereest
accio non transiens,et principiumhuiusmodi accionis est formaintel40 lectum informans. Sed essentia anime nullo modo potest informare
intellectum. Ergo anima in statu vie nullo modo directe intelligere
potest seipsam per essentiam suam.
Et huius ratio est quia cotidie raminamus quia anima non potest
informarinisi specie intelligibili a rebus sensibilibus abstracta, quia
45 anima sive substantia per intellectumnihil intelligitnisi quod presentatum est. Primo enim sensus abstrahit speciem sensibilem. Et tunc
illa species sensibilis reponiturin fantasia. Tunc supervenitlumen intellectus agentis,.et illam speciem sensibilemin fantasia repositam abstrahit a condicionibus individuantibus. Et eam sic abstractam, im50 materialem, prius sensibilem modo intelligibilem,reponit in intellectum possibilem. Tunc intellecta erit species illa que prius fuit sensibii93vb lis. /Sed essentia ipsius anime non est formasensibilis. Ergo nec seipsam nec aliquam rem de mundo intelligitper essentiam suam. Et ita
patet per primamrationemque sumiturex actu intelligendiquod anima
55 nec se nec alia intelligitper essentiam suam.
Idem potest declarari ex illa ratione que sumiturex certitudineintelligendi. Essentia rei est certissima cognicio ipsius. Sed anima non
cognoscit essentiam rei quia ipsa est materialis,sed cognoscit speciem
et similitudinemeius. Ergo etc.
60
Patet ergo duabus rationibus,quarum prima fuitex actu intelligendi,
30 primmtransit]transsit
transsiens
39 transiens]

48 repositam]
reponitam
intellectus
51 intellecta]

17Aristotle,
On Senseand SensibleObjects.II; 4827.

23:22:22 PM

65

70

75

80

85

90

secunda ex certitudineintelligendi,quod anima non cognoscitseipsam

per essentiam suam.
Tunc venit secunda opinio dicencium quod anima in statu vie cognoscitur non per seipsam nec per essentiam suam sed per quandam
reflexionem,et hoc indirecte.Propter quod notandum est quod quadruplex est cognicio. Prima quidem est que est de quidditate et natura rei.
Secunda autem est . . . , et hec est actualis cognitio rei. Tertia est
habitualis cognicio secundum quam possum res cognoscere et promte
exire in cognicionerei. Quarta cognicio est cognicio iudicii et examinis.
Actus enimanime duplex est, scilicet cognoscereet iudicare, quia primo
ipsa aliud cognoscit et postea de cognito iudicat. Iudicium enim et
examen cuilibet rei habeo per lumen intellectusagentis, et illud exemplatum est a lumine eterno. Unde dicitur in Psalmis: Signatum est
super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine.18 Et sie cognoscit se.
Triplex ergo est cognicio anime. Cognitio de quidditate et natura
anime. Hoc est querere quid est. Secunda cognicio est cognitioactualis
existencie ipsius. Tercia est habitualis per quam exit in actum cognoscendi.
De quidditate anime, non cognosciturnisi per speciem intelligibilem
a fantasmatibusabstractam. Et hoc indirecte.De secunda cognitione
dico quod anima cognosciturper suos actus sicut, si aliud calefacit,
cognosco actum calefaciendi. De cognitione habituali sie cognoscitur
per suam essentiam.
Probacio primimembriquia intellectuspossibilis habet se ad formas
intelligibilessicut materia prima ad formas naturales sensibiles. Sed
materiaprima non potest esse in actu nec aliquid agere nisi per formam
actualiter in ea existentem.Sic intellectus,ut actu sit intelligens,non
intelligitnisi per speciem intelligibilema fantasmatibusabstractam et
inde actualiter existentem.Et illa formanon nisi species intelligibilisa
fantasmatibusabstracta. Et huius ratio est quia tota nostra cognitio
ortum habet a sensibus. Et inde bene dicit Philosophus in tertio De
Anima 19quod intellectusintelligitse sicut et alia quia sicut alia cog67 . . .] l'se
? gscione
69 cognicione]
69 iudicii]indicii
70 iudicare]indicare
71 iudicat]indicat

71 Iudicium]Indicium
73 Psalmis]salmis
80 cognitione]
? g
fantastibus
90 fantasmatibus]

" Psalms, IV, 7.

ie Aristotle,
De Anima, III, 4; 4.
37

23:22:22 PM

iqra.
95

ioo

105

no

1x5

120

125

noscit per speciem intencionalem in /eo actualiter existentem sic intelligitseipsum vel seipsam per speciem intencionalemin eo actualiter
existentem.Et ista species intelligibilisa fantasmatibusabstracta est
obiectum ipsius intellectus. Et ita intellectusprius cognoscitobiectum
eius, scilicet quidditatem rei, immateriale. Et tunc per obiectum cognoscituractus intelligendi.Et iste actus tunc ducit me in cognicionem
potentie et postea in essentiam. Et sic patet quomodo intellectussive
anima per intellectumcognoscit se per quandam reflexionem.
Secunda ratio huius potest esse ista, quia virtuspotentie non extendit se nisi ad ea que sibi subiciuntur,sicut ars edificatoriaedificat,quia
edificatorisvel domificatorisest tantum componere ligna in constitucionem domus et non dolare, inquantum domificator.Accipe adhuc
aliud grossumsimile in naturalibus. Potentia sensitiva cognosciturper
speciem sensibilem,sicut visus per colorem quia nihil video nisi colorata. Sed tamen visus indirecte extendit se ad ea que coniuncta sunt,
sicut dicis: Vide quam dulce est hoc. Et illa potentia sensitiva directe
sentit propria obiecta, sed indirectesentit que illis obiectis sunt coniuncta, ut cum dicitur"Vide dulce, tange dulce", quia sunt coniuncta
rei visibili, sicut albedini in lacte. Sic virtus anime primo cognoscit
proprium eius obiectum, et tunc per reflexionemcognoscit seipsam.
Et sic videtis necessitatem et modum intelligendianime seipsam quia
indirecteet remote intelligitessentiam suam.
Et ideo illud quod dicitur quod potentie anime fluuntab anima non
per generacionemnec per transmutacionemsed sicut illud quod rsultat et consequitur ab alio. Sic potentie fluuntab anima ex sua naturali
receptibilitate. Et dictum Philosophi quod dicitur in De Anima sic
intelligitur,scilicet illud "Nos sentimus quoniam sentimus, et intelligimus quoniam intelligimus".20Nos sentimus,id est, seimus nos habere animam sensitivm,quoniam sentimus,id est, videmus, audimus,
olfacimus,tangimus,odoramus, gustamus. Et intelligimus,id est, seimus nos habere animam intellectivam, quoniam intelligimus,id est,
consideramus.
Sed de cognitionehabituali, qua aliquis potest cognoscerepromteet
faciliter,dico quod anima cognoscit se per essentiam suam, sicut si
homo habet habitm grammaticetunc grammaticaperficitintellectum
eius quantum ad loquendum grammatice,scilicet congrue et proprie,
108 dulce]duce
93 in repetitur a
126 si .
m b'e
97 immateriale]
io6 visus]virtus
20Aristotle,
Ethics,IX, 9; 729-32.
38

23:22:22 PM

quia habitus est principiumvel qualitas difficilemobilis quo aliquis

130 faciliteroperatur et exit in actum cognoscendi, et sic quia habitm
grammaticepresencialiterhabet loquitur grammatice.Sic dico de cognitione habituali. Quia anima est sibi ipsi presens, ista sola presencia
sufficitquod cognoscit se cognitione habituali. Et quomodo sufficit
presencia anime? Quia ex anima fluunt actus per quos devenitur in
135 cognitionempotentie et de cognitione potentie deveniturin Cognitionen! essentie. Sed loquendo de cognitione actualis existencie sic cognoscit se per suos actus. Ista sunt dicenda in hac questione.
Deinde respondendumest ad argumenta per ordinem.Et iudicabitis
i94rb
in solutioneomniumargumentorumtantumduas principalessolutiones.
140 i. Ad primumquando arguiturauctoritateAugustini quando dicitur
quod anima semperse novit (et est dicendum ad secundum) dicendum
est quod debet intelligide cognitionehabituali et actuali. Et accipit ibi
Augustinusnoscerepro scire et intelligerein habitu. Multa enim seimus
21
que in actu non intelligimus.Unde Philosophus dicit in Thopicis
145 quod scire convenit plura intelligere per unum. Vel sic est melius:
quando dicitur"Mens novitseipsam per seipsam", ista prepositio"per"
potest dicere duplicem habitudinem. Vel dicit habitudinemmedii cognitionis et sic est species intelligibilis,vel dicit habitudinem principii
cognitionis. Tunc dicitur quod duplex est principium. Quoddam est
150 principiumimmediatum,et quoddam mediatum. Principiumimmediatum est intellectus possibilis, specie intelligibilia fantasmatibus abstracta informatus,et hoc est principiumprimum. Et hoc modo cognoscitseipsam et sui ipsius actualem existenciam per suam potentiam
et naturam,et hoc remoteet indirecte.Et sic verumest dictumAugus155 tini. Principium vero mediatum est ipsa essentia anime.
2. Ad aliud quod arguebaturprimo contra dictumrespondentis.Dixit
enim quod anima nullo modo potest cognoscere essentiam suam nisi
per aliquam speciem vel formamsupervenientem.
Contra. Species intelligibilissuperveniens,illa est medium inter in160 tellectumintelligentem,sive essentiam anime, et rem intellectam.Sed
inter intellectum anime et suam essentiam nihil cadit medium quia
sunt immediatissima. Ergo anima intelligitse per essentiam suam.
Solutio. Verum est, ilia species est medium. Et propinquum,et non
151 abstracta]abstracte
21Aristotle,
Topics, II, 3; iiobi8.
39

23:22:22 PM

remotum,quia non est similitudeobiectiremoti.Propterhoc, hoc modo

165 non cadit medium.
3. Ad illud: "Si anima cognoscit se per speciem, aut illa species erit
species sua aut species obiecti. Si erit species sua tunc aut esset species
abstracta aut infusa aut concreata, sive naturaliter indita. Non est
abstracta quia sic abstracta haberet se a seipsa, quod est impossibile
170 quia abstraccio est rei materialis ut fiat immaterialis.Nec est species
infusa quia de talibus non loquimur in statu vie. Nec est species concreata vel naturaliterindita quia tali specie intelligitangelus. Ergo non
est species sua. Nec est species obiecti, quia propriumobiectum anime
intellective est quidditas rei immaterialis,et per talem speciem cog175 nosciturmagis ipsum obiectum quam essentia anime. Ergo anima non
intelligitse per speciem vel formamsupervenientem".
Solutio. Dicendum quod intelligitse per speciem obiecti non directe
sed indirecte et per reflexionemet representacionemproporcionis,ut
declaratum est.22
180 4. Ad aliud, quando dicitur: "Illud quod intelligitse mediante diffinitione intelligitse per essentiam suam, quia secundum Philosophum,
7 Metaphysice,diffinitioest sermo indicans essentiam rei.23Sed anima
sui
cognosciturmediante diffinitionequia ipsa cognoscit diffinicionem
De
circa
secundi
a
tam
illam
datur
Philosopho
principium
que
ipsius,
194va Anima quod anima est actus corporis etc.,24et illa que datur /ab
25
Augustino quod anima est quedam substantia incorporea, intellectualis, illuminacionem a Primo ultima percepcione recipiens. Ergo
cognoscitseipsam per essentiam suam".
Postea solvitur.2
190 5. Preterea. Nos dicimus quod angelus intelligitse propterduo, primo
quia est immaterialis, secundo quia est in actu. Sed ista duo etiam
invernoin anima quia immaterialis,ut docet Philosophus in De Anima,27et est etiam in actu. Et magis est in actu quam angelus quia quod
166 cognoscit.
187 recipiens]
recepta
22In thebodyofthequestion,at "Probacioprimi..
23Aristotle,
VII, 5; X03iai3. See also Topics,I, 5; ioib37Metaphysics,
24Aristotle,
De Anima,II, i; 4123.28.
25De Spirituet Anima (apocryphal),
cap. 8; in J.-P. Migne,PatrologiaLatina
(Paris,1844-64),vol. 40, col. 781.
* Ad 20.
27Aristotle,
De Anima,III, 4; 429ai3-b2340

23:22:22 PM

est in potentia vivens facitactu vivens. Et est actus primusinquantum

195 facit ipsum corpus vivere. Ergo intelligitse per essentiam suam.
Solutio. Dicendum est quod verum est quod conveniant in immaterialitate et etiam actu. Tamen multum differuntin modo participandi
naturam immaterialitatiset actus. Et ideo non est similis.
6. Preterea. Prius potest cognosci a priori. Sed essentia anime est
200 priorilia specie. Ergo prius intelligitse quam illam speciem.
Postea solvitur.28
7. Ad aliud quando arguebatur contra dictum. Dixit enim quod
unumquodque cognosciturprout est in actu.
Contra. Si unumquodque cognosciturprout est in actu, ergo quod
maxime
est in actu maxime est cognoscibile. Sed Deus est maxime in
205
actu. Ergo Deus est maxime cognoscibilis.Et tenes hoc argumentum
per argumentumPhilosophi: Si simpliciterad simpliciter,et magis ad
magis,et maxime ad maxime.29Sed hoc est falsum,quia Deum in statu
vie non cognoscimus. Ergo etc.
210
Solutio. Dicendum est quod Deus est maxime in actu et propterhoc
maxime cognoscibilisverum sibi et non nobis.
8. Preterea. Omnis cognicioest per assimilacionem.Sed maior assimilado potentie ad essentiam quam ad obiectum. Ergo anima intelligit
se per essentiam suam.
Ad solutionemistius argumentiet aliorum multorumnotandum est
215
de similitudine quod per eam multi fallunt et falluntur,quia dicit
Augustinus expresse in Libro de Trinitate quod similitudo est mater
falsitatis.30Et probat hoc de arbore piet et de arbore vera. Dicunt
enim multi: Sicut se habet hoc ad hoc, sic illud ad illud. Unde notan220 dum, sicut dicit Boecius in Thopicis, quod similitudo est rerumdifferenciumeadem qualitas.31 Et ideo videtis quod in parte congruuntet
in parte differunt.Unde male arguitur si in aliquibus est similitudo
ydentitatis,vel unius nature vel unius generis,et propterhoc arguunt
eandem cognitionem. Unde cognicio aliquorum super similitudinem
in margine
207 ad simpliciter

212 assimilado]assimiliacio

28Ad 12.
29Aristotle,
Tobies,V, 8: i^7b^5-x^8a2.
30IX, ii, 16.
31In Topica CiceronisCommentaria,
lib. II; in PatrologiaLatina,vol. 64, col.
1065.
41

23:22:22 PM

225 fundatur.Similiterunio aliquorum fundatursuper similitudinem.Ideo,

quando dicitur "Omnis cognitio etc./1 dicendum quod in cognitione
tria inveniuntur,scilicet actus, medium, et modus. Et ex partiali similitudine arguunt ipsi omnimodam similitudinem.Et ideo fallunt et
falluntur.Et, quando dicitur "Maior est assimilado etc.", dicendum
230 quod non est verum quia sola similitudoinformacionis,secundum quod
species intelligibilisinformatintellectum,intelligibilisest.
Vel sic dicendum quod verum quantum ad causam et effectum,sed
maior est assimilado potentie ad obiectum quantum ad perfectionem.
9. Preterea. Quod anima sit illud quod cognoscituret quo cognoscitur
235 sic probatur. Eadem est anima separata et corpori coniuncta. Sed
anima separata intelli&itse per essentiam suam. Ergo et corporiunita.
Verum est. Tarnen essentia anime non est nata informareintellectum. Sed alium modum essendi habet a corpore separata et corpori
coniuncta; et ideo etiam habebit alium modum intelligendi.
240 10. Ad idem dicitur in primo De Causis 32 quod omnis intelligencia
194vb intelligitessentiam suam. Sed anima est infima in genere/intelligenciarum. Et ibidem in Commentodiciturquod intelligentia,quando seit
essentiam suam, seit reliquas res. Ergo anima est illud quod cognoscit
seipsum.
Solutio. Dicendum quod illud verum est de anima mundi, de qua
245
loquitur auctor ibi, quia loquitur ibi de anima nobili, qualis non est
anima humana.
Vel, si anima humana sic intelligit,verum est non ad virtutemsed
ad apprehensionem.
250 ii. Preterea.Augustinusin De Trinitate 33dicit quod accio intellectus
est vita. Sed vivere est viventibusesse. Ergo vita eritessentia. Sed vita
intelligitur.Ergo anima intelligitse per essentiam suam.
Solutio. Dicendum quod concretiveloquitur. "Est vita". Id est, res
habens vitam. "Essentia". Id est, res habens essentiam. Sed dico quod
255 anima intelligitse posterius.
12.

Contra. Actus posterioressunt potentiis,et hiis obiecta. Sed ani-

227 partiali]prirt
235 sic]sicut
32PropositioIII.
33X, 4, 6; X, ii, 8.

250 dicit.
255 intelligit]
intelligat

42

23:22:22 PM

ma est subiectumsuarum potentiarum.Ergo non intelligitse posterius.

Solutio. Dicendum quod actus posterisunt potentiisquoad originem,
quia actus originantura potentiis; sed non quoad cognitionem,quia
260 actus prius cognoscunturquam potentie, et per cognitionemactuum
deveniturin cognitionempotentiarum.
13. Preterea. Ea que sunt in genere remoto plus differuntquam ea
que sunt in generepropinquo. Sed illa que sunt in eodem genere,species
unius non ducit in cognitionemalterius, sicut per speciem leonis non
265 cognosciturbos vel homo, que conveniuntin genere proximo.Ergo per
speciem intelligibilemnon cognoscituressentia rei immaterialis.Sed
anima est immaterialis.Ergo non cognoscitse per speciem abstractam.
Solutio. Dicendum quod proporcio non solum est incerta quando
sunt in genere propinquo sed etiam incerta quando sunt in genere
270 remoto.Et ideo, licet illa non sit proportionatadirecte,tarnenindirecte.
Vel aliter dicendum quod anima non dicitur cognosci per speciem intelligibilemrei sensibilis tanquam propriam similitudinem sed per
quandam analogiam perfectibilis ad suam perfectionem,sicut et
materia cognosciturper formamsuam.
275 14. Preterea. Unumquodque cognosciturab anima prout presens est
anime. Sed anima est presens intellectui. Ergo intelligitse per essentiam suam.
Solutio. Dicendum quod non presens sibi ut obiectum intelligibilis
informansintellectum.Et ideo non sequitur.
280 15. Preterea. Anima intelligitper abstraccionem a fantasmate. Sed
ipsa non abstrahit se a fantasmate. Ergo nullo modo intelligitse
per essentiam suam per species aliorum.
Solutio. Dicendum quod verum est non abstrahit se a fantasmate
suo, sed rei aliene, scilicet obiecti. Et ideo non cognosciturper se pro285 prie, sed remote et indirecte.
16. Preterea. Anima intelligitse per actum suum. Sed ille actus habet
alium actum, et ille iterum alium. Et sic erit processus in infinitum.
Ergo non intelligitse per actum suum.
Solutio. Dicendum quod non per alium actum sed per obiectum.
290 17. Preterea.Illud quod est denudatum a condicionibusmaterieindividuantibus est per se intelligibile.Anima est huiusmodi. Ergo etc.
43

23:22:22 PM

Solutio. Notandum quod "per se" distinguiturcontra "per accidens"

et contra "per aliud". Unde dicendum quod denudata est condicionibus materie quoad suum esse sed non quoad suum cognoscere, quia
omnis
nostra cognicio oritura sensibus.
295
18. Preterea. Anima intelligitse aut per essentiam aut per speciem.
Si per essentiam, habeo propositum.Si per speciem, tunc ilia aut est
eadem aut differens.Si est eadem, sic iterum habeo propositum. Si
tunc non intelligitse per essentiamquia in eis que . . . materia
differens,
300 idem erit.
Supra solutum est,34quia non intelligit se cognitione propria sed
proportionisremote.
19. Preterea. Sicut se habet sol ad aerem, sic se habet intellectus
agens ad intellectum possibilem. Sed sol immediate illumint aerem.
305 Ergo intellectus agens immediate informatintellectum.Ergo non intelligitse per speciem.
Solutio. Dicendum quod aer proportionatusest, et ideo lumen in aere
est
195
/accidentale quia aliud est in sole et aliud in aere, quia in sole
diciturlux et in aere diciturlumen. Et ideo licet sit aliquo modo simile
310 non est tamen omnmoda similitudo.
Preterea. Scientia de anima est certissima, secundum Philosophum in primo De Anima.35Sed magis certum non cognosciturper
minus certum. Ergo de anima non habtur scientia per aliud a seipsa.
Solutio. Dicendum quod secundum Philosophum scientia de anima
est
certissimaquod unusquisque in seipso experiturse animam habere,
315
et actus anime sibi inesse. Sed cognoscere quid sit anima difficilimum
est
est. Unde Philosophus ibidem subiungit quod omnino difficilimum
accipere aliquam fidemde ipsa.38
20.

21. Preterea. Omnis species per quam anima nostra intelligitest a

320 sensibus abstracta. Sed nullum sensibile est a quo anima possit suam
299 In eis,e dehtmest
299 ] item
303 animaadd. post pretrea

in .
308 secundum
3*9 a .

M Ad 3.
34Aristotle,
De Anima,I, 1; 42.
,e Ibid.; 402a10.
44

23:22:22 PM

quidditatemvel speciem abstrahere.Ergo anima non cognoscitseipsam

per aliquam similitudinem.
Solutio. Dicendum quod anima non cognosciturper speciema sensibus abstractam quasi intelligaturspecies ilia esse anima similitudo,sed
325 quia considerando naturam speciei que a sensibilibus abstrahitur invenitur natura anime in qua huiusmodi species recipitur, sicut ex
formacognosciturmateria.
Windsor, Ont., Canada
Universityof Windsor

45

23:22:22 PM

Vivarium
XV, i (1977)
An Unedited Sophism by Marsilius
' Homo est bos'1

of Inghen:

E. P. BOS

1. Purpose of this article

this article it is my intentionto edit a short sophism ascribed to
In the fourteenthcentury philosopher and theologian Marsilius of
Inghen, and to comment on its text.
The text is to be found in codex 1939 of the JagiellonicLibrary of
'
'
Cracow. By way of the (false) proposition homoestbos threedifferent
theoriesand rules of logic are put into practice. In the first,and foremost place Marsilius' theory about the character of the oratioinfinitiva and, as a closely related topic, of the propositionis broughtto the
fore. Secondly, Marsilius deals with the criteria of application of the
'
well-known rule of inference quando alterum, etc*, which has been
.2 Thirdly,
formulatedfor the firsttime by Aristotle in his Categories
Marsilius discusses the supposition of terms in propositionswith the
verb 'differ.
Descriptionof themanuscript; textof thesophism
2.1. Descriptionof themanuscript3
The sophism is foundin manuscriptCracow, Bibliotkafagiellonska,
1939 BB XXVI 5, on f. g6v. Accordingto the catalogue: paper-codex,
dating fromthe year 1408, in quarto, pp. 293 (but conferthe remark
below), 2 leaves of parchmentand 40 pp. of paper blank at the beginning and at the end. The manuscript was writtenby two different
scribes,both handwritingsin a regulargothiccursiveand rathersimilar
in character. The first handwriting(A) is on ff.I2r-45v and on ff.
58r-i5ov. The other hand (B) is on ff.46r-57v and on ff. i5ov-i58r.
1 I sincerely
to Professor
De Rij (Leiden)
wishto acknowledge
myindebtedness
thisarticle,and to
and advise I receivedwhilewriting
forthe encouragement
MrE. P. Kwaadgras(Leiden)forimproving
myEnglish.
2 Aristotle,
, ch. 3, 1 b 9-13.
Categories
3 W. Wislock,Catal.cod.mss.,Bibl. Univ.Jag.Cra.II. See alsoM. Markowski,
w Polscew OkresiePrzedkopernikaskim
II),
(Stadia Copernicana
Burydanizm
Wrociaw-Warszawa-Krakw-Gdask,
1971, pp. 18, 333, 335-7, 348, 367.
itself.
I couldnotinspectthemanuscript
Unfortunately
2.

46

23:22:28 PM

There are two numerationson each folio. One counts the pages (the
total number of which is 293), and is corrected by another one, that
counts the folia as usual. I have preferredthis last numeration.
The contentsof the manuscript are as follows:
On the cover: Questionessuper suppositioneset notabilia quedam.
On the parchmentat the beginningin another hand of the fifteenth
'
century,the words liberfacultatisartium are read togetherwith two
paragraphs of logical content. These Latin texts are followedby a
partly stained - text in Hebrew.
1. ff.ir-iiv
2. ff.I2r-43v

blank.
Questioneson the suppositionesby Marsilius of
Inghen.

The text ends abruptly.

3. ff.44r-45v
4. ff.46r-57v
5. ff.58r~77v
6. ff.77r-82v
7. ff.83-93

blank
Questiones on the consequentieby
Inghen.
Questiones on the ampliationes by
Inghen.
Questiones on the restrictionesby
Inghen.
Questiones on the appellationes by
Inghen.

Marsilius of
Marsilius of
Marsilius of
Marsilius of

On folio 93v we find this instructive explicit: 'Et sic terminantur

questiones tractatuum Reverendi magistiMarsilii de Inghen suppositionum, ampliationum,restrictionumet appellationum compilate per
magistrmJohannem Parisyensem, scripte vero per Mathiam de Zar
in studio Pragensi anno domini MCCCC0VIII etcetera. Deo laus sit
per infinitascula seculorum. Amen'.
8. ff.94r-g6v
9. f. g6y
10. ff.97r-nov
11. ff.iiov-inr
12. f. iiiv

Paralogismi by master Conrad of Zoltaw of

Prague.
Sophisma magisti Marsilii de Inghen (= our
sophism).
Sophismata by John of Hockeleym.
Several logical proceduresto prove the truthof
a sophism.
Scheme of principia causandi, essendi et cognoscendi.
47

23:22:28 PM

13- ff.Ii2r-ii7v
14. ff.Ii8r-i22r

blank
Dubia magistiJohannis et cathedratiParysiensis .4
Dubia collected fromquestions on the tracts of
Peter of Spain, magisterCristianus5 Parisiensis.

15. ff.I22r-i50r

The text ends abruptly.

16. ff.I50v-I58r So-phismataby an unknown master.
In the texts numbered 4, 5, 6 and 7 the questionesalternate with
so-phismata.
The handwritingwhich we call A is dated 1408, as can be read in the
explicit on f. 93v. Mathias de Zar, the scribe of A, wrote our sophism.
The otherhandwritingbears no date. The fact that the questions on
the consequences by Marsilius of Inghen have been writtenby a differentscribe, mightreflectsomething of the complicated constitution
of Marsilius' logical work, the TractatusParvorumlogicalium.
2.2.

Edition of thetext
SOPHISMA

MAISTRI

MRSILU

DE INGHEN

'Homo est bos'.

(I) Probatur sic: quicumque dicit hominemesse bovem, dicit verum,
igitur homo est bos. Consequentia tenet. Antecedens patet, nam qui5 cumque dicit hominemesse animal, dicit verum. Sed quicumque dicit
hominem esse bovem, dicit hominem esse animal. Igitur etcetera.
(II) Secundo sic: homo est animal, animal est bos, igiturhomo est
bos, per regulam 'quando alterum,etcetera'.
(III) Tertio sic: homo est omne animal, igiturhomo est bos. Conse10 quentia tenet. Antecedens probatur: homo non differab omni animali, et homo est, et omne animal est, igitur homo est omne animal.
Consequentia tenet ab exponentibusad expositam. Et antecedens pro4 Cathedratus,
Salimb. Chron.,p. 222, 7;
i.e. cathedradocentium
instrutus,
bis
Wrterbuch
cathedratus
Parisius,p. 229, 8, in: Mittellateinisches
magister
zum ausgehendes13. Jahrhundert,
hrsg.von der Bay. Ak. der Wiss. und
DeutschenAk. Wiss.zu Berlin,Mnchen,1968.
'Cristianus'is written.
is meant(. note3). . L. M.
Perhaps'cathedratus'
SummuleLogicales,First
caUedafterwards
de Rij, Peterof Spain, Tractatus,
Assen1972,p. LVI.
criticaledition
fromthemanuscripts,
I willdeal withthisquestionin greaterdetailin the thesisI am preparing,
entitled:Marsiliusof Inghen,TractatusparvorumLogicalium,
provisionally
witha commentary.
a criticaleditionfromthemanuscripts
48

23:22:28 PM

15

20

25

30

35

batur, quia, si homo differtab omni animal, tunc differta se ipso.

Quod est falsum.
(ad I) Improbatur: nullum rationale est bos, etcetera, dicitur negando sophisma. Et negatur maior, scilicet 'quicumque dicit hominem
esse bovem,dicitverum'. Ad oppositum: quicumque dicit hominemesse
'
animal, dicit verum. sta est distinguenda: hoc quod dicitur hominem
'
esse animal supponit materialitervel personaliter.Si materialiter,sic
est vera, et est sensus quod quicumque dicit istam propositionem' homo
est animal', dicit verum, et ita est. Si personaliter,tunc est falsa, et
est sensus: quicumque dicit hanc rem, scilicet ' hominemesse animal'
dicit verum, et in isto sensu est falsum,quia res que est ' hominemesse
animal', non est nisi homo.
Et ad minorem: 'quicumquedicit hominemesse bovem, dicit hominem
'
esse animal potest distingui sicud prima: sensus materialis est ista:
'
quicumque dicit istam propositionem homo est bos', dicit hanc pro'
positionem homoestanimal' et in isto sensu est falsa. Sensus personalis
est iste: quicumque dicit hanc rem que est (hominemesse bovem', dicit
hanc rem que est ' hominemesse animal' , et hoc est falsum,quia 'hominem esse bovem'nichil est.
(ad II) Ad secundam : nego consequentiam. Dico quod regula intelligitur in predicationibus directis affirmativisde recto et terminis
eodem modo supponentibus.
'
(ad III) Ad tertiam: nego antecedens et quando dicitur: homonon
ab omni animali' , negaturhoc. Ad oppositum: si homo differtab
differt
omni animali, differta se ipso. Negatur hoc. Et causa est quia ly
'
'
animali in ista propositione ' homodiffertab omni animali' supponit
determinateet sic non valet consequentia, igitur etcetera.
18 hoc quod dicitur]perhoc quod dicitMs.
3. Commentaryon thesophism
remarks
Introductory
During the fourteenthcentury the sophisma was of increasing importance in logic and semantics. John Buridan's (ca. 1300-ca. 1358)
collection of Sophismata (tract IX of his Summula de dialctica) is in
fact an advanced treatise in the theoryof language.7 A sophisma can
be defined as T. K. Scott does in the introductionto his translation
3.1.1.

7 JohnBuridan,Sophismson
Meaningand Truth,translatedand with an
introduction
by T. K. Scott,New York,1966,p. 5.
49

23:22:28 PM

of Buridan's Sophismata:8 'propositions,seeming to follow fromwellestablished rules, which yet are somehow unacceptable or present
special problems.They are used primarily,but not exclusively,forthe
testingand application of logical rules'.
Thus the emphasis is laid on the application of rules, on the correct
solution and formationof the sophism.9The initial propositionof the
sophism, meanwhile,can be either true or false.
I mentionedJohn Buridan in the firstparagraph because of his importance in fourteenthcenturylogic, but also because he has influenced
Marsilius' logical theoriesin many ways. For Buridan, as forhis other
pupil, Albertof Saxony, sophismatatake an importantplace.10Buridan
even includes the insolubilia in his Sophismata.11
Generallyspeaking one could say that the intricatenessand number
of the sophisms in each work increase in the course of the fourteenth
century.12In comparison with this, our sophism is rathersimple.
3.1.2. Marsilius of Inghen, life and workson logic.
First I will give some informationon the lifeof Marsiliusof Inghen,
depending almost totally on Gerhard Ritter's book 'Marsilius von
Inghen und die OkkamistischeSchule in Deutschland'.13Marsiliuswas
born ca. 1330-1340near Nijmegen (the Netherlands).He was educated
at the Universityof Paris, where he obtained his Master of Arts degree
in 1362. Most probably he attended the lectures of Buridan. He must
also have been acquainted with Albert of Saxony.14Between 1379 an(l
1386 we loose track of Marsilius. Presumably he was in Italy, as a
partisan of the Italian pope Urbanus VI. In 1386 he reappears as the
8 Ibidem;Scott, in his introduction
gives a good surveyof the place of
He adds an excellent
inMedievalPhilosophy.
(pp. 3-6).
sophismata
bibliography
9 Cp. JohnBuridan,Sophismata,ch. 1, initialsentence.
I consultedMS
Scott'seditionofthetext(withan introduction)
Erfurt,F 302,ff.I55ra-i9ivb.
und Logik
is announcedin the series'Grammatica
, Sprachtheorie
speculativa'
von Jan Pinborg
des Mittelalters.
Texte und Untersuchungen.
Herausgegeben
Band I. Stuttgart.
in Verbindung
mitH. Kohlenbererer,
10Albertusde Saxonia, Sophismata
, Parisius, 1502 (ReprintHildesheimNew York,1975).The bookalso containsAlbert'sInsolubiliaand Obligationes,
on thetitle-pageofthereprint.
notmentioned
wrongly
11Ch. 8.
12N. Kretzman,Historyof Semantics
, in: The Encyclopediaof Philosophy,
ed. P. Edwards,London-NewYork,1967.
13Sitzungsberichte
Philoder HeidelbergerAkademieder Wissenschaften,
Klasse,4 (1921).
sophisch-Historische
14E. Gilson,La philosophie
au MoyenAge, Paris,21962,p. 680.
50

23:22:28 PM

firstrectorof the Universityof Heidelberg. In 1395/6he has preceeded

to the degreeofMaster ofTheology. Some monthslater he dies (August
20th, 1396).
Most probably Marsilius composed his tracts on logic during his
sojourn in Paris, perhaps in the six year-periodafter his graduation:
the oldest manuscriptof the Parva LogicaLia is dated 1382.15He was
rectorof the Universityof Paris in 1367 and 1371, and fromthis time
onwards he became very much occupied by universitypolitics; six
years' teaching in the Faculty of Arts was a usual prerequisiteforthe
study of theology.16On the other hand, as far as I can see now, no
manuscript containinghis logical works is of Parisian origin,as one
mighthave expected.
The sophism published in this article is the only one ascribed to
Marsilius, as far as I have been able to ascertain. The sophism is
authentic,as will be the conclusion of this essay, and should probably
be broughtin connectionwith Marsilius1tract on consequences.
3.2.1. Commentaryon lines 3-6 (I) and 15-31 {ad I)
The sophism as a whole consists of two parts: firstcome the argumentsto prove the truthof the initial proposition,then the arguments
to disprove it. The subdivisions of both parts correspond.I will take
each subdivision of the probaiio togetherwith its counterpartin the
improbatio.
3.2.1.1. The firstsection of the improbatioputs forwardthe theory
that given the spoken or writtenproposition'quicumquedicithominem
esse animal, dicitverum', the accusative and infinitivephrase 'hominem
esse animal', i.e. the content of 'dicit', can be conceived in two ways
(probably, the theory is also meant to be operative in propositions
with 'scio', 'credo', etc.): firstit can stand in material supposition: in
that case it stands for the spoken or written proposition ' homo est
anim. In that case, the phrase 'quicumquedicit,etc,'is true: materially conceived 'hominemesse animal' is bearer of truth.
On the other hand, the accusativus cum infinitivocan stand in personal supposition. Conceived like that 'hominemesse animal' is a res,
in this case : homo.
In the section of lines 25-31 (ad I) we come across this same opinion
concerningthe phrase 'hominemesse bovem'.Taken materiallythe sense
15Mnchen,
CLM 4385.
16D. Knowles,The Evolutionof Medieval
New York, 1962,p. 174.
Thought,
51

23:22:28 PM

'
is: homo est bos', which is false. Conceived personally the sense of
'
hominemesse bovem'is nichil: not a thingin the outside world.
3.2.1.2. What has been said above can be compared with the remarks Marsilius makes in his tract on consequences.17He has defined
there the consequentiabona as follows: 'cuius antecedens sic se habet,
quod impossibileest qualitercumque per ipsum pronuncsecundum eius
totalem significationemsic esse significato, quin ita sit sicudpro eodem
nunc qualitercumque secundum eius totalemsignificationemper conse. This is Marsilius' finaldefinitionafterseveral aborquens significatur'
tive attemps. Nevertheless, there is an objection: according to the
words of Marsilius' definitionthe followinginferencewould be valid:
'
homoest et asinus est, ergohomoest asinus'. The opponent continues:
'
'
if 'homoestasinus only signifies hominemesse et asinum esse', then we
have proved the validity of the inferencein accordance with the definition, because the antecedent and the consequent signifythe same. If
'
the consequent, in addition,means somethingmore,viz. hominemesse
'
'
asinum', then we have a difficulty,because hominemesse asinum is
nichil, so it can not signify.Because, they argue, if it was something,
'
it would be homo existensasinus' , and this is an impossibility.The
opponent identifiesthe proposition,or the content of it, as sign, with
a term,in casu: the substantive name, as sign; a quite usual, but
Marsilius agrees to this,so that we have to
dubious identification.18
interpretthe res mentioned in the sophism as' homoexistens(or:ens)
'
animal a substantival name to which an adjective is added by way of
a participle.
The conclusion of the opponent is that the firstinterpretationof the
consequent should be followed,which involves difficultiesfor Marsilius' definition.
It should be noticed here that in Marsilius' theory (as is the case
with John Buridan's), the oratioinfinitivimodi refersin personal supposition (or, as Buridan expresses it: significative)to the same thing
as the propositionitself.
Some logicians, adheringto the definitionmentioned,do affirmthat
'
the consequent means hominemesse asinum', and they call this a
. Clearly,Marsiliusrefersto the theoryof Gregory
complexesignificabile
of Rimini (d. 1358 ; the theoryon the complexesignificabileis foundin
17Marsiliusof Inghen, Tractatusprimepartis consequentiarum
, in: codex
Uppsala,U.B., C. 640,f.4V.
18N. Kretzman,Medievallogicianson themeaningof theproposiho,
m: The
of
767-78767 (1970)PPJournal Philosophy,
52

23:22:28 PM

his Commentary on the Sentences composed shortly before 1345.19

'
Marsiliusanswers that the consequent homoestasinus' signifies'hominem esse asinum' (' significare in the sense of the word for which e.g.
'
'
dicere could be substituted: it is what the propositionsays), and in'
deed, this nichil, potestesse', but still this can be signified,because
it is sufficientthat it can be imagined. (This apparent contradiction
'
'
can, in my opinion, only be resolved by taking significare the second
time as meaning more or less our lto be about'.20)The intellect ranges,
'
Marsiliusadds, over the ymaginabilia'. Of course, the human formand
the formof an ass can be in the same materia,if we speak naturaliter.
3.2.1.3 By comparing the section of the sophism under discussion
with the text in the tract on consequences we have come upon an
extensionof Marsilius'theory.There is significancewithoutreferenceto
existentsin the outer world. This is a problem that also arrested the
attention of John Buridan, as well as logicians in the fifteenthand
sixteenthcentury.We may compare this case with the significatioof a
name of fiction,like 'chimera, especially because the oratio infinitiva
'hominemesse asinum' had been reduced to 'homo existensasinus' , as
has been mentioned above. In both cases, the fiction name neither
does nor can referto one concrete thing in the world. John Buridan
and Marsilius agree in that respect, but they differon the point that
Marsilius says that the term in itselfsignifies,viz. a res ymaginataor
res ymaginativa.
Professor Pinborg (Copenhagen) drew my attention to an anonymous commentary (<questiones
) on Thomas of Erford,21in which the
differencebetween Buridan and Marsiliushas been pointed out neatly:
followingMarsilius,the commentatorsays, the nominaficta can signify
per se, because the will can want that impossibilia can be understood
by the intellect. Marsilius puts the primacy of the will.22It would not
be beside the point to say that Marsilius recognisedsomethinglike a
'non-complexesignificabile', a notion that can be found again in postmedieval logic.23
19Ed. Venetiis,1522(ReprintNewYork,1955).On thetheoryofthecomplexe
see especially:H. Elie, Le complexesignificabile
, Paris, 1936,
significabile,
andMedieval
Theories
Ancient
pp. 17-37,an<3: G. Nuchelmans,
oftheproposition.
andfalsity,
Amsterdam-London,
conceptions
ofthebearers
oftruth
1973,pp. 22723720N. Kretzman,op. cit.(cf.note17),esp. pp. 785 and 786.
21Ms. Wroclaw,U.L., IV Q 81 b, f. 266'.
22Ritter,op. cit.,p. 15iff.
23E. J. Ashworth,
Languageand Logicin thePost-Medieval
period,Dordrecht,
1974,p. 48.
S3

23:22:28 PM

The anonymous commentatorgoes on to say that Buridan puts the

case that impossibiliacan not be understood; they do no signifyper se
but only 'consecutive',i.e. followingthe mental concepts as far as they
are constituentsof the nominal definition.This is in agreementwith
what Buridan himselfsays in the Sophismatai24'homohinnibilis'signifies all men and all asses, but stands for nothing. 'Chimera' signifies
everything,because the determination'chimera' is not determinable,
as John puts it, but the term stands fornothing.
The interpretationof the personal supposition (Buridan says: the
significativeuse) as well as of the materialsuppositionofthe accusative
and infinitivephraseby Buridan and Marsiliusis principallythe same.
Buridan gives a more detailed description (e.g. about the relation
between spoken and written in contradistinctionto mental propositions,which are the primarybearers of truthand falsity),but what is
known so far about Marsilius' theoryfitsin well with this.25Professor
Nuchelmans gives an excellent examination of Buridan's view.28
The differencein opinion between Marsilius and Buridan concerns
names that do not denote, and this is an importanttopic, already in
Buridan's as well as in Marilius' point of view.
3.2.1.4. The interpretationof the phrase 'hominemesse animal' has
its counterpartin the theory about the object of knowledge Marsilius
In the
develops in his Questionessuper quattorlibros S ententiarum.2'1
third'suppositio' Marsiliusputs the case that the 'immediate'object of
assent is the proposition. This is the obiectumscientie,the bearer of
truthand falsity.The 'remote'objects are the termsof the proposition,
as faras theyare signs of things.The 'mostremoteani ultimate,although
most intended' object is the 'res significata incomplexa per terminos
saltem in affirmativisde inesse et de presenti'.Marsilius attacks in
ample discussion Gregoryof Rimini's theory of the complexe significabile.
In this discussion Marsilius, as is manifest,sides with the so-called
'terminists'(who characterisethe propositionin termsofitsconstituents
i.e. the terms),in contradistinctionwith the 'dictists'(who define the
proposition in terms of its signification),among whom Gregory of
Rimini should be reckoned: a theoryof referenceis opposed to a theory
24Ed. Scott,ch. i.
25A good editionof e.g. Marsilius'Commentary
is still
on the Metaphysics
on theMetaphysics).
needed(Buridan'stheoryis in his commentary
2* G. Nuchelmans,
oi>.cit.,p. 248ft.
27 Straszburg,
1501 (reprinted
Frankfurt,
1966),LiberI, q. 2, art.3 (f. I2rass).
54

23:22:28 PM

of sense, though both theories are in fact complementary.28Marsilius

sides with Buridan in their opposition against Gregory.29
3.2.2. Commentaryon lines y-8 (II) and lines 32-34 (ad II)
'
In the second part of the sophism the well-knownrule quando alterum,etc.*is applied. The firstto formulatethis rule was Aristotlein
the 'Categories' In an abbreviation on the old and new logic Marsilius
gives the complete formula,togetherwith a commentary,that is also
usefulforthe understandingof our sophism: 'Regule etiam que ponuntur due: quando alteram predicatur de altero ut de subiecto (id est:
quando superius predicatur de inferiori),tunc omnia que predicantur
de predicato etiam predicantur de subiecto. Et intellige quod quecumque predicatur de predicato predicatione quidditativa et directa,
omnia predicanturde subiecto.31
Marsilius adds two conditions to this rule. In the firstplace, it con'
cerns predicatiodirecta, i.e. essential predication,as can be gathered
from the commentary abovementioned by Marsilius ('e should be
taken as explicative) and fromJohn Dorp's commentaryon the Perutile compendiumtotiuslogice by John Buridan, where a non-essential
.32The premissesof the argumentshould
predicationis called 'indirect*
be in the affirmative,the terms in the nominative case. These terms
should stand in the same supposition,as the second conditionrequires.
It is clear that in the firstpremiss of the argumentof the probatiothe
'
'
'
'
supposition of animal is differentfrom the supposition of animal
'
'
'
(the middle termof the syllogism)in: animal est bos'. Animal in the
'
'
firstpremisswould probably be called standing determinateby Marsi'
'
lius, who is not explicit in this respect.33The second time, animal has
suppositio communisdeterminatapersonalis.
3.2.3. Commentaryon lines 9-14 (III) and lines 35-39 (ad III)
It is not easy to say with what particular part of his theoryor rule
of logic the third argumentof Marsilius' is concerned. Most probably
it elucidates the behaviour of propositions with the verb 'differ'in
inferences.
28N. Kretzman,op. cit.(cf.note17).
29For a fulldiscussion,
see G. Nuchelmans,
op. cit.,ch. 15.
30Ch. III, i b Qss.
31Ms. Toledo,Cab. 95-5,f. 8r.Date: XVthc.
'
32Ed. Venetiis,1499,TractII, commentary
on 'quandoalter
um,etcetera(the
incunabelhas no pagination).
33Tractatussuppositionum,
codexMnchenCLM 4385,f. 45v.
55

23:22:28 PM

1
Marsilius in the refutationpoints to two things: in homodifferab
'
'
omni animal*, animali has suppositio determinata**In this tract on
'
consequences, Marsilius explains : differincludes a negation,35as appears in the propositio exponens,the proposition that analyses the
initial proposition. John Buridan also points to this inclusion of a
negation.36The termin question, Buridan adds, should have the same
supposition as in the analysing propositions.37
4.

Conclusion

As appears fromthe precedingcommentary,there is no doubt that

this sophism is rightlyascribed to Marsiliusof Inghen. No part of it is
contradictoryto his other works.
The main interestof the sophism lies in Marsilius' interpretationof
the oratio infinitiva, and in this connection,in his theory about the
proposition.Marsiliussides with JohnBuridan, Andr de Neufchteau,
Pierre Ailly and Paul of Venice against the complexesignificabile
theoryof Gregoryof Rimini and his followers.38
In respect of the significationof non-denotingterms and accusative
and infinitiveconstructionsthat do not referto natural existingthings
in the outer world, Marsilius does not share his master's opinion. This
is another importantdifferencebetween the two logicians.39
As the interpretationof the propositionis problematic even nowadays, it is usefulto take good notice of the discussions between medieval logicians.40
Leiden
FilosofischInstituut,
Witte Singel 71.
34 Ib., f. 48v,rule16.
36 Tractatus
secundepartisconsequentiarum
(cf.note16),f. 28v.
3e Tractatusde suppositionibus,
primaedizionea cura di Mana Eleina Reina,
XII (1957)P- 33in: Rivistacriticadi storiadellafilosofia,
37In thetracton suppositions
to further
treatby Buridanthereis a reference
but Buridandoes notcarryout thispromise.
mentin theSophismata,
38G. Nuchelmans,
op. cit.,ch. 15.
39 E. P. Bos, JohnBuridanand Marsiliusof Inghenon consequences
, in: The
Logic of JohnBuridan,Acts of the 3rd EuropeanSymposiumon Medieval
1976,p. 61-69.
1975),Copenhagen,
Logic and Semantics
(Copenhagen
40H. Schepers,'HolkotcontradictaCrathorn
II': Dos 'signi
ficatumper prodenGegenstand
ber
Theorie
AufbauundKritikeinernominalistischen
positionem'
derGrresgesellschaft,
des Wissens',Philosophisches
79, 1972,p. 107.
Jahrbuch
56

23:22:28 PM

Vivarium
XV, i (1977)
Chimeras and Imaginary Objects: A Study in the
Post-Medieval Theory of Signification

E. J. ASHWORTH

I. PrefatoryNote
the followingpaper I shall be discussing a particular problem
In of meaning and referenceas it was formulated by a group of
logicians who studied and/ortaught at the Universityof Paris in
the early sixteenthcentury.1In alphabetical order they are: Johannes
Celaya (d. 1558) who was in Paris from 1500 or 1505 until 1524;
Ferdinandus de Enzinas (d. 1528) who was in Paris fromabout 1518
until 1522; John Major (1469-1550) who was in Paris from 1492 or
1493 until 1517 and again from 1525 to 1531; William Manderston
who taught at Sainte-Barbe fromabout 1514 and returnedto Scotland
in or shortlybefore 1530; Juan Martinez Siliceo (1486-1556) who left
Paris in about 1516; Hieronymus Pardo (d. 1502 or 1505); Antonius
Silvester who taught at Montaigu; and Domingo de Soto (1494-1560)
who left Paris in 1519. I shall also discuss the work of the Spaniard
Augustinus Sbarroya and the Germans Jodocus Trutvetter (d. 1519)
and Johannes Eckius (1486-1543). Both Sbarroya and Eckius were
well acquainted with the works of the Paris-trainedlogicians. Further
material is drawn fromthe fifteenth-century
Johannes Dorp and the
in primum
anonymous author of Commentumemendtumet correctum
et quartumtractatusPetri Hyspani. The work of the medieval authors
Robert Holkot, John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen will appear as
it was described by early sixteenth-centuryauthors.
Full details of the early printedtexts used will appear in the bibliography at the end of this paper. All other referenceswill be given in
full in the footnotes.
II. Introduction
One of the main featuresof late medieval semantics was the attempt
to formulatea unified theory of the referenceof general terms. It is
1 I wouldliketo thankthe Canada Councilforthe
generousfinancialsupport
whichmade the researchforthispaperpossible.
57

23:22:39 PM

true that this attempt was not explicitly discussed, but many of the
problems which arose in the context of such topics as signification,
supposition,ampliation, appellation, and the logical relationsbetween
sentences clearly owed their existence to the assumption that general
terms always referred to spatio-temporal individuals; and in the
solutions offeredto these problems, much ingenuity was employed
to ensure that this assumption was modified as little as possible, if
at all. I have already shown in two earlierpapers how some logicians
dealt with referencein the modal context "For riding is required a
horse" and in the intentional context "I promise you a horse." 2 At
the end of this paper, I shall discuss another intentional sentence,
"A man is imaginarily an ass", which was thought to present a
difficulty.However, it would be a mistake to think that context was
the only complicating factor, for there were general terms which
placed an obstacle in the path of those seeking a unifiedtheory,not
only by virtue of the contexts in which they appeared, but by virtue
of theirmeaning. The favouriteexample of such termswas "chimera",
but "irrational man", "braying man", and "golden mountain" also
served as illustrations.The problem was not merely that they failed
to refer,but ratherthat they were thoughtto be incapable of referring
because the objects which they apparently denoted were impossible
just as, forthe modern reader, a round square is impossible.The main
purpose of the presentpaper is to explore the way in whichthe problem
was presented,and some of the solutions which were offered.
First, somethingmust be said of the reasons late medieval logicians
had for assuming that the primary functionof a general term is to
referto some external object which is independent of the speaker.
One factor which should not be overlooked is the part played by
ordinarylanguage. It is natural to suppose that when sentences are
similar in surface structure they are similar with respect to their
presuppositions and the kinds of ontological commitment they
involve. Thus, "I look at a cow" and "I look for a cow", "I see a
horse" and "I imagine a horse" are sufficientlyalike for unsophisticated speakers to feel as committed to the existence of cows and
horses when they accept the second member of each pair as true as
'For
2 E. J. Ashworth,
: A Problemof Meaning
Riding is Requireda Horse*
andReference
in LateFifteenth
andEarlySixteenth
Century
Logic, in: Vivarium
'I PromiseYou a Horse': A SecondProblem
12 (1974),94-123;E. J. Ashworth,
and Early Sixteenth
in Late Fifteenth
Century
Logic,
ofMeaningand Reference
in: Vivarium14(1976),62-79,139-155.
58

23:22:39 PM

they do when they accept the first member. In this respect Latin
does not differfromEnglish, and it is easy to believe that medieval
logicians hoped to find an account of referencewhich would permit
them to treat pairs of sentences like those quoted above as similar
in theirstructureand function,while at the same time accommodating
the awkward fact that we can indeed look for and imagine the nonexistent,although we cannot look at or see it. The doctrineof ampliation seems to have been intended,in part at least, to achieve this end.
A second factorwhich must have been particularly influentialwas
the kind of epistemological theory espoused by those at Paris. It is
clear that there was wide agreementon two points. First, there is no
justificationforpopulating the universe with such mysteriousentities
as universais and complexesignificabilia,where these play the role of
propositionsin some modern theories. Second, our ability to speak a
language depends on the possession of concepts which in turn depend
on our having had the appropriate experience of objects which are
external to us. The casual remarks made by logicians in the course
of theirdiscussion of other subjects also give us importantclues about
theirattitudes. For instance, a number of people quoted Buridan with
approval as having said that the intellect could be moved only by
3
possible objects; it was claimed that the resulting concepts were
natural similitudes of the things signified; 4 and Sbarroya remarked
that the first thing that every intellect apprehends is being, "as
Avicenna and Duns Scotus say in a thousand places/' 5 None of these
remarks added up to a fully-fledgedepistemology, nor would this
have been appropriate in a logic text, but they reinforcethe assumption that using a term with meaning presupposes a relationship to
spatio-temporal individuals.
We must now consider medieval semantic doctrinesin more detail.
The primarynotion was that of significatio
, which I will translate as
rather
than
as
"signification"
"meaning" for reasons which will
become apparent. A distinctionwas drawn between nonsense words
such as "bu" and "baf", which do not signifyexcept in the limited
sense that they present themselves for inspection, and other words
such as "man", which do. "Signify" was defined as "to represent
3 Commentum
sign.S 8; Dorp,sign.1 5; Eckius, xcviv0;Major,iii, Martinez
Siliceo,lxxxvi.
4 Commentum,
sign. S 8. "... omnisconceptusest naturalissimilitudorei
modorei que non potestesse nulla est nec potestesse similitudo
significate,
aliqua."
6 Sbarroya,xxxix.
59

23:22:39 PM

some thing or some things or in some way to the cognitive power",

where "in some way" [aliqualiter] was introduced for the sake of
syncategorematic terms which are clearly neither nonsensical nor
referential.It was furtherexplained that to represent is to make
known.What a term signified was then discussed in a way that
mightlead one to suppose that a term's significationis nothingother
than its total denotation. However, at this point the modern reader
is faced with the complication that current distinctions between
intension and extension, sense and reference, or connotation and
denotation, do not seem to fit the medieval doctrine of signification.
To talk of a term's significationwas not to talk of its sense, since that
was provided by a term's definition,and what a term signifiedwas a
consequence of how a term was defined.7On the other hand, to talk
of a term's significationwas not just to talk of its extension, since
"
some, though not all, logicians agreed that such sentences as "Man"
"
signifies an animal" and "Man" signifiesSocrates" were false, and
"
could not be derived fromsuch true premisses as "Man" signifies
men" and "All men are animals." Nevertheless,whatever the precise
nuances of "signification",it remainsclear that to say a termsignified
was to say that it had referenceof some kind.
Hand-in-hand with the doctrine of significationwent the doctrine
of supposition, whereby a term was endowed with a particular reference in a particular context, though it should be noted here that a
distinctionwas oftendrawn between "acceptance", or what a termis
taken to refer to, and "supposition", or what a term succeeds in
referringto.8 Affirmativecategorical propositions were said to be
true if and only if both subject and predicate terms supposed forthe
same objects. Thus, "Some Canadians are French-speaking" is true
if and only if at least one memberof the class of Canadians is identical
with a member of the class of French-speakers.Obviously, the present
existence of the objects referredto was not always required. One can
uttertrue sentencesabout the past or about the future,and in these the
existence of the referentsis tied to the tense of the verbs. Moreover,
some contexts can extend the temporal range of a term's referencein
Celava,sign.A vii; Enzinas,Terminisign,a vi.
7 Dorp, sign,t 8. "... quedamest diffinitio
quid nominispropriedicta,et
et quomodoperdifiinitum
ista convertibiliter
et sinonime
qualiter
explicat
quid
''
significateimplicite.
8 For further
discussionof suppositionand acceptance,see E. J. Ashworth,
Period (Dordrecht-Holland/BostonLanguageand Logic in thePost-Medieval
U.S.A., D. Reidel PublishingCompany,1974)78ff.
60

23:22:39 PM

various ways, and the doctrine of ampliation was introduced to

codifythis.9 For instance, a verb of past time can ampliate the term
precedingit so that it refersto what was or still is a referentof that
term, and a verb of futuretime can ampliate the subject so that it
refersboth to what will be and to what now is. The subject term in
"Some man was marriedin 1970" is ampliated to the present,whereas
the subject term in "Some man was killed in 1970" is not. In the
presence of such verbs as "promise", "can be", "understand" and
"signify" it was thought that ampliation extended a term's range of
referenceto possible objects as well, though there was little or no
discussion of the ontological status of such objects. In other words,
fora termto be trulysaid to signify,it would be enough forit to have
potential reference. The differencebetween "I see a horse" and "I
imagine a horse" turnsout to be that the firstverb does not ampliate,
but the second does.
Let us now consider the significanceof these theories for the word
"chimera". There are two aspects of the problem, one concerningthe
theory of significationand one concerning the theory of truth. So
faras significationis concerned,the word is obviously not just another
nonsensesyllable like "bu" or "baf". The word appears in dictionaries,
and sentencescontainingit are understoodby speakers ofthe language.
Hence, "chimera" must be a fully-fledged
significativetermand, since
it is not syncategorematic,it must by definitionrepresentsome thing
orsome thingsto the cognitivepower.Yet those thingswhich"chimera"
is said to signifyare impossible, which is at variance with our basic
assumptions about how we acquire our concepts and come to use
wordsmeaningfully.As sixteenthcenturylogicians oftenput the point,
the term "chimera" signifieswhat is impossible, but the impossible
cannot be understood and cannot, therefore,be represented,so that
the definitionof "signify" as a kind of representingseems to be at
fault.10
So far as truth is concerned, the problem arose in the following
manner. Affirmativesentences containing terms which failed to refer
were said to be false, and their negations were accordinglytrue. Thus
"All chimeras are chimeras" is false, despite Boethius's claim that
nothingis truer than the sentence in which the same is predicated of
the same, and "No chimeras are chimeras" is true. This decision does
See E. J. Ashworth,
Languageand Logic,89ff.
10Celaya,sign.A viii;Enzinas,
Termini,
xxxviii;Silvester,
sign,a vii; Sbarroya,
sign. ivvof.Cf.Major,iivof.
61

23:22:39 PM

indeed do some violence to ordinary language, but it has the overwhelmingbenefitof providing a consistentinterpretationfor a series
of basic logical rules such as that licensing the inferencefrom "All
chimeras are chimeras" to "Some chimeras are chimeras." 11 However, there are some sentences which appear to be true, and whose
denial has no apparent advantage for our logical systems. These
"
sentences include "Chimera" signifies a chimera", "I imagine a
chimera" and "I understand what a chimera is." If we say that these
are false we violate our intuitions for no correspondingbenefit,and
if we say that they are true, we are immediately faced with the
question of what the second occurrenceof the term "chimera" refers
to in each case. We cannot appeal here to possible objects, since the
chimera is an impossible object.
III. The Definition of "Chimera"
In order to understand fullythe problem if the term "chimera" as
it presenteditselfto logicians in the late fifteenthand early sixteenth
centuries,we must firstask how the word was defined.Two answers
were given to this question, one answer having literaryantecedents
and the other only logical antecedents. I shall consider the literary
definition first. References were made to such diverse sources as
Ovid,12Virgil,Lucian, and the Koran,13and the consensus of opinion
was that a chimera is a monsterformedout of parts of other animals
having, on one account, the head of a lion, the torso of a girl, and
the tail of a dragon.14This being was said to be impossible, though
only Sbarroya made the reason clear.15We can, he said, imagine a
chimera because we can simply picture the differentparts put together, but we cannot understand it any more that we can understand a creature which is at one and the same time essentiallya man
and essentially a horse. That is, the chimera was thought of not as a
mere hybrid, but as something which had the essences of all the
creatureswhich entered into it, and it was forthat reason that it was
thought to be an impossible object. If any reader objects to talk of
essences, one can simply substitute talk of an object which has a
11See E. J. Ashworth,ExistentialAssumptions
in Late MedievalLogic, in:
AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly10 (i973)I4I"I4712Soto,xiii.
13Sbarroya,xxxviiiv0.
14Dorp, sign,t 6. Cf. Celaya,sign. A viiiv0;Enzinas, Termini,sign,a vii;
Sbarroya,xxxviiiv0;Soto, xiii.
15Sbarroya,xxxviiivo.
62

23:22:39 PM

predicate which is logically incompatible with its definingcharacteristics, such as a round square. One of the important features of this
definitionof "chimera" is the kind of concept which correspondsto it.
In originat least, it is a complex concept having several parts to it,
but in practice it seems to be non-complex.16A chimerais not thought
of as a mere aggregate,a random assemblage of differentparts. If the
term "chimera" is to refer,it must referto some one thing. It must
be treated as having the kind of referencewhich "cow" and "man"
have, rather than the kind of reference enjoyed by "herd" and
"population". In this respect, the literary definition is radically
differentfromthe logical, as we shall see.
The logician's definitionof "chimera", which stems fromBuridan,17
was considerably less picturesque that the literary definition,for it
said merelythat a chimera is a being composed of parts which cannot
be put together, or which it is impossible to put together.18This
definitionwas often elaborated to the extent of introducinga reference to connotation.19For instance, Enzinas wrote that, on this
view, "chimera" signifies every being with the connotation of incompatibility,and Manderston said that "chimera" is a connotative
term which materially represents every being in the world and
formallyconnotes a being composed of parts from which it cannot
be composed. As one mightexpect, such a definitionled to a considerable amount of controversy,and a numberof argumentswere brought
against it.
In my view, the most tellingargumentwas put forwardby Enzinas,20
though he did not make as much of it as he could have. He pointed
out that givensuch a definition,all termswhichconnoteincompatibility
will turn out to be synonymous. For instance, "irrational man"
16Enzinas,Termini,sign,a vii; Soto, xiii,xxviiiy.In the latterplace Soto
wrote:"Itemnonvideturintellectus
totconceptus
formare
auditavocechimera,
in eius diffinitione,
sed unum potius incomplexum
cuius
quot exprimuntur
subindeunumest obiectum,quod nonpotestimaginanaliud quam monstrum
illud."
17JohnBuridan,Sophismson Meaningand Truth,Translatedand withan
Introduction
by T. K. Scott (New York: AppletonCenturyCrofts,1966) 77.
For a good discussionof Buridan'sviews,see L. N. Roberts,A Chimerais a
Chimera:A MedievalTautology,
in: Journalofthe Historyof Ideas 21 (i960),
273-278.
18Commentum,
, sign,a vii; Pardo,
sign.S 8; Dorp,sign,t 6; Enzinas,Termini
iiv0;Sbarroya,xxxviii.
19Enzinas,Termini,sign,a vii; Manderston,
sign,b ii; Sbarroya,xxxviiiff.;
Silvester,
sign.cv0;Soto,xiii.
20Enzinas,Tractatus,
xxviiiV0.
63

23:22:39 PM

connotes elements which axe incompatible, but "irrational man"

cannot be said to be indistinguishablefrom "chimera". Presumably
one could make an even strongercase by appealing to other fictional
hybridssuch as centaurs and mermaidswhich on the medieval account
would be impossible in just the same way that a chimerais impossible.
No solution to this criticismwas offered.In the same place, Enzinas
also objected that any attempt to explain what "connoting incompatibility" involved would lead to the production of sentences
which were false because some of their parts, such as the term "impossible" (used substantively) lacked supposition.21 However this
point can be countered by making an appeal to Dorp's argument
that the definingphrase lacked supposition for beings in the world
because it included negation.22It is only affirmativesentences that
are automatically false when the terms appearing in them lack
supposition.
One focus of attack on the logician's definition of "chimera"
concerned the question of whether"chimera" was a connotativeterm
or not. In early sixteenthcenturydefinitions,a connotative termwas
said to be one which was taken to referto an object while in addition
saying that that object existed in a certain manner.23It was said to
have both a material significateand a formal significate,though no
nominalist was willingto say that referencewas made to the latter.24
Thus the term "white" can be taken to referto Socrates, who is then
the material significate,but it is taken this way only because Socrates
is an example of whiteness,the formalsignificateof the term.28Unlike
an absolute term such as "man", a connotative term does not determine a group of objects which are the same in essence. Rather, it picks
out members of various groups, such as men, swans, and pieces of
paper, which happen to share a single property."Chimera" was said
to be a connotative term because it picked out random groups of
objects which shared the propertyof being combined in an impossible
manner. Sbarroya objected to this view because it failed to recognize
that the term at least purportsto pick out a unifiedobject, and if it
is to do that then it must be an absolute term.26Soto had two more
elaborate objections. In the first place, if one says that "chimera"
21Enzinas.Tractatus,
xxviii.
22Dorp,sign,t 6V0.
23E.g. Dolz, XXX
de SanctoMarco,sign.A mi.
; Hieronymus
24Hieronymus
de SanctoMarco,sign.A iiii.
25Dolz, xxxv0.
26Sbarroya,xxxviiiV0.
64

23:22:39 PM

connotesimpossibility,one is building the fact that ''chimera" cannot

referinto the very meaning of the term,which seems wrong.27In the
second place, a connotative term should only be said to have as its
material significaies those objects to which the formal propertiesin
question can belong.28But the formalpropertiessaid to be connoted
by the term "chimera" cannot belong to any of the objects, men,
horses and so on, which are offeredas the material significatesof the
term.Thus "chimera" lacks one of the necessary conditionsfora term
to be connotative.
The main topic of discussion introduced by the logician's definition
of "chimera" was whether the term could in fact be said to signify
everythingin the world. Two reasons were given for saying that it
could. Celaya said that the word was made by logicians to referto
everythingwhich could be imagined to be a chimera and this, for
reasons to be discussed later, meant everythingwhich exists.29However,the most common reason was simply that the definitionincludes
the term "being".30 This fact, combined with the principle that any
phrase refersto all those things which are individually signifiedby
its parts,31immediately leads to the conclusion that the definition
signifieseverythingwhich is a being, as well as everythingwhich is a
composite. To the possible objection that "chimera" must therefore
have supposition for everythingin the world, it was replied that this
did not follow because the term connoted incompatibility.32To the
possibile objection that the term "chimera" would then be convertible
with the term "being", it was replied that two terms were only convertible when they could be verifiedof the same object by means of
the same copula.33 This was not so in the present case because one
can point to an object and say truly "This is a being" but one cannot
point to the same object and say truly "This is a chimera." In this
context Enzinas drew a distinctionbetween terms which were transcendent in significationonly, and terms which were transcendentin
both signification and supposition.34 "Chimera" belonged to the
27Soto,xiii.
28Soto,xiii,xxviiiv0.
29Celaya,sign.A viiiV0."... ly chimerafuitimposituma logicisad significandumomneilludquod imaginarie
potestesse chimera."
30Dorp,sign,t 6; Pardo,iivo;Sbarroya,xxxviiiv0.
31Eckius,xcviv0;Pardo,iiv0.
32Pardo,iiv0:Silvester,
sien..
33Celaya,sign.A viiif; Silvester,
sign.c.
34Enzinas,Termini,
sign.dvo.
65

23:22:39 PM

first category and "being", like "one" and "good", to the second.
As one mightexpect, not all logicianswere happy withthis approach.
Sbarroya wrote that it is acceptable to say that the term "chimera"
signifies every being in a confused and indistinct manner, because
every substantival term,including as it does the term "being" in its
definition,will do that. However, it would be absurd to claim that
"chimera" signifies every being by means of the distinct concepts
which are appropriate to each type of being.35Domingo de Soto had
a more telling objection. He agreed that the term "being" appeared
in the definitionof the term "chimera", but argued that this did not
license the conclusionthat "chimera" signifiedeverybeing. "Chimera"
refersto a fictitiousand imaginarybeing, and the only reason we use
the word "being" is that we have not developed a separate term to
referto fictitiousbeings as opposed to actual beings.36We must not
allow our language to mislead us into overlookingvital distinctions.
IV. Can the Impossible be Signified?
Now that an account has been given of the two ways in which the
term "chimera" can be defined, we must turn to the more general
question of whetherthe impossible can be known or signified.Eckius
emphasized that this question was about objects rather than about
propositions, which it must be noted, were taken to be occurrent
entities, either spoken or written.37To some extent, the distinction
made by Eckius is an artificial one, since propositions, whether
possible or impossible,were oftenthoughtto functionas the names of
objects, whether these were the special non-spatio-temporalentities
postulated by Gregoryof Rimini,38or whetherthey were just things
in the world viewed in a certain way. In other words, if one asked
whether the propositions "Socrates runs and Socrates does not run"
could be understood, there was a strong tendency to rephrase the
question as: "Is there something,Socrates-to-runand Socrates-notto-run,which is referredto by that propositionand whichcan function
as the object of my understanding?" 39 Only a few people objected
35 Sbarroya,xxxviiivof.
3e Soto, xiii. "... ly chimerade materialinonsignificai
veraentia,sed solum
ens ficticium
et imaginabile,
quia non
poniturtarnenly ensin eiusdiffinitione,
illud ens fichabemusaliud nomencommunius
impositumad significandum
ticium."
37Eckius,xcviv0.
38Gregory
ofRimini,ivof.
39For a fulldiscussionof the problemof complexe
and further
significabilia
66

23:22:39 PM

to this kind of approach. Enzinas, for instance, argued that it is a

mistake to treat propositions as if they named some object. Instead
"
of saying "Man is an ass" signifiesman-to-be-an-ass" one should
"
40
say "Man is an ass" signifiesthat man is an ass."
Interestingly
enough, he combined this view with a tendency to rephrase apparent
reference to impossible objects in a propositional manner. Thus,
"Lucifer desires equality with God" became "Lucifer desires of himself that he should be equal with God." 41However, he did not extend
this analysis to sentences about chimeras.
The subject of impossible objects was oftenintroducedby reference
to examples which supported the claim that there were impossible
objects of some sort, and that these could be understood. As several
people pointed out, Aristotlehad writtenin Ethics III that one could
will the impossible,42and St. Augustine had added in De TrinitateIX
that nothingcould be willed unless it was known, which implied that
the impossible must be known.43Moreover,as Pardo said, in our own
experience we know what is meant by both the proposition "Man is
an ass" and the phrase "irrational man". 44He added that if you take
a group of doctorssome of whom assent to certainselected propositions
and some of whom assent to their contradictories,you will find that
some of the doctors must be assenting to what is impossible.45Finally,
there are the propositions about chimeras which introduced the
"
problem for us. "Chimera" signifiesa chimera" and "I imagine a
chimera" seem to be both meaningful and true, yet chimeras are
impossible objects.
In their discussion of the problem, some logicians apparently tried
to draw an initial distinction between two senses of "impossible".
The impossible in the first sense involves an explicit contradiction
and examples are both the proposition"Socrates disputes and Socrates
does not dispute" and the phrases "non-signifiable","non-intelligible".
The impossiblein the second sense involves only an implicitcontradicTheories
references
see G. Nuchelmans,
Ancientand Medieval
oftheProposition.
North
of theBearersof Truthand Falsity.(Amsterdam-London:
Conceptions
HollandPublishing
Company,1973).
40Enzmas,Tractatus,
xxviivo.
41Enzinas, Tractatus,
xxviivo."Similimodo dices de hac. Lucifervoluitdeo
: veramquein hoc sensulucifervoluitde se
esse equalis: esse distinguendam
quod essetequalisdeo."
42Dorp,sign.1 5; Eckius,xcviV0;Pardo,v; Soto,xxviiiv0.
43Eckius,xcviV0;Soto,xxvmv0.
44Pardo,iv.
40ardo,iv.
67

23:22:39 PM

tion. That is, it impliestwo contradictorystatementswithoutformally

containing them, and examples are the terms "irrational man" and
"chimera". It was then claimed that only the impossiblein the second
sense could be understood. John Major seemed to accept this distinction,46but everyone else who mentioned it did so only in order to
reject it.47 Soto said firmlythat the impossible Socrates-to-dispute
and Socrates-not-to-disputep certainlysignifiable,since it is signified
by the contradictories "Socrates disputes" and "Socrates does not
48
dispute." However, like other logicians he put the non-intelligible
into a special category,as we shall see below.
One of the two most serious attempts to solve the problemof understanding the impossible was that made by Buridan,49whose view
was tentativelyendorsed in our period by both Pardo and Silvester.50
The basis of his view was that any complex concept signifiesonly what
its parts signify,and that the parts, which in the last analysis are
simple concepts, signifyonly ordinaryspatio-temporalobjects. Thus,
if we examine the complex concept "chimera", which purports to
pick out an object, or the complex concept "man-to-be-an-ass",which
also purportsto pick out an object, in this case a complexesignificabile,
we will discover that neithersucceeds in picking out just one object.
Instead, both signifygroups of ordinarythings which are thought of
as related to each other in a way which turns out to be impossible.
"Chimera" signifiesevery object and "man-to-be-an-ass"signifiesmen
and asses. The postulated relationship between the objects cannot
itself be treated as just another object, so that the whole problem
of impossible objects disappears. There are no impossible objects,
there are only possible objects standing in impossible relationships.
The latter have their basis in the intellect's organizationof its simple
concepts and this process is a comprehensibleone. We can understand
between men
both that the intellect affirmsan identity-relationship
obtains.
We
can
now answer
and asses and that no such relationship
the original question by saying that the impossible cannot be understood, on the grounds that there is nothing properlyreferredto by
the term "impossible" when taken substantially.
The consequences of Buridan's view for chimeras and propositions
44Major,iii.
47Celava,sign.A viii; Enzinas,Termini,siga, a vii; Silvester,
sign.c.
48Soto. xxviiiT0.
49Buridan,Sophisms,
J2.
50Pardo,bocxii;Silvester,
sign.cv0.
68

23:22:39 PM

about chimeras can easily be summed up. We are deceived when we

think that "chimera" is an ordinary substantival term, for it is an
aggregate term.61As such, it does have reference,but only to groups
of ordinary spatio-temporal individuals. Since we do not need to
postulate impossibleindividuals,we do not need to extend the doctrine
of ampliation to include referenceto impossible or imaginaryindividuals.62As a result, the term "chimera" will always lack supposition.
It does not signifyor suppose for impossible objects, and although it
does signifyordinaryobjects, it can never be verifiedof them. Thus
"
affirmativesentences about chimeras such as "Chimera" signifiesa
chimera" and "I imagine a chimera" will always be false, however
distastefulwe find this solution.53
A somewhat differentaccount of how we formulate our concept
of "chimera" can be foundin Sbarroya.54He said, quoting St. Anselm
in support of his view, that there is a differencebetween positive
knowing, or knowing objects through their proper similitudes, and
knowingby denial [abnegative].Just as we know non-man by taking
man and denyinghim, so we know the chimera and other impossible
objects by taking possible beings and denyingthem. Thus, as Buridan
had claimed, our concept of "chimera" is derived fromour concepts
of ordinary objects, but it is not necessary to draw the conclusion
that "chimera" signifies these ordinary objects directly, as being
related to each other in a certain way. Rather, the ordinary objects
are signifiedindirectly,as having been cancelled out.
The importanceof knowledgeby denial at this point is that it could
be used by the opponents of Buridan's view to refutethe claim that
if one does accept the intelligibilityof the impossible,one will run into
contradiction.The argumentpresentedby Buridan's supporterscould
be put like this:
Every impossible is intelligible.
The unintelligibleis impossible.
51Enzinas,Termini,
sign,a vii. "Circaheca multissoletqueriutrumconceptus
cui subordinatur
isteterminus
chimerasit complexusvel incomplexus.
Ad hoc
sue diffinitioni
duplexestopinio: quidamenimdicuntsubordinari
quidnominis,
ex conceptibus
sue diffinitionis
sicut
itaqueconceptuschimeraeritaggregatum
est ly ens ly compositum
et aliis."
ly impossibile
82E.g. Enzinas,Tractatus,
xxviiv0;Manderston,
sign,g viii; Trutvetter,
sigh,
z iiii.
63Enzinas,Tractatus
, xxviiv;Manderston,
sign,g viii; Trutvetter,
sign,z iiii.
04Sbarroya,xxxviiiV0.
Cf.Pardoivvo.
69

23:22:39 PM

Thereforethe unintelligibleis intelligible.55

Alternatively,one could support the claim that it is false that the
impossible is intelligibleby arguing like this:
The unintelligibleis not intelligible.
The unintelligibleis somethingimpossible.
Thereforesomethingimpossible is not intelligible.58
The solution offeredto both arguments was that "The unintelligible
is impossible" is a false propositionbecause "unintelligible" is a term
which does not and cannot have supposition,57even in the fifthclass
of objects.58This does not entitleone to assume that it lacks signification because, as Soto explained, it signifiesall intelligibleobjects by
The field is thus left open for the presentation
denial [abnegative].59
of alternatives to Buridan's view, without the danger of producing
paradoxes.
The main rival to Buridan was Marsilius of Inghen, and at first
glance the position taken by Marsilius and his followersseems simple
enough.60They held that the impossiblewas intelligibleand signifiable,
and theybacked thisby two claims. In the firstplace, it was maintained
that we do indeed have a unified concept of such impossible objects
as chimeras and braying men. Our complex concepts do not merely
signifywhat the parts signify,but somethingdistinctfromthe parts.61
In the second place, ampliation was said to extend to a fifthclass of
objects, those which can be imagined or understood. This class must
65Major,iii; Soto,xxviiivo.Cf.Silvester,
sign.c.
5e Enzinas,Termini,
sign,a vii. Cf. Pardo, ivV0.
57Enzinas,Termini,
xxvii; Major,iii.
sign,a vii; Enzinas,Tractatus,
68Soto, xxviiiv0."Falsum enimest dicere/ non intelligibile
est aliquod imquia ly non
imaginarioest aliquodimpossibile,
possibile,aut non intelligibile
habet non suppositionem
annexam,quod sic patet, ly non inintelligibile
illud,rursus,ergoilludest signifi/supponitproaliquo,ergosignificat
telligibile
ac proindely nonintelligibile
cabile,itemergoilludestintelligibile,
/nonsup/ significat
ponitpro ilio. Ex quo sequiturfalsumesse dicere,nonintelligibile
omniainnon intelligibile,
quia ille accusativusnon supponit,sed significat
est intelligibile/'
abnegative.Igituromneimpossibile
telligibilia
69Soto,xxviiiv0.
eo Commentum,
sign,z iiii. Apartfrom
sign.S 8 f.; Eckius,xcviv0;Trutvetter,
I know of only two printedsourcesforMarsiliusof Inghen's
Commentum,
theoryof ampliation:see under"Marsiliusof Inghen"and "Pschlacher"in
inThose who agreedthat the impossiblewas signifiable
the bibliography.
a vii; Enzinas,Tractatus,
cludedCelaya,sign.A viii; Enzinas,Termini,
xxvii;
MartinezSiliceo,lxxxvi;Soto,xxviiiv0.
61Cf.Pardo,lxxxii.
70

23:22:39 PM

include impossible objects, since possible objects already form the

fourth class, after the classes formed by things which are, things
which were, and things which will be. Reference extends to the fifth
class of objects only in the presence of such intentional verbs as
"signify"and "imagine", and, some people added, only in the presence
of termswhich cannot be true of possible objects.62Thus the predicate
"
of the sentence "Chimera" signifiesa chimera" both signifiesand
supposes for an imagined chimera, and the sentence is true. On the
other hand, since "are" does not ampliate to the fifthclass, "All
chimerasare chimeras" remains false, because the termslack supposition. Hence we can both retain "chimera" as a significativeterm and
account for the distinction between those sentences about chimeras
we want to be true and those we want to be false.
There was yet another alternative to Buridan's view, but this was
by no means popular. It stems from Holkot, who argued that such
intentional sentences as "I remember Caesar" and "Antichrist is
imagined" are, strictlyspeaking, failse,given the absence of actual
referents,unless they are analyzed into more complex sentences.63
The first sentence must be analyzed into a .conjunction of three:
"There is a certain cognition in me which would be of Caesar if he
existed and Caesar was known by me and Caesar does not now exist."
The second sentence is analyzed into: "There is a certain intellection
by which Antichrist,if he were to exist, would be understood." There
is thus no requirement that either Caesar or Antichristnow exist,
and the question of an artificialreferentfor these terms is by-passed
in favour of referenceto a concept of a certain sort which does not
now have application but either did have or would have if there were
an appropriate object. The latter condition would, of course, never
be fulfilledin the case of a chimera so that "I have a concept which
would apply to chimeras if there were any" could be regarded as
counterfactually true, provided that I could define"chimera" in some
acceptable manner. In the period with which I am concerned, Trutvetter accepted Holkos analyses, which he quoted in detail,64but
Eckius mentioned Holkos solution only to express surprise that
Trutvetterhad accepted it.65The only other mention of Holkot is in
62Enzinas,Tractates,xxixv; Manderston,
commented
sign,b ii. The former
"sed hoc nil aliudest quam dicerely significai
equivocecpl.0
83Holkot,sign,h vivo.
64Trutvetter,
sign,z iiiif.
Eckius,xcviv0.
71

23:22:39 PM

Pardo, who attempted refutationby means of an argument I find

obscure.68He said that Holkot's view was not plausible because it
implied that a concept could both representand fail to representan
object while it existed. "Rose" does not now represent a rose, but
"rose if it were to exist" does.
V. Ampliation and Imaginary Objects
The ontological assumptions made by both Buridan and Holkot
are obvious enough,but the doctrineattributedto Marsilius of Inghen
is less clear. The claims that the impossible can be understood,that
our concept of a chimera is a concept of a unified object, and that
ampliation extends to a class of imaginaryobjects certainlyseems to
suggest that the followers of Marsilius were committed to a rich
ontology.Moreover,the worksof Gregoryof Rimini offereda precedent
for the unblushing acceptance of impossible objects, in the form of
impossible complexesignificabilia. These were not existents,but they
were said by Gregoryto have being "in the broadest sense." 67 However, one hardly expects to find such an attitude adopted by the
nominalists of Paris, and one is not disappointed. Pardo said that if
he were to concede that "A chimera is understood" was true, he
would say that the term supposed forsomethingin the broadest sense,
and that this somethingwould be an intelligibleobject rather than a
possible object,68but of course he did not concede the truth of the
sentence in question. A closer examination of the writingsof those
who did concede its truthreveals that impossibleobjects are once more
to disappear under analysis, for the class of things which can be
imagined merely consists of all those objects which can be imagined
to be chimeras,irrationalmen, brayingmen and so on.69Thus so long
Pardo,lxxxi.
47Gregory
ofRimini,ivof.
Pardo,lxxxiif."Et si dicaturquod ilia est falsachymeraintelligitur
quia ly
ad
chymerasupponitperse pro ilio quod potestesse conceptucorrespondente
ly chymeraet tale nichilest. ergopro nullosupponit.Diceremsi illamconcederemquod pro nullopossibilisupponeretdiceremtamenquod pro aliquo
istamchymera
. . . Undequi vultconcedere
ethocsufficit.
intelligitur
intelligibili
debetdicerequod ly chymerasupponitpro aliquo capiendoaliquidlargeut se
nonenimestapparentia
extenditad omneintelligibile
supponat
quodlychymera
pro petrout illi volunt."
Silvester,
et similiaverbaampliant
sign.c. "... ly significataly intelligitur
modumad quinqu:sicuteorum
secundumcommunem
terminm
precedentem
ideo sensus
activaterminm
utrumqueextremum.
sequentem.et ly imaginarie
est istequod est: fuit:vel erit:vel potestesse: vel
istiuschimerasignificatur
Cf.Manderston,
sign,g viii.
potestymaginari:chimerasignificatur."
72

23:22:39 PM

as there exists at least one object, a horse for instance, and so long
as one can imagine that object to be a chimera,a referentcan be found
for the term "chimera" when it appears in any intentional context
without the necessityof postulating any but spatio-temporalentities.
In the eyes ofthose who accepted it, this decision about the contents
of the fifthclass of objects did raise two problems. The firstis that
there will be some contexts in which no genuine singular term can
appear. For instance, "Every chimera is imaginarilya chimera" seems
to entail the singular proposition 'This chimera is imaginarily a
chimera", but on investigationit turns out that "this chimera" refers
to a whole range of objects, each of which can be imagined to be this
chimera.70Similarly, in "Socrates is imaginarily an ass" "Socrates"
will not functionas a genuine singular term, since by the doctrineof
ampliation it refersto all those things which can be imagined to be
Socrates.71Celaya, Enzinas, and Manderston were happy to concede
these consequences.
The second problem caused by the doctrine that intentionalverbs
such as "imagine" ampliate referenceto a fifthclass of objects, was
that there will be contexts in which ordinary nouns behave like
"chimera" and signifyeverythingin the world,even thoughthis is not
part of their definition.72If it is the case that the truth of "Man
imaginarilyis an ass" depends on the fact that "man" supposes for
"
an ass in this sentence, it seems to follow that "Man" signifiesan
"
ass" must be true.73One can also conclude that "Man" signifies
70Celaya,sign.A viiiv0."Item etiamsequeretur
quod essetdabilisaliqua universalisque nullampossethaberesingulrem.
Consequensest falsam:igitur
est chimeranon
/ omnischimeraymaginarie
sequelaprobaturista universalis
habet valet habere singulrem:igitur.antecedensprobatursi haberet
est chimera:sed illa
aliquammaximehaberetistam/ ista chimeraymaginarie
non est singularis
discretus
igiturminorprobatursubiectumnon est terminus
supponitdiscreteergonon est propositiosingularis.
Antecedens
probatur.
ly chimerasive ly ista chimerasemperpotestverificari
quia sive sit subiectum
ista est vera hoc ymaginarie
de pluribusnam quocunqueente demonstrato
est ista chimera."Silvester,
sign.c. "... dabituruniversalis
que nullampotest
haberesingulrem:quia subiectumhuiusista chimeraymaginarie
est ens de
sortepiatoneet de quolibetente mundiverificatur
mediantetali copula ut
notumest."
71Enzinas,Tractatus,
xxvii;Manderston,
sign,b iivaSoto,viV0.Cf.Commentum,
sign,p 3*of.
72Celaya,sign.A viiiv0;Enzinas,Tractatus,
xxvivof.
; Pardo,lxxxivo.
78Enzinas,Tractatus,
wrote"Dicunt ergo
xxvii; Pardo, lxxxiv0.The former
communesin hac propositione
sortesimaginarieest piato: quod ille terminus
sortespro omni ilio: quod imaginatursortessupponit:cumque omne ens
'
sortespro omnientesupponit:et ideo omneens significata
imaginetur:
73

23:22:39 PM

"
Socrates" or "Man" signifiesGod" or anything eke one likes. In
order to render this consequence more palatable, some people drew a
distinctionbetween absolute signification,which a term possesses in
ordinarycontexts, and respective signification,which a term acquired
in relation to the verb "imagine".74 The problem sentences were then
said to be false when "man" is taken absolutely and true when it is
taken respectively.Manderston accepted this solution, but it was not
popular because it was difficultto explain exactly how respective
meaning operated and how it fitted in to the normal categories of
natural and conventional meaning.75Nor did this solution solve the
problem of "chimera" which was said on some accounts to signify
everythingin the world by virtue of its absolute meaning, so that it
"
seemed as if it would still be true to say such things as "Chimera"
"
76
signifiesa man" and "Chimera" signifiesan ass."
Enzinas canvassed a series of attempts to deal with "A man
imaginarilyis an ass" without accepting either the doctrine of ampliation to five classes of objects or the doctrineof respective meaning.77
On the firstposition, "Man imaginarily is an ass" must always be
false, but one can accept "Man is imagined to be an ass" as true
because it has "man" as a subject and "imagined to be an ass" as
a predicate, and both can suppose for men without untoward consequences.78"A chimera is imagined to be a being" will be false on
this analysis because the subject does not suppose. A second position
concedes "Man is imaginarilyan ass" to be true on the grounds that
"
"
imaginarte itselfcan be treated as part of the subject or predicate.
However, said Enzinas, the truth of "A chimera is imaginarily a
chimera" cannot be saved unless one makes the arbitraryassumption
"
that in some cases both subject and predicate are modifiedby imaginarie", which cannot be a contingentmatter. Nor can "A chimera
"
is signifiedby "chimera" be conceded as true. The third position
conceded "Man imaginarily is an ass" on the grounds that for such
propositionsto be true it is not required that there be actual identity
74Enzinas,Tractatus,
Sbarroya,
xxivo;Manderston,
sign,g viiiv0;Pardo,lxxxiTO;
xlvii; Silvester,sign,c; Soto,viT0.
Soto,viT0.
7e Manderston,
sign,g viu. Sed diceretaliquishec propositioessetveranomo
significatur
per ly chimera:similiterasinuset sic de singulisrebusut patet
subiectisic dicendo.Aliquid quod ymaginarieest
explicandoampliationem
xxvii.
homosignificatur
perly chimera."Cf.Enzinas,Tractatus
77Enzinas,Tractatus,
xxviiiff.
78Cf.Commentum,
sign,p 4; Pardo,lxxxn.
74

23:22:39 PM

between the thing signifiedby the subject and the thingsignifiedby

the predicate. Imaginary identity is enough. Enzinas rejected this
position for two reasons. It offeredno salvation for the truth of
'
" "
Chimera' signifiesa chimera" and it suggestedan argumentagainst
ampliation to four groups of objects. One could simply say that in
some contextspossible identitywas sufficientfortruth,and this would
remove the necessity of referringto a class of things which can be.
To the modern reader this argumentseems to offerbetter reasons for
acceptingthe thirdpositionthan forrejectingit, but be that as it may,
Enzinas feltthat one must retainthe fulldoctrineof ampliationto five.
Fortunately there is a doctrinewhich allows one to retain reference
to a class of thingswhich are imagined or understood while absolving
one from the necessity of accepting as true both such propositions
"
"
as "Man" signifiesan ass" and such propositions as "Chimera"
signifiesan ass." This is the doctrine of appellation, which was invoked by Enzinas, Pardo and Soto, who all maintained that "signify"
and "understand" must be treated as appellative terms.79That is,
they must be treated as terms which bring into play the concepts
appropriate to the termswhich follow,though not to the termswhich
"
"
precede. Accordingto Enzinas, "Man" Socrates signifies", "Man"
"
God signifies",and "Man" angels signifies"can all be true80because
all that is being said here is that the term "man" picks out some
"
objects which can be imagined to be men; but "Man" signifies
" "Man"
"
"Man" signifies angels"
Socrates",
signifies God" and
cannot be true because what is being said here is that "man" refers
to Socrates by means of the concept of Socrates (or by virtue of his
being Socrates), "man" refersto God by means of the concept of God
(or by virtue of His being God) and so on. This doctrineclearly dealt
with the problem of chimeras as well. As Pardo put it, in "A chimera
is understood" the term "chimera", if it has supposition,will have it
not foreverythingwhich can be understood to be a chimera but only
79Enzinas,Tractatus,
Cf. Manderston,
xxixv0;Pardo, xciivo;Soto, xxviiivof.
errormultorum
sign,b ii. See also Pardo, lxxxii. "Pa tet ergo intollerabilis
istas propositiones
homo pro asino supponithomo
logicorumconcedentium
asinumsignificat
dicendumest enimquod ille suntsimpliciter
falsequalitercunquesit ampliatiode ly homoaut de ly asinum:nam ly asinumnonpotest
supponereper quamcunquecopulamampliativamnisi pro illis que possunt
ad ly asinustalia autemnonsignificatur
cognosciconceptucorrespondente
per
istumterminm
homonisiilli velintquod asinivocenturhominesde cetero."
80Enzinas,Tractatus
xxixvo.Pardo (lxxxii)and Soto (xxix)did notagree.
75

23:22:39 PM

for what can be understood by means of a concept correspondingto

the term "chimera".81
Pardo also appealed to the doctrineto avoid conceding the paradoxical sentence "A being which is not understoodis understood." 82The
doctrineof ampliation taken alone would forceus to concede it because
it would force us to postulate a being which is not understood as a
member of the fifthclass, thus giving the phrase "being which is not
understood" reference,but if we add the doctrine of appellation we
see that the supposed referenceis to a being which can be understood
by means of the concept "being which cannot be understood", and
this is an impossible situation.
Domingo de Soto seems to have felt that the proposed solution in
terms of appellation theory did not go far enough.83It allows us to
"
"
disregardthe claims that "Man" signifiesan ass" and "Chimera"
signifiesSocrates" are true, but it does not affectthe theory which
was used to support these claims, namely that in contexts of imagination "man" signifiesand supposes foreverythingwhichcan be imagined
to be a man and "chimera" signifiesand supposes foreverythingwhich
can be imagined to be a chimera. It was this foundation that Soto
wished to dispense with. One must not say that "chimera" signifies
everythingwhich is imagined to be a chimera, nor must one say
"
"Chimera" signifieseverythingof which if it were a chimera this
concept "chimera" would be the natural similitude" since the latter,
like the former,can be taken to refer successfully even to horses.
"
Instead one must say "Chimera" signifiesevery chimera which is
imagined to be, that is, everythingof which if it existed this concept
" Pardo,lxxxii."Ex quo patetquod dato quod concdantistamchymerainnontarnenproptereadicendumest quod chymerasupponatproomni
telligitur
ilio quod potestintelligiesse chymera.sed solumproilio quod potestintelligi
ad ly chimera.
conceptucorrespondente
81Pzrdo,lxxiiv0.
8' Soto, xxviiiT0.
attentenotatoquod cum
"Ubi pro solutionesextiargumenti
dicitur(v.g.) ly chimerain hac propositione
/ chimerasigniicatchimrm,
ampliare ad quinqu, non est intelligendadicta ampliatiocadere in hoc
quod estessechimerased inhocestesse,ita utnonsitsensus/chimerasigniicat
omne illud quod imaginanturesse chimera,sed chimerasignificatomnem
chimrmque imaginaturesse, quod est dicere,significatomne illud cuius
Et nondicas,cuius
similitudo.
chimeraessetnaturalis
si illudesset,hicconceptus
si illudessetchimera,nam equus etiamest talis,cuius si ipse essetchimera,
tarnenly chimeranon
talis conceptus/ chimera/ essetnaturalissimilitudo,
nonampliat
aliis
dici
sub
vel
verbis,
quod
ly
significat
equum, potest
significat
terminiqui dat ei suppostomi."Cf.
nisi quantumad existentiamsignificati
Pardo,lxxxii.
76

23:22:39 PM

"chimera" would be the natural similitude." If it were not for the

fact that Soto insisted on retainingampliation to five classes, and that
he spoke as if there were a kind of existence which has its originonly
in our mental activity,84one would almost suspect Soto of adopting
Holkos solution. Perhaps he is saying, unlike Holkot, that it is
not enough to have a concept, one must also picture a world in
which this concept does have application before one can affirmthe
truth of such sentences as "I imagine a chimera/'
VI. Conclusion
This surveyofthe way some earlysixteenthcenturylogicians treated
the problem of chimerasreveals very clearly the alternativesfaced by
any philosopherwho wants to give a unified theory of the reference
of general terms. If one adopts a purely extensionalist interpretation
of propositions,and allows only ordinaryspatio-temporalentitiesinto
one's universe of discourse,then one is faced with the choice between
rejecting as false many sentences, such as "I imagine a chimera",
which one would wish to accept as true, and accepting as true many
"
sentences, such as "Chimera" signifies an ass", which one would
wish to reject as false. If one extends one's universe of discourse to
include imaginaryobjects which are not just ordinaryobjects regarded
in a certain way, one faces grave ontological problems. On the other
hand, to appeal to appellation theoryis to acknowledge that no purely
extensionalistinterpretationof all propositionscan be given and that
no unified theory of referenceis possible; and to adopt Holkos
solution is to admit that sentences which seem to be structurally
similar are not in fact similar and that some sentences which appear
to be about objects in the world are in fact about the contents of our
own minds. On the whole my sympathieslie with those who abandoned
the belief that both general terms and subject-object sentences can
be given a uniformtreatment,but I have great respect forthe subtlety
and sophistication with which arguments for a uniform treatment
were presented. Post-medieval logicians were by no means mindless
followersof their medieval predecessors.
Waterloo, Ont., Canada
Universityof Waterloo
84Soto,xxviiiv0.
77

23:22:39 PM

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79

23:22:39 PM

VivariumXV, 2 (1977)
On Ancient and Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics

L. M. DE RIJK

Introduction

aim of this study is, ratherthan to give a contributionto the

The historyof semantics as such, to show (1) the interdependenceof
Ancient (and Mediaeval) semantic views and metaphysical doctrines,and (2) how some Mediaeval semantic points of view may be
clarifiedwhen traced back to the correspondingAncient views. As far
as Antiquity is concerned, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics as well as
Neoplatonism and Peripatetics are discussed. However, it should be
noticed at the outset that in many cases it is practically impossibleto
discern exactly what precisely in the differentviews found in Late
Antiquity came fromwhat School, let alone to attribute the various
views to specific authors. To my mind, in his inspiringpaper on the
1
logical doctrinesin the Neoplatonic and the Peripatetic schools A. C.
Lloyd made the correctapproach to the subject matter. When discussing the question how much of the Neoplatonic views is borrowedfrom
Stoic logicians his answer is that substantially it is nothing but the
fact that the forms of Neoplatonism are sometimes conditioned by
Stoic logical doctrineand terminology;what still remainedunderthose
adventitious shapes is the intrinsicimpetus and natural directionof
Neoplatonism itself (Lloyd, 158).
It seems to be useful to dwell a while on the question. Lloyd rightly
points [loc. laud.) to Simplicius, who knew better than we what was
Stoic and what was not. Well, this commentator tells us (In Arist.
Categ.y28-9)that Porphyry'slarger,lost commentaryon the Categories
expounded Stoic doctrinesto the extent that these covered the subject
1 Neoplatonic
A JournalforAncient
Logicand Aristotelian
Logicin: Phronesis,
Philosophy
(1) 1956,58-72and 146-160,henceforth
quotedas Lloyd.Thisstudy
in manypoints,however.
shouldbe corrected
81

23:21:10 PM

matterin hand kata tenkoinniantoulogon, but rarelydoes he recognise

any acceptance of them.
For that matter,coming across with a Neoplatonian some doctrine
and terminologythat we know as definitelyStoic does certainlynot
imply that the man was acting under Stoic influences.To give firstan
example pointed out by Lloyd, 158-9. Several passages in the Stoicorum
veterumfragmenta(e.g. ed. Von Arnim, II, 2321; 228a4) make it clear
enough that the view of the sensible substance as a bundle of (unique)
'
'
propertiesindicated with the term athroisma is a common one with
the Stoics. On the otherhand it is found in Porphyry'sIsagoge (721-23:
idiottnathroisma)and in Plotinus (Enn. VI, 3, 8) ; Sextus Empiricus

'
(Adv. math. VII, 276-7) explicitlyrefersthis use of athroisma to the
Academy. That it is, however,pure Platonism may be gathered from
Plato's using the term in a passage Theaetetus
, 157 B-C) where he is
or even genuine subare
substances
that
sensible
particulars
denying
be drawn that the
can
the
conclusion
Therefore
of
a
jects
proposition.
descriptionof the sensible particular as nothingbut a bundle of properties' originated with Plato and coalesced in the Middle Academy
with Stoic logic and ontologyand became a technical tool in the Stoa
as well as in the Academy, with each of them fortheir own motives.
Lloyd is quite rightin remarkingthat when it reappeared in the Neoplatonic version of Aristotelean logic, it would have sounded to contemporaries as Stoic; its doctrinal justification,however,is found as
early as in the Theaetetuspassage.2
There is another famous issue of the kind, viz. the allegued Stoic
influencein the Dialctica commonly ascribed to St. Augustine. Barwick held this work to be made out of a Stoic work on logic.3 As a
matter of fact the Augustinean tract does contain many thingswhich
are quite commonto the Stoics, as may appear fromBarwick's analysis
of it (op. cit., 8-21). However, Barwick himselfremarks (19; 22) that
the (allegued) Stoic 'Vorlage' must have been of a peculiar type: it
occasionally joined the Aristoteleanlogicians in using specificallyPeripatetic terminology.This should have made him somewhatsuspicious,
indeed. Whenever in St. Augustine's Dialctica doctrinesand terminology are foundwhichcome across in Stoic logic, too, it is quite possible,
indeed, that the matter concerned is of a definitelyPlatonian (c.q.
2 Cp. Timaeus,49-50.- I shallreturnon the item'subjectviewedas a bundle
in thenextpaperofthisserie.
ofproperties'
3 Karl .Barwick,
una Knetorifi,
in: a on. aer
oblemederstoischen
J^r
opracnienre
schs.Akad.derWiss.zu Leipzig,Phil.-Hist.Klasse,49,Heft3, Berlin1957,8.
82

23:21:10 PM

Peripatetic) originand had been adopted by the Stoa. Barwick himself

gives (7off.) a good specimen of it: the Stoic views of the origin of
speech, of etymology,and the imposition of names were stronglyinfluencedby Plato's Kratylos. Therefore,the occurrenceof some views
and termsin St. Augustine's work which are also found in the Stoa,
does decidedlynot imply theiradoption fromthe Stoics.
Besides, Augustine sometimes has referencesto the Stoics [Stoici
autumant,ut Stoici contendunt,see ed. Hamblin). To my mind this is
a plea against Barwick's assumption of some Stoic source ('Vorlage').
For eitherthe referenceis also found in the source, or it is not. If so,
the source cannot have been a Stoic treatise. If it did not occur in
Augustine'ssource and was an addition ofhis own (or of St. Augustine's
intermediarysource), why did not the author under review add such
referencesin the numerous other passages, where the doctrineis of no
less Stoic character? I would think,a moreplausible hypothesisis that
the source the Neoplatonian thinker,St. Augustine (c.q. the intermediary source) made use of, was some treatise of the Neoplatonian
syncretistictradition,which came into existence,itself,as a result of
the coalescense of Stoic and Platonic doctrinalelementsand terminology. Therefore Barwick's conclusion (op, cit., 21), if adopted at all,
that Varro's lost work on dialectics 4 which seems in fact to have been
St. Augustine'ssource,5should have been nothingbut a Latin adaptation of some Greek Schoolbook of Stoic logic does still not imply that
the Stoic' Schoolbook should not contain quite a lot of genuinely
Platonian doctrine and terminology,which had been taken over by
Stoic logicians. To be sure, this did certainlynot concernformallogic
as such, but really logical matters in the broader sense, inter alia a
numberof semantical points of view. For that matter,such adoptions
of Platonic views by Stoic logicians would fitin well with the eclecticism of an Antiochus of Ascalon, among whose pupils Varro is told
to have been. As is well-knownfromSextus it really is Antiochuswho,
'
'actually transferredthe Stoa to the Academy, so that it was even said
of him that 'In the Academy he teaches the Stoic philosophy'; forhe
tried to show that the dogmas of the Stoics are already present in
Plato" (Pyrrhon. hypot. I, 235). So the conclusion seems to be safely
drawn that partly througha Platonist of the Antiochiantype as Varro
was, a certain amount of influencefromAntiochus has come down to
4 Whichseemsto have beenthesecondBook ofhisDisciplinarum
libri.
6 See B. Fischer,De Augustinidisciplinarum
libroqui estdedialctica
, diss.Jena
1912.
83

23:21:10 PM

St. Augustine. In this connection a passage in the lattes De civitate

Dei (XIX, 3) is most interestingwhere the author makes Varro assert
that in De philosophia he is relaying the opinions of Antiochus.
One conclusion should be drawn fromthe foregoingdiscussion: any
attempt at a more or less exact attributionof doctrinalor terminological peculiarities to one specificSchool is not only practicallyimpossible but also undesirable as an attempt. More specificallyshould the
acknowledgementofan item as Stoic not lead us to exclude its Platonic
origin.
In his thorough study of the development of Middle Platonism
John Dillon rightlypoints to another specimen.6In the sphere of logic
it seems to us that the later Platonists are shamelesslyappropriating
and fatheringon Plato the distinctivediscoveriesand formulationsof
Aristotle's. Now this they may indeed have done, but what is not
obvious to us is how much of Aristotle'sinnovationsgrew out of work
already being done, by himselfand others, while he was still in the
Academy, and how soon mature Aristoteleanlogic was accepted in the
Old Academy as non-controversial.The inner-academictradition,indeed, preservingas it did both accounts of the 'UnwrittenDoctrines'
and the interpretationsof them by Plato's immediate successors are
likely to have exerted a profoundinfluencein the Old Academy and
with such seeminglyindependentauthoritiesas we are inclinedto think
Aristotleto have been. Modern enthousiasmforferretingout 'aristoteleanisms' and 'stoicisms' in works from (Neo) platonian circles, seems
to lead to a false view of the historical situation. As early as during
the Old, resp. Middle, Academy many termsand concepts mighthave
become virtuallycommon currencybeforethey appeared in the documents which happen to be preservedto us.7
As far as semantics are concerned,Lloyd's view (158) can be generalized. There is, especiallyin Antiquity and duringthe Middle Ages, an
intimate connectionbetween semantic and metaphysicalviews on the
6 TheMiddlePlatonists.
A StudyofPlatonism80 B.C. to A.D. 220. (Duckworth
London,1977),10.
7 This does notmean,however,
quiteserious
takinglaterAncientphilosophers
whenever
theyassumee.g.Plato as therealoriginofall (thatwhichwe consider)
whatsoever.For that matter,Ancienthistoriolater doctrinaldevelopments
graphyoftenbetraysa lack ofhistoricalsense,evenofthefeelingof 'development'as such. See e.g. Cicero,De oratoreIII, 67; Acad,post.,I5ff.,and De
finibusIV, 3.
84

23:21:10 PM

one hand, and the absence of semantics as a profileddisciplinestudied

in its own righton the other. This can be noticed to such an extent,
indeed, that the tendency of a philosopher's semantic views seems to
be determinedby his metaphysicalneeds (c.q. his attempt at disposing
of all kind of metaphysical presuppositions), rather than by any
interestofhis in semanticsas such.8
To be more specific,it is oftensuggested that e.g. Plato derived his
ontology of the Forms from certain semantic considerations characterized by an explicit analysis of the sentence into a subject and a
predicate term; or that Aristotleshould have come to his theoryof the
categories of being as a result of a linguistic analysis prior to the
metaphysical views involved. Such suggestions,however, are completely erroneousin that (i) they presuppose explicitdistinctionswhere
nothingof the kind is found,and (2) when using such explicit distinctions the scholars under review put things upside down by rendering
the metaphysical views dependent upon the logico-epistemological
ones, which,to say the least ofit, is quite anachronisticand, accordingly, historicallywrong.
Such suggestionis definitelyabsent in the presentauthor's approach
to the matter. Here the semantical formulaof the problems faced by
e.g. Plato's Theory of the Forms is considered equivalent with its
metaphysical wording,to the extent that the latter may be clarified
by the former,in some fashionlike this: (a) if John,Peter, and William
etc.are all wise, does this mere fact mean that theremust be something
which they are all related to in exactly the same manner,viz. wisdom
'
'
as such ? ; and: (b) if Johnis wise', Peteris wise , and ' William is wise
etc. are all true statements,what exactly is the meaning of the predicate noun 'wise ? ; does it referto somethingcommonto all the subjects
which is of the same ontologicalstatus as that which the subject terms
are claimed to refer to? The latter wording (b) requiring for some
*
furtherdistinctionsof the term refer'may clarifythe metaphysical
presuppositionshidden in the former(a). Besides, it is useful to see
how developmentsin the two series of views (metaphysicaland semantical) are closely interrelated.
The semantical views of the Ancient philosophersPlato, Aristotle,
and the Neoplatonians can most adequately be consideredthe conceptual frameworkof the argumentswith which they tried to clarifyand
8 Forthatmatter,
thesamecanbe saidofAncientandMediaevallogicin general
at leastas faras theirnon-formal
elements
areconcerned.
I shallcomebacklater
on to thispointin thediscussion
ofPorphyry's
so-called'Nominalism'.
85

23:21:10 PM

defend the more or less visionary and intuitivedoctrinesthey held in

the domain of metaphysics.Their semantics seem to be nothingbut a
highly interesting,substantial by-productof their philosophical (esp.
metaphysical and epistemological) discussions. This might explain its
occurrenceand its indistinctnessas well.
Accordingly,in order to have the appropriate background of an
authors's semantic views, I always start with a discussionof his metaphysical doctrine.The syncretisticcharacter,however,of most of the
later Ancient views makes it difficultto split up meticulouslyall our
authors over their own separate sections.
A final preliminaryremark on the use of modern labels. To start
with the Fregean usage employed in this paper,9it should be pointed
out that in accordance with Fregean semantics10 two different,correlated entities are associated with a term: a sense (or intension, or
connotation,Frege's Sinn) and a referent(or extension,or denotation,
Frege's Bedeutung), the term itself being taken as a sign [Zeichen),11
However, it should be borne in mind that the equations of (i) connotation = intension(Carnap) = sense (Sinn) and that of (2) denotation
= extension (Carnap) = reference(Bedeutung)contain a good deal of
confusion.The only thing which can be safely said is that (1) and (2)
are semantic areas opposed one to another and that within each of
these areas the conceptsinvolved are more or less closelyinterrelated.12
The most unequivocal pair would seem to be that of intensionextension. The intensionof a term consists of the characterizingmarks
which go to make up the concept correspondingto it, whereasits extension consists of the thingswhich are subsumed underit. Thus the word
9 Frege'sdistinctions
a usefultoolto
are here,ratherthanadopted,considered
clarifyAncientand Mediaevalsemanticviews.The presentauthoradheresto
have sense,
ratherthansense,and sentences
theviewthatnameshavereferences
not (direct)reference.
10See MichaelDummett,Frege.Philosophyof Language.The TrinityPress,
Worcester
and London1973.
11GottlobFrege,berSinn undBedeutung
in G. Frege,Funk(1892)reprinted
FnflogischeStudien(ed. G. Patzig),Gttingen
tion, Begriff,
1962.
Bedeutung.
in: Translations
Writings
ofGottlob
fromThe Philosophical
Englishtranslation
York 1952.
Fregeby PeterGeachand Max Black,Oxford-New
12To pickup just one difficulty,
and denotation
theEnglishwordsconnotation
used forthe connotatumand denotatumas well as forthe
are ambiguously
Thereis, accordingly,
acts (German:Konnotierung,
Denotierung).
corresponding
and reference
founda ratherlooseuse ofthewordsreferent
, denotation
frequently
" connoted.
lateron to
I shallreturn
and " thing
andconnotation
and thingdenoted,
thedifficulties
involvedin modernterminology.
86

23:21:10 PM

'

'
intension is taken as primarily referringto logical characteristics,
'
'
secondarilyto ontologicalproperties(if assumed at all) ; and extension
primarilyto ontologicalthings (thingsdenoted by the term) and secondarily to a logical class. This relationshipcould be seen as a 'semantic
chiliasm'. The semantic relations as such between terms and their
'
,
significate(s)are reflectedby the words connotationand 'denotation'
connotation being the relation of a term to its content, and denotation that of a term to the objects (things) referredto by that term.
It should be noticedthat both intensionand extensionare considered
by most of the Mediaeval logicians a term's (quasi-)physicalproperties,
the relational nature of which makes the fundamentarelationis,too,
involved. Sometimes, however, a term seems to be taken as nonphysical and as a merelysignificativefunction,to the extent that the
'
'
'
concepts intension and extension stand for a term's relation to its
notional content, taken as such and without any referenceto the
fundamentarelationis,13as well as for its relation to the concrete individual thingsdenoted, respectively.
is commonlyfoundin
The formeruse of the pair intension-extension
later Scholastic and Neoscholastic logic (whereintensionis called comprehensio).Apart fromthe above-mentionedchiliasmwhichis foundin
this usage, there is also an inverse proportionbetween intension and
extensionto the extent that the greatera term'sintensionis, the lesser
its extension,and conversely.Strictlyspeaking such proportionis absent in the latter use, where it is primarilyrelationsthat are concerned
rather than the fundamenta of these relations.
The concepts of 'connotation' and 'denotation' are differentfrom
those of 'intension' and 'extension', respectively,in that 'connotation'
clearlyrefersto somethingadditional (somethingfromoutside,viewing
fromthe view-pointof talking about things,id de quo sermoserituras
the twelfth-century
logicians used to say), which is marked by the
'
prefix con As a matter of fact a term's denotationis (its relationto)
the individual thingsdesignated by it, and its connotationconsists in
(its relation to) additional entities (whethertaken as real or merely
conceptual) that are (supposed to be) required. In the last sentence
the insertions'whethertaken as real or merelyconceptual' and 'supposed to be' are really not pleonastic, since the latter insertionrefers
to the choice for either a two-level or a three-levelsemantic system,
13In a way analogousto the interchange
of referent
and reference
pointedto
before.
87

23:21:10 PM

while the formerrefersto the status attached to the third level, if

assumed.14
'
'
includes an evaluation,
So the distinction connotation-denotation
viz. the ontological priorityof the individual denoted to the entity
connoted,i.e. signifiedsecondarily. We shall see later on how for an
adequate descriptionof (Neo)platonic semantic views this additional
'
'
meaning conveyed by the word connotation renders its use rather
doubtful.

Now, what about the use of modern semantic terminologyin interpretingAncienttexts ? An explicit distinctionofintensionand extension
is definitelyabsent in Antiquity. However, thereis, Lloyd (149) rightly
remarks,at least one passage in Aristotlewhere is found a quite clear
application of it, viz. Metaph. I 1, io52bi-3. There the author says
that the questions of (1) what sort of things are said to be one and
(2) what it is to be one, i.e. what is the definitionofit, are two different
ones. So modernterminologywould seem to be less anachronisticthan
at firstglance one would be inclined to think.Besides, an accurate use
of modern terminologyturns out to make the importantdivergencies
between ancient and modern semantic views the more manifest.For
that matter, the former (Neoplatonic) use of the pair 'intensionextension' should be preferredto all other ones.15The use of the disstinction 'connotation- denotation' will help us to make the totaliter
aliterof (Neo-)platonian semantics and metaphysicsthe more explicit.
Participation and theMultiplicationof theForm in Plato
Starting with Plato (427-347 B.C.) does not entail a denial of the
merits of Parmenides, the Sophists or Democritus 16 in the field of
2

14For the contra-distinction

of 'two-levelsystem'and 'three-level
system',see
and theLogisticAnalysisofLanguage.An Enquiryinto
GuidoKng,Ontology
Views on Universais(revisededition,Dordrecht-Holland,
the Contemporary
1967),12-15.
15This amountsto sayingthat Lesmewski
of references
s substitution
to abto concretecollectivetotalities("wholes")makes
stractclassesby references
to describeAncientand Mediaevalsemantic
his system,too, moreappropriate
in: Ratio 1 (1958),150-176;
views.See Cz. Lejewski,On Lesniewski's
Ontology
London1972,passim.
cfr.D. P. Henry,MedievalLogicandMetaphysics,
18Anexcellent
m Edwards
sketchoftheirviewsis givenbyNormanKretzmann
lemma
that
whole
For
the
matter,
7,
359-360.
Encyclopediaof Philosophy,
usefuland is hereconsultedpro, 359-406)is extremely
(Historyof Semantics
fusely.
88

23:21:10 PM

semantics, but only should stress the fact that their influenceon the
semantic views of Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages was through
Plato, Aristotleand the Stoa.
As forPlato, howevertrue it is that his theoryof the Forms was not
the whole of his thinkingas put forwardin his numerous dialogues,
yet his tremendousinfluenceon the history of thinking,commonly
dubbed with the rather ambiguous term 'Platonism', almost entirely
focusses his theoryof the Forms. Whether Plato's semantic views are
completelydependentupon that theory,or he rathercame to establish
the theory as a result of some semantic considerations,seems to be
puttingan erroneousquestion of priority.As a matterof fact the interdependence of Platonic metaphysicsand semanticsis morelikelyto be
an isomorphicrelationship(cp. above, p. 5).
Accordingto Plato's theoryofthe Forms put forwardmost explicitly
in the Phaedo (65 D ff.) the existence of all kinds of things in the
every-day-worldcan only be explained if there exists a transcendent,
separate World of Real Things that are as many paradigms of the
every-day-things.Unlike our ephemeralworld of pure appearance, the
World of Forms is timeless and immutable, apprehensibleby the intellect only, the only Being capable of exact definitionand as such
the only firmbasis of true knowledge (episteme)and action. Thus the
theoryof the Forms is at the footingof all being, knowing,and acting.
Far from being just general concepts ('Begriffe') or regulative ideas
(in Kantian parlance) the Forms are themselves Real Entities, the
constituentsof all every-day-things'
being and at the same time normative of true knowledge and correct action. As a matter of fact, the
general concepts, or universais,are nothingbut the logical side of the
ontology of the Forms.
The strongopposition of the Realm of the Forms to the domain of
every-day-thingscan safelybe taken as the most characteristicfeature
of Plato's earlier metaphysical doctrine. The dialogue Cratylus, probably written about 388, seems to belong to this stage of Plato's
thinking.There he makes Socrates expound the doctrine of the socalled Ideal Names (389 C - 390 A), to the extent that they belong to
things by nature (phusei), whose correctnesshas been produced by
nature, and which is the same for both Greeks and barbarians. The
single Ideal Name 'horse1cannot be identified,of course, with the
Form (Eidos) horse, whichis a metaphysical entityratherthan just a
linguistic (logical) one. Thereforeit must be the correctlyframedcon, 'cheval',
cept 'horse'ofwhichthe linguisticsigns 'hippos1, 'equus1, 'horse1
89

23:21:10 PM

'
'Pferd*y paar etc. are possible, equally acceptable notations. Kretzmann rightlyremarks (op. cit., 361) that to say that the concept is
framed correctlyis to say that it is the concept of the Form rather
than of individuals participating in it; to say that the Ideal Name's
correctnesshas been produced by nature is to say that it somehow
resembles the Form. So the Ideal Name cannot be but a logically
proper name of the (metaphysical) Form. Plato's view of the Ideal
Name resemblingthe Form is part of his anthropologicaldoctrinethat
the human mind, if only detached frominferiorinfluences,is capable
(or rather: is bound) to frame its concepts afterthe natural articulations of Being ('to divide the whole of Being according to its natural
articulations', Plato says in the Phaedrus (265 E) ; and in the Sophist
the task of philosophyis regarded as mainly "the mapping out of the
Realm of Forms in all its articulationsby Division", to use Cornfors
'
formula (Plato's Theoryof Knowledge, 183).
The identificationof the Ideal Name with the concepts correctly
framedis not explicit in the Cratylus,but clearlyimplied. Kretzmann
points to several passages in Plato's other works (Phaedrus 276 A;
Theaetetus189 E, 206 D ; Sophist 263 E; Philebus 38 E - 39 A) where
dealing with concepts as a kind of name Plato clearlystrengthensthis
implication.
In the later dialogues,however,it is the separate realityof the Forms
that creates the major question at issue. For that matter,in the later
development of Platonism in Antiquity it has been the everlasting
problem to know how are those separate Forms related to every-daythings; in other words: 'what exactly is meant by 'participation'
)?', or: 'how does the separate Intelligible Form
(metoch,methexis
communicate its nature to the sensible world, without being compromised by the inferiorworld?'. AfterPlato in the Phaedo (99 E - 100 A)
had already pointed to the metaphorical way of speaking in saying
that a sensible thing (e.g. something beautiful) partakes of a Form
(the beautiful), it is especially in the Parmenides that Socrates is
faced by the old Parmenides with the very problem of participation.
Participation, indeed, in relating the immutable True Forms to the
ever-changing-worldof appearances, is bound eitherto detract the
unassailableness of the Forms or to be nothingbut a metaphor that
fails to explain the most characteristicfeature of the sensible world,
.
its mutability
'
The upshot of Parmenides' severe criticismof the concept of partaking' (130 E - 133 A) is that any taking refugebehind the metaphors
90

23:21:10 PM

is unserioustalk. There is, however,a kindredproblem of whether,or

not, the separate Ideas (i.e. the Forms separated frommatter) themselves are related to one another. Of course, this question is different
(but not completelydifferent)fromthat of whethera sensible thingof
our every-day-worldcan have two contrary characters. The latter
question had been discussed by Socrates in a preceding section (128
E -130 A). He had there asserted that, if the Forms of likeness
and another, contraryForm, that of unlikeness, are contradistinguished with the many every-day-thingsthat are said to be like or
unlikeby virtueofpartakingofthe one or the otherForm,respectively,
there is nothing strange in saying that things which have a share in
both are shown to have both characters; nor yet in proving that all
thingsare one by having a share in unity and at the same time many
by sharingin plurality.What wouldsurprisehim,indeed, he continues,
is if of the Forms themselvesit could be shown that, say, simple unity
itself is many, or that plurality itself is one. And so in all similar
cases: if the Forms themselves were shown to have these contrary
characters among themselves (129 B-C). It would be extraordinarily
interestingto me, he goes on (129 E), if anyone startingwith distinguishing the Forms apart just by themselves could then show that
theseForms themselvescan be combined with, or separated from,one
anotherand that the same perplexitiesfoundwiththe every-day-things
are everywhereinvolved in the Forms themselves.
As is well-known,it is in the Sophist, 251 C ff.that the surpriseis
taken away. There the so-called StrangerfromElea clearlyargues that
if one holds that nothinghas any capacity for communionwith anything else, he must face up to most inextricable problems. For that
matter,the 'communion' involved is discussed on three levels:
17
a) there still is the old question of how can one particular everyday-thing partake of several Forms (the question discussed in the
ParmenideSy128 E - 130 A ; see above, p. 11 ; also in the Phaedo 103 E 105 B, see below, pp. 12-14).
b) on the second level, which seems to be more specificallyinvolved
in the Sophistes,our basic issue of the capacity for communionwith
one another concernstheForms themselves
.
c) the argumentas such is completelyfocussedon the semanticissue
that can be dubbed 'the nature of predication'.
17So rightly
Bluck (RichardS. Bluck,Plato's Sophist.A Commentary,
edited
by GordonC. Neal (Manchester
1975),no).
91

23:21:10 PM

I shall now discuss (in 2.1 and 2.2) the items {a) and (b); the third
one (c) will be dealt with explicitlyin a later section when the anatomy
of the propositionis under consideration; here only the general epistemologie side of the predicationitem will be discussed (2.3 and 2.4).
A particulars partakingof severalForms
It should be noted, first,that the question of whether,or not, everyday-thingscan partake of more than one Form was discussed as early
as in the Phaedo, which is, as is well-known,the dialogue in which
Plato's doctrine of the Forms is firstfully developed as a unified
formulationof the several metaphysicalviews of the earlierdialogues.
The section 102 A - 105 B is mainly concernedwith showing that the
Forms exclude, or will not admit into themselves, one or other of a
pair of opposites:
2.1

onthispoint,that
Phaedoio3C7-E818:We agree,then,withoutreserve,
- Now pleasecon- Absolutely.
no oppositewilleverbe its ownopposite.
siderwhetheryou willagreeto mynextpoint.Do you speakof 'hot'and
'cold'
fromfireandthecoldis from
that is to say,thehotis different
snow?- Yes.- But I thinkyouwouldagreethatwhatstartssissnowcannot
admitthehotand stillbe whatit was: stillbe snowand also
ever
hot; on the approachofthehotit willeitherwithdrawor perish
Againfire,whenthe cold approachesit, willeitherget out of its way or
perish;it willneverbringitselfto admitcoldnessand stillbe whatit was,
Thenin someofthesecaseswe find
stillbe fireand also cold
thatit is not onlythe formitselfthatis entitledto its ownnameforall
else,too,whichthoughnotbeingthatForm,yetaltime,but something
it exists.Here's an example
whenever
waysbearsthat Form'scharacter,
whichwillperhapsmake my meaningclearer:the odd, I presume,must
alwayshavethisnamewhichwe nowgiveit,mustn'tit ?- Ofcourse.
2.2

The Forms' capacityfor mutual communion

It is true that in the earlier formulationsof Plato's theory of the

Forms as it is foundin the Phaedo, attentionis mainly focussedon the
relation of the Forms to every-day-things,rather than on the interrelations of the Forms themselves. However, in explaining the former
relation Plato is unavoidably also concernedwith the latter in that he
is bound to base the communion found in sensible being upon some
kind of communionof the Forms themselves.For that matter,dealing
with numbersPlato clearlyspeaks of interrelationsof the Forms themselves. It shouldbe noticed,then,that the sensiblethingsare said to have
'
a right to the same name (e.g. snow ; cfr. 103 D 2) no less than the
18I use Hackforth's
Plato'sPhaedo.Translatedwith
translation
(R. Hackforth,
and Commentary,
an Introduction
2i972).
Cambridge
92

23:21:10 PM

Form itselfhas, but with the important difference,that Forms have

this right 'for all time' (E 4), whereas a sensible thing 'always during
its existence' (E 6). Given this differenceit is highlyimportantforour
purpose, indeed, that in the next Unes Plato in fact discusses the
mutual exclusion of some Forms (e.g. the two, the three) taken
admittedly as the basis of the mutual exclusion of the sensibles partaking of them:
Ibid. 103E9 - 104C 8: But willit be the onlythingin theworldto have
it .... or is theresomething
elsewhich,thoughnotidenticalwiththeodd,
nevertheless
mustbe calledby thename1odd*as wellas by its ownname,
owingto thefactthatitsnatureis suchthatit can neverbe apartfromthe
odd. What I meanmaybe illustrated
by thecase ofthenumberthree,to
takeoneofmyinstances.
Consider
thenumberthree: wouldn'tyousaythat
itmustbe alwaysbe designated,
bothbyitsownnameandalsobythename
'odd', thoughit is notidenticalwiththe odd ? Not identical:nevertheless
that
suchis the natureofthreeand fiveand halfthe entirenumber-series
two and fourand the
is odd. Correspondingly
everyone ofthesenumbers
wholeoftheothercolumnofnumbersare notidenticalwiththeeven,but
nevertheless
each ofthemis forevereven.
Ibid. 104B 5 - C 8: ThenmarkwhatI wantto show; it is this,that not
to admiteachother;
onlydo we findtheoppositesthatwe spokeofrefusing
but all things( = all Forms)which,whilenotbeingmutuallyopposed,allikewiseappearnotto admitthecharacthemselves
wayspossessopposites,
terwhichis oppositeto thatcontainedin themselves
; whenthatcharacter
advancesupon themtheyeitherperishor withdraw.Thus shall we not
affirm
thatthreewillsoonerperish,soonerallowanything
to happento it,
thanendure,whilestillbeingthree,to becomeeven?... < Andsimilarly
thattwowillsoonerperish,soonerallowanything
to
shallwe not affirm
happento it than endure,whilestillbeingtwo, to becomeodd?...>.
Nevertheless
twois nottheoppositeofthree. . . Henceit is notonlytwo
oppositeFormsthatwon'tendurean onsetby one on theother:thereare
othersalso thatwon'tenduretheonsetofopposites.
It is unmistakably manifestthat in the final part of this passage
(104 B 5 - C 8) Plato is dealing with one kind of interrelation,viz. the
mutual exclusion, of the Forms themselves. Well, the precedinglines
(103 B 9 - 104 B 5) most clearly contain an exposition of its counterpart, viz. mutual inclusion of the Forms themselves,no doubt taken
again as the basis forthe state of affairsfoundin the sensible domain.
That Plato is here speaking indeed of the Forms themselvesis clearly
proved by his saying that the numberthreemustalways be designated
.... etc. and that each of the even numbers is for evereven, rather
'
than using the formula during their (its) existence (see above,
p- 13)
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The conclusion,then,may be drawn 19that as early as in the Phaedo

Plato explicitly dealt with the necessaryinterrelationsof the Forms
themselves,(viz. mutual inclusion and mutual exclusion) and, accordingly,assumed (or was bound to assume, at least) the Hierarchyof the
Forms which is explicitlydiscussed and posited in the Sophist,Statesman, and Philebus.
So the important innovation in Plato's metaphysical doctrine as
found in the later dialogues is the extensionof the communionof the
Forms (koinnia) fromone type, already found earlier {Phaedo), viz.
the mutual inclusions and exclusions, to another, viz. the capability
of associating [epikoinonein,Soph. 251 D) ratherthan the introduction
of the communion of the Forms as such; the latter, it should be repeated, is found as early as in the Phaedo.
2.3 The Forms and theirbeingknown
The discussions of the communion of the Forms as viewed in the
Sophist, viz. as the capability of association and dissociation,is there
prepared by the Stranger's discussion of the Forms' capacity of what
is called 'being affected'(peponthenai,Soph. 245 C 1). Bluck (97) seems
to be rightin taking this expression for 'to possess the quality of'. In
245 A ff. a whole is said to be affectedby the one inasmuch as it is
unified; in 248 D ff.the question of whetherknowingis an action (or
affecting)being answered by the Strangerin the affirmative,an object
'
'
being known (e.g. a Form being the object of true knowledge) is
'
synonymouswith its beingchanged'.
Well, apart fromthe fact that Plato is bound to take the hierarchic
structureof the Ideal World culminatingin the good, as a unification
affecting,and accordingly,changingin a way, the Forms, he is to explain true knowledge as implyingsome kind of 'being affected' and,
accordingly, some kind of 'change' of the Forms. The decisive
question, however, is whether this 'change' should affect a Form's
nature.
As far as knowledge is concernedit is self-evidentthat this type of
change is nothing but acquiring, or having acquired, an unessential
attribute.Just because Plato's Ideal World is quite independentfrom
human thinking(see Parm . 132 B-C forthe most explicit rejection of
consideringthe Ideas just logical entities or 'regulative ideas' of the
19See Lon Robin,Platon,Paris1935,148-50and C. J.de Vogel,Philosophia
I.
Assen1970,244-246.
Studiesin GreekPhilosophy,
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23:21:10 PM

Kantian type) 20its being known is an entirelyunessential happening

to it. However, what is importantforcatching Plato's ontologyof the
Forms is his transitionfromknowledge to True Being:
Soph. 249 B 5 - D 7 21: From this,however,it follows,Theaetetus,first,
can reallyexistanyno intelligence
that,if all thingsare unchangeable,
wherein anything
withregardto any object.22
And,on theotherhand,if
we allowthatall thingsare movingand changing,
on thatviewequallywe
- How so ?shallbe excludingintelligence
fromthe class of real things.
Do youthink,that,withoutrest,therecouldeverbe anything
thatabides
constant
in thesamecondition
not.and in thesamerespects?- Certainly
Andwithoutsuchobjectscanyoumakeoutthatintelligence
existsorcould
- Well then,all the
everexistanywhere
?- It wouldbe quite impossible.
forceofreasoning
mustbe enlistedto opposeanyonewhotriesto maintain
at the same timethathe suppressesknowany assertionabout anything
On thesegrounds,
orintelligence
then,it
ledgeorunderstanding
seemsthatonlyonecourseis opento thephilosopher
whovaluesknowledge
and therestabove all else. He mustrefuseto acceptfromthe champions
eitheroftheOne Being[i.e.theEleatics]or fromthoseofthemanyForms
thedoctrinethatall Realityis changeless
; and he mustturna deafear to
theotherpartywhorepresent
Likea child
Realityas everywhere
changing.
beggingforboth,he mustdeclarethat Reality,i.e. the sum of thingsis
bothat once: all thatis unchangeable
and all thatis in change.
Thus Plato triesto show that any insistenceupon the immutabilityof
being means excluding all life, soul, and intelligence from Reality,
whichposition is indeed as fatal to the possibilityof knowledgeas the
opposite Heraclitean thesis (which had been dismissed by Plato in the
Theaetetus
) that being is in perpetual change. Plato refusesto take any
longerimmutabilityas the characteristicof Real Being and associate
all change with the nature proper to the world of becoming.23
It is quite obvious that the metaphysical doctrineis decisive of the
epistemologicalview. So has the Phaedo not only the strongopposition
of the two domains of being, viz. the unchangeable Forms and the
everchangingworld of becoming, but also defends two severely contrastedkindsofcognition,that ofthe worldofsheerappearance through
the senses as contradistinguishedwith true knowledge by means of
20See C. J.de Vogel,GreekPhilosophy
ofTexts,selectedand sup, A Collection
vol. I (Leyde31963),nrs.270-3.
pliedwithsomenotesand explanations,
21I used the translation
in F. M. Cornford,
Plato's TheoryofKnowledge.
The
Theaetetus
and the Sophistof Plato, London 71967, exceptfor some small
corrections.
22The pointis that,ifthewholeofRealityexcludeschange,
intelligence
(which
involveslifeand therefore
change)willhave no real existenceanywhere
(Cornford,op. cit.,241,n. 1).
23It shouldbe noticed,however,
thattheviewrejectedhereso energetically
is
defended
by Plato in his earlierdialogues,especiallyin thePhaedo, 78 C.
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23:21:10 PM

the soul's contemplation. In full accordance with all this is Plato's

anthropological view: man consistingof soul and body and his soul
being akin to the invisible world of the Forms, the soul's activity is
dragged down by the body and its activities, not excluding that of
sensible cognition (aisthsis) ; when the soul, on the contrary,is detached fromthe body and, as Plato calls it is 'by herself'she is able
to realize her natural capacity of contemplatingthe 'unseen' World of
the Forms. The same view is found elsewherein Plato many times.
As a matter of fact, in both these dialogues the domain of the Forms
is always taken as excluding any change and therefore
affordingthe
for
true
as
condition
and
sufficient
knowledge opposed to
necessary
.
or
sensible
cognition opinion (doxa)
merely
The whole gist of the criticismput forwardin the later dialogues
Parmenidesand Sophistis that the strongopposition of the Forms and
the every-day-worldshould imply the formers'being separated from
that world to such extent, indeed, that the Forms are bound to be
beyond the reach of human knowledge, and thus fail to accomplish
their epistemologicalfunction.This does not amount to saying, however, that Plato here abandons his earlier view of the Forms' unchangeableness; this he never did: he was in a constant habit of
) withassertingthat therecannot possibly be any knowledge (episteme
out the existence of unchangeable objects. What is abandoned is the
severe separation of the two domains of being: the Stranger's conclusion at the end of our passage (Sophist, 249 D 5) is that the true
philosophermust declare "that Reality, i.e. the 'sum of things'is both
at once: all that is unchangeable and all that is in change". So the
world of real being consists of immutable Forms and thingsthat are
in some kind of change as well. The unchangeable Forms are no longer
consideredthe 'whole of reality' (to on te kai topan , 249 D 4) ; life,soul
and intelligencenot only existing in the world of becoming must be
real, too, and, to say it in other words: the kind of change they are
involved in, must have a real existence as well. This kind of 'change'
is one required to admit into the Realm of True Being. This unavoidably bringsthe extent of the World of the Forms into discussion.
9
functionand theirontologicalstatus
2.4 The Forms epistemologie
The basic question of what is the extent of the World of Forms
appears with Plato in two distinct shapes: (a) which are the several
classes of things belonging to the Ideal World? and (b) where Forms
are found? As a matter of fact the two questions are clearly related.
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The formeris concerned whenever is asked about the transcendent

nature of organicand even anorganic (both honorable and undignified)
24
thingsas well as mathematical and moral entities. In last analysis
this formof the question has much to do with the hierarchicorder of
the transcendentworld. However, it is firstthe second question that
should come under review now; it is concerned with the status of the
Forms. Next, the formerquestion as confined to the Hierarchy of
Being will be discussed in the second part of this section.
2.4.1

The different
statusof thePlatonic Form

The double, or rather the ambivalent origin of the theory of the

Forms is at the root of the question concerningthe status of the Forms.
As is well known,25fromPlato's own words it can be taken that his
theorywas intended to face with three types of problems,the ontological, the ethical and the logico-epistemological.
Well, as is easy to predict,the various functionsof the Forms were
bound to entail a certain amount of ambivalence in the ontology of
the Forms themselves.Indeed, the Socratic inquiryafterthe definition
ofmoral concepts,such as that of 'justice', 'beautifulness',was certainly to lead to really existingForms, but could not help stressingtheir
logical (i.e. dfinitory) aspect in particular. For that matter, what
Socrates had in mind was the ontic Form as beingknownby (or knowable to) the human mind, rather than the Form just taken by itself.
Socrates presumably had never inquired more specifically into the
ontological status of the Forms common to some groups of sensible
things and referredto by a common name. Admittedly,to Plato's
view, theirreal existencemust be postulated, it cannot be repeated too
often; nevertheless,the Forms' practical (ethical) side being aimed at
by his spokesman Socrates, it is the Forms as beingknownthat are in
the real focus of the latter's interest.His approach of the matter may
be pointed out in supportof the presentview: it is the group of sensible
thingsbearingthesame name that share one Form, on the assumption
that every common name should have a fixed meaning, referringto
one and the same 'object' which both the speaker and his partnerof a
discoursehave beforetheirminds. This clearly is the view put forward
in the famous passage of the Republic X, 596 A-B :
24TheclassicalpassagesarefoundinthePhaedo,Republic
,Parmenides
, Timaeus,
and theSeventh
Letter
, 342 A-D.
25See C. J. de Vogel,Greek
I, nrs266-8.
Philosophy,
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23:21:10 PM

596A 5 - B 11: Shallwe,then,starttheinquiryat thispointbyourcustoa singleform(eidos)

? We arein thehabitofpositing(tithestai)
maryprocedure
in thecase ofeveryset ofthingsto whichwe givethesamename
ofthingsyouplease;
In thepresentcase,then,let us takeanymultiplicity
forexample,therearemanycouchesand tables
Well,theseutensils
imply,I suppose,onlytwoForms(ideai),one ofa couchand oneofa table
who
Are we not also in thehabitof sayingthat the craftsman
produceseitherof themfixeshis eyeson the Form(idean)and so makes
intheonecase thecouchesand in theotherthetableswe use; and similarly
makestheFormitself;
in thecase ofotherthings? For surelyno craftsman
howcouldhe ?- By no means.
So it may be expected a priori that there should also be paid some
attention by Plato to the logico-epistemologicalside of the Transcendent Forms, i.e. the Forms as beingknownby the human mind,of course in spite of the fundamentalintereston his side put in their
transcendentnature as such, quite independent of any human understanding.
So far the question concerningthe differentstatus of the Forms.
Their remains that of theirhierarchicarrangement.
2.4.2

The hierarchicarrangement
of theForms

one could say,functionaloriginsof Plato's

Apart fromthe different,
above (p. 17), there are, of course,
mentioned
of
the
Forms
theory
several bodies of doctrineout of which Plato's theoryhas originated;
among them the most famous are the Eleatic and Heraclitean ones.
However, as far as our present question is concerned,it ratheris the
Pythagorean doctrinal root that counts. As we are told by Aristotle
in his historicalsurveyin the firstBook of the Metaphysics, (I 6, 987a
to the Forms
29ff.)Plato conceived the relationofthe every-day-things
in the same way as the Pythagoreans took their relations to the
'Numbers'. His Forms were the separately existinginhabitants of the
IntelligibleWorld, where they replaced the Pythagorean Numbers,as
alternative Entities underlyingthose of the world of appearance. As
has been demonstrated by more than one study in our days, in his
later years at least Plato was more and more attracted by the intrinsic
impetus as well as the doctrinal direction of Pythagoreanismpostulating a mathematical model for the universe of being. Thus Plato
arrived at a systemwhich involved a pair of opposite First Principles
and a triple division of ontological levels. Reflectionsof these views
are found as early as in the Republic as well as in such later dialogues
as the Philebus, Timaeus and Laws.
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23:21:10 PM

It is out of the scope of the presentstudy to give Plato's view of the

hierarchyof Being in all detail. I confinemyselfto the points which
are of specificinterestforour purpose.26
The firstPrinciples Plato established are the One and the Indefinite
Dyad (Aristotle,Metaph. I 6, 987a 29ff.).The One is the active principle which imposes 'limit' {peras) on the formlessness(apeiron) of the
opposite principle. The Dyad, also termed by Plato the 'great-andsmair, is regarded as being infinitelyextensible (divisible) and simultaneouslyinfinitelylarge and infinitelysmall. The Infinite(Unlimited)
Dyad is primarilythe basic unlimitednessor 'otherness' on which the
One acts, but it is also the irrationalaspect of the Soul, and again the
substrate of the physical world, the Receptacle (hypodoche)of the
Timaeus (49 A 6; 51 A 6). By acting upon the Dyad (i.e. limitingit),
the One generates the Idea-Numbers, being mathematical entities of
some sort,among which the 'primal numbers', one, two, three,
four, (the
ten
have
and
their
sum-total,
special positions.
Tetraktys),
(the Decad)
From an action of the primal numbers on the Dyad, and its re-action
on them,all otherIdea-Numbers are generated.The latter seems to be
what the Platonic Forms of the classical period have become; the
numbersup to tencertainlyhold some kind of distinctivelybasic position among the whole domain of Idea-Numbers, out of which the
physical world has been produced. The interrelationsof all these
entities including those of the physical world, may be clarifiedby a
passage fromTheophrastus' Metaphysics(6 b iiff.) who mentionstheir
hierarchicarrangement,in speaking of Plato ''making all other things
(i.e. the physical things of the world of appearance) dependent upon
the Ideas (i.e. the mass of the Idea-Numbers), and these on Numbers
(i.e. those of the Dyad), proceeding fromNumbers to the First Principles" (i.e. The One and the Dyad).
Withinthe Decad the Tetraktysseems to play a major part in Plato's
cosmology,in providing the link between the absolute unity of the
One and the three-dimensionalmultiplicityof the physical world. We
matheknow fromAristotle[De celo III, i) that an uncompromisingly
matical model of the universewas laid down by Plato. Elsewhere, too,
Aristotleis clear enough in telling us that Plato, besides the Forms,
postulated the existence of what he called 'Mathematical', or 'objects
of Mathematics' {Metaph. I, 6 and XIII, 6). These are distinguished
fromthe Ideas by having 'many the same' and being combinable with
28A clearsurveyis givenin Dillon'swork(see above, p. 4, n. 6), of whichI
willmakesomeuse in thisas wellas in someofthefollowing
sections.
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23:21:10 PM

each other,while the Mathematical 27are each one of a kind and 'noncombinable' (asymbltoi
; M 8, 1083 a 19); from physical object they
are distinguishedby being eternal and immaterial. Dillon (op. cit., 6)
quite plausibly assumes that the Soul (= the World Soul), being the
place (topos)of the Ideas, receives them into itselfand somehow transformsthem into mathematicals,then projectingthem upon Matter to
formthe physical world.
The World Soul, an Entity of a cosmic nature (describedin Timaeus
35 A ff.),is regarded as a mediator between the intelligibleand the
physical realms and is composed itself of both 'above' and 'below'
aspects. The Timaeus in fact describes the process of the World's
generation: as the supreme mediating entitythe World Soul receives
influencesfromthe intelligiblerealm and passes them on, 'extended'
and 'diversified'to bringabout the creation of the sensible realm.
Thus, especially in his later dialogues, Plato knew of a hierarchic
arrangementof beings. The top of that hierarchicorderconsists of the
preeminentForms we have mentioned before. Besides, there is that
sort of hierarchymodelled by what is spoken of in the Sophist as the
Tables of Divisions. At theirheads stands a genericForm, say animal.
into its inThat Form is divided, down throughthe lower differences,
divisible (i.e. lowest) species man, horse, dog etc. The physical things
which are below them are the individual men, horses, dogs etc. that
all do not matter in our division, since the individual appearances of
man, horse etc. are nothingbut changeable, 'unreal' [ouk ontsonta)
things.So what is divided is not any class of individuals (men, horses)
but a single, complex Form (e.g. animal) of which the subordinate
Forms are the parts (moria, or mere)',the formeris said to embrace
the latter,but not as a containerbut as 'pervading' themand 'extended
throughoutall of them' {Sophist,253 D).
As early as in the Republic (509 D ff.)we were told that the upward
movement (whichis, of course, the division's counterpart)leads to the
fullest Form of Being, the source of all subordinate entities. In the
same line of thought we have to consider such half-way Forms as
animal having a richer'ontic value' than the lowest Forms man, horse
etc., which are found, indeed, at the lowest stage of the division of
being and, accordingly,called indivisible (atomoneidos); as a matterof
fact, the process of division finds its end with them. However, the
27Dillon(p. 6) wrongly
has Ideas.
IOO

23:21:10 PM

lowest species are by no means simple and unanalysable. Unlike a logical division, of the sort found with Aristotle,the metaphysical ('dialectic', to say it with Plato's own word) process of division produces
membersthat, in a way, are reflectedimages of one another: just like
the genericForm (e.g. animal) embraces the subordinateForms (men,
horse etc.) as a whole does its parts, so the latter consists of the
genericForm animal plus the differencesbiped, rational which are
its ontic constituents.As a matter of fact the generic Form contains
all the lower specificForms in pervading them all throughits nature,
while the latter, indeed, each contain the nature of the genus and the
specificdifferencesproper to it, which are all of them as many causes
of its being 'real' (ontson).
Despite the undeniable fact that no attention is paid by Plato, in
this connection, to the individuals as such, they are really involved
in his inquiries afterthe nature and the activities of the Forms. So in
Timaeus 50 C the inhabitants of the physical world of appearances are
spoken of indirectlywhen Plato discusses the thingsthat pass in and
out the Receptacle (>hypodoch
), as 'copies of the eternal things', ima strange manner that is hard to exfrom
them
"in
taken
pressions
are
What
these
press".
things
appears from49 E: those qualities which
"
are always comingto be in the Receptacle, making theirappearance,
and again vanishingout of it". In the same passage we are taught that
only in speaking of that in which those thingsare always comingto be
'
'
and passing away, the demonstrativepronouns this or 'that' may be
used. Thus thereis a definitecontrastbetween that stream of fluctuating qualities and the ever-lastingin which (en hi) they make their
transitoryappearances. However, it is not the in which, the Receptacle,
'
'
that is constitutiveofwhat is named by the term thebodily (tosomatoeides), a term occurringin a previous passage (31 B) togetherwith its
'
associates visible and 'tangible.
UnfortunatelyPlato is not quite clear in speaking of the nature of
those "things that pass into and out of" the Receptacle; in fact they
could not solely be identified as the qualities (poiottes)mentioned
'
above, since they cannot be regarded as the 'copies of the eternal
things" (homoimatatonontnaei mimmata)of which is spoken in the
same connection(50 C 5). His fifthcenturycommentatorProclus seems
to be quite rightin assuming that interpretingthis Timaeus passage
we have also to thinkof the Forms immersedin matter (ta eidta enula)
or somethingof the kind.
So the lowest stage of the dialectic division (of the Sophist) has
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something to do with the process of materialization ('individuation')

whichis to bringabout the physicalindividualspartakingin the Forms.
And so the immanentstatus of the Forms comes up fordiscussion.
These things being so, the conclusion may be drawn that the first
item discussed in this section,viz. the logico-epistemologicalstatus of
the Forms, implies the platonic Forms as beingknown, while the impact of the other item (viz. the hierarchicarrangementof the Forms)
concerns- among other things, of course, which are by far more explicit in Plato's expositions- , the aspect of 'immanence' of the Forms
in the physical world of appearances.
It seems to be of some use, indeed, afterthe discussionsof the preceding sections in which I have tried to follow Plato's own lines of
thinking,to collect the differentpieces of evidence to be found in
Plato's work, in support of the very distinctionof the differentstatus
the Forms are bound to have in exercisingtheir respectivefunctions.
statusof theForms as found withPlato
2.5 The threefold
It should be noticed, at the outset, that the distinctionof the differentstatus of the Platonic Forms has nothingto do with the opposition of some kind of Form to another.Multum absit.What is involved
in such distinctionis the opposition of the Form as takenin its transcendent status to the same Form as takenin its embodied or immanent
status, and an analogous opposition of it as takenin eitherof the two
status, on the one side, to the same Form as takenas being known by
the human mind. Thus a threefoldstatus of one and the same Form
comes to appear :
-

that of the Form when taken in its transcendence,i.e. existing

separately in the IntelligibleWorld, quite immaterialand independent fromhuman thinking
that of the same Form when taken in its immanence,i.e. existing
embodied in the material world,but as independentfrom,and not
touched on, by the human mind
that of the same Form when taken, apart fromboth its separate
existence in the IntelligibleWorld and that in the material world,
only as conceived by the human mind.

Two remarksshould be made.

(a) The formulationsof the firsttwo items are ambiguous, indeed,
in speaking of 'the Form when taken as', thus involving the human
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mind's activity,which is explicitlyexcluded by the same formula.As

can easily be seen, the referents,or denotata of the phrases 'the Form
'
when taken as
are meant, not theirsenses or connotata.It goes
without speaking that such distinctionsare made fromthe Platonic
point of view, i.e. fromthe belief that such entities as the Platonic
Forms are existent. Sometimes the historianhas to bringthe sacrifice
of disregardinghis personal view of the matterunder discussion.
(b) My second remark which concerns the third item, can be regarded as the counterpartof the previous one. The phrase 'when taken
.... only as conceived by the human min does not mean, of course,
that the Form is supposed by the adherentsof the theoryof the Forms
to be nothingbut a mental product- a view most energeticallyrejected
by Plato in Parmenides, 132 B-C- , but the taking apart of just one
aspect of the theoryof the Forms, viz. the Form's being conceived by
human thinking.
status
2.5.1 The Form takenin its transcendent
Of course, this aspect of the Platonic Form is most overwhelmingly
presentin Plato's exposition of his doctrine.Indeed, the real existence
of the objects of the soul's knowledge (to be well distinguishedfrom
the objects of mere opinion,doxa), being a World of IntelligibleForms
our senses perceive,is to
existingseparately fromthe every-day-things
be consideredthe most fundamentalpillar of Plato's doctrine.Aristotle
may have nearly always been giving a polemical account of Plato's
views which is not likely to do fullyjustice to them, we must always
keep in mind,however,that Aristotlehad been an intelligentassociate
of Plato's in the Academy forabout twentyyears; he must have known
what he was talking about. Well, i his eyes the separate existence of
the Platonic Forms (chorismos)was the most outstandingcharacteristic
of Plato's theoryof the Forms, which he became never tired to fight.
On the otherhand, it is in stressingtranscendenceand the immaterial
character of Being that, beginning with an Eudorus of Alexandria
(d. A.D. 19), Platonism intended to reinstatethe Old Master's original
doctrine.
To be more specific,as early as in the Meno Plato in putting forward his doctrine of Recollection effecteda complete break with current views of the sources of knowledge, which, in fact, consisted in
some empiricist view that they are, as such, present in every-daythingsand that our knowledgeof themis conveyed throughthe senses,
whetheror not by a kind of images thrownoffby the material phen103

23:21:10 PM

omena. To his view, on the contrary,knowledge(epistm,not doxa) is

acquired by a recollection (anamnesis) in this life of True Being contemplated and known by our souls before their incarnation. In the
Phaedo Socrates tries to confirmthis view with all possible ressources
of persuasion; the upshot of both dialogues is that the separation of
the Intelligible Forms from any dependence upon material things is
(as a doctrine)most intimatelyconnectedwiththat ofthesoul's detachment fromany influenceof the flesh.As far as the ontologicalside of
the theory is concerned, the Phaedo (esp. 78 C-D ff.) most clearly
speaks of two orders of things, the invisible and unchangeable one,
and the visible that is in a permanent process of changing.
It is true that the separate existence of the Forms created a basic
problem in the later dialogues, more explicitlythan it was felt before
(in certainpassages of the Phaedo forinstance: discussed above, p. 13 ;
see also below, p. 26). As a matter of fact Parmenides' criticismis
directed against the very chorismos on which the Phaedo had laid so
much stress,indeed. In the Sophist the Strangerseverelycriticizesthe
so-called 'Friends of the Forms' who preciselyhold the views defended
in the earlierdialogues, more specificallythat of the chorismos.
However, it is of extreme importance to bear in mind that, even
after all those criticismsmentioned above and taken by him quite
seriously, Plato still stuck to the view that all Forms must be immaterial Entities, existingin a separate IntelligibleWorld. The pattern
of Forms the dialectician (of the Sophist) has to divide in order to
acquire true knowledgeof Being, is what is called there 'the perfectly
real' [topantelson), or 'the All' (to on te kai pan) ; it stillis the changeless whole of unchanging,transcendentBeing, excluding any kind of
multiplicity.28
Finally a passage fromthe Timaeus can be adduced (51 E 52 A),
where Plato puts the transcendent status of the Forms in a clear
opposition to the physical world of appearances:
: Thisbeingso, we must
Timaeus51 E 7-52 A 9 (Cornford's
translation)
and unagreethat thereis, first,the unchangeableForm,ungenerated
elseintoitselffromelsewhere
whichneitherreceivesanything
destructible,
invisibleand otherwise
elseanywhere,
noritselfentersintoanything
imperceptible;that,in fact,whichthinkinghas forits object.Secondis that
whichbearsthe samenameand is like thatForm;is sensible;is brought
in motion,comingto be in a certainplace
into existence;is perpetually
28For whatPlato did concedeto his criticsfromthe doctrinalpointof view,
see above,p. 16.
104

23:21:10 PM

and againvanishing
out ofit; and is to be apprehended
by beliefinvolving
perception.29
2.5.2 The Form takenin its immanentstatus
There are several passages in Plato's work where the embodied
(immanent)status of the Forms turnsout to be involved. One of them
has already been discussed in an extensive way in our section 2.4.2,
pp. 21-22. As has been remarked there, Proclus understoodby those
"things that pass into and out of" the Receptacle also what he called
"the formsembodied in matter [ta eid ta enula), being (in this case)
copies of the eternalForms of Fire, Air, Water and Earth. To Proclus'
interpretationof the Timaeus passage a remark may be added from
the commentaryon Aristotle'sPhysics writtenby Simplicius [In Arist.
Phys., 53910)that in the Timaeus matteris called "the space and the
that the phrase
place of the embodied Forms". It appears from54033ff.
'embodied Forms' was partly based on Timaeus 53 B 4 (dieschematisato
eidesi te kai arithmois
, which,in fact, seems to referto the geometrical
and
on
Timaeus 51 A 7 (metalambanonaportatapi tou
shapes)
partly
notou).30
The same dialogue seems to contain another clue. Speaking about
the composition and structure of the World Soul we are taught by
Plato (Timaeus 35 A) that it is compounded of threeingredients,to the
extent that, between Indivisible, IntelligibleBeing and divisiblebeing
that becomes in bodies, the Demiurge compounded a third form of
existencecomposed of both; next follow,he continues,two other,additional, mixtures.31The upshot of the whole passage is that the soul has
a sort of existencewhichis not simplyidentical with the Real Being of
immutableand eternal things,nor yet with the 'becoming' ofthe physical phenomena,but has some of the characteristicsof both these sorts
of existence (see Cornford,loc. laud .).
However, as far as I can see, the oppositionput forwardin 35 A iff.
does not concernReal Being versusthe physical world taken as unreal
being, but Real Being (= the World of the Forms) in its transcendent
status versusReal being as distributedamongbodies (Plato has: peri ta
smata gignomensmerists
, 35 A 2-3), i.e. the same Forms taken in
their embodied status. So this passage, too, seems to have an implicit
29Cp. ibid.27 D - 28 A; 35 A.
30See F. M. Cornford,
Platos Cosmology,
The TimaeusofPlato translated
with
a running
commentary
(London,21948),183-4.
31See Cornford,
Plato'sCosmology
, 59-62.
105

23:21:10 PM

allusion to what was called later on (Proclus, and, as we will see in a

later section, Albinus) the eidos enulon.
Anotherclue seems to occur in the well-knownpassage of the Parmenides, 129-130 (discussed above, pp. 10-11), where the likeness we
have is distinguishedfromthe Form likeness. Here the distinctionbetween the Forms themselvestaken in theirpurelytranscendentnature,
on the one side (chrismen eid auta atta) and every-day-thingspartaking in some (or more) Form(s), on the other [chrisde ta tontnau
metechonta)is found in a most explicit way (130 B 2-3).
No doubt, this is to be put alongside with the Phaedo passage (103
C-E) discussed above, pp. 12-13, where Plato is obviously speaking of
Forms as embodying themselves in matter. The opposition of the
Form's transcendentalstatus to its immanentone is quite manifestin
his saying that thereare some cases in whichwe findthat it is not only
the Form itself (i.e. the Form in its transcendental status) that is
entitled to its own name for all timeybut also somethingelse which
although not being that Form, yet always bears that Form's character
as long as it exists. The subsequent part of this passage (see above,
p. 13) is clear enough to illustrate that, in dealing with that 'something else' (which is, no doubt, a physical phenomenon)Plato regards
it as having some nature(103 D 2 : the "nature ('what it was') ofsnow" ;
103 E 10 : "the nature of somethingodd" ; 104 A 7-8 : "the very nature
of three and five"), and it is this naturethat is an embodied Form. It
should be noticed, further,that the firstpassage under review speaks
of 'the ho beingadmitted(103 D 7), the approach of 'the ho (D 9),
. Likewise a
resp. 'the cold' approachingfireand of 'coldness1admitted
'the
tallness in
had
in
the
same
distinguished
dialogue
previous passage
No doubt, 'the hot' apus' from 'Tallness itself' (102C-103B).
proaching, 'the coldness' admittedas well as 'the tallness in us' (as
contradistinguishedwithTallness itself,i.e. Tallness in its transcendent
status) must be identifiedas Forms in their immanentstatus.
Finally, some attention must be paid to Theaetetus156 D ff. It is
true that therethe domain of sense-perceptionis concerned.A distinction is made between the sensation 'whiteness' which is what is produced by the conjunction of the stream of light fromthe eye and the
influxof colour fromthe object perceived,and, on the otherhand, the
status of the object itselfafterthat conjunctionhas taken place, which
status is called 'a white thing', "be it stock or stone or whatever else
may happen to be so coloured", Plato clarifies (156 E 5-7). Thus a
distinctionis involved between a quality, such as 'colour' or 'white106

23:21:10 PM

ness', and the 'embodied qualities'. When the situationhas been transferredfrom the level of sense-perceptionto that of intellection,the
latter entity,viz. 'embodied quality', may be equated with the Form
in its transcendentstatus, while the formerone, viz. 'colour' (or 'whiteness') may be consideredthe Form as mental entity,i.e. the Form as
conceived by the human mind.
This quite naturally leads us over to the next section.
2.5.3 The Form takenin its mentalstatus
This section aims at collecting all pieces of evidence of Plato's
speaking (whetherimplicitlyor explicitly)ofthe Form as being known,
i.e. as conceived by the human intellect.
In a previous section (2.4.1) it has been remarkedthat for Socrates
inquiringafterthe basic moral values, it is the TranscendentForms as
being known [knowable) that are in the focus of his interest.Thus the
mental status of the Forms are here also of vital importance.
The firstgroup of evidential matter concernsall the passages where
the Recollection theoryis discussed. The basic position in this theory
is taken by the human mind (soul) that, when only withdrawingfrom
the flesh to think 'by itself' and set free fromall bodily influences,
includingthose of the senses, is ready to carry on its proper function
of thinking,reflectingand contemplatingTrue Being. By all this,however, 'True Being', or the 'World of the Forms' as known{contemplated)
by the soul is really involved. See also above, pp. 15-16.
Another cluster of evidence is found in Plato's doctrine of the socalled Ideal Names put forwardespecially in the Cratylus (see above,
pp. f.). Just inasmuch as those Names, e.g. 'horse', are distinguished
fromthe transcendentForm (horse), thereis an amount of stresslaid
on the Form as mental entity. Indeed, it is the correctlyframedconcept 'horse'ybeing itselfthe correctconcept of the transcendentForm,
with which the Ideal Name should be equated; accordingly,the latter
is nothingbut a Form itselftakenin its mentalstate. This doctrineexpounded more specificallyin Cratylus, 386 E ff.,where the analogy
between the separating operations of weaving and dialectic is elaborated, has its counterpartin a passage in the later dialogue Statesman,
wherea parallel is drawn between the combiningoperationsof weaving
and statesmanship.There, too, we are told that thereis a correctway
of namingthingsby means of words expressingsomehowtheirnatures,
i.e. the Forms shared by those things,any name having the officeof
distinguishingthe nature of things. Well, the natures involved come
107

23:21:10 PM

up here for discussion inasmuch as they are the meanings of those

names. Again, the Form as a mental state seems to be implied. Finally,
in our section 2.4.1 the passage fromthe Republic 596 A has been discussed, where the assumption is involved that every common name's
fixed meaning should referto one and the same mental object being
present in the minds of both the speaker and the hearer. This mental
object cannot be anythingbut what we have called the transcendent
Form as knownby the human mind.
A thirdway in which the Form in its mental status seems to appear,
is found in some lines of the Phaedrus. There Plato speaks of the
"living speech" that is 'writtenin the soul' (276 A 5-6; 278 A 3) and
"accompanies knowledge" (276 A 5). The section 274 B- 278 B discusses the superiorityof the spoken word over the writtenone. Socrates
gives it as his opinion that written compositionsare, at the best, a
means of remindingthose who know the truth,but that lucidity and
completenessand serious importance belong only to those lessons that
are veritablywrittenin the soul of the listener.What is being opposed
to the writtendiscourse is the spoken discourse which is regarded as
being writtenin the soul, "no dead discourse,but the living speech,
the originalof which the writtendiscoursemay fairlybe called a kind
of image" (279 A 9). It is not written"in water nor in that black fluid
we call ink" (276 C 7-8), but written down by the true philosopher
(dialectician)in a pupil's soul of the righttype (276 E) which is able to
accept his "words founded on knowledge" (E4). The dialectician's
words are such as to fulfillthe conditionsmaking a discoursea product
of art: firstone must know the truth about a subject that you speak
or writeabout ; that is to say, one must be able to isolateit in a definition, and having so defined it one must understand how to divide it
into kinds until the limit of the (ontological) division is reached; next
one must discover the type of speech appropriateto each nature under
discussion (277 B 1 - C 1). Well, it is quite obvious that the speech
definingand determininga thing's real nature (the 'truth about it' as
Plato calls it) is nothing but the Transcendental Form taken in the
mentalstatusit getsin people framingcorrectlyconcepts,i.e. conceiving
correctlythose natures.
No doubt, all those other passages belong to this group where Plato
describesthinkingas "unspoken discourse" (Theaetetus189 B - 190 A;
cfr. 196 A and 206 D ; Philebus 38 C-E where the unspoken discourse
is vividly described by Socrates; finallySophist263 E can be adduced,
where thinking{dianoia) and discourse (logos)- both terms used in a
108

23:21:10 PM

larger sense including not only judgment and statement but also all
otherformsof thinkingand speech 32- are said to be "the same thing,
except that what we call thinkingis, precisely,the upward dialogue
carried on by the mind with itselfwithout spoken sound").
Finally theremay be adduced two other passages fromthe Theaetetus. First the one already discussed in the previous section, pp. 26-27,
where the contra-distinctionof the transcendentstatus of the Form
with the mental one seems to be implied. Of the doctrinalside of this
passage Timaeus 61 D ff.seems to offera parallel. The second passage
of the Theaetetuswhich is of some importance here, is 195 D - 196 A,
formingpart of the famous section of the dialogue where Plato is
tryingto define 'false judgment'. A distinctionis made between real
(physical) things and entities which one merely thinks of. Well, the
latter categorynot allowingany false judgment,we must identifythose
entitieswith transcendentForms as conceivedby the human mind. I
give the relevant passage in full:
195D 6 - 196B 7: Socrates:'On the otherhand',he 33willcontinue,'you
thinkofand
also saythatwe can neverimaginethata manwhomwemerely
do notsee is a horsewhichagainwedo notsee or touchbutmerely
thinkof
withoutperceiving
it in any way?'. I supposeI shallsay 'Yes' to that.- Socr.: 'On that showing',he will say, 'a man
Theaetetus:Andrightly.
couldneverimaginethat11 whichhemerely
thinksof,is 12 whichagainhe
thinksof'. Come,you mustfindthe answernow.- Thaet.: Well,I
merely
shallanswerthat,ifhe saworhandledeleventhings,
he mightsupposethey
weretwelve,buthe willnevermakethatjudgmentaboutthe11 and the12
- Socr.: Well now,does a man everconsiderin his
he has in his thoughts.
ownmind5 and 7 (I don'tmeanfivemenand sevenmenor anythingof
thatsort,butjust 5 and 7 themselves,
whichwe describeas recordsin that
waxenblockof ours,amongwhichtherecan be no falsejudgment),does
and ask himselfin his inward
anyoneevertake theseintoconsideration
conversation
howmuchtheyamountto; and doesonemanbeliefand state
thattheymake 11, anotherthat theymake 12, or does everybody
agree
theymake 12?... . Now considerwhat happensin this case. Is it not
that the12 itselfthat is stampedon the waxenblockis 11 ?thinking
Thaet.: It seemsso.
The same holds good of all those passages where Plato is using the
'
word ennoia in orderto indicate the notions taken as stamped on the
memory. In a Theaetetuspassage preceding the one discussed in the
above lines Plato speaks of those ennoiai as somethingwe conceive in
our own minds (autoi ennosmen,191 D 5) ; in our passage we read
32See Cornford,
Plato'sTheoryofKnowledge,
318,n. 1.
33Somebodyintroducedby Plato (195C 6-7) as an anonymousdiscussionto Socrates.
partnerwhoaddresseshimself
109

23:21:10 PM

about a man (and a horse) whom we merelythinkof [hondianooumetha

monon). All those ennoiai are clearly opposed to things we see and
touch (195 D 8). In Phaedo 73 C 7-10 Socrates makes a distinctionbetween some every-day-thingbeing perceived by somebody and 'something else' besides that, something that is the object of a different
knowledge; the latter, no doubt, is to be identifiedwith the Transcendent Form. However, in continuinghis exposition, Socrates describes this something else that somebody comes to know (kai heteron
ennosi, 73 C 7-8) as an ennoia (C 9) ; well, this ennoia is, again, the
concept correctlyframedof the TranscendentForm. In Philebus 59 D,
where Socrates speaks of the names of Reason and Intelligence as
precisely appropriate to thought whose object is True Being, this
thought is indicated by the term 'ennoia,' (59 C 4 : en tais peri to on
ontsennoiais). Again, Plato is clearlyspeakingabout the Transcendent
Form takenin its mentalstatus.
To be continued
Leiden
FilosofischInstituut
Witte Singel 71

110

23:21:10 PM

Vivarium
XV, 2 (1977)
The Views of William of Sherwood on Some Semantical Topics
and Their Relation to Those of Roger Bacon*

H. A. G. BRAAKHUIS

is well known, Roger Bacon in his CompendiumStudii TheoAs

logiae deals with the two semantical problems he considers of
primordialimportanceformetaphysicsand logic.1The positions
taken on these problems have accordingly,in his opinion, an effect
on every theological or philosophical dispute. The problems are the
following: a) can a word signify anything that is univocally common to being and non being (utrum vox possit significarealiquid
commune univocum enti et non enti), b) can a word loose its significance (utrum vox possit cadere a sua significatione).
From the beginningof his treatmentof the problems Roger makes
it unambiguously clear that in his opinion the firstof the questions
is to be answered in the negative and the second in the affirmative.
Accordingto him nouns in principlesignifyonly actual existingthings
and in case the thing(s) signifiedby a certain noun were to perish,
nothingwill be left forthat noun to signify.Or if the same noun (i.e.
the same combination of sounds) were eventually charged with the
new functionof signifyingthose things that once did exist, then the
firstand the second significationof that noun will have a relation
of equivocation.2
* This paperwas read,in firstdraft,at the SecondEuropeanSymposion
for
MedievalLogicand Semantics
heldin Leiden/Nijmegen,
November1974.
1 FratrisRogeriBacon Compendium
Studii Theologiaeed. H. Rashdall . . . ,
MCMXI (anast.repr.Farnborough
Aberdoniae
1966),pp. 52-64.
2 See ibid.,p. 54: ... quia omnianominaque inponimusrebusinponimusut
suntpresentanobis;p. 59: Ex hac ergoratione(radice,Rashdall)patet quod
non potesthomoesse animalnullohomineexistente,nec Cesar poteritesse
homo: quia nominahuiusmodi
essenciasrerumpresentes
et actuales,
significant
quia non significant
(nomensignificat,
Rashdall) aliquid communepresenti,
et futuro;pp. 60-61:quia (scilicet:nomen)noninponebatur
nisisub
preterito
et esseactualis... et ideocumperiitres,et sicnonest,nomen
racionepresents
nonsignificabit
illud;
estquodvoxque significabat
rempresentem
p. 61: dicendum
perinpositionem
rem illam preteritam
sub eadem inposicione;set
aliquandonon significabit
benepotestinponiei novainposicione,
licetsitnichil;quia possumusperprivaIII

23:21:23 PM

The usually defended semantical concepts leading to an answer

contraryto the one Roger gives, he treats very sourly and contemptuously.3 One of these conceptions so firmlyrejected by Roger is that
of the esse habitale:
semper,et iterum
Compendium,
p. 55: sed cum mendaciamultiplicantur
finguntunum esse quod nunquama philosophianec a sapientibusfuit
inventumnec receptm,et dicuntilludessehabitale
, et hoc dicuntesse
et futuro,et communeentiactualiteret non
communepresenti,
preterito,
entiactualiter.
If one now looks for a person to whom to ascribe such a conception,
the name of William of Sherwood comes easily to mind forin his socalled Introductionesin logicam we find exactly this conception of
esse habitale *
Introductiones
,6 p. 83a8-34:.... quia cum dicitur:"omne animal est",
predicaturhie esse actale,quod est existere.Cum autemdico: "omnis
esse habitale.
homoest animal",predicatur
.... Cumenim'est' poniturinterhec extrema'homo','animal' tamquam
mediaminterhec duo.
medium,dicithabitudinem
One could also point to other passages in William of Sherwoos
work, where this esse habitaleis related explicitlyto the problem of
the empty class.
Thus we read in his Syncategoremata
,6in the section on est:
p. 71: Sciendumautem quod hoc verbum'es quanSyncategoremata,
doqueaccipituraequivoce;dicitenimquandoqueesseactalequoddebetur
actualiterexistenti,
quandoqueesse habitalequod debeturei quod in se
licet
esse in aliquo singulari,
est naturaaliqua et natumest habitualiter
nonens,sicpossumusdare
nonens; et sicutintelligimus
cionementisintelligere
(signati,
nomen,set nova eritinposicio,et equivocerespectuprionssignificati
Rashdall).
of
Theselast sentencesshowthatofcourseRogerBacon allowssignification
nonbeingstoo.
3 Cfr.Sten Ebbesen & Jan Pinborg,Studiesin theLogicalWritings
Attributed
toBoethiusde Dacia, in: Cahiersde l'Institutdu Moyen-gegrecet latin (de
l'Universitde Copenhague),3 (1970),pp. 1-54te1'10*)*esP-PP-4~44 (9<>-94)
them.
is givenand ofthemenwhodefended
wherea listoftheseconceptions
4 See StenEbbesen & JanPinborg,ibidem,p. 44 (94),whoregarding
thisconceptionofessehabitalepointto WilliamofSherwoodand referto thepassage
citedhere.
ofhis Introductiones
5 We use the editionof Grabmann:Die Introductiones
in logicamdes Wilhelm
vonShyreswood
Einleitungund Textausgabe
(f nach 1267). Literarhistorische
von MartinGrabmann(SBAW, Phil.-hist.Abt., Jhrg.1937, 10)>Mnchen
s Textof
offered
by J.Malcolm,On Grabmann'
1937,but use the corrections
IX (1971),pp. 108-118.
in: Vivarium,
WilliamofSherwood,
6 See J.R. O'Donnell,TheSyncategoremata
in: Medieval
ofWilliamofSherwood,
Studies,III (1941)PP-46-93112

23:21:23 PM

non actalitersit. Primomodo haec est falsa: ' omnishomoest animai'

nullohomineexistente;secundomodovera; et sic sumiturin hac 'omnis
homoestanimai' secundumquod ly 'omnis'dividitpropartibussecundum
speciem.
In much the same way as in the preceding passage the notion of
esse habitale also occurs in William's treatment of the sophism
'omnis homo de necessitate est animar in the same work.7
These last two passages are both to be connected8 with the treatment of 'omnis' in the same work, where we read e.g. :
, p. 49: Proptereadicendumquod pars secundumspeciem
Syncategoremata
et haecestpars
estparsquae debeturuniversali
inquantumestuniversale,
est
secundumquod est habitualiter
ens; pars autemsecundumnumerum
pars actualiterens et non debeturuniversaliper se. Primomodo pars
hominisest homo habitualiterin Sorte sive Sortes,et similiterhomo
habitualiter
in Platone,et hae partes sunt nullo homineactualiterexin SortesiveSortes,
istente.Secundomodoestparshominishomoactualiter
et similiter
homoactualiterin Platone,et hae partesnonsuntnisihomine
actualiterexistente.
Perhaps one could also point to another aspect of William's doctrine, namely that of the habitual supposition (suppositio in habitu
or secundumhabitm
), which should be put on a level with Peter of
natural
Spain's
supposition (suppositio naturalis) by means of which,
as Peter asserts explicitly,a term can stand for existingand non existingthings.9
This all seems to justify considering William of Sherwood as an
advocate of the esse habitalewhich was so despised by Roger Bacon.
In my opinion, however,if that were to be the case, a problemwill
arise concerning the attitude of Roger Bacon towards William of
Sherwood. For we know Roger to have held William in high esteem
precisely with regard to philosophia communis, which is commonly
7 See hisSyncategoremata,
p. 75.
8 As is rightly
see hisWilliamofSherwood's
pointedoutbyNormanKretzmann,
Treatiseon Syncategorematic
Words,transi,withan introd.and notes,Minneapolis1968,p. 93, n. 16.
9 See Peterof Spain {PetrusHispanus Portugalensis)
calledafterTractatus,
wardsSummuleLogicales.Firstcriticaleditionfromthe manuscripts
withan
introduction
by L. M. de Rijk, Ph. D., TractatusVI, 4, p. 8i2"5andTractatus
For a treatment
and comparisonof the two notionsof supX, i, p. 19711-13.
A Contribution
to
positioninvolved,see L. M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum.
theHistory
LogicII, 1,Assen1967,pp. 571-575,andespecially
ofEarlyTerminist
, in: Vivarium,
idem,The development
ofsuppositionaturalisin mediaevallogic
IX (1971),pp. 71-107,estp.pp. 80-85.
113

23:21:23 PM

agreed upon to mean or, at any rate, to include logic.10 Now, the
reasons why Roger bestowed praise or blame on certain persons may
not be totally clear in every aspect, it would be howeverratherstrange
indeed for Roger to esteem William so highlyas a logician if he knew
- and we can be almost certainof that - William to stick to an opinion he himselfcondemnedas mendacious,the more because it concerns
a subject Roger appears to consider as pivotal not only in the field of
logic but in theology as well.
However, if we examine more carefullythe position of William of
Sherwood concerning the semantical problems under discussion, we
may not only find some reason for the praise Roger bestowed on
William, but, what is more important, also get a clearer idea of
William's opinions on these matters, especially as compared with
those of Roger. We may furthermoreget a somewhat better idea of
the ways in which some of the problems so eagerly debated in the
second half of the 13th century11had already presented themselves
in the time before.
a) Relation supposition- appellation
Let us start by taking a closer look of William's tract De appellatione.12The tract starts with some generalremarkson the differences
between appellation, supposition and copulation and it is observed
that the functionof appellation belongs to both the subject-termand
predicate-term.After that a remark is made on the relation of the
suppositumof a term to the appettatum:
Introuctiones,
p. 82a0-23:Nota enim quod suppositumquandoque est
est ens; et
aliquodens,quandoquenonens; appellatumautemsimpliciter
et appellatumquandoquesuntidem,quandoquenon.
sic suppositum
In order to determinewhen suppositum and appellatum coincide or
not, a variant of the usual rule of appellation is given:
habenssufficientiam
ibid.,p. 8224-26:Terminuscommunisnon restrictus
vim ampliandi
non
habenti
de
verbo
et
presenti
appellatorum supponens
supponittantumprohiisqui sunt.
10 See GrabmannIntrouctiones,
pp. 14-15and especiallyNormanKretzmann,
toLogic, transi,withan introd.and notes,
Introduction
Williamof Sherwood's
1966,
5-7.
pp.
Minneapolis
11See forthisStenEbbesen & JanPinborgStudies(quotedn. 3), passimt Jan
in der Logik des XIII. Jahrhunderts
, in: Miscellanea
Pinborg,Bezeichnung
im
Mediaevalia,VIII (1971),pp. 238-281and JanPinborg,LogikundSemantik
Mittelalter
. Ein Ueberblick,
Canstatt,1972,pp. 92-100.
Stuttgart-Bad
12See Grabmann,
Introductiones,
pp. 122-131.
pp. 82-85and Kretzmann,
114

23:21:23 PM

This is followed by a detailed explanation and discussion of the

various conditions laid down by that rule.13This continues until p.
8514,wherethe purpose oftherule and its treatmentis clearlyindicated:
observatisidem eritsupEt omnibushiis conditionibus
ibid.,p. 8514-15:
enimsupponitpro appellatis.
positumet appellatum;terminus
Hereafter,however, (fromp. 8515onwards till the end of the section)
anotherview follows on the relation between suppositum and appellatum and on the conditions under which they are the same or not.14
We findWilliam eager to stressthis view as the profierone (p. 8515-16:
Vel aliter, si proprie velimus loqui, dicamus quod . . p. 85s4: Unde
debet propriedici . . . ). And we should not fail to notice that this view,
which he presents as the proper one, is quite contraryto the former
one.
According to the formerone, a term has by its own virtue a range
of reference (denotation) that includes besides present things also
past and futurethings.For a termto denote in fact only presentthings,
special conditions are required (these are the conditionslaid down by
the rule of appellation) : cfr.:
' secundum
ut hic 'homocurri;iste terminus'homo
se
ibid.,p. 8233-832:
et futuris,sed coartaturhie
potestsupponerepro preteritis,
presentibus
ad presentes
temporis.
perverbumpresentis
13Thisis veryclearlyshownbythetranslation
ofKretzmann,
withitsinserted
.
subsectionheadings
14I am afraidNormanKretzmann
failedto see this,forhe says (Introduction,
p. 130,n. 101):
seemsto announcethe end of Sher"Althoughthissentence(= p. 8514-15)
wood'sexplicationof the ruleregarding
and appellation,the sensupposition
tencesimmediately
seemto presentsomeafterthoughts
on the subfollowing
ject ofampliation".
As we willsee, whatfollowsare not 'someafterthoughts',
but is theproper
and appellation,
whichis quite
wayofviewingtherelationbetweensupposition
to the formerone. For that matterparagraph16 of his translation
contrary
shouldbetternotbe extendedto theend ofthesection.
AlsoW. Kneale (W. and M. Kneale,TheDevelopment
ofLogic,Oxford1962,
viewsare presented.
p. 260) failedto noticethefactthattwodifferent
OnlyafterI had presentedthe firstdraftof this articleI couldobtainthe
workofAlfonsoMaier,Terminologia
important
logicadellascolastica(Lessico
intellettuale
Europeo Vili), Roma 1972. He, indeed,observesthat William
proposeshereanotherpossibilityof viewingthe relationof suppositionand
appellationand that the view concernedis contraryto the formerone, see
p. 168: La possibilitqui affacciatada Guglielmodi Shyreswood
rappresenta
l'essattorovesciamento
della affermazione
. . . etc. In generalthe sectionsof
thechaptersI on appellatioand II on ampliatio-restrictio
thatare devotedto
the 13thcentury(pp. 85-97,135-137and 152-172)are verypertinent
to the
problemsdiscussedin thisarticle.
115

23:21:23 PM

Or, to put it in another way, according to this view (the range of)
15) in order to
supposition is to be narrowed [restrictedor contracted
become (the range of) appellation.
Accordingto the latter view, however,a termhas by its own virtue
a range of referencethat includes only things that actually exist at
the present time, though by force of some special predicates this
range can be extended to past or future,or generally: non existent
things:
Vel aliter,si proprievelimusloqui,dicamusquod terminus
ibid.,p. 8515"24:
de se supponitpro presentibus
; et si supponatpro aliis,hoc eritratione
vel futuritemporis.
sui adiuncti,scilicetverbiampliandivel verbipreteriti
sed
nec consignificati,
Et erithec ampliationon solumrationesignificati
'
amborum.Undecumdico: "homocurrit",supponitly 'homo
pervirtutem
nontrahitur
et ab hac suppositione
de se propresentibus,
per16
predicatum.
iam trahiturhec
Si autemdicam: "homocucurrit"vel "potestcurrere",
in sensudicocompositionis.17
suppositioad nonexistentes,
Thus, according to this latter view, (the range of) supposition coincides fundamentallywith (the range of) appellation, and it is to be
widened (ampliateti
) to reach beyond appellation; thereis, accordingly,
no possibilityforrestrictionto be accomplished by the verb:
' et similia
Unde debetpropriediciquod hocverbum'potest
ibid.,p. 8524*27:
non reet
'curri
similia
verbum
hoc
termini,
ampliantsuppositionem
de se supponitpropresentibus.18
terminm,
quia terminus
stringunt
As for the reason why this second view on supposition is correct,
William points to what he considers as the significationof a term:
'homo
'
Et dico quod illeterminus
supponitpropresentibus
ibid.,p. 8527"31:
ad suas res.Hec autemcomin comparatione
formam
de se, quia significat
Solumenimestsuumsignificatimi
paratiotantumsalvaturin existentibus.
et proptereaprohiissupponitde se.
formaexistentium;
16Of coursethe typeof restriction
by theverbof a proposition
accomplished
see L. M. de Rijk, The
is meanthere. For the different
typesof restriction
note
above,
passim.
9),
(quoted
development
It shouldbe noticedthatin thepassageofWilliamdiscussedibid.,pp. 81-82
tothemanuscript
inline32 tribus
according
pp. 8228-832)
(namelyIntroductiones,
in talibus(thishas notbeennoticedby Malcolm); thediffihas to be corrected
in myopinion.
and De Rijk havelosttheirsenseherewith
cultiesofKretzmann
18perMs, ad Grabmann
(notnotedby Malcolm).
17This last remarkrefersto the distinction
reWilliamhas made p. 8414-
gardingsentenceswitha verbofthepast or futuretense,cfr.Malcolm,op. cit.
(above,n. 5), p. 110.
18 For the differences
betweentnesetwo contrasting
views,cir. inDorg,BeMaier,Terminologia,
zeichnung,
p. 249andidem,Logik,pp. 95-96andespecially
esp.pp. 157-169.
116

23:21:23 PM

I think we can hardly do anythingelse but believe William on his

word when he declares this second view to be the proper one. And I
think we can find some indication elsewhere that indeed this is the
directiontowards which his opinions tend. As such we mightdraw attention to the circumstance that William's opinion that the function of appellation belongs to the subject-termas well as to the predicate term (and to the latter precisely as predicate term19)seems to
be morein accordance with this second view on supposition.20Furthermore,we mightpoint to William's treatmentof sentenceswith a verb
of the past or future tense {Introductiones,p. 8414-30).There he declares that such sentences have a double sense, namely a compounded
and a divided one, and he furthermorestates that according to the
latter sense the supposition of the subject term is not discriminated
by the predicate term and thus maintains its original force,one could
say, of standing foractual existing things.21
19 See Introductiones
ex partesubSciendumetiamquod terminus
, p. 8215-19:
iectiappellatsuas res,sed nonsecundumquod est subiectum.Ex parteautem
predicatiappellat,et secundumquod est predicatum;secundumautemquod
predicatum(not: predicaturMalcolmp. 115) comparaturad subiectumsuum
per aliquamsuarumrerum,et secundumhoc appellat.This is broughtout by
Williamagainsttheopinionthatthesubject-term
suppositsand thepredicatetermappellates.
20 It is at anyrateremarkable
thatRogerBacon,whodefendsthesecondview
on supposition,
as willbe seen,also rejectsthe viewthat appellationis ofthe
termalone,and statestoo that appellationbelongsto the subjectpredicatesee his Sumule(cfr.below,n. 23) p. 277
termas wellas to thepredicate-term;
18-24
sinetempore
: Et diciturquodappellacioesttermini
predicabilis
significatio
(significato,
Steele). Quodestfalsum,quia appellaciodiciturpercomparacionem
ad appellataque respicit.Cumigitursubjectusterminus
equaliterrespiciatappellata sicut (sic, Steele) terminuspredicatus,erit appellaciosubjectisicut
predicati.
The mainpointhereis not that William(and Roger),in oppositionto a
viewsuchas proposedby e.g. the tractCumsitnostra(see de Rijk,Log. Mod.
of appellationto the subject-term,
forthis
II, 2, p. 449), ascribesthefunction
ofthefirstviewon supposition
is quiteusualwiththedefenders
too; it is that
Williamstressesherethatthe predicateis connectedto the subjectby means
of a res ( = concreteindividual)to whichthe formsignified
by the predicate
'
*
belongs.For in cases as homoestanimal thisis notsucha usual opinion,cfr.
below,n. 33 and n. 44.
of the passageof Williamquoted (n. 19), it is
Regardingthe interpretation
to be notedthatit givesindeedWilliam'sownopinion,as mayappearfromthe
context(Dicuntquidam ... Et sciendum. . . Sciendumetiam),cfr.however
de Rijk,Log.Mod. II, 1, pp. 563-564;and secondlythatit doesnotgivenecessarilyevidenceoftheidentitytheoryof the copula,see Maier,Terminologia,
see below,n. 57).
pp. 91-92.(For otherpointsofMaier'sinterpretation,
21Introductiones,
: Dicendumquodhuiusmodi
ubipredicatur
sermones,
p. 8414-23
'
verbumpreteriti
temporisvel futuri,suntdplices,ut homocucurri.Potest
II 7

23:21:23 PM

As far as his remark on significationis concerned (p. 8527"31),we

might compare it with other passages where significationis also linked not only to the formbut by means of the formto the substances or
things to which the formbelongs. See e.g. :
Introductiones,
p. 787-10:Omne enim nomensignificaisolam formamet
substantiamdefferentem
non absolute,sed inquantuminformat
ipsam et
substantiam.
sic aliquo mododat intelligere
ut est
humanitatem
ibid.,p. 7814-15:. . . quia hec dictio'homo'significat
. . . .aa
formaindividuorum

Now, it should be kept in mind that the view on appellation proposed by William as the proper one, is exactly the same as the one
defended by Roger Bacon, as is most clearly shown by his Sumule
dialectices.23In this work Roger makes a clear distinctionbetween the
two views on appellation24defendingvigorouslythe view that a term
: tuncdebetcontinue
vel divisus.Si compositus
enimistesermodicicompositus
subiecticumpredicatosignificat
et continuitas
quod debeatsua supproferri;
positiodiscernia predicato,et secundumhoc ly 'homo'supponitpropreteritis
nisi inquantumsuntpreterita.Si 'divisus: tuncdebet
et non pro presentibus
discontinuitas
orationis
sic "homo,cucurrit";et significat
discontinue
proferri
perpredicatum.
quod suppositionondiscernitur
22One mightpointherealso to William'sconcernto preservethe comparatio
ad resevenin thecase ofsimplesupposition[ibid.,p. 7713*16ff.).
23In my opinion,thereis not verymuchreasonto doubtthe attribution
of
doctrinalsimilarities
theseSumuleto Roger.Firstlythereare the remarkable
and the Compendium,
betweenthe Sumule,esp. the sectionde Appellatione,
MagistiRogeriBaconnecnonSumule
pointedout by Steele(SummaGrammatica
Dialectices
MagistiRogeriBaconnuncprimumed. R. Steele( = Operahactenus
ineditaRogeriBaconi,Fase. XV) OxoniiMCMXL,pp. XXI-XXII). Secondly
thereis thesecondMs: Sevilla,Bibi.Columbina
5-2-40,discovered
byE. Longpr
Franciscanum
Archivm
in:
de
dialctica
Summula
Historicum,
Bacon,
Roger
{La
to Steele,whichtoo ascribestheworkto
31 (1938),pp. 204-205)but unknown
Roger Bacon. This Ms seemsto be quite independentfromMs Digby 204.
theauthorFinally,it is to be notedthatthedoubtsofA. G. Littleconcerning
: RogerBacon's
restedonlyon an error.In hisAppendix
shipofRogerapparently
ed. H. Rashdall,pp. 71-118,on p. 103a mistakeis made
Worksin Compendium
(and it is repeatedin RogerBacon Essays etc. coll. and ed. by A. G. Little,
Oxford1914, (reissuedNew York 1972),p. 407) to the effectthat the names
Roberti
and Rogeriare exchangedforeach other;one shouldread: "Expliciunt
line 'Sincate
sumulemagistiRogeriBaccun" and in the second following
Bacon'.
fratisRoberti
greumata
24Sumule,p. 27728"38:
quia
Duplex tamenest sentenciade appellacionibus,
et
preterita,
appellatde se appellatapresencia,
quidamdicuntquod terminus
est
alii dicuntquod terminus
entibuset non-entibus;
futura,et est communis
sivepreterito,
et nichilest communeentiet non-enti,
solumnomenpresencium
presenti,et futuro,secundumquod dicit Aristotelesin primoMetaphysice.
eam.
ideo primodiscernamus
Quia verosentenciaprimaest communis,
thatRoger,likeWilliam,treatstheusualruleofappelIt is to be remarked
withtheviewhe does notconsidercorrect.
lationin connection
118

23:21:23 PM

by virtue of its own, stands only for actual existing things and that
only by virtue of some special predicates a term can stand fornon existing things.25And like William, Roger defends this view by appealing to the proper nature of significationof a term.26In my opinion
there is no need to stress that the same view underlies the principles
defendedin the Compendiumstudii theologiae.
On my view we are entitled to conclude that there is a remarkable
agreement between William and Roger, although William may not
expose his intentionsas clearly as Roger does. This agreementis the
more remarkableif we take into considerationthat the view proposed
by William and Roger was not the generallyaccepted one, as Roger
rightlyremarks.27As far as we know there is indeed no one besides
the two to defend this view in the time concerned, i.e. roughly the
firsthalf of the 13th century. On the contrarywe find that most of
the texts which are known at the moment express the view of what
one could call the theory of larger supposition, according to which
the appellata form only a subclass effectuatedby restrictionof the
class of supposita.28
25Ibid.,pp. 28o29-28i7:
de se solumconcernit
et suppresencia,
Quareterminus
ponitproillisde sui natura(materia,Steele); pernturmautemverbide preteritoet futuro,
vel habenti<s> naturam(materiali,
Steele)eorum,ut verba
Ex hiispatetquodverbumde
et futuris.
starepropreteritis
ampliandi,
poterunt
terminia partesubjecti,cum non
presentinichiloperaturad supposicionem
et terminusde sui natura
starenisi pro presentibus,
possitfacereterminm
et futuris,
hochabetquod sicstet.Set quia nonhabetde se ut stetpropreteritis
ideo verbumde preteritoet futurovel habensvim ampliandipotentfacere
ipsumstarepro aliis a presenti.Ex hiis patet quod predicatumnullomodo
set solumampliaiejus supposicionem,
vel
contrahit
subjectumnec restringit,
'
racionesignificacionis
sue, ut 'sole,'potest',conveni(ponit,contrait,Steele)
scilicettemporis,ut verbumde
et hujusmodi,vel racioneconsignificacionis,
et futuro.
preterito
28Ibid., p. 283s-19:Cujus solucioest quod nominanon habenttempuspro
sibideterminant
secunneca parteconsignificati
appellatapresencia,
significato
dumquod obiectio(absolute,Steele) procedit,set racionesue significacionis
enimnomenreipresenti
et appellatopresenti. . .
taliasibiassumunt
; inponitur
' determinai
sibiex sua significacene
Sicutenim'homo
homines,sic ethomines
et existentes.
presentes
27Sumule,p. 27735-36,
quotedabove,n. 24.
28Onemightpointto thefollowing
tracts(seethelistgivenbyMaier,TerminoParisienses(notso explicitly),
see de Rijk,
logia,pp. 87-90): the Introductiones
see ibid.,pp. 616-617;the
Log. Mod., II, 2, p. 371; theDialcticaMonacensis,
see Log. Mod.,II, 1, pp. 458-459;theTractatus
deproprietati
SummeMetenses,
see Log. Mod.,II, 2, pp. 722-723;PetrusHispanus,Tractatus
X
bussermonm,
i (ed. de Rijk) p. 1978"14,
and X 4, p. 1985-9;
LambertofAuxerre,see Lamberto
d Auxerr
Primaedizionea cura di FrancoAlessio
e, Logica (SummaLamberti).
di Milano
(= Pubblicazionidella Facolt di letteree filosofiadell'Universit
119

23:21:23 PM

b) The conceptof esse habitale

A second point to be examined is the concept of esse habitale.
Even though it is not my intention to deny that this notion can be
found in the work of William of Sherwood, I do think it merits a
closer examination in orderto determinethe consequences he attaches
to it.
Let us then examine his Syncategoremata,the section on est,29
where his ideas on the esse habitale are clearly stated.
William begins by remarkingthat the verb 'est' is not a syncategorematical term,though regarded as such by any others:
LIX), Firenze1971,p. 212: Sciendumautemquodappellatio,prouthiesumitur,
vel econverso;appellatio
differt
a suppositionesicut superbisa suo inferiori
est ad suppositionem
eniminferior
; namubicumqueest appellatio,ibi est sup. . . Ita suppositiosuperiorest ad appellationem,
positio,sed non convertitur
et est appellatiosuppositioquedam. (This last sentenceomittedby Alessio,
, cap. 37, col. 240
; and Vincentof Beauvais. Speculumdoctrinale
haplology!)
, p. 105).
(quotedby de Rijk, Development
In his chapteron Ampliatio- restrictio(coartatio)Maier (Terminologia
,
somewhatdifferent
picture.According
esp. pp. 157-172)presentsthefollowing
to himthepositionofPeterofSpain and LambertofAuxerreis to be regarded
as a combination
arisingfromon onesidetheviewoftheDialcticaMonacensis,
andtheSummeMetenses
sermonm
theTractatusdeproprietatibus
(andWilliam
ofthecomdoctrineis therestriction
ofSherwood),forwhichthefundamental
monterm,and on the othertheviewpresentedby RogerBacon,in the sense
are consideredneutrallyto be reciprocalto one
that ampliatioand restrictio
another.
It is to be noted,however,thattheworkofPeterofSpainis earlierthan,or
in whichas faras
withthatofWilliamofSherwood,
at mostcontemporaneous
forthefirsttime,and it
is formulated
we know,thetheoryofstrictsupposition
earlierthanthatofRogerBacon. It is to be remembered
is certainly
too,that
is foundalreadyin theSummule
ofampliationand restriction
thecombination
, see L. M. de Rijk, On thegenuinetextofPeterofSpain*s Summule
antiquorum
LogicalesI, in: Vivarium,VI (1968),pp. 1-34,esp. p. 17. It is to be keptin
that thosewho hold the theoryof largersuppositionand
mind,furthermore,
to be accomplished
forrestriction
thusdefendthe possibility
by the verb (as
Peter undoubtedlydoes, see Tractatus,XI 10-13,PP-202-204),nevertheless
admitalso ampliationto be accomplished
bytheverb.RogerBaconhas pointed
Item,per naturamampliacionis
out this already,see his Sumule,p. 28o10"15:
istius
videturhoc idem, cum omnessupponuntampliacionem
supposicionis
et futuro,nonpotestsua suptermini.Set si sit communispresenti,
preterito
posicioaliquo modo ampliali,igiturnon eritsic commune;quare solumerit
nomenpresencium.
Quod est concedendum.
betweenPeterand
thereis not so muchdifference
In myopiniontherefore,
Lambertand theDialcticaMonacensisetc.
At any rate therecan be no doubtthat Peterand Lambertconsideredthe
thelattercovering
as widerthantherangeofappellation,
rangeofsupposition
in
this
note.
earlier
the
texts
see
the
of
former;
quoted
onlypart
29 See O'Donnell, Syncategoremata,
pp. 70-71 and Kretzmann,Treatise,pp.
90-93.
120

23:21:23 PM

Syncategoremata,
pp. 71-72: Et primo modo procedentesprimo modo
determinemus
sed quia a
de hoc verbo'est',non quia sit syncategorema,
Et illi nituntur
multisponituresse syncategorema.
huic dietoAristotelis,
scilicetquod 'est'consignificat
quamdamcompositionem
quam'sine comCreduntenimquod hoc 'consignificare
sitsuum
positisnonestintelligere.
et conpraedicativum
et sic solumest consignificativum
sicut
significare
30
syncategorema.
And William adds explicitly that in the case of 'est' occurringin
the third position (tertiumadjacens) it should be regarded too as a
predicate also and not as only that which signifiesthe composition
(p. 71, second paragraph).
I believe that William's opinion as such is not without some importance, because in this way there is a greater emphasis on the existential importof the verb 'es.zl In any case Peter of Spain, who is
known to adhere to the theory of larger supposition,32seems to include est among the syncategorematicalterms to the extent that he
sees it as that whichhas the sole functionof formingthe composition.33
30 Kretzmann(Treatise,p. 90) prefersthe readingquod est significaiwitha
reference
to Aristotle's
De interpretation,
3 i6b23. It is to be noted,however,
thatthemedievallatintranslations
read,as is requiredby theGreektext:quod
est consignificat
Latinus II 1-2. De Interpretation
vel Perier(cfr.Aristoteles
meniased. L. Minio-Paluello
. . . G. Verbeke,Bruges-Paris,1965 ad locum).
Thereis a traditionon the 13thcenturythat givesquodestsignificat,
cfr.J.
Un florilge
mdival. . . (= Philosophes
Hamesse,Les Auctoritates
Aristotelis,
MdivauxXVII), Louvain-Paris,1974,P- 35 (- no-32-7)-In our case conis presupposed
however,
sentence,whichshouldbe
significat,
by thefollowing
translatedas follows:"fortheybelievethatthis'consignify'
(whichis said to
be accomplished
function
and thatin thatwayit (namely
byest)is itssignifying
..
est)is solelyconsignificative
31For theconnection
ofthe viewson thenatureofthecopulawiththeviews
on supposition,
cfr.Pinborg,Bezeichnung,
p. 249 and idem,Logik,p. 96.
32Cfr.above,n. 28.
33Thismaybe gatheredfromPeter'streatment
of 'est'in hisSyncategoreumata.
He does not touchthereupon the functionof 'est' as a predicate,and treats
'est'as thesignpar excellenceofthecomposition.
Thiscomposition
he declares
to be based on the convenientia
extremorum.
I quote fromMs Milano, Bibi.
H. 64 Inf. (comparedesp. withMs Ivrea,Bibi. Capitolare,
Ambrosiana,
79: for
theseMss,see de Rijk Tractatus,
pp. CIV-CVII):
f. 5orb: cum ergo in dictionibussincategoreumaticis
per se intelligantur
'est'et 'non' ...
f.50vb: nota ergo quod hoc verbum'est' consignificat
et
compositionem,
etiamalia verba,sed hoc verbum'est'perpriusconsignificat
eam,cumnatura
sit priusaliisverbis,cumin eis intelligatur.
f-53rb:(on the questionhow the composition
can be understood). . . ideo
actus ad substantiam,
compositio
que significatur
per verbum,nonpotestintelligisine extremis.Ideo dicit Aristotilesquod 'est*consignificat
quandam
nonest intelligere,
cumsolumhabeatincompositionem
quam sinecompositis
et perilludcui inclinatur,
verbi,
telligiperilludquod inclinatur
quia inclinatio
121

23:21:23 PM

William continues by pointing out that the verb 'est' sometimes is

to be taken equivocally, because sometimes it means an esse actale,
for which is needed an actual existing reality; sometimes on the
other hand it means an esse habitale, for which only some natura
suffices,and which can be conditionally(habitualiter)in some singular
thing which does not actually exist. This leads William to conclude
'
that the proposition omnis homo est animal', in the case of no single
man existing, has a double sense, because whenever esse actale is
meant, it is false, when on the other hand esse habitale is meant, it
is true:
p. 71: Sciendumautemquod hoc verbum'est' quandoSyncategoremata,
que accipituraequivoce;dicitenimquandoqueesse actalequod debetur
actualiterexistenti;quandoqueesse habitalequod debeturei quod in se
remotisquod inclinatur
et cui inclinatur
que est ipsiusactus ad substantiam,
nichilest.Et quia unumquodque
sineextremis
innichilest.Et ideocompositio
ideo
telligitur
perilludquod dat ei esse,cum extremadentesse compositioni,
compositiohabetintelligi
perextrema.
f-53Yi>:- sed hoc sequitur:'extremasuntsibi invicemconvenientia
; ergo
est; ergoextrema
compositioeorumest' ... et econversosequitur:'compositio
. . . quia convenientia
extremorum
causa est
sunt sibi invicemconvenientia'
convenientia
extremorum.
est effectus
et compositio
compositionis
in thecontextof oursubjectis theviewofPeterthat
Especiallyinteresting
ens whichis commonto being
is to be regardedas quodammodo
composition
seef.53:
andnon-being;
ensvel non.
sit simpliciter
Queriturutrumcompositio
in rebusexistentibus,
ut 'homoestanimal'
Et videturquod non,quia reperitur
'
in eis per
et in rebusnon existentibus,
ut chimeraestnonens*,ergoreperitur
in ipsis ... ; sed nichilest communeentiet non
aliquod communerepertum
;
; ergocompositioprimosequiturensquodammodo
enti,nisiens quodammodo
ens.
ergoet ipsa est quodammodoens; ergononestsimpliciter
se habetad
Et dicendumquod compositio
importataperverbumcommuniter
entiumet nonentium.Undeperpriussequiturensquodammodo,
compositionem
ut obiectumest; et ipsa in communiest ens quodammodoet nonsimpliciter.
the extrema
betweenthe two examplesis thatoftheformer
The difference
suntsimpliciter
entia,whileof the latterthe extremanonsuntentia (f.54ra).
For the referential
forceof thesesimpliciter
entia,one mightcomparePeter's
estanimal'quotedbelow,n. 44.
treatment
ofthesophism'omnishomonecessario
as presentedin the
It is to be notedthat the text of the Syncategoremata
has
been
translated
into
which
incunabular
editions,
English(Peterof
Cologne
Transi,by
and selected
treatises.
anonymous
Syncategorematum
Spain. Tractatus
J. P. Mullaly. . . (= MediaevalPhilosophicalTexts in Translation,13), MilfromPeter'sowntext.
waukee1964)is quitedifferent
'est' as tertiumadjacensofsomeonewho
For a veryexplicitviewregarding
defendsviews that are rejectedby Roger,cfr.Ebbesen & Pinborg,Studies
,
("Petrusde Ybernia"): Sed dicendum:cumdicitursic 'Cesarest
p. 19 (69)59"60
immoest nota predicandi;sic enim
Cesar',hoc verbum'est' non predicatur,
dicit.
Aristoteles
122

23:21:23 PM

esse in aliquo singulari,licet

est naturaaliqua et natumest habitualiter
nonactualiterest.Primomodohaec estfalsa'omnishomoestanimal' nullo
homineexistente;secundomodovera . . .
With regard to the circumstancesin which the verb 'est' can be taken
equivocally, William mentions two opinions. One according to which
this equivocacy occurs also when 'est' is used as a single predicate, so
that the proposition 'homo est' has the aforesaid double sense, in the
case that no man exists. The other accordingto which this equivocacy
occurs only when 'est' functions as tertiumadjacens and a superior
termis predicated of an inferior.Wilham favoursthis second opinion,
because if 'est' functionsas the only predicate, it means esse without
qualification and in its full sense and this can only occur in the case
that somethingactually exists. And when 'est' functionsas the only
predicate there is nothingthat can account for the equivocation.
Syncategoremata,
p. 71: Et hoc satis bene dicitur,quia, ut videtur,si sic
diceretur
"homoest",dicithieessesimpliciter
et completum,
quod quidem
homininoninest,si nonactualitersit,34nec est aliquidquod trahitipsum
ut dicatessesecundomododictum,quod est esse diminutivum.
This brings to mind several points.
First: it seems to me that William's refusal to allow for an esse
habitale in the case 'est' functionsas a single predicate, must be seen
as a rejection of the esse confusumor presens confusum
,35It should be
noted at least that Roger Bacon rejects this notion ofpresensconfusum
in similarwords.36
Second: it is interestingto read that William allows for an esse
diminutivum- that is to say if esse habitale is meant - in the case
that and because of the fact that animal is predicated of homo, i.e.
when a superiorterm is predicated of an inferiorone.37
34O'Donnell:homininoninest;si nonactualiter,
sic nec.The readingwe give
morewiththeMss and punctuationmarks
foundin them.
corresponds
35For thisnotion,cfr.e.g. Logica" Cumsitnostra"
, de Rijk,Log. Mod., II, 2
and theSummeMetenses
, ibid.,II, i, p. 460.
p. 45o14-26,
38Cfr.Sumule,p. 28719"27:
Ahi autemdicuntquod presensduplexest,scilicet
confusum
et determinatum.
Presensconfusum
nontenetusum,quia
presents
nonrespicit
ad omnetempus... ; presens
aliquodtempuscertumsetconfunditur
determinatum
est quod aliquodtempuset nuncrespicit.
Puto tarnenquod hoc verbum'est', propriesumptumet simpliciter
sine
determinacione
acceptum,sempercopulatesseactaleet determinatum.
37Thosenamelywhodefendtheviewsrejectedby
RogerBacon,usuallydeny
thatanimalis to be considered
a diminutive
cfr.e.g. "Petrusde
determination,
Ybernia",see Ebbesen & Pinborg,Studies,p. 20 (70)41:istudenimquod dico
'animal'determinatio
nonest.
diminuens
123

23:21:23 PM

Third: the most important point is of course, that William unambiguously accepts equivocation between esse actale and esse
habitale. It may be useful to explain what William is saying. It is
not his intention to state that there is equivocation between esse
'
actale and esse habitale in the sense that the inference homo est
animal (esse habitale); ergo homo est (esse actale)' is rendered impossible by the fallacy of equivocation.38 He defends the view that
the proposition ' homo est animal' itself has a double sense according
to esse actale or esse habitale. Thus according to the firstsense
' homoest
animal ; ergohomoes is a legitimateinference.
William is consequent in distinguishingthis double sense in sen'
tences like omnis homoest animal' Togetherwith the parallel distinc'
tion of omnis 'as referringto fartes secundumnumerum(esse actale)
or to partes secundumspeciem (esse habitale)39we findthe mentioned
38 That suchan inference
is impossible,
by thefallacyofequivocationor some
otherway,is, again,the usual opinionof thosewho defendviewsrejectedby
("Petrusde bernia");
Roger.Cfr.Ebbesen & Pinborg,Studies,p. 19 (69)60"66
73-80
p. 24 (74)74*85
(anonymous);p. 28 (78)1-8(anonymous)and p. 39 (89)
(RobertKilwardby?). For someearliertextsin whichwe meetthesameview,
see below,n. 44.
39 This distinction
is presentedin the Syncategoremata,
p. 49, (cfr.the text
between
partessecunquotedabove,p. 113).It is to be notedthatthedistinction
alsoby RogerBacon.See
numerum
is defended
andpartessecundum
dumspeciem
etdistinctionbus
hisSummadesophismatibus
(ed. Steele,OxoniiMCMXXXVII,
= Opera hactenusinditaRogeriBaconi, Fase. XIV), p. I5729-I581:Si vero
('omnis')addaturterminogenerali,aut igiturhabentitesspeciessub se, aut
si sic,potestdistribui.
non.Si non,noncaditdistributio;
Que distributio
potest
sive pro partibus
fieripro singulisgenerumvel pro generibussingulorum,
propinquisvel remotis,sive pro partibussecundumspeciemvel secundum
suntpartespropinque,et partessecundumspenumerum.
Generasingulorum
suntpartesremote,et partessecunciemsuntheedempartes,singulagenerum
see
dumnumerum
suntidem.In the following
Rogerdefendsthisdistinction,
sentiendum
ut
Et
dicendum
est
16117-18:
ibid.,p. i6o36ff.,
plures,
quamvis
esp.p.
ut pauci, quod distinctio(distributio,
Steele)sustineri
potest.Herebyit is to
that Rogerin thissame workdeclaresthat,althoughthesign
be remembered
'omnis
' needsthree
need threeappellataactu,see ibid.,
appellata,it 'does not
'
'
9
proportionateomni
quamvis omnisscincategorisma
p. 146i.esp. p. 14615*23:
numerum
sibi
hoc
determinat
ad
est
quodutrumque
quantum
quod categorisma,
'
in ternario,non tarnenquantumad actualitatemilliusnumeri,quia 'omne
'omne
' scinnon
in
set
in
se
et
multitudinem
sibi
determinat
alio,
categorisma
et ideocumilludaliudpossitesseactale
in alio numerum
requirit,
categorisma
sua apvel futurum,
vel potentiale,vel preteritimi
exiget'omnis'diversimode
p. 49: Sed intellige
pellata,et nonsemperactu. (Cfr.WilliamSyncategoremata,
requirittria appellata
pro partibussecundumnumerum,
quod, cum distribuit
triahabitualiter
actualiter
entia,et cumpropartibussecundum
requirit
speciem,
thesepointstheopinionsofWilliam
entiavel plura). Thuswe see thatregarding
and Rogerseemto be in agreement.
124

23:21:23 PM

distinction in the treatment of the sophismata: 'omne animal est

asinus',40 'nullus homo est animal'41 and 'omnis homo de necessitate
est animal'.42
With regard to the fact that William so stronglyemphasises the
equivocation between esse actale and esse habitale, one would be
inclined to say that William is not included in the denunciationRoger
Bacon expresses in his Compendium.Perhaps it is possible to evaluate
'
the situation differently,however: by stating that omnis homo est
animal' nullo homine existente has a double sense and as such is to
be regarded as either true or false, William stands somewhere halfway between Roger, forwhom in the Compendiumthis propositionis
false, even falsissimum,43and the other party, forwhom these propositions are true, usually even simplicitertrue.44
can be addedto termslike
therelatedpoint,however,if 'omnis*
Concerning
ofthepresent
in a proposition
'fenix'and 'sol' thathave onlyone appellatum,
ratherin thesamewayas in theproblemunderdistense,theiropinionsdiffer
cussion.WhereasWilliamallowsfora doublesenseofthiskindofpropositions
, p. 50: Adhucquaeriturutrumhaec dictio'omnis'possitaddi
(Syncategoremata
veretermino
habentiunicumsolumappellatumut ei quodest'sol' . . . Dicendum
existentiquod,si ly 'omnis'teneturproprieet dividatpropartibushabitualiter
tenetur,
bus,potestaddi ei quod est 'sol' ... Si autemcommuniter
non),Roger
to be simplyincongruent
declaresthesepropositions
[Summa,pp. 147-149,see
also Sumule,pp. 27831-2798).
It shouldbe keptin mindthatPeterof Spain does not presentthe abovein his De distributionibus
mentioned
distinction
, thatin facthe seemsto reject
therelatedproblemif'omnis'
XI 14, p. 2055*22.
it,see his Tractatus
Concerning
allowsforthisand rejects
can be added to termslike 'phenix',Peterexplicitly
XII 7-9,pp. 21221theviewthatthreeappellataare needed,see his Tractatus,
21618.
40 See theSyncategoremata,
Treatise,
pp. 21-22.
p. 49; Kretzmann,
41Syncategoremata,
Treatise,
pp. 48-49.
p. 56; Kretzmann,
42Syncategoremata,
Treatise,
pp. 105-106.
p. 75; Kretzmann,
It shouldbe keptin mindthatthe relatedpassageof the Introductiones
, p.
83 28-35
(cfr.above,p. 112) is fullyin accordancewiththeviewsof Williamas
ofthe sophismhereconcerned.
For it
by us and withhis treatment
presented
onestartedfrom
thatin thepassageoftheIntroductiones
shouldbe remembered
thatthereare existingonlytwomen[ibid.,p. 838-7)
theassumption
; therefore
'omnis
thatin sucha case thepredicateoftheproposition
William'sstatement
homoestanimal'concernsessehabitaleis consonantwithhis view about the
correctuse ofthesign'omnis'(cfr.above,n. 39).
43Compendium,
Ad quartumdicendum
p. 63. See also his Summa,p. 14517"20:
'
(seil.: omnis
quod nullo homineexistente,nec triangulo,ille propositiones
sunt
false
sicut
habettresetc.'et: 'omnishomoestanimal')
triangulus
'omnis simpliciter,
'omnis
sicut
est
vel
est',
scietur;
phenix
hujusmodi
incongrua
postea
whichhe apparently
inthisworkheleavesopena possibility
homoest'; although
aliter
see ibid.,p. 14520-23:
wouldnotallowforin theperiodofhisCompendium,
nonhabeantappellataactu,habent
possetfingiquod etsihomovel triangulus
nature.
tamentriaappellatasecundumhabitmvel secundumaptitudinem
125

23:21:23 PM

c) Supposition in negativepropositions
A thirdpoint that meritsattentionis William's opinion on supposition in negative propositions. As is known Roger discusses (in his
Sumule and his Compendium45) negative propositionsas presentinga
difficultyfor his view that a term by its own virtue supposits only
44For somelatertexts,cfr.Ebbesen & Pinborg,Studies,pp. 19 (69)87-22
(72)
("Petrusde Yber("Petrusde Ybernia"); 24 (74)-25(75) (anon.); 33 (83)83"64
estaliterquod
nia" ?) and esp.pp. 39 (89)60"69
?): dicendum
(RobertKilwardby
estanimal')simpliciter
vera
primapropositio(seil.: 'omnishomode necessitate
est sive homosit, sive non sit. Unde dico quod hec est vera 'omnishomode
est animal' et illa 'homoest animal' nullohomineexistente,sieut
necessitate
in naturali
ostendebatquedam ratio, quoniam ad veritatempropositionis
hominis
actu.Cumigiturintellectus
existentia
extremorum
materianonexigitur
manifestum
sint coherentes,
et animalisnaturaliter
quod, sive homosit sive
in ipso innon sit, dummodohec vox 'homo'hominemsignificet,
simpliciter
hec est vera 'homoestanimai'
animai.Et ideo nullohomineexistente
telligitur
estanimai'.
et 'omnishomode necessitate
For someearlierviews,one mightpointto: the LogicaCumsit nostra
, Log.
in quibuspredicatimi
: Dicendumquod in propositionibus
Mod.,II 2, p. 45014-23
de necessitatesequitursubiectum,predicaturesse confuse,hoc est quod non
veroin quibuspreunumtempusquam aliud.In propositionibus
magisrefert
hocest
dicatumnumquamsequitursubiectum,predicaturesse determinate,
esse ut nunc.Sed quando predicaturesse confuse,indifferenter
supponitterminuscommunis
prohiisque suntet que nonsunt.Dico quod estverade neces:
sitate: 'homoestanimal',quamvisnuushomosit in mundo.Et hec similiter
Et nonsequitur:'ergotonitrus
'tonitrus
estsonusterribilis'.
est',quia in primali
Et sic est fallacia
determinate.
in conclusione
'est'significat
tempusconfusum,
figuredictionis.
Furtherto: PetrusHispanus,Syncategoremata
(cfr.aboven. 33),f.8irb:Hiis
habitisqueriturde hoc sophismate:'omnishomonecessarioest animar.Promodonecesbatio: hec est necessaria'omnishomoestanimai'; ergomodificata
:
estanimai'. Contra
sitatiseritvera; ergohec est vera 'omnishomonecessario
omnishomonecessarioest animai; sed Sortesest homo; ergoSortesnecessario
est animai- -intertioprime.Sed conclusioest falsa; ergoaliqua premissarum
est
est falsa.Non minor;ergomaior.Sed hec estprima'omnishomonecessario
et improbatio
animai'; ergoprimafalsa. Solutio:primaest vera simpliciter
non sunt sumendi
peccat secundumaccidens,quia sub terminissimpliciter
terminiut nunc.Et dicunturterminisimpliciter
qui habentesse necessarium;
terminiautemut nuncdicunturquia aliquandosuntaliquandonon.
Bibi.
ofsophismatafoundin Ms Cittdel Vaticano,
And also to thecollection
des
Die
M.
see
Lat.
Vat
.
Grabmann,
Sophismataliteratur
7678;
Apost.Vaticana,
einesSophsimadesBoetiusvonDacien
mitTextausgabe
12. und13. Jahrhunderts
. . . (= BeitrgeXXXVI, Heft 1), Mnsteri. W. 1940,pp. 37-40,esp. p. 39:
estanimaletc.Dico quodestverasimpliciter
Solutio: omnishomode necessitate
ulterius
et respondeoad argumentum
et probationem
et concedoconclusionem
es
factumad hoc 'Sortesde necessitateest animai;ergoSortesde necessitate
seems
this
text
that
is
to
noted
It
be
et
secundum
fallaciam
simpliciter.
quid
per
similarto thoseofWilliam(see
to be acquaintedwithsolutionsand arguments
ibid.,p. 40).
45Sumule,pp. 28320-28710;
pp. 57-59.
Compendium,
126

23:21:23 PM

for actual existing things. Especially in his Sumule he states clearly

that although many assert that a term used in a negative proposition
may stand for being and non-being, according to him a term in a
negative proposition,as in a affirmativeone, stands only foractually
existingthings.46
In William I have not been able to find anything concerningthe
relation of affirmative,privative or infinite,propositions to negative
'
ones. Neither does he seem to discuss sentences like aliquid non es .47
Both of which matters are amply discussed by Roger. Nevertheless
William expresses explicitly his opinion on negative sentences with
an emphasis on universal negative ones.
Let us examine more closely his Syncategoremata
, the section on
nuttus*8 To the question whethernullus has the effectof making the
term attached to it supposit for a non existing thing,William replies
that although 'nullus homo, ergo non Caesar' is a valid inferencethis
does not mean that the term 'homo supposits for Caesar:
'
'
Syncategoremata,
pp. 57-58:Item.Dubitaturde hac dictionenullusutrum
faciatterminm
sibiadjunctumstareprononexistentibus.
Et videturquod sic: rebusenimse habentibusut nuncsequitur:'nullus
homocurrit:ergoCaesarnoncurri.Probatio:da oppositum,
scilicetquod
Caesarcurrit,et sequiturquod aliquishomocurrit,quia ipse non potest
nisiipse sit et etiamsit homo.
currere
Sed si sicpossetinferri,
tunc'homo'supponitprononentibus,
ut videtur;
sed hocestcontraregulamsuppositionum,cumhabeatsufficientiam
appellatorum.Item. Eodem modo staretin contrariaet contradictoria;
et sic
haec essetfalsa'omnishomocurri.
currentibus
proomnibuspraesentibus
Et dicendumquod benetenet:'nullushomo;ergonon Caesar'.Nec est
ibi locus a toto in quantitate,cum Caesar non sit homo; sicutnec hic:
'nullumhabens oculos videt; ergo nec lignum'.Et sicut iste terminus
'Habensoculos
' non
'
'
supponitproligno,sic nec hic homoproCaesare.
This passage should be compared with the section on non of the
same work, where the extension of a negative propositionis discussed
in comparison with that of an affirmativeone. William appears to
48Sumule,p. 28415-21:
Et dicendumad ilia quod terminusin proposicione
et indefinita,
statpro ente,sicutin affirmativa,
negativa,dico particulari
quia
in termino,
cumsequaturet nonprcdt.Dubitacio
negacionichiltransmutat
tarnenest de universalinegativa,et puto tarnenquod stat similiterin illa
terminus
et
affirmacio,
pro presenti,quia negacioidem negatquod affirmat
solumillud.
47The onlyplace I couldfindthat comesnearto such a discussionis Intro'
whereWilliamdeclaresthe proposition
ductiones,
p. 8316-16,
aliquis homonon
es to be true.Thisis stated,however,as a resultofthe conditionthat'omnis
homoes is falsebecause of insufficientia
; and that is not the
appellatorum
kindofproblemsdiscussedby Rogerin thepassagesadducedabove.
48Syncategoremata,
Treatise,
pp. 56-58;Kretzmann,
pp. 48-54.
127

23:21:23 PM

allow a negative proposition to have inferentialforce (respectus)for

beings and non-beings:
Syncategoremata,
p. 73: Proptereasic dicamusquod in propositionede
sed in
praesentiet non ampliantisolumhabeturrespectusad praesentes,
negativaetiamad non existentes.Quia, si nullushomocurrit,ergonec
tunc Caesaressetet sic essethomo,ergo
Caesar,quia si Caesar curreret,
homocurreret;
ergoa primo: si Caesarcurrit,homocurrit;ergosi nullus
homocurrit,
nec Caesar.
William denies the allegation that a termwould then stand fora nonexistingthing(s), by basing himselfon an explanation that places the
term 'homo' on a level with the term 'homoqui actualiterest':
ibid.: Sed contra: si hoc argumentum
tenet,tuncut videturest ibi locus
a toto in quantitate,et tuncly 'homo'stabitpro Caesareet sic pro non
existente.
Sed dicendumquod hoc non est verum.Quod patet in hoc exemplo
est currit',
'nullushomoqui actualiter
ergonec Caesar', quia sequitur:'si
Caesar currit,Caesar actualiterest' et similiter:'est homo'; unde: 'si
nullushomoqui actualiterest; ergonec Caesar'. Et quamvis teneathoc
'
argumentum,
patet tamenquod hie totalisterminushomoqui actualiter
est'nonsupponitproCaesare,nec estibi locusa totoin quantitate
; necin
Caesaremcurrere
sed magisab oppositis,quia haecaffirmativa
praecedenti,
non quia Caesaxsit homo,sed
rpugntpraemissaein utroquetermino,
essethomo; et quia affirmativa
rpugnt,
sequiturnegativa.
quia si curreret,
We may now safely conclude that William holds that terms in a
negative propositionstand only forexistingthings.And thisis precisely
Roger's opinion.
As an aside I should like to draw attentionto the fact that in both
passages William denies explicitly that Caesar is a man (p. 58 : cum
Caesar non sit homo, p. 73 : non quia Caesar sit homo) and so agrees
completelywith Roger on this point.49
49 Cfr.Compendium
, p. 63.
It shouldbe noticedthat it is not easy to findexamplesof opponentsto
this pointof
William'sviews (or to Roger'smoregeneralviews)concerning
One mightbe inclinedto thinkof people as Peter of
negativepropositions.
(cfr.esp. the
Spain,but he does notdiscussthepointin hisDe distributionibus
sectionon nullus, Tractatus,
pp. 2i93-2202).One couldevenstressthathe exthereshouldbe restricplicitlyrejectsthe viewthatin a negativeproposition
that
tionto non-beings
however,
; it is to be remembered,
(ibid.,pp. 20523-20721)
thatdo notrunparallelwiththoseofWilliamor
he bases thison assumptions
whorejectstheinference
Roger.One mightalso pointto LambertofAuxerre,
doesnot
'nullushomoest; ergoCesarnonest' (Summa,p. 221). This,however,
the
to William'sconcerning
thatare contrary
seemto lead himto conclusions
pointunderdiscussion.
128

23:21:23 PM

d) The conceptof habitual supposition

Finally some remarks have to be made on William's concept of
habitual supposition.
de Rijk has called attentionto the fact
In his Logica Modernorum50
that 13th century logicians sometimes fail to maintain a clearcut
distinction between signification (as the conceptual presentation of
an universal nature) and supposition (as the propertyof a term used
in a propositionand concerningdenotation). They teach a rather confusingmixture of the two, which de Rijk has called virtualsupposition: examples of this are Peter of Spain's suppositio naturalis and
William of Sherwood's suppositio secundumhabitm.In a later article
on the development of the virtual supposition51he has much contributedto the clarificationof this intricatematter.
I believe that it is possible however to propose a modificationof
the interpretationde Rijk presents of William's habitual supposition.
I think de Rijk is certainly correct in emphasizing52that William
considers habitual supposition to be a kind of significationfor which,
in contradistinctionto the genericconcept of signification,the framework of the grammaticalcategoriesis of decisive importance.The same
holds true for habitual copulation. Actual supposition and actual
copulation on the other hand require an orderingof one concept (as
presented by signification)in relation to another (also presented by
signification).And in my opinion de Rijk rightlyremarks53that this
orderingneed not necessarilybe provided by a propositionalcontext;
on the contrary what one would call an orational context (' homo
'
albus', qualislibethomo') will sufficefor this ordering.54
together,the followingschemeis the result:
Puttingour information55
i. significatio

. a. suppositio secundum habitm

^ b.
copulatio secundum habitm

50 de Rijk,Log. Mod.,II 1, pp. 571-575.

51L. M. de Rijk, The development
ofsuppositionaturalisin mediaevalLogic I,
in: Vivarium
IX, (1971),pp. 71-107.
62Development
, pp. 83-84.
53ibid.,pp. 81-82.
64In additionto the arguments
broughtforward
by de Rijk, one couldpoint
actual copulation,the counterpart
also to William'sremarksconcerning
of
In thesectionDe copulatione
actualsupposition.
Williamdealswiththe distributivecopulationaccomplished
by the signaquantitatiswhencopulatedto a
term (Introductiones,
One has to agree that a combinationlike
p.
8126-30).
'
forthis.
'qualibethomosuffices
129

23:21:23 PM

2. suppositio actualis
3. copulatio actualis
4. appellatio
The differencebetween on the one hand (1) and on the other (2), (3)
and (4) is that (1) is a propertythat a word (dictio) already has as
dictio, that is to say: before it has entered into a context,56whereas
(2), (3) and (4) occur only after a word has at least entered into an
orational context57and are the result of this. It is to be noted that of
course (1) does not disappear when (2), (3) or (4) occur, so that (2),
(3) and (4) must be considered functionsof (i).58
65Especiallyas is foundin theintroductory
chapterof thesectionDe proprietatibusterminorum
, p. 74n-755).
(Introductiones
66Williamis fullyaware of this. Cfr.Introductiones,
p. 722'24:Sicut enim
dictioest dictioantequamordinaturin oratione,similiterante habetsignifiwhere
cumalio. Cfr.also ibid.,p. 8816ff.,
cationemet nonex eo quod ordinatur
Williamagreeswiththe opinionthat: dictioest priornaturaquam oratione,
orationem.Hoc autemhabet
retinetergoesse dictionisantequamingrediatur
habet antequamingrediatur
Suam ergosignificationem
ex sua significatione.
Dicendumest
orationemet non ex ordinatione
sui in oratione,by answering:
ante orationemet ab ea
quod necesseest dictionemhaberesignificationem
nullampotesthabere.
57In the case of appellationa propositional
contextseemsto be required:
termand predicate-term,
Williamin thiscontextexplicitlyspeaksof subjectCfr.also above,nn. 19 and 20.
see Introductiones
, p. 8211"19.
to Maier{Terminologia,
p. 91) it shouldbe William'sviewthat
According
and notby actualsupposiappellationis entailedonlyby habitualsupposition
tion.Thus appellationshouldbelongto a termas such,and whenactingas a
the termcan accomplishthe functionof appellationbecauseit
subject-term
it
whenactingas a predicate-term
alwayspreservesits habitualsupposition,
becauseit thenonlyhas habitualsupposition.
thesamefunction
can accomplish
in thiswaythepassageIntroductiones,
Maierinterprets
(cfr.above,n.
p. 8212'19
can
be theresult
this
In
and
below,
only
19
p. 132). myopinion interpretation
on a parwithnatural
thatMaierputshabitualsupposition
ofthecircumstance
Thusit doesnottakeaccountofthenotionofcopulation(habitual
supposition.
term
forin thecase ofa copulating
ofsupposition,
and actual),thecounterpart
cfr.below,n.
to ascribeappellationto actual copulation,
thereis no difficulty
thatWilliamascribesappellation
65. In thiscontextit shouldbe remembered
:
seeIntroductiones
andtermini
tobothtermini
, p. 74a3-34
copulantes,
supponentes
et adiectivis(termshavingsupposiAppellatioautemin omnibussubstantivis
belowpp. 131-2.
(termshavingcopulation).Cfr.furthermore,
tion)et participiis
- and I thinkthatMaieris quiteright
This does not alterthe fact,however
muchemphasisis
in thisrespect- thatin theviewsofWilliamon signification
forceofthewords.
laidonwhatonecouldcalltheappellative
58 Cfr.Kretzmann,
Introduction,
p. 106,n. 11. Thiscomesouttoo,and perhaps
and p. 771"9,whereWilliamdefends
moreclearly,in Introductiones,
p. 7610"24
indicatea diversity
andsimplex-personalis
thatthedivisionsformalis-materialis
of suppositionand not of signification
(equivocation),since these different
Cfr.also
modesare based on,and occurwithin,one and thesamesignification.
thetextsquotedabove,n. 56.
130

23:21:23 PM

The subdivision within (i) is a mutually exclusive one in the sense

that certain parts of speech - those which signifysomethingas subsisting[significatioalicuius utsubsistentis)- have a suppositiosecundum
habitm, while others- those which signifysomething as adjoining
{significatioalicuius ut adiacentis)59- have a copulatiosecundumhabitm. The effectof this is that when parts of speech of the firstkind
{ia) enter into a context, a suppositio actuaUs results; whereas when
parts of speech of the second kind (j) enterinto a context a copulatio
actualis results.60
The above comes out quite clearly in the introductorypassage on
the propertiesof the terms. Here William states that significationis
to be found in every part or word of an expression;61supposition (i.e.
suppositio actualis) is to be found in substantive nouns or pronouns
or substantive words,62because these have the kind of signification
that is suppositio secundum habitm; and copulation (i.e. copulatio
actualis) is to be found in all adjective nouns, participles and verbs
(because these have the kind of significationthat is copulatiosecundum
habitm, one might add) :
estin omniparte
: Ex hiispatetquod significatio
Introductiones
, p. 7429*33
tantumvel
seu dictioneorationis.Suppositioautemin nominesubstantivo
rem ut subpronominevel dictionesubstantiva;hec enim significant
69Adjoining(adiacens),itis to say: to a substance,
cfr.Introductiones,
p. 8i19*20:
in adiacentiaad substantiam,
Et iterum,quia omnecopulanssignificat
et sic
Kretzmann{Introduction,
copulatpersonaliter.
p. 121, n. 66) conjectures:ad
substantivam.
This howevercannotbe right:it would not explainthat all
formam= substantiais
copulationis personal,sinceforthat a res differens
needed(cfr.William'sremarksconcerning
Introductiones,
personalsupposition,
Cfr.also e.g. DialcticaMonacensis,Log. Mod., II 2, p. 60630*33.
p. 7630'33).
Cfr.below,n. 76.
60Signification
in the genericsensetherefore
shouldnot be considered
some
to whichhabitualsupposition
and copulationform
sortofbasisofsignification
in a genericsense,becauseit is
additions.It is possibleto speakofsignification
of a formto the intellectwithoutspecifying
possibleto speak of presentation
the mannerin which(as subsistingor as adjoining)that formis presented.
Cfr.also below,n. 66.
61Thisshouldbe thecorrecttranslation
oftheratherpeculiarphrase: in omni
parteseu dictioneorationis.Possiblyhoweverthisphraseis theresultofcontaminationof in omniparteorationisand seu dictione
, this latteroriginally
it is clear that Williamdeals herewith
positedsupra lineam.Nevertheless
dictiones(partsofspeech)as forming
partof an oratio.For thetermoratioin
thiscontext,cfr.de Rijk,Development,
p. 104,n. 75.
62Fortheexplanationofthisnotion,cfr.Kretzmann,
Introduction,
p. 106,n. 7.
One might,however,also thinkof substantiated adjectives,cfr.Dialctica
andLambertofAuxerre,
Monacensis,
Log. Mod.,II 2, p. 6079"18
Logica, p. 207f.
131

23:21:23 PM

sub alio. Copulatioautemin omnibusadiectivis

et ordinabilem
sistentem
et participiis
et verbis.63
This interpretation of suppositio secundum habitm as a kind of
significationseems also to be applicable to the other passage where
William makes use of this notion:
ex partesubiectisupDicuntigiturquidamquod terminus
ibid.,p. 8211-15:
ponitet ex partepredicatiappellat.Et sciendumquod ex partesubiecti
ex parteautem
suppositionis,
supponitsecundumutramquediffinitionem
predicatisupponitsecundumhabitualemsuam diffinitionem.
In my opinion W. Kneale64is rightin supposing that here we have
to think of cases where the subject-termand the predicate term both
are substantive nouns. In such cases the subject term has supposition
in both senses (ia and 2) ; the predicate term on the other hand has
only habitual supposition (ia), forit seems rather difficult,indeed, to
consider the predicate as an orderingundersomethingelse.65
I thinkthe conclusion is certain that it is really William's intention
63As Williamremarks,
somepartsofspeechremainthatare notencompassed
and copulation,see Introductiones
of supposition
, p. 752"4:
by the combination
Nulla autemistarum,scilicetsuppositio,copulatio,appellatio,est in partibus
substantiamvel aliindeclinabilibus,
significat
quia nulla pars indeclinabilis
to notehere,again,thestressWilliamlays
quid in substantia.It is interesting
on the substance(cfr.above,p.
in regardwith(thefunctions
of) signification
118).
84Kneale,Development
oflogic,pp. 248-249.
65It willbe clearthatwhenthepredicatetermis an adjectiveor a participle
thereareforappellationto occur,see Introductiones,
(thetwootherpossibilities
sincethenthereis actual copulationex
therewillbe no difficulty,
p. 7433"34),
partepredicati.
of William'sintention,one shouldremember
For a betterunderstanding
to hima predi(withKneale,loc. cit.,and cfr.also above,n. 20) thataccording
- and therefore
alsoa predicatetermlikeanimal- predicatesa form
cate-term
(Thisdoes notmeanthatWilliamshouldholdthata
only,see ibid.,p. 787*18.
- therefore
- cfr.ibid.,p. 75s6and 8i20"26
I am not
standssimply
predicate-term
shouldbe readas : etsicstetsimpliciter,
so surethaton p. 78etsi stetsimpliciter
as Kretzmann(Introduction
, p. 112,n. 33) proposes).
It mustbe notedthatWilliam,althoughit is strictly
speakingincompatible
nevertheless
of actual supposition,
withhis definition
presents{Introductiones,
'animal' in ' omnishomo
estanimal'as an instanceofsuppositioconfusa
p. 7536)
tantum.This mightbe explainedby thefactthatWilliampresentshereto his
pupilsa ratherusual divisionofsuppositiopersonalis;usual,it is to say,in a
cfr.de Rijk,Tractatus,
certaintradition,
pp. LXXYII - LXXIX. Thereis one
however:theLogica Utdicitand theLogica Cumsitnostrapresent
difference,
- discretaas a subdivisionof suppositiopersonalisas
the divisioncommunis
p.
opposedto suppositiosimplex,whereasWilliampresents{Introductiones,
- discretasideby sidewiththedivisionsimplexthedivisioncommunis
7518*28)
formalis
ofsuppositio
as twoequivalentsubdivisions
(thesubdivision
personalis
- discretais leftout in theschemeofde Rijk {ibid.,p. LXXVIII).
communis
132

23:21:23 PM

to regard suppositio secundum habitm (and copulatio secundum

habitm
) as a kind (mode) of signification.
Now I believe that his intention is no more than this, and in my
opinion some reasons may be adduced to corroboratethis view.
Thus, it seems ratherdifficultto see how thishabitual supposition,as
it is explained above, can performthe same functionthat Peter of Spain
ascribesto his suppositionaturalis.On theotherhand, ifhabitual suppositionwere somethingsimilarto natural supposition,it would seem equally difficultto understandits use in the second passage quoted above.66
We mightfurthermore
point to the circumstancethat also other13th
authors
century
distinguish,perhaps more clearly than William does,
between supposition as a kind of significationand supposition as a
property,or acceptio, of a term. And natural supposition,if admitted
to exist, is seen as a subdivision of the latter. We might referhere
to Roger Bacon and Lambert of Auxerre.
67
Roger Bacon mentions in his Sumule four differentways of using
the term 'suppositio', one of which is substantivarei designatio, sicut
dicimus quod sustantivanomina supponuntrem suam, idest: sustantive
dsignant.This is distinguishedfromsupposition as proprietastermini
communisper comparacionemad individua; and fromsupposition as
8
proprietasterminisubjectif
It may be useful to digress somewhat upon the view of Lambert
of Auxerre.69
66Cfr.above,n. 57, fortheinterpretation
ofMaier.
07Sumule
, p. 268a0ff.
'
68Thereis howevera difficulty
here.As may appearfromtheword'secundo
whichis apparently
reidesignadodoes
faultybecausethesubstantiva
(p. 26832),
can occuronlyinsidean oratio,the textis
notmakeit clearthatsupposition
corruptedhere.And indeedMs Sevilla,Bibi. Columb.,5-2-40offersquite a
different
are mentioned,
readingof our passage. Here only two possibilities
namelyuno modo: suppositioas proprietasterminicommunisetc.(= Steele,
and the text continues:secundomodo dicitur:proprietas
termini
p. 26825-29),
et subicitur
in oratione.
subjecti,sive: suppositioestinquantumalii supponitur
De istomodoad presensestintentioetc.
in thismeaningit is clearthat: supposicionon est
Indeedwithsupposition
nisiterminiactualiterordinatiin oracioneet non extra.
proprietas
Fromthe wordsof Rogerin the sectionon copulationone mighthowever
thatsupposition
as a substantiva
infercorrectly
reidesignatio
is notat variance
with Roger'sintentions:Sumule
, p. 2893"8:Omniaenimnominaadjectivaet
omniaverbaet adverbiasignificancia
aliquamrempredicabilem
copulant,hoc
est: adjacentersignificant;
est enimcopulaciorei significate
perunamdiccionemad aliamadjecciovel adjacensinclinado.Sic nonestde sustantivis
nominibus,nec aliispartibusoracionis,aliis a predictis.
69 For I thinkthereis reasonto proposesomechangein the
de
interpretation
, esp. pp. 89-96)ofthisview.
Rijk has given(.Development
133

23:21:23 PM

Lambert, as is known, distinguishesfour differentways in which

the word 'suppostilo' is used: according to the firstway supposition
is : substantivarei designatiovel significatio; according to the fourthit
is acceptioterminipro se sive pro re sua velpro aliquo suppositocontento
sub re sua vel pro aliquibus suppositis contentissub re sua. Lambert
continues that it is the fourthway which is intended in this context
because the discussion regards supposition as the propertyof a term.
He stresses that supposition in the firstway is not such a property:

Summa,pp. 206-207: Et istoquartomodoest hicintentiode suppositione.

non tribusmodispredictis. . .
Sic enimsuppositioest termini
proprietas,
Primoautemmodo dieta suppositioest quedamsignificatio
specialistermini et non terminiproprietas.Quod patet sic: vera est predicatio,si
cumergode difest significatio",
dicatursic: "substantivareisignificatio
si substantiva
reisignififinitopossitdici quidquiddiciturde diffinitione,
catiosit diffinitio
suppositions,poteritdici quod suppositioeritsignifinonestsuppositio
catio.Si autemestsignificatio,
;
que esttermini
proprietas
quod suppositioprimomododietanonest suppositiode
quarerelinquitur
Quod verumest; sed est suppositioprimomododieta
qua hic intenditur.
terminisubstantivi.Et huic suppositioni
respondetcopulatio
significatio
que est adiectivareisignificatio.

Thus it is clear that supposition (1) is a kind of signification,namely

that of substantive terms, which is opposed to copulation (1) as the
kind of significationadjectival terms have.
Now supposition (4)- i.e. the propertyof a term- allows itselffor
a subdistinction,for it can be said in a wider and in a strict sense
(communiteret proprie). It appears from the sequel that supposition
in the widersense {communiter
dicta)- and it should be rememberedit
concernshere supposition (4)
encompasses supposition in the strict
sense {suppositioproprie dicta) and copulation.
Supposition (4) in the wider sense is said regardless of the kind of
significationthe term concerned, that is the term of which the suppositionis to be a property,has. Supposition (4) in the strictsense, on
the other hand, is said only of substantive terms,or in other words it
is the propertyof a term taken into account that the term concerned
is a substantival one; and copulation (4) is the propertyofan adjectival
term.70
I willreferto theeditionofLambert'sworkby
For thesake ofconveniency
fullof
F. Alessio(quotedabove,n. 28), althoughthiseditionis unfortunately
errors;I willcorrectthesetacitly.
70The mainpointofthesubdistinction
ofsupposition
(4) seemsindeedto be a
and supposition(4): in thesamewayas it is posparallelbetweensignification
thekind
in a generalsense,i.e. withoutindicating
sibleto speakofsignification
or whiledoingso (and thenwe speak of supposition(1) and
of signification
134

23:21:23 PM

It is to be noted that the examples given by Lambert of what is

called supposition (4) in the wider sense indeed concern substantival
'
'
and adjectival terms, namely: homo est species , homo curri (sub' album curri
'
(adjectival).71
stantival) and album disgregati
That suppositionin the strictsense and copulation,ofwhichLambert
speaks in this passage, are indeed to be considered as propertiesof a
term, that is as suppositio (4) proprie dicta and copulatio (4), may
appear not only fromLambert's own words by which he introduces
these notions.72It comes out clearly,too, in the definitionshe gives of
these notions. For these are exactly the same as the definitionhe had
given of suppositio (4) (quoted above) and he inserts only the kinds
of significationa term can have (I underlinethe pertinentwords):

remfixamet
ibid.,p. 207: Et est suppositiopropriedictaacceptiotermini
teneri
secundumquam (scilicet:acceptionem)
perse stantem
representantis
sub re sua.
potestpro re sua siveprosuppositovel suppositiscontentis
representantis
Copulatiovero est acceptio terminirem dependentem
secundum
quamteneripotestproresua velprosuppositovelprosuppositis
contentis
sub re sua.

Thus, in my opinion, we have to distinguishbetween on one side

suppositio (1) and copulatio (1) as kinds of significationand on the
other suppositio (4) and copulatio (4) as propertiesof a term.
Now this is exactly what Lambert tells us to keep in mind:
et
ibid.,p. 208: Ex predictispatetquod suppositioest termini
significatio
termini
copulatio.Alitertarnensumitursuppositio
proprietas;et similiter
et copulatio,
et ut esttermini
ut esttermini
; similiter
proprietas
significatio
et copulatione
ut visumest.Et de suppositione
que sunttermini
proprietahie intenditur.73
tes,et nonproutsunttermini
significationes,
ofwhat
copulation(1) ), so it is possibleto speakofsupposition(4) regardless
communiter
kindof termit concerns{suppositio
dicta)or withregardto this
(and thenwe have suppositio
propriedicta(4) and copulatio(4) ).
71I am afraidde Rijk did not noticethis,see his Development,
p. 92. That
'album
'
disgregaand albumcurriare indeedto be consideredexamplesof
copulation(4) may appear also fromRoger Bacon, Sumule,p. 2898-13:De
;
copulacioneautemsciendumestquod copulacioaut est simplexaut personalis
vel personaliter,
terminus
adjectivusvel particularis
potestcopularesimpliciter
secundumomnesdiffrencias
sicutpatetmanifeste
determinatas,
supposicionis
ut 'albumdisgrega,discreteut 'hoc albumcurri. . .
simpliciter
72Summa,p. 206. Et isto quartomodo est hic mtentiode suppositione.
Sic
nontribusmodispredictis;ibid.,p. 207:
enimsuppositioesttermini
proprietas,
Sciendumvero quod suppositiode qua intenditur
hie, diciturduobusmodis,
et proprie.
scilicetcommuniter
73In thepassagefollowing
thisone Lambertentersfurther
intothedistinction
ofsuppositio(4) intosuppositio(propriedicta)and copulatioand theirconnection withrespectively
substantivaland adjectivalnouns (that is withsuppositio(1) and copulatio(1) ) : Item,si querataliquisquare suppositioappro135

23:21:23 PM

If we wish to put the above said into a scheme the followingresults:74

/ suppostilo- substantivareisignificatici
= copulatio(i) )
I
(i modo) (opp.: adiectivareisignificatio
/ acceptioterm.subst.
j
/
l = suppostilo
dieta
proprie
' suppostilo= acceptiotermini
1
proetc.
dicta '
communiter
(40modo) = suppostilo
I acceptioterm.adiect.
' ==copulatio(4)
It is to be remarkednow that Lambert introducesnatural supposition as a kind of supposition(4). 75
Thus, in my opinion, the result of our digress can be that Lambert
of Auxerre distinguishes clearly between supposition as a kind of
significationand supposition as a propertyof a term and accordingly,
between suppositionas a kind of signification(cfr.William's suppositio
secundumhabitm)and natural supposition.
For my assumption that supposition as a kind of significationis
something other than natural supposition, we might furthermore
point out that some of the earliertracts,which distinguishsupposition
and copulation as kinds of significationand also allow natural supposition or somethinglike it, introduce these notions in quite distinct
76
passages. Thus the Dialctica Monacensis and the Summe Metenses.11
prietursubstantivis, copulatioadiectivis,ex dictisquid sit dicendumpatet.
per se
Supponereenimest per se stantiset rem suam fixamrepresentantis,
autem stare et rem suam fixamrepresentare
propriumest substantivorum;
adiacerevero
representantis,
copulareveroest adiacentiset remdependentem
Ideo proprie
et rem dependentem
propriumest adiectivorum.
representare
loquendosuppositioest substantivorum
copulatioestveroadiectivorum.
74In myopinionthismayshowthatthereis no questionofthetwofoldconfusionde Rijk has seenhere[Development,
primomododicta,
p. 93). For suppositio
withsuppositio
communiter
is notto be identified
thekindofsignification,
dicta,
the property(acception)of a term;and secondly,suppositio
propriedicta,the
ofa substantive
term,is notthesameas suppositio
primomododicta,
property
thekindofsignification.
are unrelatedto each other:
This does not yet mean that the distinctions
a term
theirrelationlies preciselyin the pointthat the kindsof signification
in theacceptionofthatterm.Cfr.above,p. 135.
can have are introduced
75See theend ofthetextquotedabove: Et de suppositione
et copulationeque
hieintendiet nonproutsunttermini
sunttermini
significations,
proprietates,
tur.(Cfr.also above,n. 72).
78For suppositionand copulationas kindsof signification,
see de Rijk, Log.
est substantive
60623-33:
siquidem
Mod., II 2, pp. 6o621-6o723,
Supponere
esp. p.
et per se et sine dependentiatali que est in principali
<rem> significare
et in tali dependentiaque
Copulareest adiectiveremsignificare
significatione.
136

23:21:23 PM

Finally I would like to point to Peter of Spain, because he too recognizes suppone?e and copulare (like the Dialctica Monacensis he does
not use the nouns suppositioand copulatioin this connection)as kinds
of signification,the first accomplished by substantive nouns, the
second by adjectival nouns and verbs.78Suppositio and copulatio on
the other hand he introduces as kinds of acceptio terminipro aliquo :
the firstof a terminisubstantivi
, the latter of a terminiadiectivi,79
Dicitur autem terminusille supponerequi
est de principalisignificatione.
Ut patet in hoc
nullamdependentiam
habet in principalisua significatione.
termino'homo',qui substantiamcum qualitatefinitesignificat,
que sunt de
Et similiterpateat de quolibetsubstantivo.Dicitur
principalisignificatione.
habetin principalisua signifiautemille terminus
copularequi dependentiam
catione.Ut patetin hac dictione'albus', que significat
qualitatemfinite,substantiamveroinfinite;
undedependensest ad subiectumper quod suamfiniat
substantiam.
For something
see ibid.,pp. 6i631-6i78:
likenatural- accidentalsupposition,
Undecuminappellatoneetsuppositione
terminus
communis
videndum
varietur,
est qualiterhoc fiat.Ad hoc sciendumquod terminuscommunis
per se sumptus supponitpro omniquod potestparticipai!formam
eius siveid sit presens
sive preteritum
Unde ille terminus'homo'per se sumptussupsive futurum.
ponitproomnieo quod potestessehomo.Hoc autemsunttamexistentes
quam
nonexistentes.
Et idempateatde quolibetterminocommuni.Contingit
autem
in locutione
communis
positusquandoquesumiturpro presentiquod terminus
utinhac locutione:' homoest',quandoquepropreteritis,
utinhac locutione:
bus,
'homo
ut in hac locutione:'homoeri.
fui, quandoqueprofuturis,
77For suppositionand copulationas kindsof signification,
see de Rijk, Log.
idestper
Mod.,II i, p. 455: Est autemsuppositiosubstantivarei designatio,
nomensubstantivum.Et supponereest substantiverem designare.Unde
'
'
termini
'homo'
de Rijk).
, 'asinus', albedo dicuntur
supponentes
(suppositiones,
est
adiectiva
rei
idestpernomenadiectivum.
(om.de Rijk) designatio,
Copulatio
Et copulareest adiectiveremdesignare,
ut 'albus,-ba,-bum'et 'hic est hecet
hocfelix'.
like naturalsupposition,
For something
see ibid.,p. 458: Et ex hoc patet
interappellationem
differentia
et suppositionem,
communis
quia terminus
per
se positussupponitpro omnibusillis qui sunt vel qui eruntvel qui fuerunt
formamcommunem
a qua imponitur.
Unde bene dicitur:'homo
participantes
'
est','homofuit', homoeri.
Onemightpointalso to theTractatus
deproprietatibus
see de Rijk,
sermonm,
and ibid.,p. 7165-11
Log. Mod.,II 2, pp. 7ii4-7i34forthekindsofsignification
forabsolute- respective
supposition.
78 See PeterofSpain,Tractatus(ed. de Rijk) VI 2, pp. 7917-8o6:
Significations
alia est rei substantiveet habetfieriper nomensubstantivum,
ut 'homo'; aha
estreiadiectiveet habetfieripernomenadiectivum
vel perverbum,ut 'albus'
vel 'curri.... Nominavero substantivadicuntursupponere,nominavero
adiectivaet etiamverbadicunturcopulare.
In myopinionthesewordscouldscarcelybe explainedotherwise.
79ibid.,VI 3, p. 8o8-9:Suppositiovero est acceptioterminisubstantivipro
aliquo; p. 8o17:Copulatioest terminiadiectiviacceptiopro aliquo.
It is to be notedthat in the linesbetweenthesePeterworksout the differencesbetweensignificatio
and suppositio(and copulatio,one mightadd).
137

23:21:23 PM

Whereby it should be rememberedthat he presents natural supposition as a subdivision of suppositio as acceptiotermini.

In my opinion the conclusion to be drawn fromthe preceding can
onlybe that suppositioas a kind ofsignificationshould be distinguished
fromsuppositio naturalis.
The first concerns what a term signifies, and indicates that the
universal nature, essence or formis (re)presentedas a subsisting one
(i.e. as something of the firstof the ten categories); it is opposed to
copulation (as a kind of signification),which (re)presentsthe universal
nature, essence or formas subjoined to somethingelse (i.e. as something of the other, accidental categories).80
The second concernswhat the termmay denoteas a result of having
signification; it is thereforea propertyof the term (or acceptiotermini
as it is frequentlystated) ; indicating the range of denotation- i.e.
the individuals that may participate in the universal nature which is
presented by the significationof the term- uneffectedby any context, it is opposed to accidental supposition in which the influenceof
the context takes effect.81
Peteruses theverbsupponete,
ibid.,
Adducingthe secondofthesedifferences,
: Neque sunteiusdem,quia significare
est vocis,supponerevero est
p. 8o14"15
terminiiam quasi compositiex voce et significatione.
Thus, althoughPeter
does not use the nounsuppositioin a twofoldsense,he stillusestheverbsupponetein a twofoldsense,namelyof: rei substantive
representare
(p. 8o5)and
of: to stand (said of a substantiveterm)forsomething
(p. 8o14"15).
80 It is indeedusefulto stressthepointthatthekindsofsignification
concern
ofthe
thepresentation
of a natureetc. as something
subsisting
(as something
firstcategory)respectively
as something
adjoining,forone was aware of the
a natureetc.whichis in realityan
factthate.g. albedoand albumbothsignify
accident.This comesout veryclearlye.g. in a remarkin the socalledIntro
ductiones
antique(de Rijk,GenuineTextI, pp. 24-33;forthetitle,see de Rijk,
Tractatus,
suppositioest subp. LXXII) pp. 30-31: Suppositiosic diffinitur:
earn
stantivarei designatio.Sed contra:'Albedo*
; suppositioista nonsignificai
nullaest . . . Solutio.Dicimusad primum,
perse stantem.Ergo diffinitio
quod
'
bona est,quia licet'albedo
accidens,tamensignificat
primadiffinitio
significet
se stantis.Et hec est ratioquia
modum
modum
est
hoc
substantie,
per
per
per
'albedo
'
potestsupponere.
The same will be also the backgroundof the remarkof Peter of Spain,
substantivavel
Tractatus,VI 2, p. 801-4:Quare proprienon est significatio
substantiveet aliquid adiective,quia adiecadiectiva,sed aliquidsignificatur
et non significativatiovel substantivatio
suntmodirerumque significantur,
are to be understoodas: being
and adiectivatio
tionis,in whichsubstantivatio
(made)ofthefirstcategory,
resp: beingoftheothercategories.
81Sincesuppositionas a kindofsignification
is something
quitedistinctfrom
to be a kindof
of a term,to determine
supposition
suppositionas a property
is, so to speak,neutralto the questionwhetherone admitssupsignification
positionas a propertyof a termto occuroutsidean oratio(naturalsupposi138

23:21:23 PM

Now, since William of Sherwood's suppositiosecundumhabitmwas

determinedas a kind of signification,there seems to be no reason to
put this notion on a level with suppositio naturalis.
One mighthowever object that, - if it is true that the notion of
habitual supposition differsfrom the notion of natural supposition,
and if it is true that William does not consider it the proper view to
hold that a term has a natural capacity to stand for all actual and
possible individuals partaking in a universal nature82- he nevertheless seems to hold that a term has a (natural) capacity to stand for
all the individuals that actually participate in the formsignifiedby
that term.83
Now, I have no intentionto deny that this could be a correctrendering of William's meaning. It should be remarked, however, that,
as we have seen already,84William assigns this functionexplicitlyto
the significationof a term. I am not convinced, forthat matter,that
wordingslike terminussupponit de se show necessarilythe factual admittanceof natural supposition as the propertyof a term outside any
context. It is to be rememberedthat e.g. Roger Bacon, who says explicitlythat supposition occurs only as a propertyof a term inside an
oratio,85 nevertheless states that: a terminus de se solum concernit
presencia et supponit pro illis de sui natura** On the other hand it
should be kept in mind that texts that admit a natural supposition,
definethis notion always in wordingslike terminusper se sumptusor
per se positus.87The most importantthinghowever to bear in mind in
withthislastpossibility
is theLogica
tion)ornot.An exampleofa combination
Cum sit nostra,see de Rijk, Log. Mod., II 2, p. 44618-33:
Et est suppositio
substantivarei designatio,idest significatioterminisubstantivi. . . Item.
subicibilissignificatio;
'sermonis
subicibilis'poniturad
Suppositioest sermonis
differentiam
sermonispredicabilis.Hec est differentia
intersuppositionem
et
est
significationem.
Supponereest remsuam sub appositoponere;significare
rationeipsiusinstituentis
remsuamsubprincipali
Terminus
designare.
supponit
sive poniturin orationesive
quando poniturin oratione;terminussignificat
extraorationem.
82Cfr.above,pp. 116-7.
83One couldpointto Introductiones,
forin thispassageit is stated
p. 8s15-31,
fivetimes(8516-17;
8521;8528"27;
85a8and 8531)thata termde se supponitpro
presentibus.
84Above,p. 116.
85Sumule,p. 26832-34
: . . ex quo patetquod supposiciononest proprietas
nisi
termini
actualiterordinatiin oracione,et nonextra(cfr.above,n. 68).
86Sumule,p. 28o29-30
(cfr.above,n. 25).
87Cfr.the DialcticaMonacensis,Log. Mod., II 2, pp. 6i631*6i76(quoted
above,n. 76); the SummeMetenses,
ibid.,II i, p. 458 (quotedabove, n. 77);
the Tractatus
de propriet
atibussermonm,
ibid.,II 2, p. 716: Absolutadicitur
139

23:21:23 PM

this connection,is that the admittance of natural supposition seems

to go togetherwith the definitionof supposition (as a propertyof a
term) as the acceptioof a termpro aliquo,88With William however we
find the kind of definitionof supposition that we could call the syntactical one, in which supposition (as a propertyof a term) is defined
in relation to an orderingwith another term (or concept signifiedby
another term).89Within such a view there seems to be no possibility
forsupposition as the propertyof a term standing on its own, because
in such a case there is no relation at all to whatever other term or
concept.90
Therefore,in my opinion, we have to credit William with the same
view as Cum sit nostraand Roger Bacon that there can be only sup- ,
position as the propertyof a term actually ordered in the context of
an oratio.91
Concluding these remarks, in my opinion, we are entitled to say
that we have broughtforwardsome evidence of the factthat, although
William of Sherwoodadmitsan esse habitale, neverthelesshis opinions
on quite some semantical topics run remarkably parallel with those
of Roger. Thus, we have ascertained their basic consensus of opinion
concerningi.a . the relationof supposition and appellation,the referent'
quam habet terminusper se sumptus,ut homo supponitenimabsoluteex
VI 4, p. 812"5:
Petrus
institutione
Hispanus,Tractatus,
pro quolibetequaliter;
proomnibusa quibusaptus
Suppositionaturalisestacceptioterminicommunis
de naturasua supponit
uthomopersesumptus
natusestparticipan,
proomnibus
et qui suntet qui erunt(cfr.also theSummuleAntiquohominibus
qui fuerunt
rum, de Rijk,GenuineTextI, p. 9) ; LambertofAuxerre,
Logica,p. 208: Naturalis
a se et a naturasua. Hanc diciturhabere
suppositioest quam habetterminus
and Vincent
idestquandonullialii adiungitur;
terminus
quandoperse ponitur,
of Beauvais, Speculumdoctrinale
, cap. 36 col. 239: Naturalisest quam habet
Ut iste
terminuscommunisnon ab alio, sed virtute propriaesignificationis.
se potestsupponereprohominequi est et qui non
terminus'homo'sumptus
per
'
'
est,si dicaturomnishomo(quotedby de Rijk,Development,
p. 105).
88 This holds good at any case forthe line SummuleAntiquorum
(de Rijk,
GenuineTextI, p. 9), Peterof Spain (cfr.the text quotedabove, n. 79) and
Lambertof Auxerre(cfr.the textsquoted above,pp. 134-5).The othertexts
likeit giveonlya determination
or something
thatadmita naturalsupposition
As we have statedabove (n. 81) this
of suppositionas a kindof signification.
is neutralto the allowanceforsuppositionto occuroutsidean
determination
oratio.
89 This syntacticaldefinition
is found,as we haveseen,also in theLogicaCum
sitnostra,see above n. 81, and RogerBacon,see above,n. 68.
90 Thispossibility
is deniedexplicitly
bybothCumsitnostraand RogerBacon,
to in theprecedingnote.
see thetextsreferred
91Onemightpointhereto hisdefinition
ofsuppositio
actualis,cfr.above,p. 129.
140

23:21:23 PM

ial forceof supposition in negative propositionsand the definitionof

supposition and copulation as kinds of significationand as properties
of a term. Even if William and Roger are not in entire agreementas
to some of the points we have touched upon, yet we have seen William
take up a positionregardingthese points that is not farremotedof that
of Roger. This last regards mainly the concept of esse habitale,
which is rejected by Roger92 but admitted by WilHam; notwithstanding that, however, WilHam holds there to be equivocation between actual and non-actual being. Broadly the same holds true for
the related issue of the truthvalue and truthconditionsofpropositions
'
such as omnis homoest animal'
The fundamentalpoint of their,entire or partial, agreementseems
to be the emphasis they both lay on the relation the signifyingforce
of a word establishes between that word and actually existingthings.
This is, especially as regards William, interesting,because it happens
withina frameworkin which the proper significateof a word is determined to be the forma, and in which, moreover,one adheres to the
inherencetheoryof the copula.
This agreement,now, between WilHam and his youngercontemporary93is, indeed, the more remarkablesince the views they defend,as
we have seen, are not the commonlyheld ones.
92As we have seenabove (n. 43), Roger'sattitudeis in the Summanotyetso
theredo notshowmuchenthusiasm
forthe
categorical,
althoughhis wordings
concepteither.
93I thinkthatindeedthe workof Williamis earlierthanthat of Roger.De
Rijk{Development,
p. 80,n. 28)proposedthedatec. 1250fortheworkofWilHam,
fordatinghis workc. 1240 notconbecausehe thinksthe usual arguments
clusivenor those adduced forhis influenceon Peter of Spain, Lambertof
the last point,I thinkthatthepresentpaper
Auxerreand others.Concerning
theargugivesamplesupportforDe Rijk's viewand thatit also corroborates
tracts
mentsadducedbyhimin hisSomethirteenth
on thegameofobligacentury
XIV (1976),pp. 26-49,esp. pp. 31-42,that William's
tionIII, in: Vivarium,
in Paris; cfr.also thenextnotes.
workdid notoriginate
fora date, c. 1230-1240,of
Thereis, however,in myopinionan argument
William'sworkwhichis not adducedso far. Kretzmann(Introduction,
p. 7)
to a passageofRogerBacon'sCompendium
drawstheattention
studiiphilosophic
Thomas
ae, inwhichRogeropposesthewiseantiqui,suchas RobertGrosseteste,
Wallensis,Adam Marsh,RobertMarsh,WilliamLupus and Williamof Sherwoodagainstthemoderni
saeculares.Thesenames,and certainly
thefirstthree
of them,bringus back to the yearsc. 1240-1250in Oxford(whichlines up
also withthe biographical
data of Roger); and the contextof thisargument
requiresthat Rogersumsup heretheologians.So we mightgatherfromthis
thatWilliamwas activeas a masterin theology
in Oxfordin thetimeconcerned
;
ecclesiasticalcareerhe has
this,by the way,wouldfitin withthe important
made. But thenwe have to put his workas an artistbeforethattime,let us
c. 1230-1240.
say somewhere
141

23:21:23 PM

With regard to this, we might notice some points. Firstly, it is

clear that there are great divergences between on the one hand the
views of William and of Roger and on the other the views of the
masters of what is called the Parisian tradition.94These divergences
concern doctrinal issues (e.g. the relation supposition- appellation,
the predicative function of 'est', the truth value and conditions of
'
propositionssuch as omnis homoest animal') but also more technical
issues (esp. the syntactical definitionof supposition and the rejection
of supposition outside an oratio that goes along with it). Secondly,
however, there are also divergencesbetween on the one hand William
and Roger and on the other representativesof the Oxfordtradition,
esp. the Logica Cum sit nostra. This disagreementconcerns mainly
a set of coherent doctrinal issues (so the relation supposition- appel'
lation, the notion of esse confusum,the evaluation of omnis homoest
animal' and the assignmentof the functionof appellation only to the
predicate). An interestingpoint regarding this last disagreementis
that one sometimes gets the impression of an internal dispute inside
the Oxfordtradition.95
It is, in my opinion, this basic agreement between William and
Roger in for the rest a rather isolated position that makes the praise
bestowed by Roger on William understandable but above that makes
the place of William in the developmentof the 13th centurysemantical
theorysuch an interestingone.
Nijmegen
FilosofischInstitut
Erasmuslaan 40
94See de Rijk, Tractatus,
pointedout
pp. LXVIII-LXXX. The divergences
thedefinition
in thepresentpaper,and esp. thoseconcerning
givenofand the
functionascribedto suppositionas a propertyof a term,give,I think,still
betweentheParisianandtheOxfordtradition.
bettersupportforthedistinction
beI hopeit is needlessto say thatwe have seenespeciallymanydivergences
tweenWilliamand PeterofSpain.
96One mightthinke.g. ofthe discussionaboutappellationas a timelessfunctionofthepredicate(cfr.above,nn. 19 and 20).
It is to be notedthatwe have indicationthatin othertextsof the Oxford
to someof the
traditionviewscan be foundthat are so to speakpreparatory
of
theacknowledgement
viewsofWilliamand Roger;so especiallyas concerns
suchas 'omnishomoestanimal' (I hopeto give
a doublesensein propositions
words
theevidenceforthisin mystudyofthetheoryofthesyncategorematical
in the 13thcenturythatwillbe finished
soon).As a matteroffactthiscircumbetweenthe Oxfordand the Paris
stance accentuatesmorethe difference
tradition.
142

23:21:23 PM

VivariumXV, 2 (1977)
Anonymi Teutonici commentum in Theodoli eclogam e codice
Utrecht, U. B. 292 editum (5)

RPD P. ORBN

149

se. tue
Uxoris

avariciam defies
stimulos luis, Amphiorae sacerdos,

se. uxoristue splendentis proquando

lapispreciosus
monilis :
Pectore
flagrantis, dum splendet bacca
cito
recepii te
Hausit a eum b subito

caverna
Inferni
specus ex Aceronte

infimo
profundo,

inter
locis private sc. manus filii
ficit matremin secretis
Mactat earn
orbate dextera
tenebris
prolis.
est alia Fabula: O amphiorae sacerdos, tu Lues cupiditatem
uxoris tue per remuneracionemunius lapidis preciosiin monili
positi, quare terra deglutivitte vivum et descendisti in Internum. Postea PROLestua interfecitmatremsuam proptervindictamtui.
Notandum, sicud tangunt Ovidius 1 et Alexander, erat quidam rex
Thebarum nomine Etlippus c, qui generavit duos filios uno tempore
seu pariter natos d, qui inceperuntdiscordare,postquam venerunt ad
etatem,qui eorum optineretregnum.Hoc videntes probi et boni homines ordinabant pro pace et concordia istorumfratrumquod mitterent
sortemet ille, super quem sors caderet, haberet primum annum regni
et tunc alter fraterhaberet annum alterum immediate sequentem et
sic alternati regnarent.Hoc facto cecidit sors super Ethioclen filium
Etlippi sic quod ipse deberet regnare in primo anno et alter frater,
scilicet Polithenes, exivit terram et contraxit matrimoniumcum filia
regis Adastri et fuit cum ea quousque annus finiebatur. Quo finito
reversusest ad regnum,ut regnaretanno suo. Quod videns fratersuus
Ethiocles fugavit eum a regno. Polithenes vero videns hoc consuluit
1 Met.9, 403SS.
Hic

a hausit OdoPicardus,f. 34; haurit Osternacher,

I02.
b eumOdoPicardus,f. 340',te Osternacher,
igo2.
c Etlippus= Oedipus.
d natas cod.
143

23:21:33 PM

socerum suum, scilicet patrem uxoris sue, super predicto quia non
posset regnareanno suo. Quare concordabant ad invicem quod vellent
colligere maximum exercitum et sic per violenciam intrare regnum
suum. Polithenes [f. 32*] eciam consuluit eos super predicto, qui responderunt quod non posset habere victoriam, nisi secum haberet
SACERDOtem.AMPHiORAusautem fuit optimus clericus
AMPHiORAum
et vidit in astris se moriturumsi bellum intraret,et ideo secrete abscondit se. Polithenes vero quesivit eum nec potuit invenire. Quare
venit uxor Polithenisad uxoRem AMPHiORAy
petens ab ea ubi vir suus
uxor
Polithenis
esset, ac illa negavit. Hoc videns
promisit uxori
AMPHiORAy
pulcherrimumMONiLe,in quo fuitlapis preciosus,ut monstraretsibi virum suum. Et statim monstraviteum, et sie Polithenes
duxit eum ad bellum. Dum autem amphioraus intraretbellum, aperta
est terra et deglutiviteum vivum, et sic descendit ad Infernum.Hoc
facto PROLesAMPHiORAy
postea recordata qualiter mater sua monstraverat patrem, interfecitmatrem, et sic pater vindicatus est.
Moraliterper istud intelligiturquod mulieresinvidia vel aliis causis
morte sepe seducunt viros, ut interficiantur.
Allegoricehec mulier,que seduxit virum,est Eva que recepitMONiLe,
i. pomum, per caliditatem alterius mulieris, i. dyabolice fraudis, et
seduxit virum, i. Adam. Et postea terra aperta est, i. Internus, et
deglutivit,i. Adam. Et sicut hec mulier interfectaest, sic eciam Eva
maledicta fuitet interfectaperpetua morte,nisi salvasset eam Xpistus.
153

obedire
superiori
Fata Chore miseri parere iubenta meliori:

sc. illum
dglutit sicca apertaterra
Infernus,
quem devorat arida tellus.
Accipit
illumprophetam
Sed Deus occulte Moysen
sepeliverat ipse
alicui
Nec cuiquam

investigare
hominum dedit indagare sepulchrum.

Hic est alia Historia: CHORas Dathan et Abiron devorat sunt sub
terriset descenderuntin iNFERNUm.Unde dicit: Fortune miseri chore
nocent unumquemque obedire meliori sue. Et moyses secrete sepuItus est sic quod nullus hominum potuit eius sepulchrum invenire.
Notandum CHORasfuit filiusYsaar, qui fuit filiusChaat, et ille fuit
a MONENT
OdoPicardus,/. j6r Osternacher,
igo2.
144

23:21:33 PM

filinsLevi, et Dathan et Abiron, qui fueruntfilii Elyath, et Hoy filius

Feleth, qui fuit de filiis Ruben - isti omnes et plures alii, scilicet
Elyath filiietcetera,quasi ducenti et quinquaginta surrexeruntcontra
MOYSEN. Quare moyses dixit eis "Quare elevamini super populos
Domini ?" Quia illi de genereLevi fueruntelecti et sempercum moyse.
Et dixit moyses ultra "Mane videbitis qui sunt [f. 32v] sancti et electi
Dei. Unusquisque igitur tollat thuribulumsuum, et tu chore et consilium tuum ponite ignem coram Domino et quemcumque elegerit
Deus, ipse erit sanctus". Et postea moyses vocavit Dathan et Abiron,
qui responderunt"Non venimus neque veniemus. Numquid parum est
tibi quod eduxisti nos de terra fluentelac et mei, ut occideres nos in
deserto, ubi dominatus fueras nobis ?" moyses autem iratus est valde
et dixit ad Dominum "Domine, ne respicias sacrificia." Et dixit tunc
ad chore "Tu et omnis congregado tua state seorsum coram Domino
et Aaron crastino die separatim, et quilibet recipiat thuribulum et
ponat desuper ignem". Et feceruntita. Et dixit Dominus ad moysen
et Aaron "Recedite de medio istius congregacionis,ut ego disperdam
eos subito". Quo audito cecideruntmoyses et Aaron in terramorantes
et dicentes "O deus fortissimespirituum,ira tua non procedat propter
peccatum unius super populum tuum". Respondit deus moysrPrecipe
populo universo, ut separaretur a tabernaculis chore Dathan et
Abyroril1 Hoc audito moyses dixit populo "Recedite a tabernaculis
impiorumhominum nec tangatis ea que pertinentad eos et videbitis
hodie quod Dominus faciet rem novam et quod aperiens terra os suum
degluciet eos". Et sermone finitoterra aperuit os suum et deglutivit
istos tres cum uxoribus filiisfamilia et adherentibus,et cum tabernaculis et rebus eorum descenderuntad iNFERNUm.Et hoc est quod dicit
propheta David HTerraaperuit os suum et deglutivitDatan et operuit
super congregacionemAbyron et exercit a ignis in synagoga eorum,
fiamma combuscit peccatoresl2 Et ignis egressus a Domino interfecit
ducentos et quinquaginta viros. Sequenti autem die murmuravitmultitudo filiorumIsrael contra moysen dicens TVos interiecistis populum
Domini"!,3et inceperuntinsurgeremoys malis verbis ita quod ipse et
fratersuus Aaron fugerunt.Et dum filiiIsrael sequerentureos, operuit
nubes tabernaculumfederis,in quod fugierunt,ita quod ipsi non poterant eis nocere. Et dixit Dominus ad moysen et Aaron TRecedite de
medio multitudinis.Nunc eciam delebo eos~l4.Et venit desuper incen1 Num. 16,24.

2 Ps. 105,17s.

3 Num. 16,41.

4 Num.16,45.

a exercit= exarsit,
videPs. J05,18 cod.MnchenSB elm, 5243f. Ij6r.
145

23:21:33 PM

dium et quotquot erant, combusti sunt ita quod ceciderunt bene 14

milia hominum et septingenti. Hoc videns moyses dixit ad fratrem
"Recipe thuribulum et mittas incendium desuper, ut cesset plaga".
Aaron [f. 33r] autem stans inter vivos et mortuos deprecatus est pro
populo et statim cessavit plaga. Et postea multa alia contingebant.
Postquam ergo omnia fueruntperacta et moyses populum docuerat et
recitaveratomnia populo que sibi deus dixerat,ascendit de campestribus Moab super montem, qui vocatur Nebo, in vertice directe in oppositum ipsius Ierico terre,et ibi sibi Dominus ostenditomnem terram
Galaat usque Dan et universum Neptalim et Effraymet Manasse et
omnem terram luda usque ad mare novissimum, et dixit Dominus
rHec est terra,pro qua iuravi Abraham Ysaac et Iacob, quando dixi:
Semini vestrodabo terramhancL1 Et dixitDominus rursumad moysen
"Tu vidisti oculis tuis terram hanc et non plus reverterisad eam".
Et sermone finito obdormivit in Domino moyses et mortuus est in
terra Moab et non cognovit homo sepulchrum suum usque in diem
hodiernum,nec postea poterat stiri qualiter deus disposuit de corpore
suo. Et fuit moyses centum et viginti annorum,quando mortuus est.
Et lugebant filiiIsrael eo quod mortuusesset moyses bene per triginta
dies in Moab campo, ubi perdiderunteum. Et quia moyses ante mortem posuerat manus super Iosue, qui repletus est spiritu sancto, filii
Israel obediebant sibi et non surrexitultra propheta in Israel.
Moraliterper istos tres principales,scilicetDathan Abyron etcetera,
et alios sequentes intelligimusmalos et invidos tam lyeos quam clericos, qui videntes illos de genere Levi, i. bonos, proficerein laboribus
suis invident ipsis et nituntureos impedire.
Allegorice vero per istos tres et sequaces suos intelligimusomnes
infideleset hereticos,qui insurguntcontra legem de. Quod dum percipitur a fidelibus,mittunturad ignem non tantum in terris,ymmo
eciam in inferno, eo quod ipsemet deus ddit sententiamcontra illos
quod perierentincendio.
filiamregis
agitaveratcumiliogeneremuscarum
decoratam cornibus Yo
157 Ventilat oestro
vacce
custodiam ordinai illiusviri
austera
uxorIovis
tutelam
ferox et ey
luno
deputt Argi.
Yo
vestita
crinbus
locoverborum
a
obita
a
cetis,b
regibus
Mugit pro verbis
1 Deut.34, 4.
a HORRENTiBUS
OdoPicaraus,j. 3jr Osternacher,
I02.
D CETis= saetxs.
146

23:21:33 PM

figuram
quousque
in effigiem
Donee

sc. humanam
reversa
estYo
mutata priorem.
rediit

Hic ponitur alia Fabula et dicit quod yo filia regis Ynati mutata in
vaccam fugata est per mundum a quodam genere muscarum, quod
OESTROMdicitur. [f. 33v] Quam iuno uxor Iovis tradidit argo custodiendam, qui argus centum habuit oculos. yo vero sic mutata in
vaccam fecitMUGiTumad lovem, ut veliet sibi dare formampriorem.
Qui misertusest eius MUTAnseam econversoin virginempulcherrimam.
Nota quod secundum Ovidium 1 Ynatus fuit quidam rex magnus et
potens et vocatus est dominus aquarum, qui habuit filiam pulcherrimam nomine yo, quam Iupiter summe dilexit sic quod insidiabatur
sibi. Contigit ergo, semel quod ista yo curiam paternam exivit causa
recreacionis. Quod videns Iupiter descendit per nubem et virginem
defloravit.iuno vero uxor Iovis male presumensde viro suo festinanter
descendit ad ilium locum, in quo Iupiter erat cum virginesub proteccione nubis. Iupiter vero videns uxorem suam mutavit istam iuvenculam in vaccam, ne uxor sua aliquid videret de quo posset habere
suspicionem.iuno vero uxor Iovis presumensadhuc male et suspiciose
opinata est. Quare rogavit lovem, ut veliet sibi dare vaccam illam.
Iupiter autem perplexus est nec libenter dedisset ei vaccam nec eciam
libenternegasset, sed timensuxorem dedit sibi vaccam. Qua data iuno
recepit quoddam genus muscarum, quod vocatur OESTRum,et posuit
illud sub cauda vacce iuxta foramenculi. Quo facto vacca incepit erigere caudam et currerehinc inde quasi per totum mundum propter
compunccionem illarum muscarum. iuno vero dedit sibi custodem,
scilicetARGum,precipiensquod ubicumque vacca esset, quod ibi eciam
esset argus. Unde argus habuit centum oculos. Qui dum dormivit,
semper habuit duos oculos apertos. Tandem venit hec vacca ad quendam fluvium,ubi vidit formamsuam in aquis. Qua visa doluit quod
species sua humana sic mutata esset in vaccinam. Quare deprecata est
sursum clamans MUGiendo,quia VERBa non habuit, et dixit ad lovem
quod veliet misererisui. Iupiter vero audiens hoc misertus est ipsius
et vocavit Mercuriumfiliumsuum dicens sibi quod per subtilitatem
suam istum ARGuminterficeret.Mercurius autem obediens patri suo
descendit et incepit dulciter citharizare in auribus argi ita quod ex
dulcedine argus clausit omnes oculos sic quod firme dormivit. Quo
dormienteMercuriusrecepit baculum pastoralem et interfecitARGum.
Hoc facto Iupiter mutavit vaccam illam in pulcherrimamvirginem,
1 Met.i, 583SS.
147

23:21:33 PM

et facta est sicut prius ita quod postmodum ista yo in India recepta
[f. 34r] est in deam et MUTATumest nomen eius et vocata est Ysis. Que
eciam postea residebat iuxta Parisius, antequam ibi fides viguit,
et ergo dicitur Parisius a para , quod est iuxta, et Ysis , quasi iuxta
Ysim.
Notandum quod moraliter per lovem intelligimusvirum, qui plus
apptit alienam quam propriam uxorem, quam tarnenpostea ad uxorem suam rediensvilipenditet deturpat,quam eciam uxor maritiscandalizat frequenterfaciens sibi persecuciones quousque recedit et dissuessit de ilio malefacto.
Item allegorice per istam filiam regis intelligimusquamlibet pecin vaccatricem,que propterinordinatumprocessumluxurie MUTATur
cam eo quod facit actum bestialem et vagatur per mundum in huiusmodi malo opere perseverans.Sed tandem inspicienshomineminterioren! in speculo consciencie, sicut yo vidit in aquis formamet vitam
suam bestialem,sursumvidet erigenscaput ad celum rogans pro venia.
Quod audiens misericors Iupiter, i. Deus qui semper est misericors,
misereturistius peccatricis et mutt vitam bestialem in pristinam
bonam vitam et sanctam ita quod postea recipiturin deam.
161

vexatus
Offensus

sc. Domini
Angelus

Ulepropheta
Balaan a calcaribus

i. azellam
obvit
occurrit, pecudem

pungit
urget

azinam
azellam,

angelus
stare coegit.
qui

i. azine
sc. est solvitur
Res horrenda nimis! Lassatur b vox animalis,
verba
producendo
Que consuevit homo producere verba, loquendo.
Hie est alia Hystoria et dicit quod balaan propheta offensus super
azinam pungebat earn cum calcaribus, sed angelus Domini tenuit
earn cum freno,ne posset ulterius procedere.Et tandem azina loquebatur verba ac si fuissethomo.
Nota, sicud scribiturI osue primo capitulo, postquam Moyses fuit
mortuus,locutus est Dominus ad Iosue famulumMoysi dicens TMoyses
servus meus mortuus est, surge tu et transi Iordanem tu et omnis
a Balaam OdoPicardus,f. 38TOsternacher,
1902.
D LAXATUR
Udofi caraus,j. 38Tusternacner,
1902.
148

23:21:33 PM

1
populus tecum in terram,quam ego dabo filiisIsrael a desertousque
ad fluviummagnum Eufraten,2et nullus poteritvobis resisterecunctis
diebus vite vestre, et sicud fui cum Moyse, ita ero tecum.3 Ergo esto
robustus et facias omnem legem, quam tibi precepit Moyses servus
meus"1.4
[f. 34v] Hiis et pluribus aliis auditis dixit Iosue ad populum,
ut disponeretse ad transeundumIordanem et dixit ea, que sibi Dominus dixerat ita quod populus clamabat ad Iosue dicens TQui contradixerit ori tuo et non obedient cunctis sermonibusquos preceperisei,
moriatur.Sicut enim obedientes fuerimusMoysi, sic obediemus tibi in
omnibus"1.5
Hoc facto, ut scribiturIosue 2 capitulo, Iosue misit duos
viros exploratores versus terram et civitatem Iherico, ut perciperent
qualiter esset in illa terra tam de habundancia frugumquam eciam de
regibus et statu populan illius terre et sic de multis aliis, sicut Deus
predixerat et Moyses promiserat ex parte Dei. Qui duo ex precepto
Iosue recesseruntet secrete intraveruntIherico et sic immediate veneruntin domum cuiusdam meretricisnomine Raab, et quieverant apud
eam. Hoc facto nunciatum est regi Iherico quod duo de fillis Israel
secrete ingressi essent domum illius meretricis.Quo audito rex misit
ad hanc meretricem,ut educeretillos, quia exploratoresessent et venissent considerare terram. Raab vero audiens hoc abscondit istos duos
super sollarium sub magna copia stuppe, respondens pro eis et dixit
"Verum est, tales duo fuerunthic, sed exiverunt; persequamini eos
cito et bene comprehendetiseos". Ac illi cum magna velocitate exiverunt currentes per viam, que duceret ad Iordanem. Interim autem
venit Raab ad istos duos dicens qualiter contigeratet confirmavitquod
populus Israel esset sanctus, ut ipsa perceperat, et quod Deus ageret
cum eo et quod illa terra,scilicet Iherico et omnis illa regio,esset vera
hereditaspopuli Israel ex promissioneDei. Et ultra rogavit eos dicens
"Quando contingat vos et populum Israhel venire ad terram hanc et
suppeditare cunctos inimicos vestros, mementote mei parentum et
parentele mee, quia liberavi vos a morte. Nunc ergo recedite per hanc
fenestram et transendite istum murum" - quia domus sua stabat
iuxta murum- "et ascendatis directeilla montana et ibi requiescatis
per tres dies quousque bene fuerintreversi, qui querunt vos". Postquam ergo transierunttres dies, descenderuntisti duo a montanis per
Iordanem et venerunt ad Iosue narrantessibi omnia, [f. 35 r] que acciderant eis, et dixeruntultra "Vere Dominus Deus tradiditnobis illam
terram et omnes, qui habitant in ea, sunt perterriti". Hoc facto, ut
1 los. I, 2.
2 los. I, 4.
3 los. i, 5.
4 los. i, 7.
0 los. i, 17s.
149

23:21:33 PM

scribitur3 capitulo, Iosue surrexit de nocte et suscitavit populum

dicens rSanctificamini,eras enim faciet Dominus mirabilia inter vos"!.1
Surrexit autem Iosue et omnis populus et sicud ipse preceperat,precedebant sacerdotes et omnes alii sequebantur et Iordanis aperuit terra
arida recte sicud prius mare rubrum.Et sic transgressisunt Iordanem.
Postquam ergo transgressisunt, ut scribitur40 capitulo, sacerdotes
stabant in medio Iordanis donee omnia complerentur,que preceperat
Iosue. Et tunc ulterius ascenderunt campum terre Iherico. Postquam
ergo, ut scribitur5t0 capitulo, reges Amorreorumet alii perceperant
quod ita factum esset, ut populus Israel transivissetIordanem ex potencia divina, conturbati sunt et nomen illius campi vocatum est Galgalis. Et tunc primo populus Israel incepit commedere de fructibus
terresic quod amplius non commeditmanna. Cum autem Iosue staret
in medio campi et videret virum stantem in oppositum tenentemgidium evaginatimiin manu sua, festinanteraccessit eum dicens "An tu
noster es vel adversarius noster ?" Qui respondit TNequaquam adversarius, sed princeps sum exercitusDomini et nunc veniol2 Quo audito
cecidit Iosue super terramet adoravit eum dicens TQuid Dominus meus
loquitur ad servum suum ?"V dicens quia ille cum gladio Deus erat.
Dixit ergo Deus ad eum rSolve calciamenta tua, quia locus in quo stas
sanctus est"!.4Et fecitita Iosue. Tunc, sicud scribitur6t0capitulo, porte
civitatis Iherico clause fueruntita quod nullus intraretvel exiret pre
timore filiorumIsrael. Dixit ergo Dominus ad Iosue "Ecce dedi tibi
Iherico regem eius et omnes fortesviros. Nunc ergo debetis circuire
vos omnes bellatores armati civitatemhanc sex diebus omni die semel.
Septimo autem die precedentsacerdotes et omnis populus sequetur et
circuibitiscivitatem". Et feceruntsic per 6 dies. 7moautem die Iosue
et populus surrexeruntin diluculo et in circuitucivitatem obsidebant.
Et quando tempus fuerat,sacerdotes inceperuntbuccinare et in tubis
canere et totus populus clamare, et sic cum ilio strepita virtutedivina
muri civitatis ceciderunt et Iosue cum suis ex omni parte intravit et
interfecitomnes viros et mulieres, magnos et parvos, in civitate et
extra, sed precepit Iosue illis duobus, qui fueruntin domo meretricis
[f. 35v] Raab, quod intrarentillam domum et preservarenteam, ne sibi
quid mah contingeret.Et factum est ita, quia nullus remansit vivus
nec homo nec bestia in civitate ilia nisi meretrixRaab cum parentela
sua et rebus suis. Postea, ut patet in aliis capitulis, Iosue multa bella
habebat cum diversisprincipibus,antequam illam terramIherico quiete
poterat possidere, et interfecittot reges et milia hominum quod vix
4 los. 5, 16.
3 los. 5, 15.
2 los. 5, 14.
1 los. 3, 5.
ISO

23:21:33 PM

est numerus. Sed inter ceteros surrexitquidam rex nomine Balat, qui
congregavi exercitum,ut impugnaretfiliosIsrael. Quare vocavit quendam prophetam nomine balaan, quem misit versus populum Israel
ad explorandum et videndum quomodo staret ibi et ut prophetaret
quid novi, balaan autem recepit azinam et recessit. Qui dum venit ad
unam planam viam, stetit azina et noluit procedere, balaan autem
pungebat eam cum calcaribus et adhuc noluit procedereazina. Quare
pungebat eam ultra modum sic quod azina tandem erectocapite loquebatur ad ipsum ac si fuisset homo dicens "Quid pungis me? Ecce
angelus Domini tenet me, ut non progrediarultra".1 Hoc audito perterritusest balaan et reversusad Balat regem dixit sibi hec omnia et
quod male ageret, quia populus Domini esset nec posset resistereei.
Sed brevier Balat non curavit, sed frequenternitebatur impugnare
populum Israel sic quod ipse tandem et omnes sui postea interfecti
sunt. Verumptamenquesivit Balat rex una vice quomodo posset istum
populum superare. Respondit balaan propheta isto modo, ut mitteret
ibi pulchras mulieres, quas dum filii Israel cognoscerent,transgrederenturlegem Dei et sic Deus dimittereteos et ita superali possent. Et
factumest ita, quia misit Balat rex multas pulchras mulieres,quas filii
Israel cognoverunt et sic transgressifueruntlegem Dei. Sed postea
reformatisunt. Iste eciam balaan fuit ille qui prophetavit de stella,2
que apparuit in Epyphania, et ideo illa stella Balaamitica vocatur.
MoraliterBalat et omnes sui, qui ante et postea fueruntcontrapopulum Israel, sunt scolares mali et consulti vel layci mali, qui semper
sunt contra bonos et virtuososet eos impediunt quantum possunt.
Allegorice per ipsum intelligiturAntixpistus et sui sequaces. Sed
balaan et Iosue possunt esse Elyas et Enoch vel quod reprimetur
Antixpistus. Et de hoc prius satis dictum est.3 Vel aliter per istud
intelligimusalle [f. 3r] gorice quod Antixpistus per pulchra dona et
clenodia sua nitetur seducere populum sicud Balat filios Israel per
pulchras mlieres.
165

in cameris quod
illiusphilosophi
Sufficeret thalamis ut Iupiter Amphitrionis,

auxilium
Noctis opem

delectabilis duplicavit splendida

geminavit candida
placide

ab illa mulieve
Protinus Alcmena

quamvis
licet

invite
indignante

luna
Phebe;
sc. Iunone
noverca

1 Cf.Num.22, 28. 2 Cf.Num.24, 17. 3 Vide cod.,f. ior"v.

151

23:21:33 PM

Alchidem inter
genitus Hercules sc. ad interficiendum
ficit
serpentes
Editus Alchides immissos
strangulat angues.
Hie est alia Fabula8-: Luna duplicavit NOCTempropteramorem Io vis,
ut ipse uteretur uxore amphitrionis nomine alcmena. Quare uxor
Iovis, scilicet luno, iNDiGNAtaest eis sic quod alcmena peperit filium
nomine Areles, qui postea strangulavt duos serpentes.
erat quidam magnus philosophusstudensAthenis,
Nota AMPHITRION
nomine
habuit
uxorem
alcmena, quam iupiter summe dilexit sic
qui
quod cogitavit quomodo posset earn cognoscere. Modo amphitrion
maritus eius quandoque per longa tempora fuitabsens in studio Athenensi,quare iupiter vocavit tandem Mercuriumfiliumsuum disponens
se, ut ipse mutaret se in formam Iethe - bene Ietha erat famulus
amphitrionis - et quod Mercurius sic in forma Iethe tenderet ad
uxorem amphitrionis et diceretsibi qualiter amphitrion breviterventuras esset ab Athenis. Et factum est ita. Cum autem ipsa audivisset
ista verba, gavisa est valde sperans se videre maritumsuum. iupiter
vero mutavit se in formam amphitrionis et sic accessit earn. Ipsa
autem videns eum amplexa est eum letanter et statim feceruntconvivium. Quo facto perrexeruntad lectum. iupiter autem tantum delectabatur in ea quod rogavit lunam, ut ipsa retrocederetet duplicaret
NOCTem,ut eo diucius manere posset cum ea. Luna vero duplicavit
NOCTemet retrocessit. Et ipsa concepit a love. Dum autem aurora
venit, recessit iupiter non tamen ita secrete quin uxor sua luno perceperat. Quare ipsa INDiGNAtaest et cogitavit alcmenahi male tractare. Postquam autem appropinquaverat tempus pariendi, luno uxor
Iovis accessit earn supplicans sibi quatenus partum ALCMENeveliet
impedire.Ipsa vero ingressa est templm[f. 3V]et ponens se ad quendam angulum rogavit deos, ut partus ALCMENeimpediretur,quam diu
sederetin angulo. Et sic breviternon potuit b parere,quam diu sedebat
in angulo, alcmena habuit unam pedissequam nomine Galgandis, que
videns dominam suam in tantis doloribus stupefacta est cogitans quidnam posset obesse sibi. Quare ingressa est templm et videns deam
partuum in angulo sedere cogitavit quod hoc esset in preiudiciumet
impedimentumdomine sue. Quare clamavit alta voce "Benedirti sunt
dii, quoniam alcmena peperit pulcherrimumfilium et iuvenem, et
audiat hoc qui veli' Ipsa autem sedens in angulo audiens hec verba
a historiacod.; fabulacod.MnchenSB clm5243,f. iyyv'fabulamcod.Guelferb.
212 (183Heimst.),
f. i66r.
b potuicod.
*5*

23:21:33 PM

statim surrexitab oracionibus suis cogitans se nihil proficere.Et interimALCMENA

peperit et liberata est et vocabatur filiusquem genuit
Areles vel alchides. Quo nato ipsa dea partuum et luno cogitaverunt
per quern modum possent eum a tradere morti. Quare miseruntduos
ex utraserpentesad Arclem,ubi iacebat in cunis, ut eum interficerent
que parte. Areles autem extraxit manus suas et cum qualibet manu
cepit unum serpentem et interfeciteos, et sic Areles dicitur ab her,
quod est lis, et cieos, quod est gloria, quasi gloriosusin lite.1
Moraliteriupiter est doctor, qui seminat fructumsuum in uterum
uxoris AMPHiTRiONis,
i. in animam, quem luno et ipsa partuum dea, i.
et
invidia
aliorum,nitunturdestruere,sed non possunt,quamsuperbia
vis mittuntserpentes,i. malos alios, ad destruendumeum, quia duplici
manu Areles, i. talis doctor, resistit,scilicet manu virtutissciencie et
eciam corporali.
Allegoriceiupiter est Deus, qui descendit de celis et genuit filium
per nuncium Ietham, i. Gabrielem archangelum, qui nunciavit alcMENe,i. Marie, de adventu viri dicens rAve, gracia plena"!2 etcetera.
Et sic iupiter mutans se in AMPHiTRiONem,
i. assumens humanam
i.
accessit
uxorem
uxorem
naturam,
amphitrionis,
ipsius Ioseph, scilicet Mariam, et genuit filiumab ea, scilicet Xpistum Iesum. Quo nato
luno, i. Iudea, per cooperacionemdee partuum,i. secte dyabolice fraudis, studuit quomodo traderetmortifiliumistum,sed Areles,i. Xpistus
Iesus, virtutedivina conculcavit serpentestam hominesquam dyabolos
Missos ad eum, qui nitebantureum [f. 37*] temptare,et hoc resistendo
eis cum utraque manu, i. cum Veteri Testamento et eciam Novo.
169

vincenti
olim
Victrici populo ne quondam

potestas
Deficeret virtus
ad invocacionem
Imperio

illiusurbis
Gabaon

vivida bello
propter
ad

lites
prelia,

sol
Phebus

culmine
celi
Iosue stabat defixus in arce:

attendite
Que snete fidei sunt b premia, discite

xpistiani
cuncti.

1 Cf.R. Klinck,Die lateinische

desMittelalters
, MediumAevum,17,
Etymologie
Mnchen,
1970,p. 177,n. 41.
2 Luc. i, 28.
a ei cod.; eumcod.MnchenSB clm5243,f. ij8r.
* siNTOdoPicardus,f. 40r;sunt Osternacher,
io 2.
*53

23:21:33 PM

Hic ponitur alia Historia: Ad invocacionem iosue sol retrocessitet

ne virtus
dies prolongatusest, quando iosue pugnavit pro GABAONtis,
deficeret eis. Ergo vos omnes homines discite et attenditeque sunt
PREMIASANCTEFIDEI.
Nota, sicud scribiturIosue octavo capitulo, postquam populus Israel
habuit plurima bella, surrexitquidam rex civitatis Hay, que fuitcivitas magna et populosa, contra populum Israel ut removeretlegem.
Quare Deus descendit ad iosue dicens "Ne timeas, sed tollas tecum
multitudinemarmatorum,et cum surgas contra populum Hay, quia
tradidi tibi in manus tuas regem eius populum urbem et terram." De
nocte ergo surrexitiosue recipiens secum tria milia armatorumvirorum et pugnavit contra illos ita quod iosue cum illis interfecittotum
populum civitatis, urbem destruxitincendio et regem captivavit. Quo
capto suspendit eum in patbulo, de nocte autem fecit deponi corpus
et locan iuxta introitumopidi et superius reponi magnum acervum
lapidum, qui adhuc iacet ibi. Tunc, ut scribitur90 capitulo Iosue, hoc
a
percipientesGabaonite quod iosue et populus Israel sic destruxerant
quasi maiores civitates tocius mundi, videlicet Iherico et Hay, vnrant illi de civitate gabaon confugientesad iosue et humilimedeprecantes quod ipse veliet eos recipere, quia ipsi vellent vivere et mori
cum eo et esse servi sui et observare legem Moysi, quia bene percipissent quod illa lex esset SANCTa.Et tandem iosue recepii eos. Hoc facto
iosue et principes inieruntpactum cum eis et iuraveruntsibi FiDEm.
Sed tarnenhabuerunt unam malediccionem,istam videlicet quod ipsi
semper defalcarentligna colligerentet portarentin domum Dei, similiter et aquas portarent.[f. 37v] Tunc, ut scribitur10. capitulo, venit
fama ad regem Iherusalem quod iosue destruxeratHay sicud et Iherico et quod GABAONiteconfugissentad eum. Quare maxime timuit,
quia gabaon fuit maxima civitas et una regalium. Quare rex Iherusalem misit iam ad quinqu reges Amorreorum,videlicet ad Ocham
regem Ebron et ad Pharon regem Iermioth et ad labie regem Lachi
et ad Dabir regem Egron, et ipsemet erat quintus. Isti quinqu reges
cum maximo exercitu castrametatisunt et transiveruntusque ad civitatem gabaon et obsederuntearn.Hoc videntesilli de opido clauserunt
portas et festinantermiseruntad iosue, qui tunc morabaturin Gaigala,
deprecantes ipsum ut defendereieos, quia servi facti essent Dei Moysi
et sui, et dixeruntquomodo omnes reges Amorreorumvenissentcontra
eos. Hoc audiens iosue surrexitad arma et ascendit a Galgalis cum
magno exercitu. Quo surgentedixit Dominus ad eum HNe timeas eos,
Gaabonitecod.
154

23:21:33 PM

quia tradidi illos in manus tuas"1.1Et eadem nocte cepit pugnare cum
eis ita quod percussitinfinitosgladio et qui confugerant,illos percussit
Deus grandine, videlicet plures quam perierant gladio, ita quod tam
diu erant bella quod iosuE rogavit Deum quod sol veliet STAretam diu
quod ipse posset interficereinimicossuos. Et factum est ita quod numquam antea nec postea visa est tam longa dies, sicud tunc fuit. Hoc
facto venit nuncius ad iosue quod isti quinqu reges fugissentin quandam speluncam et latitarentibidem. Hoc audito precepit quod magni
lapides ponerenturante orificiumspelunce, ut ibidem custodirentur.
Et factum est ita. Interim iosue et sui quesiverunt inimicos et eos
interfecerunt.Quibus interfectisiosue fecitillam speluncam apeririet
illos quinqu reges educi. Quibus eductis vocavit populum Israel et
precipue principesexercitus precipienseis rite et ponite pedes vestros
super colla reguml2 Qui dum hoc facerent,dixit iosue rNolite timere,
confortaminiet estote robusti,sic enimfacietDominus cunctishostibus
vestris,contra quos dimicatisT3Hoc facto recepit illos quinqu reges
[f. 38r] et quemlibet suspendit in stipite per se. Et vespere facto facit
eos deponi et proici in speluncam, in quam fugerantet de qua fuerant
educti. Et fecitibi Claudi introitumcum saccis, et sic sta hodiernodie.
Postea vero, ut scribiturn et 120,pugnavit iosue contra muitos alios
reges, quos omnes devicit et interfecit.Quibus omnibus peractis, ut
scribiturin capitulis sequentibus, fecit recapitulacionem legis et doctrinepopulo Israel, quia senuit etate. Et postea, ut scribiturvicsimo
40 capitulo et ultimo, dum esset iosue centum annorum et decern,
migravit a sculo et sepultus est in monte Effraym. Et sicud patet
Iudicum primo capitulo, post mortem iosue consuluerunt filli Israel
Dominum quis ascenderei ante eos et esset dux eorum. Respondit
Dominus HAscenditludas, quia tradidi terram in manus eiusT4 Hoc
audito recepit ludas Symonem in consortem,ut essent pariterin regimine. Et postea multa peracta sunt, ut patet in historiis in libro
Iudicum.
Moraliterenim, sicud illi inimici Dei perierunt,sic periunt omni die
qui agunt contra legem Dei, videlicet contra ecclesiam et statum bonorum, quia tales frequentermala morte moriuntur.
Item allegorice civitas gabaon est anima nostra peccatrix, que recognoscens delieta sua recurritad iosue, id est ad Xpistum Iesum,
petens veniam. Quod videntes quinqu reges, i. quinqu sensus, laborant obsidere et destruere civitatem, i. animam. Anima vero videns
tales obsessiones,i. temptaciones,mittitad iosue, i. Xpistum, depre1 los. 10,8.
2 los. 10,24.
3 los. 10,25.
4 lud. i, 2.
155

23:21:33 PM

cans ut defendat earn. Quod videns iosue, i. Xpistus, festinatdefendere gab AON,i. animam, et invenit ibi quinqu reges, quinqu sensus,
quos omnes avertitet civitatemsuam defenditet rogatprolongacionem
diei, ut civitas bene purgeturab inimicis,i. quod anima bene purgetur
et dies prolongetur,i. spacium penitencie,ne postea quid surgat quod
1
posset obesse civitati,i. anime. Et ergo hortaturnos poeta in 40 metro
quod quilibet videat que et quanta Deus facit pro amicis suis et pro
FIDE SANCTA.
Sequitur textus alchide vigilem etcetera [f. 38v]:
173

illiusviri,sc. Herculis custodem

Alchide
vigilem

baculus
clava

destruxit
spolia vit

Adlantis
sc. iliumqui custodivit
pomerium
draconem,
illiustyranni
Gerionis

superbiam
pumpam

destruxit
et
rapit

sc. perignem
consumpserat

homines
serpentent
qui interfecit
ydram.
istefur
Cacus

litemperdidit
cessit ei, succumbit

custoditor
ianitor

ianueInferni
Orchi:

velAlchidem
Herculem
comburit
pervenenum
demum pelex Dyanira a superbum.
Incendit
In ista parte proponit Pseustis aliam Fabulam ^membrem, cuius
primmmembrumest quod alchides vel Arcules cum clava sua spoliavit draconem vigilem et custodem cuiusdam pomerii, 2m membrum est quod Arcules interfecitGERiONemqui fuit tricorpor,3m est
quod interfecitserpentem,4m est quod ipse interfecitlatronem qui
vocabatur cacus, 5tumest quod ipse interfecitiANiTORemInferniet
6tumest de morte Arculis.
2
3
Nota, sicud recitantpoete ut Claudianus Ovidius et quidam alii,
Arcules, ut visum est, semper crevit in vigore et quia Iupiter genuit
eum ab Alcmena, ergo luno uxor Iovis semper studuit in morteneius.
Quapropter Arcules recessit et venit ad partes Orientales, in quibus
percepit esse quendam regem nomine Atlas, qui tyrannuserat pessimus et sine misericordiaspoLiAns subditos. De qua spoLiAcionefece1 Versus172.

2 Carm.101: Laus Herculis. 3 Met.9, iiss. Heroid.9, ss.

a DEiANiRA
OdoPicardus,f. 42r Osternacher,
1902.
156

23:21:33 PM

rat pulcherrimumpomerium ex auro, cuius arbores et poma fuerunt

aurea. Quod pomeriumcustodivit quidam draco horribilissimus.Que
omnia considerans Arcules properavit illuc, ubi draco esset, et recipiens Clav Am interfecitdraconem. Quo interfectorecepit totum aurum de pomerio et distributpauperibus, a quibus Atlas spoliavit, et
ipsum Atlantem a regno fugavit. 2a poetria est quod ilio facto Arcules
venit ad partes orientales, ubi adhuc percepit pessimum tyrannum
nomine gerion, qui fuit tricorpor,i. habuit magnitudinemtrium corporum, et possedit tria regna. Iste gerion eciam sine misericordia
spoliavit subditos suos. Quare Arcules properavitilluc et illum interfecit. 3a poetria est quod Arcules postea venit in quandam terram,
ubi invenitserpentem,qui interfecitet devastavit [f. 39r] hominesillius
terre. Quem serpentem ob rogacionem hominum ipse interfecit.4a
poetria est quod Arcules postea veniens per campestriaet deserta duxit
secum boves. Quod percipiens quidam latro nomine cacus a laboravit,
ut furareturaliquos boves, et subtraxit duos quos duxit in antrum
suum. Arcules vero videns se perdidisseduos boves sequebatur vestigia
eorumsic quod tandem venit ad speluncam latroniset recipienslapides
proiecitin antrum.Quod percipienslatro exivit et evomuit ignem contra Arculem, sed non profuit sibi, quia Arcules interfeciteum. 5^
poetria est quod Arcules habuit quendam socium, qui mortuus est et
descendit ad Infernum.Quod percipiensArcules voluit extrahere animam sodi sui et veniens ad Imfernuminvenit iANiTORemInferni,qui
voluit resisteresibi. Sed breviter non profuit,quia Arcules interfecit
illum. 6ta poetria est quod Arcules habuit quandam amasiam pulcherrimam nomine dyanira, quam summe dilexit. Cum qua semel venit
ad quendam fluvium,ubi vocavit nautam ut veheret eos ad alteram
partem fluvii. Et veniens nauta dixit quod primo veheret Arculem et
tunc 2 transveheretDYANiRAm.Quod placuit Arculi. Postquam ergo
Arcules transvectus est, revertebaturnauta pro dyanira et veniens
iuxta eam voluit violenter coire cum ea. Quod videns Arcules recepit
telum intoxicatumet sagitavit nautam et interfeciteum. Nauta autem
videns se moriturumdedit DYANiRequandam camisiam intoxicatam
sic dicens "Recipias hanc camisiam et si Arcules velit te impostrum
dimittereet recedere ab amore tuo, mittas sibi hanc camisiam quod
induat eam, et rehabebis amorem suum". dyanira fecitistud et tenuit
camisiam iuxta se. Postea vero contigitquod Arcules amavit pulcherrimam nomine Iolen filiam regis. Quod videns dyanira misit Arculi
hanc camisiam. Qua indutus statim combustus est et mortuus.
a CAPUS
cod.
157

23:21:33 PM

Nota moraliterper Arculem intelligiturquilbet bonus scolaris, per

pomeriumaureum intelligitursciencia, per draconem intelligiturruditas. Unde Arcules, i. bonus scolaris, si velit habere tale pomeriumaureum,i. scienciam,oporteteum maxime laborare et interficeredraconem per labores,i. ruditatemsuam, autoritateBoecii Diligencia cuiuslibet opens optusitas permoliturT1Item metrista[f. 39v]TGutta cavat
lapidem non vi, sed sepe cadendo. /Sic addiscit homo non vi, sed sepe
studendo"!.2Et tunc bonus scolaris ad modum Arculis fugat tyrannum
et omne nocivum intellectussui, et sic tandem Arcules,i. scolaris,ista
sciencia habita distribuitpoma et pomerium,i. fructussciencie, pauperibus, i. non habentibus scienciam. Et tunc ulteriusArcules, i. talis
scolaris, viriliterse habet,et interficitserpentemet alios supradictos
et tenet victoriam in omnibus. Sed tandem per feminamdecipitur et
propter ipsam gustat mortemhic vel alibi. Unde nAdam Sampsonem
Loth David et Salomonem /iemina decepit. Quis modo tutus erit?"l3
Allegoriceper ArculemintelligiturXpistus qui draconem, i. serpentem tortuosum,scilicet dyabolum, interfecit,qui custodivitpomerium
aureum, i. regnum paradysi, quod Arcules, i. Xpistus, nobis aperuit,
cuius poma distribuitpauperibus, i. hominibusprius eis spoliatis. Hic
eciam Arcules, i. Xpistus, postea fugavit et interfecitomnes inimicos,
i. multas creaturasmale condicionis,scilicettam dyabolos quam eciam
homines. Sed tandem iste Arcules,i. Xpistus, per tradicionemDYANiRe
mulieris,i. Iudee, induit camisiam, i. vestem purpuream,et mortuus
est, quia amavit Iolen filiam regis, i. animam cuiuslibet regentis se.
Utrecht
Institut voorLaat Latijn

Continuabitur

1 Ps.-BoethiusDe disciplinaschol.,De ordineprocedendi

(ed. E. Ducei, p. 87).
2 Cf. H. Walther,Proverbia,il, 10500; J. Werner,Lateinische
Sprichwrter,
p. 56, 36; Ov. Pont.4, 10,5.
3 Cf.H. Walther,Proverbia,
I, 519.

158

23:21:33 PM

Vivarium
XV, 2 (1977)
Book Review

de consequentiis.
ditioncritique.
HubertHubien,lohannisBuridaniTractatus
Srie: Philosophesmdivaux,t. XVI, Louvain/Paris,
(pp. 138) 1976 (300
FB).
Muchworkis stillto be done in the fieldof medievallogic.In particular,
ofpaleography
criticaleditionsoftextsshouldbe prepared,
forwhichknowledge
and forthis
and codicology
is required.Thesetextsshouldbe studiedcarefully,
betweenmodern
ofmodernlogicis desirable: theinterchange
studyknowledge
and medievallogiccan put thelatterin therightperspective.
Prof.Hubien (Lige)has nowprovidedus witha criticaleditionof an imto thisedition,he discusses
portantmedievaltracton logic.In theintroduction
ofthetractonconsequences
withreference
to modern
;
briefly,
logic,thecontents
but thisis notthemainobjectofIiis book.
His excellenteditionof Buridan'stracton consequencesmeetsthe needof
studentsof medievallogic. Buridanwas an importantand influential
fourteenthcenturylogician.His workswerewidelyknown,especiallyin France,
hispupils,Marsilius
ofInghen
Through
ItalyandtheGermanspeakingcountries.
in MiddleEurope.The Tractatus
and Albertof Saxony,he also was influential
de consequentiis
Hubienconvincingly
itself(composed,as Professor
argues,in
becauseit is a firstspecimenofan axiomatic-deductive
I335) is veryimportant,
oflogic(on thebasisofpropositional
Hubien
calculus),as Professor
exposition
is ofa widerrangethanWalterBurley's,
it.1The deductivetreatment
expresses
eventhoughone shouldnot neglectthe latter.2Buridan'stract,on the other
inferences
betweenmodal
hand,whichincludesa generaltheoryofconsequences,
non-modalcategoricalsyllogisms,
and modal syllogisms,
is perpropositions,
meatedthoroughly
bythisdeductivetreatment.
Suppositiones
(thepredecessors
ofouraxioms)andconclusiones
are foundthroughout
thewholetract.
(theorems)
In a paperpublishedelsewhere,
Professor
Hubienhas broughtforward
anotherinteresting
pointabout Buridan'stracton consequences:usingthe apparatusofmodernlogic,he showsthatBuridanwas thefirstEuropeanlogician
to recognisethe existenceof the fourthfigureof the syllogism.3
He corrects
Professor
Resher'sclaimsofthistitleforPeterTartaret.4
1 p- 142 De PuritateArtisLogicaeTractatusLongior
, edited by Ph. Boehner,New
York-Lou
vain-Paderborn,
1955,TractII, ch. 1. See also Ph. Boehner,Medieval
Logic,Chicago,1952,p. 89.
3 JohnBuridanonthefourth
de
in: Revueinternationale
figureofthesyllogism,
113 (1975),pp. 271-285.This volumeis dedicatedto the centenphilosophie,
nial ofthe birthofMartinGrabmann.It containscontributions
by J. Jolivet,
D. P. Henry,H. Hubien,J.Pinborgand L. M. de Rijk. The editorwas F. van
Steenberghen.
159

23:21:42 PM

in JohnBuridan'slogicis attestedto by a symposium

interest
The increasing
in 1975.At thissymposium
researchon
on thissubjectheld in Copenhagen,
Buridan'slogicwas stimulatedand coordinated.It is probablethat critical
editionsof all the logicalwritingsof Buridanwillbe availablewithina few
years.5
Hubienuses one ofthethreeincunabula(Parisius,
For hisedition,Professor
hithertoknown.The two otherinabout 1493) and the threemanuscripts
one (Lige,
cunabulaseem to dependon the one used. Of the manuscripts,
in the scholarlyworld
universitaire,
114C) had been forgotten
Bibliothque
ofmanuscripts
ofthe
deniedanyknowledge
(e.g. Farai and Boehnerexplicitly
in the catalogueof the Lige Litractin question),thoughit was mentioned
et de
d'histoire
braryand in an articleof Dom H. Bascourin theDictionnaire
of 1938 (s.v. Buridan); the twoothercodices(viz. Vat.
ecclsiastique
gographie
in thehandwritten
described
lat.3020and Pal. lat.994) had notbeenproperly
one that
of thesemanuscripts,
catalogues.We stillawait a good description
and codicological
to variouspaleographical
also pays attention
aspects(ProfessorHubiencouldinspecttheVaticancodicesonlyby microfilm).
we findonlytherelevantalternative
In theapparatuscriticus
readings.The
individualreadingshave been omitted,becausetheirnumberwouldunnecessarilyburdenthe apparatus,withthe exceptionof thosereadings,of course,
Thiswas inevitable,
thatareofsomeinterest.
but,ofcourse,it is alwayspossible
ofa readingthathasappearedirrelethatfurther
studywillshowtheimportance
vantat first.
Concludingthis reviewthreeremarksshouldbe made. First,I regretthe
absenceof an indexofnamesetc. This wouldhave givena betterentryto the
Hubien does not treatthe information
text. Secondly,Professor
suppliedby
on f.2ra of the
in physicam,
the tabulawhichprecedesBuridan'sQuaestiones
Iohannis
libriprimiPhysicorum
MS Lige,114 C : *Tabulaquaestionum
magisti
.
ParisiusannodominiMIII 66 pronuntiatarum'
Buridanin uicostraminum
to concludeto a later
it wouldseemattractive
On thebasisofthisinformation,
terminus
postquernofBuridan'sdeaththantheoneusuallyaccepted(viz.1358).
to be foundin MS Florence,
it is evidentthatthetracton consequences
Thirdly,
to JohnBuriBiblioteca
nazionale,Magi. cl. V, 43 (ff.35r- 38*)and attributed
as editedin Hubien'sbook; it was almost
dan,is notthetracton consequences
certainlynot composedby Buridan.But as Mrs GraziellaFedericiVescovini
it remainsto be shownwhythismistakewas made in the
rightlyremarked,
and also whowas in facttheauthorofthistract
titleas wellas in theexplicit,
on consequences.8
E. P. Bos

4 N. Resher,Galenand thesyllogism,
1966.
Pittsburgh,
5 TheLogicofJohnBuridan.Actsofthe3rdEuropeanSymposium
on Medieval
ed.
November
16.-21.
and
Pinborg,
by
Jan
1975,
Semantics,
Copenhagen
Logic
Copenhagen1976.
8 Ibid.,p. 23.
160

23:21:42 PM