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Global Crime
Vol. 6, No. 1, February 2004, pp. 1931

Italian Organised Crime: Mafia

Associations and Criminal Enterprises
Letizia Paoli

The paper reviews the different forms of organised crime in Italy. To begin with, it focuses
on the Sicilian Cosa Nostra and the Calabrian Ndrangheta, Italys two largest and most
powerful mafia associations. With their centuries-old histories, articulated structures,
sophisticated ritual and symbolic apparatuses and claim to exercise a political
dominion, these associations have few parallels in the world of organised crime. In its
second section, the paper reviews other groups and networks that arewith varying
degrees of justificationalso routinely described as organised crime: these range from the
Neapolitan Camorra to Apulian organised crime and the so-called new foreign mafie
and other criminal entrepreneurs. Whereas the new Italian and foreign players are likely
to expand their activities on Italys illegal markets, the future of Cosa Nostra and the
Ndrangheta is more uncertain and largely depends on the decisions made by the public
administrations.
Keywords: Organised Crime; Italy; Mafia; Cosa Nostra; Ndrangheta; Camorra

For almost a century the Italian mafia has been regardedin the United States and
elsewhereas the prototype of organised crime. In Italy itself, however, the
identification between mafia and organised crime was frequently questioned and even
denied right up until the mid-1980s. For the social scientists carrying out the first field
studies in Sicily between the 1960s and the early 1980s, for example, the mafia was
simply a form of behaviour and power. That is, they asserted, there were mafiosi, single
individuals, who embodied determined sub-cultural values and exercised specific
functions within their communities, but no mafia organisation existed as such [1]. As
late as 1983, Pino Arlacchis successful book, La mafia imprenditrice (Mafia Business),
opened with the following statement: Social research into the question of the mafia
has probably now reached the point where we can say that the mafia, as the term is
commonly understood, does not exist [2].
ISSN 1744-0572 (print)/ISSN 1744-0580 (online) q 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/1744057042000297954

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Contrary to what most scholars maintained up to the mid-1980s, judicial inquiries

carried out since then have proved that formalised mafia groups do exist. Cosa Nostra
in Sicily and the Ndrangheta in Calabria are the largest and most stable coalitions and
are each composed of about a hundred mafia groups or families, as they are called by
their members. These are estimated at about three thousand and five thousand males
respectively [3].
The first section of this chapter analyses the two above-mentioned mafia consortia,
focusing on their internal organisation and culture and singling out their peculiarities
vis-a`-vis other forms of organised crime. The second section reviews other groups and
networks that arewith varying degrees of justificationalso routinely described as
organised crime. Some final remarks about the future trends of Italian organised
crime(s) will follow.

The Organised Crime Core: The Sicilian Cosa Nostra

and the Calabrian Ndrangheta
At the turn of the twenty-first century, there are more than five hundred witnesses who
can confirm the existence of either the Cosa Nostra or the Ndrangheta, because they
themselves were members. Though it is not possible to establish clear lines of
continuity, recent historical research has demonstrated that antecedents of the
contemporary mafia associations existed in the 1880s, if not before. The discovery of
new documents in archives and a more objective analysis of the already known papers
have demonstrated the presence of mafia groups in Sicily and Calabria since the midnineteenth century. As the historian Paolo Pezzino puts it, if it is true that these
sources have to be examined with great prudence, it is also true that the statements on
the existence of well structured associations are so many, and finding confirmation in
several judicial proceedings, that it would be difficult to deny their reliability [4].

Secret Brotherhoods
Cosa Nostra and the Ndrangheta possess the distinguishing trait of organisations:
independent government bodies that regulate the internal life of each associated family
and that are clearly different from the authority structure of their members biological
families. Starting from the 1950s, moreover, superordinate bodies of co-ordination
were set upfirst in the Cosa Nostra, then in the Ndrangheta as well. Composed of
the most important family chiefs, they are known as commissions [5]. Although the
powers of these collegial bodies are rather limited, the unity of the two confederations
cannot be doubted. In fact, it is guaranteed by the sharing of common cultural codes
and a single organisational formula. According to a model very frequent in premodern societies, in fact, the Cosa Nostra and the Ndrangheta are segmentary
societies [6]: that is, they depend on what Emile Durkheim called mechanical
solidarity [7], which derives from the replication of corporate and cultural forms.

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Neither the Cosa Nostra nor the Ndrangheta can be compared to Max Webers ideal
type of legal-rational bureaucracy, as was suggested by Donald Cressey in the late
1960s with reference to the American La Cosa Nostra [8]. Far from recruiting their
staff and organising the latters work according to the criteria and procedures of
modern bureaucracies, mafia groups impose a veritable status contract on their
members [9]. With the ritual initiation into a mafia cosca (group), the novice is
required to assume a new identity permanentlyto become a man of honourand
to subordinate all his previous allegiances to the mafia membership. If necessary, he
must be ready to sacrifice even his life for the mafia family.
The men of honour in Sicily and Calabria are obliged to keep secret the
composition, the action, and the strategies of their mafia group. In Cosa Nostra, in
particular, the duty of silence is absolute. Secrecy constitutes, above all, a defence
strategy. Since the unification of Italy in 1861, mafia groups have been at least formally
criminalised by the state and, in order to protect themselves from arrest and criminal
prosecution for their continuing recourse to violence, they have needed to resort to
various degrees of secrecy.
The ceremony of affiliation additionally creates ritual ties of brotherhood among
the members of a mafia family: the status contract is simultaneously an act of
fraternisation [10]. The new recruits become brothers to all members and share what
anthropologists call a regime of generalised reciprocity [11]: this presupposes altruistic
behaviour without expecting any short-term reward. As F. Lestingi, chief prosecutor
for the king, pointed out in 1884, mafia groups constitute brotherhoods whose
essential character lies in mutual aid without limits and without measure, and even
in crimes. [12] Only thanks to the trust and solidarity created by fraternisation
contracts does it become possible to achieve specific goals and thus satisfy the
instrumental needs of the single members.
As secret brotherhoods using violence, Southern Italian mafia associations have
remarkable similarities to associations such as the Chinese Triads and the Japanese
Yakuza [13]. With their centuries-old histories, articulated structures, and
sophisticated ritual and symbolic apparatuses, all these associationsand the
American descendant of the Sicilian Cosa Nostra [14]have few parallels in the world
of organised crime. None of the other groups that systematically traffic in illegal
commodities have the same degree of complexity and longevity [15].
The Will to Power
Cosa Nostra and the Ndrangheta share another important peculiarity with the
Chinese Triads and the Japanese Yakuza. Unlike other contemporary organised crime
groups, they do not content themselves with producing and selling illegal goods and
services. Though these activities have acquired an increasing relevance over the past 30
years, neither the trade in illegal commodities nor the maximisation of profits has ever
been the primary goal of these associations. As a matter of fact, it is hardly possible to
single out an encompassing function or goal that characterises the mafia

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L. Paoli

phenomenon, as has been suggested by the supporters of the economistic paradigm

[16], and more recently by Diego Gambetta [17], according to whom the mafia is an
industry of private protection. Southern Italian mafia coalitions are multifunctional
organisations. In the past hundred years, their members have exploited the strength of
mafia bonds to pursue various endeavours and to accomplish the most disparate tasks.
As early as 1876 the Tuscan aristocrat Leopoldo Franchetti pointed out the
extraordinary elasticity of the associations of malfattori (evildoers): the goals
multiply, the field of action widens, without the need to multiply the statutes; the
association divides for certain goals, remains united for others [18].
Within this wide range of functions, there is one that usually has been neglected by
late-twentieth-century observers: the exercise of a political dominion. The ruling
bodies of Cosa Nostra and the Ndrangheta claim, above all, an absolute power over
their members. They control every aspect of their members lives, and they aim to
exercise a similar power over the communities where their members reside. For a long
time, their power had a higher degree of effectiveness and legitimacy than that
exercised by the state. In Western Sicily and in Southern Calabria mafia associations
successfully policed the general population, settling conflicts, recovering stolen goods,
and enforcing property rights. Even today, although most mafia rules are no longer
systematically enforced, mafia families exercise a certain sovereignty through a
generalised system of extortion. As a state would do, they tax the main productive
activities carried out within their territory, which usually corresponds to a village or
town, or to a neighbourhood in larger cities. Cosa Nostra and Ndrangheta members
have not only enjoyed high-level political connections up to the present, but the Italian
state and the mafia long shared power in considerable parts of Sicily and Calabria and
the power of mafia groups was accepted and even legalised by government
representatives [19].
In the second half of the twentieth century, Southern Italys mafia associations
participated in at least three plots organised by right-wing terrorist groups; since the
late 1970s Cosa Nostra has assassinated dozens of policemen, magistrates, and
politicians. The mafia challenge to state power reached a climax in the early 1990s. In
1992, Cosa Nostra murdered the Palermitan Judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo
Borsellino in two spectacular bomb explosions. In 1993, in an effort to demonstrate
the national power of the mafia, a series of bombings occurredfor the first time out
of traditional mafia strongholdsin Rome, Florence, and Milan [20].
Despite their power, mafia fraternities have not been able to guarantee themselves a
monopoly in any sector of the illegal economy outside of Southern Italy. In the early
1980s, Cosa Nostra families played a pivotal role in the transcontinental heroin trade
from Asia to the United States via Sicily. But in the second half of that decade, the Cosa
Nostra lost this position after being targeted by law-enforcement investigations and
replaced in the US market by a plethora of Mexican, Chinese, and, more recently,
Colombian heroin suppliers [21].
Despite the growing relevance of economic activities, the mafia has not become a
set of criminal enterprises. [22] Its history as well as its cultural and normative

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apparatus prevent this transformation and today constitute a constraint as much as a

resource. By building a strong collective identity, shared cultural codes and norms
enhance group cohesion and create trustful relationships among mafia members. The
reliance on status and fraternisation contracts, which are non-specific and long-term,
produces a high degree of flexibility and makes the multifunctionality of mafia groups
possible. The same shared cultural codes and norms also represent, however, a
powerful brake on entrepreneurial initiative. The prohibition on exploiting
prostitution, for example, which exists in both confederations [23], has blocked the
entrance of the Sicilian and Calabrian cosche into what has become a most profitable
illicit trade: the smuggling of humans and the exploitation of migrants in the sex
industry or the informal economy.
Especially constraining is one of the preconditions for recruitment: only men born
either in Sicily or in Calabria or descended from mafia families can be admitted as
members. This rule has long prevented Cosa Nostra and Ndrangheta families from
adding new members with the experience necessary to compete in the black markets
for arms, money and gold. Rigid recruitment criteria have also hampered the
Q1 geographical expansion of mafia power. Cosa Nostra, for example, prohibits settling
families outside of Sicily. This self-imposed rule, which aims to strengthen the
cohesion of the mafia consortium, has limited its involvement in the international
narcotics tradecurrently the largest of the illegal markets. Ndrangheta families,
thanks to their extensive branches in Northern Italy and abroad, played a larger role in
narcotics trafficking in the 1990s, importing large quantities of cocaine and hashish
from Latin America and North Africa; today, however, the Ndrangheta faces new
competition from foreign and Italian traffickers with more direct connections to drugproducing and transit countries.
The will to power of the mafia associations also negatively affects security and
business decisions, as a Palermitan prosecutor pointed out in 1992:
The true goal is power. The obscure evil of organisation chiefs is not the thirst for
money, but the thirst for power. The most important fugitives could enjoy a
luxurious life abroad until the end of their days. Instead they remain in Palermo,
hunted, in danger of being caught or being killed by internal dissidents, in order to
prevent the loss of their territorial control and not run the risk of being deposed.
Marino Mannoia [a former mafia member now co-operating with law-enforcement
authorities] once told me: Many believe that you enter into Cosa Nostra for money.
This is only part of the truth. Do you know why I entered Cosa Nostra? Because
before in Palermo I was Mr. Nobody. Afterwards, wherever I went, heads lowered.
And to me this is priceless [24]

As a result, ever since the early 1990s Cosa Nostra and Ndrangheta families have
extracted a growing percentage of their income from entrepreneurial activities that
depend on the exercise of regional political domination. They practise systematic
extortion in their communities and, thanks to intimidation and collusion with corrupt
politicians, they have struggled to control the market for public works [25].

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Unlike other Western forms of organised crime, the meaning (and danger) of
Sicilian and Calabrian mafia associations cannot be limited to their involvement in
illegal markets. Their peculiarity lies in their will to exercise political power and their
interest in exercising sovereign control over the people in their communities.
Other forms of Organised Crime in Italy
In addition to the Sicilian Cosa Nostra and the Calabrian Ndrangheta, two other
clusters of crime groups are usually referred to as organised crime in Italy: 1) the
galaxy of mafia-like and gangster-like groupings in Campania, collectively known as
Camorra and 2) the multiplicity of criminal groups, gangs and white-collar criminal
networks operating in Apulia.
The Camorra
The Camorra consists in a variety of independent criminal groups and gangs. Some of
them are well-established family businesses that, as much as Sicilian and Calabrian
mafia groups, claim to exercise a political dominion over their neighbourhoods and
villages and systematically infiltrate local government institutions, at some point
enjoying the protection of high-level national politicians as well. Other Camorra
groups are less lasting formations that have developed around a charismatic chief,
usually a successful gangster. Finally, there are also loose gangs of juvenile and/or adult
offenders, whichaccording to police sourcesrather belong to the sphere of
common crime than to that of organised crime [26].
To strengthen their legitimacy and cohesion, many of the above groups frequently
resort to the symbols and rituals of the nineteenth-century Camorra. This was an
organisation sharing several cultural and organisational similarities with its Sicilian
and Calabrian counterparts, though it distinguished itself by its concentration in the
city of Naples and its plebeian background. Unlike Cosa Nostra and the Ndrangheta,
however, the contemporary Campanian underworld does not directly derive from its
nineteenth-century forerunner. As Isaia Sales puts it, if Camorra means a criminal
organisation that ruled over Naples popular and plebeian strata, we can safely say that
it started and ended in the nineteenth century [27].
The Camorra was born again in the 1960s, thanks to the expansion of smuggling in
tobacco and later, in drugs. In the 1980s, several Camorra groups and short-lasting
coalitions of groups (above all, the Nuova Camorra Organizzata and the Nuova
Famiglia) then gained great wealth and power with the appropriation of the public
money flows invested in Campania after the earthquake of 1980 [28]. Despite their
extensive infiltration of the legitimate economy and the public administration,
however, contemporary Camorra groups have not succeeded in establishing stable
co-ordination mechanisms such as those of the nineteenth-century Camorra or of the
Sicilian and Calabrian mafia associations. As a result, Campania has had the highest
rate of murders and violent crime in all of Italy for more than a decade.

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The heterogeneity and anarchy of the Campanian underworld are also proved by
the great variety of entrepreneurial activities the local crime groups are involved in.
The most powerful Camorra clans are still able to condition the local legitimate
economy, despite the devastating investigations conducted by law enforcement
agencies in the 1990s. The smaller groups and gangs engage in all sorts of illegal
activitiesfrom extortion to fraud, from drug trafficking and dealing to
loansharking, from counterfeiting to the exploitation of prostitutionand are
ready to resort to violence whenever they see their turf and activities being
threatened [29].
So-called Apulian Organised Crime and other Groups
The development of Apulian organised crime goes back to the 1970s, when the region
became Italys major import point for smuggled cigarettes and was colonised by
neighbouring mafia and Camorra groups. In the following years, indigenous crime
groups and gangs sprang up in different parts of Apulia. The most successful of these
collective actors was long the Sacra Corona Unita (United Holy Crown), a
consortium of about ten to fifteen criminal groups and gangs from Southern Apulia,
which was founded in 1983 [30]. Contrary to the accounts of the media, the Sacra
Corona Unita never controlled the whole of Apulian organised crime; despite its
imitation of the Ndranghetas structure and rituals, its cohesion and stability have
always been much lower. Today, after the defection of some of its leaders and the arrest
of most of its members, the Sacra Corona Unita no longer exists as a single viable
organisation [31].
Notwithstanding the decline of the Sacra Corona Unita, illegal business activities
go on. Up to few years ago tobacco smuggling was the main source of revenue for
most Apulian criminal enterprises. Since the early 1990s these have diversified their
investments, exploiting their strategic geographical position to smuggle drugs and
migrants from the close Balkan countries. In the last few years, as the improved cooperation of Italian and Albanian police forces resulted in an intensified repression
of tobacco smuggling, Apulian crime groups have also started to engage in
extortion, usury, robberies and counterfeiting, to compensate for their loss of
revenues.
The members of Italys four major domestic crime clusters are the privileged
addressees of charges pursuant to Article 416bis of the Italian penal code, that defines
the offence of membership in a mafia-type delinquent association (associazione a
delinquere di stampo mafioso) and represents the most stringent legal translation of the
concept of organised crime in the Italian legal system [32].
A few other criminal coalitions and gangs located in Eastern and Southern Sicily
and in Northern Calabria, such as the Stidda in the Agrigento and Caltanissetta
provinces or the Laudani, Cursoti and Pillera-Cappello in Catania, are also
occasionally referred to as organised crime or mafia. Their internal cohesion and
political and economic resources are much lower than those of Cosa Nostra or

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Ndrangheta families, though Sicilian groups have from time to time been able to
threaten the supremacy of the local Cosa Nostra families due to their larger number of
members and their readiness to use violence [33].
The New Foreign Mafie and Inconspicuous Players
The expressions organised crime and mafie are also increasingly used to refer to
foreign criminals operating in Italy. For example, the last bi-annual reports on the
activities of the Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, a police body specialising in the
fight against organised crime, all contain a chapter devoted to criminalita` organizzate
straniere (foreign organised criminalities) [34].
As a matter of fact, Italy has over the past 20 years undergone a process of
internationalisation and ethnicisation of its illegal markets. This trend, which started
in other Western European countries in the 1950s, took place very rapidly in Italy from
the mid-1980s on, when Italy, too, became the destination of considerable migration
flows. All over Europe, the internationalisation of illegal markets was strongly
accelerated in the 1990s by the European integration process and the abolition of
border controls as well as by the radical transformations that occurred in what was
once called the Second World: the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Paradoxically, in Italy the internationalisation of illegal markets was also favoured by
the successes of the law enforcement forces, that in the 1990s dismantled the most
consolidated branches of mafia groups in the Centre and North of Italy. The empty
spaces, once controlled by the powerful clans of the Calabrian Ndrangheta and the
Sicilian mafia, are today occupied by various groups and gangs of different ethnic
origin and make-up [35].
As a result, today in Milan as in Rome, Frankfurt, London or Amsterdam, illicit
goods and services are offered and exchanged by a multiethnic variety of people. Next
to mafiosi and local criminals, one finds illicit entrepreneurs coming from all parts of
the world. A few of these ethnic criminalsin particular the Chinese onestend to
exercise a sort of political power within their own communities [36]much like the
Sicilian and Calabrian mafiosi in their strongholds. However, most of the foreign
criminal groups and actors active in Italy cannot claim to exercise a political authority.
They merely content themselves with making fast money by trading in illicit
commodities and/or reinvesting dirty money from their home countries in the
European Union and, specifically, in Italy.
Their internal composition is also much different from that of Southern Italian
mafia families. Foreign crime groups and gangs active in Italy hardly have the longevity
and organisational complexity of Southern Italian mafia associations. Some of them
are family businesses or organisations cemented by profit-making or by shared
revolutionary or ideological goals; many more are loose gangs, founded on ties of
friendship and locality. These are usually small, ephemeral enterprises that can be most
correctly described as crews: loose associations of people, which form, split, and come
together again as opportunity arises. In crews, positions and tasks are usually

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interchangeable and exclusivity is not required: indeed, many crew members

frequently have overlapping roles in other criminal enterprises [37].
Illegal market groups and crews are by no means composed exclusively of foreigners.
At all levels of Italys illegal markets we also find people belonging to the mainstream
population with no previous underworld connections. It is enough to say that two of
the largest cocaine importers in the late 1990s were neither mafia members nor
foreigners, but Italians who merely belonged to the sphere of white-collar crime. The
first was a Milanese, who invested money earned from loansharking in the drug
business and was able to import 600 800 kilograms of cocaine directly from
Colombia each time. The second was a former bank manager from Naples, who was
responsible for several 400 700-kilogram cocaine shippings. Both of them supplied a
plurality of wholesale traffickers, including members of Southern Italian mafia groups,
who resided in several parts of the country [38].
As such, the new illegal market players fit better into the entrepreneurial
definitions of organised crime that are en vogue in Northern and Central Europe than
into the mafia-centered understanding of organised crime that is widespread in Italy
[39]. Despite the lack of empirical proof, however, foreign illicit entrepreneurs are all
too frequently labelled as mafia and are believed to be organised in the same way as
Cosa Nostra and the Ndrangheta. Sooner or laterin Italy and elsewherewe will
have to discuss seriously these assumptions and the opportunity of employing the
instruments developed in anti-mafia campaigns in the fight against this other form of
organised crime, whichif we take the Italian understanding of the concept as a
parameteris not as organised as it is very often made out to be.

Future Trends
Whereas the new Italian and foreign players are likely to expand their activities on
Italys illegal markets, the future of the Sicilian Cosa Nostra and the Calabrian
Ndrangheta is more uncertain.
Far from expanding outwards, Cosa Nostra groups and, to a lesser extent, even
those of the Ndrangheta have in the last fifteen years receded into their territories,
avoiding international competition. Today they obtain a growing and preponderant
quota of their revenues by manipulating the tendering process of public works and
imposing generalised extortive regimes on all the economic enterprises of their areas.
Instead of creating stable enterprise syndicates [40] capable of operating on
international illegal markets, both Sicilian and Calabrian mafia families tend to fuse
entrepreneurial action with the action typical of power syndicates and thus to
concentrate on those profit-making activities that are more directly advantaged by the
control of a territory and collusion with politicians and government officials. Though
the relationship with the latter has lost its rooting in a common weltanschauung and is
accepted by shrinking portions of public opinion, Cosa Nostra and Ndrangheta cosche
have become even more dependent on the decisions made by public, local and central

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administrations. These administrators are thus today largely arbiters of both the
judicial and the economic-financial lots of mafia coalitions.
It is, above all, to condition the outcome of the pending trials, to amend heavy firstdegree sentences in appeal trials and to improve the detention conditions of their
imprisoned members that the Cosa Nostra and Ndrangheta families need politicians
and public officials to comply with them. The manipulation of state decision-making
processes, however, does not merely have judicial goals, as mafia families count on
their ramifications in the state administration to improve their financial lot as well.
All Sicilian and Calabrian mafia families place their hopes for economic recovery in
the gaining of public contracts, which have just started to be distributed once more,
especially in the South, after the sharp drop following the Tangentopoli (Bribesville,
initially an allusion to Milan) inquiries [41]. Between 2000 and 2006, Sicily and
Calabria will respectively dispose of e9,000,000,000 and e5,000,000,000 coming from
the EU funds of Agenda 2000. Apparently, the cosche intend to acquiredirectly and
through front-mena substantial portion of these funds and of the sums that are
being distributed by the central government and the local administrations. Unaware of
being wiretapped, a Sicilian man of honour recently stated: They say we should not
make any fuss, they recommend that we all avoid making noise and attracting
attention, because we have to get all this Agenda 2000. . . [42]
What is at stake was clearly singled out in the report on the DIAs activities in the
second half of 2000: if Cosa Nostra relies on dragging the public funds foreseen for
large-scale construction works in order to recover definitively, preventing it from
implementing this project could plunge it into one of the most serious crises it has ever
known [43]. Unfortunately, this awareness does seem to shared by the cabinet headed
by Silvio Berlusconi, set up in June 2001. As the Minister for Public Work,
Pietro Lunardi, officially stated a few months afterwards, while talking about the huge
public investments foreseen for the construction of a bridge over the Messina straits,
in Southern Italy there is the mafia and we need to come to terms with it [44].
Incompetence or mafia collusion? It is hard to say. There can be no doubt, however,
about the following point: even more than in the past, mafia associations survival now
seems to depend on how their relationships with politics and different sectors of the
public administration are set up in the future.
If mafia groups do not receive the political support they desperately need, in the
middle-term Italy might end up having the same type of organised crime that is
widespread in the rest of Europe: namely, a myriad of criminal enterprises selling
prohibited commodities with no ambitions to exercise a political power of any sort.

Notes
[1] See Hess, Mafia and Mafiosi: the Structure of Power; Blok, The Mafia of a Sicilian Village,
1860 1960: a Study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs; Schneider, Culture and Political Economy
in Western Sicily.

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[2] Arlacchi, Mafia Business: the Mafia Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. See also Catanzaro, Men of
Respect. A Social History of the Sicilian Mafia.
[3] Paoli, Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime, Italian Style.
[4] Pezzino, Stato violenza societa`. Nascita e sviluppo del paradigma mafioso. For a similar
opinion, see also Lupo, Il tenebroso sodalizio. Un rapporto sulla mafia palermitana di fine
Ottocento.
[5] Paoli, Mafia Brotherhoods, 40 64.
[6] Smith, Corporations and Society, 98.
[7] Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, 176 7.
[8] Cressey, Theft of the Nation.
[9] Weber, Economy and Society, 72.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Sahlins, Stone Age Economics, 193 200.
[12] Lestingi, Lassociazione della Fratellanza nella provincia di Girgenti, 453.
[13] Murray, The Origins of the Tiandihui. The Chinese Triads in Legend and History; Kaplan, Yakuza:
Japans Criminal Underworld.
[14] Paoli, Mafia Brotherhoods, 3 12.
[15] Paoli, The Paradoxes of Organised Crime.
[16] Catanzaro, Men of Respect; Santino & La Fiura, Limpresa mafiosa. allItalia agli Stati Uniti.
[17] Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia. The Business of Private Protection.
[18] Franchetti, Condizioni politiche ed amministrative della Sicilia, 100.
[19] Paoli, Mafia Brotherhoods chapters 4 and 5.
[20] Stille, Excellent Cadavers: The Mafia and the Death of the First Italian Republic.
[21] Paoli, Mafia Brotherhoods, 215 7.
[22] Becchi, & Turvani, Proibito? Il mercato mondiale della droga, 156.
[23] Falcone with Padovani, Men of Honour: The Truth about the Mafia, 115.
[24] Scarpinato, Mafia e politica, in Mafia. Anatomia di un regime, 45.
[25] Paoli, Mafia Brotherhoods, 218 9.
[26] Ministero dellInterno, Rapporto sul fenomeno della criminalita` organizzata (anno 2000), 60 5.
[27] Sales, Camorra, 468.
[28] Sales, La camorra. Le camorre; Monzini, Gruppi criminali a Napoli e a Marisglia. La delinquenza
organizzata nella storia delle due citta` (1820 1990).
[29] Ministero dellInterno, Rapporto, 60 75.
[30] Massari, La Sacra corona unita: potere e segreto.
[31] Ministero dellInterno, Relazione semestrale sullattivita` svolta e i risultati conseguiti dalla
Direzione Investigativa Antimafia nel primo semestre del 2002, 57 64.
[32] Ingroia, Lassociazione di tipo mafioso.
[33] Ministero dellInterno, Rapporto 2001 and Relazione semestrale 2002.
[34] See, for example, Ministero dellInterno, Relazione semestrale sullattivita` svolta e i risultati
conseguiti dalla Direzione Investigativa Antimafia nel secondo semestre del 2000 and Relazione
semestrale, 2002.
[35] Paoli, Pilot Project to Describe and Analyse Local Drug MarketsFirst Phase Final Report: Illegal
Drug Markets in Frankfurt and Milan, 110 15.
[36] See Suchan, La criminalita` oranizzata cinese in Toscana.
[37] Paoli, Flexible Hierarchies and Dynamic Disorder: the Drug Distribution System in Frankfurt
and Milan.
[38] Paoli, Pilot Project, 110 15.
[39] See Paoli, The Paradoxes of . . . cit., and Fijnaut & Paoli (eds), Organised Crime.
[40] Block, East SideWest Side: Organizing Crime in New York.
[41] Barbacetto et al., Mani Pulite: La vera storia.

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L. Paoli

[42] La Repubblica, 6 February 2001, 15; see also Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura, Verifica
della evoluzione delle forme organizzativo-dirigenziali di Cosa Nostra al fine di uneventuale
elaborazione di proposte per attuare strategie di contrasto. Risoluzione approvata dallAssemblea
Plenaria nella seduta antimeridiana del 7 giugno 2001, 13 15.
[43] Ministero dellInterno, Relazione 2001, 16.
[44] La Repubblica, 23 August 2001, 2.

References
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Author Query Sheet

Manuscript Information
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issue
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fGLC
Vol.1 No.1
Letizia Paoli

Manuscript
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applicable)

AUTHOR: The following queries have arisen during the editing of your
manuscript. Please answer the queries by marking necessary corrections at
the appropriate positions on the PROOFS. Do not answer the queries on
the query sheet itself. Please also return a copy of the query sheet with
your corrected proofs.
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QUERY DETAILS

AQ1

Im unsure of the sense of the sentence: Cosa Nostra, for example, prohibits settling families outside
of Sicily.
Does this mean that no Cosa Nostra member is allowed to move away from Sicily? If so, the meaning
would be clearer if the sentence were rephrased as follows: Cosa Nostra, for example, prohibits
families settling outside of Sicily.