Relief and Blowdown Systems: Are You Sure You Can Rely On Them?

Relief and Blowdown Systems
Are you sure you can rely on them?

Colin Deddis, June 2013
This document is created for general illustration only and is not intended as a substitute for specialist advice in relation to
any particular situation. All liability is expressly disclaimed.
Genesis Oil & Gas Consultants Ltd
Relief and blowdown systems as layers of

protection.
Relief and blowdown systems functionality.
What can go wrong?
Overview
Relief valve provision and set pressure
Inadequate design capacity
Liquid accumulation
Vibration
Design verification.

Basic
Process
Control
H
A
Z
A
R
D
Emergency
Shutdown &
Safety
Instrumented
Functions
TOP EVENT
Post Release
Physical
Protection
e.g. Blowdown
Process
Design
Critical
Alarms &
Human
Intervention
Physical
Protection
e.g. Pressure
Relief
Emergency
Response
C
O
N
S
E
Q
U
E
N
C
E
Relief and Blowdown Systems- Functionality

High pressure cold flare system
High pressure wet flare system
Relief
valves
Blowdown Manual
valves
valves
Rupture
disks
Control
valves
HP Flare Drum
Liquids to process system

or LP Flare Drum
Process systems
Low pressure flare system

LP Flare Drum
Liquids to process system
Relief and Blowdown Systems - Functionality
Operational Sources
Emergency Sources
Relief devices
Depressurisation
Start-up/shutdown
Process upsets
Maintenance vents
Relief System Incidents (70 examples)

The Institute of Petroleum Guidelines for the Safe and Optimum Design of Hydrocarbon Pressure Relief and Blowdown Systems. 1999
Relief valve provision,

sizing and set pressure
Management of change
Pressure build-up/
chokes
Vibration
Layout and drainage

Slugging/hydraulic
hammer
Control and
instrumentation
Reverse flow
Operation
Incompatible fluids
HP/LP interfaces
Installation/
maintenance
Design specification
Liquid hold-up/
flare drum sizing
Jet reaction forces
Materials of
construction
Purge rates
Capacity of flare
Vent ignition
Pressure Relief Devices Performance

Inspecting the inspection data, TCE , December 2011/January 2012, Flower & Jones
% Set Pressure
Number of Valves
% Valves
<95%
2044
29.3
95% to 110%
4273
61.1
110% to 130%
416
6.0
>130%
253
3.6
Test data for ~7,000 operational relief valves period 2000 - 2008
Relief System Sizing Basis

Full flow relief
Blocked outlet
To flare
SDV-001
To export
Train 1
FC
Full flow relief
Blocked outlet
To flare
SDV-002
Train 2
FC
To export
Flare sized for full flow relief from single train
Export route can be common for both trains

Simultaneous blocked outlet of both trains discounted on basis of:
segregated air supplies to SDV-001 and SDV-002 &
air accumulators on each valve with single check valves in the supply line
Actual air supply to SDVs
Liquid Accumulation/Slugging
Vibration
Complex Failures
What happened?
press =
4 barg
(no alarm)
disc failure
tell-tail blocked?
SWR
water
enters
drum
PAH no alarm
overfills
HP Flare
Drum
Heat Exch.
liquid @+40m
does not
trip
no level seawater
>LAH
pumps
LAH
LP flare
drum
ESDV
gas
SWS
not tight
shut-off
fills
Closed
drain
fills
ESDV
closed
Source: HSE Safety Alert 01/2008
ESD
Overboard
STHE Overpressure Protection the problem
Two major hazards associated with bursting disk failures:

Impairment of relief system liquid inflow & overfill.
Incident escalation - reverse rupture leads to uncontrolled
hydrocarbon release from systems connected to the relief system.
STHE Overpressure Protection the problem
Increased use of bursting disks to protect STHEs over past 10 to 15

years
Estimated frequency of guillotine tube rupture
0.0009 per unit per year (~1 per 1,100 years)[1]
Frequency of bursting disk failures protecting STHEs
7 incidents in 13 years (~50 exchangers)
0.011 per unit per year (~1 per 90 years)[2]
Future growth in numbers of high pressure STHEs requiring

overpressure protection
Has the balance of risk shifted?
1.
2.
IP Guidelines for the Design and Safe Operation of Shell & Tube Heat Exchangers to Withstand the Impact of Tube Failure, Aug 2000
Estimate based on incident details collated by Energy Institute JIP
Relief Systems Design Verification Process

Agree Scope of Work
Data Gathering
Design Verification
Overpressure
Protection
Design
Specification
Design &
Construction
Control &
Instrumentation
Relief Load
Disposal System
Design
Liquids Handling
Emergency Shutdown
HP/LP Interfaces
Purge Rates
Materials Selection
Emergency
depressurisation
Relief Device
Selection
Flare Capacity
Flare Stack / Vents /

Headers & Tail Pipes
SIL & LOPA Analysis
Relief Device Inlet

Piping
Flare Radiation
Management of
Change
Operation
Competency Assessment
Presentation of Findings and Recommendations
Agreement of Actions and Closeout Priorities
Relief System Design Verification

Categorisation of Findings
Management of
changes, modifications
and upgrades
10%
Pressure buildup/ chokes

8%
Vibration Slugging/hydraulic
3%
hammer
2%
Reverse flow
3%
Incompatible fluids
4%
HP/LP interfaces
2%
Relief valve provision,

sizing and set pressure
22%
Materials of
construction
6%
Capacity of flare
3%
Vent ignition
1%
Purge rates
3%
Jet reaction forces
0%
Layout and drainage

1%
Control and
instrumentation
6%
Operation
1%
Installation/maintenance
2%
Design specification
19%
15 Reviews, 551 Findings
Liquid hold-up/flare drum

sizing 5%
Relief Device Design Verification

313 Relief Devices - Findings
Relief Valves Adequately Sized
0.3%
Governing Relief Case Incorrect

No Relief Provision
29.4%
70.3%
Relief Device Design Verification

Inlet Line Loss Checks
36%
64%
Inlet line Losses Acceptable

Inlet losses unacceptable
(>3% of set pressure)
Summary
Relief and blowdown systems are complex pressure systems

Design constraints can be violated; impairing the relief and blowdown
systems.
Design verification can be successfully deployed to determine
system robustness prior to operation.
Design verification findings indicate some systemic design flaws.
Thank-you
Any questions?
References
1. The Institute of Petroleum Guidelines for the Safe and Optimum Design of
Hydrocarbon Pressure Relief and Blowdown Systems, 1999
2. IP Guidelines for the Design and Safe Operation of Shell & Tube Heat
Exchangers to Withstand the Impact of Tube Failure, Aug 2000
3. Inspecting the inspection data, TCE , December 2011/January 2012, Flower
& Jones
4. HSE Safety Alert 01/2008 Flare system impaired by cooling water loss
through bursting disc failure on an intercooler heat exchanger.

Relief and Blowdown Systems: Are You Sure You Can Rely On Them?

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Relief and Blowdown Systems

Are you sure you can rely on them?

Genesis Oil & Gas Consultants Ltd