Alcazar v Alcazar, G.R. No.

174451, October 13, 2009

FACTS: Veronica and Rey got married. After their wedding, they lived in Reys house
in Occidental Mindoro. Then they returned to Manila, but Rey did not live with
Veronica in her home in Tondo. Rey then left for Riyahd where he was working. He
never contacted his wife since he left about a year and a half, despite numerous
attempts by petitioner to call him. Veronica was informed by a co-teacher that her
husband is coming home. But she was surprised that he did not go directly to her in
Tondo but to his house in Mindoro instead. Thus, petitioner concluded that
respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her,
providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5,
Article 45 of the Family Code. Respondent has been uncooperative to the
investigation. Dr. Tayag, the petitioners mother, testified that Rey was suffering
from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, and that it is a sufficient ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform

his essential marriage obligations

HELD: Supreme Court denied. The action originally filed was annulment of marriage
based on Article 45, paragraph 5 of the Family Code. Article 45(5) of the Family
Code refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacity to consummate denotes the
permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of
sexual intercourse. No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that
respondent was in any way physically incapable to consummate his marriage with
petitioner.
Dr. Tayags psychological report concluding that respondent was suffering
from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, traceable to the latters experience during his
childhood, did not help the petitioners cause. It must be noted that in evaluating
respondents psychological state, Dr. Tayag was not able to personally examine the
respondent and had to rely on information provided by the petitioner, who was
hardly impartial. The report was insufficient to come up with such a conclusion and
failed to explain how such a personality disorder made respondent psychologically
incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband. The burden falls upon the
petitioner not only to prove that his husband suffers from a psychological disorder,
but also that such disorder renders him truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal,
or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations.
It remains settled that the state has greater interest in preserving the
sanctity of marriage and protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. Presumption is always in favour of the validity of marriage. In the
case at bar, petitioner failed to persuade the court that respondents actions are

grave psychological maladies that are keeping him from knowing and/or complying
with the essential obligations of marriage.