161 Oppo To Omnibus & Joinders

Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 161 Filed 05/16/14 Page 1 of 184
1 Colbern C. Stuart III

Email: Cole.Stuart@Lexevia.com
2 4891 Pacific Highway Ste. 102
San Diego, CA 92110
3 Telephone: 858-504-0171
Facsimile: 619-231-9143
4 In Pro Se
5 Dean Browning Webb (pro hac vice)
Email: ricoman1968@aol.com
6 Law Offices of Dean Browning Webb
515 E 39th St.
7 Vancouver, WA 98663-2240
Telephone: 503-629-2176
8
Eric W. Ching, Esq. SBN 292357
9 5252 Balboa Arms Dr. Unit 132
San Diego, CA 92117
10 Phone: 510-449-1091
Facsimile: 619-231-9143
11 Attorneys for Plaintiffs California Coalition for Families and Children, PBC
12
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
13
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
14
CALIFORNIA COALITION FOR

15 FAMILIES AND CHILDREN, et al.,
16
17
Plaintiffs,
v.
Case No. 13-cv-1944-CAB (BLM)

Judge: Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo
PLAINTIFFS JOINT OPPOSITION TO
OMNIBUS MOTION TO DISMISS
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
JOINDERS
18 SAN DIEGO COUNTY BAR

ASSOCIATION, et al.,
19
Defendants Date: June 6, 2014
20
Time: 2:00 p.m.
Courtroom:4C
21
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
22
SUBJECT TO COURT APPROVAL
23
Complaint Filed: August 20, 2013
24
25
26
27
28
-i-
OPPO. TO OMNIBUS MTN TO DISMISS

13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
TABLE OF CONTENTS
3 PROCEDURAL HISTORY........................................................................................... 2
4
I. The Action ............................................................................................................ 2
5
II. Superior Court Motion to dismiss ........................................................................ 2
III.
Commission Motion To Dismiss....................................................................... 4
IV.
Other Defendants Motions, Extensions............................................................. 4
V. December 19, 2013 hearing .................................................................................. 5
9 DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................ 7
I. ANALYSIS OF THE OMNIBUS ........................................................................ 7
10
11
A. Rule 41(b) Sanction is Frivolous ....................................................................... 7
12
B. Statutes Of Limitations Bar No Claim ............................................................ 28
13
14
15
C. Rooker-Feldman Bars No Claim ..................................................................... 44

D. Eleventh Amendment Bars No Claim ............................................................. 49
16
E. Color of Law Authority ................................................................................... 67
17
F. Lanham Act ..................................................................................................... 83
18
G. RICO................................................................................................................ 89
19
II. ATTACKS BY COUNT .................................................................................. 110
20
A. Count 2 (State Law Claims) .......................................................................... 110
21
22
23
B. Count 3 (Malicious Prosecution)................................................................... 111

C. Count 4 (Nesthus Obstruction of Justice) ..................................................... 120
24
D. Count 6 (Supervisory Liability) .................................................................... 121
25
E. Count 7 (Municipal Liability) ....................................................................... 127
26
27
28
F. Count 8 (Respondeat Superior) ..................................................................... 131

G. Count 9 (42 U.S.C. 1985) ........................................................................... 133
H. Count 10 (42 U.S.C. 1986) ......................................................................... 140
-1OPPO TO OMNIBUS MTN TO DISMISS
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
I. Counts 11, 12, 14, 15 (Doyne Terrorism): .................................................... 142
J. California Constitution Article I, sec. 26 Claims .......................................... 145
3
4
5
6
K. Prospective Relief Counts ............................................................................. 146

III.
OTHER AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES ......................................................... 150
A. Domestic Relations Exception to Jurisdiction ........................................... 151
B. Quasi-Judicial Immunity: .............................................................................. 152
C. California Tort Claims Act Defense.............................................................. 158
D. State Constitutional Immunities Do Not Protect Ultra Vires Conduct ......... 158
10
11
12
E. Noerr-Pennington Bars No Claim................................................................. 159

F. California Civil Code 47 Litigation Privilege ........................................ 161
13
G. RICO Claims Do Not Depend on Duties to Third Parties ............................ 161
14
H. Personal Jurisdiction and Venue ................................................................... 161
15
I. California Coalitions Capacity to Sue.......................................................... 162
16 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 164

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 CASES
2 Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970)...............................................67, 68
3 Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987) .. 29, 30
4 Aguilar v. Mega Lighting, Inc. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28348 (C.D. Cal April 6,
5
2009)....................................................................................................................... 105
6 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) .................................................................. 52
7 American Automotive Accessories v. Fishman, 175 F.3d 534, 542 (7th Cir. 1998)... 93,
8
95
9 Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 693 (1992) ................................................. 152

10 Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432 (1993)............................46, 114
11 Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006) ................................................... 151
12 Arena v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Nassau Cnty., 216 F. Supp. 2d 146, 153-54 (E.D.N.Y.
13
2002)....................................................................................................................... 115
14 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664, (2009) ...............................................10 et passim

15 Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986) ......................................47 et passim
16 Ateeq v. Najor, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1351 (1993) .......................................................35, 44
17 Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 603 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2010).. 31
18 Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935) ................................... 136
19 Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988) .................................... 32
20 Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370 (9th Cir. 1994) ............................................................ 61
21 Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) .......50, 106
22 Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001) ................ 56
23 BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002) ................................................... 160
24 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959 ........................................... 136
25 Beane v. Paulsen, 21 Cal. App. 4th 89 (1993)............................................................. 38
26 Beard v. Udall, 648 F.2d 1264 .............................................................................46, 113
27 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, (2007) ..........................9 et passim
28 Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 326 (2d Cir. 1996) ...................................................... 21
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764, 767 (9th Cir.2004) ...................................................... 107
2 Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Fla., Inc., 906 F.2d 1546 (11th
3
Cir. 1990). ................................................................................................................ 33
4 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) .................................... 145
5 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) ..................................................................68, 72
6 Board of County Commissioners v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 352........................ 29
7 Borchardt v. Reid, CV 08-3086 DOC, 2008 WL 4810791 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2008)54
8 Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) .........................................66, 141
9 Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2244 (2009) ................................................. 99
10 Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1991) ...................................................... 81
11 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)................................................................. 66
12 Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 267 (1993) .................... 137
13 Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 531 U.S.
14
288 (2001) ..........................................................................................................68, 72
15 Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist. No. 46 of Lawrence County, Ark., 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir.
16
1956). ..................................................................................................................... 136
17 Brummett v. Camble, 946 F.2d 1178, 1184 (5th Cir. 1991). ...........................33, 44, 67
18 Bryant v. Mattel, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13851 (C.D. Calif., 2 August 2010) .......... 93
19 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 275 (1993) ................................................... 153
20 Burke v. Dowling, 944 F.Supp. 1036 (D.C.N.Y. 1995) .............................................. 25
21 Burke v. Dowling, 944 F.Supp. 1036, 1049 (D.C.N.Y. 1995) ..................................... 26
22 Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 498 (1991) .................................................................. 153
23 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) .......................... 68
24 Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 2002) ............................................50, 112
25 Butz v. Economou, 438 US 478, 519 (1978) .............................................................. 120
26 Cacy v. United States, 298 F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir.1961) ............................................ 95
27 Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir.
28
2011).....................................................................................................................6, 23
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 Canyon County v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 519 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2008) .................... 97
2 Caproni v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 15 F.3d 614, 618 (6th Cir. 1994) ............................ 30
3 Carrigan v. California State Legislature, 263 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1959)...................... 26
4 Catalan v. Vermillion Ranch Ltd. Partnership, 2007, 2007 WL 38135, *5 (D.C.
5
Colo.) ........................................................................................................................ 25
6 Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. Don King Promotions, Inc., 533 U.S. 158, 161
7
(2001). .................................................................................................................... 100
8 Chenault v. Cobb, C 13-03828 MEJ, 2013 WL 6072025 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013).
9
................................................................................................................................ 131
10 Chicago Miracle Temple Church, Inc. v. Fox, 901 F. Supp. 1333, 1347 (N.D. Ill.
11
1995)....................................................................................................................... 134
12 Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir.1999) ............................................... 106
13 citing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1 (1989) ......................................... 50
14 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).......................................................... 107
15 City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988). ............................................... 107
16 Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 202 (1985) ....................................................... 115
17 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, (1957) .................................................................... 9
18 Conmar Corp. v. Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc., 858 F.2d 499, 505 (1988) ................... 36
19 Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350 (2011) ........................................................... 128
20 Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern California Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d
21
242, 247 (9th Cir.1990) ............................................................................................ 22
22 Cooper v. Molko, 512 F. Supp. 563, 568 (N.D. Cal. 1981) ......................................... 67
23 Cousins v. Lockyear, 568 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2009) .................................................. 146
24 Crumpacker v. Civiletti, 90 F.R.D. 326, 329 (D.C. Ind.1981) ........................14, 25, 26
25 Dahl v. City of Huntington Beach, 84 F.3d 363, 366 (9th Cir. 1996) .....................8, 20
26 Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962)...................................................... 136
27 Daniels Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir.2010) ....................... 11
28 Deeths v. Lucile Slater Packard Children's Hosp. at Stanford, 1:12-CV-02096-LJO,
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
2013 WL 6185175 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2013) ......................................................... 22
2 Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank, A.G., 2006 WL 4749756 **4041 (C.D.Cal.2006) .. 41

3 Del Campo v. Kennedy, 517 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2008) ..............................52, 61
4 Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27, (1980) .................................................................. 67
5 Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2005) .............................................................. 103
6 Doe v. Dep't of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1115 (D.C.Cir.1985) .................................... 42
7 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963) ........................................................................... 55
8 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) ............................................................ 55
9 Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1065-1066 9 (9th Cir. 2004) ............... 88
10 E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs., 153 Cal. App. 4th 1308, 1317-18 (2007) ..... 38
11 Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 1985) ......................35, 44
12 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) ............................................................. 9
13 Ervin v. Los Angeles Cnty., 848 F.2d 1018, 1019 (9th Cir. 1988) .............................. 34
14 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 348-349 (1880) ......................................60, 116, 118
15 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 15556 (1908) .........................................................60, 61
16 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 286 (2005) ............... 45
17 Fid. Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. Castle, 2011 WL 6141310 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ...................... 24
18 Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C.Cir.1996) ....................................... 42
19 Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164, (1978) ......................................... 68
20 Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) ................................................................. 21
21 Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) ..................... 51
22 Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 222 (1988) ............................................................. 46
23 Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) ........................................................... 115
24 Fox v. Ethicon EndoSurgery, Inc., 35 Cal.4th 797, 806 (2005) ..........................34, 38
25 Fraklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 445 (9th Cir. 2002). ..................................................... 81
26 Friedman v. 24 Hour Fitness Co., 580 F.Supp.2d 985 (C.D. Calif. 2008) ................ 99
27 Gaglione v. Coolidge, 134 Cal.App.2d 518, 527 (1955 .............................................. 35
28 Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) ................... 81
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir. 2005). ..................................... 153
2 Gibbs v. Haight, Dickson, Brown & Bonesteel, 183 Cal.App.3d 716, 228 Cal.Rptr.
3
398, 402 (1986) ........................................................................................................ 44
4 Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856 (9th Cir.1999) ........................... 75
5 Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir.1997) ............................... 51
6 Giuliano v. Everything Yogurt, Inc., 819 F.Supp. 240 (D.C.N.Y.1993) ..................... 26
7 Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 ......................................................................... 121
8 Graham v. Taubman, 610 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.1979) .............................................28, 112
9 Gray v. Evercore Restructuring L.L.C., 544 F3d 320, 324 (1st Cir. 2008) .........51, 113
10 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116, (1972) .......................................... 160
11 Greater Los Angeles Council of Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 607 F. Supp. 175, 179 (C.D.
12
Cal. 1984) .................................................................................................50 et passim
13 Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (1974)................................................................ 114

14 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, (1971) ............................................135, 140
15 Grisham v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 40 Cal.4th 623, 637, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 735, 151
16
P.3d 1151 (2007) ................................................................................................36, 38
17 Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 39697 (1957) ........................................ 31

18 Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 706-07 (9th Cir. 2006)........................................... 41
19 Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1914) ......................................................66, 121
20 Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2006) ......................................... 45
21 H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989) .......................... 97
22 H.T. v. Ciavarella, No. 3:09-cv-0357 (ARC) (M.D. Pa.) ............................................ 60
23 Han v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 1993 WL 13011266 (C.A.9) ......................................... 61
24 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890) ........................................................................ 49
25 Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 404 (7th
26
Cir. 1984) ................................................................................................................. 93
27 Harris v. Deveaux, 780 F.2d 911, 915 (11th Cir. 1986) ............................................ 114
28 Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 1997) ........................................... 81
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir.1997) ............................................ 81

2 Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dep't, 530 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2008) .......... 24
3 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) ................................................................... 120
4 Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513 U.S. 30 (1994)..............50, 51
5 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (U.S. 2013).................................................. 66
6 Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 100304 (9th Cir.2006) ................. 42
7 Ikuno v. Yip, 912 F.2d 306, 309 (9th Cir. 1990) .......................................................... 98
8 In re Credit Industrial Corp., 366 F.2d 402, 411 (2d Cir. 1966) ................................ 22
9 In re George, 322 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2003)........................................................... 8
10 In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Secs. Litigation, 2003 WL 22999478 (D.C.N.Y.) .......... 25
11 Indus. Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 278 F. Supp. 938, 949 (C.D. Cal.
12
1967)......................................................................................................................... 20
13 Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980) .......................42, 112
14 Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir.2001) .................................................. 123
15 Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989) ........................................ 106
16 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) .................................................. 69
17 Johnson v. Haberman & Kassoy, 201 Cal. App. 3d 1468, 247 Cal. Rptr. 614 (2d Dist.
18
1988)...................................................................................................................33, 39
19 Johnson v. Hawe, 388 F.3d 676, 686 (9th Cir.2004) ................................................. 107
20 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975) ................................. 29
21 Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) ..............................................35, 44
22 Junho Hyon v. Sei Shimoguchi, No. CIV 12-1235 JAM EFB PS, 2012 U.S. Dist.
23
LEXIS 74100 at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 29, 2012) ........................................................ 54
24 Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997) ................................................................... 153

25 Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988) ..... 7, 11
26 Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of California, 29 Cal. 4th 300 (2002) ......................... 119
27 Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) ............................................ 56
28 Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1996)..........................................118, 121
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 Kleinecke v. Montecito Water Dist., 147 Cal.App.3d 240, 245 (1983) ....................... 35
2 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 21 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) .............. 151
3 Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004) ................................. 46
4 Kournikova v. General Media Communications, Inc., 278 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (C.D.
5
Cal. 2003) ................................................................................................................. 88
6 Kunik v. Racine County, 946 F.2d 1574, 1580 (7th Cir.1991) ................................... 76
7 Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 720 (1983) .....................................................135, 137
8 Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Am. Sec. Bank, N.A., 890 F.2d 456, 463 n. 11
9
(D.C.Cir.1989) ......................................................................................................... 42
10 Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391 (1979)
11
.................................................................................................................................. 51
12 Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1991)
13
................................................................................................................................ 106
14 Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 31 Cal.4th 363, 370 (2003) ................................................. 34

15 Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir.1991) ............................... 123
16 Larsen v. Lauriel Investments, Inc., 161 F. Supp.2d 1029, 1042 (D. Ariz. 2001) 93, 95
17 Lauter v. Anoufrieva, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (C.D. Cal. 2009) ..................31, 36, 41, 44
18 Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. NarcoticsIntelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
19
163 (1993) ................................................................................................69 et passim
20 Lewis v. News-Press & Gazette Co., 782 F. Supp. 1338, 1341 (W.D. Mo. 1992) .... 135
21 Lewis v. Sprock, 612 F. Supp. 1316, 1324 (N.D. Cal. 1985)....................................... 90
22 Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014)......... 84
23 Life Ins. Co. of North America v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir.1979) ....... 138
24 Life Insurance Co. of North America v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 501 (9th Cir.1979)
25
.................................................................................................................................. 68
26 Living Designs Inc., v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co., 431 F.3d 353, 361, 364 (9th
27
Cir. 2005) ................................................................................................................. 97
28 Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours, 431 F.3d 353, 361 (9th Cir. 2005)
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
................................................................................................................................ 100
2 Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229 (7th Cir.) ....................................................... 114

3 Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) ...................................................... 67
4 Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir.2004). ........................................................ 106
5 Maduka v. Sunrise Hosp., 375 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2004) ................................... 122
6 Manning v. Ketcham, 58 F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1932); Restatement (Second) of Torts
7
162 (1965) ......................................................................................................113, 120
8 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803) ......................................................... 50

9 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1946)........................................................ 68
10 Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 305 (2006)....................................................... 152
11 McCarthy v. Fuller, 2010 WL 2243354, *1 (S.D. Ind. 2010) ..................................... 25
12 McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. 270, 276 (1830) ............................................................ 28
13 McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 614-17 (D.C.Cir.1980) ......................................... 135
14 McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 673-674 (1991) ............................... 34
15 McHenry v. Renne, 74 F.3d 1172, 1177-80 (9th Cir. 1996) ....................................6, 19
16 Meek v. Cnty. of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 1999) ................................. 115
17 Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802, 804 (9th Cir. 1976) ............................................... 68
18 Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802, 804 (9th Cir.1976) ................................................ 67
19 Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301-02 (9th Cir. 1999) 75
20 Mendoza v. Wilmington Fin., C-10-5792 SC, 2011 WL 2182914 (N.D. Cal. June 6,
21
2011)......................................................................................................................... 42
22 Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2002) .................................... 103
23 Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1149 (9th Cir.2005) ................................ 123
24 Merrill v. Abbott (In re Indep. Clearing House Co., 77 B.R. 843, 860 (D.Utah 1987)
25
.................................................................................................................................. 96
26 Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir.1988)
27
.................................................................................................................................. 61
28 Mollnow v. Carlton, 716 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1983) ............................................ 135
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 Monell v. Dept of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) ..............50, 106
2 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961)............................................................ 30
3 Monteagudo v. Alksne, 11-CV-1089, at 4:4-7:9, 8:2-21 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 6, 2011) ...... 48
4 Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 614 F.3d 145, 150 (5th Cir. 2010) .. 139
5 Moor v. Alameda Cnty., 411 U.S. 693, 717 (1973) ..................................................... 50
6 Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1996) ........................................... 116
7 Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2000) ........................ 34
8 Moreno v. Sanchez, 106 Cal.App.4th 1415 (2003)................................................33, 39
9 Morgan v. Kobrin Secs., Inc., 649 F.Supp. 1023, 1027 (D.C.Ill.1986) ....................... 25
10 Morgan v. Regents of University of Cal., 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 6364 (2000) .............. 41
11 Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) .....................10 et passim
12 Murray v. Sevier, 993 F.Supp. 1394 (D.C.Ala. 1997) ................................................. 26
13 Musick v. Burke, 913 F.2d 1390, 1398 (9th Cir. 1990) ............................................. 104
14 N. Ins. Co. of New York v. Chatham Cnty., Ga., 547 U.S. 189, 194 (2006) ............... 52
15 National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994)...................... 163
16 Natural Resources Defense Council v. California Dept. of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 422
17
(1996) ....................................................................................................................... 61
18 Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) ..............................................9, 10
19 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1999) ....................................................... 96
20 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, (1989) ............................................................. 9
21 Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981)....................... 6
22 New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co. v. Kinney, 260 U.S. 340, 346 (1922)........................... 35
23 Niles v. Nelson, 72 F.Supp.2d 13 (D.C.N.Y.1999 ) ..................................................... 26
24 Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1162-64 (9th Cir. 2003) ................................................ 46
25 Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2002).......................................... 120
26 Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 21 Cal.4th 383, 397 (1999). .............................................34, 38
27 North Georgia Finishing, Incorporated v. Di-Chem, Incorporated, 419 U.S. 601
28
(1975) .................................................................................................................68, 72
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California v. E.E.O.C., 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977) ........... 29
2 Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 2007) ........................................... 98
3 Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 782 (9th Cir. 2002) ....................................... 94
4 OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2012) ...........11 et passim
5 Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 825 (9th Cir. 2007) ....................................................... 97
6 Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir.1992) .............................................. 107
7 Pace Indus., Inc. v. Three Phoenix Co., 813 F.2d 234, 237 (9th Cir. 1987). .............. 31
8 Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989) ......... 19
9 People United for Children, Inc. v. City of New York, 108 F. Supp. 2d 275, 286
10
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) ..................................................................................................... 115
11 Perez-Falcon v. Synagro West, LLC, 2011 WL 6752533, *3 (E.D. Cal. 2011).......... 25

12 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1082 (9th Cir. 2012) ................................................. 66
13 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946)....................................................... 102
14 Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. United States, 648 F.3d 708, 721 (9th Cir.2011) .................. 11
15 Precision Inst. Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814
16
(1945) .................................................................................................................35, 44
17 Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 143
18
(1993) ....................................................................................................................... 52
19 Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984) ......................................................... 116

20 Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1980) ........................................47, 113
21 Recorder v. Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 72 Cal. App. 4th 258 (1999) ........... 158
22 Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.1991) ..................... 123
23 Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1982) .................................................. 47
24 Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1982)....................................... 115
25 Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 976 (S.D. Cal. 1998) .................................. 53
26 Riddell v. Riddell Washington Corp., 866 F.2d 1480, 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ............ 36
27 Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F.2d 649, 654 (10th Cir. 1990) ........................................... 31
28 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 650 (1996) ................................................................. 66
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 Rosen v. Cmty. Educ. Ctrs., Inc., CV-10-0584, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *7-9 (D.
2
Ariz. Oct. 8, 2010) ................................................................................................. 137
3 Ruiz v. Scriber, C 07-00020 WHA, 2007 WL 2790203 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2007). 145
4 Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir.1978) ... 38
5 Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 524 (9th Cir.1999); ...................... 123
6 Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997)............................................................. 102
7 Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 6165 (1997)...................................76, 101, 108
8 Sathianathan v. Smith Barney, Inc., C 04-2130 SBA, 2004 WL 3607403 (N.D. Cal.
9
June 6, 2005) ............................................................................................................ 25
10 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974................................................................. 9

11 Schmidt v. Herrmann, 614 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1980 .......................................... 6
12 Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.1975) ............................... 67
13 Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) ..................................112, 150
14 Screws v. U.S., 325 U.S. 91 (1945) ..............................................................66, 121, 142
15 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985) ................................. 110
16 Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) ....................138, 140
17 Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984),95
18 Shaw v. State of California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788 F.2d 600,
19
603 (9th Cir.1986) ................................................................................................4, 55
20 Sherman v. Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1977) ......................................... 134
21 Smith v. Berg, 247 F.3d 532 (3rd Cir. 2001), ............................................................ 103
22 Sosa v. DIRECTV. Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 929 (9th Cir. 2006) ...................................... 159
23 Soto v. Schembri, 960 F. Supp. 751, 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ....................................... 134
24 Sparkman v. McFarlin, Civ. No. F 75-129 (ND Ind., May 13, 1976)....................... 114
25 Spencer v. Kemma, 523 U.S. 1, 19 (1998); ................................................................ 120
26 Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1214 (9th Cir. 2011) .................................................... 10
27 Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 2011) ............................................... 11
28 State ex rel. Metz v. CCC Information Services, Inc., 149 Cal.App.4th 402, 418
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
(2007) ....................................................................................................................... 41
2 State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Ammann, 838 F.2 4 (9th Cir. 1987) ........................ 33
3 Sterlin v. Biomune Systems, 154 F.3d 1191, 1201 (10th Cir.1998) ............................. 33
4 Stewart v. Baldwin County Board of Education, 908 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1990)
5
.................................................................................................................................. 61
6 Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999) ................................................. 36
7 Stump v. Sparkman, 35 U.S. at 360 ........................................................................... 113
8 Sun Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 194 (9th Cir. 1987) ................... 110
9 Sun Sav. and Loan Assoc. v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187 (9th Cir.1987) ....................... 106
10 Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir.1995). ............. 34
11 Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 731 (1980) .................... 114
12 Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 720
13
(1980) ....................................................................................................................... 46
14 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, n. 1, (2002) ........................9, 14, 51
15 Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) ................................................... 122
16 Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008).......................................................55, 143
17 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 484, (1953) ................................................................. 68
18 Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 113940 (9th Cir.2000)
19
................................................................................................................................ 147
20 Thomas v. Miller, 928 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1991 ........................................................... 33

21 Thompson v. Housing Auth. of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986) .......... 8
22 Thorman v. American Seafoods Co., 421 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir.2005) ................. 38
23 Thornton v. Brown, 11-56146, 2013 WL 7216368 (9th Cir. July 31, 2013). ............ 120
24 Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Florida, 937 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1991) ........................... 97
25 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) .................................................................... 140
26 Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir.2012) ............................... 68
27 Tuveson v. Florida Governor's Council on Indian Affairs, Inc., 734 F.2d 730, 732
28
(11th Cir.1984) ......................................................................................................... 61

13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 United States ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir.
2
2003)....................................................................................................................... 124
3 United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1999) .......................................116, 118
4 United States. v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003) ............ 25
5 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588-89 (1981)............................................ 109
6 United States v. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705 (3d Cir. 2013) ......................................... 61
7 United States v. Robertson, 514 US. 669 (1995) ...................................................... 105
8 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544, 183 L. Ed. 2d 574 (2012) ............. 160
9 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) ............................................... 66
10 United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928
11
(1980) ....................................................................................................................... 94
12 United States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825, 829 (1st Cir. 1988 ............................................ 31
13 United States v. Buckley, 689 F.2d 893, 897-98 (9th Cir.1982) .................................. 94
14 United States v. Buckley, 689 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1982) ...................................... 95
15 United States v. Ciccone, 219 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 2000) .................................. 96
16 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 .............................................................. 121
17 United States v. Craft, 105 F.3d 1123, 1125 (6th Cir. 1997) ...................................... 31
18 United States v. Doherty, 867 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1989) ............................................... 105
19 United States v. Dowling, 739 F.2d 1445, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1984) ............................ 94
20 United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648 (9th Cir, 1988) ........................................... 100
21 United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2004) ...................................... 103
22 United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1230 (9th Cir.2004), ............................. 108
23 United States v. Galiffa, 734 F.2d 306, 311 (7th Cir. 1984)...................................... 102
24 United States v. Green, 592 F.3d 1057, 1060-1071 (9th Cir. 2010)............................ 94
25 United States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1997) ...................... 105
26 United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1248 (8th Cir. 1976) ................................. 94
27 United States v. National Medical Enters., Inc., 792 F.2d 906, 913 (9th Cir.1986) ... 20
28 United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 795 (1966) ........................................................ 67
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 United States v. Ripinsky, 109 F.3d 1436, 1444 (9th Cir.1997) ................................ 105
2 United States v. Robinson, 763 F.2d 778 (6th Cir. 1985) ........................................... 105
3 United States v. Rogers, 321 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1993).................................... 96
4 United States v. Schaflander, 717 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir. 1983),..................................... 96
5 United States v. Shipsey, 363 F.3d 962, 971 (9th Cir. 2004) ....................................... 94
6 United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2003) ............................................ 105
7 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (U.S. 1981) ........................................... 98
8 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9th
9
Cir.1989) .................................................................................................................. 33
10 v. 99
11 Vasquez v. Rackauckas, 734 F.3d 1025, 1037 (9th Cir. 2013) .................................... 48
12 Venegas v. Wagner, 704 F.2d 1144, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983) .......................................... 32
13 Vernon v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir.1987) ............................................. 42
14 Vierria v. California Highway Patrol, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1240 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
15
..........................................................................................................................60, 158
16 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, (2000) ......................................... 137
17 Wallace v. Powell, 3:09-cv-00268-ARC ................................................................... 113
18 Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir.2003) ................................................. 106
19 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) .............................................................................. 67
20 Westways World Travel v. AMR Corp., 182 F. Supp.2d 952, 957 (C.D. Calif. 2001)
21
.................................................................................................................................. 93
22 Westways World Travel v. AMR Corp., 182 F. Supp.2d 952 (C.D. Calif. 2001) ........ 21
23 White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2012) .....................55, 58, 105
24 White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 926-27 (9th Cir. 2012) ............................ 144
25 Wilbur v. United States, 281 U.S. 206, 218 (1930) ..................................................... 61
26 Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, N.A., 815 F.2d 522, 531, n. 7 (9th Cir.
27
1987)......................................................................................................................... 96
28 Williams-Jones v. LaHood, 656 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67-68 (D.D.C. 2009) ....................... 42

13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 Wilson v. Toussie, 260 F. Supp.2d 530, n 5 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) .................................... 90

2 Windsor v. The Tennessean, 719 F.2d 155, 161 (6th Cir.1983), ............................... 135
3 Witt v. Dep't of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 817 (9th Cir. 2008) .................................... 66
4 Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 363-64 (9th Cir. 2004) ...................................... 147
5 Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 364 (9th Cir. 2004) .............................................. 50
6 Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir.2004) .................................................. 25
7 Wyshak v. City Nat. Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 826-27 (9th Cir. 1979) .........................21, 28
8 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) ................................................................... 66
9 Yourish v. Calif. Amplif., 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir.1999) ......................................... 8
10 Zatkin v. Primuth, 551 F. Supp. 39, 42 (S.D. Cal. 1982) ............................................ 92
11 Zeller v. Rankin, 451 U.S. 939 (1981) .................................................................47, 113
12
13
14 STAVROP STATUTES
15 15 U.S.C. 1127 .......................................................................................................... 85
16 15 U.S.C. 1116(a) ...........................................................................................61, 147
17 15 U.S.C. 1116(a), .................................................................................................. 61
18 18 U. S. C. 242 .......................................................................................................... 64
19 18 U.S.C. 1951 ........................................................................................................ 108
20 18 U.S.C. 1964(a) .......................................................................................61, 62, 147
21 18 U.S.C. 3282 .......................................................................................................... 31
22 18 U.S.C. 2261(a)(1) .......................................................................................58, 105
23 28 U.S.C. 1337 ..................................................................................................61, 147
24 28 U.S.C. 1361 .......................................................................................................... 61
25 28 U.S.C. 1738 ..................................................................................................58, 105
26 28 U.S.C. 2201-2202 ......................................................................................61, 147
27 28 U.S.C.A. 2071 ................................................................................................19, 20
28 42 U.S.C. 1983 ...........................................................................................6, et passim
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 42 U.S.C. 1988(a) .............................................................................................61, 147

2 42 U.S.C. 2000d-7..................................................................................................... 58
3
4
5
TREATISES
6 Weinstein & Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform: Drafting Pleading Rules, 57

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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs California Coalition for Families and Children, PBC (CALIFORNIA
COALITION) and Colbern Stuart (STUART) hereby jointly oppose Defendants
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 131)
(OMNIBUS) and Joinders (Doc. Nos. 134-152).
To manage the substantial overlap in Defendants attacks, Plaintiffs offer this
single combined Opposition in three sections:
Section I responds to the OMNIBUS in the same organization and order it is
brought, and incorporates responses to various joinders that expand on OMNIBUS
attacks.
Section II responds to attacks from joinders which are not raised in the
OMNIBUS. The section collects from the joinders all attacks on a particular Count,
recites each attack, then responds in defense of the Count. For example, the CITY
ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS and GROCH, represented by different counsel, both
attack Count 3 in separate joinders. This Opposition responds to both attacks in one
section collecting all attacks on Count 3: Section II, B. Similar organization-byCount is followed throughout Section II.
Section III responds to all other attacks not raised in the OMNIBUS and not
specific to a Count, such as blanket affirmative defenses applicable to all counts
such as immunity, privilege, or capacity. Section III is organized by topic of the
attack.
Defendants had opportunity to file one 30 page OMNIBUS and ten pages for
each of 18 joinders, for a total of 210 pages of opportunity. Plaintiffs had similar
opportunity. Defendants used less space than permitted, as does this combined
Opposition.
27
28
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1
2
3
I.
THE ACTION
Plaintiffs filed the initial complaint on August 20, 2013 asserting violations of
4 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, and 1986 (Civil Rights Act), 15 U.S.C. 1125 (Lanham
5 Act), 18 U.S.C. 1962 (RICO), and seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. 2201 (Declaratory
6 Judgment Act). Plaintiffs are a legal and social services organization providing
7 representing the interests of family court litigants and its President. Plaintiffs sue the
8 San Diego County Bar Association, Family Justice Center Alliance, divorce
9 attorneys, forensic psychologists, family court judges, and others which organize,
10 certify, and support the divorce industry. Plaintiffs also sue various governmental
11 entities such as the San Diego Superior Court and its judges, and other governmental
12 elements working within the divorce industry such as the Administrative Office of the
13 Courts, Judicial Council, and its leaders. Plaintiffs also sue employees of the
14 Commission on Judicial Performance who have facilitated the criminal behavior
15 described herein.
16
As Plaintiff was proceeding with service of the initial complaint, two groups of
17 defendants filed motions to dismiss; one by a group of California Superior Court

18 Judicial Defendants (Superior Court Defendants) (Doc. No. 16), and one by the
19 Commission on Judicial Performance and its employee defendants (Commission
20 Defendants) (Doc. No. 22). The motions attacked the complaint broadly and
21 vigorously as follows:
22
23
II.
SUPERIOR COURT MOTION TO DISMISS
The Superior Courts Motion to Dismiss (MTD) attacked on fourteen grounds,
24 including: (1) capacity and representation of the corporate plaintiffs, (2) standing, (3)
25 sovereign immunity, (4) judicial immunity, (5) qualified immunity, (6) statute of
26 limitations, (8) Rooker-Feldman, (9) failure to state cognizable claims for (a) RICO
27 and (b) 42 U.S.C. 1985 and 1986, (c) Lanham Act (d) conspiracy under Twombly,
28 and (e) a bucket of mud attack under rule 8(a). MTD 4:4-5:9. Defendants sought
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 only dismissal with prejudice. MTD 5:8-9. Superior Court Defendants filed a
2 Request for Judicial Notice attaching nine exhibits.
3
Upon receiving the MTD, STUART prepared and on October 28, 2013
4 delivered letter to the Superior Court Defendants requesting to meet and confer
5 regarding the attacks of the MTD. (M&C). To assist defendants in understanding
6 the complex complaint, the M&C disclosed the factual legal basis for the case,
7 offered supporting citation and analysis, additional exhibits, and responded to each of
8 the criticisms raised in the MTD. The M&C requested a personal conference to
9 advance a dialogue, and requested the parties discuss a stipulation to amend the
10 Complaint to resolve certain fairly-taken allegations of insufficient fact pleading, that
11 certain frivolous grounds in the MTD be withdrawn prior to expenditure of additional
12 court and party resources, for brief leave to permit the corporate plaintiffs to complete
13 Mr. Webbs pro hac vice admission, and that the RJN be withdrawn as evidentiary
14 and controversial.
15
Two days after receiving the M&C, Superior Court Defendants categorically
16 rejected Plaintiffs invitation. Voluminous briefing followed.

17
Plaintiff opposed the MTD on grounds that (1) the MTDs argued controversial
18 facts; (2) the Complaint admitted no immunity defenses, (3) Rooker-Feldman was
19 inapplicable and (4) the RICO and civil rights claims were adequately pled and
20 supported. Plaintiff acknowledged the statutes of limitations and corporate Plaintiffs
21 representation issues, and requested leave to cure with details regarding equitable
22 tolling and estoppel, and to complete Mr. Webbs pro hac vice application. Plaintiff
23 countered Defendants Request for Judicial notice with a Motion to Strike
24 controversial evidence and testimony therein.
25
The Superior Court alone filed a motion for sanctions under Rule 11(b),
26 asserting that the Complaint was entirely frivolous and filed for no purposed other
27 than to harass the Superior Court. Plaintiff STUART filed a separate Rule 11 motion
28 directed to portions of the MTD as frivolous and intended for delay.
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
III.
1
2
COMMISSION MOTION TO DISMISS
Commission Defendants asserted only sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
3 Amendment. The Commission made no attempt at a factual showing to establish that

4 it was an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, instead
5 relying on this Circuits precedent in cases extending Eleventh Amendment Immunity
6 to the Commission without performing an arm of the state analysis required under
7 Supreme Court and this Circuits precedents. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School &
8 Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Greater Los Angeles Council on
9 Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1987); Shaw v. State of California
10 Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788 F.2d 600, 603 (9th Cir.1986).
11
Plaintiff opposed arguing the Commissions failure to establish it is a state or
12 arm of the state, that Commission employees were acting ultra vires, and noted that
13 dismissal of individual capacity claims is unavailable after Ex Parte Young.
14 Commission Oppo. 21:4-24:11.
15
16
IV.
OTHER DEFENDANTS MOTIONS, EXTENSIONS
Other Defendants filed vigorous attacks on multiple substantive grounds in
17 separate motions to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1), (6), some of which attached
18 exhibits, effectively converting those motions to Rule 56 motions for summary
19 judgment. These Motions asserted attacks parallel to the Superior Court MTD and
20 added numerous attacks specific to each Defendant, including a Noerr-Penington
21 attack, a res judicata attack, a domestic relations exception attack, assertion of state
22 tort claims presentation defects, and various individualized particularity, more
23 definite statement, conclusory allegations, and insufficient facts grounds under
24 Rules 8(a), 9(b), and 12(e).
25
Ten Defendants, including lead Defendant San Diego County Bar Association
26 and several divorce law firms sought and received from Plaintiffs a stipulation to
27 extend time to respond to the Complaint until disposition of the two pending motions
28 to dismiss. The Court granted these extensions, relieving these ten defendantsall
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 who so requestedof obligation to respond to the Complaint. Numerous other

2 Defendants joining the OMNIBUS were not named or served in the first round and
3 have not responded before the OMNIBUS. The OMNIBUS Motion lead by San
4 Diego County Bar Association is its, and every other Defendantssave the
5 Commission and Superior Court Defendantsfirst contested response to any
6 complaint.
7
8
V.
DECEMBER 19, 2013 HEARING
At hearing on December 19, 2013, the Court dismissed claims against the
9 Commission and its employees in official capacity with prejudice as immune under
10 the Eleventh Amendment. The Court denied the Commissions motion with respect to
11 the individual capacity claims against Simi and Battson, and dismissed the claims
12 against the Superior Court with leave to amend.
13
The Court provided guidance to Plaintiffs in amending the Complaint:
14
1. Corporate Plaintiffs: The Court found that counsel for Corporate Plaintiffs,
15 Mr. Dean Browning Webb, was listed on the Complaint caption, but did not sign the
16 Complaint. The Court dismissed the Corporate Plaintiffs Complaint, ruling: No
17 counsel appeared for California Coalition or Lexevia at the motions hearing held
18 December 19, 2013. Because plaintiffs California Coalition and Lexevia do not
19 appear through counsel, the court DISMISSES their claims without prejudice.
20
2. Plaintiff Stuart: The Court found that the Complaint regarding Stuart failed
21 to comply with Rule 8(a) for three reasons:

22
First, the Court found that because the Corporate Plaintiffs claims were then
23 dismissed, the remaining portions of the Complaint failed to satisfy Rule 8.

24 [B]ecause plaintiffs assert most of their claims on behalf of all three plaintiffs,
25 neither the court nor defendants can distinguish Stuarts asserted harm from the
26 corporations. The Court stated that because the corporate plaintiffs were dismissed,
27 the remaining portion of the Complaint relevant to Stuart does not set forth plain
28 statements of his claims showing that he is entitled to relief.
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Second, the Court found that Stuart fails to clearly identify each separate
2 claim for relief. The Court identified the caption for Count One, which identified
3 the Count was brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, identified the various constitutional
4 provisions which the claim asserted (U.S. Const. 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 14th
5 Amend.), and included a notation to Supplemental State Claims
6
The Court stated that this structure of caption for the Count failed to specify
7 just how many separate state and federal claims Stuart intends to assert here. The
8 Court also found that the Count fails to connect his factual allegations to the
9 numerous causes of action identified. The Court directed: If Stuart sincerely means
10 to assert that defendants violated his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and
11 Fourteenth Amendment rights, he must identify the factual allegations that support
12 each alleged violation.
13
Third, the Court noted that while length or verbosity alone are not
14 inappropriate, dismissal on Rule 8 grounds where the complaint is argumentative,

15 prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely irrelevant; McHenry v. Renne, 74 F.3d
16 1172, 1177-80 (9th Cir. 1996); verbose, confusing and conclusory, Nevijel v. North
17 Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981); or where it is impossible to
18 designate the cause or causes of action attempted to be alleged in the complaint,
19 Schmidt v. Herrmann, 614 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1980). The Court
20 characterized the Complaint generally: plaintiffs complaint here is confusing,
21 redundant, conclusory, and buries its factual allegations in pages of generalized
22 grievances about the family courts. The prolixity and inscrutability of plaintiffs
23 complaint is unduly prejudicial to defendants, who face the onerous task of combing
24 through [plaintiffs lengthy complaint] just to prepare an answer that admits or denies
25 such allegations and to determine what claims and allegations must be defended or
26 otherwise litigated. Order at 7:14 (quoting Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4
27 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2011).
28
The Courts dismissal was without prejudice and with leave to amend, with
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1 the following exceptions. The exceptionsdismissals with prejudicewere for

2 claims against the defendant judges for damages arising out of judicial acts within
3 the jurisdiction of their courts and claims against the Commission on Judicial
4 Performance and against its officials, Simi and Battson, to the extent the latter are
5 sued for damages in their official capacity. (Order 7:5-8).
Consistent with Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623
7 (9th Cir. 1988), the Court provided plaintiff a statement of the complaint's
8 deficiencies and instructed: (1) Heed the statute of limitations for Title 42 claims
9 which is generally two years and To the extent Stuart contends that equitable
10 tolling should apply, he must set forth specific allegations in his amended complaint
11 to support such a theory and (2) that Stuart appropriately and coherently identifies
12 his causes of action and the specific defendants he alleges liable for his asserted
13 damages without unnecessary verbiage, argument, and rhetoric. Order at 9:3.
The Court denied Defendant Superior Court of San Diego Countys motion for
14
15 sanctions under Rule 11 and deemed withdrawn ten other motions to dismiss,
16 providing no adjudication or direction regarding the withdrawn matter. At hearing
17 on February 26, 2014, the Court denied Plaintiffs Rule 11 motion nunc pro tunc
18 effective December 19, 2013.
19
DISCUSSION
20
I.
ANALYSIS OF THE OMNIBUS
21 A. Rule 41(b) Sanction is Frivolous

22
Defendants invite the Court to commit clear error of law in seeking sanctions
23 in a first response to a Complaint.1 The faithless litigation maneuver is not merely

24 frivolous, but a sad benchmark in the depravity, disrespect, color of law harassment,
25 and invidious discrimination these defendants have wrought upon the institutions they
26 today represent and the citizens they serve. Though sworn to the highest of standards
27
All Defendants but Superior Court Defendants (a portion of JUDICIAL

28 DEFENDANTS), BATTSON, and SIMI appear in opposition for the first time in the
Omnibus. See Procedural History Sec. IV, V.
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1 for obedience to principle and fairness, Defendants today deploy the lowest of
2 litigation tactics and abuse.
Unwarranted is the kindest characterization of Defendants attempt to lead
4 this Court into abuse of the power to sanction litigation conduct. If the plaintiff fails
5 to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to
6 dismiss the action or any claim against it. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). A sanction of
7 dismissal under Rule 41(b) is so harsh a penalty it should be imposed as a sanction
8 only in extreme circumstances. Dahl v. City of Huntington Beach, 84 F.3d 363, 366
9 (9th Cir. 1996). Before imposing dismissal as a sanction, the district court must
10 weigh several factors: the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; the
11 court's need to manage its docket; the risk of prejudice to the defendants; the public
12 policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and the availability of less drastic
13 sanctions. Thompson v. Housing Auth. of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir.
14 1986) (per curiam), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829 (1986); In re George, 322 F.3d 586,
15 591 (9th Cir. 2003). [T]he district court should make explicit findings concerning
16 each factor before dismissing an action for a party's failure to comply with court
17 orders. Dismissal (or another terminating sanction) is proper where at least four [of
18 the five] factors support dismissal, or where at least three factors strongly support
19 dismissal. Yourish v. Calif. Amplif., 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir.1999) (internal
20 citations omitted).
21 1. Plaintiffs Have Not Violated Any Rule or Order
22
Rule 41(b) is appropriate only upon a finding of failure to comply with these
23 rules or a court order. Defendants assert three failures: (1) that the FAC fails to
24 comply with Rule 8(a)(2) and (e) 2 requiring a short plain statement of a claim and
25
Defendants inaccurately recite Rules 8(a) and (e). OMNIBUS at 2:13-15 recites Rule 8(a) as
follows:
a pleading "shall" contain a "short and plain statement of the grounds on which the court's
26
jurisdiction depends" ... and a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
27 entitled to relief. ... ". This recitation is error. Accurately recited, Rule 8(a) provides: A pleading
that states a claim for relief must contain: (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing
28 that the pleader is entitled to relief. (emphasis added). Defendants also improperly recite Rule

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1 that allegations be simple, concise, and direct. (2) that the FAC fails to comply with
2 the Courts December 13, 2013 Order, and (3) the FAC fails to comply with other
3 orders. OMNIBUS at 2:12-8:16.
4
5
6
The FAC does not fail to comply with any rule or order.
a. Rule 8 Generally
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain a short
7 and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
8 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). The claim need only give the
9 defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell
10 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
11 U.S. 41, 47, (1957)). When ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must
12 accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Twombly at
13 555 556 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, n. 1, (2002);
14 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, (1989); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
15 (1974)). Dismissal is proper only where there is no cognizable legal theory or an
16 absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory. Navarro v.
17 Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). However, allegations consisting of nothing
18 more than a formulaic recitation of the elements' of a constitutional discrimination
19 claim alone do not satisfy Rule 8. Such allegations are not to be discounted
20 because they are unrealistic or nonsensical, but rather because they do nothing
21 more than state a legal conclusion. . . . Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969
22
23 8(e). Defendants claim: Rule 8(e) states a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.
OMNIBUS at 2:15-16 (emphasis added). This is inaccurate. Accurately recited, Rule 8(e) provides:
24 Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice. Defendants may have intended to cite Rule
25 8(d)(1), though they improperly recite that rule as well. Rule 8(d) governs pleadinga verb, not
a nounand provides in relevant part: (1) In General. Each allegation must be simple, concise,
26 and direct. No technical form is required. (emphasis added). Rule 8(d)s requirement of simple,
concise and direct modifies allegations, not an entire pleading. Defendants incorrectly interpret
27 the term pleading in the subsection (d) subtitle Pleading to be Concise and Direct (emphasis
added) as a noun rather than a verb. Similarly, Rule 8(a)s requirement of a short, plain statement
28 modifies claims, not the entire pleading. This is, and has been the standard for federal pleading for
at least 65 years. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).

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1 (9th Cir. 2009).

2
b. Rule 8(a) Plausibility Attacks
Each Defendant asserts one or more plausibility attacks under Twombly. To
4 enable analysis of these attacks, the following analytical framework is offered.

5
Defendants alone bear the burden of establishing entitlement to relief in any
6 pleading motionincluding establishing a failure to comply with Rule 8. Navarro v.

7 Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). The analytical framework for a plausibility
8 attack was recently articulated in Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 970 (9th
9 Cir. 2009) (Moss I), and later elaborated at Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 675 F.3d 1213,
10 1226 (9th Cir. 2012) amended, 711 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2013) (Moss II), and cert.
11 granted, 134 S. Ct. 677, (U.S. 2013) (argued March 26, 2013) (Moss III). Moss I
12 adopted the Supreme Courts suggested framework from Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
13 662, 664, (2009) to evaluate a plausibility attack:
14
[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by
15
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not
16
entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the
17
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.
18
When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
19
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
20
to relief.
21
Moss I at 970 (quoting Iqbal at 1950). The Court of Appeals reduced the
22 analysis to three stages: (1) identification of mere conclusions then (2) evaluate
23 Plaintiffs' specific factual allegations to determine whether we can reasonably infer a
24 [constitutional] violation from those facts. and (3) compare alternative explanations.
25 Id.; Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1214 (9th Cir. 2011) (The Court first identified
26 allegations not entitled to the presumption of truth . . . then determined whether the
27 remaining assumed to be true plausibly suggested an entitlement to relief.).
28
Traversing the first identification stage alone is insufficient to succeed in the

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1 defense because the existence of conclusions in virtually any pleading is inevitable.

2 [I]t is virtually impossible logically to distinguish among ultimate facts,
3 evidence, and conclusions. Essentially any allegation in a pleading must be an
4 assertion that certain occurrences took place. The pleading spectrum, passing from
5 evidence through ultimate facts to conclusions, is largely a continuum varying only in
6 the degree of particularity with which the occurrences are described. Karim-Panahi
7 v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Weinstein &
8 Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform: Drafting Pleading Rules, 57 Colum.
9 L.Rev. 518, 520 521 (1957)).
10
Moreover, the second and third stage require a comparison between a
11 plaintiffs allegations alleged to be conclusory (e.g., discriminatory animus

12 (Iqbal), or restraints effected by a contract, combination, or conspiracy (Twombly)),
13 and defendants alternative innocent explanation (e.g. normal parallel market
14 behavior (Twombly), or combatting terrorism reasonably resulting in a higher
15 proportion of middle eastern prisoners (Iqbal)). Where defendants cannot present an
16 innocent alternative in stage three, the plausibility attack fails and the conclusory
17 allegation is entitled to the presumption of truth. See Moss I multi-stage analysis,
18 supra. In Starr v. Baca, the court added to this analysis: If there are two alternative
19 explanations, one advanced by defendant and the other advanced by plaintiff, both of
20 which are plausible, plaintiff's complaint survives. Starr at 1215-16. cert. denied,
21 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012). See also Moss I, II, III, infra; Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. United
22 States, 648 F.3d 708, 721 (9th Cir.2011) (allegation that product performed below
23 industry standards certainly sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion); Daniels
24 Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir.2010); OSU Student Alliance v.
25 Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2012) (allegation that decision to destroy college
26 newspaper bins was within college administrations control was conclusory but
27 sufficient).
28
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1
2
c. Example Analysis: Moss I:

Moss I demonstrates the analytical progression. Moss plaintiffs were protesters
3 opposing President Bush while he dined at a Portland, Oregon restaurant. Two

4 groups of protestersone pro-Bush and one anti-Bushhad formed near a patio
5 where the President was seated. After the President was seated, the anti-Bush
6 protesters were moved by U.S. Secret Service agents to a location further away.
7 Pro-Bush protesters also situated nearby, but in a different location, were not
8 moved. The anti-Bush protestors alleged the move was motivated by viewpoint
9 discrimination against their anti-Bush viewpoint in violation of the First
10 Amendment. Moss I at 971.
11
Stage One: Identification of bald allegations: In carrying their burden in
12 their Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Moss I Defendants identified two conclusions in the
13 complaint they asserted were implausible conclusions: (1) impermissible motive on
14 the Agents part and (2) Agents acted in conformity with an officially-authorized
15 sub rosa Secret Service policy of suppressing speech critical of the President. Id. at
16 970.
17
Stage Two: Evaluate Supporting Factual Allegations: [O]ur next step is to
18 evaluate Plaintiffs' specific factual allegations to determine whether we can

19 reasonably infer a First Amendment violation from those facts. In this step, a court
20 examines the factual content of a challenged claim. A claim has facial plausibility
21 . . . when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
22 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at
23 969. In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory
24 factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly
25 suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. Id. at 969
26
Stage Three: Compare Competing Innocent Alternatives: The Moss
27 Plaintiffs identified two sets of facts that plausibly suggested improper motive: (a) the
28 relocation of anti-Bush demonstrators while leaving the pro-Bush demonstrators in
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1 place, and (b) diners and guests inside the restaurant were not ordered to leave the
2 restaurant despite even closer proximity to the President. Id. at 971. The Secret
3 Service asserted an alternative explanation: The agents were following content
4 neutral policies, and that the move was motivated by legitimate security concerns.
5 Plaintiffs contended that the formal policy was a sham. Id. at 966.
6
The Court analyzed the alternatives. On the first set of factsrelocation of
7 only the anti-Bush demonstratorsthe Court of Appeals relied on admissions in the

8 complaint that plaintiffs were moved an equal distance from the President, and
9 suffered no diminished ability to exercise their rights. The court reasoned that if the
10 agents motive was suppression of Plaintiffs' anti-Bush message, then they would
11 have moved plaintiffs to an area where the President could not hear their
12 demonstration, or at least to an area farther from the Inn then the position that the
13 pro-Bush demonstrators occupied. Id. at 971. Because the complaint admitted the
14 agents instructed to move the protesters to an equidistant location, the facts alleged
15 even if entirely truedid not burden expression on viewpoint.
16
On the second set of factsdiners inside the restaurant were not movedthe
17 Court of Appeals reasoned that the different treatment of diners and guests in the Inn,
18 who did not engage in expressive activity of any kind and were not located in the
19 public areas outside of the Inn, however, offers little if any support for such an
20 inference. Id. at 971.
21
The Court of Appeals concluded the complaints allegation of viewpoint
22 discrimination was not supported by alleged facts making the allegation plausible. Id.
23 It offered that the plaintiffs could possibly allege additional facts to support their
24 conclusion, and remanded with instructions that plaintiffs could amend. Id. at 975.
25
As will be seen, present Defendants neither erect nor traverse Moss Is multi-
26 stage framework. Most defendants ignore their burden of identifying conclusory

27 allegations, instead merely denying concepts such as conspiracy. Because at this
28 stage Defendants alone bear the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under the
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1 Rules they assert, all motions which fail to traverse the multi-step analysis must be
2 denied on this failure alone. Navarro, supra at 732.
3 2. The OMNIBUS Fails to Establish a Violation of Rules 8(a) and (e)
4
The OMNIBUS fails to erect the relevant test for analysis of claims under Rule
5 8. The Omnibus focusses its attack other features of the FAC, such as exhibits, or the
6 FAC as a whole. Such criticism, even if true, fails to establish a violation of these
7 Rules under Rule 41(b). Rule 8(a)(2) governs claims, not pleadings or exhibits.
8 Rule 8(a)(2) speaks of a short and plain statement of each claim, not a short and
9 plain pleading. Crumpacker v. Civiletti, 90 F.R.D. 326, 329 (D.C. Ind.1981) (citing
10 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 1217 (1969)). The test of
11 a claim is whether it gives the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is
12 and the grounds upon which it rests. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)
13 (emphasis added); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).
14
The OMNIBUS attacks the FAC on numerous points irrelevant to analysis
15 under of a claim: The FACs length (251 pages long with over 1250 pages of
16 attachments); dissatisfaction with the number and organization of exhibits (The
17 attachments appear to be exhibits but are not readily identifiable, indexed, marked, or
18 organized); the number of defendants (The FAC identifies over 58 defendants);
19 California Coalitions date of incorporation (OMNIBUS 5:5-8), that the FAC
20 mentions Lexevia while Lexevia is not a named plaintiff (OMNIBUS 5:2-4);
21 California Coalitions local and pro hac vice counsel (OMNIBUS 2:25-3:3); the use
22 of acronyms to identify groups of defendants (The list of Stuart Assault Coordinator
23 Defendants, named in numerous claims, is buried somewhere among numerous
24 acronyms and disorganized lists scattered throughout the FAC.); and even authors an
25 evidentiary soliloquy disparaging Plaintiff California Coalitions counsel (OMNIBUS
26 2:21-3:3). None of these attackseven if accurateare relevant to analysis of the
27 subject matter of Rule 8(a) and (e): claims.
28
To the extent Defendants do focus on claims, they highlight claim structures

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1 that are entirely permissible, such as multi-theory combination-claim or over 130

2 titled claims and many of those contain multiple sub-claims shotgun style . . .
3 OMNIBUS at 3:9. Multiple-party claims and multiple-claim complaints are
4 permissible: [M]ultipary, multiclaim complaints . . . should be stated as succinctly
5 and plainly as possible. Crumpacker at 329. Multiple-theory claims are also
6 permitted. See Rule 8(d)(2) Alternative Statements of a Claim or Defense.
Though the present FAC satisfies the relevant notice standard of Rule 8, and
8 though defendants may far more efficiently resolve these issues through discovery,
9 Plaintiff represents a present ability, though no desire, to separate multiparty and
10 multi-theory claims into numerous independent claims, and hereby request leave to
11 amend should the Court determine such protraction is necessary.
12 3. The FAC Complies With the Courts December 23, 2013 Order
13
The OMNIBUS incorrectly asserts the FAC fails to comply with the Courts
14 December 23 Order in three ways (OMNIBUS 5:19-6:6):

15 1.
It is pages longer: The Courts December Order explicitly disclaimed any
16 limitation on length. Citing McHenry, the Court acknowledged that length or

17 verbosity alone are not inappropriate. A complaint that is pages longer, is
18 prolix, or contains verbosity cannot be a violation of the December 23, 2013
19 Order or any Rule.
20
Though not required, Plaintiffs did eliminate some passages which were not
21 strictly necessary to support claims, such as the table articulating the Family Federal
22 Rights in the original complaint, and certain of the more argumentative passages.
23 Plainitffs intent was to delete passages that were not absolutely necessary to support
24 claims. As will be seen in rebutting defendants plausibility attacks below, every
25 remaining passage is necessary factual context required under Twombly and Iqbal.
26 There are no extraneous passages in the FAC. Indeed, Defendants presently
27 attack the FAC for not supplying enough factual detail, and insist on even more.
28 2.
It adds new defendants: The December Order included no restriction from

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1 adding Defendants. In fact, the December Order directed Plaintiff STUART to add
2 details supporting tolling and equitable estoppel defenses which also form the basis
3 for the new defendants To the extent Stuart contends that equitable tolling should
4 apply, he must set forth specific allegations in his amended complaint to support such
5 a theory. Order at 8:21. Plaintiffs complied by adding 30 pages of facts with
6 COUNT 3 detailing the MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, and various other factual
7 support for other claims elsewhere, such as COUNT 1 detailing each Defendants
8 behavior in the STUART ASSAULT, breaking out each state law claim in COUNT
9 2, expanding details against SIMI and BATTSON in COUNT 5 to address the
10 Eleventh Amendment defense they asserted, and the Court granted in part, in their
11 original motion. Each of these additions was required by the Court or Defendants
12 after the initial round of pleadings, and as Plaintiff warned, each response lengthened
13 the pleading. Because these facts also support claims for deprivation of rights and
14 racketeering against the CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS and GROCH, Plaintiff
15 added claims on these facts rather than filing a separate action in due course.
16
3.
17
The December Order did not prohibit Plaintiff from adding claims. The events
It contains a whole new set of claims for obstruction of justice:
18 alleged in Count 4 NESTHUS OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE occurred after the

19 August 20, 2013 filing of the initial Complaint and obviously could not be included
20 in that pleading. The allegations are further instances of the illegal HARASSMENT
21 AND ABUSE by the ongoing criminal enterprises set forth in the initial Complaint,
22 and are properly pled in this Action. See, Doc. No. 4, Ex Parte Applicaiotn for
23 Emergency Harassment Restraining Order.
24
Exclusion of verbiage, argument, and rhetoric Risks Error
25
Defendants recite the Order directing Plaintiff to state claims without
26 unnecessary verbiage, argument, and rhetoric." Doc. No. 88, p. 9. Plaintiffs

27 respectfully submit that the FAC does not contain such matter, and to the extent
28 Defendants complain otherwise, this cannot be grounds to dismiss.
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Plaintiff suggests that the Court and Defendants have mischaracterized as
2 verbiage or rhetoric matter that is necessary to support claimsparticularly after

3 Twombly heightened pleading burdens for complaints. The FAC alleges numerous
4 conspiracies and enterprises under complex laws necessitating detailed pleading. The
5 tension between Rule 8s short, plain statement and Twomblys sufficient factual
6 detail requirements are in tension here as in many other recent cases grappling with
7 Twomblys new pleading burdens.
8
The claims are drafted in a uniform fashion which Plaintiff STUART and
9 counsel Webb have utilized in dozens collective years pleading matters in United
10 States District Court. Every claim begins with a first paragraph specifying (1) the
11 party/ies asserting the claim, (2) the defendant/s the claim is asserted against, and (3)
12 a general description of the facts, and (4) the authority asserted in the claim. For
13 example, Claim 1.1, 153 reads: This is a Claim by STUART against Defendants
14 ODO and ODO DOES 1 and 2, for deprivation of rights under color of law pursuant
15 to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Cal. Const. art. I, 26.
16
Every claim concludes with a paragraph reciting the language of the statute or
17 law asserted, and identifying the party/ies injured. For example, Claim 1.1, 165:
18 In so acting, Defendants CULPABLY and UNREASONABLY breached one or
19 more PROFESSIONAL DUTIES, causing foreseeable injury to STUART in
20 deprivation of STUARTS right to not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
21 due process of law secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
22 Constitution of the United States and Article I 7(a) and 26 of the Constitution of
23 the State of California (SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS).
24
The body of each claim contains paragraphs alleging details relevant to the
25 claim, and incorporates by reference to specific prior passages (identified by

26 acronyms) containing relevant allegations. For example, Claim 3.2 against GARSON
27 is six paragraphs. Paragraph 478 details GARSONS wrongdoing by referencing
28 acronyms which incorporate facts earlier alleged, such as GARSON PERJURY
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1 ONE which is defined at paragraph 378.

2
Defendants attack this use of acronyms within claims to reference lengthy
3 passages alleged elsewhere. By setting forth and labeling the passages outside of
4 claims, subsequent claims are considerably more short and plain, and substantial
5 duplication of long passages is avoided. Plaintiffs invite and would eagerly consider
6 any superior suggestion to accomplish short, plain pleading of claims.
7
8
Defendants Invitation to Modify Rule 8s Notice Standard Risks Error

Plaintiff respectfully suggests that Defendants assertion of the Courts
9 instruction to eliminate unnecessary verbiage, argument, and rhetoric invites a

10 substantial deviance from notice pleading standard of Rule 8. Modifying Rule 8 by
11 local rule or order is specifically prohibited by the Rules Enabling Act to the Rules
12 of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. 2072, provides in part:
13
(a)
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of
14
practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States
15
district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and
16
courts of appeals.
17
(b)
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.
18 (emphasis added). The substantive rights which the Rules may not abridge include
19 constitutional rights of free speech, due process, and jury trial. See Hanna v. Plumer,
20 380 U.S. 460, 47073 (1965) (rules may not violate the Constitution); U.S. v.
21 Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir.1996) (local rule void for vagueness in violation
22 of Fifth Amendment due process); Standing Comm. on Discipline of U.S. Dist. Court
23 for Cent. Dist. of California v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1436-37 (9th Cir. 1995) (local
24 rule prohibiting courtroom speech overbroad because it purports to punish a great
25 deal of constitutionally protected speech, including true statements reflecting
26 adversely on the reputation or character of federal judges.). While insubstantial
27 burdens on rights may be appropriate if they pass some level of scrutiny, substantial
28 burdens are not. Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987); Bus. Guides, Inc. v.
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1 Chromatic Commc'ns Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 558 (1991) (Rule 11 sanctions
2 permitted only if sanctions insubstantial burden on Fifth and Seventh Amendment
3 rights).
4
Adding a prohibition for unnecessary verbiage, argument, and rhetoric
5 nowhere found in Rule 8 impermissibly modifies the unambiguous language of the

6 Rule. We give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain meaning. Pavelic &
7 LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989). Indeed, Rule 8
8 prohibits nothing, but unambiguously requires merely that a pleading contain a short
9 plain statement of a clam. (emphasis added)
10
The Courts authority to fashion local rules is similarly restricted. Fed.R. Civ.
11 Pro. Rule 83(a)(2) provides: (2) Requirement of Form. A local rule imposing a
12 requirement of form must not be enforced in a way that causes a party to lose any
13 right because of a nonwillful failure to comply. Section (b) provides: No sanction
14 or other disadvantage may be imposed for noncompliance with any requirement not
15 in federal law, federal rules, or the local rules unless the alleged violator has been
16 furnished in the particular case with actual notice of the requirement. All said
17 about the rules of a district court must of course apply a fortiori to the rules of an
18 individual judge. 1988 Commentary to 28 U.S.C.A. 2071 (West)
19
Prohibiting verbiage, argument, or rhetoric is also another way of prohibiting
20 length (McHenry v. Renne, 74 F.3d 1172, 1177-80 (9th Cir. 1996)) is inconsistent
21 with the unambiguous Rule, (McCarthy, 2010 WL 2243354 at *1), deprives
22 Plaintiffs First, Fifth, and Seventh Amendment rights, and would constitute an abuse
23 of discretion by committing an error of law.
24
Other Orders or Rules are Irrelevant
25
Defendants claim Stuart has violated other Rules since day one. OMNIBUS
26 6:9. Rule 41(b) does not permit sanctions for violating other rules but these
27 Rulesthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants assert violations of other
28 rules including California Government Code 6254.21, a General Order of the
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1 District Court for the Southern District, and this Courts Civil Case Procedures
2 regarding hearing scheduling rules (OMNIBUS 6:17-27),. These are not the relevant
3 Rules. 1988 Commentary to 28 U.S.C.A. 2071 (West).3
4
Defendants citation to Yourish (docketed minute order held to be a formal
5 order) and World Thrust Films (Rule 41(b) dismissal for plaintiffs contumacious
6 disobedience of two docketed scheduling orders and one order to show cause
7 reversed because less drastic sanctions available) (OMNIBUS at 7:3-6) does not
8 expand the terms rule and order in Rule 41(b) to include violations of local
9 rules, oral orders or institutional General Orders of this District Court.
10
Public Policy, Prejudice, Simple Remedies
11
Though the OMNIBUS fails to carry any burden here as Defendants must
12 (Yourish at 990), the remaining factors of the Rule 41(b) analysis weigh against a
13 sanction. In cases that implicate important public policy concerns, the court should
14 weigh the public interest in the case and the preference for disposing of cases on their
15 merits prior to granting dismissal. United States v. National Medical Enters., Inc.,
16 792 F.2d 906, 913 (9th Cir.1986). In Dahl v. City of Huntington Beach, 84 F.3d 363,
17 366 (9th Cir. 1996) the Court of Appeals reversed a dismissal sanction despite a
18 documented history of discovery abuse and numerous prior sanctions against
19 plaintiffs counsel. Id. The underlying claim of police brutality in this case is a
20 serious one, calling into question the manner by which the state exercises its
21 monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Thus, the public has an interest in having
22 this case decided on the merits. See also Indus. Bldg. Materials, Inc. v.
23 Interchemical Corp., 278 F. Supp. 938, 949 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (drastic remedy of
24 sanction only appropriate where no less drastic measures available).
25
26
Plaintiffs have elsewhere petitioned that including Defendants home addresses in the initial
Complaint is not a violation of General Order 550, and Government Code 6254.1 is invalid ab
27 initio as a matter of law. See, Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application for Emergency Harassment
Restraining Order, Doc. No. 4. Superior Court employee Ms. Kristine Nesthus threats to retaliate
28 for Plaintiffs initiation of this Action is an indictable crime, and Ms. Nesthuss threats fall
somewhat short of an Order of a United States District Court Judge.

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This Action involves issues of public policy at least as important as police
2 brutalitythe integrity and obedience to fundamental state and federal laws of our
3 statewide family courts, their in-house private forensic psychology enterprises,
4 prevention of thousands of divorce lawyers in extorting and defrauding unwary
5 families and children in the crisis of a domestic dispute, the City of San Diego and
6 its City Attorneys Office and county law enforcement deploying violence under
7 color of law to persecute an officer of this Court for his support and advocacy for
8 federal processes and institutions and enforcement of the rights of his clients and
9 families and children statewide to equal rights, privileges and immunities under state
10 and federal law. More precious public interests are difficult to imagine.
11
Defendants have not and cannot establish prejudice at their first opposition to a
12 pleading; they have been on notice of Plaintiffs efforts and the CLAIM AND
13 DEMAND for years and have well-documented their own deplorable behavior in
14 public records now in their possession. This action is in its infancy, and the present
15 motions are most defendants first contesting appearance. In the absence of prejudice
16 to the opposing party, leave to amend must be freely granted. Foman v. Davis, 371
17 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Wyshak v. City Nat. Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 826-27 (9th Cir.
18 1979).
19
The request for dismissal as a sanction nothing less than frivolous harassment
20 and expense-inducing delay. Numerous less drastic remedies such as clarification

21 through discovery and re-visitation through Rule 56 pruning motions are available
22 and far more efficient under these circumstances. [I]t would be burdensome to have
23 the district court prune a complaint at the pleading stage by making a determine
24 action with regard to each allegation within a cause of action that is legally
25 cognizable when viewed in its totality. Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 326 (2d Cir.
26 1996); Westways World Travel v. AMR Corp., 182 F. Supp.2d 952 (C.D. Calif. 2001).
27 Such an analysis is better done in the context of a motion for summary judgment
28 where the true facts, as opposed to the presumed facts, are established. Id.
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1 Conclusory allegation attacks are modernly addressed at the pleading stage through
2 the Moss I multi-stage analysis.
3
To the extent Defendants accuse particular claims of inconsistencies between
4 the claim title and defendants named in the Complaint (e.g. OMNIBUS at 4:5-6:8),
5 such inconsistencies are far more efficiently resolved through discovery or by
6 amendment. The purpose of Rule 8(a)(2) is to provide liberal pleading guidelines so
7 that the merits of plaintiffs' claims will not be decided on technicalities. In re Credit
8 Industrial Corp., 366 F.2d 402, 411 (2d Cir. 1966). To the extent that the pleadings
9 can be cured by the allegation of additional facts, the plaintiff should be afforded
10 leave to amend. Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern California Collection Serv.
11 Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir.1990) (citations omitted); Deeths v. Lucile Slater
12 Packard Children's Hosp. at Stanford, 1:12-CV-02096-LJO, 2013 WL 6185175
13 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2013). Plaintiffs represent an ability, though no desire, to amend
14 to address Defendants complaints, and should the Court desire hereby request leave
15 to do so.
16 4. Dismissal With Prejudice is Not Discretionary
17
Defendants assert that, as an additional ground for dismissal, the court has
18 discretion to dismiss for Rule 8 and 9 pleading failures without leave to amend, and
19 that discretion is particularly broad where, as here, plaintiff has previously amended
20 the complaint. OMNIBUS 7:7-8:16. They cite Rules 8 and 9 for authority for such
21 discretion, and assert such that such discretion is supported by Metzler, Cafasso,
22 and Nevijel.
23
This assertion is frivolously inaccurate. Defendants previously asserted Rule 8
24 as a basis for dismissal with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). Superior Court
25 Defendants Motion to Dismiss, Doc. No. 16-1, 9-10. In opposition, Plaintiffs noted
26 that Rule 8 is not an appropriate ground for dismissal with prejudice under 12(b)(6),
27 and that Superior Court Defendants overreached in insisting on dismissal with
28 prejudice. Plaintiffs Opposition, Doc. No. 21, 12:26-16:17. The Court denied
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1 Defendants motion on this ground. Doc. No. 88, 8:24-9:6.

2
Defendants OMNIBUS re-casts this earlier failed attempt under Rule 12(b)(6)
3 as a frivolous request for a sanction under Rule 41(b), and also at the courts
4 discretion. They assert the same arguments and authority, now asserting not Rule
5 12(b)(6), but purely by a phantom discretion to dismiss. The authority to support a
6 discretionary dismissal is even less persuasive than under Rule 12(b)(6): Metzler
7 was a dismissal on a third attempt to amend to plead the same missing elements three
8 times. At each dismissal the court specified what elements plaintiffs were required,
9 but failed, to plead. Metzler at 1062 (loss causation, strong inference of scienter
10 and falsity). Id. at 1060. Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637
11 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2011) was on plaintiffs Rule 15 motion for leave to amend
12 after defendants brought a successful Rule 12(c) motion to dismiss. Plaintiff had
13 amended three times and conducted two years of acrimonious discovery in which
14 plaintiff expressly admitted that her amended complaint did not assert a false claim.
15 Id. Plaintiff attempted to recover by moving under Rule 15 and proffering a 733 page
16 third amended complaint, yet the proffered pleading still failed to allege even a single
17 false claim. Id.
18
In Nevijel plaintiffs conceded (perhaps unwisely) that their third complaint did
19 not comply with Rule 8, and sought leave to amend again. On plaintiffs concession
20 of noncompliance, the district court dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs on appeal
21 contended that that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the case
22 under Rule 41(b) because less drastic alternatives were available. The Court of
23 Appeals found that given Plaintiffs admission of noncompliance with Rule 8, and the
24 aggravating circumstances of three other cases brought by the same plaintiff in
25 different state and federal venues against the same insurance defendants on the same
26 legal theories that had been dismissed for the same reasons, the district court did not
27 abuse its discretion to dismiss rather than search for less drastic alternatives. Id.
28
Nevijals bizarre facts are not present here. Rule 41(b) is directed to a
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1 plaintiffnot his counsel. Whatever inaccurate and unprofessional aspersions Mr.

2 Lucas craves to cast upon counsel for California Coalition, Mr. Webb, the remarks
3 are irrelevant under Rule 41(b) as Plaintiffs Stuart and California Coalition have
4 brought no prior suit on any present defendant on any present claim in this or any
5 other court, and may not be sanctioned. See Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery
6 filed herewith.
7
Moreover, Nevijel has been repeatedly diminished as authority. Since 1981,
8 this Circuit and others have found that even verbose, prolix, and conclusory
9 complaints and voluminous exhibits fully compliant with Rule 8. In Hearns v. San
10 Bernardino Police Dep't, 530 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2008) the Court of Appeals
11 revisited Nevijels application of the abuse of discretion standard under Rule 41(b):
12 We review a Rule 41(b) dismissal for abuse of discretion. To do so, we must
13 necessarily consider the legal question of whether the district court correctly
14 dismissed without prejudice the original complaint on Rule 8 grounds. A district
15 court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law. Id. at 1129
16 (internal citations omitted). Declining to follow Nevijel, the Court of Appeals in
17 Hearns reversed the district courts dismissal of a complaint under Rule 41(b) as an
18 abuse of discretion because, by misapplying Rule 8, the district court committed an
19 error of law which is, by definition, an abuse of discretion. Id.
20
Contemporary courts have also specifically declined to follow Nevijal,
21 following instead the analysis in McHenry and Hearns. In Fid. Nat. Title Ins. Co. v.
22 Castle, 2011 WL 6141310 (N.D. Cal. 2011) defendants attacked a RICO complaint
23 against 52 defendants, 12 counts, 44 pages, 565 pages of exhibits, 13 plaintiffs, with
24 claims broken into parts and in which plaintiffs regularly refer to defendants'
25 without specifying exactly which defendant or defendants is liable for the alleged
26 acts. [T]he Court finds no fault with the length and complexity of the complaint, as
27 that is a necessary consequence of the number and complexity of the schemes
28 alleged. Id. Dismissal as a sanction is particularly inappropriate plaintiff is
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1 proceeding in pro se. See Sathianathan v. Smith Barney, Inc., C 04-2130 SBA, 2004
2 WL 3607403 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2005), n. 15 (declining to follow Nevijel where
3 plaintiff proceeding in pro se). See also, Karim-Panahi, supra at 623 (declining to
4 follow Nevijel where plaintiff proceeds pro se).
5 5. Contemporaneous Analysis of Similar Complaints Held Satisfactory
6
Contemporary analysis within this Circuit and others has rejected length or
7 complexity as a violation of Rule 8. Perez-Falcon v. Synagro West, LLC, 2011 WL

8 6752533, *3 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (motion to dismiss denied because although plaintiffs
9 complaint was hardly a model of clarity or elucidation, it gave defendant fair notice
10 of claim); U.S. v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003) (Some
11 complaints are windy but understandable. Surplusage can and should be ignored.);
12 Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir.2004) (lengthy complaint not so
13 confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any,
14 is well disguised) (internal quotation omitted); See also McCarthy v. Fuller, 2010
15 WL 2243354, *1 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (complaint should not be dismissed if it is windy,
16 but understandable. [The] judge should bypass the dross and get on with the case);
17 Catalan v. Vermillion Ranch Ltd. Partnership, 2007, 2007 WL 38135, *5 (D.C.
18 Colo.) (74 pages total, 65 page statement of facts, ten claims, six plaintiffs, seven
19 defendants, RICO allegations) (The length of the Complaint appears to be a result of
20 the number of Plaintiffs and complexity of the claims, rather than a problem with the
21 Complaint being disorganized and repetitive.); In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Secs.
22 Litigation, 2003 WL 22999478 (D.C.N.Y.) (326 pages, 840 paragraphs, myriad
23 defendants, particularly complex accounting fraud held understandable that the
24 complaint was quite large); Burke v. Dowling, 944 F.Supp. 1036 (D.C.N.Y. 1995)
25 (115 pages, 231 paragraphs, seven causes of action, ten defendants); Morgan v.
26 Kobrin Secs., Inc., 649 F.Supp. 1023, 1027 (D.C.Ill.1986); Crumpacker v. Civiletti,
27 90 F.R.D. 326, 329 (N.D.Ind.1981) (80 pages, certainly prolix); ReSource N.E. of
28 Long Island, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, D.C.N.Y.2000, 80 F.Supp.2d 52 (court
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1 declined to dismiss needlessly prolix and redundant 49 page complaint because it was
2 not so opaque as to defy understanding or prevent defendants from answering); Niles
3 v. Nelson, 72 F.Supp.2d 13 (D.C.N.Y.1999 ) (accepting lengthy, rambling complaint
4 because defendant was able to comprehend plaintiffs causes of action fully and
5 submit answer); Murray v. Sevier, 993 F.Supp. 1394 (D.C.Ala. 1997) (adopting state
6 courts lack of concern over complaints length and format); Burke v. Dowling, 944
7 F.Supp. 1036, 1049 (D.C.N.Y. 1995) (Absent extraordinary circumstances,
8 however, it is an abuse of discretion for a court to dismiss a complaint under Rule 8
9 without granting leave to amend.); Giuliano v. Everything Yogurt, Inc., 819 F.Supp.
10 240 (D.C.N.Y.1993) (when pleading contains too much detail, the appropriate
11 remedy is to strike immaterial or redundant allegations, rather than dismiss
12 complaint); Carrigan v. California State Legislature, 263 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1959),
13 cert. denied 79 S.Ct. 901, (1959).
14 6. Defendants Demonstrate Abundant Ability to Defend
15
Defendants own behavior demonstrates they are quite able to defend
16 aggressively. Crumpacker v. Civiletti, 90 F.R.D. 326, 329 (D.C.Ind.1981) (Given

17 Kobrin's well-briefed Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it is clear he is fully apprised of the
18 charges against him.). The OMNIBUS accurately identifies over 130 "titled" claims
19 and many of those contain multiple sub-claims, (OMNIBUS 3:4-10), numerous
20 claims against all defendants under 42 U.S. 1983 (OMNIBUS 13:24-25), 31
21 RICO claims alleged against the SDCBA (OMNIBUS 15:21), new claims in the
22 FAC (OMNIBUS 1:12); The list of Stuart Assault Coordinator Defendants, named
23 in numerous claims, (OMNIBUS 9:11); plural damage claims (OMNIBUS 5:5,
24 12:16); plaintiffs' claims are alleged violations of their civil rights actionable under
25 42 U.S.C. 1983 (OMNIBUS 13:9-10). One hundred eighty pages of joinders
26 attacking dozens of claims on dozens of issues demonstrates that though these
27 defendants have certainly failed to understand and comply with the laws they violate
28 in their day-to-day business practices, their inability to comprehend is not the result
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1 of any pleadings inscrutability. More likely they are deterred by the complexity of
2 the statutes posed against them,4 and by what must be an unpleasant task of
3 accounting for years of compounded criminality they have inflicted on their own
4 fiduciaries, clients, justice systems, and tens of thousands of families and children
5 state and nationwide.
6 7. Defendants Improperly Introduce Extrinsic Evidence
7
Plaintiff has separately objected and moved to take testimony from Mr. Lucas
8 regarding his substantive witness testimony regarding Rule 8 issues. The scurrilous
9 characterizations of Mr. Webb are unprofessional, vigorously contested, and
10 extraneous to any issue relevant in this proceeding. See Motion for Leave to Conduct
11 Early Discovery. Defendants have injected Mr. Lucas testimony as a percipient and
12 expert witness into a motion that cannot weight evidence. In so doing, they prejudice
13 Plaintiffs rights to a fair hearing on this motion in violation of the Rules of Civil
14 Procedure and constituting a deprivation of Plaintiffs Fifth and Seventh Amendment
15 rights under the Constitution of the United States. The proscribed remedy for such
16 irregular procedure is to convert the present motion into a Rule 56 motion, permit
17 cross examination of the proposed evidence under Rule 45, and subpoena Mr. Lucas
18 to testify at hearing. Fed.R. Civ. Pro. 56(d). In the event Mr. Lucas declaration is
19 submitted in bad faith, sanctions may be sought. Fed.R. Civ. Pro. 56(h). Plaintiffs
20 hereby and by accompanying motion so move.
21
22
42 U.S.C. 1985(1), (2), and (3) is drafted as a single sentence of 590 words in six
23 paragraphs. It has been generously assailed by Justice Stevens as somewhat difficult to parse.
Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 724, (1983). RICO has been bewailed as "arcane," "tormented,"
24 "complicated," "agonizingly difficult" and "fraught with arcane mysteries." Bryant v. Yellow
25 Freight Sys., 989 F. Supp. 966, 968 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Macy's E., Inc. v. Emergency Envtl. Servs.,
Inc., 925 F. Supp. 191, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("arcane eccentricities of RICO jurisprudence");
26 Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 677 (4th Cir. 1989) (a "tormented statute"); Sadighi v.
Daghighfekr, 36 F. Supp. 2d 267 (D.S.C. 1999) (noting statute's "torment"); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493
27 U.S. 455, 465 (1990); Cent. Distribs. of Beer [,] Inc. v. Conn., 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir. 1993) ("one
of the most complex statutes ever enacted by Congress"); Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1435
28 (7th Cir. 1990) (a complex statute); Murray v. Midwest Real Estate Inv. Co., No. 98C1569, 1998
WL 919694, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 1998) ("exceedingly complicated").

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1 B. Statutes Of Limitations Bar No Claim

All Defendants assert statute of limitations defenses. OMNIBUS Doc. No. 131
3 at 7; JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS Doc. No. 139, 8:16-25; GORE Doc. No. 141-1, 2:64 23; DOYNE Doc. No. 143-1, 3-5:15; FEDERAL Doc. No. 145, 2:17, 4:16. Statute of
5 Limitations is an affirmative defense for which Defendant bear the burden of proof.
6 Wyshak v. City Nat. Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 826-27 (9th Cir. 1979). A Defendant
7 asserting a statute of limitations attack must address three variables: (1) the length of
8 the relevant limitations period for the claim (term), (2) the date the period began to
9 run (accrual), and (3) the date the action is deemed filed. At the Rule 12 stage,
10 Defendants bear the burden of proving each element from the face of the Complaint.
11 Graham v. Taubman, 610 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.1979). If those variables indicate a
12 limitation period has expired, a party facing a properly-established limitation defense
13 may assert statutory or equitable relief including for present purposes (a) tolling and
14 (b) estoppel.5
15
Defendant offer scant analysis, mistaking this case for a single incident
16 scenario. Plaintiffs offer the Court a more robust analysis.

17 1. Term
18
Civil Rights Claims: Defendants assert terms of two years applicable to section
19 1983 and 1985 actions (OMNIBUS 11:1-26; Sup.Ct. 8:22-25; DOYNE Doc. No.
20 143-1, 4:1-3), others parallel. Californias two year statute of limitations for personal
21 injuries has been identified as generally applicable, but determining which state
22 claim is most analogous requires examination of each claim. McCluny v. Silliman,
23 28 U.S. 270, 276 (1830) (federal courts look to the specific injury asserted to
24 determine the state law to apply). [T]he Court has not mechanically applied a state
25 statute of limitations simply because a limitations periods is absent from the federal
26 statute. State legislatures do not devise their limitations periods with national interests
27
28
A table Court and counsel may find useful in analysis of statutes of limitations issues is
available at 4 Am. Jur. Trials 441, VII, Solving Statutes of Limitation Problems.

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1 in mind, and it is the duty of the federal courts to assure that the importation of state
2 law will not frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national policies.
3 Although state law is our primary guide in this area, it is not, to be sure, our exclusive
4 guide. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975).
Claims most closely analogous to the present claims subject to longer terms
6 under California law, include actions for breach of written contract (Counts 2, 11)
7 C.C.P. 337 (three years); actions based upon fraud, duress, mistake (Counts 2, 11)
8 C.C.P. 338(d) (four years); and liability created by statute C.C.P. (three years).6
9
Borrowing Any Limitation Is Unnecessary, and Would Frustrate Purposes
10
Adoption of a two year statutory period in this case would frustrate the
11 purposes of the Civil Rights Act. State limitations periods will not be borrowed if
12 their application would be inconsistent with the underlying policies of the federal
13 statute. Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., supra, 383 U.S. at 701; Board of
14 County Commissioners v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 352; Occidental Life Ins. Co.
15 of California v. E.E.O.C., 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977). The Court may decline to
16 borrow state law when the applicable state limitations period would have frustrated
17 the policy of the federal statute, concluding that in such a case no limitations period
18 governs the suit. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S.
19 143, 157 (1987).
20
The purpose of the Civil Rights Act was to prohibit precisely the abuse of State
21 authority here allegedconspiracy to deprive United States citizens of equal

22 protection of the laws. There can be no doubt at least since Ex parte Virginia, that
23 Congress has the power to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against
24 those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity,
25 whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it. . . . First, it might, of
26 course, override certain kinds of state laws. . . . Second, it provided a remedy where
27 state law was inadequate. . . . The third aim was to provide a federal remedy where
28
66
BIERER asserts Californias one year statute for legal malpractice claims is analogous. Doc.
No. 135-1, 5:11-21. No plaintiff asserts legal malpractice in this action.

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1 the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice. The
2 opposition to the measure complained that It overrides the reserved powers of the
3 States. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961) (internal citations omitted).
4
The FAC details coordinated malingering of petulant state and local officials
5 deploying state-sponsored violence in concert with private wealth to impede, delay,

6 and obstruct Plaintiffs efforts to redress grievances in state and federal executive and
7 law enforcement agencies, state courts, and in this United States District Court
8 precisely the evils the Civil Rights Act was provided to prohibit and remedy. To
9 appease such belligerence by gratuitously borrowing from their own forums
10 abbreviated personal injury limitations statute to cut off this action rewards the
11 behavior the statutes were intended to deteran ongoing, coordinated, highly
12 effective pestilence onto tens of thousands of United States citizens whose interests
13 are today present, and perpetrate an obscene affront to our most cherished civic
14 values of liberty and equal justice under law. This Court is bound by no state or
15 federal limitations term, and it need not, and should not, borrow Californias or any
16 states law that would countenance those very state actors criminal violations of
17 federal law in oppression of some of the States most vulnerable citizens.
18
United States courts have reasoned that parties asserting federal rights should
19 not be handicapped simply because they assert federal law claims that could also be
20 brought under state law. The purpose of the longer limitation period is to give a
21 person with a federal claim at least as long an opportunity to sue as a person with a
22 state claim. Herm, 663 F.2d at 681. Caproni v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 15 F.3d 614,
23 618 (6th Cir. 1994). Though many Section 1983 actions are based upon facts
24 alleging personal injury, for actions sounding in other state law causes of action, the
25 federal limitations period should be no shorter than a period for the state law tort. Id.
26
RICO: There is no limitation term for RICO. District courts may, but need
27 not, borrow the four year limitation period of the Clayton Act. Agency Holding
28 Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987). Extortion claims are
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1 subject to a five year limitations period of the Hobbs Act under 18 U.S.C. 3282.
2 United States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825, 829 (1st Cir. 1988).7
3
Lanham Act: Like RICO, district courts may borrow state limitations
4 periods for fraud (C.C.P. 338(d)). Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am.,
5 Inc., 603 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010).
6 2. Accrual
7
The OMNIBUS focuses on the April 15, 2010 STUART ASSAULT as the sole
8 accrual event relevant for its statute of limitations defense. Superior Court identifies
9 an April 10, 2008 date regarding DOYNE in Count 11. Doc. No. 139, 8:22-25.
10 These events are not the appropriate accrual date for any claim.
11
Federal Law Claims: Though date of injury is an accrual event for single-
12 incident claims, the last overt act rule is used in continuing conspiracy claims.
13 Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F.2d 649, 654 (10th Cir. 1990) (continuing conspiracy
14 where defendants out to get plaintiff); Lauter v. Anoufrieva, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1060
15 (C.D. Cal. 2009). A continuing conspiracy claim arises where defendants behavior
16 is an ongoing or series of wrongs, such as an ongoing refusal to perform according to
17 duty. Pace Indus., Inc. v. Three Phoenix Co., 813 F.2d 234, 237 (9th Cir. 1987).
18 This is not a single incident action. All authority cited by Defendants relies on
19 single incident scenarioswhere a plaintiff experiences a single injury and later
20 brings suit challenged as untimely.
21
Similarly under RICO, each new, overt act that is calculated to effect the object
22 of the conspiracy renews the running of the statute. Grunewald v. United States, 353
23 U.S. 391, 39697 (1957); United States v. Craft, 105 F.3d 1123, 1125 (6th Cir. 1997).
24
25
FAC Continuing Conspiracy Allegations: Almost every claim in the FAC is

7
DOYNE asserts that RICO claims are subject to a California medical malpractice limitations
26 period under C.C.P. 340.5. Doc. No. 143-1, 4:3-5. DOYNE is not a health care provider but a law
enforcement investigator. In this case he was hired as a mediator. FAC 215, 814. BIERER
27 asserts that the limitations term for RICO claims based on the STUART ASSAULT are subject to
California law. Doc. No. 135-1, 5:26-28. BIERER and DOYNES citation to state law for RICO
28 claims is inaccurateRICO borrows from federal law. Agency Holding, supra.

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1 alleged in conspiracy.8 The conspiracies are themselves alleged as interrelated;

2 STUART ASSAULT is alleged but one set of events in a series of engagement
3 between Plaintiffs and various elements of ongoing racketeering enterprises. The
4 FAC alleges the series as including the 2007-2009 mail fraud, (RICO COUNTS 1-2),
5 the DOYNE TERRORISM in 2008-09 (COUNT 11), the STUART ASSAULT in
6 2010, the MALICIOUS PROSECUTION in 2011-2013, and the COMMISSIONS
7 OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE in 2008 and the NESTHUS OBSTRUCTION OF
8 JUSTICE in 2013. Each conspiracy furthered a pattern of HARASSMENT AND
9 ABUSE. FAC 1194. Stuart has remained at jeopardy or under execution of
10 sentence on these false charges until May 15, 2013, and remains at jeopardy under
11 two illegal protective orders to this day. FAC 419-466. As each of these crimes
12 were committed in concerted efforts, they are alleged, as they must be, as multiple
13 conspiracies and enterprises.
14
The relevant date for accrual for acts in conspiracy and enterprise is the last
15 overt act of commission; in this case no earlier than the most recent NESTHUS
16 OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE occurring on September 19, 2013. FAC 537. Even
17 accepting arguendo Defendants assertion that a two year statute applies, any action
18 filed before September 19, 2015 is timely.
19
RICO accrual: Accrual restarts each time a plaintiff experiences a new and
20 independent injury. Venegas v. Wagner, 704 F.2d 1144, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983).
21 Fraud claims (Racketeering Counts 1, 2) accrue upon date of discovery of all
22 elements of the fraud. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1102 (2d Cir.
23 1988). Subsequent injury from the same conspiracy resets the accrual date. Thomas
24
8
FAC 145, 147, 310, 370 (STUART ASSAULT COORDINATORS), 368 COUNT 3
(MALICIOUS PROSECUTION/PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT/FALSE
26 IMPRISONMENTS), 495 (GROCH/CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS), 509 (NESTHUS
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE), 553 (BATTSON/SIMI), 639 (SUPERVISING
27 DEFENDANTS), COUNTS 9, 10 (1985, 86 COLOR OF LAW DEFENDANTS), 808 (DOYNE
TERRORISM), COUNT 12, 913 (LANHAM ACT), 926, 955, 1041, 1141, 1152, 1165, 1182
28 (ALL RICO COUNTS), RICO COUNTS 8, 9, 10 (RICO CONSPIRACIES), 1184-86 (FICO
CONSPIRACIES).
25

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1 v. Miller, 928 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1991); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge
2 Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9th Cir.1989) ("To be liable, each participant in the
3 conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each participant must at
4 least share the common objective of the conspiracy."). Bankers Trust at 1103
5 (RICO); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Ammann, 838 F.2 4 (9th Cir. 1987).
6 Accrual for the Racketeering claim (as opposed to the predicate act claim) does not
7 occur until the plaintiff discovers both the injury and pattern. Bivens Gardens Office
8 Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Fla., Inc., 906 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1990).
9
Here, the complex mail and honest services fraud schemes were well-disguised
10 by fiduciaries to STUART: DOYNE, BLANCHET, VIVIANO, WOHLFEIL and

11 SCHALL. Moreno v. Sanchez, 106 Cal.App.4th 1415 (2003) (color of law actors are
12 fiduciaries to citizens). Discovery of the fraudulent schemes could not have occurred
13 before the April 10, 2010 STUART ASSAULT.
14
Claims based on COUNT 3 (MALICIOUS PROSECUTION and all federal
15 claims dependent thereon) cannot accrue before the prosecution has ended. Brummett
16 v. Camble, 946 F.2d 1178, 1184 (5th Cir. 1991).
17
Fraud ClaimsDelayed Discovery: In addition to enabling an equitable
18 estoppel, fraudulent concealment delays accrual until a plaintiff in the exercise of

19 reasonable diligence, should have discovered the facts underlying the alleged fraud.
20 Sterlin v. Biomune Systems, 154 F.3d 1191, 1201 (10th Cir.1998). Most Defendants
21 owe one or more special duties to Plaintiff, imposing additional duties of disclosure
22 and delay for breach of such duties. FAC COUNT 12 (PROFESSIONAL
23 DUTIES). Delayed accrual of a cause of action is viewed as particularly
24 appropriate where the relationship between the parties is one of special trust such as
25 that involving a fiduciary, confidential or privileged relationship. Moreno v.
26 Sanchez, 106 Cal.App.4th 1415 (2003); Johnson v. Haberman & Kassoy, 201 Cal.
27 App. 3d 1468, 247 Cal. Rptr. 614 (2d Dist. 1988).
28
The FAC alleges ongoing fraudulent concealment of the ENTERPRISES and

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1 CONSPIRACIES operating as a cabal (FAC 948), as well as policies, habits, and

2 customs to deprive Plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws (COUNT 9). Defendants
3 have not asserted a date of discovery for concealed claims, as they must to carry their
4 burden at this stage or any stage, a date of discovery. Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co.,
5 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980).
6
The OMNIBUS fails to identify any overt acts other than the STUART
7 ASSAULT, citing McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 673-674 (1991)
8 and claiming a statute begins to run when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of
9 the injury. McDougal neither holds nor discusses such a rule. McDougal holds that
10 both Sections 1985 and 1983 run from an accrualit does not articulate that
11 accrual occurs upon knowledge or reason to know of injury.
12
State Law Claims: Californias discovery rule delays accrual until a plaintiff
13 discovers all elements of the cause of action. Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 35
14 Cal.4th 797, 806 (2005); Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 21 Cal.4th 383, 397 (1999). All
15 claims in Counts 2, each assertion of Cal. Const. Art. I sec. 26, and the unjust
16 enrichment and state law fraud and breach of contract claims (Counts 9-11) are
17 subject to state law statutes of limitation which, like the federal law analysis above,
18 could not have begun to run before the NESTHUS OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE.
19 3. Tolling
20
Tolling and estoppel are derived from state law. Morales v. City of Los
21 Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2000). Motions to dismiss cannot be granted
22 "if the factual and legal issues are not sufficiently clear to permit [the court] to
23 determine with certainty whether the doctrine [of equitable tolling] could be
24 successfully invoked." Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1207
25 (9th Cir.1995). Running of a limitations period is tolled where defendants had notice
26 of a claim, pursued the claim reasonably and in good faith, the defendants have not
27 been prejudiced by the delay. Ervin v. Los Angeles Cnty., 848 F.2d 1018, 1019 (9th
28 Cir. 1988); Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 31 Cal.4th 363, 370 (2003). SAC and CITY
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1 ATTORNEY Defendants received notice STUARTS claim in April, 2010, with the
2 CLAIM AND DEMAND. FAC 353. COUNT 3. Plaintiffs delay in pursuing this
3 Action was reasonable and in good faithit was caused entirely by Defendants
4 threats, HARASSMENT AND ABUSE, and heinous illegal persecution and FALSE
5 IMPRISONMENTS in People v. Stuart. No Defendant can claim prejudice as most
6 facts underlying these allegations are preserved in their own business files and public
7 records. Precision Inst. Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
8 806, 814 (1945); Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 1985).
9
Statutes are also tolled during the disability of imprisonment. C.C.P. 335.1;
10 Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). As STUART was illegally
11 imprisoned or under suspended sentence from about February 21, 2011 until May
12 15, 2013, no term could have run during that time. FAC 402.
13 4. Estoppel
14
It is well settled that where delay in commencing an action is induced by the
15 conduct of the defendant, he cannot avail himself of the defense of the statute [of
16 limitations]. Precision Inst. Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324
17 U.S. 806, 814 (1945); Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir.
18 1985); Gaglione v. Coolidge, 134 Cal.App.2d 518, 527 (1955). [W]hen a defendant
19 has had notice from the beginning that the plaintiff sets up and is trying to enforce a
20 claim against it because of specified conduct, the reasons for the statute of limitations
21 do not exist, and we are of opinion that a liberal rule should be applied. New York
22 Cent. & H.R.R. Co. v. Kinney, 260 U.S. 340, 346 (1922). Statutes of limitations are
23 not so rigid that under certain circumstances principles of equity and justice will not
24 allow them to be extended or tolled. Kleinecke v. Montecito Water Dist., 147
25 Cal.App.3d 240, 245 (1983). Equitable estoppel will preclude a defendant from
26 pleading the bar of the statute of limitations where the plaintiff was induced to refrain
27 from bringing a timely action by the fraud, misrepresentation or deceptions of
28 defendant. Ateeq v. Najor, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1351, 1356 (1993). Equitable tolling
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1 applies when the plaintiff is prevented from asserting a claim by wrongful conduct on
2 the part of the defendant, or when extraordinary circumstances beyond the plaintiff's
3 control made it impossible to file a claim on time. Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238,
4 1242 (9th Cir. 1999).
5
United States District Courts within California apply tolling principles
6 consistent with California law. A defendant may also be estopped from asserting the
7 statute of limitations as a defense to an untimely action under a theory of equitable
8 estoppel, if his conduct actually and reasonably induced a plaintiff to forbear filing
9 suit within the applicable limitations period. Lauter v. Anoufrieva, 642 F. Supp. 2d
10 1060, 1101 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Ateeq v. Najor, supra). [M]isleading, deceptive
11 or otherwise contrived action or scheme, in the course of committing the wrong, that
12 is designed to mask the existence of a cause of action tolls the running of a statute
13 while defendants engage in the scheme. Riddell v. Riddell Washington Corp., 866
14 F.2d 1480, 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1989). A defendant's fraud in concealing a cause of
15 action against him will toll the statute of limitations, and that tolling will last as long
16 as the plaintiff's reliance on the misrepresentations is reasonable. Grisham v. Philip
17 Morris USA, Inc., 40 Cal.4th 623, 637, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 735, 151 P.3d 1151 (2007). A
18 plaintiff alleging fraudulent concealment must establish that his failure to have notice
19 of his claim was the result of the affirmative conduct by the defendant, or
20 extraordinary circumstances beyond the plaintiffs control Conmar Corp. v. Mitsui
21 & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc., 858 F.2d 499, 505 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1010 (1989);
22 Stroll at 1242.
23
Analysis: The FAC alleges Defendants have undertaken extensive efforts in
24 collaboration to delay and prevent Plaintiffs from braining this action. Allegations in
25 the FAC relevant to estoppel are identified as MALICIOUS PROSECUTION (FAC
26 349, 351, 353-467), OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE (FAC 509-539, 551-634,
27 RACKETEERING COUNT 5) DOYNE TERRORISM (FAC 808-830), FALSE
28 ADVERTISING (FAC 904-914), FRAUDS AND SWINDLES (FAC 1003-36OPPO TO OMNIBUS MTN TO DISMISS
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1 1030), HONEST SERVICES FRAUD (FAC 1034-1037), KIDNAPPING

2 (RACKETEERING COUNT 3), EXTORTION (RACKETEERING COUNT 4), and
3 various specific allegations described therein as duress fraud undue influence.
4 In short, Defendants, in conspiracy and enterprise have wrongfully and violently
5 impeded, oppressed, and delayed STUART from pursuing this Action, the CLAIM
6 AND DEMAND, DUE COURSE OF JUSTICE, and PUBLIC BENEFIT
7 ACTIVITIES sufficient to estop each of them from asserting any statute bar, and such
8 circumstances are extraordinary and beyond plaintiffs control. Stroll at 1242.
9
Lawyer Defendants assert "Nowhere does the FAC allege that wrongful
10 conduct by the Lawyer Defendants prevented plaintiffs from asserting a claim. 14911 2, 3:22-23. This assertion ignores the alleged collaboration between Lawyer
12 Defendants as STUART ASSAULT COORDINATORS and SDCBA, FEDERAL,
13 CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS, and the enterprise-level collaborations. See
14 Enterprise Level Collaboration under Color of Law Allegations, Sec. I.E.2 below.
15 5. Specific Defenses:
16
Several Defendants raise special statute of limitations arguments:
17
18
Criminal Trespass Statute of Limitations

Defendants reliance on the statute of limitations relevant to criminal trespass
19 is no help. FEDERALS threat to prosecute a criminal trespass was amplified by

20 GARSON during the People v. Stuart matter into a threat of felony stalking, (FAC
21 367-454). It was further elaborated with Ms. Stuarts false threats of a purported
22 F.B.I. investigation of Stuart for harassing judges. FAC 450.9 California Penal
23
FAC 365 (bunch of angry judges), 389 (really pissed off on this one for something
24 you did at a bar association meeting), 390 (theyre going to throw everything they can at you on
this one), (bump it up to a felony), 393, 395 (taking an unusually hard line on the case),
25 (seeking to add new stalking charges as a felony), 400 (they want you to serve time on this one
26 and you really made them angry), 406 (holding additional charges for felony stalking relating to
the bar association), 420 (better lay off on whatever you were doing and to not piss these
27 guys off again.), 427 (youve really stirred up some anger down there), 436 (theyre really
out to get you!), 437 (working for the F.B.I. to investigate for harassing judges and
28 participating in an investigation with the F.B.I. and the City Attorney involving potential federal

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1 Code section 646.9 may be charged as a felony, in which case Californias three year
2 statute of limitations period applies. Cal. Pen.C. 646.9 (felony stalking), 801
3 (three year statute of limitations). Given the harassing judges threats were made in
4 the GARSON PERJURY 3 in the April-June, 2012 Arrest Under Suspended
5 Sentence allegations, the weight of those threats remains very real. FAC 433-442.
6
VIVIANO/BLANCHET/WOHLFEIL/SCHALL/DOYNE Terrorism, Fraud,
Duress and Undue Influence
VIVIANO, DOYNE, BLANCHET, WOHLFEIL and SCHALL are special
9 cases because of their fiduciary and professional relationships, which create special
10 tolling rules for both active and passive concealment, duress and undue influence, and
11 expand the accrual date by the delayed discovery rule. E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants,
12 Inc. Servs., 153 Cal. App. 4th 1308, 1317-18 (2007). For attorneys, continuing
13 representation tolls the term until end of representation. Beane v. Paulsen, 21 Cal.
14 App. 4th 89 (1993); Grisham v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 40 Cal.4th 623, 637, 54
15 Cal.Rptr.3d 735, 151 P.3d 1151 (2007). Where a defendant is in a special
16 relationship even passive concealment will toll the statute. Thorman v. American
17 Seafoods Co., 421 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir.2005); Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose &
18 Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir.1978).
19
Under state and federal law, the term for claims against fiduciaries does not run
20 upon injury, but upon plaintiffs discovery of all facts relevant to each claim.
21 Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at the time when the cause of action
22 is complete with all of its elements. Code Civ. Proc., 312; Fox v. Ethicon Endo
23 Surgery, Inc., 35 Cal.4th 797, 806 (2005). An exception to the general rule for
24 defining the accrual of a cause of actionindeed, the most important oneis the
25 discovery rule. C.C.P. 340.6; Norgart v. Upjohn Co.. 21 Cal.4th 383, 397 (1999).
26
criminal charges), 450 (you better not blink an eye or theyll go after you again and strong
27 suggestion that STUART leave the State of California and return to his boyhood home in Arkansas
immediately upon his release.), 457 (since hes no longer employable as a lawyer) and
28 inducement of state bar proceedings, and repeated false arrests (FALSE ARRESTS 1-6).

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1 Delayed accrual of a cause of action is viewed as particularly appropriate where the

2 relationship between the parties is one of special trust such as that involving a
3 fiduciary, confidential or privileged relationship . . . against professionals. Moreno
4 v. Sanchez, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 1423, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 684; Johnson v.
5 Haberman & Kassoy, 201 Cal. App. 3d 1468, 247 Cal. Rptr. 614 (2d Dist. 1988).
6
Also relevant to the BLANCHET/DOYNE TERRORISM claims is subsequent
7 discovery of additional causes of action. Where a plaintiff asserts one of several

8 causes of action, but later discovers she also has additional causes of action, the
9 running of the term is be tolled for the newly-discovered causes of action. Fox, supra
10 at 813. A second, independent claim for fraud or concealment has a later accrual
11 date. Snow v. A.H. Robins Co., 165 Cal.App.3d 120, 134 (1985).
12
DOYNE sets up an accrual date of March, 2009 based on discovery of
13 underlying acts of DOYNE. DOYNE Doc. 143-1, 3:18. DOYNE is involved in

14 the STUART ASSAULT (COUNT 1) occurring in April, 2010, and the DOYNE
15 TERRORISM (COUNT 11) occurring throughout 2009, and all claims dependent
16 thereon.
17
Plaintiff has pled the special relationships with DOYNE, BLANCHET, and
18 VIVIANO, and their fraudulent concealment and undue influence in COUNTS 11,
19 15, and RACKETEERING COUNTS 1 and 2. Additional duress and undue
20 influence inflicted by DOYNE directly in the STUART ASSAULT and indirectly
21 through the MALICIOUS PROSECUTION and NESTHUS OBSTRUCTION OF
22 JUSTICE extend the tolling and estoppel against for DOYNE and BLANCHET until
23 no sooner than September, 2013.
24
VIVIANO/BIERER & BLANCHET/DOYNE/FRITZ Fraud and Extortion
25
Conspiracy Accrual
26
Running of the term for claims against DOYNE, BLANCHET, VIVANO,
27 BIERER, and FRITZ are also tolled during the term of their conspiracies to defraud
28 and extort STUART. COUNTS 11, 13, 15; RACKETEERING COUNTS 1-4, 7-10.
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1 The FAC alleges Doyne acted in conspiracy with Blanchet to fraudulently induce,
2 defraud, and extort STUART. COUNT 11. When STUART alerted BLANCHET to
3 concerns, BLANCHET furthered the conspiracy by fraudulently inducing STUART
4 to delay in violation of her fiduciary and attorney-client PROFESSIONAL
5 DUTIES.10 BLANCHET further induced delay by extorting STUART will threats of
6 loss of custody his son by retribution by DOYNE. STUART did delay action against
7 DOYNE.
8
DOYNE was a participant in the STUART ASSAULT, and has been a central
9 target of California Coalitions FFRRESA. His co-conspirators in the STUART

10 ASSAULT COORDINATOR group furthered that delay by committing the STUART
11 ASSAULTS, then exerting influence through C. GOLDSMITHS husband and co12 conspirator J. GOLDSMITH and GARSON in the MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
13 and PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, delaying the initiation of this Action
14 during the illegal persecution and false imprisonment of STUART. COUNT 3.
15 Acting on behalf of all defendants the NESTHUS DEFENDANTS continued to
16 further illegally impede STUART from pursuing this action through the NESTHUS
17 OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, and continues in their efforts through assertion of
18 frivolous defenses to this day. COUNT 4, Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application for
19 Emergency Harassment Restraining Order, Doc. No. 4; Plaintiffs Motion to Strike,
20 Doc. No. 19; Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions, Doc. No. 39; Plaintiffs Opposition to
21 Superior Courts Motion for Sanctions, Doc. No. 56.
22
These events delayed accrual until the last act of the conspiracy, or September,
23 2013. No limitations term has run.

24
Doynes Inequitable Conduct: DOYNE asserts that the FAC does not allege
25 undue influence against him. 143-1, 4:26-28. He asserts that because STUART filed
26 a lawsuit against BLANCHET, his claims to being reasonably delayed are incredible.
27 143-1, 5:11-15. This attack fails. First, the presumed-true allegations of the FAC
28
10
Thats how it is FAC 911; take it or leave it FAC 949; 1009-1018; DOYNE thats not
how it works, if your son is important to you, and get with the program FAC 1022-1029.

13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 allege that DOYNE and BLANCHET acted in conspiracy to defraud, conceal, and
2 divert STUART from discovery and further action. In conspiracy cases, a limitation
3 period begins to run from the time of the last overt act committed in furtherance of
4 the conspiracy. People v. Zamora, 18 Cal.3d 538, 548 (1976); State ex rel. Metz v.
5 CCC Information Services, Inc., 149 Cal.App.4th 402, 418 (2007). The continuing
6 violations doctrine creates an equitable exception to the timely filing requirement.
7 Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank, A.G., 2006 WL 4749756 **4041 (C.D.Cal.2006)
8 (quoting and citing Morgan v. Regents of University of Cal., 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 63
9 64 (2000)). Lauter v. Anoufrieva, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1100 (C.D. Cal. 2009)
10
The conspiracy allegations are sufficient to plead notice of an equitable
11 estoppel issue at this stage. Equitable estoppel, also termed fraudulent concealment,
12 halts the statute of limitations when there is active conduct by a defendant, above
13 and beyond the wrongdoing upon which the plaintiff's claim is filed, to prevent the
14 plaintiff from suing in time. The plaintiff must demonstrate that he relied on the
15 defendant's misconduct in failing to file in a timely manner and must plead with
16 particularity the facts which give rise to the claim of fraudulent concealment.
17 Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 706-07 (9th Cir. 2006).
18
Plainitffs have pled facts to support an estoppel by conspiracy between
19 DOYNE and BLANCHET. BLANCHET participated in the referral to DOYNE in

20 breach of her fiduciary duties and in commission of honest services fraud. RICO
21 COUNTS 1, 2. She concealed the nature of Doynes fraud and threatened and
22 oppressed STUART with loss of custody of his son when STUART raised his
23 concerns regarding DOYNE. This activity constitutes conspiracy to defraud and
24 conceal in enterprise with DOYNE in breach of both of their fiduciary duties above
25 and beyond the DOYNE TERRORISM.
26
DOYNES claim that STUART was not delayed from taking formal action
27 against DOYNE (143-1, 5:3-15) attacks STUARTS credibility in asserting he was in

28 fact terrorized by DOYNE. Credibility attacks are inappropriate for disposition at the
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1 rule 12 stage. When a motion to dismiss is based on the running of the statute of
2 limitations, it can be granted only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the
3 required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.
4 Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980). Generally, the
5 applicability of equitable tolling depends on matters outside the pleadings, so it is
6 rarely appropriate to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (where review is limited
7 to the complaint) if equitable tolling is at issue. Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
8 465 F.3d 992, 100304 (9th Cir.2006); Vernon v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th
9 Cir.1987). Mendoza v. Wilmington Fin., C-10-5792 SC, 2011 WL 2182914 (N.D.
10 Cal. June 6, 2011). Because statute of limitations issues often depend on contested
11 questions of fact, however, the court should hesitate to dismiss a complaint on statute
12 of limitations grounds based solely on the face of the complaint. Firestone v.
13 Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C.Cir.1996). Rather, the court should grant a
14 motion to dismiss only if the complaint on its face is conclusively time-barred. Id.;
15 Doe v. Dep't of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1115 (D.C.Cir.1985). If no reasonable
16 person could disagree on the date on which the cause of action accrued, the court
17 may dismiss a claim on statute of limitations grounds. Smith v. Brown & Williamson
18 Tobacco Corp., 3 F.Supp.2d 1473, 1475 (D.D.C.1998) (citing Kuwait Airways Corp.
19 v. Am. Sec. Bank, N.A., 890 F.2d 456, 463 n. 11 (D.C.Cir.1989)). Williams-Jones v.
20 LaHood, 656 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67-68 (D.D.C. 2009). Doyne is entitled to explain to a
21 jury why his false child abuse reports, threats, extortion, violence, imprisonment, and
22 disbarment of his client in retaliation for protests about his legal services could not
23 have reasonably caused Stuart fear and imposed delay.
24
25
DOYNE As a Health Care Provider

DOYNE asserts the Court must borrow the one year statutory period under
26 California Code of Civil Procedure 340.5 applicable to health care providers

27 applicable to an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon
28 such person's alleged professional negligence. . . . This Action does not assert
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1 ordinary negligence against DOYNE, but extreme and outrageous deprivation, fraud,
2 extortion, bribery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, racketeering, and false
3 advertising, in conspiracy, under federal law. Section 340.5 simply has no
4 application to suits for violations of federal constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
5 1983. Ellis v. City of San Diego, Cal., 176 F.3d 1183, 1191 (9th Cir. 1999).
The actions of DOYNE accused were not health care, but dispute resolution
7 serviceshe was hired to mediate a dispute.11 His profession of forensic

8 psychology purports to exercise the authority of law enforcement, judges, and the
9 science of psychology. A more preposterous concept has never appeared on the
10 shores of any free nation, and by grace of God such evil will soon be gone and never
11 appear on any shores anywhere ever again. DOYNES forensic psychology
12 profession renders neither health nor care, but fraud, abuse, extortion, and oceans of
13 cruelty, hypocrisy, and pain onto families already in crisis who are compelled to
14 entrust such unrepentant evil with their futures. Whatever this Courts judgment of
15 DOYNES conduct as culpable, innocent, inequitable, or otherwise, Plaintiffs are
16 certain it will not be the final word.
17
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
18
CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS assert a two year limitations period
19 against the MALICIOUS PROSECUTION Counts accrued on March 11, 2011, and
20 an expiration of March 11, 2013. This analysis rests on two single incident accrual
21 cases: Usher v. Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 558 (9th Cir. 1987) and Stavropoulos v.
22 Superior Court of the Los Angeles County, 141 Cal. App.4th 190 (2006). The
23 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION is a conspiracy furthered by each act subsequent to
24 the March, 2011 termination of proceedings in STUARTS favor, including FALSE
25 IMPRISONMENT 5 (FAC 421); the Prosecution Within The State Bar FAC
26 426-432, 455-460; collaboration with the FBI and Ms. Stuart to procure GARSON
27
11
DOYNES Opposition falsely asserts he was appointed by reference to a controversial
28 exhibit. 143-1, 2:4. He was not appointed, but hired in a private commercial transaction. See
Motion to Conduct Early Discovery.

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1 PERJURY 3, and evidence in the Arrest Under Suspended Sentence (FAC 4332 447); inducement and threats to leave California (FAC 448-451), and illegal
3 Domestic Violence Protective Orders FAC 461-466. The MALICIOUS
4 PROSECUTION was also furthered by subsequent conspiracies, including the
5 NESTHUS OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE. No claim relating to the MALICIOUS
6 PROSECUTION accrued before September, 2013.
7
Similar facts constitute duress and undue influence to toll and estop CITY
8 ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS from asserting a statute bar in this case. CITY

9 ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS illegally prosecuted the People v. Stuart matter
10 without probable cause, using manufactured evidence, false testimony, sought an
11 illegal sentence and restraining orders. FAC 375, 461-466; Precision Inst. Mfg.
12 Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945); Ellenburg v.
13 Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 1985); Brummett v. Camble, 946 F.2d
14 1178, 1184 (5th Cir. 1991). See also tolling, estoppel analysis under Ateeq v. Najor,
15 15 Cal. App. 4th 1351, 1356 (1993) and Lauter v. Anoufrieva, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1060,
16 1101 (C.D. Cal. 2009) above. While CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS may assert
17 some of their illegal acts are immune from civil liability under the Civil Rights Act,
18 the tolling and estoppel effects of such illegal conduct are in no way diminished. See
19 Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004).
20
Finally, malicious prosecution claims are tolled during an appeal from the
21 judgment. Gibbs v. Haight, Dickson, Brown & Bonesteel, 183 Cal.App.3d 716, 228
22 Cal.Rptr. 398, 402 (1986). STUART timely filed an appeal from the People v. Stuart
23 matter, which was pending at the time this Action was filed. FAC 449.
24
For all of the above reasons, every claim built on the MALICIOUS
25 PROSECUTION and PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT was tolled until after this

26 action was filed.
27 C. Rooker-Feldman Bars No Claim
28
Various defendants invoke a bankrupt Rooker-Feldman doctrine. OMNIBUS

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1 11:1-28; Sup. Ct. (Doc. No. 139) 8:16-28; DOYNE 143-1, 6:8-7:14; BLANCHET
2 Doc. No. 146, 8:1-16; CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS Doc. No. 151, 2:1-3:11.
3 To invoke Rooker-Feldman, a defendant must show that (1) there was a final
4 judgment of a state court, and (2) the federal court action seeks a reversal of that final
5 judgment. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 286 (2005).
6 A suit brought in federal district court is a "de facto appeal" forbidden by Rooker7 Feldman when "a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous
8 decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that
9 decision." Noel v. Hall, 341 F.c3d 1148, 1164 (2003).
10
Defendants identify no judgment or order, instead referencing sections from
11 the FAC describing People v. Stuart and Stuart v. Stuart, and making a sweeping
12 assertion that the FAC is nothing more than de facto appeals from state court
13 judgments and orders. OMNIBUS 11:8-9, Sup. Ct. (Doc. No. 139, 9:25-10:4. This
14 fails.
15
People v. Stuart: Defendants cannot identify a final judgment, decision, or
16 order in People v. Stuart. FAC 449. Under Exxon Mobil, the RookerFeldman
17 doctrine only applies to cases brought after the state proceedings have ended. 125
18 S.Ct. at 1526. Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2006). A state
19 court proceeding is not final for purposes of Rooker-Feldman until all appeals from
20 such proceedings are final. Id. Where plaintiff initiates federal proceedings prior to
21 the entry of final judgment in the state proceeding, the collateral federal proceedings
22 cannot be an appeal from a final judgment of a state court because the state court
23 judgment is not final until the conclusion of the appeal process. Id.
24
Stuart v. Stuart: Nor can defendants identify a relevant final judgment,
25 decision, or order in Stuart v. Stuart. Family Courts purport only to exercise limited
26 jurisdiction over issues of property division, child custody, and spousal support
27 between the parties. This Action seeks no relief altering any final judgment,
28 decision, or order of a domestic courts decision. To the extent that claims in Count
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 9, the DOYNE TERRORISM, relate to the Stuart v. Stuart matter, they do not seek
2 reversals of a final judgment, decision, or order, but arise from behavior of parties to
3 that action external to the proceedingsfraud, extortion, breach of contract, bribery,
4 and other crimes not within the jurisdiction of domestic courts. Kougasian v. TMSL,
5 Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004). Rooker-Feldman also does not bar a
6 federal court action that "asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission
7 by an adverse party [during the state court action.] Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148,
8 1162-64 (9th Cir. 2003). All actions alleged against DOYNE, SCHALL,
9 WOHLFEIL and others are ultra vires, collateral, or criminal acts which are never
10 part of any proceeding. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, (1879), Cal. Const. Art. I.
11 sec. 26.
12
The OMNIBUS recasting of the referral to DOYNE as an interlocutory
13 order or non-final judgment omits the distinction between judicial acts and other
14 functions of a judge. OMNIBUS 11:16-18. The FACs claims against WOHLFEIL
15 and SCHALL relate to their referral to and administrative oversight of DOYNEa
16 third party to the litigationduring the course of the Stuart v. Stuart proceedings.
17 Referral and oversight are not adjudicationstheyre at best administrative or
18 ministerial acts, more likely coram non judice. Defendants cite no authority for the
19 proposition that a referral or oversight to a mediator originating from a domestic
20 court is a judicial act that is inextricable to a final order. Abundant authority
21 holds otherwise. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435 (1993)
22 (oversight of court staff); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 222 (1988); Supreme
23 Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 720 (1980)
24 (judges disciplining judges); Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229 (7th Cir. 1980)
25 (oversight of prosecutor), cert. dismissed, 449 U.S. 1028 (1980); Beard v. Udall, 648
26 F.2d 1264 (judge as investigator); Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir.
27
28
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 1980), cert. denied Zeller v. Rankin, 451 U.S. 939 (1981), overruled12 by Ashelman v.
2 Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986); Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911 (9th Cir.
3 1982) (judges overseeing judges).
4
Further, DOYNES accused acts are themselves not judicial acts. DOYNE
5 was hired as a private mediator, and is accused of defrauding STUART in procuring

6 a contract, extortive threats in attempts to obtain money, and false reports of child
7 abuse to county workers who determined DOYNES reports to be false. These events
8 occurred outside of the domestic court proceeding. FAC 1027.
9
The Napolitano case cited by Defendants is no help. There the Court of
10 Appeals examined whether actual interlocutory orders considering contested motions

11 on fully-briefed legal issues by a state court were inextricably intertwined with an
12 actual final order that expressly incorporated those legal findings. The Court of
13 Appeals found that the state courts denial of a pretrial motion was an interlocutory
14 order because it considered and rejected legal argument, and the final order was
15 based in part on the order denying the motion. If no consideration has been given,
16 or any decision on the matter is ambiguous, it is unlikely that the issues presented to
17 the state high court and to the federal court are so inextricably intertwined that the
18 federal court cannot take jurisdiction. Napolitano at 1029. The FAC does not allege
19 consideration or disposition of legal argument because none occurred or could have
20 occurred.
21
Finally, to fall within Rooker-Feldmans jurisdictional analysis, the
22 interlocutory order must inextricably intertwined with a final order. Id.

23 Interlocutory orders that are not intertwined with a final order are not Rooker24 Feldman questions, but preclusion or estoppel questions which require identity of
25
26
12
Ashelmans overruling of Rankin v. Howard appears improvident in light of the

Supreme Courts denial of certiorari in Zeller v. Rankin. Plaintiffs assert Rankin as
28 good law under the denial of certiorari on this point and reserve the issue for appeal.
27

13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 issues or parties between proceedingsneither of which is presented here.13

2
Superior Court Defendants assert Rooker-Feldman bars prospective relief
3 claims: Insofar as Stuart may claim that he may be subject to orders in the future in
4 his dissolution proceeding that he believes to be unlawful . . . an attack on such orders
5 would clearly be barred by Rooker-Feldman. 9:25-28 (citing Monteagudo v. Alksne,
6 11-CV-1089, at 4:4-7:9, 8:2-21 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 6, 2011).14 Whatever may be the
7 outcome in some future attack on such orders in the future, today the FAC does
8 not attack any order of any court. Rule 65 injunctions may be sought against
9 enforcement of a state court retraining orders for a variety of reasons. See Vasquez v.
10 Rackauckas, 734 F.3d 1025, 1037 (9th Cir. 2013); Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
11 Doc. No. 109.
12
DOYNE also asserts an attack on Prospective Relief Count 2 as barred by
13 Rooker-Feldman because it seeks order finding that orders of the superior court in
14 family law matters are unconstitutional and thereby invalid. 143-1, 7:4-6.
15 Prospective Relief Count 2 does not seek to invalidate any order of a domestic court;
16 it seeks orders declaring certain California state laws as invalid under the United
17 States Constitution (FAC 1201), and enjoining enforcement of certain laws,
18 policies, and practices (FAC 1202). Injunctions do not overturn orders, and thus
19 cannot be an effective appeal of any state court judgment. See, e.g., Vasquez v.
20 Rackauckas, 734 F.3d 1025, 1037 (9th Cir. 2013).
21
CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS reliance on Cooper v. Ramos does not
22 help. Doc. No. 151, 2:11. The plaintiff in Cooper was a convicted prisoner who,
23 years after his conviction and habeus appeals were exhausted, filed a motion in state
24 court for post-conviction DNA testing of evidence used to obtain his conviction. The
25
13
See Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75 (1984); White v.
City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2012). SCHALL, WOHLFEIL, and DOYNE were
27 not parties in Stuart v. Stuart; Ms. Stuart is not a party here; this Action does not seek re-litigation
of any issue resolved in Stuart v. Stuart.
28
14
This Order was not attached with a request for judicial notice under Rule of Evidence 201 and
is objected to for lack of notice and opportunity to be heard. Fed.R. Evid. 201(e).
26

13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 state court denied his motion. Rather than appealing the denial to the California
2 Supreme Court, Cooper filed a section 1983 claim in federal court against the district
3 attorney alleging conspiracy to manipulate the inculpatory evidence used against him.
4 The district court dismissed the case and the Court of Appeals agree the 1983 claim
5 was barred by Rooker-Feldman because the attack in federal court was a direct
6 horizontal appeal on the state courts final denial of his motion to test evidence.
7
Moreover, in Cooper the Court of Appeals acknowledged that Rooker-Feldman
8 does not preclude a plaintiff from bringing an "independent claim" that, though
9 similar or even identical to issues aired in state court, was not the subject of a
10 previous judgment by the state court. Skinner, 131 S.Ct. at 1297. The FAC asserts
11 claim against CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS based on action independent of
12 their functions as prosecutors, including the Malicious Prosecution Within State Bar
13 FAC 426-432, 455-460; collaboration with the FBI and Ms. Stuart to procure false
14 testimony and evidence in the Arrest Under Suspended Sentence FAC 433-447;
15 inducement and threats to leave California FAC 448-451, and illegal Domestic
16 Violence Protective Orders FAC 461-466. None of these claims were inextricably
17 intertwined with a final order of any court, and could not be an appeal from People
18 v. Stuart because this action was field before People v. Stuart could become final.
19 D. Eleventh Amendment Bars No Claim
20
JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS assert an Eleventh Amendment Attack on Count 7
21 on behalf of Superior Court, Judicial Council, and Administrative Office of the

22 Courts. Doc. No. 139, 5:20-6:12. BATTSON and SIMI attack at Doc. No. 134, 2.
23 The attacks are analyzed jointly here.
24
The Supreme Court has construed the Eleventh Amendment to restrict federal
25 jurisdiction over sovereign States unless the State consents.15 Hans v. Louisiana, 134
26 U. S. 1 (1890); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
27
15
Immunity is a misnomer. Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is jurisdictional

28 doctrine. States remain fully liable for their wrongdoing, but are not amenable to suit
for injuries therefrom in federal courts, absent waiver or consent.
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 This construction is contrary to the clear language of the Eleventh Amendment, yet
2 tolerated by some. Justice Stevens has described Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
3 as creating "two Eleventh Amendments, one narrow and textual and the othernot
4 truly a constitutional doctrine at allbased on prudential considerations of comity
5 and federalism. Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513 U.S. 30, 52
6 (1994) (Stevens, J, concurring) (citing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1,
7 23-29 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens teaches that fictitious
8 construction is not merely misguided as a matter of constitutional law; it is also an
9 engine of injustice. . . . [T]hroughout the doctrine's history, it has clashed with the just
10 principle that there should be a remedy for every wrong. See, e. g., Marbury v.
11 Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803). Sovereign immunity inevitably places a lesser
12 value on administering justice to the individual than on giving government a license
13 to act arbitrarily. Arising as it did from the peculiarities of political life in feudal
14 England . . . sovereign immunity is a doctrine better suited to a divinely ordained
15 monarchy than to our democracy. Hess at 53-54.
16
Entities beneath state level are not co-equals with the United States, and may
17 not escape the jurisdiction of federal courts. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
18 Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown,
19 520 U.S. 397 (1997); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S.
20 658 (1978); Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103,
21 1110 (9th Cir. 1987). When an entity attempts to assert itself as a sovereign, it must
22 establish its status. Id.; Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 364 (9th Cir. 2004). A
23 government entity that is not a state may is not entitled to State status unless it is
24 simply the arm or alter ego of the State. Moor v. Alameda Cnty., 411 U.S. 693, 717
25 (1973). Alter-ego is a question of fact, the burden of proving which rests with the
26 party asserting it. Id.; Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 2002). We must
27 look behind the pleadings to determine whether a decree in the case would operate in
28 fact against the sovereign. If the judgment would actually run against the state
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 treasury, the action is barred. Zolin at 1110. A trier of fact must look to whether the
2 beneath State level entity is accused for activity that is (1) a State level function,
3 (2) controlled by the State, (3) for which the State is liable and (4) the State will be
4 bound for any injunctive remedy sought. Id.; Ford Motor Co. v. Department of
5 Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). This analysis is necessary for any beneath
6 State level entityboth individuals and municipalitiesaccused of a function that is
7 an arm of the State: Where such facts are not apparent from the face of the
8 Complaint, the defense is not apparent with certitude. Gray v. Evercore
9 Restructuring L.L.C., 544 F3d 320, 324 (1st Cir. 2008). Where facts necessary to
10 prove an element of a claim are beyond control of a Plaintiff, they may be alleged
11 generally, and a motion to dismiss prior discovery is inappropriate. Swierkiewicz v.
12 Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002); Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249
13 (9th Cir.1997).
14
Federal courts approach assertions of Eleventh Amendment immunity with
15 suspicion. "By its terms, the protection afforded by [the Eleventh] Amendment is
16 only available to one of the United States. It is true, of course, that some agencies
17 exercising state power have been permitted to invoke the Amendment in order to
18 protect the state treasury from liability that would have had essentially the same
19 practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself. But the Court has
20 consistently refused to construe the Amendment to afford protection to political
21 subdivisions such as counties and municipalities, even though such entities exercise a
22 `slice of state power.' " Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
23 Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 400-401 (1979). In Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson
24 Corporation, 513 U.S. 30 (1994), the Supreme Court declined to extend Eleventh
25 Amendment immunity to an entity owned and operated by two States, reasoning that
26 entities not subject to the unilateral control of any one of the States that compose the
27 federal system were too distant from voters who may exercise their will to direct
28 state policy, and thus not entitled to the cloak of sovereign immunity. Id. at 42.
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 Such joint control entitieseven though operated by States themselvesare not

2 entitled to immunity [u]nless there is good reason to believe that the States
3 structured the new agency to enable it to enjoy the special constitutional protection of
4 the States themselves, and that Congress concurred in that purpose. Id. at 43-44
5 (citing Lake County, supra). Both Courts in Lake County and Hess declined to extend
6 Eleventh Amendment immunity to State-level entities despite complete control by the
7 States. Id.16
8
In our own Circuit, extending Eleventh Amendment immunity to non-State
9 entities has been described as strong medicine, and has been undertaken with
10 caution by federal courts. See, e.g., Del Campo v. Kennedy, 517 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th
11 Cir. 2008); N. Ins. Co. of New York v. Chatham Cnty., Ga., 547 U.S. 189, 194 (2006);
12 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999); Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v.
13 Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 143 (1993). Caution in doing so her would seem
14 wise.
15
16
Defendants assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity in this case is similarly
16 inappropriate. The interpretation offered by the Commissionrecently rationalized through an un17 enacted judicial policy of dignity of a sovereign (See Federal Maritime Commission v. South
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Carolina State Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743 (2002))cannot justify the effective exemption of an
entity so independent as the San Diego Superior Court and various county court administrative
employees. Whatever rationale for extending immunity to a State because of its dignity, the
these Defendants fall short of parity with the United States, and are entitled to no such dignity
particularly when the net effect of such a policy amounts to nothing more than a coerced hometown
forum selection clause. If anything, exempting Defendants from accountability to the citizens who
created them in a neutral forum is itself an affront to whatever dignity these Defendants aspire to,
and even to the lay intelligence of the governed.
In good faith advocacy for a correction in the misguided machinery of 20th Century Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence, and in good faith obedience to the wisdom of a name that will be cited
long after most who have sat on the same bench, Plaintiff respectfully submits that Defendants
assertion that the Eleventh Amendment bars citizen claims against their own State in federal court is
inconsistent with the language of that Amendment, inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment
governing States, and requests Defendants motion be denied on that basis along to reserves the
issue for appeal. See John Paul Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1121, 11241125
(1993); Scott Dodson, Dignity: The New Frontier of State Sovereignty. 56 Okla. L. Rev. 777, 808823 (2003); Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L. J. 1 (1924); Kenneth Culp Davis,
Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 Admin. L. Rev. 383 (1970); Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the
Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1342 (1989); Vicki Jackson, The Supreme
Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 Yale L. J. 1 (1988); Akhil Reed
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L. J. 1425 (1987).

13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 1. Defendants Fail to Establish Sovereignty

2
Entities that are not States, but seek to defend themselves as if they were a
3 State, must prove entitlement to State status in two steps: The first step of the
4 analysis concerns how the State has structured the entity. Fresenius Med. Care
5 Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. Puerto Rico & Caribbean Cardiovascular Ctr. Corp.,
6 322 F.3d 56, 65 (1st Cir. 2003). Relevant factors include (a) the extent of state
7 control over the entity, (b) whether the state appoints controlling members, (c) how
8 the enabling legislation characterizes the entity, (d) whether the state has veto
9 power over the entitys actions, (e) whether the entity's functions are readily
10 classifiable as state functions or non-state (local or non-governmental) functions, and
11 (f) whether the state bore legal liability for the entity's debts. Hess at 4446. In the
12 second step, the vulnerability of the state's purse is the most salient factor in the
13 Eleventh Amendment determination. Where it is clear that the state treasury is not at
14 risk, then the control exercised by the state over the entity does not entitle the entity
15 to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Fresenius 65.
16
The OMNIBUS (Doc. No. 131-1, 12:1-12), BATTSON and SIMI (Doc. No.
17 134, 2-3), and the SUPERIOR COURT, AOC, and JUDICIAL COUNCIL separately
18 (Doc. No. 139, 5:20-6:12) fail to traverse this analysis to make the factual showing to
19 establish status as a sovereign.
20
21
Sovereignty Cannot Be Established by Preclusion

Instead of traversing the analysis, some Defendants cite other district court
22 adjudications of Eleventh Amendment issues for the proposition that it is well23 established that such entities are arms of the state. The tactic invites clear error.
24
SIMI and BATTSON cite district court opinions which involved their
25 employerthe Commission on Judicial Performancenot its individual employees.

26 Moreover, the cases cited involved unsophisticated pro se plaintiffs, the courts were
27 not asked, and did not conduct, a real party in interest analysis. In Ricotta v.
28 California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 976 (S.D. Cal. 1998) this District Court was not
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 requested to perform analysis of the relationship between the Commission and the
2 State of California. This lack of analysis appears to follow from a poorly-pled
3 complaint by a near-hysterical pro se plaintiff. The opinion reflects no awareness,
4 much less analysis, of the Commissions status as a below-State level entity
5 aspiring to Eleventh Amendment immunity as an arm of the state. As the pro se
6 plaintiff failed to recognize the issue, the court extended Eleventh Amendment
7 immunity to the Commission on the Commissions motion to dismiss, with no
8 substantive analysis of the Pennhurst or Zolin real party in interest test. Id.
9
In Junho Hyon v. Sei Shimoguchi, No. CIV 12-1235 JAM EFB PS, 2012 U.S.
10 Dist. LEXIS 74100 at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 29, 2012), plaintiff pro se proceeding in
11 forma pauperis, alleged a Commission staff counsel was negligent in performing
12 her duties in violation of Federal Rule 1.01. Without reaching the issue of whether
13 there was, in fact, a Federal Rule 1.01, the District Court determined that [t]he
14 claim against Shimoguchi is also barred by the Eleventh Amendment since plaintiff's
15 claims against Shimoguchi are based entirely on Shimoguhi's conduct in carrying out
16 his/her official duties . . . . Id. at *5. Like Ricotta, the pro se plaintiff failed to
17 allege activity other than negligent performance of ordinary job responsibilities,
18 and the court undertook no substantive analysis of the State level issue not raised
19 by plaintiff. Id.
20
Similarly, in Borchardt v. Reid, CV 08-3086 DOC, 2008 WL 4810791 (C.D.
21 Cal. Oct. 31, 2008) a pro se plaintiff sued various entities including the Judicial
22 Council, Commission on Judicial Performance, AOC and county officials. Id. at *3.
23 Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment.
24 In granting the motions, the District Court performed no arm of the state analysis
25 under Zolin, Pennhurst, and Hess whatsoever, merely summarily concluding
26 plaintiff has sued the following state officials and listing each defendant
27 including even the county officials which are clearly not arms of the state. Id. at *3.
28 Borchardts summary analysis is error in light of Zolin, Hess, and Pennhursts arm
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 of the state test. Defendants assertions that cases which failed to adjudicate the
2 arm of the state test settle any Eleventh Amendment issue is frivolous. See
3 Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (no preclusion absent an adjudication on
4 the merits).
5
BATTSON and SIMIS employer can clearly notch its belt for deflecting a
6 series of pro se plaintiff cases with motions to dismiss similar to the one it presents
7 herewithout any argument relating to the critical arm of the state test it must
8 achieve. See Zolin, Pennhurst, supra. The streak ends here.
9
Defendants cite these prior rulings not as legal authority, but in a reach for an
10 issue preclusion here. In order to preclude litigation of the Eleventh Amendment

11 affirmative defense not previously litigated here or anywhere between these parties,
12 defendants must establish parities of parties, facts, or issues necessary for a
13 preclusion. They cannot, and the rulings of other district courts are a nullity in this
14 courthouse. See White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2012).
15
Defendants Cannot Establish State Level Status On the Present Record
16
The FAC does not name the State of California, does not concede that the State
17 is the alter ego of any defendant, or that any defendant is the State of Californis
18 arm. Defendants therefore are faced with the burden of proving that the face of the
19 FAC establishes that they are otherwise entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity
20 with certitude. Gray v. Evercore, supra. Defendants burden in proving an
21 entitlement to immunity will be significant. They must establish:
22
(i) State Financial Liability: The general rule is that a suit is against the
23 sovereign if the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or
24 domain, or interfere with the public administration, or if the effect of the judgment
25 would be to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act. Dugan v.
26 Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); Pennhurst, supra; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663
27 (1974); Shaw v. State of California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788
28 F.2d 600, 603 (9th Cir.1986).
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
(ii) State Authority: The legal authority or jurisdiction, if any, the entity or
2 individual asserting immunity is acting under, both generally and with respect to the
3 specific acts accused. The scope of the authority and nature of the acts and other
4 facts relating to the alleged malfeasance has also been an issue often in contention.
5 Zolin, supra;
6
(iii) State is Bound: Whether any equitable relief on the individual would
7 effectively bind the State of California. Pennhurst, Zolin, supra.

8
Defendants have failed this undertaking, and their motions may be denied on
9 this basis alone.

10 2. Defendants Have Waived or Consented to Federal Jurisdiction in Due Process and
11
12
Equal Protection Claims

Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from
13 suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language
14 of the statute. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000). The
15 Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: No State shall
16 make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
17 of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
18 property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
19 the equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, sec. 1. The
20 Amendment, passed by representatives of the States in the Senate, and Congress as a
21 whole in 1868, nearly 84 years after the 1795 ratification of the Eleventh Amendment
22 constitutes unequivocal consent by the states, through their representatives in the
23 Senate, to be bound by this federal law. The Amendment specifically prohibits
24 States, and specifically grants rights to citizens of the United States.
25
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce
26 the substantive guarantees contained in 1 by enacting appropriate legislation.

27 Amend. XIV, 5; Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365
28 (2001). The subsequent passage of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, modernly codified as
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 sections 1981-1988 of Title 42 containing the sections 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988
2 under which this Action is brought, also enacted through a majority of the Senate and
3 the House of Representatives, was a specific embodiment of Congress power under
4 section 5, empowering citizens to bring suit under the Fourteenth Amendment, and
5 further articulating the States consent to be sued in federal court for its violations of
6 the Fourteenth Amendment.
7 3. States are Not immune under the Eleventh Amendment for Discrimination
8
Title 42 U.S.C. 2000d-7 provides:
(a) General provision
10
(1) A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the
11
Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of
12
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. 794], title IX of the
13
Education Amendments of 1972 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], the Age
14
Discrimination Act of 1975 [42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.], title VI of the Civil
15
Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], or the provisions of any other
16
Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial
17
assistance.
18 (emphasis added). The States of California receives generous funding from federal
19 taxation through sources far too numerous to list, including interstate highways,
20 education, agriculture, housing and urban development, energy, justice, labor, social
21 insurance and welfare, and medical insurance, subsidies, and special funding. Many
22 of these federal funds find their way directly to present defendants in programs
23 relating to child care, social services, domestic violence (VAWA) programs,
24 incentive matching payments to States for child support enforcement and family
25 programs under Titles I, IV-A and D, X, XI, XIV and XVI of the Social Security
26 Act and the Act of July 5, 1960 (24 U.S.C. chapter 9)funds delivered directly to
27 Family Court government entities administering the policies, conspiracies, and
28 enterprises accused herein. Family Court orders enjoy full faith and credit
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 recognition and enforcement in all States under 28 U.S.C. 1738 (Acts, records, and
2 judicial proceedings of any State ... of the United States ... shall have the same full
3 faith and credit in every court within the United States ... as they have by law or
4 usage in the courts of such State ... from which they are taken.) and in federal courts
5 and military courts under 18 U.S.C. 2261(a)(1), 2265 (FAC 962). White v. City
6 of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2012). Family Court child support orders
7 may be enforced in foreign Countries through bilateral international treaty between
8 the United States and foreign nations, and are enforceable by the U.S. State
9 Department in refusing to issue, honor, or revoking passports of U.S. citizens. 42
10 U.S.C. 652(k), 654(31). There are perhaps no local government entities more
11 tightly interwoven with and dependent upon United States laws, treaties, and
12 institutions for funding, operation, and enforcement for their orders and decrees than
13 Family Courts.17
14
As present defendants are recipients of federal financial assistance, they are
15 subject to suit in federal court for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment for
16 Actions brought under the Civil Rights Acta Federal statute prohibiting
17 discrimination. 42 U.S.C. 2000d-7. This Action asserts numerous such violations
18 against the EQUAL PROTECTION CLASSES. FAC 163, and each section 1983
19 Claim. As Defendants in their official capacities have received abundant benefits of
20 federal resources and laws, they have subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of that
21 sovereign in claims they have not administered those resources according to federal
22 law. Even if mere arms of the state, all defendants are subject to suit in this
23 courthouse.
24 4. Individual Defendants Have Not Shown Entitlement to Sovereignty for Their
25
26
17
As Defendants bear the burden of proving the source of their funding is state coffers under
27 assertion of an Eleventh Amendment defense (Pennhurst, supra), they should not be heard to
contest this assertion at the Rule 12 stage. If necessary, Plaintiffs proffer to amend to plead
28 additional facts, presumed true at this stage, establishing the abovereferenced extensive federal
funding.

13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1
2
Specific Functions As Being State Functions

BATTSON, SIMI and certain individual JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS appear to
3 assert status as sovereigns. Individuals face even greater challenges to invoke the
4 misguided engine of injustice of the Eleventh Amendment. They must show that
5 the specific functions they are alleged to have performed are State level functions,
6 making them an arm of the state. Pennhurst, Zolin, supra. Such a proposition is
7 plainly futile on the present record, and would appear to be so on any.
8
In Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103,
9 1106 (9th Cir. 1987), the plaintiff, a public interest organization for the deaf, sued the
10 Los Angeles County Superior Court and its Jury Commissioner alleging injury
11 caused by the defendants refusal to provide sign-language interpreters to enable deaf
12 citizens to serve as jurors. Id. at 1107. The District Court tried the case (Greater Los
13 Angeles Council of Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 607 F. Supp. 175, 179 (C.D. Cal. 1984)),
14 finding that the County would be answerable to any damages charged to individual
15 employee defendants. The Court of Appeals found that on these facts, the individual
16 court employees were not entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereignty status. A
17 functional approach governs the eleventh amendment's application to actions for
18 money damages against state officials. Such actions are considered to be suits against
19 the state, and thus barred, if the state is the real, substantial party in interest. Id. at
20 1110 (citing Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)).
21 Because facts at trial showed that the state treasury is not in jeopardy for the
22 specific functions performed, the individual employees were not entitled to
23 Eleventh Amendment immunity. Zolin, 812 F.2d at 1110.
24
Ultra Vires Acts Are Not Immune
25
The FAC avers numerous ultra vires acts, criminal acts, and acts in furtherance
26 of conspiracy. Each claim asserting California Constitution Article I, sec. 26 is an

27 assertion of ultra vires activity that cannot be actions of the State of California.
28 California Constitution Art I, 26 (Count 13, FAC 493). See Ex parte Virginia,
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 100 U. S. 339, 348-349 (1880); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 15556 (1908). Further,
2 even while performing an official task, to the extent any individual defendant was
3 furthering a criminal enterprise or conspiracy, each ceased acting in his official
4 capacity when he actively participated in the criminal conspiracy among defendants.
5 Vierria v. California Highway Patrol, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1240 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
6 While arguably certain individual activities were innocent official duties, the FAC
7 alleges many that were not.
8
Individual Defendants have not, and cannot carried the significant burden they
9 faces in achieving sovereignty Eleventh Amendment immunity.

10
Participation in Private Enterprise Not a State Central Function
11
Individual Defendants are alleged to be participants in the criminal RICO
12 ENTERPRISES relating to the Domestic Dispute Industry. Acts in furtherance of a

13 commercial psychology enterprise are not central functions of the State of
14 California or any Stateand are as such should not be shielded by the fiction of
15 immunity. The Complaint accuses the peculiar practice of the San Diego County
16 Superior Court Defendants in embarking on an entrepreneurial frolic to operate a for17 profit psychological enterprise purposed to privately evaluate parent and children
18 litigants in a cloistered, off the record, no-holds-barred forum in which they are
19 stripped of all of fundamental rights as litigants, citizens, and parentsand extorted
20 with threats of manipulation of process utter even a hint of autonomy. Such practice
21 is notand by grace of God shall never bea central function of any government
22 created to serve its people. Recent atrocities by state court judges acting in criminal
23 enterprise with private co-conspirators to abuse the most vulnerable of litigants
24 childrenindecently, cavalierly, baselessly, and willfully . . . for personal gain
25 have recently been exposed, condemned, and rightfully severely punished in our
26 federal justice system. See H.T. v. Ciavarella, No. 3:09-cv-0357 (ARC) (M.D. Pa.)
27 (November 20, 2009 Memorandum and Order, p. 19). The Third Circuit Court of
28 Appeals affirmed the criminal RICO conviction of a Pennsylvania state court judge
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 involved in that kids for cash public corruption in United States v. Ciavarella,
2 716 F.3d 705 (3d Cir. 2013) (RICO criminal conviction of honest services and mail
3 fraud affirmed). See Plaintiffs RJN Ex. A.
4
Our own Circuit has wisely rejected extension of sovereign immunity to state
5 actors conspiring with private commercial enterprises. See, e.g., Del Campo v.
6 Kennedy, 517 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2008); Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community
7 College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir.1988). Courts in other Circuits are
8 similarly wary of defendants invocation of the misguided engine of injustice of
9 Eleventh Amendment immunity to shield governments entrepreneurial aspirations.
10 See, e.g., Stewart v. Baldwin County Board of Education, 908 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th
11 Cir.1990); Tuveson v. Florida Governor's Council on Indian Affairs, Inc., 734 F.2d
12 730, 732 (11th Cir.1984).
13 5. All Beneath State Level Defendants Are Subject to Prospective Relief
14
As the Complaint articulates several bases for invoking equitable remedies
15 against all Defendants, Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity cannot shield them
16 from this Courts plenary jurisdiction to enforce federal law. 18 U.S.C. 1964(a); 28
17 U.S.C. 2201-2202; 28 U.S.C. 1337; 15 U.S.C. 1116(a), 1117, 1118; 42
18 U.S.C. 1988(a); Fed.R.Civ.P. 57, 65. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar
19 actions for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers in their
20 official capacities for violations of federal law. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 155
21 56 (1908); Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984);
22 Natural Resources Defense Council v. California Dept. of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 422
23 (1996). Injunctive relief may include both declaration, injunction, and mandamus
24 against federal officers failing to act in the face of a clear duty to do so. 28 U.S.C.
25 1361; Han v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 1993 WL 13011266 (C.A.9) at *16; Barron v.
26 Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1994); Wilbur v. United States, 281 U.S. 206, 218
27 (1930). False description of services and facilitation of unfair business practices may
28 be enjoined in federal court. 15 U.S.C. 1116(a), 1117, 1118, 1125; Bus & Prof. C.
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 17200, 17500. Racketeering is subject to prohibition, mandamus, divestiture, and

2 other equitable remedies exclusive to United States courts. 18 U.S.C. 1964(a), (c),
3 and (d).
4
5
Standing to Issue Injunctions

BATTSON and SIMI assert an attack in their Eleventh Amendment
6 jurisdictional defense analysis that should be asserted through an attack on Plaintiffs

7 standing to assert prospective relief. Because Defendants raise it here it is addressed
8 here.
9
SIMI and BATTSON assert that this Court lacks the authority to force
10 Defendants Simi and/or Battson to take any particular action (BATTSON, SIMI
11 Doc. No. 134, 2, fn. 2) citing Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
12 The assertion that a United States District Court cannot enjoin color of state law
13 actors from violating citizen rights is staggering. Linda R.S. did not re-write the
14 Fourteenth Amendment, but is an early case in what was in 1973 the Supreme
15 Courts developing Article III standing doctrine on the third speculative prong,
16 later articulated in more mature form in Lujan, infra.
17
In Linda R.S., Plaintiff, an unwed mother, was unsuccessful in obtaining child
18 support from her childs father. She sought assistance from authorities to prosecute
19 the father under a Texas child support enforcement law. The District Attorney
20 refused to prosecute, articulating the despicable proposition that Texas courts
21 construed the law to apply only to the benefit of legitimate children.
22
Plaintiff filed suit in district court, requesting an injunction running against
23 the district attorney forbidding him from declining prosecution on the ground that the
24 unsupported child is illegitimate. Linda R.S. at 616. She asserted an equal
25 protection violation against a prosecutorial policy discriminating against
26 illegitimate children. Id. The Court declined to reach the equal protection
27 question, instead holding that Plaintiff lacked standing to force prosecution of the
28 father because she made an insufficient showing of a direct nexus between the
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 vindication of her interest and the enforcement of the State's criminal laws. In other
2 words, she could not show that enforcement of the law (jailing the childs father), and
3 the vindication of her interest in the care of her childthe fathers payment of
4 child support.
This nexus argument was developed in subsequent decisions in L.A. v Lyons
6 and B.C. v. Plumas, and is today recognizable as the third speculative prong
7 described in Lujan. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative,
8 that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of
9 Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).18
10
BATTSON and SIMI appear hopeful of establishing a rule that state
11 administrators cannot be liable or subject to injunction for policies to refrain from

12 enforcing equal protection laws on the behavior of those over whom they have the
13 power and duty to control if, so long as possible injuries from unequal treatment are
14 speculative. This of course ignores the fact that the very existence of behaviors
15 and policies depriving a vulnerable class of citizens equal protection of the laws is in
16 and of itself an outrageous affront to equal justice. Whether a plaintiff can prove
17 injury from such an outrage is a response that only a lawyerand deprived one even
18 at that standardcould celebrate.
19
Moreover, in addition to being an outrageous insult to perhaps the most
20 fundamental of our nations civic values of equal protection of the law (See Ex parte
21 Commonwealth of Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879), U.S. Const., Amend XIV), is
22 inconsistent with the ruling in Linda R.S. First, BATTSON and SIMI are not
23
24
25
26
27
28
18
The evolution from nexus to speculative is mapped at fn. 20 in Lyons: [A] court must
determine that there is an available remedy which will have a substantial probability, Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, [508] (1975), of redressing the plaintiff's injury. This latter concern is merely
a recasting of the causal nexus, supra, at 16781679, that must exist between the alleged injury and
the action being challenged, and ensures that the granting of judicial relief will not be an exercise in
futility. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, [74] (1978). These
considerations are summarized by the requirement that a plaintiff need only allege an injury that is
legally redressable. Jenkins, supra, 395 U.S., at 424, 89 S.Ct., at 1850 (emphasis added). City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 129, fn. 20. (1983).

13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 prosecutorstheyre administrative supervisors who, like any supervisor, may

2 discipline their subordinates. While judges are perhaps entitled to a higher degree of
3 autonomy for acts within their judicial discretion (none of which are accused in this
4 Action), the act of policymaking, administering courts, a forensic psychology
5 commercial enterprise, family law facilitator offices, equal protection violations, state
6 constitutional violations, and crime, are not within judicial discretion, are not judicial
7 functions, and are properly the subject of judicial discipline regardless of amenability
8 to suit for civil damages or injunction. See, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424
9 (1976) (We emphasize that the immunity of prosecutors from liability in suits under
10 1983 does not leave the public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that
11 which occurs. This Court has never suggested that the policy considerations which
12 compel civil immunity for certain governmental officials also place them beyond the
13 reach of the criminal law. Even judges, cloaked with absolute civil immunity for
14 centuries, could be punished criminally for willful deprivations of constitutional
15 rights on the strength of 18 U. S. C. 242, the criminal analog of 1983.). A
16 citizens imposed incapacity to protect herself does not excuse others who can from
17 their duty to enforce the laws equally. In fact, their failure in conspiracy or as a
18 policy, habit, or custom is itself actionable and indictable. See Count 10, below.19
19
In addition, the speculative issue is not present in this case. In Linda R.S.
20 Justice Marshall rationalized his decision that plaintiff lacked standing because
21 prosecuting delinquent child support debtors of illegitimate children could assure
22 such delinquent parents were jailedbut Justice Marshall reasoned it was too
23 speculative to presume it would have an effect on their willingness to pay child
24 support. That condition does not exist in this Action against SIMI and BATTSON.
25 An illegal policy, habit, or custom of not prosecuting judges for abusing a class
26 litigants directly and foreseeably will lead to more abuse. The condition Justice
27
28
19
Plaintiffs have separately filed a tort claim against the United States Attorney for her failures
to police present defendnats. See http://wp.me/p4aG7J-O9

13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 Marshall identifieda policy of not prosecuting person A for As not doing

2 something A should (pay person B) was speculative to person Bs injury because
3 even if person A was jailed, he may or may not pay person B.
4
That disjunction in proximity is not present here. The question is: Do
5 BATTSON and SIMIS activities in refraining from policing judges for abusing a
6 class of citizens foreseeably set in motion more abuse that class of citizens? The
7 answer is clear, and well-articulated by Justice White, joined by Justices Douglas,
8 Blackmun, and Brennan, in the dissent from Linda R.S.:
9
[W]hy should only an actual or potential criminal defendant have a
10
recognizable interest in attacking this allegedly discriminatory statute and not
11
appellant and her class? They are not, after all, in the position of members of
12
the public at large who wish merely to force an enlargement of state criminal
13
laws. Appellant, her daughter, and the children born out of wedlock whom she
14
is attempting to represent have all allegedly been excluded intentionally from
15
the class of persons protected by a particular criminal law. They do not get the
16
protection of the laws that other women and children get. Under Art. 602, they
17
are rendered nonpersons; a father may ignore them with full knowledge that he
18
will be subjected to no penal sanctions. . . . I had always thought our
19
civilization has assumed that the threat of penal sanctions had something more
20
than a speculative effect on a person's conduct. This Court has long acted on
21
that assumption in demanding that criminal laws be plainly and explicitly
22
worded so that people will know what they mean and be in a position to
23
conform their conduct to the mandates of law. Certainly Texas does not share
24
the Court's surprisingly novel view. It assumes that criminal sanctions are
25
useful in coercing fathers to fulfill their support obligations to their legitimate
26
children. . . .
27
If a State were to pass a law that made only the murder of a white person a
28
crime, I would think that Negroes as a class would have sufficient interest to
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
seek a declaration that that law invidiously discriminated against them.
Appellant and her class have no less interest in challenging their exclusion
from what their own State perceives as being the beneficial protections that
flow from the existence and enforcement of a criminal child-support law.
5 Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 620-21 (1973) (White, J. dissenting).
6
Courts in the United States have repeatedly found government actors liable for
7 creating policies and conditions which foreseeably permit others to cause injury. See
8 Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982). When that policy, habit, or
9 custom of permitting crime, causing a deprivation of liberty, property, speech, or
10 other fundamental rights, or works against a class, the policy is a violation of equal
11 protection under state and federal constitutions. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.
12 456, 465 (1996); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United States,
13 238 U.S. 347 (1914); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326; Screws v. U.S., 325
14 U.S. 91 (1945).
15
As the interests and numerous fundamental rights of classes no less important
16 than families and children are present here, their equal treatment in crisiswhen they
17 need the fair protection of the law the mostdeserves federal attention. Families are
18 our nations core and future. They are clearly identifiable, and deserve at least as
19 much protection as other groups, who have achieved recognition for class-based
20 discrimination against them. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
21 432, 441 (1985) (illegitimacy a recognized intermediate scrutiny class); Witt v.
22 Dep't of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 817 (9th Cir. 2008) (9th Circuit modern standard for
23 equal protection analysis of intermediate scrutiny class); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d
24 1052, 1082 (9th Cir. 2012) cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (U.S. 2012) and vacated and
25 remanded sub nom, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (U.S. 2013) (modern
26 standard for rational basis scrutiny); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 650 (1996);
27 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (strict scrutiny). They speak
28 today through a powerless representative, but do not assert disgruntled litigant
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 claimsbut clearly demonstrable commercial fraud, extortion, deprivation, and

2 abuse committed on an enterprise scale.
3
In the event that SIMI or BATTSON are or become aware of de facto
4 discrepancies or de jure policies in how family court judges or family court litigant
5 complaints are handled, Plaintiffs will look forward to offering further analysis on
6 this topic. For present purposes, the claims are adequately pled.
7 E. Color of Law Authority
8
Multiple private Defendants assert a plausibility attack on the FAC allegations
9 that the private entities are liable under section 1983 as color of law actors.
10 OMNIBUS (Doc. No. 131-1) 12:24, 13:26, 14:3-5; BIERER (Doc. 135-1) 3:28-4:1,
11 4:13-17; JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS (Doc. 139) 6:27-7:2, 7:14-20; GORE (Doc.
12 141-1); FEDERAL Doc. No. 145, 4:25-5:18; LAWYER DEFENDANTS (Doc. 14913 2) 4:2-6:15. Defendants focus on conspiracy, alleging only that there are no specific
14 facts showing an agreement between all these private parties and any state actor
15 acting under color of law. OMNIBUS 13:25-27. While direct interaction between a
16 private party and a state actor is one foundation for liability, there are many:
17
Conspiracy between public and private actors. Adickes v. S. H. Kress &
18 Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27, (1980)
19 (conspiracy between private actors and prosecutors); Brummett v. Camble, 946 F.2d
20 1178, 1184-85 (5th Cir. 1991).
21
Private action in concert with state officials. United States v. Price,
22 383 U.S. 787, 795 (1966); Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (2002); Cooper v.
23 Molko, 512 F. Supp. 563, 568 (N.D. Cal. 1981);
24
State actors delegating authority to private actors: West v. Atkins, 487
25 U.S. 42 (1988);
26
Private party invoking state procedure or authority in private action:
27 Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802,
28 804 (9th Cir.1976); Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.1975),
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 and cases cited therein at n. 6; Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164,
2 (1978).
3
Private actors carrying out a public function: See Terry v. Adams, 345
4 U.S. 461, 484, (1953) (Clark, J., concurring); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 5075 08 (1946).
6
Private action compelled by state actors: Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
7 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970).

8
Pervasive entanglement between public authority and private actors:
9 Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 531 U.S.

10 288 (2001).
11
Exercise of government-created framework for private action: North
12 Georgia Finishing, Incorporated v. Di-Chem, Incorporated, 419 U.S. 601 (1975);

13 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (private party liable where state and party
14 form a symbiotic relationship or state coerces or provides significant
15 encouragement to private actors).
16
Private entities such as SDCBA and FEDERAL enacting or enforcing
17 policies in concert with authority in violation of plaintiffs rights may be liable under
18 Monell. Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir.2012).
19 1. Color of Law is a Question of Fact
20
Defendants must establish that the FAC fails to allege facts supporting any of
21 the numerous grounds for state action. Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 382-83
22 (9th Cir. 1983). The analysis is complex, involving sifting facts and weighing
23 circumstances. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961);
24 Life Insurance Co. of North America v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 501 (9th Cir.1979);
25 Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802, 804 (9th Cir. 1976). Discovery will cement what
26 is today apparent and properly alleged: The domestic dispute industry is a criminal
27 enterprise operating in coordination with color of authority to exploit domestic
28 dispute litigants, by fraud, extortion, and violence through abuse of the public powers
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1 and authority of Californiasand our nationsdomestic relations courts. FAC

2 63-75; 929-1000,
3 2. Color of Law Allegations from FAC
4
The OMNIBUS asserts a general plausibility attack on color of law allegations:
5 the occasional conclusory phrase can be found to the effect that defendants all
6 conspired with each other. OMNIBUS 14:3-5. This sweeping characterization of
7 facts as mere boiler-plate-conclusory statements is insufficient to carry the
8 movants burden under a plausibility attack. See multi-stage analysis, supra.
9
10
Information and Belief Allegations In Plausibility Attacks

In this and other plausibility attacks the OMNIBUS ignores facts alleged on
11 information and belief. Information and belief allegations are appropriate when
12 alleging facts out of a plaintiffs control. The existence of a subjective belief will
13 frequently turn on factors which a plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to know.
14 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, (Before discovery has unearthed
15 relevant facts and evidence, it may be difficult to define the precise formulation of the
16 required prima facie case in a particular case.). See also Starr Baca, 652 F.3d
17 1202, 1204-1205; Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. United States, 648 F.3d 708, 721 (9th
18 Cir.2011) (allegation that product performed below industry standards certainly
19 sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion); Daniels Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n,
20 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir.2010); OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1058
21 (9th Cir. 2012); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
22 Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 167 (1993). Information and belief claims are particularly
23 appropriate where parties maintain duties to perform control or agency relationships
24 with other Defendants. Allegations of wrongful conduct which sets in motion acts
25 by others causing injury are sufficient to establish liability. Johnson v. Duffy, 588
26 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011).
27
28
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1
2
a. Enterprise-Level Integration
Defendants themselves provide the best evidence of their operation as
3 public/private enterprise, variously describing themselves as a Family Law

4 Community or Family Law System. FAC 62, 66. In San Diego, top certified
5 family law specialists regularly meet with Superior Court leaders to set and
6 administer policy for the Family Law System.20 The FAC alleges the California
7 Domestic Dispute Industry is a highly integrated partnership between private and
8 public actors, functions, powers, and control. Id., FAC Ex. 1, 2. The FAC
9 summarizes the abundant evidence of Defendants unhidden collaboration:
10 California legal institutions such as family courts and the legal community,
11
professional institutions such as the state bar and
12
psychology boards, and criminal justice institutions
13
have in the recent decade gradually combined to
14
cultivate a joint enterprise forum in which
15
widespread family practice exceptions to the rule
16
of law are not only tolerated, but increasingly
17
encouraged. Count 7. Its members also operate
18
private networks to pursue their commercial
19 purposes and collaborate toward those ends in the form of a cabal FAC 946-949.
20 They collaborate in mutual referral networks (Racketeering Count 2) and coordinate
21 their public commercial advertising to support one anothers fraud (FAC 949,
22 Count 15). Private entities collaborate with public entities to create and police a
23 commercial market for illegal, unnecessary, and even harmful domestic relations
24 legal services (FAC 933-36, 953), maintain the long-term viability of the market
25 in collaborative pacts (FAC 956-61), and compete unfairly with any disfavored
26 competitors in the same marketplace, including California Coalition. FAC 913,
27
20
KPBS interview by Maureen Cavanaugh of Shawn Weber, Esq., CFLS Cuts To San Diego
28 County Courts Are Affecting Families, December 3, 2012, available at
http://www.kpbs.org/audioclips/16090/

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1 950, 951. By agreement and abuse of process in knowing collaboration with public
2 entities, private entities invoke public authority, police powers, and the criminal
3 justice system to protect their markets (FAC 952).21 Each of these allegations is an
4 independent basis for color of law liability.
5
Defendant ALLIANCE operates a family justice center business model in
6 San Diego and throughout the nation based on public/private colocation. This
7 collaboration is a central pillar of the SD-DDICE, DDI-IACE, and a major pillar of
8 the DDICE. FAC 937, Ex. 1. This model coagulates public officials under a
9 public/privately funded alliance to create and disseminate illegal policies,
10 indoctrinate officials away from settled law, establish practice-level protocols,
11 share public/private infrastructure and technical assistance research, and enforce
12 compliance (FAC 938, Ex. 1, P6-7, P47-71, P72-90, P97-104, P127, P292-306,
13 P441-447, P448-456, P457, P460-467).22 The vertical integration of Family Courts
14 and Criminal Courts explained by Dr. Baskerville in Ex. 13 further describes the
15 integration of Divorce Industry lawyers, social workers, police, family courts, and
16 criminal courts in abundant detail.
17
SDCBA is another pillar of the SD-DDICE. Through meetings such as the
18 SDCBA SEMINAR (and numerous others not specifically alleged) it coordinates

19 dissemination of illegal policy, custom, and practice and direction throughout the
20 Family Law Community utilizing SDCBA premises and infrastructure. In California
21 such policies include the Domestic Dispute Industrys Pit (FAC 964-974),
22 collaborate with state and county defendants to invoke The Pits domestic violence
23 restraining orders and other abuses to commit fraud and extortion (FAC 937-939,
24
21
To assist the court in its plausibility analysis, details the enterprise-level

collaboration have been generously provided by Plaintiffs affiliates from
26 DivorceCorp available here: http://wp.me/p4aG7J-Y8. The entire film is available
27 for purchase at www.weightiermatter.com. If desired, PLAINTIFFS hereby proffer
and request leave to amend to plead this detail.
22
28
Further analysis that may be pled on leave to amend is located within FAC Ex. 1
Exs. A, B, and B.1, and at Plaintiffs website here: http://wp.me/p4aG7J-8y
-7125
OPPO TO OMNIBUS MTN TO DISMISS

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1 975-76; Doc. No. 109), abuse of process by SDCB members using SDCBA2 maintained listervs (FAC Exhibit 2 re: Lesh/Doyne). The SD-DDICE has created
3 and maintains an extensive fraudulent forensic psychology commercial enterprise
4 (FAC 940-942, 977-983, FAC Ex. 2) and utilize public licenses in collaboration
5 with knowing but illegal abstention of judicial officers to conduct False Flag fraud
6 (FAC 984-999). Federal provides insurance and financial and legal backing to
7 these illegal enterprises (FAC 30), and coordinates their legal defense to include in
8 this case collaboration with CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS in the MALICIOUS
9 PROSECUTIONS. All Defendants invoke police powers and the criminal justice
10 system regularly and illegally to enrich and defend their public-private enterprise
11 industry. See STUART ASSAULT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION,
12 OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE (Count 4), NESTHUS OBSTRUCTION OF
13 JUSTICE, EQUAL PROTECTION CONSPIRACIES, RACKETEERING COUNTS,
14 FICRO CONSPIRACIES. Defendants Superior Court, COUNTY, SDSD, and CITY
15 ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS implement the enforcement element of these
16 enterprises through illegal abuse of color of law authority. See, FICRO
17 CONSPIRACIES.
18
The framework, policies, and legal tools for this collaboration fall within the
19 symbiosis, entanglement, and state constructed framework models for state

20 actor liability disclosed in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School
21 Athletic Association, 531 U.S. 288 (2001), North Georgia Finishing, Incorporated v.
22 Di-Chem, Incorporated, 419 U.S. 601 (1975) and Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991
23 (1982) above. Specific deployments of this framework in both enterprise and
24 conspiracy are identified elsewhere in the FAC and below. All Defendants operate
25 and profit from this entanglement, and are therefore color of law actors for all
26 purposes. See Stuart Decl. for multimedia explanations of additional element should
27 the Court desire additional pleading to support these allegations.
28
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
b. Harassment And Abuse Collaboration
The FAC describes a history between Domestic Dispute Industry Defendants
3 and California Coalition and its community of parents and children that has devolved
4 into nothing short of concerted warfare on Plaintiffs by private and public
5 collaboration. The FAC details how the enterprise-level collaboration above has
6 graduated to focus its ominous machinery of criminal and civil justice systems,
7 private wealth, connections, and know-how in conspiracy and enterprise to
8 specifically target California Coalitions reform efforts, exercise and advocacy for
9 federal supremacy, and support of candidates, processes, and institutions of the
10 United States (FFRRESA).
11
c. Racketeering Collaboration
The collaboration between various defendants is also described by their use of
12
13 specific types of schemes and artifices to defraud and tools of extortion to commit
14 racketeering, extortion, bribery, fraud, and multiple acts of violence to crush
15 Plaintiffs attempts to compete with and reform a heinous domestic dispute industry.
16 See, COUNTS 1, 3, RACKETEERING COUNTS 3, 6. Such crimes would not be
17 possible absent common observance and coordinated policing of extra-legal policies
18 or customs utilizing the coercive tools of domestic courts and law enforcement
19 which, though perhaps immune from civil rights lawsuits, are nevertheless illegally
20 deployed onto the targets of the crime: Families. The heinous tools deployed in such
21 schemes include issuance of illegal DVILS ORDERS,23 disobedience of state and
22 federal constitutional protections for litigants, deployment of illegal forensic
23 psychology commercial enterprises24, disregard of ordinary rules of evidence in
24 violation of state statutes, caselaw,25 to equal protection, enforcement of illegal
25 attorney fees awards, and wide-scale and shameful judicial abstention and
26
23
See, e.g., Doc. No. 109, fn. 11 for detail on constitutional violations.
See http://wp.me/p4aG7J-OR for detail on this issue and a forthcoming motion for
28 preliminary injunction.
25
See Elkins v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 483, 492-94 (2007).
27
24

13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 acquiescence by judges under whose noses the practice occurs daily. FAC 9842 999. In just this case Defendants have acted in highly-coordinated conspiracy and
3 enterprise over the past six years to conduct and participate in the racketeering
4 enterprises and conspiracies to combat Plaintiffs competition and reform, including
5 illegally imprisoning CALIFORNIA COALITIONS leader, and threatening dozens
6 of its members with similarly deplorable retaliation. See, NESTHUS
7 OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE; RICO COUNTS 3-10; DDI Marketplace allegations;
8 Doc. No. 4.
9
d. Stuart Assault Coordinator Collaboration
10
The FAC details sufficient collaboration between public and private actors at
11 the STUART ASSAULT to invoke liability under section 1983. Paragraph 294
12 alleges: [d]efendants inflicted the above-described injury on Plaintiffs while
13 formally assembled under color of law as judges, peace officers, officers of the court,
14 and their agents, while bearing the color of their honorable titles, regalia, and
15 designations of authority, including judicial robes, uniforms, armory, and badges of
16 authority, and exercised the same in all activities. This collaborative assemblythe
17 SDCBA SEMINARwas organized, planned, and conducted by SDCBA on
18 SDCBA property using SDCBA infrastructure. See COUNT 1. The purpose of the
19 SDCBA SEMINAR was to collaborate regarding policy and practice for the SD20 DDICEs use of Professional Services for Defendants DOYNE, LOVE, SIMON,
21 and others. FAC 109-111.
22
Each SAC Defendant collaborated with or exercised color of law authority in
23 the STUART ASSAULT. See COUNT 1. The STUART ASSAULT and its public
24 entity elements were backed and defended by SDCBAs insurer, FEDERAL.
25 COUNT 3. STUART and CALIFORNIA COALITION were persecuted in
26 collaboration between the SAC Defendants, including SDCBA and FEDERAL,
27 through the MALICIOUS PROSECUTION and PROSECUTORIAL
28 MISCONDUCTS in retaliation for and to thwart the CLAIM AND DEMAND and
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 Plainitffs PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITIES hostile to the industry as a whole.

2
The FAC alleges California Coalitions assertion of federal remedies to redress
3 injuries caused by the present public-private enterprises was also attacked by the
4 NESTHUS DEFENDANTSincluding each SAC and CITY ATTORNEY
5 DEFENDANTS in the OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE. It was executed in
6 collaboration between SAC Defendants in retaliation for Plaintiffs FFRRESA and
7 DUE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE and DDIJO COMPLAINTS against
8 COLOR OF LAW ACTORS WOHLFEIL, SCHALL, DOYNE, and others. FAC
9 79-85, 91-97.
10
SDCBA is alleged as a backbone infrastructure element of the SD-DDICE,
11 and an aider and abettor in the STUART AHCE (and thousands of other AHCEs in
12 San Diego County yet unnamed) and DDI-FICE, functioning to facilitate the
13 extensive collaboration and operation of the SD-DDICE, and to support and defend
14 the fraud, extortion, and obstruction of justice of the black hat criminal elements
15 that have overtaken the San Diego Family Law Community. FAC 63, 66, 68, 93116 936, 953-961, Ex. 2. SDCBA, along with each SAC, PLANNED AND
17 DELIVERED the SDCBA SEMINAR at which the SDCBA ENGAGEMENT was
18 targeted. FAC 108-116. FEDERAL is an enterprise-level financial backer,
19 supporter, and defender of SDCBA and each several alleged enterprises and
20 conspiracies to deprive the EQUAL PROTECTION CLASSES of rights. FAC 30,
21 257, 288, 351-372, 764-799.
22 3. Conspiracy Attacks
23
Several Defendants attack adequacy of the FAC conspiracy pleading. The
24 elements of a civil rights conspiracy are simplean agreement to perform the act
25 alleged. Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301-02 (9th Cir.
26 1999). Agreement may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence explicit
27 agreement, or simply a meeting of the minds to collaborate. Gilbrook v. City of
28 Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856 (9th Cir.1999). A showing that the alleged
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 conspirators have committed acts that are unlikely to have been undertaken without
2 an agreement may allow a jury to infer the existence of a conspiracy. Kunik v.
3 Racine County, 946 F.2d 1574, 1580 (7th Cir.1991). RICO conspiracies require only
4 agreement to facilitate operation or management of the enterprise. A defendant is
5 guilty of conspiracy to violate 1962(c) if the evidence shows that he or she
6 knowingly agreed to facilitate a scheme that includes the operation or management of
7 a RICO enterprise. United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1230 (9th Cir.2004),
8 cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1043 (2005). Agreement to facilitate is sufficient--a plaintiff
9 need not plead or prove any act in furtherance of the agreement. Salinas v. United
10 States, 522 U.S. 52, 6165 (1997). 26
11
California law does not require that each defendant charged with conspiracy
12 have committed an overt act; it is sufficient that at least one co-conspirator have
13 committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Cal. Pen.C. 184 (overt
14 act must be committed "by one or more of the parties to such agreement"); People v.
15 Russo, 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1135 (2001) ("Moreover, any one of the conspirators, and
16 not necessarily the charged defendant, may commit the overt act to consummate the
17 conspiracy."). It is unclear, however, whether the overt act must be committed while
18 the defendant is a part of the conspiracy in order for it to be used against him.
19 Compare CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL 6.10 ("It is not necessary to
20 the guilt of any particular defendant that he personally committed an overt act, if he
21 was one of the conspirators when the alleged overt act was committed.") (alternative
22 pronouns omitted), with 1 WITKIN & EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW
23 (3d ed. 2000) Elements 95 ("[O]ne who joins with the existing conspirators in the
24 criminal plan does not create a new conspiracy but becomes a member of the existing
25 conspiracy. Hence, an overt act committed prior to the new member joining will be
26 just as effective against him or her as against the prior parties....").
27
28
26
Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instructions:

http://www.akd.uscourts.gov/docs/general/model_jury_civil.pdf

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FEDERAL: FEDERAL cites Wasco Products for the proposition that a federal
2 plaintiff must allege the basic elements of a conspiracy of formation and

3 operation, wrongful acts pursuant thereto, and damages." FEDERAL Doc. No. 145,
4 5:2-3. Wasco Products analyzed the required elements of conspiracy under
5 California state law commercial damages claims. Wascoe at *12. The relevant
6 allegations against FEDERAL allege a civil rights conspiracy under federal law
7 civil rights and RICO.
8
FEDERAL also claims the conspiracy claim lacks an underlying tort.
9 FEDERAL is accused of numerous violations of law both independently and as the

10 underlying tort.
11
FEDERAL asserts the FAC is defective because it does not satisfy this
12 Courts published pleading standards for RICO claims, referencing exhibit 2 to its
13 RJN consisting of this Courts RICO Case Statement form. 145, 5:20. This Courts
14 RICO Case Statement is not a pleading standard but an optional form the Court
15 may instruct Plaintiffs to complete during pleading or discovery. Many Courts use
16 them, and Plaintiffs counsel is well-familiar with the format and process, which is
17 often helpful in complex cases such as this one. Should the Court require Plaintiffs to
18 complete such a form, Plaintiff will of course comply. Until such an order issues,
19 FEDERALS attack fails.
20
21 4. SDCBA-FEDERAL-CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS Collaboration
22
The OMNIBUS asserts a special attack on behalf of SDCBA and FEDERAL
23 that Count 3 simply lumps together City Attorney defendants with the SDCBA and
24 numerous private party defendants for deprivation of rights under color of law with
25 no facts establishing the necessary elements of an agreement or conspiracy.
26 FEDERAL makes a similar allegation at Doc. No. 145, 3:25-4:15.
27
The FAC alleges numerous specific acts by FEDERAL and SDCBA in
28 conspiracy and collaboration during exercise of state power, entanglement, and

13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 enterprise sufficient to provide abundant foundation for private defendants liability

2 for abuse of color of law authority. Count 3 alleges Stuart delivered the CLAIM
3 AND DEMAND to SDCBA, which delivered it to FEDERAL. 353, 355.
4 FEDERAL identified itself as an agent of SDCBA and all parties and insureds
5 including all SAC. FEDERAL stated it was considering prosecution of STUART
6 for criminal trespass if STUART pressed further. 355, 359, 364, 366-70.
7 FEDERAL identified a bunch of angry judges as damage caused by STUART
8 which FEDERAL intended to assert in its defense of the CLAIM AND DEMAND,
9 and suggested STUART drop it. FAC 366. The FAC identifies these facts as
10 supporting a conclusion that a FEDERAL had joined the STUART ASSAULT
11 COORDINATORS in conspiracy: The FEDERAL representative indicated what
12 appeared to be a conspiracy between FEDERAL, SDCBA, and one or more of the
13 STUART ASSAULT COORDINATORS, including powerful San Diego judicial
14 officials. FAC 368. FEDERAL cannot prosecute crimes, but represented a
15 relationship with other SAC judicial officers and the City Attorney enabling it to do
16 so. FAC 364-368.
17
The FAC alleges collaboration between SDCBA (as a Stuart Assault
18 Coordinator), FEDERAL, and CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS. Facts

19 supporting this conclusion include providing or generating false or misleading
20 information, testimony, documents and other evidence to other Defendants. FAC
21 471. The false or misleading information was conveyed to GARSON, who used it
22 in the MALICIOUS PROSECUTION to threaten prosecution not merely for the
23 criminal trespass charge, but GARSON amplified the charge to one for felony
24 stalking of judges the MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. FAC 367-454. She later
25 amplified it further by suborning perjury to threaten STUART with an investigation
26 by the F.B.I. for harassing judges. FAC 437.
27 5. BIERER Color of Law Attack:
28
BIERER comes closest to traversing the analysis, but fails to identify a

13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 conclusory allegation in the FAC to attack. She instead misrepresents the FAC in a
2 generalization, then attacking the misrepresentation:
3
Plaintiffs allege that everyone and anyone involved in the family law process is
part of a grandiose scheme against them and their rights. Put simply, there are
no factual allegations in the FAC to support this contention against any of the
defendants, let alone Bierer. The lack of factual allegations aside, the alleged
scheme and conspiracy against Plaintiffs is so implausible as to borderline
on ludicrous. Instead, a much more likely explanation is that Plaintiffs,
including Colbern Stuart, had poor experiences with the family law system,
10
and now hold a grudge against the system as a whole.
11 135-1, 3:10-17.
12
This is an inaccurate. The FAC alleges specific conspiracies detailed above in
13 which BIERER is involved, including the STUART ASSAULT Claim 1.8, identifies
14 her as a member of the STUART ASSAULT COORDINATOR group, a participant
15 in four ENTERPRISES, and details her liability through several Racketeering Claims
16 for Relief. These allegations are supported by significant factual detail. To
17 overcome the presumption of truth of the conspiracy and enterprise allegations,
18 BIERER must respond with a more plausible explanation. Here she misses the
19 mark: Plaintiffs hold a grudge against the system as a whole. A plaintiffs motives
20 in bringing a lawsuit are irrelevant to a Twombly plausibility analysis. Instead
21 BIERER must identify an alternative explanation for her own behavior other than, for
22 example, knowingly furthering the STUART ASSAULT by alerting SDCBA DOE 1
23 and SDSD of STUARTS location at the SEMINAR, as alleged at FAC 242, 243.
24 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567. She will also have opportunities to
25 explain her participation with the domestic dispute industry criminal enterprises, the
26 forensic investigator criminal enterprise, and the STUART-AHCE criminal
27 enterprises by collaborating with others in the abundant frauds, extortion, and violent
28 crimes alleged against her.
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 6. Lawyer Defendants Color of Law Attack

2
Lawyer Defendants assert a plausibility attack on the FAC alleging they have
3 acted under color of law. Doc. No. 149-2, 5:10-6:15. Lawyer Defendants are part of
4 the STUART ASSAULT COORDINATOR group. The FAC alleges color of law
5 generally at FAC 150 and against these defendants in the STUART ASSAULT as
6 Defendants inflicted the above-described injury on Plaintiffs while formally
7 assembled under color of law as judges, peace officers, officers of the court, and their
8 agents, while bearing the color of their honorable titles, regalia, and designations of
9 authority, including judicial robes, uniforms, armory, and badges of authority, and
10 exercised the same in all activities alleged. FAC 294. Specific facts demonstrating
11 collaboration in the STUART ASSAULT include the PLANNING AND DELIVERY
12 (Claim 1.12, FAC 179-182, 288), selection of timing for the STUART ASSAULT
13 to maximize chilling and personal and competitive injury (FAC 291), collaborating
14 and communicating with one another upon learning of the ENGAGEMENT, and
15 agreeing to affiliate and support the STUART ASSAULT (FAC 140-144),
16 collaborating with SDCBA and SDCBA DOE 1 in preparing, conducting the
17 SEMINAR and identifying STUART (FAC 189-193), alerting one another and
18 SDSD to STUARTS presence and location (FAC 198), inducing breach of contract
19 and competitive injury (Count 2), furthering harm and injury and ratifying the
20 STUART ASSAULT by defaming Plaintiffs and their cause (FAC 134),
21 collaborating with FEDERAL and SDCBA in fabrication and destruction of evidence
22 in response to the CLAIM AND DEMAND and DUE ADMINISTRATION OF
23 JUSTICE (FAC 367, 370-71, 470), collaborating with of other STUART
24 ASSAULT COORDINATORS and the CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS in the
25 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION by providing or generating false or misleading
26 information, testimony, documents and other evidence to other Defendants,
27 precipitating acts in the MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, and foreseeably causing the
28 FALSE IMPRISONMENTS and other subsequent events (FAC 414, 471),
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Lawyer Defendants are also alleged as participants in the DDICE and SD-
2 DDICE. As participants in the public/private enterprises they also act under color of
3 law. FAC 929, 932, 935, 944, and RACKETEERING COUNTS.
4
Lawyer Defendants Invalid Analysis of Conspiracy Elements
Lawyer Defendants assert To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff alleging
6 conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights must include in his complaint
7 nonconclusory allegations with evidence of unlawful intent citing Harris v.
8 Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir.1997) and Fraklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 445
9 (9th Cir. 2002). This citation to Fox simply distinguishes purely private action from
10 color of law authority. Franklin furthered that statement to specify four categories of
11 substantial degree of cooperation which could subject private actors to liability
12 under section 1983. The Supreme Court has articulated four tests for determining
13 whether a private individual's actions amount to state action: (1) the public function
14 test; (2) the joint action test; (3) the state compulsion test; and (4) the governmental
15 nexus test. Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 444-45 (9th Cir. 2002). This case fits
16 several of those categories.
17
Lawyer Defendants claim that Plaintiffs civil rights claims must satisfy a
18 heightened pleading standard for unlawful intent citing Harris v. Roderick, 126
19 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 1997) is abrogated law. 149-2, 5:26-28, Harriss
20 heightened pleading holding followed Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir.
21 1991), which first established the heightened pleading requirement. Branchs
22 heightened pleading requirement has been abrogated at both the United States
23 Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit. In light of CrawfordEl and Swierkiewicz, we
24 must conclude that Branch I and II are no longer good law to the extent that they
25 require heightened pleading of improper motive in constitutional tort cases.
26 Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002). Today, the
27 appropriate analysis is the plausible pleading requirement for conclusory
28 allegations detailed in Twombly. See I.A.1(b) supra.
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 7. CORRIGAN and LOVE Color of Law Attacks

2
CORRIGAN and LOVE identify four of the several tests relevant for holding
3 private entities liable for association with color of law authority. LOVE 144, 5:214 8:23. The State Compulsion Test of Blum v. Yaretsky and joint action test of
5 Franklin v. Fox is met by the FAC allegations that Defendants claim thats how it
6 is (FAC 911). BLANCHET and ABC&K have described The Pit as coercive: Of
7 course theyre unconstitutionaltheyre illegal as Hell, but they know its expensive
8 to fight it, so they strike first, throw you in The Pit and make you pay or work to
9 climb your way out (FAC 969).27 The STUART ASSAULTS PLANNING AND
10 DELIVERY in which LOVE and CORRIGAN participated was carried out at the
11 direction of ALKSNE. FAC 180-181. DOYNE and BLANCHET conveyed state
12 coercion to waive fundamental rights as thats just how it is, take it or leave it,
13 and if you ever want to see your son again (FAC 949, 1035).
14
CORRIGAN and LOVE contest the public function test and the
15 governmental nexus tests. The FAC alleges the Family Law System has
16 supplanted traditional state functions administered according to state and federal
17 constitutional restrictions and due process with enterprises operating according to
18 policies directed to deprive, extort, and defraud those seeking traditional public
19 functions of principled dispute resolution according to law. The Jackson and Sturm
20 cases cited at 144, 7:7-23 involve genuinely distinct private entities acting under
21 licenses or regulations according to law. The allegations were that by acting
22 according to regulation, the entities were color of law actors. The FAC does not rely
23 solely on public license or adherence to a regulatory scheme, but that DDICE entities
24 act inconsistent with law according to unreacted policies and quid-pro-quo
25 exchanges. E.g., FAC 948, RACKETEERING COUNT 2.
26
27
27
STUART hereby represents an ability to plead numerous additional statements by Defendants

in his own case and in many others detailing judicial policymaking, direction, conspiracy, and
28 coercion if granted leave. The issue of industrywide disregard of professional and fiduciary duties
will also be the subject of Plaintiffs expert witness testimony.

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Color of Law Conclusion

Defendants are bound by numerous PROFESSIONAL DUTIES including the
3 strictest fiduciary and legal representative obligations to protect their clients and
4 citizen rights to due process and equal protection, including rights to evidentiary
5 protections, privacy, and procedural protections available to every other civil
6 litigant.28 While perhaps immune, the acts are nonetheless illegal. It is
7 inconceivable that an entire class of lawyers, psychologist, and judge could violate
8 their professions clear PROFESSIONAL DUTIES to openly participate in vast
9 deprivation, commercial fraud, and unveiled extortion29 that has become de rigueur in
10 family court without intelligent direction, collaboration, and reinforcement. Such
11 deplorable collaboration is precisely the illegal collusion that subjects the commercial
12 Divorce Industry bar to liability as state actors, and precisely the behavior this Action
13 is aimed to remedy.
14 F. Lanham Act
15
Several Defendants attack Plaintiffs Lanham Act claim (Count 15). Lawyer
16 Defendants assert the FAC fails to assert (1) a commercial injury based upon a
17 misrepresentation about a product; and (2) that the injury is competitive, or harmful
18 to the plaintiff's ability to compete with the defendant. Doc. No. 149-2, 8:20-26.
19 OMNIBUS asserts (The fatal flaw here is plaintiffs' allegation at FAC paragraph 912
20 that 'plaintiffs compete with defendants for provision of legal services" 14:19-15:19.
21 BIERER asserts There are also no factual allegations as to how Plaintiffs compete in
22 the same marketplace as Bierer. Doc. No. 135-1, 5:6-9. COUNTY similarly
23 attacks: No claim is stated because the County of San Diego and the Sheriff do not
24 engage in the advertisement or sale of goods or services; are not involved in interstate
25 commerce; and the County defendants do not compete with plaintiffs in any
26
28
The instances of Family Courts illegal divergence from the California Code of Civil
27 Procedure are well documented in California. See Elkins v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 483,
492-94 (2007).
28
29
See Stuart Declaration in Support of Preliminary Injunction, discussion of extortion
counseled in AAML article by Leonard Karp, 17-31; fraud counseled by Christopher Zopatti.

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1 commercial activity. Doc. 141-1, 7:1-17.

These attacks fail. Plaintiffs do compete with Defendants for citizens seeking
3 domestic dispute resolution services in the DDI Marketplace, and the FAC alleges
4 those facts. FAC 913, 935-36, 950, 952-961. Moreover, recent caselaw makes the
5 attacks moot.
6 1. Lexmark v. Static Controls
7
These assertions excusably omit a recent Supreme Court decision which
8 overturns the line of Ninth Circuit precedent on which Defendants rely. In Lexmark
9 Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014) the Court settled
10 on the broadest of several tests for determining Article III standing in Lanham Act
11 claimsthe zone of interest test. In so doing, the Court overturned the Waits30 line
12 of cases on which defendants rely for the proposition that only competitors have
13 standing to assert Lanham Act claims.
14
After Lexmark, any party suffering foreseeable commercial injury by false
15 advertisingeven a non-competitorhas standing under the Lanham Act. The issue

16 in Lexmark was whether Static Controls, a toner cartridge component part
17 manufacturer, could sue Lexmark, a toner cartridge manufacturer and competitor of
18 Static Controls customers, for false advertising about Lexmarks own products.
19 Lexmark alleged Static Controls lacked standing because Static Controls did not
20 directly compete with Lexmark. Id. at 1384.
21
The Court adopted the broad zone of interest test: The plaintiff must have
22 suffered or be imminently threatened with a concrete and particularized injury in

23 fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and likely to be
24 redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014)
25 (citing Lujan). [T]he test is not especially demanding. [W]e have often
26
27
30
Waits v. FritoLay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1108 (9th Cir. 1992) (OMNIBUS citation at 15:3-6 is
to Jurin v. Google Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122 (E.D. Cal. 2010). Jurin is derived from Jack
28 Russell Terrier Network of Northern California v. American Kennel Club, Inc., 407 F.3d 1027,
1037. Jack Russell is turn founded on Waits. The entire line is abrogated.

13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 conspicuously included the word arguably in the test to indicate that the benefit of
2 any doubt goes to the plaintiff, and have said that the test forecloses suit only when
3 a plaintiff's interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes
4 implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that. Id. at 1389.
5 Looking to the Lanham Acts statutory statement of purpose at 15 U.S.C. 1127, the
6 Court identified the broad intent to protect persons engaged in such commerce
7 against unfair competition. Id. at 1389. The Court held: a plaintiff must allege an
8 injury to a commercial interest in reputation or sales . . . flowing directly from the
9 deception [of plaintiffs consumers] wrought by the defendant's advertising . . causes
10 [plainitffs consumers] to withhold trade from the plaintiff. Id. at 1390.
11 2. The FAC Alleges Zone of Interest and Foreseeable Commercial Injury
12
The FAC allegations satisfy this test. The FAC describes the common
13 Domestic Dispute Industry Market and its Domestic Dispute Industry Litigants
14 (DDIL) which Lawyer Defendants and Plaintiffs serve: DDIL are ordinarily families
15 in crisis seeking to resolve their personal difficulties by altering relationships. In
16 doing so they must often seek the involvement of the state. For contested or unusually
17 complex matters, DDIL enlist experts to help navigate . . . Hence, a market for
18 family law experts to assist in navigating the complexity and/or maximizing outcome
19 exists. (DDI MARKET). FAC 953. The processes are described at FAC 64 as
20 governmental, and justice system process concerning domestic relations, child
21 rearing, parenting, constitutional law, child custody, and domestic violence. FAC
22 953-961.
23
Defendants services in that market are alleged at FAC 63, 66, 69, 107
24 (Defendants are owners, associates, participants, collaborators, affiliates,

25 benefactors, associates of entities providing traditional professional, legal, social,
26 and government services as part of the Domestic Dispute Industry.). Their
27 anticompetitive behavior is described generally: They have acted aggressively and
28 illegally against Plaintiffs to commit criminal and civil violations of Plaintiffs state
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 and federal rights, obstruct justice, abuse process, interfere with existing and
2 prospective business relations, and commit civil and criminal violations federal law
3 as detailed herein.
4
Plaintiffs commercial presence in the DDIL Market is described as
5 COMMERCIAL PURPOSES and BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

6 beginning at FAC 70, 74, and 98: [CALIFORNIA COALITION] is a public
7 benefit corporation educating, supporting, protecting, and promoting parents and
8 childrens rights and interests which are presently under- or misrepresented by
9 existing marketplace or government institutions, particularly in domestic dispute and
10 child custody matters. Since 2008 CALIFORNIA COALITION has assisted mothers,
11 fathers, and children in defending and supporting family autonomy in relations with
12 one another and government interests with related jurisdiction); FAC 99
13 (CALIFORNIA COALITIONS commercial activities have been directed toward
14 educating, empowering, supporting, and representing parents and children to
15 withstand and eventually reverse this well-armed invidious bureaucratic menace
16 eroding parents and childrens welfare.); FAC 100 (CALIFORNIA COALITION
17 works closely with national parenting organizations such as the National Parents
18 Organization, ACFC, and Up To Parents to provide healthy, safe, and legal
19 counseling, resources, representation, services, and support alternatives to traditional
20 domestic dispute services.); FAC 102 (Lexevias public interest or pro bono
21 engagements have included numerous Civil Rights and Constitutional Law matters,
22 including representation of CALIFORNIA COALITION and numerous parents
23 affiliated therewith); FAC 104 (independent parent-child-oriented private support
24 networks and services to share resources, improve awareness, advance joint social,
25 political, and legal goals, protect and promote the independent interests of families
26 and children in domestic dispute matters, develop superior, more efficient, safer, and
27 legal alternatives to traditional family law practices, and to improve the visibility of
28 parent-child interests to legal institutions including policymakers, law enforcement,
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1 and courts. Recognizing abundant opportunity to fill a demand for more efficient,
2 safe, and legal services within the family law community, CALIFORNIA
3 COALITIONS early business development efforts focused on gaining intelligence
4 about the Domestic Dispute Industry to better understand the existing business
5 structures and thereon reform and/or influence and build more efficient, effective,
6 safe, and legal services for parents and children who have no effective advocates in
7 the present industry. These goals include improving professional standards of care for
8 DDI professionalsincluding lawyer, professional service providers, judicial
9 officials, social workers, law enforcement, and others, providing consumer-oriented
10 legal and government services, inform and improve industry governance, improve
11 licensing, certification, discipline, oversight standards, from consumer (parents and
12 childrens) perspectives, and develop or assist in developing superior service products
13 to compete in that healthier environment.); FAC 105, 959 (educating the DDIL
14 marketplace to improve awareness and thereby eliminate the competitive advantage
15 of illegal black hat operators has been a central theme both in Plaintiffs FFRRESA
16 and BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT.).
17
Defendants deception of Plaintiffs consumers causing foreseeable injury is
18 described: at FAC 912-13: Plaintiffs, their clients, and affiliates provide safe,
19 legal, efficient, and healthier competing professional services in compliance with law.
20 Defendants, by virtue of their illegal collusion, conspiracy, and coordination are
21 competitively advantaged to overcharge for harmful, inefficient, oppressive, and
22 unhealthy services. To protect such inefficient, illegal, and anticompetitive activities,
23 Defendants have and continue to mislead consumers of PLAINTIFFS and
24 DEFENDANTS services in their COMMERCIAL SPEECH. Plaintiffs reasonably
25 believe they are likely to be mislead and damaged by such COMMERCIAL SPEECH
26 again in the future. See additional detail at FAC 935-936, 947, 949-52, 957, 959,
27 1034, 1064, 1076, 1081.
28
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1 3. Lanham Act Pleading Standard

2
OMNIBUS 15:7-10 incorrectly cites Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d
3 1058, 1065-1066 9 (9th Cir. 2004) for the proposition that a Lanham Act claims is
4 also subject to the heightened pleading standard for fraud 8 under FRCP 9(b).
5 Edwards did not involve Lanham Act pleading standards, but RICO Fraud pleading
6 standards. Defendants citation is inaccurate. Yet even so, given RICOs relaxed
7 fraud pleading standards, the Lanham Act claims would satisfy RICO pleading under
8 Rule 9(b). See RICO, Sec. I.G., infra.
9 4. Other Lanham Act Attacks:
10
a. Specific Misleading Words and Phrases
11
BIERER asserts the FAC lacks factual allegations against Bierer as to what
12 words, terms, names, symbols, and devices were used by Bierer and how they were
13 false or misleading; 135-1, 6:2-6. She cites no requirement for such specificity, and
14 none is required. Fed.R.Civ. Pro 8(a). The FAC alleges these matters with
15 specificity to provide notice at FAC 906-907, subsections (a), and 911, and
16 specifically against BIERER at (g) and Exhibit 48 (BIERERS Internet website).
17
FEDERAL asserts the Lanham Act claims do not plead elements required
18 under Kournikova v. General Media Communications, Inc., 278 F. Supp. 2d 1111

19 (C.D. Cal. 2003). FEDERAL Doc. No. 145, 5:24-26. FEDERAL does not identify
20 any element it alleges is missing, but Kournikova is explicitly based on Waits, which
21 was recently abrogated under Lexmark Controls. Kournikova at 1117-18. The FAC
22 properly pleads a claim under the relevant authority. See Lexmark v. Static Controls
23 analysis above.
24
COUNTY asserts that GORE and COUNTY do not advertise or compete.
25 Doc. 141-1, 12-15. COUNTYS website actively promotes its dispute resolution
26 services and family law facilitator offices. FAC 907(e), 464, 65,1, 653, 677, 67927 80, 694, 700, 705, 724, 739, (DDI-IACE ENTERPRISE). It uses those services to
28 direct legal services consumers to preferred Domestic Dispute Industry services
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1 providers, including specifically Defendant Alliance, provides misinformation to

2 legal consumers about the legality, safety, and effectiveness of legal consumers, fails
3 to warn legal consumers of the enormous dangers of using the services of the Family
4 Law Facilitator Offices services and Domestic Dispute Industry Criminal Enterprise
5 fraud and extortion. Rather than directing the attention of its law enforcement
6 resources to protecting families in crisis by arresting the operatives of a criminal
7 syndicate residing in its own courthouse, the COUNTY devotes a substantial portion
8 of its website to referral and cross-promotion of family law services to entities it
9 knows or should know constitute a despicable for-profit fraud and extortion crime
10 ring harming thousands of county citizens including children.
11
All Defendants advertise the tools used by the DDICE enterprises as safe,
12 legal, and health methods of dispute resolution. FAC 907. They represent that the
13 rights of California families are protected under Californias administration of its
14 family code. They fail to warn of the abundant deprivations of civil rights, fraud,
15 extortion, invasions of privacy, and harm that befall families in crisis upon hiring the
16 private services they advertise and cross-promote. These abundant and shameful
17 failures to warn, misrepresentations, and referral and cross-promotional quasi-private
18 behavior and its co-promotion of it on private and county websites (FAC 653-654,
19 906-907, 911, 983, 1071, DDI-FICE, DDI-IACE allegations), and may be alleged
20 with even more particularity should the Court desire.
21
Plaintiff did not intend the FAC to be construed to assert a Lanham Act claim
22 against GORE or SDSD, and hereby disclaims any such Lanham Act claim.
23 G. RICO
24
Lawyer Defendants attack RICO alleging they are accused in no predicate
25 crimes. BIERER makes a similar challenge. These challenges omit to acknowledge

26 they are accused as SAC Defendants as well as RICO co-conspirators and aiders and
27 abettors, accused in RACKETEERING COUNTS 2-10 and numerous predicate
28 crimes alleged therein.
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The OMNIBUS, BIERER, DOYNE and LAWYER DEFENDANTS attack
2 more generally that the RICO Counts lack specificity. These attacks appear to
3 misunderstand the expansive scope and flexibility of RICO pleading.
4 1. The RICO Claims Satisfy Rule 8
5
SDCBAS attack that the RICO claims must meet a specificity standard is
6 inaccurate. OMNIBUS Doc. No. 131, 15:25-26. Most of the RICO claims are
7 subject only to Rule 8s short plain statement requirement. The specificity
8 pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) apply only to predicate crimes of mail and wire
9 fraud. See Lewis v. Sprock, 612 F. Supp. 1316, 1324 (N.D. Cal. 1985) ("[I]f the
10 racketeering acts are not frauds, the general principles of pleading embodied in Rule
11 8 apply."). Rule 9(b) thus only applies to RACKETEERING COUNT 1. Allegations
12 of the enterprises, schemes, markets, interstate commerce, longevity, pattern,
13 conspiracy, and aiding and abetting are subject to Rule 8. See 11 Wright & Miller,
14 Federal Practice & Procedure, Civ.3d 1251.1, RICO Act, p. 343, footnote 14,
15 (Conspiracy claims not subject to Rule 9(b)); Wilson v. Toussie, 260 F. Supp.2d 530,
16 n 5 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (home buyers RICO conspiracy claim build on fraud not
17 required to meet Rule 9(b); Rule 8(a) applies to RICO conspiracy claim); Toto
18 v.McMahon, Brafman, Morgan & Co., Case No 93 Civ 5894, 1995 US Dist LEXIS
19 1399, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec L Rep (CCH) 98.639 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 7, 1995)
20 (RICO 1962(d) conspiracy claim neednt meet Rule 9(b) specificity).
21
Consistent with the claim format for the Civil Rights Act claims pled under
22 Rule 8(a) detailed in Section I.A.1 above, each RACKETEERING COUNT and
23 Claim for Relief specifies the accused Defendants and asserted predicate and RICO
24 statutes. For example:
25
26
27
28
RACKETEERING COUNT 1
(FAC p. 209)
Entire heading:
18 U.S.C. 1962(c), (d)
Frauds and Swindles
18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343, 1344
Against Defendants DOYNE INC,
BLANCHET, VIVIANO, FRITZ
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
Line 1:
Count (or Claim) Title
Line 2:
RICO Statutes asserted:
1962(c)
(conduct of or participation in a
racketeering enterprise)
&
1962(d)
(conspiracy to commit racketeering)
Line 3:
Title of Predicate Crime
(Mail Fraud)
Line 4:
Predicate Crime Statute
(Mail Fraud)
Line 5:
Defendants Accused
18 U.S.C. 1962(c), (d)
Frauds and Swindles

18 U.S.C. 1341
Against Defendants DOYNE INC,
BLANCHET, VIVIANO, FRITZ
Where more detail is appropriate for multiple defendants, groups of defendants or

multiple events, the Racketeering Count is further broken down into specific
Racketeering Claims for Relief, also identifying predicate crimes, RICO section,
defendants accused. The body of the claim contains supporting facts. For example,
Racketeering Count 3 alleges kidnapping premised on state law predicate crimes
under 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(A). It is based on several eventsthe STUART
ASSAULT, FALSE ARRESTS, and MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. Each separate
event of kidnapping is broken down into subordinate Claims such as Claim 3.1, based
on the STUART ASSAULT events:
25
Racketeering Claim for Relief 3.1

Kidnapping
Cal. Pen. C. 207(a)
26
Against STUART ASSAULT COORDINATORS
24
27
28 This Claim (and every other claim) proceeds to identify Defendants by group
(STUART ASSAULT COORDINATOR DEFENDANTS), sets forth a short, plain
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1 incorporation by reference of the STUART ASSAULT facts, recites the language of

2 the kidnapping statute (Cal. Pen. C. 207(a)), and articulates existence of injury to
3 Plaintiffs to be proven at trial. FAC 1045-1048. The Claim totals four paragraphs.
4 Because of the efficiencies enabled by the use of acronyms earlier in the FAC, most
5 Racketeering Claims are similarly short and plain. Its difficult to imagine a form
6 of pleading claims more compliant with Rule 8.
7 2. Defendants Fail to Traverse any Moss I Plausibility Attack
8
SDCBA dismissively characterizes: [t]o the extent plaintiffs allege RICO
9 claims on non-fraudulent acts, the claims are deficient under Rule 12(b)(6) for failing
10 to state facts, as opposed to conclusory statements, that would support relief.
11 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557. OMNIBUS 16:5-7. This appears to aspire toward a
12 Moss I multi-stage plausibility attack under which Defendants bear the analytical
13 burden.
14
However, the attack fails to cite specific Claims for Relief or analyze
15 supporting facts pled within the claim, most often identified by acronym. E.g.
16 STUART ASSAULT is the foundation for numerous claims. Nor do Defendants
17 offer more plausible alternative explanations.
18
The RICO claims satisfy Rule 8(a).
19 3. Relaxed Pleading Under Rule 9(b) for RICO

20
Rule 9(b) must be applied flexibly in accordance with Rule 8(a)'s liberal
21 pleading standards and cannot be used to subvert Congress' liberal construction

22 mandate for RICO. Rule 9(b) does not contradict notice pleading embraced by
23 Rule 8(a), which requires that all averment be "simple, concise and direct" and that
24 the Ninth Circuit has consistently taken the approach of "reading the two rules in
25 conjunction." Zatkin v. Primuth, 551 F. Supp. 39, 42 (S.D. Cal. 1982). See also 11
26 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Civ.3d 1233, Pleading Claim for
27 Relief, _____ Conspiracy, pp. 370, 374-376, footnotes 7- 14, RICO conspiracy
28 claims not subject to Rule 9(b)(see cases identified therein); no pleading of
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1 evidentiary facts required); See Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of
2 Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 404 (7th Cir. 1984), affirmed, 473 U.S. 606, 105 S. Ct. 3291,
3 87 L.Ed.2d 437 (1985)(We see no grounds for demanding that a civil RICO plaintiff
4 essentially plead evidence and prove the case in the complaint.); Larsen v. Lauriel
5 Investments, Inc., 161 F. Supp.2d 1029, 1042 (D. Ariz. 2001) (The plaintiff need not
6 show that each individual defendant personally used the mail or wire services, but
7 only that he caused the mail or wire service to be used by acting with the knowledge
8 that their use would follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use
9 could reasonably be foreseen. American Automotive Accessories v. Fishman, 175
10 F.3d 534, 542 (7th Cir. 1998)).
11
Once a court is satisfied that a complaint properly pleads one predicate act, the
12 remaining claims may be admitted with minimal examination. Westways World

13 Travel v. AMR Corp., 182 F. Supp.2d 952, 957 (C.D. Calif. 2001) (The Court has
14 already concluded that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged the predicate act of extortion for
15 a Section 1962(c)) claim. This Court need not prune the FAC of any allegations of
16 mail fraud as another predicate act in determining whether the motion to dismiss
17 should be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court has already concluded Plaintiffs
18 sufficiently pled at least one type of predicate act. Therefore, the Court will deny
19 Defendants motion to dismiss the second claim on this basis.). See also Bryant v.
20 Mattel, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13851 (C.D. Calif., 2 August 2010) (finding the
21 allegations sufficiently pleaded to satisfy claim pleading for purposes of FRCP 8(a),
22 FRCP 9(b)).
23
In light of Westways the plaintiff is not required to plead to Rule 9(b)
24 particularity for every RICO predicate act, and mail and wire fraud may be pled
25 generally.
26 4. Pleading Mail and Wire Fraud Under RICO
27
Section 1341 of Title 18 United States Code provides:
28
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to

13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises . for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or
authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent
or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any
matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial
interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or
knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier according to the
direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the
10
person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined under
11
this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
12
The elements of mail and wire fraud are: (1) a scheme or artifice devised with
13 the (2) specific intent to defraud and (3) use of the mail or interstate telephone wires
14 in furtherance of such a scheme. See Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 782 (9th
15 Cir. 2002); United States v. Green, 592 F.3d 1057, 1060-1071 (9th Cir. 2010). Wire
16 fraud similarly is pled: (1) a scheme to defraud; (2) use of wires in furtherance of the
17 scheme; and (3) a specific intent to deceive or defraud. United States v. Shipsey, 363
18 F.3d 962, 971 (9th Cir. 2004).
19
Fraud is defined broadly under federal law as a calculated effort to use
20 misrepresentations or other deceptive practices to induce the innocent or unwary to

21 give up some tangible interest. United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1248 (8th
22 Cir. 1976). Fraud may be an active representation or a failure to disclose. It is
23 settled in this Circuit that a scheme to defraud need not be an active
24 misrepresentation. See United States v. Buckley, 689 F.2d 893, 897-98 (9th
25 Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1086 (1983); United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d
26 1167, 1172 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928 (1980). A duty to disclose material
27 facts arises in the context of a special relationship. United States v. Dowling, 739
28 F.2d 1445, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1984) rev'd, 473 U.S. 207 (1985) (reversing finding of
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 duty outside of special relationship).

2
STUARTS pleading burden is even lower because DOYNE, BLANCHET,
3 and VIVIANO owed fiduciary and other PROFESSIONAL DUTIES to Stuart.

4 JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS and specifically WOHLFEIL and SCHALL owed
5 STUART fiduciary duties to disclose the dangers associated with their forensic
6 psychology operations. United States v. Buckley, 689 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1982)
7 (Public officials duties are fiduciary in nature.). Sellers owe affirmative duties to
8 disclose to buyers. Cacy v. United States, 298 F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir.1961).
9
Use of mails or wires is pled generally. The plaintiff need not show that each
10 individual defendant personally used the mail or wire services, but only that he
11 caused the mail or wire service to be used by acting with the knowledge that their use
12 would follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use could reasonably
13 be foreseen. Larsen v. Lauriel Investments, Inc., 161 F. Supp.2d 1029, 1042 (D.
14 Ariz. 2001); American Automotive Accessories v. Fishman, 175 F.3d 534, 542 (7th
15 Cir. 1998)). Rule 9(b) requires plaintiffs to plead with particularity the
16 "circumstances" of the alleged fraud in order to place the defendants on notice of the
17 precise misconduct with which they are charged. . . . it is certainly true that
18 allegations of "date, place or time" fulfill these functions, but nothing in the rule
19 requires them. Plaintiffs are free to use alternative means of injecting precision and
20 some measure of substantiation into their allegations of fraud." Seville Indus. Mach.
21 Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
22 1211 (1985). Seville is followed in this Circuit. In re National Mortgage Equity
23 Corp. Mortgage Pool Certificates Securities Litigation, 636 F. Supp. 1138,
24 1158(C.D. Calif. 1986) (Bank of America's RICO complaint complied with Rule
25 9(b), and noting that Bank of America's RICO complaint "contain[ed] multi26 paragraph sections that identify the role of each defendant in the alleged fraud in a
27 manner sufficient to allow defendants to prepare a responsive pleading,").
28
Intent to defraud may be inferred from circumstances. United States v. Rogers,

13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 321 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1993). Mere recklessness satisfies a RICO fraud intent
2 element. In re Phillips Petroleum Securities Litigation, 881 F.2d 1236 (3rd Cir.
3 1989) (federal mail fraud allegations in civil RICO case can be proven by evidence of
4 reckless disregard for the truth as well as by proof of specific intent to defraud;
5 United States v. Schaflander, 717 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
6 1216 (1984) (same). Courts have held that the mere existence of a scheme is
7 sufficient to demonstrate intent to defraud. See Hayes v. Palm Seedlings Partners (In
8 re Agric. Res. & Tech., 916 F.2d 528, 536 (9th Cir.1990) (existence of Ponzi scheme
9 sufficient to establish actual intent to defraud). See also Merrill v. Abbott (In re
10 Indep. Clearing House Co., 77 B.R. 843, 860 (D.Utah 1987) (citations omitted).
11 Justifiable reliance is not required for RICO fraud. See Neder v. United States, 527
12 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1999); United States v. Ciccone, 219 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 2000)
13 (proof of justifiable reliance not required); Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon,
14 N.A., 815 F.2d 522, 531, n. 7 (9th Cir. 1987).
15
The FAC mail and wire fraud COUNTS more than satisfy this permissive
16 threshold. Allegations regarding timing and use of mails are detailed in

17 RACKETEERING COUNT 1. Specific misrepresentations are detailed at COUNT
18 11 (FAC 1029, 808-888). Schemes used include The PIT (FAC 964-974),
19 Forensic Custody Evaluator scheme (FAC 977-979); Custody Evaluator Abuse
20 of Process scheme (FAC 980-983); False Flag Breach of PROFESSIONAL
21 DUTIES scheme (FAC 984-995). Misrepresentations by advertising are pled at
22 COUNT 15.
23
If the Court desires, Plaintiffs hereby represent an ability to plead additional
24 details from Exhibits 1-3, and incorporating the DivorceCorp multimedia descriptions
25 of the DDICE, SD-DDICE, DDI-FICE, and DDI-IACE ENTERPRISES at
26 http://wp.me/p4aG7J-Y8, FAC Ex. 3 (P652-668). Additional Domestic Dispute
27 Industry publications describing Forensic Investigator Fraud are analyzed by
28 Plaintiffs are located at http://wp.me/p4aG7J-OR. DDI-FICE Fraud is explained at
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1 Doc. No. 109-2 26-30; DDI-IACE extortion is explained at Doc. No. 109-2 172 25. DDI-Ad Hoc Criminal Enterprise schemes are detailed in a publication entitled:
3 A Promise to Ourselves: A Journey Through Fatherhood and Divorce, Baldwin, A.,
4 ISBN-10: 0312586019, FAC 943, Ex. 32. Plaintiff hereby requests leave to amend
5 to plead these details, should the Court desire.
6 5. Pattern Of Racketeering Is Necessary and Properly Pled
7
The OMNIBUS criticizes the FACS reference to past acts of racketeering in
8 FAC 1000. These predicate acts are not alleged as part of claim for relief,
9 apparently to Defendants displeasure: allegations of violations of "tens of
10 thousands" of laws including "Enticement into slavery," "Sale into involuntary
11 servitude," and "Service on vessels in slave trade." [FAC Doc. 90 at pp. 208-209.]
12 OMNIBUS Doc. No. 131, 15:22-24.
13
This listing of past acts of Racketeering (FAC 1000) establishes the scope of
14 the enterprises, and is relevant to elements of RICO, including longevity and

15 pattern of racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. 1961(5). H.J. Inc. v.
16 Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989). To prove pattern a plaintiff
17 must "show that the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or
18 pose a threat of continued criminal activity." Id. at 239. The relationship requirement
19 is satisfied by a showing that the racketeering predicates "have the same or similar
20 purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are
21 interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events." Id. at 240.
22
Similarly, to satisfy the continuity prong of the pattern test, plaintiff must
23 show that the predicates pose a threat of continued criminal activity, such as when the
24 illegal conduct is "a regular way of conducting [a] defendant's ongoing legitimate
25 business." Id. at 243. See also Canyon County v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 519 F.3d 969
26 (9th Cir. 2008); Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 825 (9th Cir. 2007); Living Designs
27 Inc., v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co., 431 F.3d 353, 361, 364 (9th Cir. 2005);
28 Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Florida, 937 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Technically, the pattern may be established by only two acts in the past ten
2 years. See, Ikuno v. Yip, 912 F.2d 306, 309 (9th Cir. 1990); Odom v. Microsoft
3 Corp., 486 F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 2007). The paragraph 1000 allegations are therefore
4 not required, but support the pattern of racketeering activity, enterprises, and
5 longevity requirements for every claim. Moreover, because this case is alleged
6 against defendants in several enterprises, the identification the scope of their illegal
7 activity supports existing and future claims. The enterprises track record of
8 criminality also establishes grounds for declaratory and injunctive remedies,
9 appropriate scope of discovery, and foundation for identifying additional DOE
10 defendants.
11
More specifically, each Defendant is named in at least two predicate acts,
12 establishing pattern for every Defendant. All defendants are named in

13 RACKETEERING COUNTS 7-10, and each Defendant is alleged in at least one
14 other predicate crime in RACKETEERING COUNT 1-6. This satisfies pattern.
15 6. Enterprise
16
DOYNE at 143-1, 10:8-11 attacks:
17
Here, there is no enterprise. The complaint fails to allege sufficient facts
18
demonstrating the existence of a continuing unit separate and apart from the
19
ambiguously alleged predicate acts, and thus the elements of a RICO claim
20
cannot be met.
21 DOYNE doesnt appear to assert a plausibly challenge, and cant argue evidence, so
22 the attack is taken as FAC doesnt allege enterprise. Having only asserted a
23 presence of allegation attack, DOYNE accurately cites United States v. Turkette,
24 452 U.S. 576, 583 (U.S. 1981) for its open-ended description one of the several ways
25 a plaintiff can prove enterprise: "proved by evidence of an ongoing organization,
26 formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a
27 continuing unit. Turkette at 583.
28
Since Turkette in 1981, our own Circuit and others have explained that an
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1 association-in-fact enterprise requires no entity, structure, or hierarchy, but only

2 (1) common purpose, and (2) continuity. Odom v. Microsoft, 486 F.3d 541, 551;
3 Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2244 (2009). The common purpose need
4 not be illegal or economic. U.S. v. Turkette. ). A mere contractual relationship is
5 sufficient to establish enterprise. Odom v. Microsoft, 486 F.3d 541, 551;
6 Countrywide Financial Corp. Mortgage Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation,
7 601 F. Supp.2d 1201, 1212-1213 (S.D. Calif. 2009) (co-promotion enterprise);
8 Republic of Colombia v. Diageo North America Inc., 531 F.Supp.2d 365 (E.D.N.Y.
9 2007) (individuals, corporations, and governmental entities with common purpose
10 sufficient). Continuity requires no specific duration, constancy, or end.
11
In Boyle, the Court explained what is not required for an enterprise:
12
[A]n association-in-fact enterprise . . . . need not have a hierarchical structure
13
or a chain of command; decisions may be made on an ad hoc basis and by
14
any number of methods by majority vote, consensus, a show of strength, etc.
15
Members of the group need not have fixed roles; different members may
16
perform different roles at different times. The group need not have a name,
17
regular meetings, dues, established rules and regulations, disciplinary
18
procedures, or induction or initiation ceremonies. While the group must
19
function as a continuing unit and remain in existence long enough to pursue a
20
course of conduct, nothing in RICO exempts an enterprise whose associates
21
engage in spurts of activity punctuated by periods of quiescence. Nor is the
22
statute limited to groups whose crimes are sophisticated, diverse, complex, or
23
unique; for example, a group that does nothing but engage in extortion through
24
old-fashioned, unsophisticated, and brutal means may fall squarely within the
25
statutes reach.
26 See also Bryant v. Mattel, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103851, ** 14-19, (C.D. Calif., 2
27 August 2010); Friedman v. 24 Hour Fitness Co., 580 F.Supp.2d 985 (C.D. Calif.
28 2008) (plaintiff must plead a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct
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1 between defendants and advertising agency; United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648
2 (9th Cir, 1988); Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours, 431 F.3d 353, 361
3 (9th Cir. 2005); Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. Don King Promotions, Inc., 533
4 U.S. 158, 161 (2001).
5
6
Enterprise From the FAC

Against LAWYER DEFENDANTS, the FAC alleges participation in the
7 DDICE and SD-DDICE. Against BIERER the FAC alleges participation in the
8 DDICE, SD-DDICE, DDI-FICE, and STUART-AHCE. Against DOYNE the FAC
9 alleges four enterprises, all of which allege a common purpose generally at FAC
10 946-952, and specifically for each ENTERPRISE as follows:
11
12
DDICE:
930. These entities, acting concert with one another, are organized and
13
maintained by and through a consensual hierarchy of agents, partners,
14
managers, directors, officers, supervisors, agents, deputies, and/or
15
representatives that formulate and implement policies, practices, relationships,
16
rules, and procedures related to Domestic Dispute Law.
17
SD-DDICE:
18
932. SD-DDICE utilize and share private and SDCBA, SAN DIEGO
19
SUPERIOR COURT, STUART ASSAULT COORDINATOR, DDIPS and
20
others communications systems, offices, fixtures and equipment, professional
21
and personal networks, certification mills, campaign and lobbying vehicles
22
and personnel, and political organizations and networks. The DDICE and SD-
23
DDICE also conspires to promote Defendants CIVIL CONSPIRACIES,
24
HARRASSMENT AND ABUSE, agenda detailed above for the benefit of the
25
enterprise and detriment of the DDIL.
26
933. The DDICE and SD-DDICE have been in existence for as long as
27
the Family Law Community has been organizeddating back far longer than
28
ten years. . DDI-FICE: organized and maintained by and through a consensual

13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
hierarchy of, managers, directors, officers, supervisors, agents, deputies, and/or
representatives that formulate and implement policies relative to providing the
rendition of forensic psychology services to the public, including, but not
restricted to, DDIL, their lawyers, judges, and others in the field of family law,
child custody, and domestic relations.
DDI-FICE:
941. The DDI-FICE ENTERPRISE Defendants engage in a course of
conduct designed and intended to conspire to commit one or more SAD,
deprive of Family Federal Rights and CFR, and commit HARASSEMENT
10
AND ABUSE as described herein through the rendition of fraudulent, illegal,
11
and harmful forensic psychology services, including custody evaluation,
12
mediation, and parent coordination by use of one or more SAD, fraud,
13
extortion, abuse of process, kidnapping, unfair competition, and obstruction of
14
justice.
15
942. The DDI-FICE commercial purpose is to generate revenue and
16
income within this District committing one or more SAD, false
17
COMMERCIAL SPEECH, and HARASSMENT AND ABUSE of DDIL,
18
including Plaintiffs.
19 Continuity is alleged in several places, including generally at FAC 963. These

20 allegations more than sufficiently plead enterprise.
21 7. RICO 1962(d) Conspiracy, Aiding and Abetting
22
All Defendants are accused of conspiracy to commit racketeering, aiding and
23 abetting, and aiding and abetting a racketeering conspiracy under RACKETEERING

24 COUNTS 7-10. These Counts alone satisfy the two-predicate act minimum
25 requirement of pattern.
26
Under 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) a racketeering conspiracy may be plead by (1) an
27 agreement and (2) an act in furtherance. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 6165
28 (1997). The liability chain extends further. The FAC alleges 1962(d) RICO
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1 conspiracy claims are brought under the Pinkerton Doctrine. Pinkerton v. United
2 States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) and Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997). Under
3 Pinkerton, anyone joining a conspiracy is liable for offenses other conspirators
4 committed to advance the objectives of their agreement. Pinkerton at 647. The mere
5 act of agreeing to the commission of certain crimes sufficesno act in furtherance is
6 required. Further, one can aid and abet a crime without agreeing to its commission.
7 See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975). However, aiding and abetting
8 requires some act to further the criminal ventureit is not sufficient to merely agree.
9 See United States v. Galiffa, 734 F.2d 306, 311 (7th Cir. 1984). Thus, virtually any
10 positive association with an existing enterprise or conspiracy-whether by aiding it
11 without an intent, or intending its commission without aiding it, or both, exposes one
12 to liability for the crime under these three related RICO doctrines. This alignment
13 of a defendant with others committing a crime constitutes mediate causation
14 element required under the Pinkerton doctrine.
15
This act [affiliating with another for a criminal purpose] satisfies the criteria for
16
imposing accountability under the traditional criminal law standard of personal
17
liability: affiliating with another for criminal purposes is a voluntary act
18
committed with a culpable mental state, or mens rea, that causes a prohibited
19
social harm. In either of its guises, as Pinkerton liability or as complictious
20
liability, this act is clearly more culpable than the act that suffices for
21
imposition of vicarious liability in civil law. . . . The only element of criminal
22
liability that is attenuated under Pinkerton is causation, which receives the
23
same treatment accorded it under the kindred doctrine of accomplice liability.
24
Liability can attach under either form of affiliative liability without showing
25
that the affiliative act actually caused commission of certain crimes. (footnote
26
omitted). And because the affiliative act is a wrong in itself, liability can attach
27
28
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
even though the target crime was not accomplished.31
The Court of Appeals has recognized this concept of guilt by association in
3 Smith v. Berg, 247 F.3d 532 (3rd Cir. 2001), and followed and with approval in
4 United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2004).
5
Simply by being affiliated with the Domestic Dispute Industry, each Defendant
6 satisfies this guilt by association test.

7 8. Business or Property Loss
8
CHUCAS and GRIFFIN attack Plaintiffs have not alleged harm to a specific
9 business or property interestor a "concrete financial loss"as required under RICO

10 caused by either Mr. Chucas or Ms. Griffin. Id. at 975. As a result, they do not have
11 the requisite standing to sue under RICO. CHUCAS Doc. No. 150, 9:8-11.
12
The FAC alleges property loss in several ways, including payments to
13 DOYNE, BLANCHET, and VIVIANO (COUNT 11, RACKETEERING COUNT 1),

14 lost business revenue for California Coalition, demands for payment of sums to
15 BIERER and FRITZ (RACKETEERING COUNTS 3, 4). Moreover, lost income is a
16 cognizable property loss under RICO. See Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d
17 1163 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding plaintiffsillegal agricultural laborers alleging losses
18 from defendants' hiring practices to pay plaintiffs at below market wageshad
19 alleged a sufficient property interest for RICO purposes : the "legal entitlement to
20 business relations unhampered by schemes prohibited by the RICO predicate
21 statutes." 301 F.3d at 1168 n.4); Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2005) (per
22 curiam) (en banc) (plaintiffs falsely accused, tried, convicted, and sentenced as a
23 result of LAPD evidence fabrication sufficiently alleged property loss of lost wages
24 by their false imprisonment for RICO purposes; plaintiffs' alleged wage losses
25 constituted property because their interests in wages were protected under applicable
26 California state law causes of action for intentional interference with contract of
27
28
31
See Susan W. Brenner, Of Complicity and Enterprise Criminality: Applying Pinkerton

Liability to RICO Actions, 56 MO. L. Rev. 931, 963-64 (1991).

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1 business relations; in particular, the majority opinion rejected the position of the
2 dissenting judges that, to allege a RICO claim, the alleged business or property
3 interest must have been the "direct target" of defendant's predicate act. 420 F.3d at
4 898, 900-901, 902).
The FAC alleges lost income to STUART, California Coalition, and Lexevia.
6 FAC 326, 334, 341, 348, 599.

7 9. BIERER Attack
8
BIERER asserts the FAC fails to state any specific facts regarding the alleged
9 predicate acts of Bierer. In fact, the only references to actions by Bierer are found in a
10 count that Plaintiffs do not bring against Bierer. BIERER Doc. No. 135-1, 7:7-11.
11 She cites FAC 1007-1008, describing VIVIANOS execution of the False Flag
12 scheme with BIERER. BIERER accurately states that STUART has omitted to asset
13 a mail and wire fraud claim directly against BIERER. However by virtue of her
14 interaction with VIVIANO, BLANCHET, DOYNE, FRITZ, Ms. Stuart, and others,
15 STUART has asserted an Honest Services Fraud claim against her
16 (RACKETEERING COUNT 2), as well as aiding and abetting and conspiracy claims
17 (RACKETEERING COUNTS 7-10). As a STUART ASSAULT COORDINATOR
18 she is named as a Defendant in RICO Claims for Relief 3.1, 3.6, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.5,
19 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10, and RACKETEERING COUNT 6.
20 10. Nexus to Interstate Commerce:
21
BIERER asserts that the widespread criminal elements of the $50 Billion
22 annual revenue Domestic Dispute Industry32 do not have a de minimus impact

23 interstate commerce. BIERER Doc. No. 135-1, 7:12-8:2. BIERER cites a standard
24 from a 1990 case, Musick v. Burke, 913 F.2d 1390, 1398 (9th Cir. 1990), that has
25 been interpreted by numerous courts, all of which articulate a de minimus impact
26 standard. [W]here the regulated activity is commercial in nature, the government
27
32
New Documentary Sheds Light On $50-Billion Divorce Industry Huffington

28 Post, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/06/divorcedocumentary_n_4550450.html. (May 10, 2014, 4:00 p.m.)
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1 need only prove that the individual transactions in this case each had a minimal effect
2 on interstate commerce that, through repetition by others similarly situated, could
3 have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. United States v. Ripinsky, 109 F.3d
4 1436, 1444 (9th Cir.1997). Ripinsky, Rone, and Musick, all support our holding that
5 the interstate commerce connection in a RICO prosecution may be de minimis.
6 United States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v.
7 Shryock, 342 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2003) (de minimis impact); United States v.
8 Robertson, 514 US. 669 (1995) (de minmis impact required); United States v.
9 Doherty, 867 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1989) (no more than a slight effect); United States v.
10 Robinson, 763 F.2d 778 (6th Cir. 1985) (minimal impact); United States v.
11 Muskovsky, 863 F.2d 1319 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1067 (1989)
12 (minimal effect). BIERER incorrectly analyzes the impact issue by looking only
13 to the predicate acts instead of the enterprise as a whole. Instead, RICO requires
14 that the activities of the enterprise, not each RICO predicate act, affect interstate
15 commerce. Aguilar v. Mega Lighting, Inc. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28348 (C.D. Cal
16 April 6, 2009).
17
FAC 962 alleges at least a de minimus impact on interstate and indeed
18 international commerce. Family court orders enjoy full faith and credit recognition
19 and enforcement in all States under 28 U.S.C. 1738 (Acts, records, and judicial
20 proceedings of any State ... of the United States ... shall have the same full faith and
21 credit in every court within the United States ... as they have by law or usage in the
22 courts of such State ... from which they are taken.) and in federal courts and military
23 courts under 18 U.S.C. 2261(a)(1), 2265 (FAC 962). White v. City of Pasadena,
24 671 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2012). Child Support awards may be enforced in foreign
25 Countries through bilateral international treaty between the United States and foreign
26 nations, and are enforceable by the U.S. State Department in refusing to issue, honor,
27 or revoking passports of U.S. citizens. 42 U.S.C. 652(k), 654(31). The scope and
28 size of the Domestic Dispute Industry is more than sufficient to establish a basis for
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1 federal jurisdiction.
2 11. Municipalities Can Form Sufficient Intent Under RICO
3
COUNTY asserts that a RICO claim may not be asserted against a
4 municipality, citing Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d
5 397, 404 (9th Cir. 1991). GORE 141-1, 8:812. In Lancaster the plaintiffs sued a
6 municipality as a RICO enterprise33, alleging RICO claims based on mail fraud,
7 alleging an intentional scheme to misappropriate public funds. The Court of Appeals
8 confirmed the district courts dismissal of the RICO claims asserting a general notion
9 that government entities are incapable of forming a malicious intent. Lancaster at
10 404. The court pointed to other cases involving municipalities such as Sun Sav. and
11 Loan Assoc. v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187 (9th Cir.1987), reasoning that a specific
12 intent to deceive is an element of the predicate act, mail fraud, on which Lancaster's
13 RICO claim is based. Lancaster at 404.
14
The Court of Appeals reasoning in 1987 is no longer an accurate statement of
15 the intent necessary to prove mail fraud; Malicious intent and intent to deceive
16 are sufficient intent to find mail fraud, but they are not necessary. See Mail Fraud
17 analysis, Section II.G, supra. Municipalities are modernly treated as persons
18 fully capable of forming intent. Monell v. Dept of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S.
19 658, 691 (1978); Bd. of County Commrs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S.
20 397, 403 (1997). Moreover, a municipality may be liable for the acts of its final
21 policymaker. Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir.2004). See also Jett v. Dallas
22 Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989). [A] municipality can be liable for an
23 isolated constitutional violation when the person causing the violation has final
24 policymaking authority. Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir.1999)
25 (citations omitted), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 928 (1999). See also Webb v. Sloan, 330
26 F.3d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir.2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1141 (2004). The final
27
33
Here COUNTY is not alleged to be an enterprise, but sued as a RICO Person,

28 a participant within the DDICE and SD-DDICE, and a conductor of the DDI-IACE,
and DDI-FICE. Municipalities are recognized as persons under 1983. Monell.
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1 policymaker for SDSD is GORE, and he is certainly capable of forming criminal

2 intent to enable liability of the COUNTY.
3
A municipality may also be liable where a final policymaker ratifies a
4 subordinate's unconstitutional action and the basis for it. Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d
5 1231, 1239 (9th Cir.1999). To show ratification, a plaintiff must prove that
6 authorized policymakers approve a subordinate's decision and the basis for it. Id. at
7 1239 (quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). Deliberate
8 indifference and failure to train can also impute liability to a municipality. [A]
9 local governmental body may be liable if it has a policy of inaction and such inaction
10 amounts to a failure to protect constitutional rights. Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470,
11 1474 (9th Cir.1992), citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). The
12 policy of inaction must be a conscious or deliberate choice among various
13 alternatives. Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764, 767 (9th Cir.2004); Johnson v. Hawe, 388
14 F.3d 676, 686 (9th Cir.2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1048 (2005).
15
Clearly, municipalities can form intenteven if not malicious intent
16 necessary to impose punitive damages. The proper analysis then is to examine

17 whether COUNTY is capable of forming the type of intent necessary to establish
18 liability for the predicate crimes it is accused of. In this case, COUNTY is named in
19 RACKETEERING COUNTS 2 (Honest Services Fraud), and 7-10 (aiding and
20 abetting and conspiracy to commit Racketeering). Thus, if the COUNTYS policies,
21 training, deliberate indifference, or the acts of GORE, TRENTACOSTA, RODDY, or
22 others directly, by dereliction of duty, or by their involvement in policy, training, and
23 indifference, set in motion acts which would foreseeably lead to a predicate crime,
24 the COUNTY may be directly liable as a principal, co-conspirator, and aider and
25 abettor. COUNTY fails to conduct this analysis that is their burden at this stage.
26
Malicious intent or intent to deceive is simply not an element of any crime
27 charged in any Count. Extortion requires simply obtaining property from another
28 with their consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence,
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1 or fear, or under color of official right. 18 U.S.C. 1951. Kidnapping requires no

2 intentsimply use of force or fear to move someone a substantial distance. Cal.
3 Pen.C. 207(a). Obstruction of justice is knowingly using force or threat of force
4 to impede the due course of justice, or taking any act to retaliate against someone
5 for cooperating with authorities. Aiding and abetting requires no criminal intent at
6 allsimply intending to aid another in so doing. Intent is not required. Conspiracy
7 requires knowingly agreed to facilitate a scheme that includes the operation or
8 management of a RICO enterprise. United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1230
9 (9th Cir.2004), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1043 (2005). The conspirator need not have
10 committed or agreed to commit the two or more predicate acts, such as bribery,
11 requisite for a substantive RICO offense under 1962(c). Salinas v. United States,
12 522 U.S. 52, 6165 (1997).
13
Because GORE is the COUNTYS final policymaker in issues of judicial
14 official security, and because he is alleged to be directly involved in the STUART

15 ASSAULT the COUNTY is also liable for GORES direct acts, which include his
16 behavior in the STUART ASSAULT and all follow-on conspiracies. These
17 allegations form the basis of RACKETEERING COUNTS 3 (Kidnapping), 5
18 (Obstruction of Justice), 6 (Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering).
19
TRENTACOSTA and RODDY are also alleged as final policymakers for the
20 SUPERIOR COURT, which is a COUNTY entity. FAC 669-70, Claims 6.5, 6.10.
21 As the COUNTYS policymaker with regard to the DDI-FICE and DDI-IACE, the
22 COUNTY is liable for their actions relating to the Family Law Facilitator Offices,
23 and the forensic child custody evaluator commercial enterprise. Count 6.
24
Each is alleged to be involved in policymaking, training, oversight, discipline
25 and enforcement of the DDI-FICE and DDI-IACE operations. Those operations are
26 alleged to have set in motion acts of racketeering. Thus, each policymaker may be
27 liable for their own involvement in the polices, as well as their failures to comport the
28 policies they affect with the law, should those policies set in motion predicate
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1 crimes.
2 12. RICO Conclusion
3
All RICO claims are adequately pled under Rule 8 and 9(b). Courts permit
4 generous pleading of RICO because of the pernicious nature of the criminal elements
5 the statute is targeted to eradicate. The statement of findings that prefaces the
6 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 reveals that Congress enacted RICO to redress
7
a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains
billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal
use of force, fraud, and corruption using social exploitation deriving
10
money and power . . . increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate
11
business . . . and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes. The breadth of
12
the organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the
13
Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations,
14
interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce,
15
threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation
16
and its citizens.
17 Congress enacted RICO in 1970 intending to improve enforcement of fraud and

18 extortion laws that were not being enforced by state authorities under which
19 organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering
20 process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence
21 necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful
22 activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and
23 remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.
24 84 Stat. 922923. U.S. v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588-89 (1981).
25
Defendants schemes in this case are exactly the intended targets of RICO
26 widespread collaboration to commit fraud and extortion by sophisticated interrelated

27 schemes to defraud, launder the money and/or use it to corrupt others, use the ill28 gotten gains to infiltrating professional organizations, government, and industry to
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1 corrupt the entities and governments assigned to their oversight, and persecution of
2 the victims who reach out to federal authorities for assistance. The FAC is
3 adequately pled to give abundant notice of claims, and further amendment
4 unnecessary. Although RICO cases may be pesky, courts should not erect artificial
5 barriersmetaphysical or otherwiseas a means of keeping RICO cases off the
6 federal dockets Sun Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 194 (9th Cir.
7 1987) (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985)).
8
II.
ATTACKS BY COUNT
9 A. Count 2 (State Law Claims)

10
CHUCAS attacks that Count 2 fails to state a defamation claim. CHUCAS is a
11 member of the FAC, which orchestrated the removal of STUART from a meeting of
12 a group of professionals of which he is a member. Doc. No. 150, 5:1. STUART
13 ASSAULT. Several SDCBA panel speakers joked during the Seminar I guess he
14 got what he asked for and lets see if that gets them any publicity. They made
15 puns about STUART and CALIFORNIA COALITION as THE Litigants Behaving
16 Badly, calling STUART and CALIFORNIA COALITION a bunch of borderlines
17 crazy parents and stating thats why we have to do what we do. FAC 134.
18 Participating in an assault and forced ejection of a person from a meeting of his
19 colleague professionals, then joking about it while criticizing their sanity and motives
20 is defamatory, extreme and outrageous, and properly pled. CHUCAS involvement
21 in the activity subjects him to liability.
22
LAWYER DEFENDANTS attack Count 2 for failing to establish a link
23 between a defendant's business practice or act and the alleged harm. Doc. No. 14924 2, 6:23-16. They attack similarly that STUART fails to allege lost money or
25 property as a result of the unfair competition. Doc. 149-2, 7:13.
26
The FAC alleges California Coalition is a competitor in the DDI
27 Marketplace with Defendants for domestic dispute industry litigants. California

28 Coalition as present at the SEMINAR for COMMERCIAL PURPOSES. Removing
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1 STUART from the SEMINAR caused injury to California Coalitions and Lexevias
2 revenues, reputation and existing and potential business interests. FAC 312-351.
3 The racketeering and illegal persecution of STUART, California Coalition, and
4 Lexevia have devastated all three. FAC 334.
5
Plaintiffs submit the FAC adequately pleads each Claim in Count 2. In the
6 event the Court determines otherwise, Plaintiffs represent a present ability to remedy
7 and hereby request leave to amend.
8 B. Count 3 (Malicious Prosecution)
9 1. Superior Court Defendants
10
Superior Court Defendants attack Count 3 on behalf of C. GOLDSMITH
11 asserting it fails to allege that any conduct by Judge Goldsmith violated any rights
12 secured by the Constitution or federal laws, let alone that Judge Goldsmith caused the
13 deprivation of such rights. Doc. No. 139, 2:25-3:28. They also attack on behalf of
14 GROCH that all claims in Count 3 are barred by the doctrine of judicial
15 immunit[y.] Doc. No. 139, 3:9-10.
16
a. C. GOLDSMITH Participated in the STUART ASSAULT, Was A Complaining
17
Witness in People v. Stuart, Co-Conspirator in NESTHUS OBSTRUCTION,
18
and Conductor/Participant Several DDICE
19
The FAC alleges C. GOLDSMITH violated Plaintiffs rights by participating
20 in the STUART ASSAULT under color of law in the complete absence of

21 jurisdiction. FAC 898, 899. FAC facts supporting allegations directed at C.
22 GOLDSMITH are too voluminous to detail, but include acts and failures to act in
23 dereliction of duty depriving Stuart of rights under the California and United States
24 Constitutions in the STUART ASSAULT (Claim 1.5) acting as a complaining
25 witness, supervisor, and collaborator in the MALICIOUS PROSECUTION (FAC
26 349, 351, 381-383, 463, 488, Count 3), collaborating with NESTHUS and all
27 defendants in the NESTHUS OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE and RETALIATION
28 (FAC 509, Count 4), and participation in the DDICE, SD-DDICE racketeering
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1 enterprises and activity, and in related FICRO CONSPIRACIES (FAC 1187-1190).

2 Each of the civil rights claims against C. GOLDSMITH alleges C. GOLDSMITH
3 caused deprivation of specific rights. E.g. FAC 201, 211.
4
5
b. GROCHS Monstrous Criminal Behavior and Conspiracies Are Not Immune

JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS make a bare assertion that the claims against
6 Judge Groch, all of which arise out of his presiding over Stuarts criminal action . . .
7 are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity (3:9-10) and the FAC fails to
8 identify any acts of Judge Groch beyond those exercised in his judicial capacity.
9 Defendants do not identify any claim or allegation. They do not describe or even
10 assert GROCHS jurisdiction. They do not propose that any of GROCHS many acts
11 alleged in the FAC are judicial acts. JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS fail to make any
12 showing toward their burden on the affirmative defense of judicial immunity.
13
GROCH has not, and cannot, establish the affirmative defense of immunity.
14 Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 2002) (Government officials sued in
15 their individual capacities under 1983 may raise the affirmative defenses of
16 qualified or absolute immunity. GROCH fails to address his burden in asserting
17 immunity, asserting: The FAC, however, fails to identify any acts of Judge Groch
18 beyond those exercised in his judicial capacity. Doc. No. 139, 3:25-27. Defendant
19 must plead any matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense Fed.Rule
20 Civ.Proc. 8(c). Affirmative defenses may be raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion only
21 when the if based on some non-controversial preclusive legal defense. Scott v.
22 Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984). A defendant may bring a Rule
23 12(b)(6) motion based upon an affirmative defense in unusual circumstances, such as
24 when the face of the Complaint admits the defense. See, e.g., Jablon v. Dean
25 Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980) (If the running of the statute is
26 apparent on the face of the complaint, the defense may be raised by a motion to
27 dismiss.); Graham v. Taubman, 610 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.1979). A Rule 12(b)(6)
28 motion asserting that the complaint admits a defense must show the defense is (i)
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1 definitively ascertainable from the complaint and other allowable sources of

2 information, and (ii) suffice to establish the affirmative defense with certitude.
3 Gray v. Evercore Restructuring L.L.C., 544 F3d 320, 324 (1st Cir. 2008).
The analysis necessary to determine existence of judicial immunity is
5 evidentiary, and if not apparent on the fact of the complaint, the defense is
6 unavailable. Id. To prove entitlement to judicial immunity, GROCH must establish:
7 (1) each act against him was within the scope of his authority and (2) each act alleged
8 against him was a judicial act. Stump v. Sparkman, 35 U.S. at 360; Ashelman v.
9 Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1986); Beard v. Udall, 648 F.2d 1264 (9th
10 Cir.1981); Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied Zeller
11 v. Rankin, 451 U.S. 939 (1981), overruled34 by Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th
12 Cir. 1986). Conspiracies outside of court setting in motion deprivation in court are
13 not immune. Wallace v. Powell, 3:09-cv-00268-ARC, Document # 1510, filed 9
14 January 2014 (Plaintiffs Request for Judicial Notice Ex. A); Rankin at 847
15 (Although a party conniving with a judge to predetermine the outcome of a judicial
16 proceeding may deal with him in his judicial capacity, the other party's expectation,
17 i. e., judicial impartiality, is actively frustrated by the scheme. In any event, the
18 agreement is not a function normally performed by a judge. It is the antithesis of
19 the principled and fearless decision-making that judicial immunity exists to
20 protect.). Actions by a judge under color of law in the absence of authority are void
21 as coram non judice, and a defendant causing injuries while in coram non judice is
22 entitled to no immunity whatsoever, but is strictly liable as a trespasser. Manning v.
23 Ketcham, 58 F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1932); Restatement (Second) of Torts 162 (1965).
24
GROCH Cannot Establish His Jurisdiction
25
Establishing jurisdiction requires reference to facts and law. In Stump, the
26 Supreme Court analyzed an extensive record developed in the district court to

27
28
34
Plaintiffs assert Rankins validity and reserve this issue for appeal. See note 9,
supra.
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1 determine Judge Stumps jurisdiction. Stump at 356, fn 4 (citing the analysis in the
2 district court in Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F. 2d 172 (CA7 1977): In approving the
3 petition, Judge Stump cited no statutory or common law authority under which he
4 was purporting to act. Moreover, counsel has not during the course of this litigation
5 cited any specific statutory or common law basis under which a court can order the
6 sterilization of a child simply upon the petition of a parent. Sparkman v. McFarlin,
7 Civ. No. F 75-129 (ND Ind., May 13, 1976)). In Mireless v. Waco Judge Mireless
8 was sued for having a public defender assaulted in the same courthouse. The judge
9 established jurisdiction under Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. 128(5) because the public
10 defender was deemed a ministerial officer of the court. By contrast, in Gregory v.
11 Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (1974) a judges actions in assaulting a litigant in his
12 courtroom was neither within the judges jurisdiction or a judicial act, and the judge
13 was not entitled to immunity. Id.
14
JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS havent attempted to establish GROCHS
15 jurisdiction over any person or act in the FAC, and thus have not carried the first
16 prong of the defense.
17
18
GROCH Has Not Identified a Judicial Act Which Could Be Immune

The second prong requires the party asserting immunity to identify a precise
19 act that was a judicial act. Ashelman at 1076. Judicial acts are acts requiring
20 exercise of discretion in the independent decision-making adjudication of
21 controversies. Id.; Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 731
22 (1980); Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432 (1993). A judge is
23 only immune for acts which are only performed by judges. Stump at 362; Gregory
24 v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (Judges eviction of a litigant from his courtroom was law
25 enforcement act, not a judicial act); Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229 (7th Cir.) ,
26 cert. dismissed, 449 U.S. 1028 (1980) (Judge bringing charges functioning as a
27 prosecutor not a judicial act); Harris v. Deveaux, 780 F.2d 911, 915 (11th Cir. 1986).
28 Judges appointing and supervising subordinate personnel have been consistently
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1 denied judicial immunity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988); Meek v.
2 Cnty. of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 1999); Richardson v. Koshiba, 693
3 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1982) (These [executive] functions bear little resemblance to
4 the characteristic of the judicial process that gave rise to the recognition of absolute
5 immunity for judicial officers: the adjudication of controversies between
6 adversaries.).
7
The analysis necessary to resolve the second judicial act prong is complex,
8 evidentiary, and is certainly not derivable from the FAC. This test considers (i) the
9 adversary nature of the process, (ii) the correctability of error on appeal, (iii) the
10 importance of precedent, and (iv) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for
11 private damage actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct.
12 Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 202 (1985); Arena v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of
13 Nassau Cnty., 216 F. Supp. 2d 146, 153-54 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). It seems unlikely that
14 JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS will identify authority for a judge to banish an adult from
15 his home State to reside in another. Nor would it seem likely that similar authority
16 exists permitting a judge to place a litigant under house arrest during trial without
17 bringing charges or finding a litigant in contempt. Whatever the nature of these acts
18 and their relationship to constitutional authority, these and every other act of a Family
19 Court judge are not acts of a court of competent jurisdiction. See People United for
20 Children, Inc. v. City of New York, 108 F. Supp. 2d 275, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
21
Here, JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS fail even to attempt their burden. Count 3
22 alleges facts as foundation for the civil rights and other claims against many
23 defendants including GROCH. FAC 350. These allegations are foundation for
24 tolling and estoppel (FAC 466), claims against other defendants which may not
25 assert personal immunities (claims 3.1FEDERAL; 3.6Chilling; Count 4; Claims
26 5.1, 5.2, 5.5BATTSON, SIMI; Count 6Supervisory Liability of
27 TRENTACOSTA, J. GOLDSMITH, CANTIL-SAKAUYE, JAHR, and RODDY;
28 Count 7 Municipal Liability against CITY OF SAN DIEGO, COUNTY OF SAN
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1 DIEGO, SAN DIEGO SUPERIOR COURT; Count 9 for Section 1985 liability; and
2 Count 10 for Section 1986 liability. The MALICIOUS PROSECUTION and
3 PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT allegations are also relevant to numerous civil
4 rights claims to which immunity is never a defense, including deprivation of equal
5 protection (Count 9) and all acts outside the scope of judicial power as provided in
6 California Constitution Art I, 26 (Count 13, FAC 493). See Ex parte Virginia,
7 100 U. S. 339, 348-349 (1880). Judicial immunity is not a defense to civil rights and
8 racketeering crimes. See U.S. v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1999); Imbler v.
9 Patchman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); 18 U.S.C. 241, 242.
10
c. Judicial Immunity Does Not Bar Prospective Relief
11
Neither GOLDSMITH nor GROCH is entitled to immunity from claims for
12 prospective relief. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984) (judicial immunity
13 is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in her
14 judicial capacity.). GROCH asserts otherwise, claiming Judicial immunity is not
15 limited to suits for damages, but extends to actions for declaratory, injunctive and
16 other equitable relief citing Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir.
17 1996). Doc. No. 138, 3:21-23. This is inaccurate. Moore v. Brewster stands for
18 exactly the opposite proposition. Correctly recited, Moore v. Brewster holds:
19
The judicial or quasi-judicial immunity available to federal officers is not
20
limited to immunity from damages, but extends to actions for declaratory,
21
injunctive and other equitable relief. Mullis v. Bankruptcy Court for the
22
District of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1394 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
23
1040 (1988). Cf. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984) (state officials
24
enjoy judicial or quasi-judicial immunity from damages only).
25 Moore at 1243-44 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). GROCH is a county

26 judge. FAC 26.
27
GROCHS crimes and their consequences are unshielded when lurking from
28 beyond the short fiction of immunity. Claim 3.5 sets forth the core civil rights claim
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1 against GROCH, and expressly limits the claim to non-immune acts: the attempt to
2 coerce, induce, or wrongfully persuade STUART to leave this District, the state of
3 California, and return to live in Arkansas after his release from imprisonment, (FAC
4 493), identifies harm consisting of obstruction of the CLAIM AND DEMAND, the
5 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, and FALSE
6 IMPRISONMENTS (FAC 496) and constitutional injury consisting of a
7 deprivations relating to SEARCH AND SEIZURE; SUBSTANTIVE DUE
8 PROCESS PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS; EXPRESSION, PRIVACY, and
9 ASSOCIATION; ACCESS TO JUSTICE; EXCESSIVE FORCE; and CRUEL
10 AND/OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT (defined at FAC 164) resulting therefrom.
11 Subsequent claims of Counts 4, 9, 10 against GROCH are based on the non-immune
12 acts in Claim 3.5 and describe the subsequent deprivations set in motion thereby.
13 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,
14 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). While JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS may reasonably stand
15 agape at their colleagues ignorance of laws clearly-established for over one hundred
16 years criminalizing such deplorable conduct, they cannot credibly claim that the FAC
17 fails to give notice of the non-immune portions of that illegal course of conduct.
18 Establishing otherwise is Defendants burden. JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS fail.
19 2. CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS Litigation Privilege Defense
20
CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS assert that they call a litigation
21 privilege, citing Fry v. Melarango, 939 F.2d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 1991). Fry involved
22 a Bivens action against IRS attorneys who had prosecuted a civil claim in tax court
23 against a man accused of underpayment of taxes. The tax court defendant sued the
24 IRS attorneys for violation of his constitutional rights in the tax court proceeding.
25 The IRS attorneys asserted qualified and absolute immunity, analogizing their work
26 in a civil tax proceeding to a criminal prosecutor. The Court of Appeals agreed
27 holding that IRS attorneys actually litigating the civil claim were analogous to
28 prosecuting attorneys, and therefore entitled to the same immunity as criminal
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1 prosecutors under Imbler v. Pachtman. The court held that other actions by the
2 attorneys akin to investigation were only entitled to qualified immunity under Butz
3 and Harlow. Thus Fry establishes that IRS attorneys prosecuting a tax claim enjoy
4 the same level of immunity as criminal prosecutors when performing prosecutorial
5 functions, and the same qualified immunity when performing all other functions.
6
CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS dont need Frys holdingtheyre
7 entitled to immunity under the superior authority of Imbler for their prosecutorial
8 acts. COUNT 3 recognizes that immunity and pleads around it. Oddly, CITY
9 ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS bare claws to fit Fry when they might have lounged
10 into Imbler.
11
CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS cite a state law immunity defense under
12 Govt Code 821.6, Miller v. Filter, and Gillan v. City of San Marino at 4:26. These
13 cases ponder state law immunities. Californias girding of its stock class of
14 government criminals with state immunities is invisible to federal law. Government
15 code 821.6 is presently irrelevant. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.
16 1996).
17
On the relevant analysis under Imbler, the FAC alleges liability that could
18 never be shielded under state or federal law. First, immunity is personal, and the
19 CITY can assert no immunity for municipal or policymaker supervisory claims.
20 Second, immunity is no defense to racketeering crime or equal protection violations.
21 See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 348-349 (1880) (equal protection violations of
22 a prosecutor not immune); U.S. v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1999) (judicial
23 immunity no defense to racketeering); Imbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); 18
24 U.S.C. 241, 242 (FICRO CONSPIRACIES). Second, the FAC alleges functions
25 which are not prosecutorial, were pre-litigation, investigative, collateral, or post26 litigation functions not protected by prosecutorial immunity, though possibly eligible
27 for a qualified immunity. This collateral conduct includes the out-of-court portions
28 of the PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT FAC 373-414; Malicious Prosecution
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1 Within State Bar FAC 426-432, 455-460; collaboration with the FBI and Ms.
2 Stuart to procure false testimony and evidence in the Arrest Under Suspended
3 Sentence FAC 433-447; inducement and threats to leave California FAC 4484 451, and illegal Domestic Violence Protective Orders FAC 461-466.
5
CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS bear the burden of establishing the scope
6 of any personal immunities of GARSON. To do so they must establish the authority

7 GARSON claims to be exercisinga question of factthat she has act within such
8 authority, and that her actions were intimately associated with the criminal
9 prosecution. Imbler, supra. The analysis follows that outlined for GROCH above,
10 and requires attention to each act alleged which GARSON claims is immune.
11 Defendants fail here.
12
Further, even for actions potentially falling within prosecutorial functions, the
13 FAC alleges CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS actions in prosecuting People v.

14 Stuart were in knowing violation of STUARTS equal protection and due process
15 rights. FAC 479. As such, even would CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS
16 identify authority to prosecute STUART, their actions in doing so in violation of the
17 California Constitution were ultra vires and therefore void ab initio. As we
18 observed more than a century ago, [e]very constitutional provision is self-executing
19 to this extent, that everything done in violation of it is void. Oakland Paving Co. v.
20 Hilton, 69 Cal. 479, 484 (1886); Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of California, 29 Cal.
21 4th 300, 307, 58 P.3d 339, 342 (2002); Cal. Const. Art. I, sec. 26. Ex parte Young,
22 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (If the act which the state attorney general seeks to
23 enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer, in proceeding under
24 such enactment, comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution,
25 and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is
26 subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The state has
27 no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority
28 of the United States.). An officer operating off the reservation exceeds his
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1 authority, and is naked to those injured by his frolic. Butz v. Economou, 438 US 478,
2 519 (1978); Manning v. Ketcham, 58 F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1932); Restatement (Second)
3 of Torts 162 (1965).
4
5
Heck v. Humphrey
CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS attack asserting Heck v. Humphrey, 512
6 U.S. 477 (1994). Doc. No. 151, 7:21-8:21. Heck bars claims which necessarily
7 attack the validity or duration of a prisoners confinement. Heck v. Humphrey, 512
8 U.S. 477, 486 (1994); Thornton v. Brown, 11-56146, 2013 WL 7216368 (9th Cir.
9 July 31, 2013). Heck is a defense to claims by an imprisoned plaintiff who bypasses
10 a habeus petition in favor of a Section 1983 claim on the same grounds. Spencer v.
11 Kemma, 523 U.S. 1, 19 (1998); Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 876-77 (9th Cir.
12 2002) ([g]iven the Courts holding that petitioner does not have a remedy under the
13 habeas statute, it is perfectly clear . . . that he may bring an action under 42 U.S.C.
14 1983.). STUARTS illegal incarceration ended in May, 2013. He has no habeus
15 remedy, and Heck cannot be a bar. Spencer v. Kemna, supra at 21 (Souter, J,
16 concurring). Because STUART is not imprisoned, he has no habeus standing, and his
17 present claims could not interfere with a habeus petition. Further, the instant action
18 will not necessarily imply the invalidity of a state court final conviction because
19 STUART was acquitted of the charges against his free speech he asserts were
20 maliciously prosecuted. There is no final judgment of a state court to interfere with
21 because the final judgment in People v. Stuart agrees with STUART. FAC 416.
22 Heck can bar no claim.
23 C. Count 4 (Nesthus Obstruction of Justice)
24
Judicial Defendants attack Count 4 asserting (1) there is no private cause of
25 action for obstruction of justice (2) Ms. Nesthus demands were entirely proper
26 under California Law, and (3) Nesthus demands are protected by Californias
27 litigation privilege under Cal.Civ.C. 47.
28
(1) Obstruction of Justice as Civil Rights Claim: Defendants attack the use of
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1 the term Obstruction of Justice to refer to the claims of Count 4. The title is
2 irrelevant to the substance of the claim, which identifies 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Cal.
3 Const. art. I, 26 in each claim. FAC 541, 543, 545, 547, 549. Count 4 alleges
4 Nesthus interference with Plaintiffs and their members rights to access justice in
5 this courthouse after this Action was filed. These facts are the basis for two sets of
6 claims; Civil Rights Act claims for deprivation of First, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh
7 amendment rights to SPEECH, PRIVACY, and ASSOCIATION; SEARCH AND
8 SEIZURE; ACCESS TO JUSTICE; and SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS as well as
9 the racketeering claims for Obstruction of Justice under Title 18, sections 1503, 1505,
10 1512, and 1513 (RACKETEERING COUNT 5). One title is used for convenience.
11
(2) Nesthus Demands Entirely Proper Under State Law or Privileged:
12 Defendants assert a state Government Code provision as a defense deprivation of

13 federal civil rights. It has been settled for well over a century that state laws do not
14 authorize deprivation of state or federal constitutional rights. Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
15 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1914); United States v.
16 Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326; Screws v. U.S., 325 U.S. 91 (1945). It works the opposite
17 way. Californias litigation privilege cannot immunize any entity for violations of
18 federal law. Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1996) (Because the
19 existence of 1983 immunities is a matter of federal law, the district court erred in
20 determining that the Attorney Defendants were entitled to litigation immunity
21 pursuant to Cal.Civ.Code 47(b)). Defendants are entitled to explain the state law
22 defense to a jury to support a good faith immunity, but the defense does not erect an
23 immunity. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640; Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c).35
24 D. Count 6 (Supervisory Liability)
25
SUPERIOR COURT asserts Count 6 does not allege that any supervisor
26 Judicial Defendants were personally involved in any purported constitutional

27
35
These events have been previously briefed in this litigation in an emergency motion for
28 restraining order. Doc. No. 4. Should the Court desire to consider this affirmative defense,
Plaintiffs incorporate herein that pleading in its entirety.

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1 deprivation, or that there is a causal connection between the supervisor Judicial

2 Defendants actions and any alleged constitutional injury. Doc. No. 139, 5:14-18.
3 GORE asserts contains no factual allegations against William Gore on which federal
4 or state tort liability can attach, characterizing Claim 6.3 as a respondeat superior
5 claim. COUNTY Doc. No. 141-1, 4:17-24. CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS
6 attack there are no allegations regarding the City Attorneys personal involvement in
7 the prosecution of Plaintiff Stuart, or any causal connection between the City
8 Attorneys conduct and the violation. CITY ATTORNEY Doc. No. 151, 5:14-16.
9
In general, supervisory liability may be adequately pled alleging minimal facts:
10 (1) the supervisor acted under color of law, (2) the supervisors subordinates deprived
11 plaintiff of rights, and (3) defendant directed the subordinate, set in motion events
12 leading to, or knew but failed to prevent the subordinates acts causing deprivation.
13 Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Jury Instructions, Instruction 9.3 Claim Against
14 Supervisory Defendant in Individual Capacity; Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045
15 (9th Cir.1989).
16 1. SUPERIOR COURT/JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS
17
Supervisory liability is properly pled generally because a plaintiff rarely has
18 sufficient knowledge of internal policies, training, and past acts necessary to plead
19 with specificity. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011); Maduka v.
20 Sunrise Hosp., 375 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2004); Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. 506, 513.
21 Count 6 alleges generally that each Supervisory Defendant acted under color of law
22 (FAC 150). Each claim identifies the scope of their authority and their subordinate
23 co-defendants (e.g., TRENTACOSTA, FAC 668-673; GORE, FAC 657, 171),
24 and specific supervisory duties regarding each subordinate (e.g., TRENTACOSTA,
25 FAC 673). Each claim against each supervisor includes an allegation that the
26 supervisor failed to perform own PROFESSIONAL DUTIES and one or more
27 SUPERVISORY DUTY over his or her subordinates, setting in motion the
28 subordinates acts as elsewhere alleged, depriving Plaintiffs of rights as elsewhere
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1 alleged, causing injury in a nature and amount to be proven at trial. (e.g.,

2 TRENTACOSTA, FAC 674).
3
Superior Court Defendants assert a lack of causal connection (Doc. No. 139,
4 5:11). The causation element is satisfied by the identification of the supervisors

5 subordinates, and the allegation that the subordinates acts caused deprivation as
6 elsewhere alleged. See, e.g., FAC 648, 654, 658).
7
Though the above allegations satisfy the minimal pleading requirements for a
8 supervisory liability case, the FAC also pleads claims with more specificity under the
9 several theories of supervisory liability, including failures to train at FAC 640-641,
10 682. See, e.g., Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1149 (9th Cir.2005)
11 ([s]upervisory liability is imposed against a supervisory official in his individual
12 capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control
13 of his subordinates, for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivations of which
14 the complaint is made, or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference
15 to the rights of others.). The FAC also alleges the supervisors policymaking
16 activity as direct action at FAC 637-643. See, e.g, Ruvalcaba v. City of Los
17 Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 524 (9th Cir.1999); Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 915 (9th
18 Cir.2001); Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.1991) (en
19 banc)). The FAC alleges failure to control subordinates (Larez v. City of Los
20 Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir.1991) and Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207
21 (9th Cir. 2011)) (FAC allegations of supervisors knowledge of prior violations of
22 law and deprivations by their subordinates (FAC 639), duties to remedy their
23 subordinates behavior (FAC 641), and breach of duties (FAC 642, 43; e.g.
24 TRENTACOSTA 674; ALKSNE: STUART ASSAULT).
25
Each allegation in each count is relevant to one of the several foundations for
26 supervisory liability. To the extent Defendants assert the claims assert too many
27 allegations, they are incorrect. In any event, surplussage can and should be
28 ignored. U.S. ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir.
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1 2003). The Count is properly pled.

2 2. GORE
3
GORES assertion that the FAC contains no factual allegations supporting
4 liability against his is inaccurate. GORE Doc. No. 141-1, 4. The FAC alleges
5 GORES personal involvement in the STUART ASSAULT at FAC 181(f), (h),
6 191, 205, 216, 274-284. His relationships and authority over subordinates SDSD
7 DOES 1-15, SMITH, MARCQ, CSB-INVESTIGATIONS, and all other members of
8 his department are alleged. FAC 170-175, 124-134, 275, 276, 637, 657. The FAC
9 alleges facts that GORE knew or had reason to know of PLAINTIFFS reform
10 activities (FAC 639), the operation of the ENTERPRISES including each SCHEME
11 AND ARTIFICE TO DEFRAUD (FAC 639, 928-999), the planned
12 ENGAGEMENT (FAC 117-118), planning for the STUART ASSAULT (FAC
13 179-181), the CLAIM AND DEMAND (for post-CLAIM AND DEMAND counts)
14 (FAC 142), and prior breaches of his subordinates own PROFESSIONAL DUTIES
15 (FAC 640). This knowledge combined with the power to control gives rise to
16 duties to exercise his powers to prevent or aid in the prevention of injury to others. .
17 Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011); 42 U.S.C. 1986. The FAC
18 alleges the fact that GORE failed to do. FAC 643, Count 10. These facts support
19 the conclusion that GORE breached his own PROFESSIONAL DUTIES, setting in
20 motion deprivation and injury. FAC 283.
21
The FAC also pleads details of GORES direction acts in participation in and
22 planning for the STUART ASSAULT, including communicating with one or more
23 STUART ASSAULT COORDINATORS regarding response to the
24 ENGAGEMENTS and preparation for the STUART ASSAULT (FAC 279),
25 altering the SDSD DOES security detail in response (FAC 280(a)), advising his
26 deputies of PLAINTIFFS, their FFRRESA, the DDIJO COMPLAINTS, and the
27 STUART ASSAULT COORDINATORS disfavor for such actions (FAC 280(b)),
28 advising his deputies to assist in the STUART ASSAULT (FAC 280(c))
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1 coordinating with the CITY OF SAN DIEGO, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CITY
2 ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS to plan for the STUART ASSAULT (FAC 280(d)),
3 instructing deputies to act under the direction of the STUART ASSAULT
4 COORDINATORS in the STUART ASSAULT (FAC 280(e)), and supervising,
5 planning, and participating in the STUART ASSAULT (FAC 280(f), 171, Count
6 1.12, 1.13). The FAC specifically pleads six false arrests and false imprisonments by
7 deputies under GORES control while GORE knew or had reason to know of the
8 illegal nature of these false arrests and imprisonments. FAC 657, 384, 392, 398,
9 402, 421, 453. GORE participated in the line drawing and policymaking of the
10 COUNTY and SUPERIOR COURT alleged in the municipal claims against them.
11 FAC 726, 746, 747, 748. GORE is identified as a RICO Person and participant
12 in the DDICE, SD-DDICE, and STUART-AHCE Enterprises. FAC 926, 931, 943.
13
These fundamental acts and derelictions of duty are the foundational facts for
14 the various plausible legal conclusions that GORE acted UNREASONABLY and
15 CULPABLY in the numerous civil rights claims against him (e.g., FAC 283, 284,
16 658, etc.), and committed the crimes alleged in the racketeering and conspiracy
17 counts, including the aiding and abetting claims of Racketeering Count 10. As
18 Defendants have offered no alternative solution at all, they have certainly failed to
19 prove that PLAINTIFFS conclusions of law are implausible. See Moss I multi-stage
20 analysis, supra.
21
GORE characterizes the FAC allegations against him as respondeat superior.
22 The FAC pleads STUART was in custody of GORE. FAC 392, 398, 417, 421.
23 This is not an allegation of derivative liability, but based on GORES delegation of
24 authority to his deputies to take custody of persons in a courtroom. At each
25 FALSE IMPRISONMENT, STUART was remanded to custody of the Sheriff by a
26 superior court judge. GORE is The Sheriff. GORE apparently delegates whatever
27 authority he exercises to execute courtroom custody powers to his deputies, all of
28 whom are within his control. Such custody falls within the ambit of his power and
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1 duty to control his subordinate officers, including policy, training, discipline, of such
2 deputies. See, e.g., Starr, supra. If necessary, Plaintiff proffers to amend to specify
3 DDISO DOES (FAC 922) as Defendants in the Count 3 claims.
4 3. CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS
5
CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS assert that Claim 6.7 for Supervisory
6 liability against City Attorney J. GOLDSMITH (supervisor to GARSON and

7 unknown others) under Section 1983 does not state a claim because there are no
8 allegations regarding the City Attorneys personal involvement in the prosecution of
9 Plaintiff Stuart, or any causal connection between the City Attorneys conduct and
10 the violation. CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS Doc. No. 151, 5:14-16. This is
11 inaccurate. The FAC asserts both wrongful acts and personal involvement against J.
12 GOLDSMITH at 688-689: [J. GOLDSMITH] directly oversaw, supervised,
13 guided, and approved all acts of GARSON in the MALICIOUS PROSECUTION,
14 PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, GARSON PERJURIES 1-4, and each FALSE
15 IMPRISONMENT as elsewhere alleged and that J. GOLDSMITH CULPABLY
16 and UNREASONABLY failed to perform his own PROFESSIONAL DUTIES and
17 one or more SUPERVISORY DUTY over his subordinates, setting in motion the
18 subordinates acts as elsewhere alleged . . . FAC 637, 638 detail J.
19 GOLDSMITHS supervisory duties, 639, 630 his knowledge of prior wrongful
20 acts of his subordinates including GARSON and each ENTERPRISE PERSON,
21 (639 A, B, E), 641 alleges a duty to remedy based upon such knowledge, 642
22 implementation of customs, policies and practices leading to injury, and 643 failure
23 to implement preventative measures despite such knowledge and ability. Specific
24 allegations against GARSON and J. GOLDSMITH include communications between
25 GARSON and STUART as well as STUARTS attorneys Chang and Turner. FAC
26 387-401, 404-07, 413-14, 420, 425 (Chang), 436-37, 441-42, 446, 447, 450 (Turner),
27 455-460, 466.
28
As GARSONS Supervisor, GOLDSMITH would be liable for his deliberate

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1 indifference and failure to train her setting in motion her actions as well as for his
2 personal interactions with her in her accused behavior. Taylor v. Swift, supra. The
3 FAC alleges GARSON collaborated, agreed, affiliated, and conspired with her boss,
4 San Diego City Attorney and former San Diego Superior Court Family Division
5 judge Jan Goldsmith, and her bosss wife, sitting Family Division judge, and instant
6 Defendant Christine Goldsmith and that C. Goldsmith and J. Goldsmith supervised,
7 directed, encouraged, facilitated, and tolerated GARSON PERJURY ONE and TWO
8 to interfere with and retaliate for Plaintiffs PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITIES and the
9 DUE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE and GARSON, J. GOLDSMITH, and C.
10 GOLDSMITH did so with the knowledge and support of SCHALL and WOHLFEIL,
11 all of whom acted with the specific intent to retaliate against STUART for the DDIJO
12 COMPLAINTS I and II against them. FAC 381-382. Similar allegations are
13 contained at FAC 483 (J. GOLDSMITHS supervision of GARSON), 488 (C.
14 GOLDSMITHS familial and work relationships with J. GOLDSMITH and
15 GARSON). He is also directly liable for his conspiracies with GROCH. FAC
16 494-95.
17
City Defendants also assert state law defenses to supervisory liability under the
18 California Tort Claims Act. CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS Doc. No. 151, 5:319 16. The FAC federal law supervisory liability claims under Section 1983 are not
20 subject to the CTCA, and Art. I 16 of the California Constitution. See Kimes,
21 supra.
22
To the extent these allegations are not pled to the Courts satisfaction, Plaintiff
23 hereby proffers to plead more detail on all issues and requests leave to amend.
24 E. Count 7 (Municipal Liability)
25 1. COUNTY
26
GORE and COUNTY assert a plausibility attack on Count 7 generally:
27 Plaintiffs allegations that the County and Sheriffs Department maintain a culture of
28 deliberate indifference, fail to train and supervise, make policies for the States
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1 judiciary, operate the courts, and had power to supervise the Doyne corporation are
2 but conclusions without factual support and thus insufficient to state a claim. GORE
3 Doc. No. 141-1, 3:14-4:16. They target Claim 7.4 a Monell claim directed to the
4 Countys operations of the Superior Courts (FAC 716, 745) and Claim 11.11 a
5 supervision claim directed to the Countys oversight of its forensic psychology
6 enterprise in which DOYNE is a participant ( 873, 875).
7
Claim 7.4 Monell Claim Against Superior Court and SDSD: Municipal liability
8 claims may be pled generally. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508
9 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
10 U.S. 163, 167 (1993). Count 7 is plead to comply with Ninth Circuit Court of
11 Appeals Model Jury Instruction 9.4 and Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1214 (9th Cir.
12 2011). Instruction 9.4 requires (1) color of law action (2) deprivation of right (3) the
13 actor was behaving pursuant to policy. Instruction 9.7 for failure to train adds (4)
14 defendants training was inadequate, leading to the deprivation. See also Connick v.
15 Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350 (2011).
16
Here GORE and COUNTY effectively assert that a Twombly plausibility attack
17 converts Monells Rule 8 notice standard for pleading policy, deliberate indifference,
18 supervision and training, into a Rule 9(b) specificity standard. Doc. No. 141-1, 5:5
19 (The first amended complaint should be dismissed as to William Gore because there
20 is no factual basis for personal liability.). This is error. Monell and supervisor
21 claims are adjudged under ordinary Rule 8 notice standards, not Rule 9(b).
22 Leatherman 507 U.S. 163, 167 (1993). Because municipal and supervisory policies
23 and practices are not within a plaintiffs control, specificity is not required. Id.
24
GORES attack under Twombly and Iqbal requires tighter aim than his shotgun
25 approach. He must direct the Court through the Moss I multi-stage analysis of
26 identifying a truly conclusory allegation, identify the supporting facts of any
27 conclusory allegations, and to identify defendants innocent alternative
28 explanations. In the case of Monell and supervisory claims, the plaintiffs
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1 supporting facts such as authority to issue policies, control subordinates, and

2 knowledge of prior incidents, are satisfactory even if pled generally. See, e.g., Starr
3 v. Baca, supra, OSU v. Ray, supra.
4
5
Claim 7.4 is Adequately Pled

The FAC alleges with requisite specificity the existence of policies, training,
6 and deliberate indifference of the municipal entities. 716-718. Claim 7.4 further
7 details the scope of each municipal entitys authority over specifically-identified
8 subordinates, the categories of policies, and types of operations accused, and each
9 municipalitys relationship to various enterprises (e.g., 745), the control of the
10 Sheriffs Department ( 746), oversight of GORE and SDSD DOES 1-15 (STUART
11 ASSAULT DOES) and ties them to the STUART ASSAULT, MALICIOUS
12 PROSECUTION, FALSE IMPRISONMENTS four enterprises, and the
13 RACKETEERING of each. ( 747, 748). Factual details of the underlying wrong
14 are in the passages elsewhere (e.g., MALICIOUS PROSECUTION at FAC 34915 467). This is abundant detailfar more than adequate to plead Monell liability.
16
More importantly, GORE and COUNTY offer no second-stage alternative
17 explanation to the conclusions they target. To do so they must, for example, provide
18 an innocent explanation for their operation of a fraudulent forensic psychology
19 enterprise. See, e.g., FAC 977-983, Ex. 2.
20
21
Claim 11.11 COUNTY Supervision of DOYNE is Adequately Pled

COUNTY attacks Claim 11.11 similarly. Claim 11.11 is pled to accompany
22 the DOYNE TERRORISM facts, separate from Counts 6 and 7 but alleging
23 municipal and supervisory liability consistent with and incorporating the supervisory
24 and municipal general allegations. Claim 11.11 alleges acts and omissions in
25 dereliction of duty to supervise DOYNE, following Starr v. Baca at and Model Jury
26 Instruction 9.3 (see law detail regarding Claim 6). Supervisory liability is imposed
27 on a supervisor for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or
28 control of his subordinates. Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th
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1 Cir. 1991).
2
The FAC pleads these defendants powers and duties to control both Dr. Doyne
3 individually (DOYNE) and his professional corporation (DOYNE INC) ( 875), prior
4 knowledge of DOYNES criminal behavior ( 879), failure to discipline, train or
5 remedy DOYNE and DOYNE INC ( 880-883), policies ( 884), and injury caused
6 thereby in the STUART ASSAULT and DDIJO COMPLAINTS ( 883). The FAC
7 alleges abundant factual detail elsewhere, yet for this supervision claim the minimal
8 allegations are sufficient. Further, COUNTY offer no innocent alternative in what
9 appears to be a plausibility attack.
10 2. CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS
11
CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS assert the FAC does not allege entity
12 liability against the City of San Diego under Monell, claiming the FAC alleges only
13 a single, isolated or sporadic incident and is thus merely a respondeat superior
14 claim. CITY ATTORNEY Doc. No. 151, 5:26-6:4.
15
The CITY claims it cannot identify a claim asserted against it as an entity.
16 The entity liability claim relevant to the CITY is Claim 7.5 (FAC 713-718, 75017 753). The Claim is not a challenge to identify:
18
Claim 7.5
19
42 U.S.C. 1983 and Cal. Const. art. I, 26
20
CITY OF SAN DIEGO
21 The Claim alleges the CITY created, maintained, and enforced policies, customs,
22 rules, procedures, traditions, practices, including line-drawing activities as
23 elsewhere detailed (policies) and permitted and directed behaviors by policymakers
24 themselves, causing or permitting deliberate indifference and a culture of deliberate
25 indifference to foreseeable constitutional injury of the type caused to Plaintiffs in the
26 DDIJO and DOYNE, INC. COMPLAINTS, STUART ASSAULT, MALICIOUS
27 PROSECUTION, and PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, and NESTHUS
28 OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE and failed to train J. GOLDSMITH and GARSON
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1 constituting deliberate indifference (FAC 716, 717). The FAC alleges numerous
2 prior similar incidents giving rise to a duty to train at FAC 639-40 (supervisory
3 knowledge incorporated by reference). Claim 7.5 incorporates allegations regarding
4 the DDIJO COMPLAINTS and past events relevant to BATTSON and SIMIS
5 knowledge are also relevant. FAC 578, 605-07.
6 F. Count 8 (Respondeat Superior)
7
FEDERAL attacks Claim 8.2, which alleges FEDERAL is liable for the acts of
8 its employee identified as CHUBB DOE 1 under the doctrine of respondeat

9 superior. FEDERAL does not dispute that CHUBB DOE 1 is its employee, but only
10 that there is no independent cause of action for respondeat superior. The FAC alleges
11 an independent claims against CHUBB DOE 1 at COUNT 3, FAC 349, 356
12 (MALICIOUS PROSECUTION), 931 (DDICE participation), 944 (SD-DDICE
13 participation), RACKETEERING COUNT 3 (Kidnapping), RACKETEERING
14 COUNT 4 (Extortion, Robbery), RACKETEERING COUNT 5 (Obstruction of
15 Justice), RACKETEERING COUNT 6 (Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering).
16
Respondeat Superior Independent Claim 8.2: Plaintiffs acknowledge the 2013
17 holding cited by FEDERAL that California does not recognize a cause of action for
18 respondeat superior; rather, it is merely a theory of liability. Chenault v. Cobb, C 1319 03828 MEJ, 2013 WL 6072025 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013). PLAINTIFFS maintain
20 that FEDERAL is liable for the acts of its agents and employees, including each
21 STUART ASSAULT COORDINATOR and CHUBB DOE 1, hereby withdraw
22 Claim 8.2 as an independent claim, and request leave to amend Claim 3.1 in
23 incorporate the respondeat superior liability allegations directly into that claim.
24
FEDERALS Agency: FEDERAL asserts a plausibility attack on the FAC
25 assertion at paragraphs 760-762 that [FEDERAL] DOE 1 is the agent of the CITY
26 ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS and STUART ASSAULT COORDINATORS.
27 FEDERAL Doc. No. 145, 3:25-4:15. The factual allegations supporting agency are
28 contained throughout COUNT 3. The FAC alleges that FEDERAL was the insurer of
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1 SDCBA representing SDCBA in handling the CLAIM AND DEMAND, that

2 FEDERAL insured or was on tender to defend the STUART ASSAULT
3 COORDINATORS, that FEDERAL recognized that the $10,000,000 CLAIM AND
4 was a serious threat to FEDERALS insureds, additional insureds, and other parties
5 that FEDERAL represented all parties, that STUART should direct all claims to
6 him, stated Im handling the Claim for all parties. FAC 359. FEDERAL
7 threatened to prosecute STUART for criminal trespass, referenced his damage as
8 angry judges, and indicated he was destroying or falsifying evidence which
9 implicated each STUART ASSAULT COORDINATOR. FAC 360-366. The FAC
10 concludes, as did STUART, that FEDERAL was working on behalf of the each
11 STUART ASSAULT COORDINATOR to thwart the CLAIM AND DEMAND.
12 FAC 368-372.
13
The FAC alleges convergence between FEDERALS work for the SAC and the
14 involvement of the CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS at FAC 373-408. C.

15 GOLDSMITH is an SAC, a complaining witness and initiator of the People v. Stuart
16 matter, a collaborator in the CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS group, and wife of
17 J. GOLDSMITH. The CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS joined FEDERALS and
18 SACS effort to thwart the CLAIM AND DEMAND by escalating an already-illegal
19 prosecution. In about July, 2010 GARSON communicated the collaboration between
20 the CITY ATTORNEY and CHUBBS threats through her own threat to bump it up
21 to a felony for charges relating to the criminal trespass. FAC 387-391.
22 Through the course of prosecution, GARSON escalated the criminal trespass to
23 stalking and harassment for something about the bar association. These efforts
24 created an agency between FEDERAL and the CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS
25 on behalf of an in agency with the SAC defendants to thwart the CLAIM AND
26 DEMAND in which all three groups shared an interest. FAC 394-466. See also
27 Color of Law at Section I.E. supra.
28
FEDERAL accurately assert that it is not subject to respondeat superior

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1 liability for section 1983 claims, and the FAC contains no such claims. The FAC
2 alleges against FEDERAL Monell-type claims for FEDERALS independent liability
3 for its policies, practices, training, and deliberate indifference relating to their state
4 law actor collaborators for their violations of section 1983. See, e.g., Walker v.
5 Gates, CV 01-10904GAF(PJWX), 2002 WL 1065618 (C.D. Cal. May 28, 2002);
6 Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir.2012).
7 G. Count 9 (42 U.S.C. 1985)
8
JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS attacks Count 9 on 3 grounds: (1) Failure to
9 allege facts with sufficient particularity showing a conspiracy involving any Judicial
10 Defendant (Doc. No. 139, 7:14-16), (2) that Stuart does not and cannot allege he is
11 an employee of the federal government, or that he is authorized to perform any
12 official federal duties (Doc. No. 139, 8:1-2), and (3) FAC offers no factual
13 allegations showing that any Judicial Defendants acted with a discriminatory
14 animus. Sup. Ct. Doc. No. 139, 8:12-13. Other Defendants pose similar attacks.
15 GORE Doc. No. 141-1, 5:6-6:25; CHUCAS/GRIFFIN 150, 5:8-18; CITY
16 ATTORNEY Doc. No. 151, 8:22-9:22.
17
(1) Conspiracy: Defendants appear to assert a plausibility attack on the
18 conspiracy foundation for Section 1985 claims. As a plausibility attack, it must be

19 analyzed under Moss Is multi-stage process. Defendants do not specify which of the
20 several conspiracies alleged they attack, making a plausibility analysis impossible.
21 For example, Claim 9.4 794 is the introductory paragraph identifying each
22 conspiracy and group: This is a Claim for conspiracy to deprive persons of civil
23 rights under 42 U.S.C. 1985(3)(b) against STUART ASSAULT COORDINATOR
24 Defendants based on the STUART ASSAULT in Count 1, CITY ATTORNEY
25 DEFENDANTS and GROCH based on the non-immune acts in the MALICIOUS
26 PROSECUTION and PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT in Count 3, NESTHUS
27 Defendants based on the OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE in Count 4, BATTSON and
28 SIMI on acts alleged in Count 5, and supervisor and municipal entities in Counts 6
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1 and 7. Defendants fail to identify which conspiracy they attack.

Defendants also fail to undertake the second step in the Moss I multi-stage
3 analysis: Identify the factual support for the various conspiracies, and compare the
4 FAC allegation of conspiracy and their alternative explanation. JUDICIAL
5 DEFENDANTS fail to traverse the plausibility analysis.
GORE asserts the FAC fails to allege with specificity facts showing a meeting
7 of the minds. CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS similarly allege a plaintiff must

8 allege each element with particularity. Doc. No. 151, 8:24-25. These attacks
9 confuse Rule 9(b)s specificity standard for Rule 8 and his burden in a plausibility
10 attack. Conspiracy claims are properly alleged under a notice standard, and GORES
11 burden is to erect and traverse Moss I Multi-Stage attack. Leatherman, 507 U.S. 163,
12 167 (1993), Iqbal, supra. Facts supporting the conspiracy allegations are detailed
13 throughout this pleading, and specific for GORE include those identified in analysis
14 under Attacks on Count 6 supra.
CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS attack similarly, citing two pre-Twombly
15
16 casesSherman v. Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1977), Soto v. Schembri,
17 960 F. Supp. 751, 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), and Chicago Miracle Temple Church, Inc. v.
18 Fox, 901 F. Supp. 1333, 1347 (N.D. Ill. 1995) for the proposition that In order to
19 successfully state a section 1985 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege each
20 element with particularity. Doc. No. 151, 8:24. These pre-Twombly and pre21 Leatherman36 cases are no longer persuasive authoritythe proper procedure today is
22 to traverse the Moss I multi-stage analysis. Further, Chicago Temples 1995 holding
23 was an appeal from a Rule 56 motion to dismiss on evidentiary standards inapplicable
24 to the present stage.
25
The FAC pleads abundant facts supporting each alleged 1985 conspiracy in far
26 too much detail to include here. In the event the Court determines otherwise,
27
28
36
Sotos comment re: particularity was single sentence dicta, citing only Leon v. Murphy, 988
F.2d 303, 31011 (2d Cir.1993)a pre-Leatherman case.

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1 Plaintiffs hereby request leave to amend to cure.

2
(2) 1985(1) office, trust, or place of confidence:
JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS (Doc. No. 139, 7:21-8:3), GORE (Doc. No. 141-1,
4 5), and CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS (Doc. 151, 9:3-4) seek to narrow the
5 unambiguous language of section 1985(1), which prevents interference, injury, or
6 harassment of one holding any office, trust, or place of confidence under the United
7 States from discharging duties or leaving any state, district or place. 42 U.S.C.
8 1985(1). Defendants do not, and cannot cite a case construing section 1985(1) to
9 permit only federal employees, a United States officer, an officer holding
10 federal office or persons authorized to perform . . . federal duties or The
11 Supreme Court has stated that 1985 is to be accorded a sweep as broad as its
12 language. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971); Kush v. Rutledge, 460
13 U.S. 719, 724 (1983). Courts of appeal have recognized that 1985(1) is a statute
14 cast in general language of broad applicability and unlimited duration. Stern v.
15 United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1335 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
16 975, 98 S.Ct. 533, 54 L.Ed.2d 467 (1977). See also Windsor v. The Tennessean, 719
17 F.2d 155, 161 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984). Under Griffin and its
18 progeny, courts have applied section 1985(1) to protect both state and federal actors
19 in performance of duties under federal law. Mollnow v. Carlton, 716 F.2d 627, 630
20 (9th Cir. 1983) (tax collector); Lewis v. News-Press & Gazette Co., 782 F. Supp.
21 1338, 1341 (W.D. Mo. 1992) (state judge); McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 614-17
22 (D.C.Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981).
23
Defendants attempt to cabin the sweeping language of section 1985(1) is
24 inconsistent with the language and statutory intent of the statute. Protection of a broad
25 class persons acting under the United States was the express intent of Congress in
26 enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1871. McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 615 (D.C.
27 Cir. 1980) (statutory history); Griffon v. Congress of Racial Equality, 221 F.Supp.
28 899 (E.D.La.1963); Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist. No. 46 of Lawrence County, Ark.,
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1 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956). 37

2
The FAC describes Plaintiffs status at the time of the STUART ASSAULT as
3 an officer of the federal courts of five federal districts in three states including
4 California and this District, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
5 Circuit, his status as a party and witness in the DUE COURSE OF JUSTICE, and
6 federal law practice including numerous civil rights and constitutional law pro bono
7 and commercial client matters. In this matter such activity includes his founding,
8 participation, and leadership of a public benefit corporation to support education,
9 exercise, enforcement, and reform of federal family civil rights (FFRRESA) in both
10 his personal and official capacity as an officer of the corporate Plaintiffs on behalf of
11 their clients and affiliates. Further, the injury alleged herein occurred while and
12 because all Plaintiffs were specifically engaged in such activity. FAC 324.
13
Any narrowing construction of the unambiguous terms of section 1985(1) at
14 this or any stage would be inappropriate. U.S. Const., Amend VII, V; Baltimore &
15 Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 656 (1935); Markman v. Westview
16 Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 371 (1996) (the first issue in a patent case,
17 construing the patent, is a question of law, to be determined by the court. The second
18 issue, whether infringement occurred, is a question of fact for a jury.). To the extent
19 that the statutory terms office trust and place of confidence are ordinary
20 language terms capable of comprehension by a jury, no question of law exists.
21 Markman, supra; Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Dairy
22 Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
23
24
25
26
27
28
37
The 1871 Reconstruction Congress clearly intended the broad sweep of section 1985 to
protect any personofficial or otherwisewith any affiliation to the Union who operates inside
what was then recently-quelled enemy territory: States that had mobilized their institutions and
society into violent hostility to the Constitution, laws, and institutions of the United States. That
precise sentiment of institutional hostility to equal protection and due process is the crux of this
lawsuit. STUARTS actions as a formal officer of this Court asserting the equal protection rights of
an oppressed class of families and children within an unrepentant hostile territory of the State of
California would without question satisfy the 1871 Congress as being action taken through an
office, trust, or place of confidence under the United States.

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Whether STUART, in his actions as an attorney admitted to practice before this
2 and numerous other United States District Courts, in representing a class of citizens
3 in the very act of protecting their rights, privileges, and immunities under the United
4 States Constitution, qualifies as one holding an office, trust, or place of confidence
5 is a question of fact, and Defendants are entitled to a day in court at the appropriate
6 time to make their claims to the contrary. The statutes meaning in 1871 can be
7 construed no differently todayunder the broad sweep of a statute intended to
8 protect the rights of an oppressed class, the FAC adequately states a claim under
9 Section 1985(1).
10
(3) Discriminatory Animus: JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS assert FAC offers
11 no factual allegations showing that any JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS acted with a

12 discriminatory animus. Doc. No. 139, 8:12-13. CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS
13 pose a similar attack. Doc. No. 151, 9:5-17. Others join more generally.
14
The existence of class-based invidious intent is a question of fact not properly
15 resolved at the Rules 12 stage. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S.
16 263, 267 (1993). The FAC alleges intent sufficient to provide notice under Rule 8:
17 Plaintiffs are members of and/or advocates for each of the following three classes
18 subject to historic de facto and de jure invidious discrimination in violation of the 5th
19 and 14th Amendment rights to Equal Protection of the Laws (collectively EQUAL
20 PROTECTION CLASSES) FAC 777. Specific details of invidious intent are
21 alleged as incorporated at FAC 781-83, Exs. 1, 2, 13. Class of one claims (FAC
22 784-85) do not require invidious intent. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.
23 562, 564, (2000). Similarly, support and advocacy claims (COUNTS 9, 10;
24 FFRRESA, FAC 76-97, 146, 148, 161, 800, 1198) require no invidious intent.
25 Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 720 (1983).
26
JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS cite Rosen v. Cmty. Educ. Ctrs., Inc., CV-10-0584,
27 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *7-9 (D. Ariz. Oct. 8, 2010) as rejecting Section 1985(3)
28 claim based on gender discrimination. Rosen stands for exactly the opposite
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 proposition, citing Life Ins. Co. of North America v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 505
2 (9th Cir.1979), which acknowledged gender as a 1985(3) class, with approval. See
3 also Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (it is well
4 established that gender-based classifications may result in invidious discrimination.).
5 In Rosen the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff did not state a claim for class
6 discrimination because plaintiff does not offer factual allegations to back up her
7 hypothetical discriminatory animus that motivated the alleged deprivation of her
8 rights. Rosen at *3. California Coalitions 1985(3) equal protection claims are not
9 speculative, but backed up by extensive research. FAC 781-85, Exs. 1 (P15-17,
10 47-71, 72-104), 2, 13. Moreover, the FAC pleads that the Parent-Child class and
11 Domestic Relations Class have been previously identified by courts and legislatures
12 as classes. FAC 778, 779, Ex. 2 (P577-651).
13
CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS citations of Miller and Mears impose
14 nothing more than a requirement that animus must be alleged. Doc. No. 151, 9:1215 17. The FAC alleges animus. FAC 99, 105, 427, 630-31, 777, 781-83, 997.
16
(4) Party or Witness in Any Court of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1985(2))
17
CHUCAS and GRIFFIN attack FAC Claim 9.2 brought under 1985(2). Doc.
18 No. 150, 5:19-16. They assert first that the FAC does not allege PLAINTIFFS
19 testimony or appearance in federal court citing Timmerman v. US. Bank, N.A., 483
20 F.3d 1106, 1124 (10th Cir. 2007). Section 1985(2) imposes liability more broadly
21 than this citation.
22
In Justice Stevenss classic parsing of the 590-word long run-on single
23 sentence that is section 1985, Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 724 (1983), he
24 explained that paragraph (2) imposes liability for interference with (b) the
25 administration of justice in federal courts; (c) the administration of justice in state
26 courts. Section (b) holds liable persons who hampered the claimant's ability to
27 present an effective case in federal court or because they attended or testified in
28 federal court. Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 348 (5th Cir.1981) (en
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1 banc). If parties and witnesses ... have not yet testified in the proceeding ... the
2 conspirator must injure the party or witness in order to deter him from attending or
3 testifying in federal court. . . The section would not reach every conspiracy that
4 affected a federal right, but only a conspiracy whose predominant purpose was to
5 deter or punish the exercise of the federal right. Kinney, 367 F.3d at 355 n. 22
6 (quoting Guest, 383 U.S. at 760, 86 S.Ct. 1170). Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package
7 Sys., Inc., 614 F.3d 145, 150 (5th Cir. 2010).
8
The FAC identifies Plaintiffs relationship with relevant federal proceedings
9 generally as the DUE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (FAC 77-97).

10 California Coalition members have actively pursued numerous matters with
11 FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS. FAC 83. The DUE
12 ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE includes STUARTS engagement of the U.S.
13 Attorneys Office, which redirected him from filing an action in U.S. District Court to
14 the Commission on Judicial Performance; delivering DDIJO Complaints I and II to
15 the United States Attorney, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Grand Jury for
16 the Southern District of California; the filing of this action (COUNT 4).
17
Further, by the delegation of authority to the Commission on Judicial
18 Performance for investigation and enforcement of federal criminal laws including 18

19 U.S.C. 241, 242, and 371, the Commission on Judicial Performance is effectively a
20 proceeding before a court of the United States for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1985(2)
21 (COUNT 5).
22
CHUCAS and GRIFFINS interference includes their membership in the
23 STUART ASSAULT as well as the acts in furtherance conspiracies of the

24 PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (COUNT 3) and the (OBSTRUCTION OF
25 JUSTICE) (COUNT 4). These allegations establish sufficient relationships with
26 federal institutions.
27
CHUCAS and GRIFFIN also attack absence allegations of invidious
28 discrimination necessary under 1985(2) second part. Doc. 150, 6:12-16. Invidious
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1 discrimination against EQUAL PROTECTION CLASSES and intent to interfere by

2 virtue of advocacy for and membership in is abundantly alleged at FAC 163, 289,
3 629-632, and 777. Invidious discrimination is not necessary for a class of one
4 claim. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, (2000). Interference with
5 relevant state (and federal) proceedings are alleged as the DUE ADMINISTRATION
6 OF JUSTICE. CHUCAS and GRIFFINS interference and retaliation are alleged as
7 their involvement in the STUART ASSAULT and conspiracies in furtherance.
8 1985(3) Attacks:
9
CHUCAS and GRIFFIN attack (i) conspiracy, (ii) deprivation, and (iii) class-
10 based discrimination. CHUCAS Doc. No. 150, 6:25-7:2. Conspiracy (i) is alleged
11 against CHUCAS and GRIFFIN by virtue of their membership in the SAC group and
12 all allegations against that group (FAC 141-152, 286-348), and further liability for
13 conspiracies in furtherance of the STUART ASSAULT (MALICIOUS
14 PROSECUTION, NESTHUS OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, RACKETEERING
15 COUNTS). Deprivation is specified in each claim in each of the above counts.
16 Invidious discrimination to satisfy 1985(3), Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102,
17 (1971), and Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (it is
18 well established that gender-based classifications may result in invidious
19 discrimination.) is alleged at FAC 777 (Parent-Child Class See FAC 778,
20 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Domestic Relations Class See FAC 77921 782, Cal. Fam. C. 6211, Pen. C. 13700, FAC Ex. 1; Gender Class See Sever,
22 supra, FAC 783, Ex. 13. Class of One does not require invidious discrimination.
23 See STUART ASSAULT, FAC 786, 787. These allegations sufficiently allege
24 CHUCAS and GRIFFINS liability under section 1985(3).
25 H. Count 10 (42 U.S.C. 1986)
26
Several Defendants attack Count 10 arguing that it fails because of their attacks
27 on section 1985. A conspiracy under 1985 is therefore a prerequisite to a valid

28 claim under 1986. Because no section 1985 claim is stated, the section 1986 claim
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 also fails. CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS 151, 9:18-22. Because Defendants

2 attacks on the 1985 claims fail, their attacks on the 1986 claim fails.
3
In addition, SDSD DOES and GORE possess unique duties as peace officers
4 sworn to uphold state and federal law. See COUNT 12. These officers recognized
5 the illegal behavior of their co-Defendants in the STUART ASSAULT and the
6 subsequent illegal persecution of STUART. FAC 126-133 (SDSD); 193-197.
7 Their duties were then, as they are now, to act immediately to prevent abuse of color
8 of law authority committed by those in their presenceincluding private security
9 guards, judges, lawyers, and other peace officers. Their and their co-defendants
10 failures to protect families from harm caused within the Family Court System at the
11 direction of others even acting under color of law is a uniquely appropriate subject for
12 this and future litigation. See Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982)
13 (We do not want to pretend that the line between action and inaction, between
14 inflicting and failing to prevent the infliction of harm, is clearer than it is. If the state
15 puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect him,
16 it will not be heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is as much an active
17 tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit.); Johnson v. City of Seattle, 474
18 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (creation of danger). Moreover, protection from abuse
19 of authority by authority is a guarantee. We held that immunity from any such
20 discrimination is one of the equal rights of all persons, and that any withholding it by
21 a State is a denial of the equal protection of the laws, within the meaning of the
22 amendment. We held that such an equal right to an impartial jury trial, and such an
23 immunity from unfriendly discrimination, are placed by the amendment under the
24 protection of the general government and guaranteed by it. Ex parte Commonwealth
25 of Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345, 25 L. Ed. 676 (1879). GORE has not option to sit by
26 while authority is abusedhe must act, and his failure to act alone is independent
27 foundation for liability under the Civil Rights Act..
28
It is well-settled in our State and our Union that orders in violation of citizen
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1 rights have no effect: As we observed more than a century ago, [e]very

2 constitutional provision is self-executing to this extent, that everything done in
3 violation of it is void. (Oakland Paving Co. v. Hilton (1886) 69 Cal. 479, 484, 11 P.
4 3.). Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of California, 29 Cal. 4th 300, 307, 58 P.3d 339,
5 342 (2002); Cal. Const. Art. I, sec. 26. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60, 28 S.
6 Ct. 441, 454, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908). Law enforcement can be confident that orders
7 from a gowned criminal offer no more immunity than do orders from a masked one.
8 See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 126 (1945); Ex parte Young at 167
9 (The state cannot, in either case, impart to the official immunity from responsibility
10 to the supreme authority of the United States.).
These claims are adequately pled on the STUART ASSAULT facts through the
11
12 1985(2) and (3) claims of Count 9. If requested by the Court, Plaintiff proffers an
13 ability to plead them at more length and detail.
14 I. Counts 11, 12, 14, 15 (Doyne Terrorism):
BLANCHET attacks Counts 11. 12. 14. and 15 are State Claims for Legal
15
16 Malpractice. VIVIANO is represented by the same counsel and attacks similarly.

17 Doc. No. 148, 3:19-6:12. JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS attack on Rooker-Feldman is
18 analyzed under OMNIBUS Sec. C, their attack on statute of limitations at Sec. B.
These Counts are built on the DOYNE TERRORISM allegations that DOYNE,
19
20 BLANCHET and others conspired to defraud and extort STUART. While they might
21 also be stated as legal malpractice, the level of wrongdoing alleged far exceeds
22 mere negligence. They are not malpractice claims, and BLANCHETS arguments at
23 pages 4-7 regarding federal preemption of state malpractice claims are wildly off24 mark.38
25
38
Defendants, who presently and abundantly insult the Complaint and First Amended
26 Complaint as a bucket of mud and incomprehensible rambling, appear also confused regarding
the distinction between federal preemption and federal supremacy. This confusion perhaps helps in
27 understanding how the Divorce Industrys lawyers and related California institutions have wandered
so astray from any semblance of authority within our federal constitutional system. If it need be
28 saidand perhaps among some California divorce attorneys and government employees today it

13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1
2
The Claims Against BLANCHET are Not Barred by Res Judicata

BLANCHET asserts that a 2010 lawsuit for legal malpractice is res judicata to
3 the present federal law racketeering, civil rights, and false advertising claims. Doc.
4 No. 146, 7:1-8:16. The FAC identifies the Stuart Dissolution, which involved only
5 questions of property division, child custody, and support. Without analysis,
6 BLANCHET asserts that a subsequent legal malpractice action brought by Stuart
7 asserted that ABC&K and Blanchet committed malpractice relating to DOYNE.
8
The preclusive effect of a judgment is defined by claim preclusion and issue
9 preclusion, which are collectively referred to as res judicata. Taylor v. Sturgell,

10 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008). [C]laim preclusion is the doctrine providing that a final
11 judgment forecloses successive litigation of the very same claim, whether or not
12 relitigation of the claim raises the same issues as the earlier suit. Id. (quoting New
13 Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001)) Issue preclusion, in contrast, bars
14 successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a
15 valid court determination essential to the prior judgment, even if the issue recurs in
16 the context of a different claim. Id. (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting
17 New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 74849; White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 92618
should bethe Constitution of the United States pre-empted State law in 1788 upon the States
19 ratification of a Constitution of the United States containing a supremacy clause at Article VI,
clause 2. This supremacy concept was confirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Ware v.
20 Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) and has achieved noncontroversial statusat least outside of the
21 State of Californiain thousands of matters since. After a dispute over the supremacy concept
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
occurring from1861 until 1865, States through the Senate and Congress re-confirmed the
Constitutions supremacy to State laws in 1868 with the States ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Section 1, clause 2 provides: No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. Though the fact is often lost
among many present, almost every American family is comprised of United States citizens. The
Civil Rights Act passed by the States through the Senate and Congress in 1871 enabled U.S.
citizens in every Stateincluding even Californiato enforce their rights under the United States
Constitution over any State laws to the contrary. This supremacy concept of the United States
Constitution to State law has been recognized on many occasions since. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). An excellent primer for those who may
wish to explore the supremacy concept further in performance of their duties and aid of their
clients and fiduciaries is available for free. See The Federalist Papers, (1788), Essay No. 33
(Hamilton, A) and Essay No. 44 (Jefferson, T).

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1 27 (9th Cir. 2012).

2
Against Blanchet this Action asserts only federal questionsracketeering, and
3 false advertisingwhich were not, and could not be litigated in California state court.
4 This Action asserts damages against Blanchet for conspiracies in collaboration with
5 defendants who were notand could not beparties to a malpractice action against
6 Blanchet. This Action seeks special equitable and prospective remedies under 42
7 U.S.C. 1988, 15 U.S.C. 1125, 28 U.S.C. 2201, and 18 U.S.C. 1964 which
8 were notand could not beobtained from a California court. This Action asserts
9 events which occurred after 2010 when BLANCHET was sued for malpractice which
10 were notand could not beasserted in the 2010 malpractice action. In short, the
11 claims against Blanchet in this Action are notand cannot bebarred by any prior
12 litigation in a California county courthouse. Moreover, BLANCHET could not erect
13 a preclusion as the claim was not adjudicated on the merits. BLANCHET asserted an
14 immunity under state law, which cannot bar a federal claim. See Kimes, supra.
15
Further, STUART did not and could not have understood the depth of collusion
16 constituting the Domestic Dispute Industry in 2010. The complexity of the

17 enterprises operated by present Defendants has been revealed to STUART through
18 the STUART ASSAULT, the subsequent highly-integrated interactions between the
19 SDCBA, FEDERAL, CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS, and GROCH in
20 committing deprivation upon-deprivation to retaliate and oppress Plaintiffs for their
21 reform activity, one element of which includes STUARTS action against
22 BLANCHET, BATTSON and SIMIS outrageous impotence to remedy these obvious
23 violations of state and federal law through 2011-2013; all of which have occurred or
24 come to light after 2010.
25
Moreover, preclusion is an equitable doctrine. BLANCHETS unclean hands in
26 the course of dealings with STUART should prohibit her asserting any equitable
27 remedies in this Action, including equitable estoppels and statutes of limitation. This
28 maxim closes the doors of a court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or
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1 bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks relief, however improper may have
2 been the behavior of the defendant. Precision Inst. Mfg. Co. v. Automotive
3 Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945); Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763
4 F.2d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 1985). Blanchet is alleged to be the primary conductor of
5 the mail fraud and extortion racketeering activity involving DOYNE (STUART6 AHCE) that has incompetently demolished the futures of at least one small family
7 likely dozens morea CFLS level conductor in the San Diego Domestic Dispute
8 Industry Enterprise (SD-DDICE) which operates the Godless shams to defraud and
9 extort San Diego families of their and their childrens futures, a participant in the
10 California Domestic Dispute Industry Enterprise (DDICE) that fuels a $50 Billion
11 annual state-supported crime ring, and leading facilitator, inducer, aider, and abettor
12 to the Domestic Dispute Industry Forensic Investigator Enterprise (DDI-FICE) that is
13 the outcast bastard of the of the American psychology profession. She actively
14 induced STUART to hire DOYNE based on knowingly fraudulent and malicious
15 misrepresentations, and then actively oppressed and defrauded his efforts to take
16 action. She lied, cajoled, threatened, and even laughed at STUARTS insistence that
17 DOYNES behavior was irregular. FAC 1021-1030. To permit her to assert the
18 product of her misdeeds as a defense here because they were highly successful in
19 delaying STUART would constitute error. Ruiz v. Scriber, C 07-00020 WHA, 2007
20 WL 2790203 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2007) aff'd sub nom. Ruiz v. Scribner, 341 F. App'x
21 278 (9th Cir. 2009).
22 J. California Constitution Article I, sec. 26 Claims
23
Each claim asserting liability against state color of law actors under the Civil
24 Rights Act is also asserted as a state law constitutional claim under California
25 Constitution Article I, Section 26. Section 26 claims are the California equivalent of
26 claims against the federal color of law actors under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
27 Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of California, 29 Cal.
28 4th 300, 307, 58 P.3d 339, 342 (2002). Because the pleading and proof analysis of
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1 Article I, Section 26 claims and 1983 claims are similar, they are pled together.
2
FEDERAL claims the FAC fails to specifically identify what acts violated
3 Art. I. 26 of the California Constitution. Doc. No. 145, 5:22. FEDERAL cites
4 Cousins v. Lockyear, 568 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2009) in which a prisoner alleged
5 violation of broad federal constitutional right to be free from wrongful
6 incarceration Id. at 1070. The Court of Appeals dismissed the federal claims, citing
7 the caselaw requiring a civil rights plaintiff to allege violation of a right with
8 specificity. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). Finding no broad federal
9 constitutional right to be free from wrongful incarceration, the Court of Appeals
10 found defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Cousins at 1070.
11
FEDERALS assertion that Saucier governs Section claims is without
12 authority. Cousins analyzed the prisoner claims in that case differently, finding that
13 even though the prisoner couldnt state a federal claim for the broad right, his state
14 law claims on the same broad right were cognizable under Californias broader
15 Constitutional provisions. Cousins at 1070-71. See also Katzberg (describing
16 analysis of Art. I 26 claims under California law). Moreover, even if Saucier were
17 applied to state law, PLAINTIFFS have pled the constitutional rights FEDERAL has
18 violated with specificity. FAC 158-165; and as further specified in each Claim
19 naming FEDERAL.
20 K. Prospective Relief Counts
21
Several Defendants pose similar attacks on Plaintiffs standing to seek
22 prospective relief analyzed together here. JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS Doc. No. 139,
23 9:1-10:4; BIERER; LAWYER DEFENDANTS; COUNTY Doc. No. 141-1, 9:11-23.
24 LAWYER DEFENDANTS and BIERER assert the FACs prayer for Prospective
25 Relief do not assert concrete and particularized legal harm, coupled with a
26 sufficient likelihood that they will again be wronged in a similar way sufficient to
27 plead prospective relief. LAWYER DEFENDANTS Doc. No. 149-2, 10:14-22;
28 BIERER Doc. No. 135-1 8:3-9:3. BIERER claims that the FAC alleges only desires
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1 to have this countrys laws and Constitution upheld. BIERER 135-1, 8:20-21.
2 BATTSON and SIMI attack the Supreme Courts decisions consistently hold that a
3 citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he
4 himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution. Citing Linda R. S. v.
5 Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Doc. No. 134, 2:25-28. JUDICIAL
6 DEFENDANTS attack: Absent from the FAC are any allegations that Plaintiffs are
7 likely to be wronged in the future by any Judicial Defendants. Doc. No. 139, 9:228 10:23. These attacks are inaccurate.
9
The FACs two prospective relief counts request orders enjoining the patterns
10 of activity described in the civil rights, racketeering, and Lanham Act counts, and
11 declaring such patterns and related laws invalid, or federal law superior. Such relief
12 is provided under 18 U.S.C. 1964(a); 28 U.S.C. 2201-2202; 28 U.S.C. 1337;
13 15 U.S.C. 1116(a), 1117, 1118; 42 U.S.C. 1988(a); Fed.R.Civ.P. 57, 65.
14
15
Standing Attacks
There are three elements to standing. First injury in factan invasion of a
16 legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or
17 imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal
18 connection between the injury and the conduct complained ofthe injury has to be
19 fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result
20 [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be
21 likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
22 favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). A
23 plaintiff can establish standing by demonstrating he has previously engaged in the
24 sort of activity in which he now claims he will engage again if not prohibited by the
25 statute he seeks to challenge. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 363-64 (9th Cir.
26 2004). One can also establish standing to sue by demonstrating a history of
27 enforcement against oneself and others. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights
28 Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 113940 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc) (pattern of enforcement of
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1 a statute is shows likelihood of future enforcement and injury); AmericanArab Anti

2 Discrimination Comm. v. Thornburgh, 970 F.2d 501, 508 (9th Cir.1992) (threat of
3 injury was not speculative because the plaintiffs had been previously charged under
4 the challenged statute).
5
(1) Harm and (2) Cause: The FAC alleges numerous concrete and
6 particularized injuries. Each of the STUART ASSAULT, CHILLING, BREACH

7 OF CONTRACT and UNFAIR COMPETITION, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION,
8 COMMISSION and NESTHUS OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, DOYNE
9 TERRORISM, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, FALSE ADVERTISING, and each act of
10 RACKETEERING are alleged to have caused concrete and particularized harm (e.g.,
11 FAC 167: As an actual and foreseeable result, Plaintiffs have been deprived of
12 state and federal constitutional rights, damaged, and injured in a nature and amount to
13 be proven at trial.).
14
(3) Non-Speculative: The FAC also alleges these concrete injuries are related to
15 ongoing policies, habits, customs, enterprises, conspiracies and courses of conduct

16 likely to continue if not enjoined. The FAC alleges a continuing concerted course of
17 conduct to harass, interfere with, intimidate, harm, and retaliate for Plaintiffs
18 protected activities reiterated throughout the FAC as HARASSMENT AND ABUSE
19 (FAC 1194; See also Doc. No. 4 Ex Parte Application for Emergency Harassment
20 Restraining Order, COUNT 4); that Defendants have consistently denied the
21 existence of and refused to assert Plaintiffs Family Federal Rights in family court
22 proceedings (FAC 1198-99); deprived, injured, and punished Plaintiffs and the
23 class of U.S. Citizens similarly situated of the same (FAC 1199); asserted,
24 threatened to assert, and enforced laws and procedures against Plaintiffs which
25 Plaintiffs contend, and Defendants deny, are unconstitutional (FAC 1199, 1200);
26 STUART was and in fact remains intimidated, oppressed, fearful, and under duress
27 from GARSONs and Judge GROCHS illegal activity (FAC 452); STUART is
28 under an illegal DVILS order until May, 2015 and 2022 (FAC 444, 465, 1203).
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1 The FAC alleges standing as a class as Plaintiffs have experienced and are in fear of
2 further harassment, threats, and intimidation (FAC 1196); the DVILS today remain
3 a tool in widespread use, and daily form the basis of state family courts issuing illegal
4 and highly invasive DVILS ORDERS (FAC 965-68); STUART and
5 CALIFORNIA COALITION have been injured by and remain at jeopardy for
6 making complaints to the Commission on Judicial Performance (FAC 593-94, 599,
7 Count 5). These allegations establish a sufficient likelihood that they will again be
8 wronged in a similar way (Lujan, supra) and establish a pattern of enforcement of
9 illegal laws and virtual certainty they will be enforced again (Strankman, supra).
10
11
Association Standing
Plaintiffs also have standing as representatives of similarly-situated
12 individuals. Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 344
13 (1977). Such association standing exists when (a) its members would otherwise
14 have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are
15 germane to the organizations purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the
16 relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. Id.
17
California Coalition is an association of mothers, fathers, and children who
18 have withstood abundant hardship resulting from the current practices of . . . the
19 Family Law Community. These injuries and insults include fraudulent, inefficient,
20 harmful, and even dangerous services; an institutionalized culture of deliberate
21 indifference toindeed contempt forclearly-established liberties; insults to the
22 autonomy and dignity of parents and children; and extortion, robbery, and abuse
23 founded upon such illegal color of law crime, delivered at the hands of eager
24 institutional operators within the Family Law Community. (FAC 64). Plaintiffs
25 have organized to confront the State of Californias dispossession of law and reason
26 by engaging those within the Domestic Dispute Industry who administer the decay
27 family court judges. An astonishingly vast judicial administrative bureaucracy,
28 domestic dispute industry attorneys, psychologists, and other professionals whose
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1 nearly imperceptible deliberate indifference to the creeping deprivations of parental

2 rights is leaving the family cupboard nearly bare. FAC 69. Plaintiffs efforts on
3 behalf of parents and children have included increasing public and governmental
4 awareness of family rights, representing and supporting parents and children in
5 exercising and enforcing such rights, lobbying state and federal, policymakers to
6 improve protections for federal rights under state law, and undertaking litigation,
7 complaints, or other formal and informal engagements with state and federal
8 authorities to assert, exercise, communicate regarding, educate, inform, establish and
9 defend such rights with the goal of enabling parental autonomy and empowerment
10 through reform state of California domestic dispute laws, practices, and institutions.
11 (FAC 70).
12
Each mother, father, child, and member of each EQUAL PROTECTION
13 CLASS represented here would have standing to sue in their own right for
14 abundant wrongs committed against them by various defendants present. The
15 Prospective relief counts seek to protect interests germane to the organizations
16 purpose. No claims asserted requires the participation of individual members in the
17 lawsuit other than STUART.
18
19
III.
OTHER AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Defendants assert various affirmative defenses at the pleading stage.
20 Affirmative defenses may not be raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion unless based on a
21 non-controversial legal defense. Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir.
22 1984). None of Defendants affirmative defenses are stated on the face of the
23 complaint, and their extrinsic evidence is controversial. See Objections to RJN.
24 defenses here are non-controversial. The burden of pleading and proving any
25 affirmative defense rests with the defendant. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c). A defendant may
26 bring a Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on an affirmative defense in unusual
27 circumstances: where the face of the Complaint admits the defense. Graham v.
28 Taubman, 610 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.1979). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion asserting that the
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1 complaint admits a defense must show the defense is (i) definitively ascertainable
2 from the complaint and other allowable sources of information, and (ii) suffice to
3 establish the affirmative defense with certitude. Gray v. Evercore Restructuring
4 L.L.C., 544 F3d 320, 324 (1st Cir. 2008).
5 A. Domestic Relations Exception to Jurisdiction
DOYNE asserts this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the federal law
7 racketeering, unfair competition, and civil rights claims because of a domestic

8 relations exception, citing Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1968).
9 143-1, 5:16-6:7. DOYNE does not move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), but assets
10 simply that The burden of establishing federal court jurisdiction falls on the party
11 seeking to invoke jurisdiction citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America,
12 511 21 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). This form of jurisdictional challenge is procedurally
13 disordered, and may be denied for that reason alone.
This courts subject matter jurisdiction is firmly rooted through 28 U.S.C.
14
15 1331 (federal question) 1337 (regulation of interstate commerce), 2201 (declaratory

16 judgment) and 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). FAC 1. DOYNE is sued for his
17 fraudulent commercial transactions, extortion, abuse of process, and conspiring with
18 others to commit violence and oppression within this District. This Action does not
19 assert diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332. To assert an absence of
20 jurisdiction DOYNE must abide the procedural requirements, and his failure to do so
21 is grounds for denial alone. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006)
22 (drive-by jurisdictional rulings should be accorded no precedential effect).39
23
DOYNES attempted drive-by assertion of a domestic relations exception
24 is specious at best, and not supported even by the case he cites. In Beuchold v. Ortiz
25 the Court of Appeals declined to exercise diversity jurisdiction over a case behalf of a
26 German citizen against a citizen of California involving paternity and child support.
27
39
The Kokkonen case DOYNE cites is wildly inapposite, involving the issue of whether a
28 district court may assert jurisdiction over a settlement agreement entered into by parties to a prior
federal case who dismissed the original case voluntarily under Rule 41 (a)(1)(ii). Kokkonen at 378.

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1 This is not a diversity case, and plaintiffs do not assert any claims relating to paternity
2 or child support. Oddly, DOYNE claims there is no indication in Mr. STUART's
3 complaint as to why he cannot seek relief in the state court. DOYNE perhaps
4 omitted a glance at paragraph 1 of the FAC asserting exclusive federal question
5 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and substantive federal law. This matter is
6 brought under the constitution and laws of the United States. No Plaintiff asserts
7 state domestic law. Plaintiffs challenges the constitutionality of state policies and
8 laws are within this Courts Public Health and Welfare jurisdiction under Title 42.
9
The Domestic Relations Exception referred to by DOYNE is a narrow
10 exception to diversity jurisdiction which even our Supreme Court has doubted. In
11 Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 693 (1992) the Court defined the Domestic
12 Relations Exception to exist only within federal diversity jurisdiction under 28
13 U.S.C. 1332. Its inapplicability to federal question jurisdiction has been recently
14 confirmed in a case originating out of our neighboring Central District, Marshall v.
15 Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 305 (2006). This case does not rely on diversity jurisdiction.
16 B. Quasi-Judicial Immunity:
17
DOYNE asserts quasi-judicial immunity for his acts as a private mediator.
18 Doc. 143-1, 7:15-9:10. First, immunities are personal; entities are not entitled to
19 assert them. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997). Doyne, Inc. is thus not
20 protected. Second, because the controversial extrinsic evidence controverts the FAC
21 allegation that DOYNE was hired, not appointed, as a mediator, the motion may be
22 denied on that basis alone. See, Objections to Requests for Judicial Notice; Motion to
23 Conduct Early Discovery. DOYNE offers extrinsic evidence claiming he was court
24 appointed to act as a mediator in the Stuart Dissolution. Doc. No. 143-1, 7-17. The
25 assertion is based entirely on controversial extrinsic evidence that directly
26 contravenes DOYNES assertion as well as the FAC. See Objections to Request for
27 Judicial Notice. The FAC alleges WOHLFEIL recommended and offered to
28 oversee DOYNE, and that WOHLFEIL and BLANCHET made recommendations
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1 and referral to DOYNE. FAC 809-812. Further, the document DOYNE offers
2 via his Request for Judicial Notice (143-3) is not an order. See Objections to RJN.
3 The assertion of immunity may also be denied on each of those bases alone.
4
5
Doyne Ignores the Function Test

DOYNES reach for quasi-judicial immunity cites cases which have been
6 modernly synthesized into the function test initially articulated in Burns v. Reed,
7 500 U.S. 478, 498 (1991) and subsequently synthesized into the modern function
8 doctrine through Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 275 (1993), Kalina v.
9 Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997), and in our own District in Genzler v. Longanbach,
10 410 F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir. 2005).
11
These cases refute the immunity outcome DOYNE pursues here. Modernly
12 courts analyze immunity claims by distinguishing between judicial functions such

13 as ruling on motions, advocating at trial, and trial testimony, which are given absolute
14 immunity. Other functions such as investigative ministerial administrative or
15 otherwise are not absolutely immune even if related to a judicial function. The single
16 exception for out-of-court functions entitled to absolute immunity applies to criminal
17 prosecutors in activity that is intimately related to the criminal prosecution. See,
18 Imbler v. Pachtman, supra. Even for prosecutors, investigative, administrative,
19 ministerial, or other functions not in the form of advocacy during the criminal
20 prosecution are not entitled to absolute immunity. Genzler, 410 F.3d 630, 636 (9th
21 Cir. 2005).
22
The function test as applied to social workers was adopted in this Circuit in
23 the lead case DOYNE cites, Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 898-900 (9th Cir.
24 2003). Following the Burns v. Reed function analysis, the Court of Appeals
25 considered a claim by social workers in a court dependency proceeding to take
26 custody away from parents that they were entitled to an absolute immunity. Id. at
27 898. In the district court, the social workers asserted prosecutorial immunity in a
28 Rule 12 motion to dismiss. Id. at 894. The district court declined to grant or deny
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 the motion to dismiss the Rule 12 motion because it was not clear at the pleading
2 stage whether the social workers were performing prosecutorial or investigative
3 functions. The court granted leave to conduct limited discovery. The social workers
4 immediately appealed. The Court of Appeals agreed with the district courts
5 reasoning:
6
Here, the district court was obligated to examine the functions [defendant
social workers] Gammie and Zito performed; however, those functions were
unclear. Moreover, the defendants bear the burden of showing that their
respective common-law functional counterparts were absolutely immune. It
10
would appear that the critical decision to institute proceedings to make a child
11
a ward of the state is functionally similar to the prosecutorial institution of a
12
criminal proceeding. The decision, therefore, is likely entitled to absolute
13
immunity. It also may be that some submissions to the court by social workers
14
are functionally similar to the conduct recognized at common law to be
15
protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity. To the extent, however, that
16
social workers also make discretionary decisions and recommendations that are
17
not functionally similar to prosecutorial or judicial decisions, only qualified,
18
not absolute immunity, is available. Examples of such functions may include
19
decisions and recommendations as to the particular home where a child is to go
20
or as to the particular foster parents who are to provide care. On this record, we
21
cannot make that determination.
22 Miller at 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). The Court of Appeals
23 remanded to the district court to permit discovery on defendants functions. Miller v.
24 Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003).
25
DOYNES functions in this case are apparent from the FAC: He was hired as a
26 private mediatorhe had no authority to undertake any judicial, investigative, or

27 other potentially immune act. Unlike social workers in dependency proceedings in
28 which the state takes away custody from parents, mediators in a dissolution
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 proceeding do not advocate for the state, either party, or the child. Moreover, even
2 social workers appointed by a court or agency who function as prosecutors are only
3 entitled to immunity for prosecutorial, and not investigative acts. Genzler, supra.
4 DOYNE cannot establish immunity here because there is no state-advocacy role of
5 a prosecutor role to play in a dissolution. At best, appointed child custody evaluators
6 might function as police investigators eligible for a qualified immunity. See, e.g.,
7 Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 642 (9th Cir. 2005); Broam v. Bogan, 320
8 F.3d 1023, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003); Hoffman v. Harris, 511 U.S. 1060 (1994) (An
9 official seeking such immunity, however, must at the outset show that a counterpart
10 to the privilege he asserts was recognized at common law in 1871, for [w]here we
11 have found that a tradition of absolute immunity did not exist as of 1871, we have
12 refused to grant such immunity under 1983.). On the FAC or any set of facts,
13 DOYNE cannot achieve immunity here.
14
Evidence Code 730 Appointments: DOYNE references California Evidence
15 Code section 730 describing the functions of court-appointed 730 expert. (143-1,
16 9:4-10) yet makes no claim that he was in fact appointed pursuant to Evidence Code
17 section 730, because he was not.
18
Even so, DOYNEs claim that an appointment of an investigator under
19 California Evidence Code section 730 extends judicial immunity to an appointee is

20 preposterous. DOYNES assertion would mean that county judge could use an
21 Evidence Code provision to extend absolute immunity under the Constitution and
22 laws of the United States, to hoist not only psychologists, but also police, criminal
23 investigators, prison wardens, even social workers working at the feet of a county
24 judge to operate above United States law. Such a fantastic vision is uniquely
25 appealing perhaps to present defendants who nourish conflict among a childs blood
26 relations to inject a paid surrogate from the sciences of forensic child custody
27 evaluation into a familys affairs. To those not bestowed with such visions, the
28 suggestion would be reasonably received as treason.
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1
2
No Foundation for Immunity

Like GROCH, DOYNE must establish the scope of any authority he was
3 operating under, which is a question of fact. See Sec. II.B.1(b)-(e), supra. The FAC
4 alleges he has acted ultra vires under color of law, and thus cannot assert immunity
5 for violating STUARTS rights. California Const. Art. I sec. 26. Any officer who
6 acts in excess of his jurisdiction is operating off the reservation and is not protected
7 by any immunity. Butz v. Economou, 438 US 478, 519 (1978); Ex Parte Virginia,
8 supra. The FAC alleges that DOYNE violated STUARTS rights under the
9 California. As a color of law actor exercising authority in excess of his jurisdiction,
10 he was at all relevant times acting in coram non judice, and may not assert immunity,
11 but is strictly liable for any injuries he has caused. Manning v. Ketcham, 58 F.2d 948
12 (6th Cir. 1932); Restatement (Second) of Torts 162 (1965).
13
Finally, DOYNES crimes can never achieve immunity, nor can his violations
14 of due process and equal protection. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 348-349
15 (1880) (equal protection violations of a prosecutor not immune); U.S. v. Frega, 179
16 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1999) (judicial immunity no defense to racketeering); Imbler v.
17 Patchman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); 18 U.S.C. 241, 242. None of DOYNES acts are,
18 and God willing will never be, beyond the law of any state or nation. Marbury v.
19 Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803).
20
21
No Witness Immunity
Doyne cites Briscoe v. LaHue and Kurazawa, which concern witness
22 immunity. Doc. No. 143-1, 7-8. In both cases the witness performed work both
23 inside and outside of court, but the liability claims were focused on in-court
24 proceedings. Neither case immunizes non-testimonial investigative activity. Briscoe
25 at 342. While DOYNE certainly committed perjury, the civil rights claims against
26 him are not based on his perjury, but abundant other illegal behavior. Racketeering
27 claims under 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(A) and (B) or 1962 (d) are not subject to witness
28 immunity. E.g. RACKETEERING COUNTS 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10.
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1
2
No Mandatory Reporter Immunity

DOYNE asserts a California state law immunity for mandatory reporters
3 making negligent reports of suspected child abuse under California Penal Code
4 11172. He directs the immunity to paragraph 817 of the FAC, which alleges
5 numerous misrepresentations and wrongdoing by DOYNE in procuring mediation
6 services, billing, protracting a mediation in weekly sessions over months to generate
7 fees, conducing unauthorized activities beyond the contract, inserting himself into
8 non-custody issues to create conflict, failing to follow through with promises made in
9 the procurement of the mediation contract (FAC 814), and generally manipulating
10 the mediation process to increase hostilities, expand and extend the conflict, and
11 increase his fees. When STUART objected to this process and refused to pay for any
12 more sessions, DOYNE immediately filed a false report with CPS that STUART
13 held his son upside down over a balcony. These reports were determined to be
14 false, and DOYNE knew them to be false when he made them. FAC 821. The
15 claims against DOYNE are not for reporting activity, but commercial activity, fraud,
16 breach of contract, unfair business practices based on bribery and extortion, state
17 constitutional violations, and federal constitutional violations, and RICO (DOYNE
18 TERRORISM). DOYNE does not identify which claim he attacks, but none of the
19 claims in the FAC which are based on the DOYNE TERRORISM, including fraud,
20 extortion, assault, kidnapping and deprivation of rights in are vulnerable to a state law
21 defense against negligent reporting of child abuse. Immunity is not a defense to
22 crime. U.S. v. Frega, supra. DOYNE is also sued for false advertising (COUNT 15)
23 and prospective relief, to which no immunity can apply.
24
DOYNE asserts he is a mandatory reporter under Penal Code section
25 11165.7(21), which describes health care providers. He presumably relies on that

26 categorys inclusion of psychologist or therapist. Mediators are not identified as
27 mandatory reporters. The FAC does not assert DOYNE provided health care,
28 therapy, or counseling services. DOYNE is not entitled to immunity as a mandatory
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 reporter.
Further, state immunities are never a defense to liability for constitutional
3 violations. In Buckheit v. Dennis, 713 F. Supp. 2d 910, 925 (N.D. Cal. 2010) the
4 Northern District rejected the same argument DOYNE makes here, holding that
5 section 11172 does not shield a defendant from deprivation under section 1983.
6 C. California Tort Claims Act Defense
COUNTY, GORE, and CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS assert failure to
8 plead filing of state tort claims act claims. COUNTY Doc. No. 141-1, 2:25; CITY
9 ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS Doc. No. 151, 6:5-27. Timely claims were filed with
10 all Defendants. Plaintiffs hereby request leave to amend to plead this fact. Tolling
11 and estoppel principles relevant to statute of limitations analysis above also toll claim
12 filing deadlines such that all recently-filed claims are timely. Addison v. State of
13 California, 21 Cal. 3d 313, 321, 578 P.2d 941, 945 (1978).
14 D. State Constitutional Immunities Do Not Protect Ultra Vires Conduct
SIMI and BATTSON assert immunity under Article VI, 18(h) of the
15
16 California Constitution. Doc. No. 134, 3:1-15.40 For the same reasons that
17 Defendants criminal and ultra vires frolics are not protected by immunity under
18 federal law, they are not acts undertaken in the course of their official duties and
19 are thus not protected by the immunity granted by Article VI, 18(h). Recorder v.
20 Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 72 Cal. App. 4th 258 (1999); Vierria v. California
21 Highway Patrol, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1240 (E.D. Cal. 2009). Defendants complain
22 that the FAC fails to allege specific facts showing the conduct of Defendants was
23 outside the course of their official duties. Doc. No. 134, 3:15. This is untrue; the
24 FAC alleges ultra vires activity in all counts asserting violations of California
25 Constitution Art. I, sec., 26. Against BATTSON and SIMI these include the facts of
26 Count 5, Claims 5.1-5.6, and each claim dependent thereon.
27
28
40
BATTSON and SIMI raised the same argument in their initial motion, which
this Court denied. Doc. No. 88.
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 E. Noerr-Pennington Bars No Claim

2
Several Defendants represented by Mr. Grebing assert an identical Noerr-
3 Pennington defense. BLANCHET Doc. No. 146, 8:17-10:6; ALLIANCE Doc. No.
4 147 3:13-5; VIVIANO Doc. No. 148, 6:13-8:2. In so doing, Defendants advance the
5 proposition that uniform practices constituting coordinated extortion, fraud, violence,
6 and obstruction of justice inflicted on their own clients is necessary to protect their
7 ability to practice before family courts, and is therefore petitioning activity. This
8 admission that fraud and extortion is essential to their practices is insightful, and
9 certainly information Sharon Blanchet, Ashworth, Blanchet, Christenson, &
10 Kalemkiarian, LLP, Lori Clark Viviano, and Dr. Stephen Doyne of San Diego should
11 perhaps pass on to their clients seeking information or reviews of these attorneys
12 before being retained.
13
Defendants cite Sosa v. DIRECTV. Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 929 (9th Cir. 2006). In
14 Sosa, DIRECTV send pre-lawsuit demand letters to thousands of individuals who

15 owned descrambling boxes. DIRECTV believed the individuals were using the boxes
16 to illegally access DIRECTVs proprietary satellite television broadcasts. DIRECTV
17 asserted in the district court that pre-lawsuit demand letters was protected
18 petitioning under the First Amendments petition clause.
19
To fit the present Action within Noerr-Pennington, Defendants must establish
20 that the activity they are accused of is petitioning activity protected by the First
21 Amendment. Defendants fail to undertake this first stepbypassing any First
22 Amendment analysis, and moving on to describing the relationship between the
23 necessity for their illegal fraud and extortion on their own clients is to their ability to
24 practice family law before their co-defendants in this lawsuit. This failure alone is
25 sufficient grounds for denial.
26
But even a cursory review of the FAC reveals that it asserts acts that are not
27 protected speech: Commercial fraud in engaging expert witnesses, extortion in

28 secluding and enforcing the scheme, and violence against those who identify it upon
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 revelation. Such is not protected petitioning activity BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB,
2 536 U.S. 516 (2002), (emphasis added). Noerr-Pennington is a constitutional
3 doctrine, and its immunities can be no broader than the First Amendment on which it
4 is based. Extortion and robbery (Count 11, Racketeering Count 4), fraud (Count 11,
5 Racketeering Counts 1, 2), and defamation (Count 2) are not protected by the First
6 Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544, 183 L. Ed. 2d
7 574 (2012) (content-based restrictions on speech have been permitted, as a general
8 matter, only when confined to the few historic and traditional categories [of
9 expression] long familiar to the bar, Among these categories are . . . speech
10 integral to criminal conduct, . . . fraud, true threats. . .) (internal citations omitted).
11 Needless to sayor perhaps it is appropriate to remind some presentassault (Count
12 1), kidnapping (Racketeering Count 3), kidnapping, false imprisonment, and related
13 violence (Racketeering Counts 4, 5, 6) would exceed the behavior the Constitution
14 tolerates as expression. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116, (1972)
15 (Of course, where demonstrations turn violent, they lose their protected quality as
16 expression under the First Amendment.); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336
17 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (speech incident to criminal conduct); United States v. O'Brien,
18 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (regulation of non-expressive elements of expression
19 permitted). Moreover, even if purely expressive, the most protection afforded to the
20 fraudulent counsel accused in this case is that for commercial speech. See, e.g.,
21 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447
22 U.S. 557 (1980), which permits a balancing test nothing close to blanket petitioning
23 immunity sought by Defendants.
24
Finally, to the extent Defendants will insist that the Court of Appeal in Sosa
25 extended First Amendment protection to fraud and extortion crimes under the federal
26 criminal code, Defendants interpretation stands in conflict with Supreme Court
27 precedent spanning decades. See, e.g., Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
28 Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 F. California Civil Code 47 Litigation Privilege

2
Fritz asserts his actions are immunized under a state law litigation privilege
3 under California Civil Code section 47. FRITZ Doc. No. 138, 2:26-4:4. See also,
4 Nesthus litigation privilege attack, supra. Fritz is not sued under any state law or for
5 malpractice, but for federal law racketeering crimes and false advertising. FAC
6 907, 929 (DDICE), 931 (SD-DDICE), 940 (DDI-FICE), 944 (STUARTAHCE),
7 RACKETEERING COUNT 1 (mail fraud), 1019-1020, RACKETEERING
8 COUNT 2 (honest services fraud), RACKETEERING COUNT 4 (extortion) all
9 aiding and abetting and conspiracy RACKETEERING COUNTS 7-10. Californias
10 litigation privilege is not a defense to liability under federal law. Kimes v. Stone,
11 84 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1996) (Because the existence of 1983 immunities is a
12 matter of federal law, the district court erred in determining that the Attorney
13 Defendants were entitled to litigation immunity pursuant to Cal.Civ.Code 47(b)).
14 No privilege or immunity is a defense to racketeering. U.S. v. Frega, supra.
15 G. RICO Claims Do Not Depend on Duties to Third Parties
16
Fritz claims he cannot be liable for racketeering because he never owed a duty
17 to STUART and was STUARTs litigation adversary, citing California courts of

18 appeals cases involving attorney malpractice claims. Doc. No. 138, 4:6-27. RICO
19 does not depend on a duty of care, and may be asserted even against adversaries.
20 Where a defendants racketeeringincluding fraud on a third partycauses
21 foreseeable property loss to another, the injured party has standing to sue under
22 RICO. See Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 498 (2000); Bridge v. Phoenix Bond &
23 Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008). Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient foreseeable
24 property loss due to Defendants abundant malfeasance.
25 H. Personal Jurisdiction and Venue
26
ACFEI and OBlock attack on personal jurisdiction and improper venue
27 grounds. Doc. No. 137, 5:9-6:3. They cite Rules 12(b)(2) and (3), but no other law.
28
The FAC alleges venue under 28 U.S.C. 1391(b) as one or more Defendants
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 are located or reside in this District, and a substantial part of the events and omissions
2 giving rise to Plaintiffs Claims occurred in this District. Jurisdiction is appropriate
3 for the same reasons. The FAC alleges OBlock is the President of ACFEI. ACFEI
4 does business in this District as, in their words, the largest forensic science
5 membership association, forensics education, credentials, courses, training and
6 membership for forensics examiners. FAC 53, 54, 907, Ex. 43. They sell
7 memberships and distribute magazines into this District, train and certify forensic
8 examiners in forensic psychology, forensic mental health, forensic counseling
9 forensic accounting, forensic dentistry, forensic engineering and technological
10 discipline, forensic medicine, forensic nursing, forensic social workers, and
11 recorded evidence all within this District. FAC 909. They offer advanced
12 training and certifications in such disciplines, through a website accessible from this
13 District conducing commerce within this District. FAC 909. They are alleged do
14 have conspired with DOYNE and others through the Domestic Dispute Industry
15 Forensic Investigator Criminal Enterprise to commit and aid and abet fraud in their
16 advertising and sale of their own goods and services, and to facilitate the fraudulent
17 advertisement and sale of the goods and services of others including DOYNE in this
18 District. FAC 53-54, 907, 909, 929, 940, RACKETEERING COUNTS 7-10. If
19 necessary, Plaintiffs are capable of amending to add details regarding Mr. OBlocks
20 and ACFEIS abundant related business activities within this District, including their
21 certifications of numerous San Diego city and county employees.
22 I. California Coalitions Capacity to Sue
23
COUNTY argues California Coalition lacks capacity to sue because California
24 Coalition PBC was formed after certain of the injuries claimed were suffered. Doc.
25 No. 141-1. California Coalition, PBC is the successor in interest to Plaintiff
26 STUARTs former law firm, Lexevia, PC (FAC 103), the entity representing
27 California Coalition, Inc. and a number of parents in the DUE COURSE OF
28 JUSTICE and at the STUART ASSAULT. FAC 101, 102, Ex. 24. It is also a
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1 successor-in-interest to California Coalition, Inc. which, due entirely to the criminal

2 anticompetitive and racketeering behavior of Defendants alleged herein, and illegal
3 imprisonment of its President, Plaintiff Colbern Stuart, was inoperative until revived
4 upon Stuarts release from illegal imprisonment by the COUNTY on May 14, 2013.
5 STUART promptly revived the corporation by forming and merging California
6 Coalitions meager existence with a new public benefit entity, and asserts its standing
7 herein. See also, National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249
8 (1994) (womens civil rights organization has standing to assert injuries to class of
9 abortion clinics and women seeking abortion).
10
California Coalition and the hundreds of thousands of families and children it
11 speaks for today and for years prior have abundant reason and legal status to explain
12 to a jury in this courthouse how defendants collectively operate a despicable crime
13 ring under color of law, comprised of evil hearts guided by deviant minds depriving
14 millions of American families of their health, independence, livelihoods, and their
15 childrens futures. Defendants day of reckoning to the victims of their heinous
16 predation must, and will soon come.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
1
2
3
4
5
6
CONCLUSION
The claims of the First Amended Complaint are pled fully compliant with the Rules
of Civil Procedure. Defendants attack fails to carry the heavy analytical burden at
this stage of identifying implausible claims and provided more plausible innocent
alternatives. Plaintiffs proffer a present ability to amend to cure any defects, and
respectfully request leave to do so.
Respectfully Submitted:
8
9
10
DATED: May 16, 2014
By: /s/
Colbern C. Stuart III
Colbern C. Stuart, III, President,

California Coalition for Families and
Children, PBC
in Pro Se
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
DATED: May 16, 2014
By: /s/__________________________
Dean Browning Webb
Dean Browning Webb, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff, California
Coaliton for Families and Children, PBC
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1
2
3
4
5
6
The undersigned hereby certifies that all counsel of record who are deemed to have
consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this document via the
court's CM-ECF system per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b )(2)(E). Any other
counsel of record will be served by facsimile transmission and/or first class mail this
16th day of May, 2014.
7
By: /s/
8
9
10
11
Colbern C. Stuart III
Colbern C. Stuart, III, President,

California Coalition for Families and
Children, PBC
in Pro Se
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

161 Oppo To Omnibus & Joinders

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Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 161 Filed 05/16/14 Page 1 of 184

1 Colbern C. Stuart III

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CALIFORNIA COALITION FOR

Case No. 13-cv-1944-CAB (BLM)

18 SAN DIEGO COUNTY BAR

Complaint Filed: August 20, 2013

OPPO. TO OMNIBUS MTN TO DISMISS

Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 161 Filed 05/16/14 Page 2 of 184

II. Superior Court Motion to dismiss ........................................................................ 2

Commission Motion To Dismiss....................................................................... 4

Other Defendants Motions, Extensions............................................................. 4

V. December 19, 2013 hearing .................................................................................. 5

A. Rule 41(b) Sanction is Frivolous ....................................................................... 7

B. Statutes Of Limitations Bar No Claim ............................................................ 28

C. Rooker-Feldman Bars No Claim ..................................................................... 44

E. Color of Law Authority ................................................................................... 67

F. Lanham Act ..................................................................................................... 83

II. ATTACKS BY COUNT .................................................................................. 110

A. Count 2 (State Law Claims) .......................................................................... 110

B. Count 3 (Malicious Prosecution)................................................................... 111

D. Count 6 (Supervisory Liability) .................................................................... 121

E. Count 7 (Municipal Liability) ....................................................................... 127

F. Count 8 (Respondeat Superior) ..................................................................... 131

Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 161 Filed 05/16/14 Page 3 of 184

I. Counts 11, 12, 14, 15 (Doyne Terrorism): .................................................... 142

J. California Constitution Article I, sec. 26 Claims .......................................... 145

K. Prospective Relief Counts ............................................................................. 146

OTHER AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES ......................................................... 150

A. Domestic Relations Exception to Jurisdiction ........................................... 151

B. Quasi-Judicial Immunity: .............................................................................. 152

C. California Tort Claims Act Defense.............................................................. 158

E. Noerr-Pennington Bars No Claim................................................................. 159

G. RICO Claims Do Not Depend on Duties to Third Parties ............................ 161

H. Personal Jurisdiction and Venue ................................................................... 161

I. California Coalitions Capacity to Sue.......................................................... 162

16 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 164

Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 161 Filed 05/16/14 Page 4 of 184

9 Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 693 (1992) ................................................. 152

14 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664, (2009) ...............................................10 et passim

Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 161 Filed 05/16/14 Page 5 of 184

Cir. 1990). ................................................................................................................ 33

288 (2001) ..........................................................................................................68, 72

1956). ..................................................................................................................... 136

Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 161 Filed 05/16/14 Page 6 of 184

(2001). .................................................................................................................... 100

242, 247 (9th Cir.1990) ............................................................................................ 22

Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 161 Filed 05/16/14 Page 7 of 184

2013 WL 6185175 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2013) ......................................................... 22

2 Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank, A.G., 2006 WL 4749756 **4041 (C.D.Cal.2006) .. 41

Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 161 Filed 05/16/14 Page 8 of 184

398, 402 (1986) ........................................................................................................ 44

Cal. 1984) .................................................................................................50 et passim

13 Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (1974)................................................................ 114

P.3d 1151 (2007) ................................................................................................36, 38

17 Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 39697 (1957) ........................................ 31

Cir. 1984) ................................................................................................................. 93

Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 161 Filed 05/16/14 Page 9 of 184

1 Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir.1997) ............................................ 81

LEXIS 74100 at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 29, 2012) ........................................................ 54

24 Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997) ................................................................... 153

Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 161 Filed 05/16/14 Page 10 of 184