SreWARr SHAPIRO, Taking abowt mathemat:s. The phlosophy of mathematics. Ox- ford Universty Press, Oxford and New York 204, xi + 308 pp. Stowart Shepno hes written @ very good, very useil textbook on the philosophy of reathematcs. The bock is also sorely needed, for while there are a few texthook.style overviews ofthe philosophy of mathematics inthe literature, they ae ll badly out of cate ‘What is good about Shapir’s beok i that (i) a large chunk of the book (about a third) is dedicated to bringing the reader upto date on contemporary work inthe philosophy of ‘mathematics, end (i it takes the old logisn+-formalism-atultionism debate for what it was, ‘namely sa historical episode, and no! as somehow capturing the three main views that one right endorse bout mathematics, To most contemporary writes, ll thre of those views are mistaken (though, of course, there are still some contemporary advocates, and Shapiro covers them). I seems to me that there was something ofa divide in tbe middle of 2th- century pilosoply of mathematics: there were very few sigifcaat works published on the ‘melapipsics and pistimology ofmathematics between 191, the yea that Cury (ceri an ldschocler) published kis book on formalism, and 1968, the year that Benacerraf published the frst of the two famous papers that, in my view ushered in the contemporary era in the piilosopty of mathematics. The latter era is now a significant nelectul episode in its wn Tight, and itis about time we had a book that provided z survey of this eisode. Shapito’s book des tis and doesit wel ‘The book is divide into four parts. Per [provides some background for the rest ofthe book. Snaito begin by discussizg the question of whether the philosophy of mathematics ought to dictate how mathematics showls be praciced or account for ow i practiced: he points cut thatthe ater view is sandard today. Then ke disousses the notions of necessity and a priority, and decries the three main ontologeal views about mathematics (realism, ‘idealism, and pominalisn). Next, Shapto discusses what be callealism-n-iruh-alue, “the view that mathematical statements have objective truth-alucs, independent of the minds, languages, conventions, and so on of mathematicians” (p. 29). (Shapiro claims that some ontologeal ante-realists. eg. Field and te intuitionists are also anterelistsin-trathaaive but that others, eg. Chiara and Hellman, are reaistsin-truth-valuz One might question this characterization of Fed: Shapzo pois ou that for Field, mathematical statements hove oaly vacuous truth values but Field thinks that for example. 3s prime’ is objectively false, ie, alse independently of ws, becawe of te natare ofthe werld. Tt seems tome that theres sensein which Field view is more realist than Chikar’s or Hellman, semantically speaking. because unlte them he safece abut about the truth conditions of mathematical Statements.) AN this, Shapiro Gscusses the problem ofthe applicability of mathematics snd ten heeadsPartTby runing though soa ofthe particular mathematical propositions tat philosophers have beea especialy interested in, for example the LEneaheim Skolem ‘theorem. the continuum hypothesis, andthe incompleteness theorem, Part If begins the historical surey ofthe plilosopy of mathematics, In particular, it covers Pato, Arsote, Kant. and MilL The section on Kant i partcalarly good, Anyone wo hs ever tried to summarize Kant pilosophy of mashemates knows how ificlitcan ‘betopin this iew down. Shapiro does anexcllent ob of pulling the various strands together He alo docs a good job making Mills view seem more plausble than itis sometimes made to seem. For example, Shapiro points out that Mil has responses to several the stndard Fregean arguments against his view rts about logicism, formalism. and intticnism. Within the logit carp, Shapira covers Frege, Russell, Carnap, and the contemporary neo-logiciss. Wright and Hale. In coanecifon with formalism, be begins with the views that Frege attacked, namely, those of Heine ard Thomas, which, as Shapiro poias ou, both coatain elements of erm formalism sndgame formalism: Shapiro tea diseustes th ery Hilber'sdeductvim, telatr Hilber’s fiitsm (and the Hiert program). and Curry/smetamathematical version of formalisms (In2 addition to these, I would have liked to see a discussion here of the carly Puinam, who ise more contemporary advocate of deductivism,) As for intuitionism, Shapiro covers Brouwer, Heyting, and Dummett. Overal, Shapiro's treatment of al these philosophers is excellent. (One thing | vould have liked included in Part I] isa discussion ofthe strangeness of the very Tact that chese three views were cnce thought of as opponents and, indeed, th ony “tive options” in the philosophy of mathematics. In fac, the three views here are all compatible ‘with one anotherthey are not even answers to the same question and as subsequent work his shown, they do not come close to exkausting all of the viable philosophies of ‘mathematics. Indeed it seems to me that formalism isthe only one of ther that even counts az fal-biown philosophy of mathematics, for its the only one that providesaasemantics and ‘ontology for mathematics. Logicism and intutionism were historically aligned with ceriain semantic and ontological views, but this is not central to those views the one is 2 thesis bout the logical relationship between mathematics and logic. and the others thesis sbout the cogency of certain kinds of mathematical proofs—and what is more it seems to me that Doth of them can, with justas much plausiilty, be aligned with radially different semantic ‘and ontological views.) Finally, Part [V covers contempomry views. It focuses, as it should, on views about the semantics end ontology of mathematis, in particular, on the question of whether or not ‘mathematical realism i true. On the reais side ofthe debate, Shapiro discusses the views of Godel. Quine, and the early Maddy. On the anti-tealst side, he covers the views of Field, Chihara, Burgess and Rosen, Azzouni, and myself He then ends with a chapter on structuralism, covering the views of Benacerraf, Hellman, Resnik. and himself Tam not s0 sure that tructuralism really deserves to be singled out in this way; if I were organizing a book like this, I would include Resrik-Shapito ante rem structuralism with the other ‘contemporary realist views. and I would include Hellman's modal structuralism with the other contemporary anti-realist views. But ofcourse, this s Shapiro's book, not mine, and ic isunderstandable that he thinks that structuraism deserves a bit more space. For the most part. Shapiro’ discussions of the various contemporary views are accurate and very good. IFT have any complaint at all here itis that [think be might have devoted bit ‘more space, inthe chapter on realism, to bringing out the different varieties of post-Gade!- ‘Quine ontological realism that have emerged in recent years, and perhaps more important, to the different ways in which realiss have tried to answer the Benacerrafian epistemological challenge. Shapiro says quite abit on this topic in various places in the book for example, in the chapter on structuralism, he discusses the ontology and epistemology of (his and Resnik’) ance rem structural, and in the chapter on anti-realism. he describes my own work on the ontology and epistemology ofrealism—but I think it would have been nice for the reader to see the various contemporary relist views brought together. Tn sum, Shepiro has written an excellent book. It will be most useful, | think, 28 @ secondary source for (graduate and undergraduate) students in philosophy of mathematics ‘courses: and for graduate students and professional philosophers who do not know much about the philosophy of mathematics but want to be introduced to the area (anyone with a half-way decent philosophical background should be able to follow the book); and for professional philosophers ef mathematies, who can Us the text as a quick (but, of cours, ‘ncompleta) source book onthe views of tae various figures that Shapiro covers Mask Batacues Department of Philosophy. California State University. Los Angeles. Los Angeles. CA 90032, USA. mbalagu@exchange calstatela.edu.