1800 K Street, NW

Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006
Phone: 1.202.775.3270
Fax: 1.202.775.3199
Email:
acordesman@gmail.com
Web:
www.csis.org/burke/reports

Analyzing the Impact of Preventive

Strikes Against Irans Nuclear
Facilities
AnthonyH.Cordesman,
Arleigh A.BurkeChairinStrategy
and
Abdullah Toukan

Rev: September 10th,

2012
www.csis.org |

ThisreportisbasedonaseriesofreportsbyDr.AnthonyCordesmanonIran,
publishedbytheBurkeChair,CSIS.Theycanbefoundat:

IranandtheGulfMilitaryBalance PartOne:ConventionalandAsymmetricForces,available
ontheCSISwebsiteathttp://csis.org/publication/reassessinggulfmilitarybalancepartone
conventionalandasymmetricforces.

IranandtheGulfMilitaryBalanceII:TheMissileandNuclearDimensions,availableonthe
CSISwebsiteathttp://csis.org/publication/iranandgulfmilitarybalanceiimissileand
nucleardimensions.

ProfessorAnthonyH.Cordesmancanbereachedatacordesman@gmail.com
Dr.AbdullahToukancanbecontactedat:abdullah.toukan@sagracenter.org
StrategicAnalysisandGlobalRiskAssessment(SAGRA)Center
AbuDhabi
UAE

9/10/2012

Page
ExecutiveSummary

USPerceptionoftheIranianThreat

10

TheMilitaryOptiontoDealwithIransNuclearProgram

15

IllustrativeU.S.PreventiveMilitaryStrikes

18

CounteringIransAirDefense

29

GCCvsIranAirforceComparison

33

IransMissileForce

44

U.S.&GCC DefenseagainstIranianBallisticMissiles

56

CounteringIranianattacksontheStraitsofHormuz

64

MilitaryStrike Israel:ScenarioI

81

MilitaryStrike Israel:ScenarioII

89

USSimulationResultsontheConsequencesofanIsraeliStrike

92

Appendix

95

ExecutiveSummary

ExecutiveSummary

Overthepastcoupleofmonths,speculationaboutaU.S.orIsraelistrikeonIransnuclearfacilitieshas
madeheadlinesaroundtheglobe.ThisreportaddresseshowtheU.S.couldtaketheleadincarryingout
apreventiveMilitaryStrikeagainstIranIfallpeacefuloptionshavebeenexhaustedandIranhasleftno
othermeanstoconvinceittostoporchangeitscourseinpursuingnuclearweapons.Italsoexamines
howtheUScouldprovideadefenseumbrellaagainstanyIranianairandmissileretaliationthatwouldbe
aimedatU.S.militarytargetsandalliesintheregion,inparticulartheGCCstates.

Akeyquestionarisesiswhatshouldtheobjectivesofamilitarystrikebe?TohalttheIraniannuclear
program?Tosetitbackfiveyearsorforoneyear?Thiscriteriaisthekeytodefiningtheforceallocation
requiredtoachieveasuccessfulmissionagainstIransnuclearfacilities.

ThestudyshowsthattheinitialstrikeshouldbeagainstkeyIraniannuclearenrichmentandresearch
facilities,ballisticmissilebasislocatedaroundthecountry,numerousmobileballisticmissilelaunchers
dispersedaroundIranandmainballisticmissileproductionfacilities.Atthesametime,itshowsthatthe
payloadsrequiredtohitundergroundenrichmentfacilitieswithahighlevelofdamage,tocarryoutthe
scaleofinitialandfollowupattacks,andprovidingresourcessuchasnearrealtimeintelligencerequired
todetectanddestroyotherpotentiallylethalIranianmilitaryweapons,forinstanceballisticmissilesthat
couldbeusedinaretaliation,canonlybecarriedoutbytheUnitedStates.

AninitialU.S.strikewillrequirealargeforceallocationconsistingofDefensiveCounterairandOffensive
CounterairOperations,suchasthemainBomberForce,theSuppressionofEnemyAirDefenseSystem,
EscortaircraftfortheprotectionoftheBombers,ElectronicWarfarefordetectionandjammingpurposes,
FighterSweepandCombatAirPatroltocounteranyairretaliationbyIran.

Whilesuchfirststrikewilltrytobeaseffectiveaspossible,theU.S.wouldbetheonlycountrythathasthe
airpower,supportcapability,andmixofseaairforcesintheGulftocontinueasustainedcampaignover
aperiodoftimeandrestrikeafteraninitialbattledamageassessmentitisfoundthatfurtherstrike
sortiesarerequired.

Severalotherkeypointsaremadeintheanalysis:

TheagingIranianairforcewilldefinitelybenomatchagainsttheU.S.andeventheGCCairforces.Inadditionthe
IranianAirDefensesystemsdonothavetheCommandControlCommunicationsandIntelligencerequiredto
detect,trackandshootdowntheUSadvancedmilitarycombataircraft.HoweverU.S.plannerswilldefinitely
takealloperationalplanningprecautionsnecessarytoensurethatboththeIranianAirforceandAirDefense
systemareineffectiveandallU.S.combataircrafthaveahighprobabilityofsurvivalthroughout.

U.S.officialsareworkingwithalliesintheGulftodevelopthecapabilitytodefeatthethreatIranposestothe
Gulf,alliedterritory,andtheflowoftradeandenergyexportsGCCcountriesworrythatduringacrisis,Irancould
trytopreventtheirshipsfromtraversingtheStraitofHormuz,cuttingofftheiroilexportbusiness.

TheonlyeffectivecounterstrikecapabilityIranhasotherthanasymmetricwarfareintheGulf,andtheuseof
proxieslikeHezbollah,istheirBallisticMissileForce.Amassiveretaliationstrikewithwhateverlaunchingsites
thathavesurvivedtheU.S.firststrikecouldstillcausequiteaconsiderabledamagetotheGCCstates,inenergy,
financeandvariousothercriticalinfrastructurecenters.

TheU.S.iscurrentlyinvolvedinbuildingaDefensiveShieldagainstamassiveIranianBallisticMissileattack
targetedattheGCCstates.ThedefensiveshieldconsistsofaMultiTierBallisticMissileDefenseSystem
consistingofTerminalHighAltitudeAirDefense(THAAD)andPatriotAdvancedCapability,PAC3,missile
systemssupportedwiththemostadvancedRadarandCommandandControlfacilities.

Ballisticmissiledefense(BMD)systemshavebeenprovidedtoKuwait,theUnitedArabEmirates,Qatarand
Oman,aswellasstationingAegisequippedwarshipsinthewatersoftheArabianGulf.TheU.S.hasbeen
developinganintegratedearlywarningradarsystemacrosstheGCCstatesthatcouldhelpU.S.andGCCforces
toquicklyrespondtoanIranianmissileattack.

IsraeldoesnothavethecapabilitytocarryoutpreventivestrikesthatcoulddomorethandelayIranseffortsfor
ayearortwo.

Finally,thefactthatUShasthecapabilitytocarryoutpreventivestrikesdoesnotmeanitshouldnotseekto
negotiateanendtothethreateningaspectsofIransnuclearprograms.Thebriefshowsjusthowdangerousany
warintheGulfcouldbetotheworldseconomy althoughIranismorevulnerablethananyofitsSouthernGulf
neighbors.

TheU.S.alsoneedsitsGulfalliesaskeypartnersandmustconsiderthelawofunintendedconsequences.
Preventivemilitarystrikescouldpushthepresentlyvolatilemiddleeastregionintoawarwithfarreaching
globalpolitical,military,andeconomicconsequences.

USPreventiveMilitaryStrikeagainstIranianNuclearFacilitiesandBallisticMissileBases
BallisticMissileBases
NuclearFacilities
5MainNuclearFacilities
8BallisticMissileBases
15BallisticMissileProductionFacilities

Tabriz
Panchin

Bakhtaran

Iraq

Fordow
ImamAli

Arak

SemnanSpace&
MissileCenter

Mashhad
Airbase

Natanz

Esfahan

SaudiArabia

Kuwait

B2
Bombers
StrikeForce

Iran

CombatAircraftStrikeForcecouldbe
F18sofftheU.S.5th fleet,andF15E
launchedfromForwardAreaBases.
TheCombatAircraftcanalsoperform
allOffensiveCounterairOperations:
FighterSweep,SEAD(suppressionof
EnemyAirDefense),Interdictionand
Escort.
B2MissionPayloadistheB57A/B
MissionOrdnancePenetrator(MOP).

Combat
Aircraft
StrikeForce

Bandar
Abbas

Qatar

AbuMusa
Island

UAE

Kuhestak

Google
(LocationofFacilitiessource:NTI)

TwoTierTheaterBallisticMissileDefense(TBMD) THAAD&PAC3
EndoandExoAtmosphericEngagementsusing
ShootLookShoot&HittoKill
UpperTier
1st Intercept

Needtodestroyasmany
MissileLaunchersas
possible,preboostphase,
inordertoreducenumber
ofincomingwarheads.

UpperTier
2ndIntercept

MidCoursePhase

ShootLookShoot

IRAN
LowerTier
1st Intercept

MissileLaunch

ShootLookShoot

LowerTier
2nd Intercept

Qatar

THAADLauncher
PAC3Launcher

ArabianGulf
UAE

Qatar:MissileEarly
WarningRadar

TBMDSystem
SaudiArabia

Defense against

THAAD :UAE

SRBMs(<1000 km)andMRBMs(1000 3000km)

PAC3:UAE,Kuwait,
SaudiArabia

SRBMs(300 1000km)

USPerceptionsoftheIranianThreat

TheMilitaryPowerofIran:TheOfficialUSView
AnnualReportonMilitaryPowerofIran ReportbyU.S.DefenseSecretaryLeonPanetta,June2012
IranianGrandStrategy,SecurityStrategy,andMilitaryStrategy

TherehasbeennochangetoIran'sstrategiesoverthepastyear.Iran's grandstrategyremainschallengingU.S.
influencewhiledevelopingits domesticcapabilitiestobecomethedominantpowerintheMiddleEast. Iran's
securitystrategyremainsfocusedondeterringanattack,andit continuestosupportgovernmentsandgroups
thatopposeU,S.interests. Diplomacy,economicleverage,andactivesponsorshipofterroristandinsurgent
groups,suchasLebaneseHizballah,IraqiShiagroups,andthe Taliban,aretoolsIranusestoincreaseits
regionalpower.Iran's principlesofmilitarystrategyremaindeterrence,asymmetricalretaliation, andattrition
warfare.

IranseekstoincreaseitsstaturebycounteringU.S.influenceand expandingtieswithregionalactorswhile
advocatingIslamicsolidarity. Iranalsodesirestoexpandeconomicandsecurityagreementswithothernations,
particularlymembersoftheNonalignedMovementinLatinAmericaandAfrica.

WiththeadventoftheArabSpringin2011,Iransawopportunitiestoincreaseitsinfluencebysupporting
groupsopposedtoregimesinpower,particularlythoseperceivedtosupportU.S.interests.Iranpublicizedits
beliefthatthesepopular,democraticuprisingswereinspiredbyitsown1979IslamicRevolution.

Source:AnnualReportonMilitaryPowerofIranApril2012,FullUpdateJune29.ReportbyU.S.DefenseSecretaryLeonPanettaforfourcongressional
defensecommitteestocomplywithafiscal2010directivetoprovideanannualclassifiedandunclassifiedassessmentofIransmilitarypower.]
http://media.bloomberg.com/bb/avfile/rNnp87SL4Ew8
[ProvidedbyBloombergNews:

OutsidetheMiddleEastIran'seffortstoexpandpolitical,economic,andsecuritytieswitharangeof
countriesdemonstrateTehran'sdesiretooffsetsanctionsanddiplomaticisolation.Irancontinuestousea
multiprongedstrategyinIraq,includingengagementwithleadersacrossthepoliticalspectrum,outreachto
theIraqipopulace,andcontinuedsupporttoIraqiShiamilitantsandterrorists,suchasKataibHizballah,Asaib
AhlalHaq,andthePromisedDayBrigade,inthewakeoftheU.S.militarywithdrawal.Iranprovidesmoney,
weapons,training,andstrategicandoperationalguidancetoShiamilitiasandterroristgroupstoprotectand
preserveIran'ssecurityinterests,includingthreateningtheresidualU.Spresence.Inadditiontoproviding
armsandsupport,theIslamicRevolutionaryGuardCorpsQodsForce(IRGCQF).isresponsiblefortraining
IraqimilitantsandterroristsinIran,sometimesusingLebaneseHizballah
instructors.

IrancontinuestoinfluenceeventsinAfghanistanthroughamultifacetedapproach,includingsupportforthe
Karzaigovernmentwhilealsosupportingvariousinsurgentgroups.TehranmaintainstieswithAfghanleaders
acrossthepoliticalspectrumandcontinuestobeinvolvedinanumberofhumanitarian,economic,and
culturaloutreachactivitiesamongtheAfghanpopulace.AlthoughTehran'ssupporttotheTalibanis
inconsistentwiththeirhistoricenmity,itcomplementsIran'sstrategyofbackingmanygroupstomaximizeits
influencewhilealsounderminingU.S.andNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)objectivesbyfomenting
violence.

IranhasbeeninvolvedinLebanonsincetheearlydaysoftheIslamicRepublic,especiallyseekingtoexpand
tieswiththecountryslargeShia]population.TheIRGCQFcontinuestoprovidemoney,weapons,training,
andlogisticsupporttoLebaneseHizballahandviewstheorganizationasakeytoolinitseffortstopressure
Israel.

SincethebeginningoftheSyrianunrest,IranhassupportedPresidentBasharalAsadwhiledownplayingthe
depthofthissupportinpublic.Iran'ssupporttotheAsadregimehasincludedmilitaryequipmentand
communicationsassistance.IranprobablyhasprovidedmilitarytrainerstoadviseSyriansecurityforces.

Iran'sConventionalForces

Iran'sconventionalmilitarycapabilitiescontinuetoimprove,Navalforcesareaddingnewshipsand
submarineswhileexpandingbasesontheGulfofOman,thePersianGulf,andtheCaspianSea.In
addition,Irancontinuestoexpandthebreadthofitsnavaloperations.Irandeploysnavalshipsintothe
GulfofAdenandArabianSeaforcounterpiracyoperationsandin2011
andearly2012deployedtwoseparatesurfacegroupstotheMediterranean.

Inearly2012,theIslamicRevolutionaryGuardCorpsGroundResistanceForces(IRGCGRF)conducteda
seriesofexercisesinnortheasternandcentralIran.Theexercises,MARTYRSOFUNITYinthenortheast
andSUPPORTERSOFVELAYATandVALFAJRincentralIran,werethefirstsignificantexercises conducted
bytheIRGCGRFsinceitsreorganizationin2008.Thethreeexercisesconsistedofcombinedarms
maneuversandweremeanttoshowthe!RGCGRF'soffensiveanddefensivecapabilitieswhileoffering
limitedtrainingvaluefortheparticipatingunits.

Iran'sUnconventionalForcesandRelatedActivities

ThroughtheIRGCQF,IranprovidesmaterialsupporttoterroristormilitantgroupssuchasHAMAS,
LebaneseHizballah,thePalestinianIslamicJihad,theTaliban,andIraqiShiagroups.

InclosecooperationwithSyria,IranhasprovidedLebaneseHizballahwithincreasinglysophisticated
weapons,includingawidearrayofmissilesandrocketsthatallowHizballahtolaunchweaponsfrom
deeperinLebanonortostrikeIsrael.WejudgethattheIranianmilitarytrainsHizballahandPalestinian
extremistgroupsatcampsthroughouttheregion.
IranprovidesfundingandpossiblyweaponstoHAMASandotherPalestinian
terroristsintheGazaStrip.

IranianCapabilitiesRelatedtoNuclearandMissileForces

Iranisdevelopingarangeoftechnicalcapabilitiesthatcouldbeappliedtotheproductionofnuclearweaponsif
thedecisionismadetodoso.ItcontinuestoprogresswithitsuraniumenrichmentatNatanzandthenewly
operationalQom'EnrichmentFacilitydespiteUNSecurityCouncilsanctions,TheInternationalAtomicEnergy
Agency's(IAEAs)November2011reportonIranprovidedextensiveevidenceofpastandpossiblyongoingIranian
nuclearweapons relatedresearchanddevelopmentwork.Iranhasrefusedtoaddressthisevidenceanddenied
repeatedIAEArequestsforaccesstodocuments,personnel,andfacilities.

AttheNatanzUndergroundFuelEnrichmentPlant,asofFebruary2012,Iranwasproducing3.5percentlow
enricheduraniumhexafluoride(LEUF6)withabout8,800ofthe9,150installedIR1lcentrifuges.AttheNatanz
AbovegroundPilotFuelEnrichmentPlant,Iranwasproducing20percentLEUF6withoneinterconnectedcascade
pair(328centrifuges).About6,200emptyIR1centrifugecasingswereinstalledinthatfacility.AttheQom
EnrichmentFacility(akatheFordowFuelEnrichmentPlant),Iranwasproducing2OpercentLEUF6withtwopairs
ofinterconnectedcascades(about700IR1centrifuges).Iranhadfilledtheremainderofthefacilityscentrifuge
capacitywith2,100emptyIR1centrifugecasings.Irandeclaredtheentirefacilitywouldbeusedforproducing
LEUF6,abandoningpreviousplanstoconductcentrifugeresearchanddevelopmentthere.

IrancontinuedconstructionattheheavywaterIranNuclearResearchReactor(IR40)atKhondabinviolationof
UNresolutions.

RegularIranianballisticmissiletrainingcontinuesthroughoutthecountry.

Irancontinuestodevelopballisticmissilesthatcanrangeregionaladversaries,Israel,andEasternEurope,
includinganextendedrangevariantoftheShahab3anda2,0OOkmmediumrangeballisticmissile,theAshura.
Beyondsteadygrowthinitsmissileandrocketinventories,Iranhasboostedthelethalityandeffectivenessof
existingsystemswithaccuracyimprovementsandnewsubmunitionpayloads.Iransmissileforceconsistschiefly
ofmobilemissilelaunchersthatarenottetheredtospecific physicallaunchpositions.Iranmaybetechnically
capableofflighttestinganintercontinentalballisticmissileby2015.

TheMilitaryOptiontoDealwith
IransNuclearProgram

USExtendedDeterrenceagainsttheproliferationofWMDandtheirdeliverysystems.
TheU.S.seesIranwithitsballisticmissilesandpotentialofdevelopinganuclearweaponisadirectthreatto
theGCCandalsoposesathreattoallfriendsandalliesintheMiddleeastregion.
IranhasignoredU.S.warnings andhaspressedaheadwithitsuraniumenrichmentprogramandhasrecently
announcedthatitisselfsufficientinnucleartechnology.Iranclaimsthatitcandomesticallyproduceits
ownrawuraniumforenrichment.
TheU.S.administrationhasstatedthatthefullrangeofU.S.militarycapabilityinbothconventionaland
unconventionalweaponswillbeavailableandreadytobecommittedtodefendingitsalliesandfriends
againstanythreat.TheU.S.hasstartedimplementingastrategytoinfluencethedecisionmakingbodiesin
IranastothedevastatingconsequencesiftheGCC,andanyotheralliesareattackedorthreatened.
CitingtheIranianthreat,theObamaadministrationshiftedfromtheBushadministrationsplanstoplace
missiledefensesitesinPolandandradarintheCzechRepublictoanapproachthatwouldinfourphasesplace
closertoIransomeAegisclassNavymissiledefensevessels,groundradarandeventuallyland basedNavy
StandardMissile3interceptors
Shoulddeterrencefail,theU.S.willhavealreadyprovidedtheGCCcountrieswithBallisticMissileDefense
Systems whichhavealltheEarlyWarningandCommandControlfacilities.Thiswilllimitthedamageshould
theybeattacked,andtoenhancetheconventionaldeterrencecapabilityoftheGCC.Inadditionproviding
moderntechnologycombataircraftthatcanbelaunchedwithinaveryshortwindowoftimetoblockanyfirst
attackwaveandtohavethecapabilitytomovethewarintoenemyterritory,intheshortesttimeperiod,
usingbothDefensiveandOffensiveCounterairMissions.

Ballisticmissiledefense(BMD)systemshavebeenprovidedtofourcountriesontheArabianPeninsula.
BMDsystemswereprovidedtoKuwait,theUnitedArabEmirates,QatarandOman,aswellasstationing
BMDcapable,AegisequippedwarshipsinthewatersoftheArabianGulf.

TheU.S.hasbeendevelopinganintegratedearlywarningradarsystemacrosstheGCCstatesthatcould
helpU.S.andGCCforcestoquicklyrespondtoanIranianmissileattack.Themovesareintendedto
reassureGulfcountriesthattheywouldbeprotectedagainstpossibleoffensiveactionfromTehran.U.S.
officialsstressedthedefensivenatureoftheactionsbeingtakenthroughouttheregion.

U.S.officialsalsoareworkingwithalliesintheGulftoensurefreedomofnavigationintheregion.Arab
countriesworrythatduringacrisis,IrancouldtrytopreventtheirshipsfromtraversingtheStraitof
Hormuz,cuttingofftheiroilexportbusiness.USofficialshaverepeatedlyinsistedtheyarekeeping"all
optionsonthetable,"whichincludesamilitarystrikeoption,whenitcomestoIran.SecretaryofState
ClintonmadethefollowingremarkswithSaudiArabianForeignMinisteronMarch31,2012(USState
Department).

Webelievestronglythat,inadditiontoourbilateralmilitarycooperationbetweentheUnitedStatesand
everymembernationoftheGCC,wecandoevenmoretodefendtheGulfthroughcooperationonballistic
missiledefense.Webeganthatconversationinthisforumtoday.AdmiralFox,thecommanderoftheFifth
Fleet,madeapresentationoutliningsomeofthechallengesthatwefacewhenitcomestoballisticmissile
defense.ButwearecommittedtodefendingtheGulfnationsandwewantittobeaseffectiveaspossible.

Sowewanttobeginexpertdiscussionswithourfriendsaboutwhatwecandotoenhanceballisticmissile
defense.Therearesomeaspectsofaballisticmissiledefensesystemthatarealreadyavailable,someof
whichhavealreadybeendeployedintheGulf.Butitsthecooperation itswhattheycallinteroperability
thatwenowneedtoreallyrollupoursleevesandgettoworkon.
17

IllustrativeU.S.PreventiveMilitaryStrikes

18

MilitaryRisksinStrikeagainstIransNuclearFacilities

TheU.S.istheonlycountrythatcanlaunchasuccessfulMilitaryStrike,ifallpeacefuloptionshavebeen
exhaustedandIranhasleftnoothermeanstoconvinceittostoporchangeitscourseinpursuingNuclear
Weapons.TheU.S.shouldalonedeterminewhatthetimelinecouldbeifIrandoespursuethepathto
developnuclearweapons.

Thequestionarisesiswhatwouldtheobjectivesofamilitarystrikebe?TopulltheIraniannuclear
programback5yearsordelayitfor1year?Thiscriteriawilldefinetheforceallocationrequiredtoachieve
asuccessfulmissionagainstIransnuclearfacilities.Wepointoutthatitisnotasimplemissionof
bombersflyinginandoutofIran,thisisacomplicatedOffensiveAirStrikethatwillinvolvemanyaircraft,
eachwithitsownrole,suchasCombatAircarftwhoseroleistosuppressenemyairdefensesalongthe
way,aircraftthatflyfighterescortwiththebombers,aircraftthatcarryspecializedelectronicwarfare
equipmenttojamenemyradarsandcommunications.,plusprobablyairtoairrefuelingalongthewayin
andoutofIran.

Dependingontheforcesallocatedanddurationofairstrikes,itisunlikelythatanaircampaignalone
couldaloneterminateIransprogram.Thepossibilityofdispersedfacilitiescomplicatesanyassessmentof
apotentialmissionsuccess,makingitunclearwhattheultimateeffectofastrikewouldbeonIrans
nuclearfacilities.

TheU.S.isawarethattheactionofamilitarystrikecouldbedestabilizingfortheentireMiddleEastregion
andpotentiallygenerateanuclearweaponsraceinthatpartoftheworld,"AdmiralMichaelMullen,the
chairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,toldCNN."Ithinkanattackwouldalsobe,byusorbyanybodyelse,
beverydestabilizing.
19

IllustrativeUSStrikeMission
B2bombersoutofDiegoGarcia,eachcarrying2GBU57MOPbombs.

Missioncanbeachievedwithahighsuccessratealsomaintainingasustainedstrikeovera
coupleofdays.
B2bombersescortedbyF18sfromthe5th fleetstationedintheGulfarea,orF15EsandF16Cs
fromforwardareaairbases.
UnitedStatesandWesternalliesconsideredtobetheonlycountriesinvolved,noGCCorany
ArabcountryinvolvementandespeciallynoIsraelidirectinvolvement.
Stillthough,IranmostprobablywillaccuseIsraeltobepartoftheStrikeandwilltrytoretaliate,
eitherbylaunchingaBallisticMissileonIsraelcarryingconventionalorWMD(chemical,biological,
radiological)andactivatingHezbullahtolaunchcrossborderattacksagainstIsrael.
IranwouldalsotrytoattackanyU.S.militaryairbasesthatareactiveintheGulfeveniftheyare
stationedinGCCcountries.
IfIranattacksanyoftheGCCcountries,thentheywillhavetherighttoselfdefense.Inaddition
thewholeArabMiddleEastwillnotacceptanIranianattackonanyoftheGCCcountries.

20

TheB2Bomber

PrimaryFunction

Multiroleheavybomber

Engines:

FourGEF118GE100engines,eachwithathrustof17,300pounds(7,847kg)

Speed,Cruise:

Highsubsonic

Ceiling:

50,000ft(15,000meters)

WeightTakeoff,(typical):

335,500 350,000pounds(152,600 159,000kg)

Weight, Empty(typical):

125,000 160,000pounds

Range:

6,000nmi (9,600km),unrefueledrangeforaHiLoHimissionwith16B61
nuclearfreefallbombs10,000mileswithoneaerialrefueling.

Payload:

40,000pounds(18,000 kg)

Crew:

Twopilots

CurrentArmament:

Nuclear:16B61,16B83
Conventional:80MK82(500lb),16MK84(2000lb),3436CBU87,3436CBU
89,3436CBU97
Precision:216GBU39SDB(250lb),80 GBU30JDAM(500lb),16GBU32
JDAM(2000lb),GBU27,GBU28,GBU36,GBU37,AGM154HSOW,816
AGM137TSSAM,2MOP/DSHTW/BigBLU

(Source:http://www.GlobalSecurity.org/wmd/systems/b2s[ecs.html)

21

 InJuly2009,verificationofequipmentrequiredtointegratetheMOPontheB2wascomplete the

hardwarethatholdstheMOPinsidetheweaponsbay.TheMOPisaGPSguidedweaponcontainingmore
than5,300poundsofconventionalexplosivesinsidea20.5ftlongbombbodyofhardenedsteel.Itis
designedtopenetratedirt,rockandreinforcedconcretetoreachenemybunkerortunnelinstallations.
TheB2willbecapableofcarryingtwoMOPs,oneineachweaponsbay.
TheB2currentlycarriesupto40,000poundsofconventionalordnance.Forexample,itcandeliver80
independentlytargeted500lbclassbombsfromitssmartbombrackassembly;orupto162,000lbclass
weaponsfromitsrotarylauncher.IntegrationoftheMOPontheB2isthelatestinaseriesof
modernizationprogramsthatNorthropGrummananditssubcontractorshaveundertakenwiththeAir
Forcetoensurethattheaircraftremainsfullycapableagainstevolvingthreats.
GBU57A/BMassiveOrdnancePenetrator(MOP)

Specifications

Weight,total

13,600kg(slightlylessthan30,000pounds)

Weight,explosive

2,700kg(6,000lb)

Length

6m/20.5feet

Diameter

31.5indiameter

Control

Shortspanwingsandtrellistype tail

Penetration

60meters(200ft)through5,000psireinforcedconcrete
40meters(125ft)throughmoderatelyhardrock
8meters(25feet)through10,000psireinforcedconcrete

Contractors

Boeing,Northrop Grumman

Platforms

B52,B2

Guidance

GPSaidedInertialNavigationSystem
22

PriorityTargetsinadditiontoIransMainNuclearNuclearFacilities

(Source:http://www.nti.org/countryprofiles/iran/deliverysystems/)

U.S.MilitaryStrikeForceAllocationagainstIransNuclearandBallisticFacilities
OffensiveCounterair(OCA)Mission
PerformanceCriteriaandMissionParameters:
Adamageperformancecriteriaabove75%foreachtarget,nuclearandmissile,resultinginadelayof
atleast5to10yearsinIransNuclearProgram,andsubstantiallyweakeningIransballisticmissile
retaliatorycapability.
TwoaircraftareallocatedtoeachtargettomaximizethedamageonFirstStrike.
DestroyingthemaximumnumberofMissileBases,MobileLaunchersandProductionFacilitiesduring
(boostPhase)orbeforeLaunch, therebyreducingthenumberofincomingmissiles(warheads)andalso
reducingthenumberofshotsdefenseneedstotakeateachIncomingwarhead.
IranTarget

NumberofTargets

AircraftAllocated

MainNuclear

5Facilities

2A/C pertargetresultingin10B2
Bombers

MissilesBases

8 Bases

2A/Cperbaseresultingin16
StrikeA/C

MissileProduction

15Facilities

2A/Cpertargetresultingin30
StrikeA/C

MobileMissileLaunchers

Assuming22Launchersinvarious
locations

2A/Cper mobilelauncherresulting
in44A/C

50

10B2Bombers
90StrikeAircraft
=100

TOTAL

OffensiveCounterairMissions(OCA)

CAP

AttackOperations
Attackoperationsareintendedtodestroy,disrupt,or
degradecounterairtargetsontheground.
Thesemissionsaredirectedagainstenemy:
BallisticMissileSites
Airfields
CommandControlandtheirsupportinfrastructure:

Attack
Operations

SuppressionofEnemyAirDefenses(SEAD)
SEADisanOCAmissiondesignedtoneutralize,destroy,ordegradeenemy
surfacebasedairdefensesbydestructiveordisruptivemeans.
FighterSweep:
Anoffensivemissionbyfighteraircrafttoseekanddestroyenemyaircraftor
targetsofopportunityinadesignatedarea.

EnRoute
SEAD

Escorts:
Escortsareaircraftassignedtoprotectotheraircraftduringamission.Escort
missionsareflownoverenemyterritorytotargetandengageenemyaircraft
andairdefensesystems.
DecreaseinAircraftRequiredinanAirtoGroundStrikeMission:

ImprovedWeaponsAccuracy

IncreasedSurvivability

LargerPayload

(Source:CounterairOperationsUSAFAFDD21.1October1,2008)

25

AdditionalrequirementstoincreaseMissionEffectiveness
TheeffectivenessofOCAoperationsdependsontheavailabilityofcertainresources.Systemcapabilitiesare
influencedbythesituation,threats,weather,andavailableintelligence.Thefollowingaresomeoftheresources
usedtoconductOCA:
Aircraft:
FighterandbomberaircraftprovidethebulkoftheweaponsystemsforOCAoperations.Othertypesofaircraftand
weaponsystemsareoftencriticalenablersofcounterairoperations(e.g.,electronicattack,electronicprotection,
andairrefuelingaircraft).
Missiles:
Theseweaponsincludesurfacetosurface,airtosurface,andairtoairmissiles,aswellasair,land,andsea
launchedcruisemissiles.Manyoftheseweaponshavelongrangesandsomehaveveryquickreactiontimes.These
weaponsystemscaneliminateorreducetheriskofharmtofriendlyforcesbydestroyingenemysystemsintheair
andontheground.
ISRSystems:
ISRsystemsandresourcesmaybeusedincounterairoperationstoprovideintelligence,surveillance,
reconnaissance,deception,andothereffectsagainstenemyforcesandairdefensesystems.Theseactivitiesinclude
theuseofairborne,spaceborne,andground(e.g.,humanintelligence)assets.

(Source:CounterairOperationsUSAFAFDD21.1October1,2008)

UnmannedAircraftSystems(UAS):
UASmaybeusedincounterairoperationstoprovideISR,deception,jamming,harassment,or
destructionofenemyforcesandairdefensesystems.Thesesystemsmaybepreprogrammedor
remotelypiloted.Theyprovidevaluableintelligencetofriendlyforcesandmaynowbeusedtoattack
sometargetseithertoodangerousorriskyformannedaircraftorwheremannedaircraftarenot
presentoravailabletorespond.Theymayalsobeusedtohelpprovidepersistentairpresenceover
enemyforcesinsituationswherethismayhaveimportantpsychologicaleffectsuponanadversary(as
partofOCAorotheroperations)ifsynergisticallytaskedtohelpprovidepersistentpresenceover
adversaryforces.
SpecialOperationsForces(SOF):
SOFcanconductdirectactionmissions,specialreconnaissance,andprovideterminalguidancefor
attacksagainstvaluableenemytargets.PlannersintheAOCcoordinatewiththespecialoperations
liaisonelementtocoordinatetheuseofspecialoperationsassetsinsupportofthecounterair
mission.
C2Systems:
ThesesystemsenhanceOCAoperationsbyprovidingearlywarning,intelligence,identification,and
targetingdata,aswellasC2offriendlyforces.

(Source:CounterairOperationsUSAFAFDD21.1October1,2008)

USPreventiveMilitaryStrikeagainstIranianNuclearFacilitiesandBallisticMissileBases
BallisticMissileBases
NuclearFacilities
5MainNuclearFacilities
8BallisticMissileBases
15BallisticMissileProductionFacilities

Tabriz
Panchin

Bakhtaran

Iraq

Fordow
ImamAli

Arak

SemnanSpace&
MissileCenter

Mashhad
Airbase

Natanz

Esfahan

SaudiArabia

Kuwait

B2
Bombers
StrikeForce

Iran

CombatAircraftStrikeForcecouldbe
F18sofftheU.S.5th fleet,andF15E
launchedfromForwardAreaBases.
TheCombatAircraftcanalsoperform
allOffensiveCounterairOperations:
FighterSweep,SEAD(suppressionof
EnemyAirDefense),Interdictionand
Escort.
B2MissionPayloadistheB57A/B
MissionOrdnancePenetrator(MOP).

Combat
Aircraft
StrikeForce

Bandar
Abbas

Qatar

AbuMusa
Island

UAE

Kuhestak

Google
(LocationofFacilitiessource:NTI)

CounteringIransAirDefense

IransCurrentLandBasedAirDefenseSystems
Iranhasextensivesurfacetoairmissileassets,butmostareobsoleteorobsolescent.Iranssystemsare

poorlynetted,havesignificantgapsandproblemsintheirradarandsensorcoverageandmodernization,
andanumberofitssystemsarevulnerabletoelectronicwarfare
U.S.neverdeliveredintegratedsystembeforefallofShah soIranneverhadafullyfunctioningairdefense
system.
Iranhasmademanystatementsthatithasupgradedandmodernizedmanyofthecomponentsofsuch
itsAirDefensesystemsusingRussian,Chinese,US,European,andIraniandesignedandmadeequipment.
ButIrandoesnothavethedesignandmanufacturingcapabilitytocreatetrulymodernsystem,onethatis
immunetoelectronicwarfare,andonethatcanfunctionwithoutbecometacticallyvulnerabletoanti
radiationweaponsandotherformsofactivesuppressionofenemyairdefense(SEAD)systems.
OnlymodernshortrangepointdefensesystemisTORM.OthershortrangesystemsmixofolderRussian
system,SHORADs(ShortRangeAirDefense),andaging possibleinactiveBritishandFrenchsystems.
Mediumtolongrangesystemsarelowcapabilityorobsolescent.Iranhassome150HAWKSandIHAWKs
donothavecapableECM.Datebackto1960sand1970s.ItclaimstobeabletoproduceitsownIHAWK
missiles.HasvariousversionsofSA2obsolete.
Radarsensorandbattlemanagement/C4Isystemshavemajorlimitations.
RegardlessofhowmuchIranstatesthatithasmadeprogress,itwillstillbevulnerabletotheadvanced
technologyU.S.combataircraftaswellastheelectronicwarfareanddefensesuppressionweaponsystems.
ThiswillgivetheU.S.StrikeForcethefreedom,ifrequiredafterthefirststrike,toconductasustained
campaignofstrikesoverafewdays.
(Source:AnthonyCordesmanCSIS)

30

GulfLandBasedAirDefenseSystemsin2008
Country

MajorSAM

LightSAM

AAGun

Bahrain

(8)IHAWK

(60)RBS70
(18)FIM92AStinger
(7)Crotale

(26)Guns
(15)Orlikon35mm
(12)L/7040mm

Iran

(16/150)IHAWK
(3/10)SA5
(45)SA2Guideline

SA7/14/16HQ7
(29)SA15;SomeQW1Misaq
(29)TORM1;SomeHN5
(30)Rapier;SomeFM80(ChCrotale)
15Tigercat;SomeFIM92AStinger

(1,700)Guns
ZSU23423mm
ZPU2/423mm
ZU2323mm
M193937mm
S6057mm

Kuwait

(4/24)IHAWKPhaseIII
(5)PatriotPAC2

(6/12)Aspide
(48)Starbust

12Oerlikon35mm

Oman

None

Blowpipe;(2)MistralSP
(34)SA7;(6)Blindfire
(20)Javelin;(40)Rapier
S713Martello

(26)Guns
(4)ZU23223mm
(10)GDF(x)5Skyguard35mm
(12)L6040mm

Qatar

None

(10)Blowpipe
(12)FIM92AStinger
(9)RolandII
(24)Mistral
(20)SA7

SaudiArabia

(16/128)IHAWK
(46/1624)Patriot
(17/141)ShahineMobile
(24/160)PAC2
Launchers
(17)ANA/FPS117Radar
(73/68)CrotaleShahine

(40)Crotale
(500)Stinger(ARMY)
(500)Mistral(ADF)
(500)FIM43Redeye(ARMY)
(500)Redeye(ADF)
(73141)ShahineStatic
(500)FIM92AStinger(ARMY)
(400)FIM92AAvenger(ADF)

(1,220)Guns
(92)M163Vulcan20mm
(30)N167Vulcan20mm(NG)
(850)AMX30SA30mm
(128)GDFOrlikon35mm
(150)L7040mm(store)
(130)M290mm(NG)

UAE

(2/31)IHAWK

20+Blowpipe
(20)Mistral
SomeRapier/Crotale/RB70/Javelin/SA
18

(62)Guns
(42)M3VDA20mmSP
(20)GCFBM230mm

(Source:IranianWeaponsofMassDestruction.AnthonyCordesmanCSIS)

31

MediumtoLongRangeSurfaceToAirMissileSystems
AirDefense
System

AssociatedEarly
Warning/Acquisition
Radars

AssociatedTracking&
GuidanceRadars

MissileRanges(km)
Altitude(ft)

In Service
Date

SA2

SpoonRestD(P18)
FlatFaceA(P15)

FansongA/B

Max (km):40
Min(km):8
Altitude(ft):3,000to90,000

1971
Upgraded

SA3

FlatFaceB(P19)
SquatEye

LowBlow

Max(km):30
Min(km):6
Altitude(ft): 150to160,000

1971

SA6

LongTrack(P40)
HeightFinder:
ThinSkinB(PRV9)

StraightFlush

Max(km):24
Min (km):4
Altitude(ft):50to45,000

1973

SA8

FlatFaceB(P19)
LongTrack(P40)
HeightFinder:
ThinSkinB(PRV9)

LandRoll

Max(km):15
Min(km):0.2
Altitude(ft):40to40,000

1982

SA5

BackTrap(P80)
TallKingC(P14)
Spoon RestD(P18)
HeightFinder:
Oddpair(PRV13)
OddGroup(PRV16)

SquarePair

Max(km):250
Min(km):20
Altitude(ft):1,500to130,000

1983

IHAWK

AN/MPQ50
AN/MPQ55(PIPII)/62 (PIPIII)
RangeonlyRadar

AN/MPQ57(PIPII)/61(PIPIII)

Max(km):35
Min(km):3
Altitude(ft):0to55,000ft

1971

PatriotPAC2

AN/MPQ53PhasedArrayRadar
CarriesoutSearch,target
detection,trackandidentification,
missiletrackingandECCM
functions

AN/MSQ104EngagementControl
Station(ECS)

Max(km):70
Min(km):3
Altitude (ft):80,000

1990

(Source:IranianWeaponsofMassDestruction.AnthonyCordesmanCSIS)

32

GCCvs IranianAirforceComparison

 IransmostadvancedfightersconsistofasmallnumberofexportversionsoftheSu24andMiG29,
whoseavionicslagfarbehindtheirRussiancounterparts.ItisreportedthatIranhaslessthan30
exportversionsofMiG29,somenotoperational.TheselimitstoIransairforceareparticularly
importantasIranhasairbasesthatareonlyafewminutesflighttimefromcriticaltargetsintheGulf
andinthecoastalareasofthesouthernGulfstates.TheyarealsoimportantbecauseIrans
weaknessesinairtoaircombat,anditsweaknessesinsurfacetoairmissiledefensewhichare
describedshortly,leaveithighlyvulnerabletoanyUSattack.
Iranclaimstohavemodernizedtheavionicsonsomeoftheseaircraft,andtohaveadapteditsF14s
tocarrytheHawkairtosurfacemissileasalongrangeairtoairmissiletocompensateforthefact
itsF14sweresabotagedduringthefalloftheShahandcannotmakeeffectiveuseofPhoenix
missiles whichinanycasearelongbeyondtheirusefullife.Italsoclaimstohavecreatedelectronic
warfareaircraftandtohavemodernizedtheavionicsonits3PF3Orionmaritimepatrolaircraft
whichareasclosetoanAWACs/airbornewarningandcontrolaircraftasIranhas.Italsohasclaimed
tohaveamixofunmannedcombataerialvehicles(UCAVsandUAVs)itcanusetomakeupforsome
ofthelimitationinitsaircraft.
TheGCChavebeenplanningtheirdefensessoastoprovideamilitarydeterrentsufficienttomake
anydirectconfrontationascostlyaspossibletoIranoranyotheradversary.Itisinthisdeterrentrole
thatliestheultimaterationaleforanyGCCJointDefensePactandCooperation.
TwomainconsiderationsunderlyingthechoiceofaMilitaryDoctrinebytheGCCstateshavebeen:
BalanceofForcesandStrategicDepth.InparticularfortheArabianGulffrontlinestatesKuwait,
Bahrain,Qatar,UAEandOman,themainconcernwouldbestrategicdepthtoanIranianattack.

(Source:AnthonyCordesmanCSIS)

 DefensePerformanceCriteriashouldbea85%Probabilitythatthedefenseshootsdownalltheincoming
threataircraft;thisalsomeansan85%ofzeroleakage.Furthermorea90%Probabilitythatincomingare
incomingthreataircraftaresuccessfullydetectedearlyandtrackedbytheGCCAirDefense.
LackofStrategicDepthresultsinlimitationsontheareaofoperationalmaneuverabilityduringconflict,
timetorespond,andanincreaseinthevulnerabilityofvitalstrategiccriticalinfrastructureeconomic
centersduetotheproximitytotheborders.SaudiArabiaisbetheonlystatethathasstrategicdepth,
andislookedupontoplayapivotalroleintheSecurityArrangementsoftheGulfandtheArabIsraeli
conflict.SaudiArabiasoilresources,populationandstrategicdepthmakeitamajorandessential
participantinanyregionalsecurityarrangementsorconflictintheGulfregion.
Whentransformedintoanoperationaldoctrine,theGCCstateswouldbasetheirForceStructure
Planningon:DefensibleBorders.Borderswhichcanbedefendedwithoutapreemptiveinitiative,and
theparallelcapabilitytotakethewartotheenemyandtofightonenemyterritory.
TherequirementwouldbetoenhancetheconventionalmilitaryabilityfortheGCCstatesconsistingof
fourmajorcomponents:ForceStructure;Modernization;Readiness;Sustainability.Inadditionitwould
includedevelopinganasymmetricwarfarecapability.ThetotalGCCAirPoweris428combataircraft,in
assumingonly75%areoperationallyready(fullmissioncapable),thetotalavailableforcewillthenbe
320andwithasortierateof3peraircraftperdaythetotalnumberofsortiesgeneratedwouldbe960.
WhereasforIran,atotalof158aircraftwithanoperationalreadinessrateof60%,theavailablecombat
forcewillbe95,andwith2sortiesperaircraftperdaythetotalsortiesgeneratedwillcometo190.The
6:1ratioofsortiesgeneratedprojectstheweaknessoftheIranianAirforcevsthethoseoftheGCC
countries.
ByfollowingtheguidelinesoftheUSAFDoctrinemanualsinthemissionsneededforOffensive
Counterair,DefensiveCounterairaswellasCounterlandOperations,the6:1ratioclearlyimpliesthat
thereisasubstantialadvantageinfavoroftheGCCAirforcesachievingthespecifiedwartimeobjective
ofwinninganairwarordestroyingatargetset.

IranAirforceTacticalFighterCapabilities 2012
Type

No

Operational
Readiness(%)

Force
Available

TotalSortie
PerDay

Postulated
Employment

MiG29A

25

60

15

30

Air
Defense/Escort/FS/BAS

Su25

13

60

16

CAS/BI/DeepStrike

SU24

30

60

18

36

CAS/BI/DeepStrike

F14

25

60

15

30

AirDefense/FS
CAS/BI/Deep

F4E/D

65

69

39

78

Strike/SEAD

Total

158

95

190

BAS:BattlefieldAirSuperiority
CAS:CloseAirSupport
BI:BattlefieldInterdiction
DS:DefenseSuppression
FS:FighterSweep
SustainedConditions:12hrOperationalDay
18hrMaintenanceDay
2SortiesperAircraftperday

37

GCCAirforceTacticalFighterCapabilities 2012

Type

OrderofBattle

Operational
Ready%

ForceAvailable

ForceTotal
SortiesperDay

Postulated
Employment

TornadoIDS

SaudiArabia:25

75

19

57

DeepStrike

Typhoon

SaudiArabia:22

75

16

48

75

UAE:46
Qatar:9
(Total:55)

UAE:138
Qatar:27
(Total:165)

UAE:62
Qatar:12
(Total:74)

Mirage2000

F18

Kuwait:39

FS,BAS,AD,Escort

FS,BAS,AD,Escort

FS,BAS,AD,
Escort,CAS,BI,
SEAD

75

29

87

F16C/D

Bahrain:21
Oman:12
UAE:80
(Total:113)

75

Bahrain:16
Oman:9
UAE:60
(Total:85)

Bahrain:48
Oman:27
UAE:180
(Total:255)

F15C/D

SaudiArabia:84

75

63

189

FS,BAS,AD,
Escort,CAS,BI

F15S

SaudiArabia:71

75

53

160

DeepStrike,FS,
AD,Escort,CAS,BI

320

960

Total

428

FS,BAS,AD,
Escort,CAS,BI

FS:FighterSweep,BAS:BattlefieldAirSuperiority,AD:AirDefense,
CAS:CloseAirSupport(AirtoGroundRole),BI:BattleFieldInterdiction(AirtoGroundRole)
SEAD:SuppressionofEnemyAirDefense
SustainedConditions:12hrOperationalDay
18hrMaintenanceDay
3Sortiesperaircraftperday

39

DefensiveCounterairOperations

Combat
AirPatrol

AWACS

StripLaunched
Intercept

GroundControl
InterceptRadar

Mission :DefenseofBorderfromEnemyIntrusion.
Objective :Provide AirspaceSurveillanceover
selectedcorridorandIntercept.
Assumptions&Conditions:
CorridorWidth&DistancefromBase
ThreatOperations
DurationofCoverage

CentralFactorsinThreatEngagementAnalysis:
C4I(CommandControlCommunicationsComputingandIntelligence)
andthemaximumAirDefenseengagementforce
TheOperationalReadinessoftheforcesresultinginthecombatforces
availableasFullMissionCapable.
ThemaximumusableGround/StripLaunchedInterceptorforceandCombat
AirPatroloperations.TheMaximumStripLaunchedInterceptorsishighlysensitive
totheC4Itimedelayandtheresponsetime.
IntheAlertPhaseofairoperations,thecombatreadyassetsareassignedto
theGroundLaunchedInterceptandCombatAirOperations(CAP).

(Source:CounterairOperationsUSAFAFDD21.1October1,2008)

40

TypicalGCCCombatAirPatrolMission
AircraftRequiredonCAPStations

NumberofAircrafttoSupport
EachCAPStation

TotalAircraftRequired

(NumberofCAPStations)x2

OperationalDay12hrs
(SortieRate)x(LoiterTime)

(AircraftRequiredonCAP)x
(AircraftRequiredtoSupportCAP)

3x2=6

6x2=14

12/(3x2)=2

CorridorWidth
RadarCoverage

IRAN
ThreatAircraft

Qatar

CAP

CAP

CAP
UAE

SaudiArabia

DecreasingtheNumberofAircraftRequiredEntails:
IncreasingAircraftSortieRate&TimeonStation(LoiterTime)
IncreasingAircraftRadarRange&TimeonStation(LoiterTime)

OMAN

WhatIranlacksinAirPower:
ThefollowingaresomegeneralcriteriathatwouldberequiredforIrantotryandmaintainatechnologicaland
qualitativeedgeovertheGCCAirforces:
Aircraft:
Multimissioncapability.
HighOperationalReadiness/FullMissionCapablestateandhighsortierates.
Allweatherday/nightoperationalcapability
Quickresponse/groundlaunchedinterceptorsagainstincomingintruders.
HighEndurance.
AirborneElectronicWarfare(ESM/ECM/ECCM)survivability
DetecttrackandengagemultiplemobilegroundtargetsaswellasHardandDeeplyBuriedTargets
(HDBTs).
Rapidlydestroyadvancedairdefensesystems.
Capableofcarryingoutdeepstrikemissions.
ShortC4IEarlyWarningdelaytimeduetohavingantiquatedSystem,semiautomatedmanintheloop,
givingrisetolongResponse/ScrambleTimebyCombatAircraft
AirtoAirMissiles:
Aircrafttobecapableofmultipletargetengagement.FireandForget/Launchandleavewithhighsingle
shotkillcapability.
Goodtargetdiscriminationandenhancedresistancetocountermeasures.
Increaseinrangeoffiringmissileatthesametimeshorteningtheflighttimetothetarget.
lowLossExchangeRatioinaClosing/BVREnvironmentandVisualEngagementEnvironment.

42

AirtoGround:
Weaponsthatserveasaneffectiveforcemultiplier.
Standoffcapability,operatingfromrangesoutsideenemypointdefenses.
Lowandhighaltitudelaunches.
Preservecrewandaircraftsurvivability
Effectiveagainstawidearrayoflandandseatargetswithhighsingleshotkillprobability.
Weaponsthatemploylaunchandleavewithhighaccuracy(smallCEP).
Capableofday/nightandadverseweatherconditions

IransMissileForces

DeterrenceandActiveDefenseRisks
IransMissileProgram

ThereislittledisagreementthatIransactionsposeapotentialthreat,butthereisfarlessagreementover
thenature,scaleandtimingofthisthreat.US,European,Gulf,andIsraelipolicymakersandexpertsagree
thatIranpossessesalargeandgrowingmissileforce,withsomemissilescapableofhittingIsrael,and
Europe.TheyagreethatIranhasbegundevelopinglongerrangeandsolidfuelmissiles.Atthesametime,
theIranianprogramisinfluxandmanyofIransmissilesystemsarestillinadevelopmentphasewheretheir
range,accuracy,warhead,andreliabilityareimpossibletopredict.

IranhasbeendevelopingballisticmissilecapabilitiesbasedonRussian,NorthKorean,andChinese
technologyorweaponssystemssincetheearly1980s.Irancurrentlypossessesthelargestballisticmissile
inventoryintheMiddleEast,andthecountrysmilitaryandscientificestablishmentsareworkingtoincrease
thesophistication,scale,andreachofitsmissiles.

Iranseesitsmissilecapabilitiesasawaytocompensateforitsshortcomingsinconventionalforces,aswell
asameanstostrikeathighvaluetargetswithlittlewarning,suchaspopulationcenters,andWesternand
Westernbackedforcesintheregion,includingUSbasesintheGulf.Assuch,ballisticmissilesplayanintegral
roleinIransasymmetricwarfaredoctrine.GiventheemphasisIranplacesonitsmissileprogram,itisclear
thatIranconsidersitsballisticmissilearsenalamongitsmostimportantassetsasbothadeterrenttoattack
andleverageoverotherregionalplayers.

ThereisnoagreementastowhenIranmayacquiremissileswithhomingwarheadsandthekindofterminal
guidancethatcanhitpointtargetseffectivelywithconventionalwarheads.Thereisnoagreementonthe
reliabilityandaccuracyofIransmissilesunderoperationalconditions,thereisnoagreementonIransability
todeploysystemswithcountermeasurestomissiledefenses.ThereisnoagreementonwhenIranmight
deployafullyfunctionnuclearwarhead.And,thereisnoagreementonthefuturesize,character,and
basingmodeofIransmissileforcesonceitslongrangesystemsaredeployedinstrength.
(Reference:AnthonyCordesmanandAlexanderWilner.CSISIranandtheGulfMilitaryBalance IandII.)

45

IranMilitaryDoctrine:

SinceIranpresentlydoesnothaveaccesstohightechnologymilitaryweaponsystems,itwillneedto
developallrangesofBallisticMissilestocompensateforitsdeficienciesinconventionalforces.

IranhasnoprobleminStrategicDepth,canbeanadvantagefightinginandoverfamiliarterritory.Force
StructurePlanningbasedon:
o

Highattritionrateinflictedonadversarycivilians

Indepthdefenses,asIranhasthestrategicdepth

TacticalBallisticMissilesThreat:

Iransballisticmissilescoverthecompletespectrumrangefrom150kmupto5,500km,theShort,Medium,
andIntermediateRangesofBallisticMissiles.Iranbelievesthatthesewillcompensateforanydeficiencies
initsAirPower.

BallisticMissilescanbeusedwithsuccessagainstSoftTargets,inopenareasandcitiestoinflictmaximum
humancasualtiesandcreateterror.InessencewhatisconsideredasamajorcomponentinAsymmetric
Warfareintheformofhighciviliancasualties.

ThisarsenalofBallisticMissilespossessedbyIranhasbeendeclaredtobefordefensivepurposesagainst
anyforeigninvasion,inparticularagainsttheU.S.

However,ithasbecomeveryclearthatitisanarsenalthatisintendedtoinflictmaximumcasualtiesand
damage,inessenceamajorcomponentforAsymmetricWarfareintheformofhighattritionanddefenses
indepthandtocompensateforanydeficienciesinitsAirPower.

SRBM:ShortRangeBallisticMissile
MRBM:MediumRangeBallisticMissile
IRBM:IntermediateRangeBallisticMissile
ICBM:IntercontinentalBallisticMissile

(Reference:TheodrePostol,ATechnicalAssessmentofIransBallisticMissileProgramMay6,2009.Technical
AddendumtotheJointThreatAssessmentonIransNuclearAndMissilePotential.)

(Reference:TheodrePostol,ATechnicalAssessmentofIransBallisticMissileProgramMay6,2009.Technical
AddendumtotheJointThreatAssessmentonIransNuclearAndMissilePotential.)

(Reference:TheodrePostol,ATechnicalAssessmentofIransBallisticMissileProgramMay6,2009.Technical
AddendumtotheJointThreatAssessmentonIransNuclearAndMissilePotential.)

(Reference:TheodrePostol,ATechnicalAssessmentofIransBallisticMissileProgramMay6,2009.TechnicalAddendumtothe
JointThreatAssessmentonIransNuclearAndMissilePotential.)

Iran
ShahabBallisticMissiles
RangevsPayload

IRAN

(Reference:BallisticMissileDefenseReviewReport.
BMDRDoDFebruary2010)

Shahab1
Class:

Shahab2

Shahab3

Shahab4

SRBM

SRBM

MRBM

MRBM

Range(km):

300

500

1,300

2,000

Payload(kg):

1,100

600

650

1,000

U.S.& GCC
DefenseagainstIranianBallisticMissiles

SeaBasedAirDefenses
TheU.S.NavysRoleinMissileDefenseNetwork
RoleoftheU.S.NavyAegisSystem:
WillprovideanefficientandhighlymobileseabaseddefenseagainstShortandMedium RangeBallisticMissilesin
theirmidcoursephase.
ThesystemwillallowtheBMDCommandtomoveitsdefensecapabilitiesclosetotheenemysites.
ThesystemwillhavetheEngagement&LongRangeTrackingCapability
InterceptingShorttoMediumRangeBallisticMissilesinthemidcoursephaseoftheflightwithStandardMissile 3.
Servesasaforwarddeployedsensor,providingearlywarningandlongrangesearch&trackcapabilitiesforICBMs
andIRBMs.
Contributions:
WillextendthebattlespaceoftheBMDsandcontributetoanintegratedlayereddefense.TheNavalAegissystem
extendstherangeoftheGroundMissiledefense(GMD)elementbyprovidingreliabletrackdatausedtocalculate
firingsolutions.
AegisBMDwillcoordinateengagementsofshortandmediumrangeballisticmissileswithterminalmissiledefense
systems.
Astrackinginformationissharedamongthesesystems,theBMDSwillhavetheopportunitytofollowthe
engagementofatargetduringthemidcoursesegmentwithcoordinatedterminalengagements.

SeaBasedRadar

SeaBasedRadar

(Source:MissileDefenseAgency.(MDA)DepartmentofDefense.TestingBuildingConfidence,2009)

AegisBallisticMissile 3
58

Country

TBMDSystem

UAE

TheUAE issofarthefirstGCCcountrytobuytheTerminalHighAltitudeAirDefense
(THAAD)missilesystem.
OnDec31,2011PentagonannouncedthattheUAEwillbebuying2fullTHAAD
batteries,96missiles,2RaytheonAN/TPY2radars,and30yearsofspareparts.Total
Value$3.34billion.
In2008theUAEorderedPatriotPAC3:10fireunits,172missiles,Firstdelivery2009.

Kuwait

July2012,Pentagon informedCongressofaplantosellKuwait$4.2billioninweapon
systems,including60PAC3missiles,20launchingplatformsand4radars.Thiswillbein
additiontothe350Patriotmissilesboughtbetween2007and2010.In1992,Kuwait
bought210oftheearliergenerationPatriotsand25launchers.Kuwaitboughtafurther
140morein2007.

SaudiArabia

In2011Saudi Arabiasigneda$1.7billionUScontracttoupgradeitsPatriotantimissile
system.

Qatar

TheU.S.isbuildingaMissileWarningFacilityinQatarthatwouldutilizeanAN/TPY2X
BandRadar.

(Source:AnthonyCordesmanandAlexanderWilner,IranandtheGulfMilitaryBalance1July11,2012)

TwoTierTheaterBallisticMissileDefense(TBMD) THAAD&PAC3
EndoandExoAtmosphericEngagementsusing
ShootLookShootHittoKill
UpperTier
1st Intercept

Needtodestroyasmany
MissileLaunchersas
possible,preboostphase,
inordertoreducenumber
ofincomingwarheads.

UpperTier
2ndIntercept

MidCoursePhase

ShootLookShoot

IRAN
LowerTier
1st Intercept

MissileLaunch

ShootLookShoot

LowerTier
2nd Intercept

Qatar

THAADLauncher
PAC3Launcher

ArabianGulf
UAE

Qatar:MissileEarly
WarningRadar

TBMDSystem
SaudiArabia

Defense against

THAAD :UAE

SRBMs(<1000 km)andMRBMs(1000 3000km)

PAC3:UAE,Kuwait,
SaudiArabia

SRBMs(300 1000km)

DefenseRequiredtomeetPerformanceCriteria

DefensePerformanceCriteria:85%Probabilitythatthedefenseshootsdownalltheincomingmissiles(warheads);
85%ofzeroleakage.
99%Probabilitythatincomingmissiles(warheads)aresuccessfullytrackedbythedefense.
Numberofshotsthatmustbetakenateachincomingmissile
(warhead)toachievethedefenseperformancecriteria.

DestroyingasmanyBallisticMissileLaunchersduring(boostPhase)
orbeforeLaunch:
Decreasesthenumberofincomingmissiles(warheads)andalso
Decreasesnumberofshotsdefenseneedstotakeateach
Incomingwarhead.

Probabilitythatanincomingmissile(warhead)isdestroyed

THEATERBALLISTICMISSILEDEFENSESYSTEM,C4ISR&BATTLEFIELDMANAGEMENT.
TheChallengefortheGCCStatesistodesignaneffectivemultilayeredTheaterBallisticMissileDefenseSystem
(TBMDS)tocountertheShort,MediumandIntermediateBallisticMissiles.
DuetotheveryshorttimewindowinthedefenseagainstBallisticMissiles,theywillhavetobeengaged
automatically,whichrequiresinterceptauthorizationandrulesofengagementtobeagreeduponinadvance.All
partofaneffectiveC4ISR/BMsysteminbothpeacetimeandwar.ThiswillalsoactasaForceMultiplier.
EvidentthatthekeytoaneffectiveTBMDliesinregionalcooperation,whichcantakearangeofformsfrom
coordinationandcooperationbetweencommandcentersanddefensesystemsforTBMDpurposes whileenabling
eachstatetocontrolitsowndefenses.
Cooperationtobecomprehensiveinnature,leadingtoanearrealtimesituationawarenessofthemilitary
developmentsinthearea,hostileandfriendlymilitarycapabilitiesandtheiroperationallevels.Thiswouldalso
beintheformofcooperationintoTBMDsandNBCthreatassessment.ThisrequiresanC4ISRcapabilityinallits
Components,suchas,UnmannedAirSystems(UASs)/UnmannedAirVehicles(UAVs).
AstheFrontLinesofaMissileWarwillbeovertheArabianGulfregion,theaMultiTierTBMDsystemswillplaythe
leadingroleinAirDefensesandinaTheaterBallisticMissileDefenseNetwork.Seabasedsystemswillprovidean
efficientandhighlymobiledefenseagainstTheaterBallisticMissiles.
TheNavalSystem,suchastheU.S.NavyAegissystem,willallowtheTBMDcommandtomoveitsdefense
capabilitiesclosetotheenemysitesandserve asaforwarddeployedsensorandwillhavetheLongRange
Engagementand TrackingCapability.Thiswillextendthe battlespaceoftheBMDsandcontributetoanintegrated
layereddefense.

62

BallisticMissileWarBetweenIrantheU.S.andtheGulfStates
DefenseSupport
PrograminBoostPhase

Space
Sensor
IranianShahab3
LaunchedagainstIsrael

IRAQ

EarlyWarning&LongRange
Search&TrackCapabilities
againstIranianMRBMs

IRAN

KUWAIT

Midcourse&Terminal
MissileDefense

BAHRAIN

QATAR
SeaBasedEW&
TerminalDefense

SAUDIARABIA

Gulfof
Oman

AirDefense

PAC3
THAAD

EarlyWarning
Radar

UAE
OMAN
AWACS

63

CounteringIranianattacksonthe
StraitsofHormuz

TheIMFinareportWorldEconomicOutlook(update)January24,2012,summarizedtheglobalfinancial
situationasfollows:

Concernsaboutgeopoliticaloilsupplyrisksareincreasingagain.Theoilmarketimpactofintensifiedconcerns
aboutanIranrelatedoilsupplyshock(oranactualdisruption)wouldbelarge,givenlimitedinventoryand
sparecapacitybuffers,aswellasthestilltightphysicalmarketconditionsexpectedthroughout2012.

OnJanuary25,2012,InaregularnotetotheGroupof20leadingindustrializedcountries,theIMFsaidthatif
IrangoesaheadwithathreattoblockadeoilexportsviatheStraitsofHormuzintheGulf,theshockcouldbe
evengreater.AblockadeoftheStraitofHormuzwouldconstitute,andbeperceivedbymarketstopresage,
sharplyheightenedglobalgeopoliticaltensioninvolvingamuchlargerandunprecedenteddisruption."

EffectsofOilPriceSpikes:

Sharpand/orsustainedoilpriceincreasesplacefurtherpressuresonhighlyoildependentindustriesand
consumers,aswellasraisinggeopoliticaltensions.AccordingtotheInternationalEnergyAgency(IEA),a
sustainedUS$10/barrelincreaseinthepriceofoilcouldlowergrowthofglobalGDPby0.5percentagepoints
(pctpts)inthesubsequentyear.

Inadditiontoadverseimpactsforgrowtheffects,substantiallyhigheroilpricesgeneratecurrentaccount
surplusesinproducingcountries,whichmayexacerbateglobalmacroeconomicimbalancesandfuelfinancial
marketturbulence.

65

OilTransitChokepoints
TheSuezCanal/SumedPipeline:
OilFlow:4.5millionbbl/d

TheStraitofHormuz:
OilFlow:16.5millionbbl/d

Mediterranean
Sea

BabelMandab:
OilFlow:3.3millionbbl/d

GlobalImportanceofGulfEnergyExports

ThevolumeofGulfoilexportsamountstosome20%ofalltheworldsoilproductionof87millionbarrelsa
day.AnymajordisruptionaffectstheentireeconomyofAsiaandallworldoilprices regardlessofwhere
oilisproduced.ItcanleadtopanicandhoardingonaglobalbasisandtheUSeconomywillbenomore
exempttotheresultingriseinenergypricesandtheglobalimpactonlimitedexportstotheUSandother
majorindustrialandtradingstatesonthananyothermajoreconomicpower.USandotherenergyimporter
energyindependencemayhappensomeday,buttodayitisfoolish,dangerousmyth.

VirtuallyalloftheGulfsoilmustpassthroughtheGulf,theStraitofHormuz,theGulfofOman,andthe
ArabianSea andthenthroughtheIndianOcean.Gulfoilproductionandloadingfacilities,andtanker
trafficcanbeattackedanywhereintheGulf.Irancanuseamixofmines,submarines,submersibles,
drones,antishipmissiles,smallcraft,andassaultforcesanywhereintheGulfregiontothreatentheflow
ofoilexports.

IrancancherrypickitstargetsinanefforttopressureandintimidatetheUSandSouthernGulfstates.It
canuselongrangeconventionallyarmedmissilesordronesagainstlargemilitaryorurbantargetsas
terrorweapons.ItcanattacksporadicallyandunpredictablyinawarofattritionorattempttoswarmUS
andGulfnavalforces.).

(Source:EIA/DOE,WorldOilTransitChokepoints,August2012,http://www.eia.gov/countries/regionstopics2.
cfm?fips=WOTC&trk=c.

69

StraitofHormuz

Atitsnarrowestpoint,theStraitis21mileswide,butthewidthoftheshippinglaneineither
directionisonlytwomiles,separatedbyatwomilebufferzone.TheStraitisdeepandwide
enoughtohandletheworld'slargestcrudeoiltankers,withabouttwothirdsofoil
shipmentscarriedbytankersinexcessof150,000deadweighttons.

FlowsthroughtheStraitin2011wereroughly35percentofallseabornetradedoil,or
almost20percentofoiltradedworldwide.Morethan85percentofthesecrudeoilexports
wenttoAsianmarkets,withJapan,India,SouthKorea,andChinarepresentingthelargest
destinations.

Inaddition,Qatarexportsabout2trillioncubicfeetperyearofliquefiednaturalgas(LNG)
throughtheStraitofHormuz,accountingforalmost20percentofglobalLNGtrade.
Furthermore,KuwaitimportsLNGvolumesthattravelnorthwardthroughthe Straitof
Hormuz.Theseflowstotaledabout100billioncubicfeetperyearin2010.

(Source:EIA/DOE,WorldOilTransitChokepoints,August2012,http://www.eia.gov/countries/regionstopics2.
cfm?fips=WOTC&trk=c.

70

VolumeofCrudeOilandPetroleumProductsTransportedThroughWorldChokepoints,
20072011inMillionsofBarrelsPerDay

Source:EIA/DOE,WorldOilTransitChokepoints,August2012,http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions
topics2.cfm?fips=WOTC&trk=c .
71

AlternativeRoutestotheStraitofHormuz
MostpotentialoptionstobypassHormuzarecurrentlynotoperational.OnlyIraq,SaudiArabia,andthe
UnitedArabEmirates(UAE)presentlyhavepipelinesabletoshipcrudeoiloutsideoftheGulf,andonlythe
lattertwocountriescurrentlyhaveadditionalpipelinecapacitytocircumventHormuz.Atthestartof2012,
thetotalavailablepipelinecapacityfromthetwocountriescombined,whichisnotutilized,was
approximately1millionbbl/d.Theamountcouldpotentiallyincreaseto4.3millionbbl/dbytheendofthis
year,asbothcountrieshaverecentlycompletedstepstoincreasestandbypipelinecapacitytobypassthe
Strait.
Iraqhasonemajorcrudeoilpipeline,theKirkukCeyhan(IraqTurkey)Pipelinethattransportsoilfromthe
northofIraqtotheTurkishMediterraneanportofCeyhan.Thispipelinepumpedabout0.4millionbbl/din
2011,farbelowitsnameplatecapacityof1.6millionbbl/dandithasbeenthetargetofsabotageattacks.
Moreover,thispipelinecannotsendadditionalvolumestobypasstheStraitofHormuzunlessitreceivesoil
fromsouthernIraqviatheStrategicPipeline,whichlinksnorthernandsouthernIraq.Currently,portionsof
theStrategicPipelineareclosed,andrenovationstotheStrategicPipelinecouldtakeseveralyearsto
complete.
SaudiArabiahasthe745milelongPetroline,alsoknownastheEastWestPipeline,whichrunsfromacross
SaudiArabiafromitsAbqaiq complextotheRedSea.ThePetrolinesystemconsistsoftwopipelineswitha
totalnameplatecapacityofabout4.8millionbbl/d.The56inchpipelinehasanameplatecapacityof3million
bbl/danditscurrentthroughputisabout2millionbbl/d.
The48inchpipelinehadbeenoperatinginrecentyearsasanaturalgaspipeline,butSaudiArabia.recently
converteditbacktoanoilpipeline.TheswitchcouldincreaseSaudiArabia'sspareoilpipelinecapacityto
bypasstheStraitofHormuzfrom1millionbbl/dto2.8millionbbl/d,whichisonlyattainableifthesystemis
Source:EIA/DOE,WorldOilTransitChokepoints,August2012,http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions
abletooperateatitsfullnameplatecapacity.
topics2.cfm?fips=WOTC&trk=c .
72

AlternativeRoutestotheStraitofHormuz 2
TheUAEconstructeda1.5millionbbl/dAbuDhabiCrudeOilPipelinethatrunsfromHabshan,acollection
pointforAbuDhabi'sonshoreoilfields,totheportofFujairahontheGulfofOman,allowingcrudeoil
shipmentstocircumventHormuz.Thepipelinewasrecentlyopenedandthefirstshipmentof500,000barrels
ofoilwassentthroughthepipelinetotheFujairahoilterminalwhereitwasloadedonatankerandsentto
thePakArabRefineryinPakistan.
Thepipelinewillbeabletoexportupto1.5millionbb/d,ormorethanhalfofUAE'stotalnetoilexports,
onceitreachesfulloperationalcapacityinthenearfuture.However,theUAEdoesnotcurrentlyhavethe
abilitytoutilizethispipelinecompletely,untilitrampstofullcapacity.InlateMay,FujairahrulerSheikh
Hamad binMohammedAlSharqi notedthatthispipelinecapacitycouldrisefurthertoa
maximum1.8millionbbl/d.
SaudiArabiaalsohastwoadditionalpipelinesthatrunparalleltothePetrolinesystemandbypasstheStraitof
Hormuz,butneitherofthemhavetheabilitytotransportadditionalvolumesofoilshouldtheStraitof
Hormuzbeclosed.TheAbqaiqYanbunaturalgasliquidspipelinehasacapacityof290,000bbl/dandis
runningatcapacity.TheIPSA(IraqiPipelinethroughSaudiArabia)isusedtotransportnaturalgastoSaudi
Arabia'swesterncoast.Itwasoriginallybuilttocarry1.65millionbbl/dofcrudeoilfromIraqtotheRedSea,
butSaudiArabialaterconvertedittocarrynaturalgas,andhasnotannouncedplanstoconvertitbackto
transportcrudeoil.
Otherpipelines,suchastheTransArabianPipeline(TAPLINE)runningfromQaisumah inSaudiArabiatoSidon
inLebanon,havebeenoutofserviceforyearsduetowardamage,disuse,orpoliticaldisagreements,and
wouldrequireacompleterenovationbeforebeingusable.Relativelysmallquantities,severalhundred
thousandbarrelsperdayatmost,couldbetruckedtomitigateclosureoftheStraitofHormuz.
73

CurrentlyOperable CrudeOil Pipelines that Bypassthe StraitofHormuz:

IfwarshouldcomewhilesurpluspipelinecapacityisstilllimitedtothehighEIAestimateof
4.3millionbarrelsaday andallpipelineloadingandotherfacilitiesremainedsecure
fromattack thiswouldonlyprovide25%percentofthe17millionbarrelsaday
flowingthroughtheGulf.

Notes:AllestimatesareEIAestimatesasofAugust17,2012andexpressedinmillionbarrelsperday(bbl/d).
1AlthoughtheKirkukCeyhanPipelinehasanominalnameplatecapacityof1.6millionbbl/d,itseffectivecapacityis0.4millionbbl/dbecauseit
cannottransportadditionalvolumesofoiluntiltheStrategicPipelinetowhichitlinkscanberepairedtobringinadditionalvolumesofoilfromthe
southofIraq.
2"UnusedCapacity"isdefinedaspipelinecapacitythatisnotcurrentlyutilizedandcanbereadilyavailable.
3Allestimatesfor2012areratesaroundthemidyearpoint;nottheforecastaveragefor2012.
4The2012throughputratesarebasedoffof2011estimates.
Source:EIA/DOE,WorldOilTransitChokepoints,August2012,http://www.eia.gov/countries/regionstopics2.
cfm?fips=WOTC&trk=c.

74

OverlandOilSupplyPipelines

(Source:http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Persian_Gulf/images/pg_map.pdf)

75

IranianCounterVulnerabilities:

Highly populated, state dominated, corrupt economy with high military spending and major state interference.

Halting all oil exports critical to Iran. EIA reports that,

Pre-sanctions, Iran exported approximately 2.2 million bbl/d of crude oil. Iranian Heavy Crude Oil is Iran's largest crude export followed by
Iranian Light. In 2011, Iran's net oil export revenues amounted to approximately $95 billion. Oil exports provide half of Iran's government
revenues, while crude oil and its derivatives account for nearly 80 percent of Iran's total exports.

Kharg Island, the site of the vast majority of Iran's exports, has a crude storage capacity of 20.2 million barrels of oil and a loading capacity
of 5 million bbl/d. Lavan Island is the second-largest terminal with capacity to store 5 million barrels and loading capacity of 200,000 bbl/d.
Other important terminals include Kish Island, Abadan, Bandar Mahshar, and Neka (which helps facilitate imports from the Caspian
region).

Iran is the second-largest oil consuming country in the Middle East, second only to Saudi Arabia. Iranian domestic oil demand is mainly for
diesel and gasoline. Total oil consumption was approximately 1.8 million bbl/d in 2010, about 10 percent higher than the year before. Iran has
limited refinery capacity for the production of light fuels, and consequently imports a sizeable share of its gasoline supply (Imports 300,000
bbbl of gasoline per day.). Iran's total refinery capacity in January 2011 was about 1.5 million bbl/d, with its nine refineries operated by the
National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC), a NIOC subsidiary.

Refineries and gas distribution critical to economy. Are highly vulnerable.

Natural gas accounts for 54 percent of Iran's total domestic energy consumption.

Key aspects of transportation and power grid are highly vulnerable. Todays precision strike assets allow to know out key,
repairable links or create long term incapacity. They have become weapons of mass effectiveness.

EIA reports Some power plants are running as low as 10 percent of their nameplate capacity as Iran's electricity infrastructure is largely in a
state of dilapidation and rolling blackouts become endemic in summer months. The amount of generation lost in distribution is a central
indicator of the disrepair of the electricity network, with upwards of 19 percent of total generation lost during transmission.

Limited and vulnerable air defenses with only one modern and very short-range air and cruise missile defense system. Will
remain vulnerable to stealth, cruise missiles, and corridor suppression of enemy air defenses unless can get fully modern mix
of radars, C4I/BM assets, and S-300/400 equivalent.

Needs imports of food and product.

Rail system vulnerable. Can use smart mines on all ports.

Naval embargo presents issues in maritime law, but can halt all Iranian traffic, inspect all incoming shipping.

No fly zone would affect operations, especially if include helicopters. Warning could affect civil aviation.

KeyTargetsthatIllustrateIransVulnerability
Criticaldependenceonrefinerieswithhighcost,longleadfacilitiesandonimportsofproduct.

Minimalpowergridthatcanbecrippledordestroyedselectivelyonaregionalornationalbasis.

GasproductionanddistributionfacilitiesneededbyIransdomesticeconomy.

Keybridges,tunnels,overpassesandmountainroutesforroadandrailtraffic.

Gulftankerloadingfacilities,oilstorageandandtankerterminals forminingordirectattack.

Keymilitaryproductionfacilities

Commandandcontrolcenters.

Communicationsgrids.

Airfieldandairbases.

IRGCland,air,andnavalfacilities.

Coastalnavalbasesandportfacilities.

79

IsraeliPreventiveStrikeOptions
ScenarioI:
IsraeliAirforceCombatAircraft

81

IsraeliStrike:

ItispossiblethatIsraelwillcarryoutastrikeagainstIranianNuclearFacilities,iftheU.S.doesnot,withthe
objectiveofeitherdestroyingtheprogramordelayingitforsomeyears.ThesuccessoftheStrikeMissionwillbe
measuredbyhowmuchoftheEnrichmentprogramhasitdestroyed,orthenumberofyearsithasdelayed
IranianacquisitionofenoughUraniumorPlutoniumfromtheArakreactortobuildanuclearbomb.

WeconcludethatamilitarystrikebyIsraelagainstIranianNuclearFacilitiesispossibleandtheoptimumroute
wouldbealongtheSyrianTurkishborderthenoverasmallportionofIraqthenintoIran,andbackthesame
route.However,thenumberofaircraftrequired,refuelingalongthewayandgettingtothetargetswithout
beingdetectedorinterceptedwouldbecomplexandhighriskandwouldlackanyassurancesthattheoverall
missionwillhaveahighsuccessrate.

TheU.S.wouldcertainlybeperceivedasbeingapartoftheconspiracyandhavingassistedandgivenIsraelthe
greenlight,whetheritdidorhadnopartinitwhatsoever.ThiswouldunderminetheU.S.objectivesin
increasingstabilityintheregionandbringingaboutapeacefulsolutiontotheArabIsraeliconflict.Itwillalso
harmforaverylongperiodoftimerelationsbetweentheU.S.anditscloseregionalallies.

AnotherscenarioisinusingLowYieldEarthPenetratingNuclearWeaponsasasubstituteforconventional
weaponstoattackdeeplyburiednuclearfacilitiesinIran.Somebelievethatthesearetheonlyweaponsthatcan
destroytargetsdeepundergroundorintunnels.

TheU.S.wouldnotallowanyothercountry,evenastrongallysuchasIsrael,tousethem,unlessanother
countryhadusednuclearweaponsagainsttheU.S.anditsallies.

AstrikebyIsraelonIranwillgiverisetoregionalinstabilityandconflictaswellas terrorism.Theregional
securityconsequenceswillbecatastrophic.

NorthernRoute

CentralRoute

SouthernRoute

83

IsraeliStrikeagainstIranianNuclearFacilities
MainTargetSet

Caspian
Sea

Turkey

Qum:Enrichment
FacilitywithTunnel
Entrances

Tehran

Natanz:Uranium
EnrichmentFacility
(65,000sqm)

Syria
Iraq

Iran
ARAK:HeavyWaterPlant
andFuturePlutonium
ProductionReactor
(5,500sqm)

Esfahan:NuclearResearch
Center.UraniumConversion
Facility(UCF).
(10,000sqm)

Jordan
Bushehr:1000MW

SaudiArabia

NuclearPowerPlant

84

(440 nmi)

(420 nmi)
To Esfahan

(250 nmi) from

North of
Israel

85

MissionAnalysis:
ApproximaterangetothefurthesttargetEsfahanissome1,110nmi.Whenapproachingthe550nmi
range,theF15EsandF16IsneedtorefuelonthewaytoIranandonthewayback.
Refuelingcanbedoneinthreeways:
o RefuelingfromKC135AandKC10tankers.
o BuddyRefuelingbetweenF15EsandF16Is
o Atemporarylandingstrip,alongtheSyrian,TurkishandNorthernIraqregion,whereaircraft
refuelingisavailable.
TotalFuelinanF15EfortheHiLoLoHistrikemissionis26,300lbs,whereasthatforanF16Iisabout
14,755lbs.Thetotalmaximumstrikepackagewasaround80aircraft,allthe30F15IintheIsraeliAirforce
Inventory plus55F16I/C.TheF15Ewouldthenneed5to6KC130storefuelfrom,andtheF16Iswould
require6to7KC130.
Israelpresentlyhas5KC130Hand4B700(SourceIISS).SoalltheIsraeliTankerswillhavetobe
airbornetoservicetheF15EandF16IStrikeForceduringtheoutboundlegandinboundlegsofthe
mission.Couldbedifficulttofindalocationalongtheroutesuchthatthetankerscouldavoiddetection
andpossibleinterception.
Theseestimatesweredoneassuminga100%aircraftandweaponsoperationalreliabilityandthestrike
forcenotencounteringanyIranianAirandGroundDefense.Soifwegivetheoverallreliabilitytobe90%
thenweshouldaddaround9to10moreaircraft,bringingthetotalstrikeforceto95.
Soinessenceover25%ofthehighendcombataircraftofIsraeliAirforceand100%oftheTankerswill
havetobeallocatedforthismission.
86

Onestrikewouldnotnecessarilybeenoughtoachievethemissionobjectives.Strikeaircraft
needtoreturnforanotherstrike.ThiswouldputaheavyburdenontheIsraeliAirforce.

WecanconcludethatamilitarystrikebytheIsraeliAirforceagainstIranianNuclearFacilitiesis
possible,however,itwouldbecomplexandhighriskintheoperationallevelandwouldlackany
assurancesofahighmissionsuccessrate.

Iranianretaliationwillhaveadevastatingregionalconsequences.U.S.expectsIsraeltobe
responsibleandnottocarryoutsuchastrike.

Airtogroundstrikemissioncanbedifficulttoimplementandwouldinvolvesomerisks.Flyingona
verytightroute,practicallyhuggingtheTurkishSyrianborders.Aerialrefuelingalongthewayand
avoidbeingdetectedbyTurkey,SyriaandtheU.S.FlyingdowntoS/LwheninIranianterritory,avoid
beingdetectedbyflyinglowandapplyingECMalltheway.IfdetectedbyIranianairdefensethe
strikeformationshouldbepreparedtoencounterinterceptors,andtoencounteringfiringof
groundbasedSAMs.

87

IsraeliPreventiveStrikeOptions
ScenarioII:
LowYieldEarthPenetratingNuclearWeapons

88

LowYieldEarthPenetratingNuclearWeapons
Anotherscenarioisusingthesewarheadsasasubstituteforconventionalweaponstoattackdeeplyburied
nuclearfacilitiesinIran.Somebelievethatnuclearweaponsaretheonlyweaponsthatcandestroytargets
deepundergroundorintunnels.
TheguntypeUraniumbasednuclearbombdroppedonHiroshimabytheU.S.inAugustof1945wasabout
8,000poundsinweight,andcontainedabout60kgofweaponsgradeHighlyEnrichedUranium(HEU),ofwhich
about0.7kgunderwentfissionproducingaYieldof12.5kilotons.ThePlutoniumimplosionbombdroppedon
Negasakiweighedabout10,800poundsandcontainedabout6.4kgofweaponsgradePlutoniumPU239.
Producingayieldof22kilotons.inthesubsequentyearstheU.S.wasabletoproducePlutoniumimplosion
nuclearbombsinthesameyieldrangewithweightsdownto2,000lbsandless.
IfBallisticMissilesareusedtocarryoutthemission,IsraelhashaveaBallisticMissileDefenseSystemwhereas
Irandoesnothaveone,suchastheRussianS300PMU2Favorit,thatwasdesignedto interceptballistic
missilesaswellascombataircraft.

89

USSimulationsoftheConsequences
ofanIsraeliStrike

91

TheNewYorkTimes,March19,2012
U.S.WarGamesSeesPerilsofIsraeliStrikeAgainstIran

AclassifiedwarsimulationheldthismonthtoassesstherepercussionsofanIsraeliattackonIran
forecaststhatthestrikewouldleadtoawiderregionalwar,whichcoulddrawintheUnitedStatesand
leavehundredsofAmericansdead,accordingtoAmericanofficials.

TheofficialssaidthesocalledwargamewasnotdesignedasarehearsalforAmericanmilitaryaction
andtheyemphasizedthattheexercisesresultswerenottheonlypossibleoutcomeofarealworld
conflict.

ButthegamehasraisedfearsamongtopAmericanplannersthatitmaybeimpossibletopreclude
AmericaninvolvementinanyescalatingconfrontationwithIran,theofficialssaid.Inthedebate
amongpolicymakersovertheconsequencesofanyIsraeliattack,thatreactionmaygivestronger
voicetothoseintheWhiteHouse,Pentagonandintelligencecommunitywhohavewarnedthata
strikecouldproveperilousfortheUnitedStates.

TheresultsofthewargamewereparticularlytroublingtoGen.JamesN.Mattis,whocommandsall
AmericanforcesintheMiddleEast,PersianGulfandSouthwestAsia,accordingtoofficialswhoeither
participatedintheCentralCommandexerciseorwhowerebriefedontheresultsandspokeon
conditionofanonymitybecauseofitsclassifiednature.Whentheexercisehadconcludedearlierthis
month,accordingtotheofficials,GeneralMattistoldaidesthatanIsraelifirststrikewouldbelikelyto
havedireconsequencesacrosstheregionandforUnitedStatesforcesthere.

Thetwoweekwargame,calledInternalLook,playedoutanarrativeinwhichtheUnitedStatesfound
itwaspulledintotheconflictafterIranianmissilesstruckaNavywarshipinthePersianGulf,killing
about200Americans,accordingtoofficialswithknowledgeoftheexercise.TheUnitedStatesthen
retaliatedbycarryingoutitsownstrikesonIraniannuclearfacilities.
92

TheinitialIsraeliattackwasassessedtohavesetbacktheIraniannuclearprogrambyroughlyayear,andthe
subsequentAmericanstrikesdidnotslowtheIraniannuclearprogrambymorethananadditionaltwoyears.
However,otherPentagonplannershavesaidthatAmericasarsenaloflongrangebombers,refuelingaircraft
andprecisionmissilescoulddofarmoredamagetotheIraniannuclearprogram ifPresidentObamawereto
decideonafullscaleretaliation.

Theexercisewasdesignedspecificallytotestinternalmilitarycommunicationsandcoordinationamongbattle
staffsinthePentagon;inTampa,Fla.,wheretheheadquartersoftheCentralCommandislocated;andinthe
PersianGulfintheaftermathofanIsraelistrike.Buttheexercisewaswrittentoassessapressing,potential,
realworldsituation.Intheend,thewargamereinforcedtomilitaryofficialstheunpredictableand
uncontrollablenatureofastrikebyIsrael,andacounterstrikebyIran,theofficialssaid.

AmericanandIsraeliintelligenceservicesbroadlyagreeontheprogressIranhasmadetoenrichuranium.But
theydisagreeonhowmuchtimetherewouldbetopreventIranfrombuildingaweaponifleadersinTehran
decidedtogoaheadwithone.

WiththeIsraelissayingpubliclythatthewindowtopreventIranfrombuildinganuclearbombisclosing,
AmericanofficialsseeanIsraeliattackonIranwithinthenextyearasapossibility.Theyhavesaidprivately
thattheybelievethatIsraelwouldprobablygivetheUnitedStateslittleornowarningshouldIsraeliofficials
makethedecisiontostrikeIraniannuclearsites.

Officialssaidthat,underthechainofeventsinthewargame,IranbelievedthatIsraelandtheUnitedStates
werepartnersinanystrikeagainstIraniannuclearsitesandthereforeconsideredAmericanmilitaryforcesin
thePersianGulfascomplicitintheattack.IranianjetschasedIsraeliwarplanesaftertheattack,andIranians
launchedmissilesatanAmericanwarshipinthePersianGulf,viewedasanactofwarthatallowedan
Americanretaliation.
93

Appendix

Mission Planning Payloads

GBU27

BLU1092000lbclasspenetratingwarhead.Penetrates1.8
to2.4metersofconcrete/hardtargetsdependingonangle
ofattach.Itcarries550lbsofhighexplosives,andcan
penetratemorethan6feetofreinforcedconcrete.

This2000lbweaponwouldbemostlikelyused
againsttheEsfahanUraniumConversionFacility.In
additiontheGBU10canalsobeused.

GBU28

BLU1135000lbclasspenetratingwarhead.Penetratesat
least6meters(20feet)ofconcrete,presumablyreinforced
concreteand30meters(100ft)ofearth.

TheGBU28/BLU1135000lbpenetratorwouldbe
themostlikelyweaponofchoiceagainstthe
NatanzCentrifugeFacilityaswellastheEsfahan
UraniumConversionFacility.

Itisa5,000lblaserguidedconventionalmunitionsthat
usesa4,000lbpenetratingwarheadblast/fragmentation,
whichcontains630poundsofexplosive.

UsedasaBunkerBuster.2properlysequenced
GBUswouldmostcertainlypenetratethe30
metersofearthandupto6mofconcrete.
TheProbabilityofHit(PH)of2GBUsaimedatthe
samepointessentiallyonefollowingtheotheris
50%.

Peak Overpressure Distance

Weapon

Warhead(kg)

10psi
(ft)

5psi
(ft)

3psi
(ft)

GBU28

306

62

92

125

GBU27

240

59

89

118

GB10

428

69

105

144

95

TargetDamageProbabilityEstimates
Wepresentthedestructivecapabilitiesofvariousnuclearweapons:
SurfaceBurstsorContactBurstsatthegroundsurface
Thosethatburstafterpenetratingthesurface

TheaboveshowsthattheEarthPenetratorWeapon(EPW)needstobeofsufficientyield

tobeeffectiveagainsttargetsofinterest.Fordeeplyburiedtargets,anEPWismore
effectivethanacontactburst(surfaceburst)ofthesameyield.Theprobabilityofdamage
fora300ktEPWat3metersDepthofBlast(DOB)isequivalenttothatfora5to6Megaton
SurfaceBurstofthesameaccuracy.
Ingeneral,fordeeplyburiedtargets,anEPWyieldsintherangeofseveralhundredsof
kilotonstoaMegatonareneededtoeffectivelyholdthesetargetsofinterestatriskwitha
highprobabilityofdestruction.
(Source:EffectsofNuclearEarthPenetratorandOtherWeapons.NationalResearchCouncil.http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11282.html)

96

 EarthPenetratorWeapon(EPW)at3
metersdepthofburstwith100metersCEP
accuracy,againstadeeplyburiedtarget.
ForafixedCEP,effectivenessisnotstrongly
dependentontargethardness.

EarthPenetratorWeapon(EPW)at3
metersdepthofburstwith10metersCEP
accuracy,againstadeeplyburiedtarget.
ForafixedCEP,effectivenessisnotstrongly
dependentontargethardness.

(Source:EffectsofNuclearEarthPenetratorandOther
Weapons.NationalResearchCouncil.
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11282.html)

97