HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 179987
April 29, 2009
en banc
FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration
before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang
Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purcha
sed the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-inter
est had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession
of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property
was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-gra
ndfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteb
an the fourth being Aristedes s grandfather. Upon Lino s death, his four sons inherite
d the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban s wife, Magda
lena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazc
o sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their
son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property
that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated
11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, D
epartment of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that t
he subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land pe
r Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approv
ed as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. On 3 December 2002, the RTC approv
ed the application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabana
n had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had be
en in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time requir
ed by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of
Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.
ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be re
gistered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable an
d disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification oc
cur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided t
hat it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parce
l of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and ther
efore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Co
de?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because
of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable und
er Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisio

ns of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their nam
es under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or b
oth?
HELD:
The Pertition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Sectio
n 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselv
es or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, excl
usive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, sinc
e June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands
based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does n
ot require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the e
ntire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirm
ation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, s
ubject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, conside
r that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring o
wnership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patri
monial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposab
le. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is
already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development
of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the prope
rty has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of pr
operty of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acqui
res ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is en
titled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Regist
ration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acq
uired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescrip
tion, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession f
or at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordina
ry acquisitive prescription, a person s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrim
onial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just
title, ripens into ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that M
alabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malaban
an or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date
back their possession, according to their own evidence the Tax Declarations they p
resented in particular is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.

While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, the
re is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or
for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of t
he Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and dispo
sable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the pu
blic dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible
to acquisition by prescription.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 154953

June 26, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 21 August 2002 Decision
2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658. The Court of Appeals affirmed
in toto the 16 December 1999 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan,
Batangas, Branch 6 (trial court) in Land Registration Case No. T-635.
The Antecedent Facts
This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title file
d by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. covering Lot 10705-B of the subdivision plan Csd-04
-019741 which is a portion of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Ca
dastre. The land, with an area of 564,007 square meters, or 56.4007 hectares, is
located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
On 31 August 1999, the trial court set the case for initial hearing at 9:30 a.m.
on 11 November 1999. The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Officia
l Gazette, 20 September 1999 issue, Volume 95, No. 38, pages 6793 to 6794,4 and
in the 18 October 1999 issue of People s Journal Taliba,5 a newspaper of general c
irculation in the Philippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing was also posted in
a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the Municipal Building of Sto. Toma
s, Batangas, as well as in a conspicuous place on the land.6 All adjoining owner
s and all government agencies and offices concerned were notified of the initial
hearing.7
On 11 November 1999, when the trial court called the case for initial hearing, t
here was no oppositor other than the Opposition dated 7 October 1999 of the Repu
blic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands (petitioner). On 15
November 1999, the trial court issued an Order8 of General Default against the
whole world except as against petitioner.
During the hearing on 19 November 1999, Ceferino Carandang (Carandang) appeared
as oppositor. The trial court gave Carandang until 29 November 1999 within which
to file his written opposition.9 Carandang failed to file his written oppositio
n and to appear in the succeeding hearings. In an Order10 dated 13 December 1999

, the trial court reinstated the Order of General Default.

During the hearings conducted on 13 and 14 December 1999, respondent presented t
hree witnesses: Anthony Dimayuga Torres (Torres), respondent s Operations Manager
and its authorized representative in the case; Primitivo Evangelista (Evangelist
a), a 72-year old resident of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas since birth; a
nd Regalado Marquez, Records Officer II of the Land Registration Authority (LRA)
, Quezon City.
The testimonies of respondent s witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang
Puroy) had peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous possession of the land in the
concept of an owner since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by
his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27 September 1960, Antonio executed a De
ed of Donation covering the land in favor of one of his children, Fortunato Dima
yuga (Fortunato). Later, however, Antonio gave Fortunato another piece of land.
Hence, on 26 April 1961, Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of Donation, and
the land was adjudicated to one of Antonio s children, Prospero Dimayuga (Porting)
.11 On 8 August 1997, Porting sold the land to respondent.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated the land in favor
of respondent.
The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for r
egistration of land provided such entity and its predecessors-in-interest have p
ossessed the land for 30 years or more. The trial court ruled that the facts sho
wed that respondent s predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in the concept o
f an owner prior to 12 June 1945, which possession converted the land to private
property.
The dispositive portion of the trial court s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order of General Default, the C
ourt hereby adjudicates and decrees Lot 10705-B, identical to Lot 13637, Cad-424
, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, on plan Csd-04-019741, situated in Barangay of San Bartol
ome, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, with an area of 564,007 s
quare meters, in favor of and in the name of T.A.N. Properties, Inc., a domestic
corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws with principal of
fice at 19th Floor, PDCP Bank Building, 8737 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.
Once this Decision shall have become final, let the corresponding decree of regi
stration be issued.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner appealed from the trial court s Decision. Petitioner alleged that the t
rial court erred in granting the application for registration absent clear evide
nce that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have complied with the p
eriod of possession and occupation as required by law. Petitioner alleged that t
he testimonies of Evangelista and Torres are general in nature. Considering the
area involved, petitioner argued that additional witnesses should have been pres
ented to corroborate Evangelista s testimony.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial
court s Decision.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelista s knowledge of the possession and occu

pation of the land stemmed not only from the fact that he worked there for three
years but also because he and Kabesang Puroy were practically neighbors. On Eva
ngelista s failure to mention the name of his uncle who continuously worked on the
land, the Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelista should not be faulted as he w
as not asked to name his uncle when he testified. The Court of Appeals also rule
d that at the outset, Evangelista disclaimed knowledge of Fortunato s relation to
Kabesang Puroy, but this did not affect Evangelista s statement that Fortunato too
k over the possession and cultivation of the land after Kabesang Puroy s death. Th
e Court of Appeals further ruled that the events regarding the acquisition and d
isposition of the land became public knowledge because San Bartolome was a small
community. On the matter of additional witnesses, the Court of Appeals ruled th
at petitioner failed to cite any law requiring the corroboration of the sole wit
ness testimony.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that Torres was a competent witness since he
was only testifying on the fact that he had caused the filing of the application
for registration and that respondent acquired the land from Porting.
Petitioner comes to this Court assailing the Court of Appeals
r raises the following grounds in its Memorandum:

Decision. Petitione

The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in allowing the grant of title t
o applicant corporation despite the following:
1. Absence of showing that it or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuo
us, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in the concept of an owne
r since 12 June 1945 or earlier; and
2. Disqualification of applicant corporation to acquire the subject tract of lan
d.13
The Issues
The issues may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;
2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, excl
usive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an
owner since June 1945 or earlier; and
3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under t
he Public Land Act.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Respondent Failed to Prove
that the Land is Alienable and Disposable
Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has the burden of ove
rcoming the presumption that the land forms part of the public domain. Petitione
r insists that respondent failed to prove that the land is no longer part of the
public domain.
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of privat
e dominion presumably belong to the State.14 The onus to overturn, by incontrove
rtible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for reg
istration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant.15

In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department o

f Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas City,16 c
ertified that "lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San
Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an area of 596,116 square meters falls with
in the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 30, Land Classification M
ap No. 582 certified [on] 31 December 1925." The second certification17 in the f
orm of a memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the Regional Technic
al Director, Forest Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated "that the
subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land, Project No. 30 of S
to. Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582."
The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20,18
dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the offices with
in the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of
land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The Provincial Environme
nt and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land classificati
on status for lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38,19 dated 19 April 1990
, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the au
thority of the CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for are
as below 50 hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO to issue certificate
s of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares.20 In this c
ase, respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot
10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate cove
red the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO
No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alie
nable and disposable.
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 an
d 38 to issue certificates of land classification. Under DAO No. 20, the Regiona
l Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products (OM) permits except ra
ttan;
2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for publi
c infrastructure projects; and
4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for logs, poles, piles, and lu
mber dealers.
Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products] (OM) permits except
rattan;
2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, poles, and piles and
lumber dealers;
3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters within calamity de
clared areas for public infrastructure projects; and
5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits covering over five hecta
res for public infrastructure projects.

Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in

the form of a memorandum to the trial court, has no probative value.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alien
able and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DEN
R Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the pu
blic domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the applic
ation for registration falls within the approved area per verification through s
urvey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration mu
st present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. The
se facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent d
o not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondent s Operations Manager, identified the certifications submit
ted by respondent. The government officials who issued the certifications were n
ot presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial cour
t should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the fa
cts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admi
ssible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land i
s alienable and disposable.
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Ph
ilippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testamen
ts; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by la
w to be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in S
ection 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official p
ublication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of
the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official repository or
legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as
alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publicatio
n21 of the DENR Secretary s issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie e
vidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, ev
en against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of
the date of the latter.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall
within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Secti
on 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries made by
the Civil Registrar22 in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the sh
ip s logbook.23 The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated r
eproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government o
ffice. The certifications are not even records of public documents.24 The certif

ications are conclusions unsupported by adequate proof, and thus have no probati
ve value.25 Certainly, the certifications cannot be considered prima facie evide
nce of the facts stated therein.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove
that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed b
y the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere issua
nce, prove the facts stated therein.26 Such government certifications may fall u
nder the class of documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of
Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due exe
cution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of t
he facts stated therein.
The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the test
imony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated therein.27 Here
, Torres, a private individual and respondent s representative, identified the cer
tifications but the government officials who issued the certifications did not t
estify on the contents of the certifications. As such, the certifications cannot
be given probative value.28 The contents of the certifications are hearsay beca
use Torres was incompetent to testify on the veracity of the contents of the cer
tifications.29 Torres did not prepare the certifications, he was not an officer
of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not conduct any verification survey whether the
land falls within the area classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and di
sposable.
Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when the land allegedly became
alienable and disposable. The DENR Secretary certified that based on Land Classi
fication Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 19
25. However, the certificate on the blue print plan states that it became aliena
ble and disposable on 31 December 1985.
We agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted by respondent s
how that under the Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable an
d disposable on 31 December 1925, the blue print plan states that it became alie
nable and disposable on 31 December 1985. Respondent alleged that "the blue prin
t plan merely serves to prove the precise location and the metes and bounds of t
he land described therein x x x and does not in any way certify the nature and c
lassification of the land involved."30 It is true that the notation by a surveyo
r-geodetic engineer on the survey plan that the land formed part of the alienabl
e and disposable land of the public domain is not sufficient proof of the land s c
lassification.31 However, respondent should have at least presented proof that w
ould explain the discrepancy in the dates of classification. Marquez, LRA Record
s Officer II, testified that the documents submitted to the court consisting of
the tracing cloth plan, the technical description of Lot 10705-B, the approved s
ubdivision plan, and the Geodetic Engineer s certification were faithful reproduct
ions of the original documents in the LRA office. He did not explain the discrep
ancy in the dates. Neither was the Geodetic Engineer presented to explain why th
e date of classification on the blue print plan was different from the other cer
tifications submitted by respondent.
There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious
Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner
Petitioner alleges that the trial court s reliance on the testimonies of Evangelis
ta and Torres was misplaced. Petitioner alleges that Evangelista s statement that
the possession of respondent s predecessors-in-interest was open, public, continuo
us, peaceful, and adverse to the whole world was a general conclusion of law rat
her than factual evidence of possession of title. Petitioner alleges that respon
dent failed to establish that its predecessors-in-interest had held the land ope
nly, continuously, and exclusively for at least 30 years after it was declared a

lienable and disposable.

We agree with petitioner.
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the land bef
ore 1945. Yet, Evangelista only worked on the land for three years. Evangelista
testified that his family owned a lot near Kabesang Puroy s land. The Court of App
eals took note of this and ruled that Evangelista s knowledge of Kabesang Puroy s po
ssession of the land stemmed "not only from the fact that he had worked thereat
but more so that they were practically neighbors."32 The Court of Appeals observ
ed:
In a small community such as that of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, it is
not difficult to understand that people in the said community knows each and eve
ryone. And, because of such familiarity with each other, news or events regardin
g the acquisition or disposition for that matter, of a vast tract of land spread
s like wildfire, thus, the reason why such an event became of public knowledge t
o them.33
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by Fortunato. However, h
e admitted that he did not know the exact relationship between Kabesang Puroy an
d Fortunato, which is rather unusual for neighbors in a small community. He did
not also know the relationship between Fortunato and Porting. In fact, Evangelis
ta s testimony is contrary to the factual finding of the trial court that Kabesang
Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio, not by Fortunato who was one of Antonio s
children. Antonio was not even mentioned in Evangelista s testimony.
The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires that the testimony
of a single witness needs corroboration. However, in this case, we find Evangel
ista s uncorroborated testimony insufficient to prove that respondent s predecessors
-in-interest had been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner for m
ore than 30 years. We cannot consider the testimony of Torres as sufficient corr
oboration. Torres testified primarily on the fact of respondent s acquisition of t
he land. While he claimed to be related to the Dimayugas, his knowledge of their
possession of the land was hearsay. He did not even tell the trial court where
he obtained his information.
The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax
declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of
claim of ownership.34 Respondent did not present any credible explanation why th
e realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimay
ugas were allegedly in possession of the land before 1945. The payment of the re
alty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that the Dimayugas claime
d ownership or possession of the land only in that year.
Land Application by a Corporation
Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply for regi
stration of the land of the public domain in this case.
We agree with petitioner.
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or t
imber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domai
n may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be de
voted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lan
ds. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of th
e public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, r

enewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hec
tares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred
hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestea
d or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development,
and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine
, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, develope
d, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.
The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring a
ny kind of alienable land of the public domain. In Chavez v. Public Estates Auth
ority,35 the Court traced the law on disposition of lands of the public domain.
Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no prohibition against private corporatio
ns from acquiring agricultural land. The 1973 Constitution limited the alienatio
n of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the Philippi
nes. Under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly owned by
Filipino citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the publ
ic domain. The present 1987 Constitution continues the prohibition against priva
te corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.3
6 The Court explained in Chavez:
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution bannin
g private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public d
omain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporat
ions to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. x x x x
[I]f the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution
could have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain that
corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have followed the limitation
s on individuals, who could acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands
of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares
under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing
the land in the name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the
break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a corporati
on, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporati
on instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continu
ing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to
the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limita
tion on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands
of the public domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already a
cquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily se
t up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could ow
n as many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hi
de his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the
corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitu
tional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public
domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer
ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qu
alified individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision p
rohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, sin
ce the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The available
alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-growing
population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this constitu

tional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only to i
ndividuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the const
itutional ban.37
In Director of Lands v. IAC,38 the Court allowed the land registration proceedin
g filed by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. (Acme) for five parcels of land with
an area of 481,390 square meters, or 48.139 hectares, which Acme acquired from m
embers of the Dumagat tribe. The issue in that case was whether the title could
be confirmed in favor of Acme when the proceeding was instituted after the effec
tivity of the 1973 Constitution which prohibited private corporations or associa
tions from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to e
xceed 1,000 hectares. The Court ruled that the land was already private land whe
n Acme acquired it from its owners in 1962, and thus Acme acquired a registrable
title. Under the 1935 Constitution, private corporations could acquire public a
gricultural lands not exceeding 1,024 hectares while individuals could acquire n
ot more than 144 hectares.39
In Director of Lands, the Court further ruled that open, exclusive, and undisput
ed possession of alienable land for the period prescribed by law created the leg
al fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure
and without the need of judicial or other sanction ceases to be public land and
becomes private property. The Court ruled:
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering po
ssession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by sta
tute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the
statute itself that the possessor(s) "x x x shall be conclusively presumed to h
ave performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be en
titled to a certificate of title x x x." No proof being admissible to overcome a
conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more
than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession cl
aimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereund
er would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proc
eedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but o
nly confirm such a conversion already effected by operation of law from the mome
nt the required period of possession became complete.
x x x [A]lienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his pre
decessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed s
tatutory period of (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted
to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject o
f this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the
Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the t
ime no prohibition against said corporation s holding or owning private land. x x
x.40 (Emphasis supplied)
Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. In Director of Lands, t
he "land x x x was already private property at the time it was acquired x x x by
Acme." In this case, respondent acquired the land on 8 August 1997 from Porting
, who, along with his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to have been, as o
f that date, in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the land for 30 year
s since 12 June 1945. In short, when respondent acquired the land from Porting,
the land was not yet private property.
For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to file for registration
of alienable and disposable land, the corporation must have acquired the land w
hen its transferor had already a vested right to a judicial confirmation of titl
e to the land by virtue of his open, continuous and adverse possession of the la
nd in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years since 12 June 1945. Thus, in

Natividad v. Court of Appeals,41 the Court declared:

Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the above rulings, the parcels of l
and in question had already been converted to private ownership through acquisit
ive prescription by the predecessors-in-interest of TCMC when the latter purchas
ed them in 1979. All that was needed was the confirmation of the titles of the p
revious owners or predecessors-in-interest of TCMC.
Being already private land when TCMC bought them in 1979, the prohibition in the
1973 Constitution against corporations acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain except through lease (Article XIV, Section 11, 1973 Constitution) did not
apply to them for they were no longer alienable lands of the public domain but
private property.
What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the
corporate applicant for land registration to establish that when it acquired the
land, the same was already private land by operation of law because the statuto
ry acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed. The length of
possession of the land by the corporation cannot be tacked on to complete the s
tatutory 30 years acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail
of such acquisitive prescription since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions proh
ibit corporations from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original registration o
f land under the doctrine in Director of Lands. Republic Act No. 917642 (RA 9176
) further amended the Public Land Act43 and extended the period for the filing o
f applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to a
lienable and disposable lands of the public domain until 31 December 2020. Thus:
Sec. 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted
time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefi
ts of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the area a
pplied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the sev
eral periods of time designated by the President in accordance with Section Fort
y-five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of
this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any of said
persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by
the President.
Sec. 3. All pending applications filed before the effectivity of this amendatory
Act shall be treated as having been filed in accordance with the provisions of
this Act.
Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12 h
ectares, consistent with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that a
private individual may only acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and d
isposable land. Hence, respondent, as successor-in-interest of an individual own
er of the land, cannot apply for registration of land in excess of 12 hectares.
Since respondent applied for 56.4007 hectares, the application for the excess ar
ea of 44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab initio. In applying
for land registration, a private corporation cannot have any right higher than i
ts predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right. This assumes, of cour
se, that the corporation acquired the land, not exceeding 12 hectares, when the
land had already become private land by operation of law. In the present case, r
espondent has failed to prove that any portion of the land was already private l
and when respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997.

WHEREFORE, we
A-G.R. CV No.
t of Tanauan,
e application

SET ASIDE the 21

66658 and the 16
Batangas, Branch
for registration

August 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in C

December 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Cour
6 in Land Registration Case No. T-635. We DENY th
filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

- versus -

CAYETANO L. SERRANO,[1] and HEIRS OF CATALINO M. ALAAN, represented by PAULITA P

. ALAAN,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 183063

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

February 24, 2010

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D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Respondent Cayetano L. Serrano (Cayetano) filed on September 21, 1988 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City an application for registration,[2] d
ocketed as LRC Case No. 270, over a 533-square meter parcel of commercial land k
nown as Lot 249 ([on Plan Psu-157485] the lot), located in Poblacion Cabadbaran,
Agusan del Norte.

Cayetano claimed to have acquired the lot by inheritance from his deceased paren
ts, Simeon Serrano (Simeon) and Agustina Luz; by virtue of a Deed of Exchange[3]
dated February 10, 1961; and by a private deed of partition and extrajudicial s
ettlement forged by him and his co-heirs.

Invoking the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Regis
tration Decree or, in the alternative, the provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 4
8(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,[4] Cayetano also claimed to have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot under a claim of owne
rship before 1917 by himself and through his deceased parents predecessors-in-inte
rest or for more than 70 years.

The Heirs of Catalino Alaan, represented by Paulita Alaan (Paulita),[5] interven

ed and filed an application for registration,[6] their predecessor-in-interest C
atalino Alaan (Catalino) having purchased[7] a 217.45-square meter undivided por
tion of the lot from Cayetano on February 27, 1989 during the pendency of Cayeta
no s application for registration.

The intervenor-heirs of Catalino, also invoking the provisions of

the Pro
perty Registration Decree or, alternatively, of Chapter VIII, Section 48(b) of C
ommonwealth Act No. 141, prayed that their application for confirmation of title
be considered jointly with that of Cayetano s, and that, thereafter, original cer
tificates of title be issued in both their names.

Cayetano raised no objection or opposition to the intervenor-Heirs of Catalino s

application for registration.[8]

Cayetano s brother-attorney-in-fact Leonardo Serrano (Leonardo) represented him a

t the hearings of the application. During the pendency of the case, Cayetano pas
sed away[9] and was substituted by his heirs.

At the trial, the following pieces of documentary evidence, inter alia, were pre
sented to support Cayetano s claim of ownership over the lot: original survey plan
dated January 3, 1957 and certified by the Department of Environment and Natura
l Resources (DENR), and Bureau of Lands Director Zoilo Castrillo,[10] technical
description of the lot (Psu-157485),[11] Tax Declarations for the years 1924 (in
the name of Simeon) and 1948-1997 (in the name of either Simeon [deceased] or C
ayetano),[12] official receipts showing real estate tax payments (from 1948-1997
),[13] and Surveyor s Certificate No. 157485 dated January 1957.[14]

As Cayetano s sole witness Leonardo was already physically infirm (hard of hearing
and due to old age) at the time trial commenced, his testimony was taken by dep
osition on written interrogatories.[15]

In answer to the interrogatories,[16] Leonardo declared that his family had live
d on the lot since pre-war time, his father Simeon having built a house on it fo
llowing his acquisition from Julian Ydulzura in 1923[17] who had purchased it fr
om Lazaro Raada in 1917;[18] that the construction of a family home in 1923 was r
eflected in Tax Declaration No. 18,587 in the name of Simeon for the year 1924[1
9]; that after his father s death in 1931, his mother and his brother Cayetano con
tinued to possess the lot in the concept of owners and Cayetano in fact built hi
s own house and a bodega thereon; that Cayetano religiously paid real estate tax
es from 1951 up to the current year 1997;[20] that the lot was assigned to him
and Cayetano as their share of the inheritance by virtue of a private document, K
aligonan, dated June 16, 1951,[21] which was executed by all of the heirs, the co
ntents of which document were subsequently confirmed in a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement dated August 24, 1988;[22] and that on February 10, 1961, Cayetano ex
changed a titled lot in Butuan City for his (Leonardo s) half-share in the lot, th
ereby making Cayetano the sole and exclusive owner thereof.[23]

On the other hand, Paulita, wife of Catalino who represented the heirs of Catali
no, declared that in February 1989, Cayetano sold to her husband a 217.45-sq. me
ter portion of the 533-sq. meter lot subject of the present case as embodied in
a deed of absolute sale;[24] and that Catalino religiously paid real estate taxe

s therefor. And she presented an approved Subdivision Plan of Lot 249,[25] Cad866 indicating therein the respective shares of Cayetano and Catalino based on a
survey undertaken by Geodetic Engineer Armando Diola on May 9, 1997.[26]

The above-said Subdivision Plan of the lot, duly approved by Celso V. Loriega, J
r., Regional Technical Director of the DENR, Lands Management Services, Region O
ffice XIII for Butuan City, carries the following annotation:

Surveyed in accordance with survey authority no. (X-2A) 77 issued by CENRO.

This survey is inside the alienable and disposable area as per project no. 5 L.C
Map No. 550 certified on July 18, 1925.

Lot 249-A, Lot 9090, Lot 249-B, Lot 9091, CAD 866 Cabadbaran Cadastre. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by Butuan provincial

prosecutor Ambrosio Gallarde, did not present any evidence to oppose the applica
tions.

By Decision of November 3, 2003,[27] the RTC granted respondents

sposing as follows:

applications, di

WHEREFORE, conformably with existing laws and jurisprudence, DECISION is hereby

rendered:

1. Awarding a portion of Lot 249, Psu-15(5)7485 (now known as Lot 249-B, Csd-13000443-D) containing an area of 316 sq. meters to applicant Cayetano L. Serrano,
Sr., represented by his heirs;

2. Awarding a portion of Lot 249, Psu-157485 (now known as Lot 249-A, Csd-1-0004
43-D) containing an area of 217 sq. meters to applicant Catalina M. Alaan, repre
sented by Paulita P. Alaan;

IT IS SO ORDERED.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of herein petitioner, appealed th

e RTC decision before the Court of Appeals on the grounds that respondents faile
d to present evidence that the property was alienable or that they possessed the
same in the manner and duration required by the provisions of the Property Regi
stration Decree.[28]

By Decision of May 13, 2008,[29] the appellate court affirmed the decision of th
e RTC in this wise:

x x x x

. . . [F]rom the aforequoted annotation, the OSG s assertion that there was no com
petent evidence that would clearly show the subject land was released as alienab
le and disposable land is unavailing. On the contrary, We HOLD that the said ann
otation would suffice to comply with the requirement of certification as the sam
e is competent enough to show that the disputed land or the parcels of land (now
Lot Nos. 249-A, Cad-866 and 249-B Cad-866, respectively) applied for by the app
licants (Cayetano and Alaan) were already reclassified as alienable and disposab
le as early as 18 July 1925, under Project No. 5, L.C. Map No. 550.

x x x x

Records show that the subject land was first owned and possessed by Lazaro Raada
and the same was sold to Julian Ydulzura per untitled document executed on 15 Ma
y 1917. On 3 September 1923, Ydulzura sold the subject land for one hundred fift
y pesos (Php150.00) to Simeon M. Serrano per untitled document, father of Cayeta
no. Simeon M. Serrano then had the subject land tax declared in his name in 1924
per Declaration of Real Property (Urban) No. 18,587. Upon the demise of Simeon
Serrano on 9 January 1931, his heirs, including herein applicant Cayetano, parti
tioned by way of an Agreement on 16 June 1951 the properties of their deceased f
ather. On 24 August 1988, the heirs of Simeon M. Serrano executed a Deed of Extr
ajudicial Settlement confirming further the Agreement executed on 16 June 1954 (
sic). It is worth noting that from 1955 up to the filing of the Application for
Registration in 21 June 1988 and until 1997, Cayetano religiously paid the real
estate taxes of the said subject property. As held in a long line of cases, tax
declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of o
wnership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of ow
ner. Undoubtedly, applicant Cayetano, through his predecessors-in-interest, havi
ng been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation o
ver the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 194
5, or earlier had met the requirements set forth in Section 14(1) of the Propert
y Registration Decree.

In fine, We FIND and so HOLD that applicant Cayetano L. Serrano and intervenor-a
ppellee heirs of Catalino M. Alaan, have registrable title to the aforesaid subj
ect lands, Lot 249-B, Csd-13-000443-D and Lot 249-A, Csd-1-000443-D, respectivel
y, as they were able to prove that they are qualified and had complied with the
requirements set forth by the provisions of P.D. No. 1529 which amended Commonwe
alth Act No. 141, as amended and Presidential Decree No. 1073, which to Our mind
merited the allowance of the application for registration of the said property
by the trial court.[30] (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring sup
plied)

Hence, the present petition which raises the same grounds as those raised by pet
itioner before the appellate court.

The petition fails.

The requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are: that the property is ali
enable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselv
es or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, excl
usive and notorious possession and occupation thereof; and that such possession
is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[31]

The Court reiterates the doctrine which more accurately construes Section 14(1)
in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Naguit,[32] viz:

. . . the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requ

ires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at
the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at t
he time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the pro
perty for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is s
till reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve it
s ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even i
f in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienab
le and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on
the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of Appeals
. Therein, the Court noted that to prove that the land subject of an application
for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a po
sitive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands inves
tigators; and a legislative act or a statute. In that case, the subject land had
been certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the
Court concluded that the alienable status of the land, compounded by the
established fact that therein respondents had occupied the land even before 192

7, sufficed to allow the application for registration of the said property. In t

he case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject property was release
d and certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.[33]
(Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

While Cayetano failed to submit any certification which would formally attest to
the alienable and disposable character of the land applied for, the Certificati
on by DENR Regional Technical Director Celso V. Loriega, Jr., as annotated on th
e subdivision plan submitted in evidence by Paulita, constitutes substantial com
pliance with the legal requirement. It clearly indicates that Lot 249 had been v
erified as belonging to the alienable and disposable area as early as July 18, 1
925.

The DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any evidence
to the contrary. It bears noting that no opposition was filed or registered by
the Land Registration Authority or the DENR to contest respondents applications o
n the ground that their respective shares of the lot are inalienable. There bei
ng no substantive rights which stand to be prejudiced, the benefit of the Certif
ication may thus be equitably extended in favor of respondents.

Petitioner s contention that respondents failed to adduce sufficient proof of pos

session and occupation as required under Section 14(1) of the Property Registrat
ion Decree does not lie.

Undeniably, respondents and/or their predecessors-in-interest must be shown to h

ave exercised acts of dominion over the lot under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. On what constitutes open, continuous, exclusiv
e and notorious possession and occupation as required by statute, Republic v. Al
conaba[34] teaches:

The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by
the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymou
s with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes cons
tructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks
to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken togeth
er with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation
serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession m
ust not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifesta
tion of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exe
rcise over his own property. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Leonardo clearly established the character of the possession of Cayetano and his
predecessors-in-interest over the lot. Thus he declared that the lot was first
owned by Lazaro Raada who sold the same to Julian Ydulzura in 1917 who in turn s

old it to his and Cayetano s father Simeon in 1923; that Simeon built a house ther
eon after its acquisition, which fact is buttressed by entries in Tax Declaratio
n No. 18,587 in the name of Simeon for the year 1924 indicating the existence of
a 40-sq. meter residential structure made of nipa and mixed materials, and of c
oconut trees planted thereon; and that after Simeon s demise in 1931, Cayetano bui
lt his own house beside the old nipa house before the war, and a bodega after th
e war, which claims find support in Tax Declarations made in 1948-1958.[35]

When pressed during the request for written interrogatories if Leonardo had any
other pre-war tax declarations aside from Tax Declaration No. 18,587, he explain
ed that all available records may have been destroyed or lost during the last wa
r but that after the war, the lot was reassessed in his father s name.[36] The Co
urt finds Leonardo s explanation plausible and there is nothing in the records tha
t detracts from its probative value.

Finally, the official receipts of realty tax payments[37] religiously made by Ca

yetano from 1948 to 1997 further serve as credible indicia that Cayetano, after
his father s death in 1931, continued to exercise acts of dominion over the lot.

The totality of the evidence thus points to the unbroken chain of acts exercised
by Cayetano to demonstrate his occupation and possession of the land in the con
cept of owner, to the exclusion of all others.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

- versus -

CARLOS R. VEGA, MARCOS R. VEGA, ROGELIO R. VEGA, LUBIN R. VEGA, HEIRS OF GLORIA
R. VEGA, NAMELY: FRACISCO L. YAP, MA. WINONA Y. RODRIGUEZ, MA. WENDELYN V. YAP
and FRANCISCO V. YAP, JR.,
Respondents,

ROMEA G. BUHAY-OCAMPO, FRANCISCO G. BUHAY, ARCELI G. BUHAY-RODRIGUEZ, ORLANDO G.

BUHAY, SOLEDAD G. BUHAY-VASQUEZ, LOIDA G. BUHAY-SENADOSA, FLORENDO G. BUHAY, OS
CAR G. BUHAY, ERLYN BUHAY-GINORGA, EVELYN BUHAY-GRANETA, and EMILIE BUHAY-DALLAS
,
Respondents-Intervenors.

G. R. No. 177790

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J.,

Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

January 17, 2011

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D E C I S I O N
SERENO, J.:
This is a Rule 45 Petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner
Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), questioning the De
cision of the Court of Appeals,[1] which affirmed a lower court s grant of an appl
ication for original registration of title covering a parcel of land located in
Los Baos, Laguna.
The facts of the case as culled from the records of the trial court and
the appellate court are straightforward and without much contention from the pa
rties.
On 26 May 1995, respondents Carlos R. Vega, Marcos R. Vega, Rogelio R.
Vega, Lubin R. Vega and Heirs of Gloria R. Vega
namely, Francisco L. Yap, Ma. Wi
nona Y. Rodriguez, Ma. Wendelyn V. Yap and Francisco V. Yap, Jr. (respondents Ve
gas) filed an application for registration of title. The application covered a p
arcel of land, identified as Lot No. 6191, Cadastre 450 of Los Baos, Laguna, with
a total area of six thousand nine hundred two (6,902) square meters (the subjec
t land). The case was docketed as Land Registration Case No. 103-95-C and raffle
d to the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 92.
Respondents Vegas alleged that they inherited the subject land from the
ir mother, Maria Revilleza Vda. de Vega, who in turn inherited it from her fathe
r, Lorenzo Revilleza. Their mother s siblings (two brothers and a sister) died int
estate, all without leaving any offspring.
On 21 June 1995, petitioner Republic filed an opposition to respondents
Vegas application for registration on the ground, inter alia, that the subject l
and or portions thereof were lands of the public domain and, as such, not subje
ct to private appropriation.

During the trial court hearing on the application for registration, respondents
Vegas presented several exhibits in compliance with the jurisdictional requireme
nts, as well as witnesses to prove respondents Vegas ownership, occupation and po
ssession of the land subject of the registration. Significant was the testimony
of Mr. Rodolfo Gonzales, a Special Investigator of the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Los Baos, Laguna, under the Department of En
vironment and Natural Resources (DENR). He attested to having conducted an inspe
ction of the subject land[2] and identified the corresponding Report dated 13 Ja
nuary 1997, which he had submitted to the Regional Executive Director, Region IV
. The report stated that the area subject of the investigation was entirely with
in the alienable and disposable zone, and that there was no public land applicat
ion filed for the same land by the applicant or by any other person.[3]

During the trial, respondents-intervenors Romea G. Buhay-Ocampo, Franci

sco G. Buhay, Arceli G. Buhay-Rodriguez, Orlando G. Buhay, Soledad G. Buhay-Vasq
uez, Loida G. Buhay-Senadosa, Florendo G. Buhay, Oscar G. Buhay, Erlyn Buhay-Gin
orga, Evelyn Buhay-Grantea and Emilie Buhay-Dallas (respondents-intervenors Buha
ys) entered their appearance and moved to intervene in respondents Vegas applicat
ion for registration.[4] Respondents-intervenors Buhays claimed a portion of the
subject land consisting of eight hundred twenty-six (826) square meters, purpor
tedly sold by respondents Vegas mother (Maria Revilleza Vda. de Vega) to the form
er s predecessors-in-interest - the sisters Gabriela Gilvero and Isabel Gilverio by virtue of a Bilihan ng Isang Bahagi ng Lupang Katihan dated 14 January 1951.[5
] They likewise formally offered in evidence Subdivision Plan Csd-04-024336-D, w
hich indicated the portion of the subject land, which they claimed was sold to t
heir predecessors-in-interest.[6]
In a Decision dated 18 November 2003, the trial court granted responden
ts Vegas application and directed the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue
the corresponding decree of registration in the name of respondents Vegas and re
spondents-intervenors Buhays predecessors, in proportion to their claims over the
subject land.
Petitioner Republic appealed the Decision of the trial court, arguing t
hat respondents Vegas failed to prove that the subject land was alienable and di
sposable, since the testimony of Mr. Gonzales did not contain the date when the
land was declared as such. Unpersuaded by petitioner Republic s arguments, the Cou
rt of Appeals affirmed in toto the earlier Decision of the trial court. Aggriev
ed by the ruling, petitioner filed the instant Rule 45 Petition with this Court.
Respondents Vegas, who are joined by respondents-intervenors Buhays (collectivel
y, respondents), raise procedural issues concerning the filing of the instant Pe
tition, which the Court shall resolve first. Briefly, respondents found, in the
instant Petition, procedural deficiencies that ought to warrant its outright dis
missal. These deficiencies are as follows: (a) petitioner Republic failed to inc
lude the pertinent portions of the record that would support its arguments under
Rule 45, Section 4 (d) of the Rules of Court, specifically the Appellee s Brief o
f respondents Vegas in the appellate proceedings; and (b) it raised questions of
fact, which are beyond the purview of a Rule 45 Petition.[7]
The Court is not persuaded by respondents arguments concerning the purported defe
cts of the Petition.
First, petitioner Republic s failure to attach a copy of respondents Vegas Appellee s
Brief to the instant Petition is not a fatal mistake, which merits the immediat
e dismissal of a Rule 45 Petition. The requirement that a petition for review on
certiorari should be accompanied by such material portions of the record as woul
d support the petition is left to the discretion of the party filing the petition
.[8] Except for the duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment so
ught to be appealed from,[9] there are no other records from the court a quo tha
t must perforce be attached before the Court can take cognizance of a Rule 45 pe
tition.
Respondents cannot fault petitioner Republic for excluding pleadings, documents
or records in the lower court, which to their mind would assist this Court in de
ciding whether the Decision appealed from is sound. Petitioner Republic is left
to its own estimation of the case in deciding which records would support its Pe
tition and should thus be attached thereto. In any event, respondents are not pr
evented from attaching to their pleadings pertinent portions of the records that
they deem necessary for the Court s evaluation of the case, as was done by respon
dents Vegas in this case when they attached their Appellee s Brief to their Commen
t. In the end, it is the Court, in finally resolving the merits of the suit that

will ultimately decide whether the material portions of the records attached ar
e sufficient to support the Petition.
Second, the Petition raises a question of law, and not a question of fact. Petit
ioner Republic simply takes issue against the conclusions made by the trial and
the appellate courts regarding the nature and character of the subject parcel of
land, based on the evidence presented. When petitioner asks for a review of the
decisions made by a lower court based on the evidence presented, without delvin
g into their probative value but simply on their sufficiency to support the lega
l conclusions made, then a question of law is raised.
In New Rural Bank of Guimba (N.E.) Inc. v. Fermina S. Abad and Rafael Susan,[10]
the Court reiterated the distinction between a question of law and a question o
f fact in this wise:

We reiterate the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact. A

question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct appli
cation of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, t
he truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted. A question of fact exists whe
n a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the
query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibil
ity of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circum
stances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the proba
bility of the situation. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner Republic is not calling for an examination of the probative value or

truthfulness of the evidence presented, specifically the testimony of Mr. Gonzal
es. It, however, questions whether the evidence on record is sufficient to suppo
rt the lower court s conclusion that the subject land is alienable and disposable.
Otherwise stated, considering the evidence presented by respondents Vegas in th
e proceedings below, were the trial and the appellate courts justified under the
law and jurisprudence in their findings on the nature and character of the subj
ect land? Undoubtedly, this is a pure question of law, which calls for a resolut
ion of what is the correct and applicable law to a given set of facts.
Going now to the substantial merits, petitioner Republic places before the Court
the question of whether, based on the evidence on record, respondents Vegas hav
e sufficiently established that the subject land is alienable and disposable. Wa
s it erroneous for the Court of Appeals to have affirmed the trial court s grant o
f registration applied for by respondents Vegas over the subject land? We find n
o reversible error on the part of either the trial court or the Court of Appeals
.

Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decre
e, provides for the instances when a person may file for an application for regi
stration of title over a parcel of land:

Section 14. Who May Apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether person
ally or through their duly authorized representatives:

Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in o

pen, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership s
ince June 12, 1945, or earlier. x x x.

Thus, pursuant to the afore-quoted provision of law, applicants for registration

of title must prove the following: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and (2) that they have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the l
and under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.[11] Sect
ion 14 (1) of the law requires that the property sought to be registered is alre
ady alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration is fil
ed.[12]
Raising no issue with respect to respondents Vegas open, continuous, exclusive an
d notorious possession of the subject land in the present Petition, the Court wi
ll limit its focus on the first requisite: specifically, whether it has sufficie
ntly been demonstrated that the subject land is alienable and disposable.
Unless a land is reclassified and declared alienable and disposable, occupation
of the same in the concept of an owner - no matter how long -cannot ripen into o
wnership and result in a title; public lands not shown to have been classified a
s alienable and disposable lands remain part of the inalienable domain and canno
t confer ownership or possessory rights.[13]
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed; they call
for proof.[14] To prove that the land subject of an application for registration
is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a posit
ive act of the government, such as any of the following: a presidential proclama
tion or an executive order; other administrative actions; investigation reports
of the Bureau of Lands investigator; or a legislative act or statute.[15] The ap
plicant may also secure a certification from the government that the lands appli
ed for are alienable and disposable.[16]
Previously, a certification from the DENR that a lot was alienable and disposabl
e was sufficient to establish the true nature and character of the property and
enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence.[
17]
However, in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,[18] the Supreme Court overturne
d the grant by the lower courts of an original application for registration over
a parcel of land in Batangas and ruled that a CENRO certification is not enough
to certify that a land is alienable and disposable:

Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alien
able and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DEN
R Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the pu
blic domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the applic
ation for registration falls within the approved area per verification through s
urvey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration mu
st present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. The

se facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent d
o not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable. (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, as it now stands, aside from a CENRO certification, an application for ori
ginal registration of title over a parcel of land must be accompanied by a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records in order to establish
that the land indeed is alienable and disposable.[19]
To comply with the first requisite for an application for original registration
of title under the Property Registration Decree, respondents Vegas should have s
ubmitted a CENRO certification and a certified true copy of the original classif
ication by the DENR Secretary that the land is alienable and disposable, togethe
r with their application. However, as pointed out by the Court of Appeals, respo
ndents Vegas failed to submit a CENRO certification -- much less an original cla
ssification by the DENR Secretary -- to prove that the land is classified as ali
enable and disposable land of the public domain.[20] If the stringent rule impos
ed in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., is to be followed, the absence of the
se twin certifications justifies a denial of an application for registration. Si
gnificantly, however, the Court s pronouncement in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc., was issued after the decisions of the trial court[21] and the appellate co
urt[22] in this case.
Recently, however, in Republic v. Serrano,[23] the Court affirmed the findings o
f the trial and the appellate courts that the parcel of land subject of registra
tion was alienable and disposable. The Court held that a DENR Regional Technical
Director s certification, which is annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in
evidence, constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirement:
While Cayetano failed to submit any certification which would formally attest to
the alienable and disposable character of the land applied for, the Certificati
on by DENR Regional Technical Director Celso V. Loriega, Jr., as annotated on th
e subdivision plan submitted in evidence by Paulita, constitutes substantial com
pliance with the legal requirement. It clearly indicates that Lot 249 had been v
erified as belonging to the alienable and disposable area as early as July 18, 1
925.

The DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any evidence
to the contrary. It bears noting that no opposition was filed or registered by t
he Land Registration Authority or the DENR to contest respondents' applications
on the ground that their respective shares of the lot are inalienable. There bei
ng no substantive rights which stand to be prejudiced, the benefit of the Certif
ication may thus be equitably extended in favor of respondents. (Emphasis suppli
ed)

Indeed, the best proofs in registration proceedings that a land is alienable and
disposable are a certification from the CENRO or Provincial Environment and Nat
ural Resources Office (PENRO) and a certified true copy of the DENR s original cla
ssification of the land. The Court, however, has nonetheless recognized and affi
rmed applications for land registration on other substantial and convincing evid
ence duly presented without any opposition from the LRA or the DENR on the groun
d of substantial compliance.

Applying these precedents, the Court finds that despite the absence of a certifi
cation by the CENRO and a certified true copy of the original classification by
the DENR Secretary, there has been substantial compliance with the requirement t
o show that the subject land is indeed alienable and disposable based on the evi
dence on record.
First, respondents Vegas were able to present Mr. Gonzales of the CENRO who test
ified that the subject land is alienable and disposable, and who identified his
written report on his inspection of the subject land.
In the Report,[24] Mr. Gonzales attested under oath that (1) the area is entirely
within the alienable and disposable zone as classified under Project No. 15, L.C
. Map No. 582, certified on 31 December 1925;[25] (2) the land has never been f
orfeited in favor of the government for non-payment of taxes; (3) the land is no
t within a previously patented/decreed/titled property;[26] (4) there are no pub
lic land application/s filed by the applicant for the same land;[27] and (5) the
land is residential/commercial.[28] That Mr. Gonzales appeared and testified be
fore an open court only added to the reliability of the Report, which classified
the subject land as alienable and disposable public land. The Court affirms the
Court of Appeals conclusion that Mr. Gonzales testimony and written report under
oath constituted substantial evidence to support their claim as to the nature of
the subject land.
Second, Subdivision Plan Csd-04-02433-6, formally offered as evidence by respond
ents-intervenors Buhays,[29] expressly indicates that the land is alienable and
disposable. Similar to Republic v. Serrano, Mr. Samson G. de Leon, the officer-i
n-charge of the Office of the Assistant Regional Executive Director for Operatio
ns of the DENR, approved the said subdivision plan, which was annotated with the
following proviso: [T]his survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per
Project No. 15, L.C. Map No. 582, certified on Dec. 31, 1925. Notably, Mr. De Leo
n s annotation pertaining to the identification of the land as alienable and dispo
sable coincides with the investigation report of Mr. Gonzales.
Finally, upon being informed of respondents Vegas application for original regist
ration, the LRA never raised the issue that the land subject of registration was
not alienable and disposable. In the Supplementary Report submitted during the
trial court proceedings,[30] the LRA did not interpose any objection to the appl
ication on the basis of the nature of the land. It simply noted that the subject
subdivision plan (Psu-51460) had also been applied for in Case No. 1469, GLRO R
ecord No. 32505, but that there was no decree of registration issued therefor. T
hus, the LRA recommended that should the instant case be given due course, the ap
plication in Case No. 1469, GLRO Record No. 32505 with respect to plan Psu-51460
be dismissed. In addition, not only did the government fail to cross-examine Mr.
Gonzales, it likewise chose not to present any countervailing evidence to suppo
rt its opposition. In contrast to the other cases brought before this Court,[31]
no opposition was raised by any interested government body, aside from the pro
forma opposition filed by the OSG.
The onus in proving that the land is alienable and disposable still remains with
the applicant in an original registration proceeding; and the government, in op
posing the purported nature of the land, need not adduce evidence to prove other
wise.[32] In this case though, there was no effective opposition, except the pro
forma opposition of the OSG, to contradict the applicant s claim as to the charac
ter of the public land as alienable and disposable. The absence of any effective
opposition from the government, when coupled with respondents other pieces of ev
idence on record persuades this Court to rule in favor of respondents.
In the instant Petition, petitioner Republic also assails the failure of Mr. Gon
zales to testify as to when the land was declared as alienable and disposable. I

ndeed, his testimony in open court is bereft of any detail as to when the land w
as classified as alienable and disposable public land, as well as the date when
he conducted the investigation. However, these matters could have been dealt wit
h extensively during cross-examination, which petitioner Republic waived because
of its repeated absences and failure to present counter evidence.[33] In any ev
ent, the Report, as well as the Subdivision Plan, readily reveals that the subje
ct land was certified as alienable and disposable as early as 31 December 1925 a
nd was even classified as residential and commercial in nature.
Thus, the Court finds that the evidence presented by respondents Vegas, coupled
with the absence of any countervailing evidence by petitioner Republic, substant
ially establishes that the land applied for is alienable and disposable and is t
he subject of original registration proceedings under the Property Registration
Decree. There was no reversible error on the part of either the trial court or t
he appellate court in granting the registration.
Respondents-intervenors Buhays title to that portion of the subject land is likew
ise affirmed, considering that the joint claim of respondents-intervenors Buhays
over the land draws its life from the same title of respondents Vegas, who in t
urn failed to effectively oppose the claimed sale of that portion of the land to
the former s predecessors-in-interest.
It must be emphasized that the present ruling on substantial compliance applies
pro hac vice. It does not in any way detract from our rulings in Republic v. T.A
.N. Properties, Inc., and similar cases which impose a strict requirement to pro
ve that the public land is alienable and disposable, especially in this case whe
n the Decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals were rendered prior
to these rulings.[34] To establish that the land subject of the application is a
lienable and disposable public land, the general rule remains: all applications
for original registration under the Property Registration Decree must include bo
th (1) a CENRO or PENRO certification and (2) a certified true copy of the origi
nal classification made by the DENR Secretary.
As an exception, however, the courts - in their sound discretion and based solel
y on the evidence presented on record - may approve the application, pro hac vic
e, on the ground of substantial compliance showing that there has been a positiv
e act of government to show the nature and character of the land and an absence
of effective opposition from the government. This exception shall only apply to
applications for registration currently pending before the trial court prior to
this Decision and shall be inapplicable to all future applications.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of App
eals Decision dated 30 April 2007 and the trial court s Decision dated 18 November
2003 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.