US v Ruiz

Facts:
1.The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base
was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the
Philippines and the United States. The United States invited the submission of
bids for the following projects: Repair offender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S.
Naval Station Subic Bay, Philippines.Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi
shoreline; repair typhoon damage to shoreline revetment, NAVBASE Subic; and
repair to Leyte Wharf approach, NAVBASE Subic Bay, Philippines.
2. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
Subsequent thereto, the company received from the United States two telegrams
requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding
company. The company complied with the requests. [In its complaint, the
company alleges that the United States had accepted its bids because "A request
to confirm a price proposal confirms the acceptance of a bid pursuant to
defendant United States' bidding practices." (Rollo, p. 30.)
3. the company received a letter which was signed by Wilham I. Collins, Director.
The letter said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the
projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair
contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic
Bay. The letter further said that the projects had been awarded to third parties.
4. the company sued the United States of America to order the defendants to
allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that
specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay
damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties
for work on the projects.
5. The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of
questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the
complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the
complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents
of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not
given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action
asserted in the complaint."
ISSUE:
Whether the United States Naval Base in bidding for said contracts exercise
governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.
Held:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a state from being sued in the
courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and equality of states. However,

the rules of international law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and
evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been
necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts and
private, commercial and proprietary acts. The result is that state immunity now
extends only to sovereign and governmental acts. The restrictive application of
state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs. A state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and
can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it
enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates the
exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the projects are an integral part
of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the US and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they
are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes
Dissenting: Makaisar
When the U.S. Government, through its agency at Subic Bay, confirmed the
acceptance of a bid of a private company for the repair of wharves or shoreline in
the Subic Bay area, it is deemed to have entered into a contract and thus waived
the mantle of sovereign immunity from suit and descended to the level of the
ordinary citizen. Its consent to be sued, therefore, is implied from its act of
entering into a contract
Constant resort by a foreign state or its agents to the doctrine of State immunity
in this jurisdiction impinges unduly upon our sovereignty and dignity as a nation.
Its application will particularly discourage Filipino or domestic contractors from
transacting business and entering into contracts with United States authorities or
facilities in the Philippines whether naval, air or ground forces-because the
difficulty, if not impossibility, of enforcing a validly executed contract and of
seeking judicial remedy in our own courts for breaches of contractual obligation
committed by agents of the United States government, always, looms large,
thereby hampering the growth of Filipino enterprises and creating a virtual
monopoly in our own country by United States contractors of contracts for
services or supplies with the various U.S. offices and agencies operating in the
Philippines.
Reyes v Bagatsing
Facts:
Justice JBL Reyes filed a petition on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition
to compel the issuance of a permit for a rally to be held at the Luneta
and a subsequent march to the U.S. Embassy on Roxas Boulevard. The

petition was filed the day before the scheduled assembly as no action
had apparently been taken on the application, although it turned out
later that it had been rejected in a letter sent earlier by ordinary mail.
The reasons for the denial was the mayors fear that the assemblage
might be infiltrated by subversive elements to the prejudice of the
public order, and thus the intended rally would violate a city ordinance
implementing the provisions of the Diplomatic Convention requiring
the receiving state to afford adequate protection to foreign embassies;
hence his suggestion that the rally be held at an enclosed place like
Rizal Coliseum for better security.
Issue: Whether the denial of the issuance and modification of the
permit is meritorious and is guaranteed under Article II, Section 3 of
the Constitution.
Held:
The court set aside the denial or the modification of the permit sought
and order the respondent official to grant it. The choice of Luneta and
U.S. Embassy for a public rally cannot legally objected to in the
absence of clear and present danger to life or property of the embassy.
The Philippines, being a signatory of Vienna Conventions which calls
for the protection of the premises of a diplomatic mission, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land as cited in Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution.
Baer v. Tizon
Facts:
WHO v. Aquino
Facts:
Herein petitioner, in behalf of Dr. Verstuyft, was allegedly suspected by the
Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) officers of carrying dutiable
goods under the Customs and Tariff Code of the Philippines. Respondent Judge
then issued a search warrant at the instance of the COSAC officers for the
search and seizure of the personla effects of Dr. Verstuyft notwithstanding his
being entitled to diplomatic immunity, as duly recognized by the Executive
branch of the government.
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised the respondent judge
that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for his
personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant to
the Host Agreement and further requested for the suspension of the search

warrant. The Solicitor General accordingly joined the petitioner for the quashal
of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the
quashal.
Issue:
Whether or not personal effect of WHO Officer Dr. Verstuyft can be exempted
from search and seizure under the diplomatic immunity.
Ruling:
The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is
entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host
Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine
Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as principal law officer of
the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to
diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant.
It recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation
of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and
courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of
government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized by the
executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of
the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the
principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or
other officer acting under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their
jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarass the executive
arm of the government in conducting foreign relations.
The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction
and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search
warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner
Verstuyft.