Borromeo v.

Descallar
Facts:

Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met Antonietta Descallar (respondent), a Filipina, while the
former was working in the Philippines sometime in 1983. The two became sweetheart, and later
cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
During their cohabitation, the two acquired some real properties in the Philippines composed of
several houses and lots which they bought from Agro-Macro Development Corporation. The
deed of sale of said real properties were placed in the name of both Jambrich and Descallar as
buyers, but were registered under the Torrens system in the name of Descallar alone as Jambrich
is disqualified to own real properties in the country. It is sufficiently established though that the
funds used to buy said properties came solely from Jambrich, as Descallar has no sufficient
source of income.
After their relationship has turned sour and the two went their separate ways, Jambrich sold his
rights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to Camilo Borromeo (the petitioner), a Filipino,
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment. When Borromeo, the buyer, tried to register
the properties in his name, he discovered that it is registered in the name of Descallar, and that it
has already been mortgaged.
Borromeo filed a complaint for recovery of real property against Descallar.
Issues:

1. Having established that the true buyer of the disputed properties was the Austrian Wilhelm
Jambrich, what is the effect of registration of the properties in the name of respondent Descallar?
2. Whether the sale or assignment made by Jambrich to Borromeo valid considering that the
former as alien is disqualified to own real properties in the Philippines?
Held:

1. The registration of the properties in question in the name of Descallar does not make her the
owner of the said properties. It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
It is only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large.
Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not make one the
true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed
properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner.
(Borromeo vs. Descallar, ibid.)
2. Given that aliens are disqualified to own real properties in the country, [t]herefore, in the
instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is
an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the
properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for World Ministries v.
Sebastian (G.R. No. L-34672, March 30, 1988, 159 SCRA 446), the Court reiterated the

consistent ruling in a number of cases that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.

Benin v. Tuason
Facts:
The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the three parcels of
agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the barrio of La
Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal,
that they inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited
the same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they and their predecessors in interest had
possessed these three parcels of land openly, adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same
and exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvested therefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's
grandfather, had said parcels of land surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894, that during the
cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Sixto Benin
and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over said parcels of land; that they declared said
lands for taxation purposes in 1940 under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak
of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from
Manila and other places, after having secured the permission of the plaintiffs, constructed
their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs.
Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually served with summons. The other
defendants were ordered summoned by publication in accordance with Sections 16 and 17
of the Rules of Court. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared. The other defendants
were all declared in default.
HELD:
It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the
three parcels of land described in the complaint on their being heirs or successors in interest
of Sixto Benin who died in 1936. In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs base their claim of
ownership over the two parcels of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs
and successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara who died in 1934. In Civil Case No. 3623 the
plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the one parcel of land described in their complaint
on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Candido Pili who died in 1931. It will be
noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the three
parcels of land described in the complaint on their being heirs or successors in interest of
Sixto Benin who died in 1936. In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs base their claim of
ownership over the two parcels of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs
and successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara who died in 1934. In Civil Case No. 3623 the
plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the one parcel of land described in their complaint
on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Candido Pili who died in 1931.
Therefore, that the decision of this Court, which affirmed the order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal dismissing the complaint of Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili
(along with four other plaintiffs) should apply not only against the heirs, of Elias Benin,
against Jose Alcantara, and against Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622
and 3623, respectively, but also against all the other plaintiffs in those cases. We find that
the plaintiffs do not claim a right which is different from that claimed by Elias Benin.
Likewise, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622 do not claim a right different from that claimed
by Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No Q-156. And, also, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 do
not claim a right different from that claimed by Pascual Pili.

The court sited the Santiago case which states that,

(T)he mere fact that appellants herein were not personally notified of the registration proceedings
that resulted in a decree of registration of title in favor of the Tuasons in 1914 does not constitute in itself
a case of fraud that would invalidate the decree. The registration proceedings, as proceedings in rem,
operate as against the whole world and the decree issued therein is conclusive adjudication of the
ownership of the lands registered, not only against those parties who appeared in such proceedings but
also against parties who were summoned by publication but did not appear. The registration by the
appellee's predecessors-in-interest freed the lands from claims and liens of whatever character that
existed against the lands prior to the issuance of the certificates of title, except those noted in the
certificate and legal encumbrances saved by law (Yumol vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17 and cases
cited therein). In addition, there being no allegation that the registered owners procured the nonappearance of appellants at the registration proceedings, and very much more than one year having
elapsed from the issuance of the decree of registration in 1914, neither revocation of such decree nor a
decree of reconveyance are obtainable any more.

The joint decision of the Court of First Instance, appealed from, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Cayanan v. delos Santos
21 scra 1348
FaCTS:
On May 30, 1958, the title of appellee De los Santos to Lot No. 56 of the Porac
Cadastre was confirmed by the Hon. Arsenio Santos, then Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga. On December 16, 1958, a petition for review was filed in the
same proceeding alleging that the said lot was registered in the name of appellee
De los Santos "through actual fraud, through deceit and through intentional
omission of facts" as a result of which the aforesaid decision was rendered and a
decree of registration obtained on August 8, 1958. Moreover, it was stated further
that a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of the other
respondent, appellee Felix L. Camaya, on October 26, 1958, covering the said lot.
The prayer was for the opening of the decree of registration, the cancellation of the
Original Certificate of Title, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title and the
adjudication of said lot in favor of petitioners, now appellant Cayanan and others.
This petition was denied in the order of February 9, 1959, which is on appeal. It was
the view of the lower court: "Such being the case, as admitted by the petitioners,
even [if] the petition has been filed within one (1) year after entry of final decree,
the same cannot be favorably acted upon for the reason that the questioned lot has
already been transferred to Felix L. [Camaya] in accordance with section 38 of the
Land Registration Act. While it is true that the petition states that such transfer is
fictitious and, therefore, not for value and that Felix L. [Camaya] is not an innocent
purchaser, this question can be properly threshed out in an ordinary civil action and
not in a simple petition, like the one at bar."
ISSUE:
whether or not the cadastral court acting as such could likewise inquire into an
allegation that the lot subject of the decree was transferred in a simulated sale
intended to avoid such a review.
HELD:
It can and accordingly reverse the appealed order.

The mere mention by the law that the relief afforded by Section 38 of Act 496 may
be sought in 'the competent Court of First Instance' is no sufficient indication that
the petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance, exercising its general
jurisdiction, considering the fact that it is also the Court of First Instance that acts on
land registration cases. Upon the other hand, it has been held that the adjudication
of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible
until the expiration of one year from entry of the final decree, and that as long as
the final decree is not issued and the period of one year within which it may be
reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may even
set aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another."
As long as the final decree is not issued by the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office in accordance with the law, and the period of one year fixed for
the review thereof has not elapsed, the title is not finally adjudicated and the
decision therein rendered continues to be under the control and sound discretion of
the court rendering it.

In Capio v. Capio, the ruling being to the effect "that the adjudication of land in a registration or
cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after
the entry of the final decree; that as long as the final decree is not issued and the period of one
year within which it may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and
sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may set aside the
decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another party."
The order was SET ASIDE and the case remanded to the Court of First Instance for a hearing on
the merits of the petition of appellants for the reopening of the decree of registration in favor of
appellee Leon de los Santos.

Bautista-Borja vs Bautista
Facts:
The spouses Pablo Bautista (Pablo) and Segundina Tadiaman Bautista (spouses Bautista) died intestate in
July 1980 and April 1990, respectively. Pablo was the registered owner of several agricultural lands situated in
Ramon, Isabela totaling around 30 hectares and in Llanera, Nueva Ecija totalling 17 hectares. They had five
children, namely: respondents Iluminada and Aurea, Francisco (who died in 1981), Simplicio (who died in 1986),
and Natividad (petitioner).
Francisco was survived by six children, namely: respondents Clarita, Florentino, Diosdado, Francisco II,
and Francisco III, and the now deceased Arsenio, all surnamed Bautista.
Simplicio was survived by five children, namely: respondents Danilo, Lorna, Luzviminda, Luz, and
Paulino, all surnamed Bautista.

By petitioners claim, respondents, through fraud and deception, convinced her to take possession and
cultivate the above-stated parcels of land which would eventually be partitioned; and that unknown to her, however,
the titles to the lands were cancelled by virtue of Deeds of Sale purportedly executed on different dates by her
parents in favor of her siblings Simplicio and Francisco, a fact which she came to know about only in 1994.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the deed of Sale is valid.
HELD:
The appellate court went on to hold that petitioner was guilty of laches, and assuming that the transfer of
the properties in favor of respondents was procured through fraud, still, her action should have been filed within
four years from the discovery of the fraud.
Hence, this petition, petitioner insisting that since her cause of action is for annulment or declaration of
inexistent contracts, the provisions on void contracts, specifically Arts. 1390 and 1391 of the Civil Code, apply,
hence, her cause of action had not prescribed, for under Article 1410 of the Civil Code, the action or defense for the
declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.
Further, petitioner contends that even if there be implied trust, her cause of action has not prescribed
because it is anchored on the annulment of a void or inexistent contract. Corollarily, she argues that if at all, a
resulting trust and not a constructive trust was established in the case at bar, considering that she only gave her
consent to respondents upon their representation that they were going to take possession and cultivate the properties
with the understanding that they would later partition them among the legal heirs. She thus contends that the rule
on imprescriptibility of actions to recover property held in trust apply to resulting trusts, as in this case, so long as
the trustee has not repudiated the trust.
Petitioner furthermore alleges that the continued assurances of respondents that partition proceedings were
just dragging on, despite their having already transferred the titles in their names, is a clear indication that they have
not repudiated the resulting trust, the requisites for which, as enunciated in Huang v. Court of Appeals, not having
been met. And she maintains that while the registration of land under the Torrens system operates as a constructive
notice to the whole world, it cannot be construed as being equivalent to a notice of repudiation, for the same cannot
be used as a shield for fraud.
From the allegations in petitioners complaint, it is clear that her action is one for declaration of the nullity
of the Deeds of Sale which she claims to be either falsified because at the time of the execution thereof, Pablo was
already gravely ill and bedridden, hence he could not have gone and appeared before the Notary Public, much less
understood the significance and legal deeds and/or because there was no consideration therefor. Clearly, following
Article 1410 of the Civil Code, petitioners action is imprescriptible.
But even if petitioners complaint were to be taken as one for reconveyance, given that it is based on an
alleged void contract, it is just the same as imprescriptible.
The petition was GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Order of the
Regional Trial Court dismissing the case was REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 179987
April 29, 2009
en banc

FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the
RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of
71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and
continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property
owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio,
Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four
sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife,
Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons
from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio
succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally
belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo
Velazco to Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June
2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property
was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No.
3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March
15, 1982. On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had
failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property
in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the
appliocation of Malabanan.

ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered
under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12,
1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the
applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land
classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to
acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or
because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive
prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section
14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?
HELD:
The Pertition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and
registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require
that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of
possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as
soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section
47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further
confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under
the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial
property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code.
And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure
registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one
ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires
ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good
faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons
uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years,
regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has
acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own
evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they
cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the
subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent
evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the
subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

Manotok v. Barque
FACTS:
Petitioners, (respondents herein) as the surviving heirs of the late Homer Barque, filed a
petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177
issued in the name of Homer L. Barque, which was destroyed in the fire that gutted the
Quezon City Hall, including the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, sometime in
1988. In support of the petition, petitioners submitted the owners duplicate copy of TCT No.
210177, real estate tax receipts, tax decla-rations and the Plan FLS 3168 D covering the
property.
Upon being notified of the petition for administrative recon-stitution, private respondents
(petitioners herein) filed their opposition thereto claiming that the lot covered by the title
under reconstitution forms part of the land covered by their reconsti-tuted title TCT No. RT22481, and alleging that TCT No. 210177 in the name of petitioners predeces-sors-ininterest is spurious.
ISSUE:
Whether or not irregularly issued titles can be cancelled by the LRA.
Held:
Respondents levied on a portion of the MAGRA to satisfy the tax delinquency of PNOC-EDC.
However, the land being levied is classified as inalienable. It is owned by the government
and thus, cannot be sold at public auction. Likewise, the machineries, equipment and other
infrastructures in the MAGRA cannot be levied and sold at public auction because it is not
the property that is subject to the tax.

The personal liability for the tax delinquency, is generally on whoever is the owner of the
real property at the time the tax accrues; where, however, the tax liability is imposed on the
beneficial use of the real property such as those owned but leased to private persons or
entities by the government, or when the assessment is made on the basis of the actual use
thereof, the personal liability is on any person who has such beneficial or actual use at the
time of the accrual of the tax.
In the case at bar, PNOC-EDC is the beneficial user, however, since respondents cannot avail
of the administrative remedy through levy, they can only enforce the collection of real
property tax through civil action.
PNOC-EDC also claims that the real property tax assessment is not yet final and executory. It
avers that prior resort to administrative remedies before seeking judicial remedies is not
necessary considering that the issue raised is purely a question of law. Consequently, it need
not appeal the assessment to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals or to the Central Board
of Assessment Appeals as provided under Sections 22627 and 22928 of the LGC.
We disagree. It is well-settled in Systems Plus Computer College of Caloocan City v. Local
Government of Caloocan City29 that all adminis-trative remedies must be exhausted before
availing of the judicial remedies.
Thus:
The petitioner cannot bypass the authority of the concerned administrative agencies and
directly seek redress from the courts even on the pretext of raising a supposedly pure
question of law without violating the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Hence, when the law provides for remedies against the action of an administrative board,
body, or officer, as in the case at bar, relief to the courts can be made only after exhausting
all remedies provided therein. Otherwise stated, before seeking the intervention of the
courts, it is a precondition that petitioner should first avail of all the means afforded by the
administrative processes.
If PNOC-EDC was not satisfied with the assessment of its property, it should have appealed
to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals within 60 days from receipt of the written notice
of assessment. Instead, it waited until the issuance of a warrant of levy before it filed a
petition for injunction in the regional trial court, which was not in accordance with the
remedies provided in the LGC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision and Order of the Regional
Trial Court are AFFIRMED insofar as it declared PNOC-EDC liable to pay the real property tax
accruing from its use of the MAGRA. Respondents however are DIRECTED to refrain from
levying on the buildings, infrastructures and machineries of PNOC-EDC to satisfy the
payment of the real property tax delinquency.
HERMOSILLA V. REMOQUILLO
FACTS:
Petitioners Heirs of Salvador Hermosilla, assail the Court of Appeals Decision which
reversed the trial courts decision in their favor and accordingly dismissed their complaint.
On August 31, 1931, the Republic of the Philippines acquired through purchase the
San Pedro Tunasan Homesite.

Apolinario Hermosilla (Apolinario), who was occupying a lot in San Pedro Tunasan
Homesite until his death in 1964, caused the subdivision of the lot into two. On April 30,
1962, Apolinario executed a Deed of Assignment transferring possession of Lot 19 in favor of
his grandson, herein respondent Jaime Remoquillo (Jaime). As the Land Tenure
Administration (LTA) later found that Lot 19 was still available for disposition to qualified
applicants, Jaime, being its actual occupant, applied for its acquisition before the LTA on May
10, 1963.
On July 8, 1963, Apolinario conveyed Lot 12 to his son Salvador Hermosilla
(Salvador), Jaimes uncle.
Salvador later filed an application to purchase Lot 12 which was awarded to him by
the defunct Land Authority on December 16, 1971.
On February 10, 1972, Jaime and his uncle Salvador forged a "Kasunduan ng Paglipat
Ng Karapatan sa Isang Lagay na Lupang Solar" (Kasunduan) whereby Jaime transferred
ownership (the questioned property) in favor of Salvador.
After Apolinario died, his daughter Angela Hermosilla filed a protest before the Land
Authority, which became the National Housing Authority (NHA), contending that as an heir of
the deceased, she is also entitled to Lots 12 and 19. By Resolution of June 10, 1981, the NHA
dismissed the protest.
The NHA later awarded on March 16, 1986 Lot 19 to Jaime for which he and his wife
were issued a title, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-156296, on September 15, 1987.6
On May 25, 1992, petitioners filed an action for Annulment of Title on the ground of
fraud with damages against Jaime and his spouse, together with the Register of Deeds,
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of alleging that by virtue of the Kasunduan executed in
1972, Jaime had conveyed to his uncle Salvador the questioned propertypart of Lot 19
covered by TCT No. T-156296 which was issued in 1987.
The RTC found the Kasunduan a perfected contract of sale, there being a meeting of
the minds upon an identified object and upon a specific price, and that ownership over the
questioned property had already been transferred and delivered to Salvador.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

HELD:
An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years. The ten-year prescriptive
period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession
of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in possession of the
property, the prescriptive period to recover the title and possession of the property does not run against him. In such
a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action
that is imprescriptible.11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is undisputed that petitioners houses occupy the questioned property and that respondents have not been
in possession thereof.12 Since there was no actual need to reconvey the property as petitioners remained in
possession thereof, the action took the nature of a suit for quieting of title, it having been filed to enforce an alleged
implied trust after Jaime refused to segregate title over Lot 19. One who is in actual possession of a piece of land

claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking
steps to vindicate his right.13 From the body of the complaint, this type of action denotes imprescriptibility.
The Petition is Denied.
Ching v. Enrile
FACTS:
On September 5, 1985, petitioners purchased from a certain Raymunda La Fuente a 370square meter lot. La Fuente delivered to petitioners a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.
with the Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title and thereafter, petitioners took physical
possession of the subject property.
For reasons known only to petitioners, the conveyance was not registered in the Register of
Deeds as prescribed by Section 51 of PD 1529. Instead, on November 20, 1986, petitioners
executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which was 8 reflected in the Memorandum of
Encumbrances
In the meantime, petitioners peacefully and continuously possessed the subject property.
On August 19, 1988, three years after they purchased the disputed property, petitioners
received a Notice of Levy on Attachment and Writ of Execution issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig in favor of respondents, in Civil Case No. 54617 entitled Sps. Adolfo
Enrile and Arsenia Enrile v. Raymunda La Fuente.
On January 8, 1990, petitioners filed a Petition to Remove Cloud on or Quiet Title to Real
Property asserting ownership of the disputed property.
On May 11, 1993, the RTC rendered judgment in favored of petitioners
HELD:

Good faith, or the want of it, is capable of being ascertained only from the acts of
one claiming its presence, for it is a condition of the mind which can only be judged
by actual or fancied token or signs.
It is beyond dispute that the property in question had already been sold by La
Fuente to petitioners on September 5, 1985. Petitioners immediately took
possession thereof. When the Notice of Levy on Attachment and when the Writ of
Execution and Certificate of Sale were inscribed in favor of respondents, petitioners
have been, since September 5, 1985, in actual, physical, continuous and
uninterrupted possession.
The law does not require a person dealing with the owner of registered land to go
beyond the certificate of title as he may rely on the notices of the encumbrances on
the property annotated on the certificate of title or absence of any annotation. Here,
petitioners' adverse claim is annotated at the back of the title coupled with the fact
that they are in possession of the disputed property. To us, these circumstances
should have put respondents on guard and required them to ascertain the property
being offered to them has already been sold to another to prevent injury to prior

innocent buyers. A person who deliberately ignores a significant fact which would
create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for
value. It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which
should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good
faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.
Respondents were not purchasers in good faith and, as such, could not acquire good
title to the property as against the former transferee.
The petition is GRANTED.