Criticising Empirical Theorists of Democracy: A Comment on Skinner

Author(s): Carole Pateman

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Political Theory, Vol. 2, No. 2 (May, 1974), pp. 215-218
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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CRITICISINGEMPIRICAL
THEORISTSOF DEMOCRACY:
A Comment on Skinner

CAROLE PA TEMAN
University of Sydney

[
T IS NOT CLEARfrom QuentinSkinner'sarticle(PT, Vol. 1,
No. 3) what kind of democratic theory he regards as relevant or
appropriate,having wished a plague on the houses of empiricaltheorists
and their critics alike. Are we to accept the empiricaltheory despite its
ideological nature-or are the critics right in regardingthat as a good
reasonto rejectit?
While I agree with Skinner that the critics that he cites have not
substantiated their claims against the empirical theorists, the aspect of
their argumentthat he has taken up does not get us very far. Eventhough
Skinner may have placed the claim that the empirical theorists have
produced a conservative,ideological defense of the status quo, on a firmer
footing (albeit by a somewhat tortuous route), he still remains in
essentially the same place in the argumentas the critics that he attacks.
Neither these critics nor Skinnerhas shown that the empiricaltheorists are
mistaken in their revision, given the empirical data-referred to by
Skinner-on which the empirical theorists base their claim that the
'classical' theory of democracy needs revision, and the present system
meets the necessaryrequirementsfor a 'democracy.'
That is to say, the really crucial argument between the empirical
theorists and their critics is not over the question of the ideologicalnature
of the empiricaltheory in the sense in which Skinnerdealswith it, but on
Political Theory, Vol. 2 No. 2, May 1974, ? 1974 Sage Publications, Inc.

[215]

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[216] POLITICALTHEORY /MAY 1974

the question of whether it is empiricallyfeasible in the latter part of the

twentieth century to have a 'democracy'characterizedby anything other
than the social basis and competing leaders in periodic, free elections
describedby Dahl et al. If the empiricalrequirementsfor the realizationof
the 'classical'theory of democracy are not realizableundercontemporary
social and economic conditions, then there seems little point, irrespective
of whetherthe empiricaltheory is or is not conservativeand ideological,in
these critics continuingto defend it (althoughit should be addedthat they
are often unclear about the exact nature of the ideal that the empirical
theoristsarebetraying).
It is significantthat the criticsdiscussedby Skinnerare very selectively
chosen. Those who go further and make a stronger case against the
empiricaltheorists arecarefullyomitted;there is no mention, for example,
of Peter Bachrach (1967) or of my own Participationand Democratic
Theory (1970), in which the empiricaltheorists are tackled on their own
ground-the empirical one. Their own interpretationof the evidence is
open to question, and it can be argued on the basis of a different
interpretationthat the 'classical'ideal of a democracybased on widespread
participation,includingsome direct participation,is a feasibleone. Indeed,
although Skinnerrefers to Dahl'sAfter the Revolution?,he appearsnot to
have noticed that Dahl has, in that book, introduced industrial selfmanagementinto democratic theory as 'one solution too obvious to be
ignored'to some of the problemsof 'polyarchy'(Dahl, 1970: 134).
This radical modification of the empiricaltheorists' 'democracy'is a
significant concession to the arguments of the critics whom Skinner
ignores. It is the strongest, not the weakest, part of the critics' case that
Skinnermust meet if he is to dismissthem as well as their opponents.
Skinner'sselectivity in the choice of critics also helps him to make the
kind of case he does for the ideologicalnatureof the empiricaltheory. He
suggeststhat it is only recently that the meaningof 'democracy'has been
in dispute. On the contrary, in its modernform at least, there have always
been two fairly well-definedtraditionsof argumentabout properform for
a 'democratic' system. As I have argued (Pateman, 1970), the idea,
accepted alike by almost all the writerson the subject, of one 'classical'
theory of democracythat is to be opposed to the new empiricaltheory is a
myth. In fact, the empirical theorists are merely the latest, 'operationalized,' version of the liberal democratic tradition; that is, the theory of
(ideology of?) the actual political institutional arrangementsthat have
been part and parcel of the development of the capitalist, liberal,
'democratic'West, especially the United States and Great Britain,which
has always stressed the role of leaders and seen participation as a

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Pateman / CRITICISING EMPIRICALTHEORISTS [217]

protective device, and a cost that, ideally, the citizen shouldhave only to
pay very seldom. This view of democracy has never been universally
accepted among theorists, although the alternative,participatorytradition
has, until very recently, been virtuallycompletely ignoredby most writers
on democratictheory: includingSkinnerin this presentarticle.
I would argue that democracy itself, and the other key terms of
democratic theory, always were 'evaluative-descriptive'
terms.' Thus the
argumentabout democracyalways has been 'ideological'in the sense that
those who 'commended'it have never been agreedabout its meaning.The
argument goes beyond the question whether 'oligarchy' or 'democracy'
best characterizesthe present system, to the question of what other form,
if any, of democracycan be reasonablyheld to be feasible.After all, if the
presentsystem is 'oligarchical,'then what exactly is a democracy?
Part of the claim of the empirical theorists, as Skinner notes in his
discussion of Dahl, is that the set of institutional arrangementsthat they
specify as 'democratic'is also characterizedas involving'politicalequality,'
'political freedom,' 'popularsovereignty,''control' and 'responsiveness'of
leaders, and so on. The crucial question here is how it is to be decided if
the characterizationis a correctone. Anothertheorist may disagreethat it
is correct, and arguethat (say) 'politicalequality' refersnot merely to the
periodicelection of representativesthroughuniversalsuffrage(and perhaps
the existence of pressuregroups) but to a situation where citizens can
actually take part in makingpolitical decisions. That this is more than a
matter of arbitrarystipulations can be seen if it is considered how the
empirical theorists could defend their characterization.I would suggest
that a complete argumentwould demand not just referenceto the actual
operation of the existing system-control of leaders, protection of
individualinterests-and the lack of feasibilityof the alternativeinterpretation, but also referenceto a 'realistic'conception of the citizen as a certain
kind of (male) individual-see the discussionof homnocivicus(Dahl, 1961:
223-225)-with certainkinds of interests (cf. Bachrach,1967: 38-39, 95).
The empirical theorists' defense would appeal to the existing political
system and its political culture and therefore is, as Skinner argues,
conservative. But the conservatismlies not only, as Skinner's analysis
would suggest, in a linguistic sphere,in the realmof speech acts which the
term democracy is 'standardly' used to perform. It is precisely those
standardsand the actual social and political relationshipsof which they
form a part, that lie at the heart of the critics'attack. The argumentis over
something much wider than the 'application'of one term. Moreover,the
empirical theorists would hardly claim that the conditions necessaryfor
applying the term have been drawn too narrowly;ratherthe argumentis

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[218] POLITICAL THEORY /MAY 1974

that in the 'classical'theory they are far too wide, involvingan ideal of the
citizen and political participation that is unrealistic, even utopian.
Skinner'sargumentdoes not advance the critics' case much beyond the
point where he took it up because he ignores the real strengthof their
argument;that they meet their opponentshead-onover the interpretation
of empiricalevidence and so move beyond oligarchy/democracyto open
up the so long neglected theoretical and empirical questions about
participatorydemocracy.

NOTE
1. These remarks draw on Pateman (1971: ch. 2).

REFERENCES
BACHRACH, P. (1967) The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique. Boston:
Little, Brown.
DAHL, R. A. (1970) After the Revolution?: Authority in a Good Society. New
Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press.
--- (1961) Who Governs? New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press.
PATEMAN, C. (1971) "Participation and recent theories of democracy." Ph.D.
dissertation. Oxford University.
---(1970)
Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge
Univ. Press.

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