Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Rights of The Accused
Rights of The Accused
1.1. No person shall be held to answer for an offense without due process of law
(Sec. 14(1), Art III)
1.2. limitations
1.4.1. Denial of right to preliminary investigation (Patanao vs Enage 121 SCRA 228)
2. Self incrimination
2.1. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself (Art III, Sec 17)
2.2. Based on humanitarian ang practical considerations
2.2.1. Humanitariian because it prevents the State from exacting testimony that
might convict accused.
2.2.2. Practical because such compulsion perjures the accused for his own
protection
2.3. Availability
2.4.1. accused
2.4.2. a witness to whom incriminating questions are addressed
2.5. Scope
2.5.1. Covers
the right to examine the same, such as books of accounts of corporations under
the police power.
2.5.1.4. Where accused was compelled to furnish a specimen of his hand writing
in evidence against him for falsification charge, the SC held this is covered by the
prohibition, writing is not merely a mechanical act but requires application of
intelligence and attention. (Beltran vs. Samson)
2.5.2. Does not cover
2.5.2.6. Does not cover questions where previous immunity has been granted
under a statute
2.6. When available
3. Custodial Investigation
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3.1.1. Sec 12 stresses the right of the person under investigation to ""competent
and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice""
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3.5.1. a) Prior to any questioning the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent
3.5.2. b) that any statement he does make may be used in evidence against him
3.5.3. c) that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed
3.5.4. d) the defendant may waive his rights but waiver must be done voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently
3.5.5. e) However, if he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the
investigation that he wishes to consult with an attorney before further speaking,
there can be no questioning.
3.5.6. f) If he is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be
interrogated the police may not question him
3.5.7. g) The mere fact that he answered some questions on his own does not
deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further questions until he
has consulted with his attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
3.6. Confession inadmissible in violation of right against self incrimination (People vs
Buscato)
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3.6.1. Their conviction was reversed on grounds that the physical, mental,, and
moral coercion exerted upon their persons rendered the confessions inadmissible
as contrary to the right against self incrimination (People vs. Buscato)
3.7. A desirable end must not be accomplished by unconstitutional means (People vs
Bagasala)
3.7.1. The imperative requirements of truth and humanity condemn the use of
force and violence to extract information from unwilling victims. Crimes must be
punished and the guilty must not escape. A desirable end cannot, however, be
attained by unconstitutional means. (People vs Bagasala)
3.8. The interrogating officer must exercise patience in explaining the custodial
rights (People vs. Ramos)
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3.8.1. As mandated, it is not enough that the police merely inform the accused of
his constitutional right to silence and to counsel... the interrogating officer must
have patience in explaining these rights to him (the court observed the appellant
has only finished Grade 6, which indicates he is not fully educated enough to
understand fully and fairly the significance of his constitutional rights to silence
and to counsel). Conviction was reversed (People vs Ramos)
3.9. The manner of informing the accused must satisfy the requirements of the law
(People vs Galit, Morales vs. Enrile)
3.9.1. The manner of informing the accused through a lengthy statement of his
constitutional rights to silence and to counsel followed by the question of whether
he was ready to make his statement, to which the accused replied in a
monosyllabic answer, ""Opo"", does not satisfy the requirements of the law that
the accused be informed of his rights (People vs Galit, citing Morales vs. Enrile)
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3.10. Confession by a person whose sanity is dubious and where intelligence is not
only limited but impaired must be disapproved (People vs. Capitin)
3.10.1. A reading of the supposed confession shows there was the mechanical
advise of the suspect's rights including assistance of counsel, followed by the
sacramental query as to whether or not she was waiving her rights to such
assistance and followed by a stereotype answer in statements of this nature. The
question was unacceptable, the answer thereto, is likewise unacceptable, as it
could not have been possibly composed by accused appellant in her state of mind
at the time (assuming she was sane) and given her limited knowledge of Tagalog
(a 22 year old housemaid with her deficiencies in Tagalog, has killed her own child
and was under strong emotional stress). If confessions written in advance by
police officers for persons of limited intelligence or educational attainment is
outlawed, the same disapprobation applies where a confession was signed by a
person whose sanity is dubious, where the intelligence was not only limited but
impaired. (People vs Capitin)
3.11. The swearing officers should have the confessant physically examined by
independent doctors before administering the oath, to discourage attempts to
secure confessions through violence (People vs. Barros)
3.12. When does right to counsel attach? (Gamboa vs. Cruz)
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3.12.1. The right to counsel attached upon the start of an investigation, i.e., the
investigation officer begins to ask questions to elicit information or confession
from the accused (Gamboa vs. Cruz)
3.13. A police line up is not part of the custodial investigation
3.13.1. A police line up is not part of the custodial investigation and the right to
counsel is not required. However, after the start of the custodial investigation, any
identification of an accused without the presence of counsel made in a police line
up is inadmissible. (Gamboa vs. Cruz)
3.14. The right to counsel began when the interrogation started in Quezon (People
vs Compil)
3.14.1. Where the accused was arrested in Quezon, subjected by the police to
informal inculparoty interrogation that continued during their trip back to Manila,
where his formal investigation was conducted at the police station and was
without assistance of counsel until the following day, the SC held that his right to
counsel began when the interrogation started in Quezon (People vs. Compil)
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3.15.1. The operative act is when the question is no longer a general inquiry but
has begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the
police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting
incriminatory statements (People vs Compil)
3.16. The constitution requires an effective and vigilant counsel (People vs Lucero)
3.16.1. In People vs Lucero, the SC held that the Constitution requires not just any
kind of counsel, but an effective and vigilant counsel. In the case, the counsel
merely signed a confession to authenticate regularity when in fact such confession
was made under duress during interrogation by military escorts. The lawyer failed
to perform his duty when he merely asks if such confession was freely made and
did not ascertain the matter if such was the case before signing the same.
3.17. A re-enactment of the cirme in the absence of counsel is inadmissible
evidence against accused. (People vs. Suarez)
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3.18. The waiver of the suspect's custodial rights without assistance of counsel is
invalid (People vs Bonola)
3.19. The taking of confession before advising the suspect of his custodial rights is
inadmissible in evidence against him (People vs Andan)
3.20. The right to counsel is not unlimited where the accused repeatedly asked for
postponement of his trial on grounds he was still looking for a lawyer de parte. The
court should appoint counsel de officio for him. (People vs Serzo)
3.21. The right to counsel is absolute subject only to the limitation that it be
exercised within a reasonable time
3.21.1. During custodial investigation, arraignment, trial, and even appeal, the
accused has the option to be represented by counsel of his choice. In the event
that accused refuses or neglects to exercise this right during arraignment and trial,
the court should appoint one for him. While the right to counsel is absolute, the
accused's option to exercise it is limited and cannot be sanctioned to trifle with
the Rules or prejudice the right of the State to prosecute and the offended party
to speedy and adequate justice. (People vs. Serzo)
3.22. Under RA 7399, victims of unjust imprisonment, arbitrary or illegal detention
or of violent crimes may file a claim for damages with the Board of Claims under the
DOJ. For victims of unjust imprisonment or detention, the award shall be not more
than P1,000.oo per month of detention/imprisonment. In all other cases, the award
shall not exceed 10,000.oo or the expenses incurred for hospitalization, medical
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treatment, loss of wage, loss of support, or other expenses directly related to the
injury, whichever is lower, without prejudice to the right of claimants to seek other
remedies under existing laws.
4. Bail
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4.1. All persons except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. (Art III, Sec. 13)
4.2. Definition
4.2.1. Bail is the security given for the provisional release of a person in custody of
the law, furnished by him or a bondsmand conditioned upon his appearance
before any court as may be required.
4.3. Bail as a matter of right
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4.3.1. Rule 114 of the Rules provide that all persons in custody shall be entitled to
bail as a matter of right except those charged with a capital offense or an offense
which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when the evidence of
guilt is strong.
4.3.2. Even if the crime imputed is punishable by reclusion perpetua, th]e accused
is still entitled to bail if the evidence of guilt is NOT strong. It is for the prosecution
to prove the contrary although it is not necessary at this point to prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. (Pareja vs Gomez)
4.4. Exception to right to bail
4.4.1. The exception to bail applies to any offense which under prevailing laws at
the time of its commission and at the time of application for bail, may be punished
by reclusion perpetua or death, even if a lesser penalty may be imposed upon
conviction owing to mitigating circumstances that may be disclosed later (People
vs. Marcos)
4.4.2. However, an accused is entitled to bail if for example, he is charged with
murder (capital offense) and evidence adduced by the prosecution at the hearing
for bail indicates only a case of homicide (Bernardez vs. Valera)
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4.5. Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution has reversed the ruling in Garcia-Padilla
vs. Enrile where it provides the right to bail is preserved even if the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
4.6. When bail is cancelled and accused placed in confinement
4.7.1. May be done summarily or held in the course of the trial itself. A separate
hearing is not necessary (Gerardo vs. CFI)
4.8. Probability of escape is not ground for denial of bail (Zafra vs. City Warden)
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4.8.1. The remedy is to increase the bail subject to the prohibition that it must not
be excessive. (Zafra vs. City Warden)
4.8.2. After conviction, denial of bail is proper on grounds of risk of absconding
(Zafra vs. City warden)
4.9. On humanitarian grounds, bail may be granted even when the evidence of guilt
of the offense was strong in view of the illness of the accused which required his
hospitalization (Dela Rama vs. People's Court)
4.10. Primary considerations in fixing the amount of bail (not exclusive) - Rule 114
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4.11.1. The respondent court fixed the bail for appellant in the sum of P5,500,000.
equivalent to his civil liability as found by the trial court. The SC reduced the bail
to P200k, saying that bail is not intended as punishment nor as satisfaction of civil
liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court. (Yap
vs. CA)
4.12. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines
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4.12.1. A person granted bail while facing estafa charges wanted to leave for
abroad to attend to certain business matters. He was denied permission, on
appeal to the SC the denial was sustained on the ground that if he were allowed
to leave without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the
courts (Manotoc vs. CA)
5. Presumption of innocence
5.1. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved (Art. III, Sec. 14(a))
5.2. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt (People vs. Dramayo)
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5.3.4. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for
conviction be in existence (People vs Malilay, also citing above cases)
5.4. The evidence of the defendant was weak, but the evidence of prosecution was
weaker (People vs. Sunga)
5.4.1. In People vs Sunga, a prosecution for rape, the SC held that although the
defense of appellant was weak, he nevertheless could not be convicted because of
the constitutional presumption of innocence. The evidence of the prosecution is
weaker.
5.5. The constitutional provision is expilcit
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5.5.1. Explicit is the constitutional provision that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel. An accusation, according to the
fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso (of a
statute) contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate
is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges
have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before
one is fully heard. (Dumlao case)
5.6. An ambiguous evidence cannot justify condemnation of appellant (People vs
Tempongko)
5.6.1. The guilt of appellant has not been established beyond reasonable doubt...
The defense is weak, to be sure, but for all the persuasive arguments of the
SolGen and the private prosecutor, this Court remains unconvinced that the
appellant raped the complainant. The appellant may have been lying and there is
evidence to this, but we are not prepared to accept, to the point of moral
certainty, that the complainant is telling the truth. The ambiguous evidence of the
prosecution cannot justify our condemning the appellant to prison where there
are whispers of doubt that he is guilty. (People vs. Tempongko)
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5.9.1. It is incumbent on the accused who admitted the killing to establish his case
of self defense instead of relying merely on the weakness of the prosecution
(People vs. Regulacion)
5.10. On the right to remain silent
5.10.1. No inference of guilt may be drawn against an accused for his failure to
make a statement of any sort. The neglect or refusal of the accused shall not in
any manner prejudice or be used against him. (People vs. Arciaga)
5.10.2. While accused have a right to remain silent, they run the risk of an
inference from the non-production of evidence (People vs Solis)
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5.10.3. Failure of accused to testify may prejudice him if the prosecution has
already established a prima facie case against him (People vs Resano)
5.10.4. The duty to apprise the accused of the right to be silent rests with the
defense counsel, not with the court (People vs Tampus)
6. Right to be heard
6.1. ... and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel...
6.2. Such a right is indispensable in any criminal prosecution where the stakes are
the liberty or even the life of the accused who must for this reason be given the
chance to defend himself.
6.3. The SC set aside the conviction of three co-accused after finding they were
denied due process because they were not given a chance to testify and to present
additional evidence on their behalf. (People v. Lumague)
7. Assistance of counsel
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7.1. The right to counsel begins from the time a person is taken into custody and
placed under investigation for the commission of a crime (People vs. Lino)
7.2. The reason why the accused is entitled to be heard by himself and counsel.
7.2.1. An ordinary layman, let alone one who is ignorant or unlettered, is without
knowledge of the intricacies of courtroom procedures. That is why the accused is
entitled to be heard in his defense not only by himself but also with the assistance
of counsel. He shall be appointed a counsel de officio if he cannot afford the
services of a retained lawyer.
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7.3.1. In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel... Even the most intelligent man may have no
skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without
counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not
know how to establish his innocence. It is for this reason that the right to counsel
is deemed important that it has become a constitutional right and is so
implemented that under our rules of procedure, it is not enough for the court to
apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him
whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should
assign one de officio for him if he is poor or if he so desires, grant him reasonable
time to procure an attorney of his own (People vs. Holgado)
7.4. The duty of the court is not ended with such appointment, as it should also see
to it that counsel de oficio is doing his duty by the defendant.
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7.4.1. Counsel de oficio should not merely make the motions of defending the
accused but exert his utmost efforts as if he were representing a paying client.
7.4.2. The SC has reversed convictions based on pleas of guilty made on advice of
counsel de oficio presumably seeking to avoid the inconveniences of
unremunerated services. (People vs. Hondolero)
7.4.3. Thus, the judge should take extra care in informing the accused of his rights
and the consequences of his plea of guilty, and in ascertaining the presence of
different circumstances taken into account in imposing the proper penalty (People
vs. Alde)
7.4.3.1. Justice Makasiar scolded the trial court for its pro forma appointment of
a counsel de ofico, who in turn did not exert his best efforts for the protection of
his non-paying client, and its own failure to explain to defendant the
consequences of his plea of guilty. The judgment was set aside and the case
remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings (People vs. Magsi)
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7.4.4. In People vs. Malunsing, a defendant in a murder case had lost confidence in
his former counsel and made manifest his intention to retain counsel de parte.
Nevertheless the court appointed the same lawyer as his counsel de oficio. As the
case proceeded, no evidence was adduced in behalf of the defendant. On appeal
of his conviction, the SC remanded the case for new trial in view of the violation of
the constitutional rights of the accused.
7.5. Note that the right to be silent and to the assistance of counsel may be waived
during custodial investigation under Art III, Sec. 12 (1). The right to counsel does not
cease after trial but continues even when the case is appealed (People vs Rio)
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8.5.1. Where the statute itself is couched in such indefinite language, such that it
is not possible for men of ordinary intelligence to determine therefrom what acts
or omissions are punished and hence, should be avoided.
8.5.2. To charge an accused for penalties under a statute couched in vague
language constitutes denial of the right to be informed of the charge against him,
and to due process as well.
8.5.3. Reasonable degree of certainty and not absolute precision for a statute to
be upheld.
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8.6.1. An arraignment assures [the defendant] that he be fully acquainted with the
nature of the crime imputed to him and the circumstances under which it is
allegedly committed. It is not useless formality, much less an idle ceremony.
(Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan)
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8.7. The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means,
whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against him
denied the accused his fundamental right to due process of law. The accuracy and
fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was
determined was not safeguarded. (People vs Crisologo)
9. The Trial
9.2.1. requires the cold neutrality of an impartial judge to ensure that justice is
done to the defendant. (Gutierrez vs Santos)
9.2.2. It was held as part of the rule that the judge must not only be impartial but
must also appear to be impartial (Fernandez vs. Presbitero)
9.2.3. It is beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of
that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of
his being fair and just (Mateo vs Villaluz)
9.2.4. Convictions are based not on mere appearance of the accused (tadtad ng
tattoo), but on his actual commission of the offense, to be ascertained with the
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pure objectivity of the true judge who must uphold the law for all without favor or
malice and always with justice (People vs. Opida)
9.3. public trial
9.3.1. Publicity is necessary to avoid abuses that may be committed by the court
to the prejudice of the defendant.
9.3.2. The people have the right to attend the proceedings to see whether or not
the constitutional safeguards for the benefit of the accused are being observed.
9.3.2.1. This rule is not absolute. The court can bar the public in certain cases,
like rape trials.
9.4. speedy trial
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9.4.1. Defined as one free from vexatious, capricious, and oppresive delays (Flores
vs People, 61 SCRA 331)
9.4.2. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi judicial, or administrative bodies. (Art III, Sec. 16, Bill of Rights)
9.4.3. We lay down the legal proposition that where a prosecuting officer, without
good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest
beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the
accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus, to compel a dismissal of
the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom (Conde vs. Rivera, 45 Phil. 650)
9.4.4. The respondent court's delay of more than one year in resolving petitioner's
motion to dismiss the charges against him violated the right to speedy trial,
considering all pertinent pleadings required by the Sandiganbayan had already
been submitted (Cojuanco vs. Sandiganbayan)
9.4.5. It was held, since the prosecution, by repeated motions for postponement
caused the delay of the proceedings from the time the information was filed in
Feb 1996, from which time the test of violation of the right to speedy trial is to be
counted, the dismissal of the case, on motion of the accused, amounts to
acquittal. (Padilla vs. Apas, 487 SCRA 29)
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9.4.6. Speed is not the chief objective of a trial... more than the mere convenience
of the courts or the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be
served thereby are more important than a race to end the trial. (Amberti v. CA)
9.4.7. The right to speedy trial, which begins from the filing of the information,
cannot be quantified in a specified number of days... but must be examined in
light of surrounding circumstances such as the unavailability of witnesses.(Martin
vs. Ver, 123 SCRA 745)
9.5. The right to be present at trial is personal and can be waived.
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10.1. Section 14(2) of the Bill of Rights provide ""after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
10.2. Requisites
make his failure to appear unjustified because he has by escaping placed himself
beyond the pale, and protection of the law (People vs. Salas)
10.4. A judgment of conviction will be set aside if it appears the accused was tried
and convicted in his absence before he had been formally arraigned. (Borja vs
Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422)
10.5. Arraignment is an indispensable pre-requisite to trial in absentia, to accord an
accused due process. (Borja vs Mendoza)
10.6. The court has the power to forfeit the bail bond if the accused fails to appear
at his trial (Rule 114, Sec 18)
10.7. The trial court committed a grave error in reconsidering its original order and
deferred confiscation of bail bond of accused, who had already gone abroad and
could not attend his trial, as being premature until judgment is rendered. (People
vs. Prieto)
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11.4. An affidavit implicating the accused as a drug pusher was rejected as mere
hearsay by the SC because the affiant had not been presented in court and so could
not be cross examined by the defense. (People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312)
11.5. A conviction based on mere affidavits and denying the defense the right to..
cross examine the affiants was annulled by the SC. (Combate vs. San Jose 135 SCRA
693)
11.6. the witness must be presented in court
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12.1. and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and
the production of evidence in his behalf...
12.2. Accused is entitled to issuance of
12.2.1. subpoena
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12.5.1. Where the testimony is material and the witness is so sick as to afford
reasonable ground to believe that he will not be able to attend the trial
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12.5.2. Where the witness resides more than 100 kilometers from the place of
trial and has no means to attend the same
12.5.3. Other similar circumstances exists that would prevent him from attending
the trial
12.6. The right to compulsary processes must be invoked during trial. Failure to do
so constitutes a waiver that cannot be undone on appeal. (US vs. Garcia, 10 Phil.
384)
13.1. Sec 19(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading, or
inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for
it....
13.2. To be violative, the penalty must be inhuman and barbarous and shocking to
the conscience (People vs. Dionisio)
13.3. Torture is a cruel punishment because it involves a deliberate design to
increase the suffering of a prisoner in a manner so flagrant and oppressive as to
revolt the moral sense of the community.
13.4. When is punishment degrading and inhuman
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13.6.3. There are penalties not normally proportionate to the offense in some
instances are imposed without violating the fundamental law, such as where the
offense has become rampant as to require the adoption of a more effective
deterrent.
13.7. Excessive fines
13.7.2.1. take into account the financial condition of the convict. to prevent the
fine from becoming excessive and discriminatory.
13.7.3. A fine is imposed as a penalty and not as payment for a specific loss or
injury, and since its lightness or severity depends upon the culprit's wealth or
means, it is only just and proper that the latter be taken into account in fixing the
amount (People vs Ching Kuan, 74 Phil. 23)
13.7.4. Obviously, to impose the same amount of fine for the same offense upon
two persons thus differently circumstanced would be to mete out to them a
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penalty of unequal severity and hence, unjustly discriminatory (People vs. Ching
Kuan)
14.1. Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
14.2. Definition
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14.2.1. The right against double jeopardy prohibits the prosecution again of any
person for a crime of which he has previously been acquitted or convicted.
14.2.2. The object is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest,
assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be put to the dangers and anxiety
of a second charge against him for the same offense.
14.3. Requisites of
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competent jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not attach because the defendant
had not been in danger of conviction in the original prosecution. (People vs.
Galano)
14.5.4. Where the defendant was convicted in the first proceedings which was
not recorded and on appeal the defendant was convicted anew in a court with
concurrent original jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not attach because the first
proceeding was void for lack of record. Double jeopardy requires a valid previous
proceedings. (People vs. Brecinio)
14.5.5. Where a court martial and a civil court have concurrent jurisdiction, a
decision by one court will bar another prosecution for the same offense in the
other court. (Crisologo vs People)
14.5.6. Where an information is motu proprio dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by
a court which is actually competent to hear it, the dismissal will inure to the
benefit of the accused, who is entitled to plead double jeopardy. (US v. Regala, 28
Phil. 57)
14.5.7. Olaguer v. Military Commission, 150 SCRA 144, (Olaguer doctrine) - held
that military courts have no jurisdiction to try cases of civilians which fell under
the competence of ordinary civil courts even during the period of martial law. No
jeopardy in retrial in competent civil courts because of absence of jurisdiction of
courts martial to try and convict prisoners. There is jeopardy if there is a valid
previous proceeding. Absent a valid previous proceeding, retrial in competent civil
courts will not result in double jeopardy.
14.5.8. Tan vs. Barrios, 160 SCRA 702 - The Olaguer doctrine applies prospectively
only to future cases and cases still pending when that decision was promulgated.
No retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal,
rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of Olaguer
decision.
14.6. Valid plea (after arraignment)
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14.6.1. A defendant is never place in jeopardy until after he shall have pleaded to
the charge against him during arraignment.
14.6.2. Where a defective complaint was dismissed before arraignment of
defendant and an amended complaint was later filed, double jeopardy does not
attach because there was no valid previous indictment. (US vs. Solis, 6 Phil 676)
14.6.3. The accused pleaded guilty during arraignment. Thereafter, defendant
testified to prove mitigating circumstances. The trial court acquitted the
defendant. The government appealed. The defendant interposed the defense of
double jeopardy. The SC held there had been no standing plea at the time the trial
court rendered its judgment of acquittal because the testimony of accused had
the effect of vacating his plea of guilty. Thus double jeopardy did not attach with
respect to the appeal. (People vs. Balisacan, 17 SCRA 119)
14.7. Termination of case
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14.7.1. General rule: a dismissal with the express consent of the defendant will
not bar another prosecution for the same offense because said consent amounts
to waiver of his right against double jeopardy.
14.7.2. To be effective, the consent must be expressly given. Mere silence or
failure to object to the dismissal are excluded. (People vs Ylagan)
14.7.3. In the morning, the prosecutor moved for dismissal of the case for
frustrated murder on ground of lack of jurisdiction because intent to kill was not
alleged in the information. Counsel for the defense manifested he had no
objection to the dismissal. The court granted the motion. In the afternoon of the
same day, accused filed a manifestation making of record his opposition to the
dismissal of the case. The motion was denied. The prosecutor later filed a new
information for the same offense. The accused moved to quash on double
jeopardy. The motion was granted holding the dismissal was erroneous, and not
made with the express consent of defendant. The SC held that the oral
manifestation of counsel of accused that he had no objection to dismissal of the
case was equivalent to a declaration of conformity to its dismissal or to an express
consent to its termination within the meaning of Section 9 Rule 117.
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14.7.7.1. The prosecution can appeal where the accused is deemed to have
waived or estopped from invoking his right against double jeopardy.
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14.8.1. If the four elements of double jeopardy are present the accused may not
be prosecuted anew for the original offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the original
information or complaint.
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14.9.1. Under the doctrine of supervening event, the accused may be prosecuted
for another offense if a subsequent development changes the character of the
first indictment under which he may have already been charged or convicted.
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the face of the victim. The SC held that there was no double jeopardy as the
deformity did not exist and could not have been apprehended at the time the
first information was filed. (People vs. Adil, 76 SCRA 462)
14.9.2. Instances in Rule 117 where the conviction of accused shall not bar
another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged
in the first complaint or information:
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14.10.1. Where one offense is inseparable from another and proceeds from the
same act, they cannot be the subject of separate prosecutions.
14.10.1.1.A person indicted for smoking opium cannot be charged also with
possessing opium (US vs. Pho Chi, 20 Phil. 140)
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14.10.2.4.Conviction of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code does not bar
prosecution for estafa (People vs. Saley, 291 SCRA 715)
14.10.2.5.When the subsequent information charges another and different
offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts, there is no prohibited
double jeopardy. In the case, it appears clear to us, the first offense charged is
that of unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm penailzed under a special
statute, while the second offense charged was that of murder punished under
the RPC. These two offenses in themselves are different one from the other,
such that in principle the subsequent filing of the second charged is not to be
regarded as having place appellant in prohibited second jeopardy. (People vs.
Tac-an)
14.10.2.6.A plea of double jeopardy cannot be accorded merit where two
indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law however closely they may
appear to be connected in fact. Protection against double jeopardy may be
invoked only for the same offense or identical offense. Where two different
laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of
them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise
from the same technical offense.(same facts), if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element of the other.(Perez vs CA 168
SCRA 236)
14.10.2.7.Common elements between consented abduction and qualified
seduction; (1) the offended party is a virgin, and (2) she must be over 12 and
under 18 years of age. However, two elements differentiate the two crimes. In
consented abduction; (1) the taking away of the offended party must be with
her consent and (2) the taking away must be with lewd design. In qualified
abduction (1) the crime was committed by abuse of authority, confidence, or
relationship (2) the offender has sexual intercourse with the woman. (Perez vs.
CA)
14.11. An act violating a law or ordinance
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the offense charged in one case is not included in or does not include the
crime charged in the other case.
14.11.1.2.The second sentence provide, if an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
14.11.1.2.1. This prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same act
14.11.1.2.2. The second sentence applies even if the offenses charged are not
the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance
and the other a violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and
the same act, conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance
shall bar a prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such conviction or
acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has attached under one
of the informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the
other case involving the same offense,even if there has been neither
conviction or acquittal in either case.
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