THE LAW AND PRACTICE ON PHILIPPINE AGENCY LAW

NATURE, FORM AND KINDS OF AGENCY

I. DEFINITION AND OBJECTIVE OF AGENCY
1. Definition and Objective of Agency
Article 1868 of the Civil Code defines the contract of agency as one whereby a person binds himself to render some
service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter. [1]
In Eurotech Industrial Technologies, Inc. v. Cuizon, 521 SCRA 584 (2007), the Supreme Court held that The underlying
principle of the contract of agency is to accomplish results by using the services of others to do a great variety of things
like selling, buying, manufacturing, and transporting. Its purpose is to extend the personality of the principal or the party
for whom another acts and from whom he or she derives the authority to act. (at p. 592)
In Orient Air Service & Hotel Representatives v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 645 (1991), the Court held that the purpose
of every contract of agency is the ability, by legal fiction, to extend the personality of the principal through the facility of the
agent; but the same can only be effected with the consent of the principal.
In Litonjua, Jr. v. Eternit Corp., 490 SCRA 204 (2006), the Court held that It bears stressing that in an agent-principal
relationship, the personality of the principal is extended through the facility of the agent. In so doing, the agent, by legal
fiction, becomes the principal, authorized to perform all acts which the latter would have him do. Such a relationship can
only be effected with the consent of the principal, which must not, in any way, be compelled by law or by any court.[2] (at
p. 223)
In Doles v. Angeles , 492 SCRA 607 (2006), the Court held
The CA is incorrect when it considered the fact that the supposed friends of [petitioners], the actual borrowers, did not
present themselves to [respondent] as evidence that negates the agency relationshipit is sufficient that petitioner
disclosed to respondent that the former was acting in behalf of her principals, her friends whom she referred to
respondent. For an agency to arise, it is not necessary that the principal personally encounter the third person with whom
the agent interacts. The law in fact contemplates, and to a great degree, impersonal dealings where the principal need not
personally know or meet the third person with whom her agent transacts; precisely, the purpose of agency is to extend the
personality of the principal through the facility of the agent. (at p. 622)
Lately, in Philex Mining Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 551 SCRA 428 (2008), the Court reiterated the
principle that the essence of an agency, even one that is coupled with interest, is the agents ability to represent his
principal and bring about business relati0ns between the latter and third persons.
When an agency relationship is established, and the agent acts for the principal, he is insofar as the world is concerned
essentially the principal acting in the particular contract or transaction on hand. Consequently, the acts of the agent on
behalf of the principal within the scope of the authority have the same legal effect and consequence as though the
principal had been the one so acting in the given situation. Rallos v. Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corp., 81 SCRA 251
(1978); Eurotech Industrial Technologies, Inc. v. Cuizon, 521 SCRA 584 (2007).
Some of the legal consequences that flow from the doctrine of representation in the contract of agency are that
Notice to the agent is notice to the principal. Air France v. Court of Appeals , 126 SCRA 448 (1983).
Knowledge of the agent pertains to the principal
When an agent purchases the property in bad faith, the principal is deemed to be a purchaser in bad faith. Caram, Jr. v.
Laureta , 103 SCRA 7 (1981).
A suit against an agent in his personal capacity cannot, without compelling reasons, be considered a suit against the
principal. Philippine National Bank v. Ritratto Groups, Inc., 362 SCRA 216 (2001).
2. Parties to a Contract of Agency
The parties to a contract of agency are:
the PRINCIPAL the person represented
the AGENT the person who acts for and in representation of another
The other terms used for the position of agent are attorney-in-fact, proxy, delegate, or representative.
Although Article 1868 of the Civil Code defines agency in terms of being a contract, it should also be considered that upon
the perfection of the contract of agency, it creates between the principal and an agent an on-going legal relationship which
imposes personal obligations on both parties. This is in consonance with the progressive nature of every contract of
agency.
a. Capacity of the Parties
The principal must have capacity to contract (Arts. 1327 and 1329), and may either be a natural or juridical person (Art.
1919[4]).
There is legal literature that holds that since the agent assumes no personal liability, she does not have to possess full
capacity to act insofar as third persons are concerned.[3] Since a contract of agency is first and foremost a contract in
itself, the parties (both principal and agent) must have legal capacities to validly enter into an agency. However, if one of

the parties has no legal capacity to contract, then the contract of agency is not void, but merely voidable, which means
that it is valid until annulled.
Thus, a voidable agency will produce legal consequences, when it is pursued to enter into juridical relations with third
parties. If the principal is the one who has no legal capacity to contract, and his agent enters into a contractual relationship
in the principals name with a third party, the resulting contract is voidable and subject to annulment. On the other hand, if
the principal has legal capacity, and it is the agent that has no legal capacity to contract, the underlying agency
relationship is voidable; and when the incapacitated agent enters into a contract with a third party, the resulting contract
would be valid, not voidable, for the agents incapacity is irrelevant, the contract having been entered into, for and in
behalf of the principal, who has full legal capacity.
The foregoing discussions support the fact that as a general proposition the lack of legal capacity of the agent does not
affect the constitution of the agency relationship. And yet, it is clear under Article 1919(3) of the Civil Code that if during
the term of the agency, the principal or agent is placed under civil interdiction, or becomes insane or insolvent, the agency
is ipso jure extinguished. It is therefore only logical to conclude that if the loss of legal capacity of the agent extinguishes
the agency, then necessarily any of those cause that have the effect of removing legal capacity on either or both the
principal and agent at the time of perfection would not bring about a contract of agency.
Obviously, there seems to be an incongruence when it comes to principles involving the legal capacities of the parties to a
contract of agency. The reason for that is that the principles actually occupy two different legal levels. When it comes to
creating and extinguishing the contractual relationship of principal and agent, the provisions of law take into consideration
purely intramural matters pertaining to the parties thereto under the principle of relativity. Since agency is essentially a
personal relationship based on the purpose of representation, then when either the principal or agent dies or becomes
legally incapacitated, then the agency relation should ipso jure cease. But a contract of agency is merely a preparatory
contract, where the main purpose is to effect through the agent contracts and other juridical relationships of the principal
with third parties. The public policy is that third parties who act in good faith with an agent have a right to expect that their
contracts would be valid and binding on the principal. Therefore, even when by legal cause an agency relationship has
terminated, say with the insanity of the principal, if the agent and a third party enter into contract unaware of the situation,
then the various provisions on the Law on Agency would affirm the validity of the contract. More on this point will be
covered under the section on the essential characteristics of agency.
3. Elements of the Contract of Agency
Like any other contract, agency is constituted of the essential elements of (a) consent; (b) object or subject matter; and (c)
cause or consideration.
In Rallos v. Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corp., 81 SCRA 251 (1978), the Court held that the following are the essential
elements of the contract of agency:
(a) Consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish the relationship;
(b) Object, which is the execution of a juridical act in relation to third parties;
(c) Agent acts as a representative and not for himself; and
(d) Agent acts within the scope of his authority.[4]
The element not included in the Rallos enumeration is the cause or consideration of every contract of agency. Under
Article 1875 of the Civil Code, every agency is presumed to be for compensation, unless there is proof to the contrary. In
other words, it is clear that there can be a valid agency contract which is supported by consideration of liberality on the
part of the agent; that although agency contracts are primarily onerous, they may also be constituted as gratuitous
contracts. The value that Article 1875 of the Civil Code brings into the Law on Agency is that the presumption is that every
agency contract entered into is for valuable considerationthat the agency serves for the benefit of the principal
expecting to be compensated for his efforts. It is the party who avers that the agency was gratuitousthat the agent
agreed to serve gratuitously.
The last two elements included in the Rallos enumeration should not be understood to be essential elements for the
perfection and validity of the contract of agency, for indeed they are matters that do not go into perfection, but rather into
the performance stage of the agency relationship. The non-existence of the two purported essential elements (i.e., that the
agent acted for herself and/or the agent acted beyond the scope of her authority), does not affect the validity of the
existing agency relationship, but rather the legality of the contracts entered into by the agent on behalf of the principal.
Thus, under Article 1883 of the Civil Code, If an agent acts in his own name, the principal has no right of actions against
the person with whom the agent has contracted; neither have such persons against the principal. Under Article 1898 of
the Civil Code, If the agent contracts in the name of the principal, exceeding the scope of his authority, and the principal
does not ratify the contract, it shall be void as to the principal.
a. Consent
The essential element of consent is manifest from the principle that No person may be represented by another without
his will; and that no person can be compelled against his will to represent another.
Thus, the Supreme Court held in Litonjua, Jr. v. Eternit Corp., 490 SCRA 204 (2006), held that consent of both the
principal and the agent is necessary to create an agency: The principal must intend that the agent shall act for him; the

agent must intend to accept the authority and act on it, and the intention of the parties must find expression either in
words or conduct between them.
In the same manner, Dominion Insurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 376 SCRA 239 (2002), held that since the basis for
agency is representation, then there must be, on the part of the principal, an actual intention to appoint or an intention
naturally inferable from his words or actions; on the part of the agent, there must be an intention to accept the
appointment and act on it; and in the absence of such intent, there is generally no agency.
Perhaps the only exception to this rule is agency by estoppel, but even then it is by the separate acts of the purported
principal and purported agent, by which they are brought into the relationship insofar as third parties acting in good faith
are concerned. More discussions on the essential element of consent shall take place in the section on essential
characteristic of consensuality of contracts of agency.
b. Object or Subject Matter
The object of every contract of agency is service, which particularly is the legal undertaking of the agent to enter into
juridical acts with third persons on behalf of the principal.
Items (b), (c) and (d) in the enumerated elements of Rallos can actually be summarized into the object of every contract of
agency to be that of service, i.e., the undertaking (obligation) of the agent to enter into a juridical act with third parties on
behalf of the principal and within the scope of his authority.
c. Consideration
The cause or consideration in agency is the compensation or commission that the principal agreed or committed to be
paid to the agent for the latters services. Under Article 1875 of the Civil Code, agency is presumed to be for
compensation, unless there is proof to the contrary. In other words, liberality may be the proper cause or consideration for
an agency contract only when it is so expressly agreed upon. Unless otherwise stipulated, therefore, every agent is
entitled to remuneration or compensation for the services performed under the contract of agency.
The old decision in Aguna v. Larena, 57 Phil 630 (1932), did not reflect the general rule of agency-is-for-compensation
reflected subsequently in Article 1875 of the Civil Code. In Aguna, although the agent had rendered service to the
principal covering collection of rentals from the various tenants of the principal, and in spite of the agreement that principal
would pay for the agents service, nevertheless, the principal allowed the agent to occupy one of his parcels of land and to
build his house thereon. The Court held that the service rendered by the agent was deemed to be gratuitous, apart from
the occupation of some of the house of the deceased by the plaintiff and his family, for if it were true that the agent and
the deceased principal had an understanding to the effect that the agent was to receive compensation aside from the use
and occupation of the houses of the deceased, it cannot be explained how the agent could have rendered services as he
did for eight years without receiving and claiming any compensation from the deceased. (at p. 632) If Aguna were
decided under the New Civil Code, then under Article 1875, which mandates that every contract of agency is deemed to
be for compensation, then the result would have been quite the opposite.
d. Entitlement of Agent to Commission Anchored on the Rendering of Service
The compensation that the principal agrees to pay to the agent is part of the terms of the contract of agency upon which
their minds meet. Therefore, the extent and manner by which the agent would be entitled to receive compensation or
commission is based on the terms of the contract.
Sometimes, the terms are not that clear, and decisions have had to deal with the issue of when an agent has merited the
right to receive the compensation either stipulated or implied from the terms of the contract. The doctrine that may be
derived from the various decisions on the matter are anchored on the nature of the contract of agency as a species of
contracts of services in general. When the rendering of service alone, and not the results, is the primordial basis for which
the compensation is given, then the proof that services have been rendered should entitle the agent to the compensation
agreed upon. On the other hand, if the nature of the service to be compensated is understood by the results to be
achieved, e.g., that a particular contract with a third party is entered into in behalf of the principal, then mere rendering of
service without achievement of the results agreed upon to be achieved would not entitle the agent to the compensation
agreed upon.
Thus, in Inland Realty v. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 70 (1997), the Court held that
Although the ultimate buyer was introduced by the agent to the principal during the term of the agency, nevertheless, the
lapse of the period of more than one (1) year and five (5) months between the expiration of petitioners authority to sell
and the consummation of the sale, cannot authorize compelling the principal to pay the stipulated brokers fee, since the
agent was not longer entitled thereto.
The Court takes into strong consideration that utter lack of evidence of the agent showing any further involvement in the
negotiations between principal and buyer during that period and in the subsequent processing of the documents pertinent
to said sale. (at p. 79)
In contrast, in Manotok Bros. Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 224 (1993), the Court held that although the sale of the
object of the agency to sell was perfected three days after the expiration of the agency period, the agent was still be
entitled to receive the commission stipulated based on the doctrine held in Prats v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 360
(1978), that when the agent was the efficient procuring cause in bringing about the sale that the agent was entitled to

compensation. In essence, the Court ruled that when there is a close, proximate and causal connection between the
agents efforts and labor and the principals sale of his property, the agent is entitled to a commission.
The matter pertaining to entitlement to commission will be discussed in greater details in the section that distinguishes a
contract of agency from that of a brokers contract.
4. Essential Characteristics of Agency
a. Nominate and Principal
Not only is the contract of agency specifically named as such under the Civil Code, it is a principal contract because it can
stand on its own without need of another contract to validate it.
The real value of the contract of agency being a nominate and principal contract is that it has been so set apart by law
and provided with its own set of rules and legal consequences, that any other arrangement that essentially falls within its
terms shall be considered as an agency arrangement and shall be governed by the Law on Agency, notwithstanding any
intention of the parties to the contrary. After all, a contract is what the law says it is, and not what the parties call it.
In Doles v. Angeles, 492 SCRA 607 (2006), it was held that if an act done by one person in behalf of another is in its
essential nature one of agency, the former is the agent of the latter notwithstanding he or she is not so calledit will be an
agency whether the parties understood the exact nature of the relation or not.
b. Consensual
The contract of agency is perfected by mere consent. Under Article 1869, an agency may be expressed or implied from
the act of the principal, from his silence or lack of action, or failure to repudiate the agency; agency may be oral, unless
the law requires a specific form.[5]
Under Article 1870 of the Civil Code, acceptance by the agent may also be express, or implied from his acts which carry
out the agency, of from his silence or inaction according to the circumstances.
c. Unilateral and Primarily Onerous
Ordinarily, an agency is onerous in nature, where the agency expects compensation for his services in the form of
commissions. However, Article 1875 recognizes that an agency may be supported by pure liberality, and thus would be
gratuitous, but the burden of proof would be to show that the agency was constituted gratuitously.
When it is gratuitous, the contract of agency is unilateral contract because it only creates an obligation on the part of the
agent. But even when it is supported by a valuable consideration (i.e.,compensated or onerous agency), it would still be
characterized as a unilateral contract, because it is only the fulfillment of the primary obligations of the agent to render
some service upon which the subordinate obligation of the principal to pay the compensation agreed upon arises.
When an agent accepts the agency position without compensation, he assumes the same responsibility to carry out the
agency and therefore incurs the same liability when he fails to fulfill his obligations to the principal. It is therefore rather
strange that Article 1909 of the Civil Code provides that The agent is responsible not only for fraud, but also for
negligence, which shall be judged with more or less rigor by the courts, according to whether the agency was or was not
for a compensation.
d. Preparatory and Representative
There is no doubt that agency is a species of the broad grouping of what we call the service contracts, which includes
employment contract, management contract and contract-for-a piece of work. There are also special service contracts
which include the rendering of professional service (e.g., doctors and lawyers), and consultancy work. But it is the
characteristic of representation that is the most distinguishing mark of agency when compared with other service
contracts, in that the main purpose is to allow the agent to enter into contracts with third parties on behalf of, and which
would bind on, the principal.
A contract of agency does not exist for its own purpose; it is a preparatory contract entered into for other purposes that
deal with the public. This characteristic of an agency is reflected in various provisions in the Law on Agency and in caselaw, that seek to protect the validity and enforceability of contracts entered into pursuant to the agency arrangement, even
when to do so would contravene strict agency principles. In another way of putting it, an agency contract is merely a tool
allowed to be resorted to achieve a greater objective to enter into juridical relations on behalf of the principal;
considerations that pertain merely to the tool certainly cannot outweigh considerations that pertain to the main objects of
the agency.
In Amon Trading Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 477 SCRA 552 (2005), the Court decreed that In a bevy of cases as the
avuncular case ofVictorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Court Appeals, [333 SCRA 663 (2000)], the Court decreed from Article 1868
that the basis of agency is representation, (at p. 560), and that consequently one of the strongest feature of a true
contract of agency is that of control that the agent is under the control and instruction of the principal. Thus,
in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 333 SCRA 663 (2000), it was ruled
It is clear from Article 1868 that the basis of agency is representation.[6] On the part of the principal, there must be an
actual intention to appoint or an intention naturally inferable from his words or actions; and on the part of the agent, there
must be an intention to accept the appointment and act on it, and in the absence of such intent, there is generally no
agency. One factor which most clearly distinguishes agency from other legal concepts is control; one person the agent
agrees to act under the control or direction of another the principal. Indeed, the very word agency has come to

connote control by the principal.[7] The control factor, more than any other, has caused the courts to put contracts
between principal and agent in a separate category. . . .
xxx
In the instant case, it appears plain to us that private respondent CSC was a buyer of the SLDFR form, and not an agent
of STM. Private respondent CSC was not subject to STMs control. The question of whether a contract is one of sale or
agency depends on the intention of the parties as gathered from the whole scope and effect of the language employed.
That the authorization given to CSC contained the phrase for and in our (STMs) behalf did not establish an agency.
Ultimately, what is decisive is the intention of the parties. That no agency was meant to be established by the CSC and
STM is clearly shown by CSCs communication to petitioner that SLDR No. 1214M had been sold and endorsed to it.
The use of the words sold and endorsed means that STM and CSC intended a contract of sale, and not an agency. (at
pp. 676-677)
In Doles v. Angeles, 492 SCRA 607 (2006), it was held that for an agency to arise, it is not necessary that the principal
personally encounter the third person with whom the agent interacts precisely, the purpose of agency is to extend the
personality of the principal through the facility of the agent.
In Eurotech Industrial Technologies, Inc. v. Cuizon, 521 SCRA 584 (2007), the Court held
It is said that the basis of agency is representation, that is, the agent acts for and on behalf of the principal on matters
within the scope of his authority and said acts have the same legal effect as if they were personally executed by the
principal. By this legal fiction, the actual or real absence of the principal is converted into his legal or juridical presence
qui facit per alium facit per se. (at p. 593)
Earlier, in Rallos v. Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corp., 81 SCRA 251 (1978), the Court held that Agency is basically
personal, representative, and derivative in nature. The authority of the agent to act emanates from the powers granted to
him by his principal; his act is the act of the principal if done within the scope of the authority. Qui facit per alium facit per
se. He who acts through another acts himself. (at p. 259)
(1) Principles Flowing from Agency Characteristics of Prepartatory and Representative
The following principles flow from the application of the essential characteristics of an agency being preparatory and
representative contract, thus:
(a) The contract entered into with third persons pertains to the principal and not to the agent; the agent is a stranger to
said contract although he physically was the one who entered into it in a representative capacity;
the agent has neither rights or obligations from the resulting contract;
the agent has no legal standing to sue upon said contract
(b) The liabilities incurred shall pertain to the principal and not the agent;
(c) Generally, all acts that the principal can do in person, he may do through an agent, except those which under public
policy are strictly personal to the person of the principal.
(d) The agent who acts as such is not personality liable to the party with whom he contracts, unless he expressly binds
himself or exceeds the limits of his authority without giving such party sufficient notice of his powers. (Art. 1897)
(e) Notice to the agent should always be construed as notice binding on the principal, even when in fact the principal
never became aware thereof. Air France v. Court of Appeals, 126 SCRA 448 (1983)
(f) Knowledge of the agent is equivalent to knowledge of the principal.
EXCEPT WHERE:
(1) Agents interests are adverse to those of the principal;
(2) Agents duty is not to disclose the information, as where he is informed by way of confidential information; and
(3) The person claiming the benefit of the rule colludes with the agent to defraud the principal (De Leon & De Leon, at p.
367,citing TELLER, at p.150)
Thus, in Eurotech Industrial Technologies, Inc. v. Cuizon, 521 SCRA 584 (2007), the Court held
Article 1897 reinforces the familiar doctrine that an agent, who acts as such, is not personally liable to the party with whom
he contracts. The same provision, however, presents two instances when an agent becomes personally liable to a third
person. The first is when he expressly binds himself to the obligation and the second is when he exceeds his authority. In
the last instance, the agent can be held liable if he does not give the third party sufficient notice of his powers. (at p. 593)
In Philpotts v. Phil. Mfg. Co., 40 Phil 471 (1919), the Court held that the right of inspection given to a stockholder under the
law can be exercised either by himself or by any proper representative or attorney in fact, and either with or without the
attendance of the stockholder. This is in conformity with the general rule that what a man may do in person he may do
through another.
e. Derivative, Fiduciary and Revocable
A contract of agency creates a legal relationship of representation by the agent on behalf of the principal, where the
powers of the agent are essentially derived from the principal, and consequently, it is fiduciary in nature. One of the legal
consequences of the fiduciary nature of the contract of agency is that it is essentially revocable: neither the principal nor
the agent can be legally made to remain in the relationship when they choose to have it terminated.

Severino v. Severino, 44 Phil. 343 (1923), held that the relations of an agent to his principal are fiduciary in character
because they are based on trust and confidence, which must flow from the essential nature a contract of agency that
makes the agent the representative of the principal. Consequently:
(a) As regards property forming the subject matter of the agency, the agent is estopped from asserting or acquiring a title
adverse to that of the principal. (Art. 1435);
(b) In a conflict-of-interest situation, the agent cannot choose a course that favors herself to the detriment of the principal;
she must choose to the best advantage of the principal. Thomas v. Pineda, 89 Phil. 312 (1951); Palma v. Cristobal, 77
Phil. 712 (1946); and
(c) The agent cannot purchase for herself the property of the principal which has been given to her management for sale
or disposition (Art. 1491[2]);
Unless:
(i) There is and express consent on the part of the principal (Cui v. Cui, 100 Phil. 913 (1957); or
(ii) If the agent purchases after the agency is terminated (Valera v. Velasco, 51 Phil. 695 (1928).
In Republic v. Evangelista, 466 SCRA 544 (2005), the Court held that generally, the agency may be revoked by the
principal at will, since it is a personal contract of representation based on trust and confidence reposed by the principal on
his agent. As the power of the agent to act depends on the will and license of the principal he represents, the power of the
agent ceases when the will or permission is withdrawn by the principal.
In Orient Air Services v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 645 (1991), it was held that the decision of the lower court ordering
the principal airline company to reinstate defendant as its general sales agent for passenger transportation in the
Philippines in accordance with said GSA Agreement, was unlawful since courts have no authority to compel the principal
to reinstate a contract of agency it has terminated with the agent:
Such would be violative of the principles and essence of agency, defined by law as a contract whereby a person binds
himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, WITH THE CONSENT OR
AUTHORITY OF THE LATTER. In an agent-principal relationship, the personality of the principal is extended through the
facility of the agent. In so doing, the agent, by legal fiction, becomes the principal, authorized to perform all acts which the
latter would have him do. Such a relationship can only be effected with the consent of the principal, which must not, in any
way, be compelled by law or by any court. The Agreement itself between the parties states that either party may
terminate the Agreement without cause by giving the other 30 days notice by letter, telegram or cable.[8] (at p. 656)
5. Distinguished from Similar Contracts
a. From the Employment Contract
Unlike agency relationship which is essentially contractual in nature, an employment contract under Article 1700 of the
Civil Code is The relationship between capital and labor [which] are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with
public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special
laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor
and similar subjects. More specifically, the purpose of an employer-employee relationship is for the employee to render
service for the direct benefit of the employer or of the business of the employer; while agency relationship is entered into
to enter into juridical relationship on behalf of the principal with third parties. There is, therefore, no representation in a
contract of employment.
In Dela Cruz v. Northern Theatrical Enterprises, 95 Phil 739 (1954), the Court held that the relationship between the
corporation which owns and operates a theatre, and the individual it hires as a security guard to maintain the peace and
order at the entrance of the theatre is not that of principal and agent, because the principle of representation was in no
way involved. The security guard was not employed to represent the defendant corporation in its dealings with third
parties; he was a mere employee hired to perform a certain specific duty or task, that of acting as special guard and
staying at the main entrance of the movie house to stop gate crashers and to maintain peace and order within the
premises.
b. From the Contract for a Piece-of-Work
Under Article 1713 of the Civil Code, By the contract for a piece of work the contractor binds himself to execute a piece of
work for the employer, in consideration of a certain price or compensation. The contractor may either employ only his
labor or skill, or also furnish the material. Under a contract for a piece of work, the contractor is not an agent of the
principal (i.e., the client), and the contractor has no authority to represent the principal in entering into juridical acts with
third parties. The essence of every contract-for-a-piece-of-work is that the services rendered must give rise to the
manufacture or production of the object agreed upon.
In Fressel v. Mariano Uy Chaco Sons & Co., 34 Phil. 122 (1915), it was held that where the contract entered into is one
where the individual undertook and agreed to build for the other party a costly edifice, the underlying contract is one for a
contract for a piece of work, and not a principal and agency relation. Consequently, the contract is authorized to do the
work according to his own method and without being subject to the clients control, except as to the result of the work; he
could purchase his materials and supplies from whom he pleased and at such prices as he desired to pay. And the mere
fact that it was stipulated in the contract that the client could take possession of the work site upon the happening of

specified contingencies did not make the relation into that of an agency. Consequently, when the client did take over the
unfinished works, he did not assume any direct liability to the suppliers of the contractor.
c. From the Management Agreement
In Nielson & Co., Inc. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., 26 SCRA 540, 546-547 (1968), the Court held that in both
agency and lease of services, one of the parties binds himself to render some service to the other party. Agency, however,
is distinguished from lease of work or services in that the basis of agency is representation, while in the lease of work or
services the basis is employment. The lessor of services does not represent his employer, while the agent represents his
principal. x x x . There is another obvious distinction between agency and lease of services. Agency is a preparatory
contract, as agency does not stop with the agency because the purpose is to enter into other contracts. The most
characteristic feature of an agency relationship is the agents power to bring about business relations between his
principal and third persons. The agent is destine to execute juridical acts (creation, modification or extinction of relations
with third parties). Lease of services contemplate only material (non-juridical) acts.[9]
The Court also held in Nielson & Co. that where the principal and paramount undertaking of the manager under a
Management Contract was the operation and development of the mine and the operation of the mill, and all other
undertakings mentioned in the contract are necessary or incidental to the principal undertakingthese other undertakings
being dependent upon the work on the development of the mine and the operation of the mill. In the performance of this
principal undertaking the manager was not in any way executing juridical acts for the principal, destined to create, modify
or extinguish business relations between the principal and third person. In other words, in performing its principal
undertaking the manager was not acting as an agent of the principal, in the sense that the term agent is interpreted under
the law of agency, but as one who was performing material acts for an employer, for compensation. Consequently, the
management contract not being an agency cannot be revoked at will and was binding to its full contracted period.
In Shell Co. v. Firemens Insurance of Newark, 100 Phil. 757 (1957), in ruling that the operator was an agent of the Shell
company, the Court took into consideration the following facts: (a) that the operator owed his position to the company and
the latter could remove him or terminate his services at will; (b) that the service station belonged to the company and bore
its tradename and the operator sold only the products of the company; that the equipment used by the operator belonged
to the company and were just loaned to the operator and the company took charge of their repair and maintenance; (c)
that an employee of the company supervised the operator and conducted periodic inspection of the companys gasoline
and service station; and (d) that the price of the products sold by the operator was fixed by the company and not by the
operator.
d. From the Contract of Sale
Under Article 1466 of the Civil Code, In construing a contract containing provisions characteristic of both the contract of
sale and of the contract of agency to sell, the essential clauses of the whole instrument shall be considered.
Jurisprudence has indicated what the essential clauses that should indicate whether it is one of sale or agency to
sell/purchase, refers to stipulations in the contract which places obligations on the part of the purported agent having to
do with what should be a seller obligation to transfer ownership and deliver possession of the subject matter, or the
buyers obligation on the payment of the price.
In Quiroga v. Parsons, 38 Phil. 501 (1918), although the parties designated the arrangement as an agency agreement, the
Court found the arrangement to be one of sale since the essential clause provided that Payment was to be made at the
end of sixty days, or before, at the [principals] request, or in cash, if the [agent] so preferred, and in these last two cases
an additional discount was to be allowed for prompt payment. These conditions to the Court were precisely the essential
features of a contract of purchase and sale because there was the obligation on the part of the purported principal to
supply the beds, and, on the part of the purported agent, to pay their price, thus:
These features exclude the legal conception of an agency or order to sell whereby the mandatory or agent received the
thing to sell it, and does not pay its price, but delivers to the principal the price he obtains from the sale of the thing to a
third person, and if he does not succeed in selling it, he returns it. By virtue of the contract between the plaintiff and the
defendant, the latter, on receiving the beds, was necessarily obliged to pay their price within the term fixed, without any
other consideration and regardless as to whether he had or had not sold the beds. (at p. 505)
As a consequence, the revocation sought to be made by the principal on the purported agency arrangement was denied
by the Court, the relationship being one of sale, and the power to rescind is available only when the purported principal is
able to show substantial breach on the part of the purported agent.
Quiroga further ruled that when the terms of the agreement compels the purported agent to pay for the products received
from the purported principal within the stipulated period, even when there has been no sale thereof to the public, the
underlying relationship is not one of contract of agency to sell, but one of actual sale. A true agent does not assume
personal responsibility for the payment of the price of the object of the agency; his obligation is merely to turn-over to the
principal the proceeds of the sale once he receives them from the buyer. Consequently, since the underlying agreement is
not an agency agreement, it cannot be revoked except for cause.
In Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. v. Arco Amusement Company, 72 Phil. 402 (1941), which covered a purported agency
contract to purchase, the Court looked into the provisions of their contract, and found that the letters between the parties
clearly stipulated for fixed prices on the equipment ordered, which admitted no other interpretation than that the [principal]
agreed to purchase from the [agent] the equipment in question at the prices indicated which are fixed and determinate.

(at p. 407). The Court held that whatever unforeseen events might have taken place unfavorable to the [agent], such as
change in prices, mistake in their quotation, loss of the goods not covered by insurance or failure of the Starr Piano
Company to properly fill the orders as per specifications, the [principal] might still legally hold the [agent] to the prices
fixed. (at p. 407). It was ruled that the true relationship between the parties was in effect a contract of sale. Consequently,
the demand by the purported principal of all discounts and benefits obtained by the purported agent from the American
suppliers under the theory that all benefits received by the agent under the transactions were to be accounted for the
benefit of the principal, was denied by the Court.
Gonzalo Puyat also ruled that when under the terms of the agreement, the purported agent becomes responsible for any
changes in the acquisition cost of the object he has been authorized to purchase from a supplier in the United States, the
underlying agreement is not an contract of agency to buy, since an agent does not bear any risk relating to the subject
matter or the price. Being truly a contract of sale, any profits realized by the purported agent from discounts received from
the American supplier, pertain to it with no obligation to account for it, much less to turn it over, to the purported
principal. Reiterated in Far Eastern Export & Import Co., v. Lim Tech Suan, 97 Phil. 171 (1955).
In Chua Ngo v. Universal Trading Co., Inc., 87 Phil. 331 (1950), where a local importing company was contracted to
purchase from the United States several boxes of oranges, most of which were lost in transit, the purchaser sought to
recover the advance purchased price paid, which were refused by the local importing company on the ground that it
merely imported the oranges as agent of the purchaser for which it could not be held liable for their loss in transit. The
Court, in reviewing the terms and conditions of the agreement between the parties, held that the arrangement was a sale
rather than a contract of agency to purchase on the following grounds: (a) no commission was paid by the purchaser to
the local importing company; (b) the local importing company was given the option to resell the oranges if the balance of
the purchase price was not paid within 48 hours from notification, which clearly implies that the local importing company
did in fact sell the oranges to the purchaser; (c) the local importing company placed order for the oranges a lower the
price agreed upon with the purchaser which it could not properly do if indeed it were merely acting as an agent; (d) the
local importing company charged the purchaser with a sales tax, showing that the arrangement was indeed a sale; and (e)
when the losses occurred, the local importing company made claims against the insurance company in its own name,
indicating that he imported the oranges as his own products, and not merely as agent of the local purchaser.
In Pearl Island Commercial Corp. v. Lim Tan Tong, 101 Phil. 789 (1957), the Supreme Court was unsure of its footing
when it tried to characterize a contract of sale (Contract of Purchase and Sale) between the manufacturer of wax and its
appointed distributor in the Visayan area, as still being within a contract of agency in that while providing for sale of Bee
Wax from the plaintiff to Tong and purchase of the same by Tong from the plaintiff, also designates Tong as the sole
distributor of the article within a certain territory. (at p. 792)
The reasoning in Pearl Island is wrong, of course, since as early as inQuiroga v. Parson, the Court had already ruled that
appointing one as agent or distributor, when in fact such appointee assumes the responsibilities of a buyer of the
goods, does not make the relationship one of agency, but that of sale. Perhaps the best way to understand the ruling
in Pearl Island was that the suit was not between the buyer and seller, but by the seller against the surety of the buyer
who had secured the shipment of the wax to the buyer, and the true characterization of the contract between the buyer
and seller was not the essential criteria by which to fix the liability of the surety, thus
True, the contract (Exhibit A) is not entirely clear. It is in some respects, even confusing. While it speaks of sale of Bee
Wax to Tong and his responsibility for the payment of the value of every shipment so purchased, at the same time it
appoints him sole distributor within a certain area, the plaintiff undertaking is not to appoint any other agent or distributor
within the same area. Anyway, it seems to have been the sole concern and interest of the plaintiff to be sure that it was
paid the value of all shipments of Bee Wax to Tong and the Surety Company by its bond, guaranteed in the final analysis
said payment by Tong, either as purchaser or as agent. . . . (at p. 793)
In Ker & Co., Ltd. v. Lingad, 38 SCRA 524 (1971), covering a contract of distributorship, it was specifically stipulated in the
contract that all goods on consignment shall remain the property of the Company until sold by the Distributor to the
purchaser or purchasers, but all sales made by the Distributor shall be in his name; and that the Company at its own
expense, was to keep the consigned stock fully insured against loss or damage by fire or as a result of fire, the policy of
such insurance to be payable to it in the event of loss. It was further stipulated that the contract does not constitute the
Distributor the agent or legal representative of the Company for any purpose whatsoever. Distributor is not granted any
right or authority to assume or to create any obligation or responsibility, express or implied in behalf of or in the name of
the Company, or to bind the Company in any manner or thing whatsoever. In spite of such stipulations, the Court did find
the relationship to be one of agency, because it did not transfer ownership of the merchandise to the purported distributor,
even though it was supposed to enter into sales agreements in the Philippines in its own name, thus:
The transfer of title or agreement to transfer it for a price paid or promised is the essence of sale. If such transfer puts the
transferee in the attitude or position of an owner and makes him liable to the transferor as a debtor for the agreed price,
and not merely as an agent who must account for the proceeds of a resale, the transaction is a sale; while the essence of
an agency to sell is the delivery to an agent, not as his property, but as the property of the principal, who remains the
owner and has the right to control the sale, fix the price, and terms, demand and receive the proceeds less the agents
commission upon sales made. (at p. 530)

In Victoria Milling Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 333 SCRA 663 (2000), the Court held that an authorization given to the
buyer of goods to obtain them from the bailee for and in behalf of the bailor-seller does not necessarily establish an
agency, since the intention of the parties was for the buyer to take possession and ownership over the goods with the
decisive language in the authorization being sold and endorsed.
In Lim v. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 170 (1996), it was held that as a general rule, an agency to sell on commission
basis does not belong to any of the contracts covered by Articles 1357 and 1358 of the Civil Code requiring them to be in
a particular form, and not one enumerated under the Statutes of Frauds in Article 1403. Hence, unlike a sale contract
which must comply with the Statute of Frauds for enforceability, a contract of agency to sell is valid and enforceable in
whatever form it may be entered into.
The old decision in National Rice and Corn Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 437 (1979), presents an interesting
situation where it is possible for a party to enter into an arrangement, where a portion thereof is as agent, and the other
portion would be as buyer, and still be able to distinguish and set apart to the two transactions to determine the rights and
liabilities of the parties.
In National Rice a formal contract was entered into between the National Rice & Corn Corp. (NARIC) and the Davao
Merchandising Corp. (DAMERCO), where they agreed that DAMERCO would act as an agent of NARIC in exporting the
quantity and kind of corn and rice mentioned in the contract (Exhibit A), as well as in importing the collateral goods that
will be imported thru barter on a back to back letter of credit or no-dollar remittance basis; and with DAMERCO agreeing
to buy the aforementioned collateral goods. Although the corn grains were duly exported, the Government had issued
rules banning the barter of goods from abroad. NARIC then brought suit against DAMERCO seeking recovery of the price
of the exported grains. The Court ruled that insofar as the exporting of the grains was concerned, DAMERCO acted
merely as agent of NARIC for which it cannot be held personally liable for the shortfall considering that it had acted within
the scope of its authority. The Court had agreed that indeed the other half of the agreement whereby DAMERCO bound
itself as the purchaser of the collateral goods to be imported from the proceeds of the sale of the corn and rice, was a
valid and binding contract of sale, but for which DAMERCO could not be made to pay the purchase price, because NARIC
itself was no longer in a position to import any of such goods into the country, by reason of force majeure, thus
It is clear that if after DAMERCO had spent big sums incident to carrying out the purpose of the contract, the importation
of the remaining collateral goods worth about US$480,000.00 could not be effected due to suspension by the government
under a new administration of barter transactions, the NARIC (now Rice and Corn Administration) ought to make the
necessary representations with the government to enable DAMERCO to import the said remaining collateral goods. The
contract, Exhibit A, has reciprocal stipulations which must be given force and effect. (at p. 449)
Although it is clear from the decision that DAMERCO had assumed also the position of being a buyer of goods from
NARIC, the Court inNational Rice was able to segregate his role as merely an agent of NARIC insofar as the export of the
grains was concerned, and apply the doctrine that an agent does not assume any personal obligation with respect to the
subject matter of the agency nor of the proceeds thereof, his obligation being merely to turn-over the proceeds to the
principal whenever he receives them. National Rice also demonstrate the progressive nature of every contract of
agency, in that it presents a pliable legal relationship which may be adopted into other relationships, such a contract of
sale, to be able to achieve commercial ends.
e. From Broker
A broker is best defined in Schmid and Oberly, Inc. v. RJL Martinez, 166 SCRA 493 (1988), where the Court held that a
broker is one who is engaged, for others, on a commission, negotiating contracts relative to property with the custody of
which he has no concern; the negotiator between other parties, never acting in his own name but in the name of those
who employed him. . . . a broker is one whose occupation is to bring the parties together, in matters of trade, commerce or
navigation. (at p. 501) In other words, the services of a broker is to find third parties who may be interested in entering
into contracts with other parties over particular matter, and may include negotiating in behalf of both parties the perfection
of a contract, but that the actual perfection must still be done by the parties represented. A broker essentially is not an
extension of the persons of the parties he is negotiating for.
In Reyes v. Rural Bank of San Miguel, 424 SCRA 135 (2004), the Court held that unlike an agent who must act in the
name of the principal, a broker is one who is engaged for others on a commission to negotiate between other parties,
never acting in his own name but in the name of those who employed him.
In Pacific Commercial Co. v. Yatco, 63 Phil. 398 (1936), the Court ruled that a broker has no relation with the thing he has
been retained to buy or to sell; he is merely an intermediary between the purchaser and the vendor. He acquires neither
the custody nor the possession of the thing he sells; his only office is to bring together the parties to the transaction.
It must be noted though that a broker may at the same time be an agent. When he acts in his behalf in dealing with the
public, even when he handles things pertaining to the principal, he is a mere broker. On the other hand, if he is duly
authorized to act in the name of the principal, there is no doubt that the broker is also an agent. Thus, in Abacus
Securities Corp. v. Ampil, 483 SCRA 315 (2006), it was held that since in that case the brokerage relationship was
necessary a contract for the employment of an agent, principles of contract law also govern the broker-principal
relationship.
In the same manner, in Domingo v. Domingo, 42 SCRA 131 (1971), the Court held that the duties and liabilities of a broker
to his employer are essentially those which an agent owes to his principal. In such a situation, the decisive legal

provisions to determine whether a broker has violated his duty or obligation] are found in Articles 1891 and 1909 of the
New Civil Code, whereby every agent is bound to render an account of his transactions and to deliver to the principal
whatever he may have received by virtue of the agency, even though it may not be owning to the principal; and that an
agent is responsible not only for fraud, but also for negligence.[10] On the other hand, the Court also held in Domingo that
The duty embodied in Article 1891 of the New Civil Code will not apply if the agent or broker acted only as a middleman
with the task of merely bringing together the vendor and vendee, who themselves thereafter will negotiate on the terms
and conditions of the transaction. (at p. 140)
(1) Broker Has No Authority To Enter into Contract in the Name of the Principal
In Litonjua, Jr. v. Eternit Corp., 490 SCRA 204 (2006), it was held that a real estate broker is one who negotiates the sale
of real properties; his business, generally speaking, is only to find a purchaser who is willing to buy the land upon terms
fixed by the owner. He has no authority to bind the principal by signing a contract of sale. Indeed, an authority to find a
purchaser of real property does not include an authority to sell. Thus, when the seller himself closes the sale with the
purchaser located by the broker, the seller is bound to pay the commission he has contracted with the broker for merely
finding the buyer.
It must be noted that the ruling in Litonjua, Jr. does not provide for a strict rule on compensability of a broker, but like any
other contract, its perfection is subject to the terms and conditions that have been agreed upon. The essence of the ruling
in Litonjua, Jr. is that the main service for which the broker was contracted for is to find a prospective buyer, then if the
seller on his own closes the deal with the buyer found by the broker, the latter has earned his finders fee.
On the other hand, it is possible that the terms of the brokers contract is that it is not enough for the broker to find the
prospective buyer, but that his services must include efforts to negotiate, i.e., convince him to enter into a contract with
the client, then it is not enough that the broker found the prospective buyer, but he must spend efforts at negotiating with
the said person that leads him to enter into a contract with the client, otherwise mere finding would not entitle the broker to
the fees agreed upon.
(2) Broker Is Not Legally Incapacitated to Purchase Property of the Principal
In Araneta, Inc. v. Del Paterno, 91 Phil. 786 (1952), it was held that the prohibition in Article 1491(2) of the Civil Code
which renders an agent legally incapable of buying the properties of his principal connotes the idea of trust and
confidence; and so where the relationship does not involve considerations of good faith and integrity the prohibition
should not and does not apply. To come under the prohibition, the agent must be in a fiduciary relation with his principal.
The Court held that a broker does not come within the meaning of Article 1492, because he is nothing more than a gobetween or middleman between the defendant and the purchaser, bringing them together to make the contract
themselves. There is no confidence to be betrayed, since a broker is not authorized to make a binding contract for the
purported principal; he is not sell the property, but only to look for a buyer and the owner is to make the sale; he was not to
fix the price of the sale because the price had to be already fixed in his commission; he is not to make the terms of
payment because these, too, would be clearly specified in his commission. In fine, a broker is left no power or discretion
whatsoever, which he could abuse to his advantage and to the owners prejudice.
(3) Brokers Entitlement to Commission
In quite a number of decisions, the Supreme Court has held that the determination of whether one is an agent or a broker
constitutes a critical factor of whether he would be entitled to the commission stipulated in the contract.
Thus, in Tan v. Gullas, 393 SCRA 334 (2002), quoting from Schmid & Oberly, Inc. v. RJL Martinez Fishing Corp., 166
SCRA 493 (1988), it defined a broker as one who is engaged, for others, on a commission, negotiating contracts
relative to property with the custody of which he has no concern; the negotiator between other parties, never acting in his
own name but in the name of those who employed him. x x x a broker is one whose occupation is to bring the parties
together, in matters of trade, commerce or navigation. (at p. 339) The Court then held that An agent receives a
commission upon the successful conclusion of a sale. On the other hand, a broker earns his pay merely by bringing the
buyer and the seller together, even if no sale is eventually made. . . . Clearly, therefore, petitioners, as brokers, should be
entitled to the commission whether or not the sale of the property subject matter of the contract was concluded through
their efforts. (at p. 341)
Also, in Hahn v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 537 (1997), the Court held that Contrary to the appellate courts conclusion,
this arrangement shows an agency. An agent receives a commission upon the successful conclusion of a sale. On the
other hand, a broker earns his pay merely by bringing the buyer and the seller together, even if no sale is eventually
made. (at p. 549)
It must be noted that the entitlement of a broker or an agent to the commission depends really on the wordings of the
contract between them, and not really whether one is a broker or agent.
In Phil. Health-Care Providers (Maxicare) v. Estrada, 542 SCRA 616 (2008), the Court held that the term procuring
cause in describing a brokers activity, refers to a cause originating a series of events which, without break in their
continuity, result in the accomplishment of the prime objective of the employment of the brokerproducing a purchaser
ready, willing and able to buy on the owners terms. To be regarded as the procuring cause of a sale as to be entitled to
a commission, a brokers efforts must have been the foundation on which the negotiations resulting in a sale began.

Again, this ruling is correct only if it is clear that the agreement on the services of the broker, for which he would be
entitled to his fees, is not merely of finding the prospective buyer.
But truly, since both a brokerage arrangement and an agency agreement are inherently contractual relations, the
entitlement of a broker or agent to the compensation or commission stipulated would have to depend upon the contractual
clause covering the same. In other words, it may well be stipulated in a true brokerage arrangement that the broker would
be entitled to a commission only when a sale is eventually made. In the same manner, the agency contract may well
stipulate that the agent shall be entitled to earn commission by merely bringing the buyer and the seller together, even
when the actual sale of the person referred to by the agent happens long after the agency relationship has terminated.
To illustrate, in Guardex v. NLRC, 191 SCRA 487 (1990), the Court held that when the terms of the agency arrangement is
to the effect that entitlement to the commission was contingent on the purchase by a customer of a fire truck, the implicit
condition being that the agent would earn the commission if he was instrumental in bringing the sale about. Since the
agent had nothing to do with the sale of the fire truck, and is not therefore entitled to any commission at all.
Although Schmid & Oberly, Inc. is now credited with laying down the definition of a broker, the decision shows that it
quoted from the early decision of Behn, Meyer and Co., Ltd. v. Nolting and Garcia , 35 Phil. 274 (1916), where the Court
held
A broker is generally defined as one who is engaged, for others, on a commission, negotiating contracts relative to
property with the custody of which he has no concern; the negotiation between other parties, never acting in his own
name but in the name of those who employed him; he is strictly a middleman and for some purpose the agent of both
parties. (19 Cyc., 186; Henderson vs. The State, 50 Ind., 234; Blacks Law Dictionary.) A broker is one whose occupation it
is to bring parties together to bargain, or to bargain for them, in matters of trade, commerce or navigation. (Mechem on
Agency, sec. 13; Wharton on Agency, sec. 695). Judge Storey, in his work on Agency, defines a broker as an agent
employed to make bargains and contracts between other persons, in matters of trade, commerce or navigation, for
compensation commonly called brokerage. (Storey on Agency, sec. 28) (at p. 279-280)
Note therefore that broker is considered a commercial term for a person engaged as a middleman to bring parties
together in matters pertaining to trade, commerce or navigation. If the person has not been given the power to enter into
the contract or commerce in behalf of the parties, then he is a broker in the sense that his job mainly is to bring parties
together to bargain, and even then he may not be entitled to his commission if the bargaining between the parties does
not result in a contract being perfected. But in this sense, the broker does not assume the role of an agent because he
has no power to enter into a contract in behalf of any of the parties; he also assumes no fiduciary obligations to either or
both parties, since they are expected to use their own judgment in deciding to bind or not to bind themselves to a contract.
On the other hand, if the person has been given the power to enter into a contract or commerce on behalf of any, or even
for both the parties, he is truly an agent. In which case, he assumes fiduciary obligations to the person who is therefore
legally his principal. In such case, he is entitled to a commission if his efforts (i.e., the services he rendered) where the
efficient cause for the eventual perfection and consummation of the contract that was the object for appointing him
broker/agent.
oOo
________________________________________
[1]See Chemphil Export v. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 217 (1995);Shoppers Paradise Realty v. Roque, 419 SCRA 93
(2004); Dominion Insurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 426 SCRA 620, 626 (2002);Republic v. Evangelista, 466 SCRA
544 (2005); Litonjua, Jr. v. Eternit Corp., 490 SCRA 204 (2006); Eurotech Industrial Technologies, Inc. v. Cuizon, 521
SCRA 584 (2007).
[2]Citing Orient Air Services and Hotel Representatives v. Court of Appeals, 274 Phil. 927, 939 (1991).
[3]DE LEON AND DE LEON, COMMENT AND CASES ON PARTNERSHIP AGENCY AND TRUSTS, 2005 ed., at p. 356;
hereinafter referred to as DE LEONS.
[4]Reiterated in Eurotech Industrial Technologies, Inc. v. Cuizon, 521 SCRA 584 (2007).
[5]See also Litonjua, Jr. v. Eternit Corp., 490 SCRA 204 (2006).
[6]Citing Bordador v. Luz, 283 SCRA 374, 382 (1997).
[7]ROSCOE T. STEFFEN, AGENCY-PARTNERSHIP IN A NUSTSHELL (1977) 30-31.
[8]Reiterated in Litonjua, Jr. v. Eternit Corp., 490 SCRA 204 (2006).
[9]Quoting from REYES AND PUNO, AN OUTLINE OF PHILIPPINE CIVIL LAW, Vol. V, p. 277.
[10]Citing 12 Am. Jur. 2d 835; 134 ALR 1346; 1 ALR 2d 987; Brown vs. Coates, 67 ALR 2d 943; Haymes vs. Rogers, 17
ALR 2d 896;Moore vs. Turner, 32 ALR 2d 713.
- End of Footnotes II. FORM REQUIRED FOR CONTRACTS OF AGENCY
2. Forms Required of Agency
a. How Agency May Be Constituted

Article 1869 of the Civil Code emphasizes the consensual nature of the contract of agency, as it provides that Agency
may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal, from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the
agency, knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without authority. Agency may be oral, unless the law requires
a specific form. This principle is reiterated under Article 1870, which provides that Acceptance by the agent may also be
express, or implied from his acts which carry out the agency, or from his silence or inaction according to the
circumstances.
Equitable PCI-Bank v. Ku, 355 SCRA 309 (2001), held that an agency may be express but it may also be implied from the
acts of the principal, from his silence, or lack of action or his failure to repudiate the agency knowing that another person
is acting on his behalf without authority. Likewise, acceptance by the agent may also be express, although it may also be
implied from his acts which carry out the agency, or from his silence or inaction according to the circumstances. Thus,
when a law firm allowed the employee of its client to occasionally receive its mail, and not having formally objected to the
receipt by said employee of a court process, or taken any steps to put a stop to it, it was construed to mean that an
agency relationship had been established, to which receipt of the court process by said employee was legally deemed to
be service to the law firm.
In Lim v. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 170 (1996), the Court noted that there are some provisions of law which require
certain formalities for particular contract: the first is when the form is required for the validity of the contract; the second is
when it is required to make the contract effective as against third parties such as those mentioned in Article 1357 and
1358 of the Civil Code; and the third is when the form is required for the purpose of proving the existence of the contract,
such as those provide in the Statute of Frauds in Article 1403. Since a contract of agency to sell pieces of jewelry on
commission does not fall into any of the three categories, it was considered valid and enforceable in whatever form it may
have been entered into.
(1) From the Side of the Principal
On the side of the principal, Article 1869 of the Civil Code provides that an agency is impliedly constituted ( i.e., principal
has given his consent to the agency arrangement) from his acts formally adopting it, or from his silence or inaction, or
particularly from his failure to repudiate the agency knowing someone is acting in his name. Certainly, the ideal form by
which the principal is deemed to have entered into a contract of agency is when he issues a written power of attorney to
the person designated as agent.
(2) From the Side of the Agent
On the side of the agent, Article 1870 of the Civil Code provides that his acceptance of the agency (i.e., agent has given
his consent to the agency arrangement) may be expressed, or implied from his acts which carry out the agency, or from
his silence or inaction according to the circumstances.
(3) Various Instances of Perfection of the Contract of Agency
Under Article 1871 of the Civil Code, which describes the most ideal form of perfection of the contract of agency, when the
constitution of the agency is made with both principal and agent being physically present at the time of perfection of the
contract of agency (i.e., Between persons who are present), the acceptance of the agency may be implied if the principal
delivers his power of attorney to the agent and the latter receives it without objection.
On the other hand, under Article 1872 of the Civil Code, when the constitution of the agency is made with the principal and
agent not being physically present in one place (i.e., Between persons who are absent), then there can be no implied
acceptance of the agency from the silence or inaction of the agent, except in two instances:
(a) When the principal transmit his power of attorney to the agent (i.e., it is in writing?), who receives it without any
objection; or
(b) When the principal entrusts to the agent by letter or telegram a power of attorney with respect to the business in which
he is habitually engaged as an agent, and he did not reply to the letter or telegram.
The languages used in Articles 1871 and 1872 indicate that the power of attorney must constitute a written instruments,
because in both cases the articles refer to situations where the principal delivers his power of attorney to the agent, and
when the principal transmits his power of attorney to the agent, which requires that it must be in writing, which today
would include texting and electronic mail, which are considered to be equivalent to a written instrument under the
Electronic Commerce Law. Consequently, when the other provisions of the Law on Agency refer to general power of
attorney and special power of attorney, does the law mean that they conform to the rudimentary requirement that they
be in writing?
(4) From the Side of Third Parties/Public
The previous rules on when a contract of agency is deemed constituted (i.e., perfected) are taken from the intramural
point of view: as between the parties to the contract of agency. However, a contract of agency is merely a preparatory
contract, and is meant to achieve goals beyond its own being; consequently, the Law on Agency contained in the Civil
Code provides for additional rule that addresses most essentially the targets of every contract of agency: the third parties
intended to be contracted with by the agent in behalf of the principal.
Under Article 1873 of the Civil Code, when the principal informs another person that he has given a power of attorney to a
third person (the agent), the latter thereby becomes a duly authorized agent with respect to the person who received the
special information. The clear implication is that even when in fact there has been no meeting of the minds between the

purported principal and agent (i.e., there is strictly speaking no contract of agency), there is deemed to have arisen one
with respect to the third party who has been so informed by the principal.
On the other hand, when the principal states by public advertisement that he has given a power of attorney to a particular
individual (the agent), the latter thereby becomes a duly authorized agent with regard to any person. And it is specifically
provided in said article that [t]he power [of the agent] shall continue to be in full force until the notice is rescinded in the
same manner in which it was given.
Thus, under Article 1921 of the Civil Code, if the agency has been entrusted for the purpose of contracting with specific
persons (referred to as special agency), the revocation of the agency shall not prejudice the latter if they were not given
notice thereof. Under Article 1922, if the agent had been granted general powers (referred to as general agency), the
revocation of the agency will not prejudice third persons who acted in good faith and without knowledge of the revocation;
however, notice of the revocation in a newspaper of general circulation constitutes sufficient notice to bind third persons.
In Rallos v. Yangco, 20 Phil 269 (1911), the Court held that a long-standing client, acting in good faith and without
knowledge, having sent goods to sell on commission to the former agent of the defendant, could recover from the
defendant, when no previous notice of the termination of agency was given said client. The Court emphasized that having
advertised the fact that Collantes was his agent and having given special notice to the plaintiff of that fact, and having
given them a special invitation to deal with such agent, it was the duty of the defendant on the termination of the
relationship of principal and agent to give due and timely notice thereof to the plaintiffs. Failing to do so, the defendant
was held responsible to them for whatever goods may have been in good faith and without negligence sent to the agent
without knowledge, actual or constructive, of the termination of such relationship.
In Conde v. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 245 (1982), the Court held that when the right of redemption by sellers-a-retro is
exercised by their son-in-law who was given no express authority to do so, and the buyer-a-retro accepted the exercise
and done nothing for the next ten years to clear their title of the annotated right of repurchase on their title, and
possession had been given to the sellers-a-retro during the same period, then an implied agency must be held to have
been created from their silence or lack of action, or their failure to repudiate the agency.
(5) Agency Not Presumed to Exist
Although an agency contract is consensual in nature and generally requires no formality, the Court has stressed that an
agency arrangement is never presumed. Lopez v. Tan Tioco, 8 Phil. 693 (1907). In other words, the declaration of one
that he is an agent of another is never to be accepted at face value, except in those cases where an agency arises by
express provision of law. Compania Maritima v. Limson, 141 SCRA 407 (1986).
In People v. Yabut, 76 SCRA 624 (1977), it was held that although the perfection of a contract of agency may take an
implied form, the existence of an agency relationship is never presumed. The relationship of principal and agent cannot be
inferred from mere family relationship; for the relation to exist, there must be consent by both parties. The law makes no
presumption of agency; it must exist as a fact. This principle was reiterated in Reiterated in Lim v. Court of Appeals, 251
SCRA 408 (1995).
In Harry E. Keeler Elec . Co. v. Rodriguez, 44 Phil. 19 (1922), the Court ruled that a third person must act with ordinary
prudence and reasonable diligence to ascertain whether the agent is acting and dealing with him within the scope of his
powers. Obviously, if he knows or has good reason to believe that the agent is exceeding his authority, he cannot claim
protection. So, if the character assumed by the agent is of such a suspicious or unreasonable nature, or if the authority
which he seeks is of such an unusual or improbable character, as would suffice to put an ordinarily prudent man upon his
guard, the party dealing with him may not shut his eyes to the real state of the case but should withal refuse to deal with
the agent at all, or should ascertain from the principal the true condition of affairs.
In Bordador v. Luz, 283 SCRA 374 (1997), the Court held that
The basis for agency is representation. Here, there is no showing that Brigida consented to the acts of Deganos or
authorized him to act on her behalf, much less with respect to the particular transactions involved. Petitioners attempt to
foist liability on respondent spouses through the supposed agency relation with Deganos is groundless and ill-advised.
Besides, it was grossly and inexcusably negligent of petitioners to entrust to Deganos, not once or twice but on at least six
occasions as evidenced by six receipts, several pieces of jewelry of substantial value without requiring a written
authorization from his alleged principal. A person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must discover upon his
peril the authority of the agent. (at p. 382)
In Dizon v. Court of Appeals, 302 SCRA 288 (1999), the Court held that a co-owner does not become an agent of the
other co-owners, and therefore, any exercise of an option to buy a piece of land transacted with one co-owner does not
bind the other co-owners of the land. The basis for agency is representation and a person dealing with an agent is put
upon inquiry and must discover upon his peril the authority of the agent. Since there was no showing that the other coowners consented to the act of one co-owner nor authorized her to act on their behalf with regard to her transaction with
purported buyer. The most prudent thing the purported buyer should have done was to ascertain the extent of the
authority said co-owner; being negligent in this regard, the purported buyer cannot seek relief on the basis of a supposed
agency.
On the other hand, under Article 1873 of the Civil Code provides that the declaration of a person that he has appointed
another as his agent is deem to have constituted the person alluded to as an agent (even when the latter is unaware),
insofar as the person to whom such declaration has been made. What is clear therefore is that third parties must never

take the words or representation of the purported agent at face value; they are mandated to apprise themselves of the
commission and extent of powers of the purported agent. On the other hand, third parties (to the contract of agency) can
take the word, declaration and representation of the purported principal with respect to the appointment of, and extent of
powers, of the purported agent. The principle is self-evident from the nature of agency as a relation of representation
that an agent acts as though he were the principal and therefore if the principal himself says so, then it is taken at face
value as a contractual commitment.
b. Agency by Estoppel
Under Article 1873 of the Civil Code, if a person specially informs another or states by public advertisement that he has
given a power of attorney to a third person, the latter thereby becomes a duly authorized agent, even if previously there
was never a meeting of minds between them.
Under Article 1911 of the Civil Code, even when the agent has exceeded his authority (i.e., he acts without authority from
the principal), the principal shall be solidarily with the agent if he allowed the agent to act as though he had full powers.
In Macke v. Camps, 7 Phil 553 (1907), where the owner of a hotel/cafe business allowed a person to use the title
managing agent and during his prolonged absences allowed such person to take charge of the business, performing the
duties usually entrusted to managing agent, then such owner is bound by the act of such person. The Court held that
One who clothes another apparent authority as his agent, and holds him out to the public as such, can not be permitted
to deny the authority of such person to act as his agent, to the prejudice of innocent third parties dealing with such person
in good faith and in the following pre-assumptions or deductions, which the law expressly directs to be made from
particular facts, are deemed conclusive. (at p. 555)
The hotel owner was deemed bound by the contracts entered into by said managing agent that are within the scope of
authority pertinent to such position, including the purchasing such reasonable quantities of supplies as might from time to
time be necessary in carrying on the business of hotel bar.
In Naguiat v. Court of Appeals, 412 SCRA 592 (2003), the Court applied the provisions of Article 1873 of the Civil Code to
rule that if by the interaction between a purported principal and a purported agent in the presence of a third person, the
latter was given the impression of the existence of a principal-agency relation, and the purported principal did nothing to
correct the third persons impression, an agency by estoppel is deemed to have been constituted, and the rule is clear:
one who clothes another with apparent authority as his agent, and holds him out to the public as such, cannot be
permitted to deny the authority of such person to act as his agent, to the prejudice of innocent third parties dealing with
such person in good faith, and in the honest belief that he is what he appears to be. (at p. 599)
In Litonjua, Jr. v. Eternit Corp., 490 SCRA 204 (2006), the Court held that for an agency by estoppel to exist, the following
must be established:
(a) the principal manifested a representation of the agents authority or knowingly allowed the agent to assume such
authority;
(b) the third person, in good faith, relied upon such representation;
(c) relying upon such representation, such third person has changed his position to his detriment. An agency by estoppel,
which is similar to the doctrine of apparent authority, requires proof of reliance upon the representations, and that, in turn,
needs proof that the representations predated the action taken in reliance.