UNIVERSITATEA DE VEST DIN TIMISOARA FACULTATEA DE SOCIOLOGIE SI PSIHOLOGIE CATEDRA DE PSIHOLOGIE Alin Gavreliuc a PSIHOLOGIE POLITICA READER it. \ 2003Alin Gavreliue Universitatea de Vest din Timisoara Facultatea de Sociologie si Psihologie Departamentul de Psihologie e-mail: alingavreliue@xnet.ro IMAGINAR IDENTITAR $1 ASTEPTARI SOCIALE IN VESTUL ROMANIED Deopotriva in miezul discurcului promovat la nivel public, dar gi al omului obignuit, se poate remarca astizi febra ,integrarii in Europa”. Invadind teritoriul aspiratilor colective romanesti, tema integrarii este hriniti nu de pufine ori cu prejudecati vinovate, excese resentimentare sau proiectii bovarice. ,Noi suntem europeni de cind ne-am niscut ca neam”, proclamé o tezA aproape de neatins, care ilustreazi curentul dominant in rindul elitei intelectual, iar .Europa se impune si ia act” de o asemenca realitate atotputernici, care aduce in jocul simbolic cu ,celdlalt occidental” o mostenire culturalé si istoricd in absenja céreia ,Europa nu ar fi intreaga”. Fard a tespinge o asemenea perspectiva, ce o infrunti pe cea care, travesti si deloc inocent, ascunde cel mai adesea ratarea individuald si colectiva, deplingind spovara de a fi romén”, vom incerca sa sugerim in paginile urmitoare ci, pe baza traditilor locului si Fira sd refuzam o viziune identitar critics, mult mai eficients se va dovedi abordarea Romdniei reale, mai contratianta $i mai imprevizibita decit las& s& se inteleaga adepti cligeclor autohtoniste sau europeniste cu orice pret, intrucit Europa nu constituie doar 0 realitate geografica (din care nimeni nu ne poate exputza!), nici un teritoriu imaginar simbolic (in care ,,vestul prestigios gi prosper” isi va deschide generozitatea ~estului sarac si neferict"), nici macar un ensamiblu politic monolitic (care e departe de a fi omogen chiar in interioral corpului sau occidental), ci o realitate valoricd, atitudinalé si institutional anume, un ansamblu de ritualur si practici sociale specifice, un tip de lume si un mod de viata care se prezint® altfel decit cele proprii majoritatii romanilor de astaz. Credem, agadar, && recunoagterea diferenfei nu se poate realiza decit print-o inifald cunoastere de sine, care si se producé — atit cit este cu puting& — dincolo de tiparele de reflect ideologice. $i abia ‘mai apoi, daca tot ne definim evasi-consensual tinta colectiva — toti ,yrem in Europa”, diferim dupa cum anume vrem si ajungem acolo ~ se impune, pornind de la ceea ce suntem, si construim strategii de ‘adecvare In tipal de lore gi a modal de viath european” {ncd de fa lansarea dezbateri identitare la mijlocul secolului XIX, tema specificului national a reprezentat 0 adevirata obsesie interogativa Ja nivelul elite, devenind poate singura tema majors durabila 4 dezbateri intelectuale in Romania modema (Alexandrescu, 1998, p. 36). Flaborind un operator mental prin care igi artculau inferentele discursive (,in esenfa, tot ce este in Rominia / Europa este bun’), schimbind, in functic de genealogia ideatici si interesul social doar referental, cele dou tabere au pierdat, ‘mi de putine ori, confruntarea cu provocétile reale ale clipei. S-ar cuveni, in sfirsit,s& incercam si aliceva {in lucrarea de fata, ct mijloacele psitologiei sociale, antropologici culturale si etnopsihologici ‘vom incerca si deslusim portretul identitar al unci parti din aceasté Romanic reali, pe baza unor anchete de teren si analize documentare. O parte deopoiriva regional ~ studiind fie realitatile sociale ale Banatului, fie ale unor judete (Timis, Arad, Carag-Severin si Hunedoara) incluse conventional in zona vestic’ a fri, constituind teritoriul romanese al Euroregiunii Dundre-Crig-Mues-Tisa -, dar si simbolica — hirinitt de reprezentarile polare care populeaz’ imayinarul social-poltic european pe axa ,Est-Ves actimatizat la geografia imaginera autobtona, care opune vestul rominese mai occidentalizat” estului sau sudului ,orientalizat sau baleanizat” Cele citeva trasituri ale lecturii fenomenelor identitare pe care 0 propunem aici, fiecare fiind ‘nsojits de temerile potentiale, dar gi de raspunsurile ce pot fi oferite acestor provocési, s-ar putea rezuma dup cum urmeaza: = 1, Actorul social ~ fie el individual sau colectiv — angajat in confiuntarea cu o istorie nestatomnicd, nu de putine ori tragicd, se dovedeste a fi un actor actiy, inzestrat cu competenti induetiva, capabil si isi reconfigureze pozitiv identitatea personal sau grupalé. Temerea: nu suntem pregitifi pentru integrare. Dar atit un individ, cit si o comunitate isi descoperd, chiar in contexte social-istorice mult ‘mai neasezate, resurse penta se regasi, intr si afirma. * Studiu a apart in voluml eoordonat de Adan Nevula, No gi Baropa, Edita Polrom, li,= 2, Identitatea sociald a subiectilor apare mai puyin ca o substanti imuabill: care cilatoreste in istorie”, de genul ,romanitajii vesnice”, cit © entitate fluid, construta social prin nteracfunea emijlocith, ealS sau imaginard, cu ,cefalalt”. Temeres: ne vom plerde identiiatea, Insk identitatea nu ,se pierde” niciodati, ci se aflé intr-un continuu proces de reconstructie in care, print-o alchimie tainicd, elementele care fi asigura si conserva individualitatea se combina cu cele ale diferentes, intr- un context care impune de ficcate dath scnsul 51 miza profaccrilor care se petree. Se produce eeca ee am putea numi un fenomen de sublimare idencitard, tn care now ,identitate european” nu se va articula in opozitie cu ,identitatea romineasct”, ci ca o entitate care, fird si evacueze mostenirile traditii, le valorfica int-un nou orizont valoric af lumii integratoare. = 3 Rominia este mai degrabi eterogeni decit omogen’ identtar, ,Romania” este formati din foarte multe ,Rominii”. Temere: 0 asemenca viziune incurajeazi secesionismul. Departe de a propune 0 altenativa de acest gen la omogenitatea proclamati si incurajati astizi, lectura noastra sugereaz doar nevoia de abandonare a perspectivei substantialiste unificatoare. in consecinti, cultivarea diferentei poate deveni mai degrabi un atu decit un handicap, in timp ce postularea ideologicd gi susfinerea social-politicd cu orice pre} a unei omogenititi culturale — indeosebi dupa criteriul etiei potte conduce la tensiuni care se adincesc, mai degrabl decit ee solufioneazi. fntotdeauna realitatea ocala si inferactiunea nemijlocita cu ,celalalt”(indiferent de etnie, confesiune, origine regionala) cu care actorul a construit natural o istorie comand vor genera reprezentari, asteptisi si proiecte rociproce mai generoase decit cele proprit unei istori siluite, in care entitate straina realitafilor locale impune ce identtati se cuvin pretuite si care depreciate. - 4. In sfirsit, orice schimbare sociala majora ~ iar procesul integrarii europene se incadreazi neindoielnic in aceasti categorie — pentru a fi implinita, trebuie si recupereze gi s& valorifice dou resurse rarcori cvocate in stile din gfinfele sociale: incredcres 9i speranfa sociala. Ori o autentick sporire a acestor energii sociale, care se intemeiazi, in egala misura, pe incurajarea activisrmului gi competentei actorului, pe reconstructia identitara sinatoasa si pe cultivarca diferente, trebuie si se bizuie pe o relafie echilibraté gi reciproc stimulativa intre ,centru” si realitatea localé. Temerea: pierderea contralului $i incaerenta strategiilar sociale glahale poate f invalidat de Iunga istarie de ppeste un secol de ineficient& a centralismului excesiv — politic, administativ, economic, dar si ideologic -, justficat, poate, la debutul procesului de modemizare a societitii rominesti, dat inoportun astizi. Aceste rinduri nu pledeaza nicidecum pentru regionalizare, care nu ar face decit si ‘ute ,centrul” de Ja Bucuresti in alte centre” asociate, mai mult sau mai putin arbitrar, provinciilor istorice, imprumutindy-i viziunea, moravurile si aparatul birocratic, ci pentru o schimbare de paradigms in politica romsineasca, pornind de ta prineépiul ca atita timp cit comunitatile locale, care sunt singurele ce pot identifica adeevat nevoile gi tntele sociale propri, nu vor dobindi o autentica autonomic, neinerederea si lipsa de speranfa social. vor adinci clivajele dintre .Roménii”, mai dograba decit si le diminueze, iar climatul social asttel tensionat va ingreuna procesul integrarii europene. Strategi identitare angajante si identitate narativa fin cele ce urmeezi vom ilustra primele trei trisdturi descrise anterior prin parcurgerea unui csantion de interviuri comprehensive aflate in Arhiva gruputui de antropologie culturala si istorie oral a Fundatiei A Trefa Europa” din Timigoara, Cele 31 de ,istorii ale view” au fost astfel selectionate incit, prin apactenenta autorilor, urmreasc indeaproape configuratia ctaic’ a Banatului de astizi gi oferk o imagine cuprinzitoare a reaitatilor Sociale, culturale si politice a ultimelor decenii, Stratul generational este evasi-exclusiv unul al supraviejuitorilor vechii lumi, anterioare lui 1947 (cet intervievati sunt ndscufi, 100) si cele care ipostaziaza ,suferinja” (v37, pi > 60), receptate ca extrem de prezente. Existi gi 0 serie de valosi negative freevent evacate, precum ,sabatarea celnilalt” (v16) si conditile modeste, sircia” (¥21), dar ansamblul influentei celorlalte valori determind preponderenta ‘onului pozitiv al discursurifor (veri figura nr. I] Tonalitatea criterilor referenfiale ne infifigeaza, Ia nivelul superior de generalitate, dominanfa criteriilor centrate pe ,Individ”, in dauna celor focalizate pe ,Comunitate/Societate”, respectiv ,Culturd” La nivelul subordonat de generalitate se observa cum mucleul reprezentirii sociale (Abric, 1994) se construieste in jurul ancoreé discursive a familie", cu cele mai numeroase referinte pozitive (pi > 120) [vezi figura nr. 2}; singurele crterii care pot ,concura” familia fiind criteriul ,sine™ (pi > 100), respectiv celalalt” (pi 100), ambele orientate pozitiv, si crteriul orientat negativ ~ previzibil prin incarcatura sa emorialé ~ ,evensmente traumatice”, la care pi >100. Daca tratém eniterule distinct, se remarcd proiectile pozitive asupra ,sinelui", confirmind constructia ego-centric& a personalitiii in context grupal, desi actorul colecti investigat igi serie scenariul retrospectiv in registrul dramaticului. Observatia de mai sus confirmé cereetirile din cimpal psihologiei sociale experimentale, care evidenfiaza rolul proicctiilor apreciative asupra sinelui, in vedleres dobindiait yi vonseivatii stimei de sine (Baumeister, Tive, 1986, Higgins, 1989). Se mai distinge cum ,celélalt” ramine un criteriu putemic polarizat, in care evaludrile pozitive si negative depagese pragul pi >80. Astfel, s-a observat ci apare o diferentiere semnificativa intre ~celilaltetnic” (precum ,germanul”, ,maghiarul pbulgarul”) si ,celdlalt regional” (de genul yolteanului”, ,moldoveanului” sau basarabeanului”), aprecierile fiind, eurprinzitor, mai pozitive in primal caz, dupa cum se distinge o diferentiere inte ,celalalt generic” (definit in termeni globali, mediat) si ,celdlalt particular” (definit in termeni specifici, nemediat). ilFigura nr. 1 — Asociere eriterii referentiale-categorii valorice [Valor pozitive NIV WValori negative COMUNITATE /SOCIETATE ‘CULTURA ft 8 Valori negative 7Figura nr. 3 200 1507 4100) +0) Figura nr, 4 Figura nr. 5 13Analiza structural a caterorilor vslorice pune, torodat, in evident diferenieri semnificative in cadral dimensiunit axiologice a autoimaginit. Atfl spus, atunci cind realizim transferal de la nivel individual inspre cel grupal ~ in fond tabelul nr. 3 este un portret de grup — se genereazi o important rmutafie a modotului valorc s atitudinal [veri figurile nr. 3,4 si 5]. Semnalati in abordarile din domental psihologie intercultrale (Munroe, Munroe, 1986; Shweder, Sullivan, 1993; Bemry etal, 1997; Segall et al, 1999), reconfigurarea identitarareelizaté prin acest transier se produce in mai multe registe: = fipare auitudinale si comportamentale ~ in care atitudiaile sociale $i comporsamentele comunitare declarate dezirabile sunt cele ce se integreaz’ imperativelor ,,rinduielii”, ale Ini ,,ceea ce se cuvine”, recuzind ceea ce este resimfit ca degradant pentru conunitate. in pofida presiunilor istoriei, care incuraja obedienga gi derespousabilizarca, rlatvle memorial rents legea moralé nescris8 a loculu owen care cred ca mai existd un bine, mai exist un viitor, vor binele, se grupeazd, se adund.” (Edith Cobilanschi, C, p. 330)", = patternur exstenfale ~ producinduse o reelaborare a verbelor ontologice fundamental: registra hi a ave, grav afecat de o istorie nedreapti, este progresiv substtut de registul hii a ft. Actfel, merth realizati comparatia inte valorile final, care odata dobindte introduc actorul socal in tipara I a avea" gi valorile instrumental, din tipaul lui ,a 41". Se observ cum prezentl continu al muni si al asumarit destnului ~ reprezentat de teritorio! lui wa fi" - este mai cuprinzitor decit tertorul care i insereazi pe subiect in registrul lui a avea”, subliniind o importanté reconstructie de paradigma cxistenfialé pentru cei confruntyi eu 0 istore neagezati, ameningétoare, Descori in dscursul retrospectiv ‘memoria devine un suport pentru reabilitarea de tp idetitar, iar recuperares se pete rai mult simibolic si, orice caz, intr-un alt dimensiune (dacé ,no! am pierdut total” ~ bunuri case, paminturi, agoniseala de 0 vial — afirmau, ca intrain reften despoviraor, mai multi subieci, ,copiit nostri s-au realizat, devenind peste ani medici, ingineri, profesori)’. Asadar, deposedarea in registrul Iui a avea” este contrabalansati de o implinire in registrul Ini a f°, sugerind o schimbare a cadrului de orientare a rucleului identta, care acum este pretuit print-o alt deschidere valoricd si atitudinalt. Mai mutt, registal lui a supraviefui, impus individului de determinirle social-politice disriminatoare este convert fn regisirul lui a event, asocia de etre comunitate ctivari valorlor instrumental, Analiza valoior de nivel I relative [vezi figura nr. 5] ne infitiseaz’ o coplesitoare predominant a valorilor instrumentale, accentuind constatarea anterioard conform cireia presiunile istorici nu determina doar o replica debila, inerfalé« subiecilor si, ci una angajant, responsabila, care ipostaziazA mai degraba fupea cur istoria si destin doct accoptarea lor pasiva si inert. Se reconfitma, gi pe aseasticale, voeatia conmmunitijilor do a tobiliza adevarate siraegit idenitae in confrantarca cu un context soci neprieinic (Camilleri et a. 1990; Camilleri, Vinsonneau, 1996), tocmai pentru a conferi coerenta propriului traseu existential sia stipini determinate conextuale = universul axiologic dominant mut’ sermifiativ accentul dinspre valorle asistenfiale, proprit unui subiect trait de istorie, inspre valorile participative, ale subiectului care igi tréieste istoria. Tensiunea dine cele doua registe este iustata de disputa polar dinte valorite de nivel I ale satisfacie afectve gi valorile de actiune [vezi figura 4], in care cele din urma obfin o victorie simbolica remarcabila. Perspectiva teoretca capabils si explice acest metabolism idenitar este conturata in cadral unui now curent consitit in anit din urm& in cimpul psibologiei sociale: psihologia narativa (narrative psychology), care depiseste viziunea constructivismului social $i oferi clile necesare examinarii structurarii culturale a experienfei individuale si grupale (Bettelheim, 1976; Taylor, 1989; Bruner, 1990, 1991; Gergen, 1991, Edwards, Potter, 1992; Widdershoven, 1993; Crossley, 2000a, 20004). Accastt perspectiva discipinara s-a ingemanat cao altemativa la abordarite canttative dominante, care prin Stridanile lor obsesive de a categoriza experienfe umane atit de complexe prin cuantificare gi proceduri staistice, au pierdut dramatic in incercarea lor de a incorpora dimensiunea bermeneuticé a experienei personale sau grupale, ratind astfl intlirea cu natura vie, autenticd a interacfiuni cw ,celalalt Paihologia maraiva ofc cercetitoruhs instramentcle de cunoagtoe ncccsare prin care poate wri cum sinele este modelat in forme culturle, precum cele ale limbii si ale atribuirt de infeles, asigurind mentinerea ‘unui sens intern, coerent i personal experientei propii subiectlui (Crossley, 20006, p. 533) Intemeiate pe concluzile unoriavestigatit recente cu uneltele psihologiei sociale si antpologiei caltwrate asupra experienfelor traomatice, aceste tdi argumentear8 cd ruptira gi fingmentaren identitard imediaté inevitabilé, mai degrabi decit si dezorganizeze deplin identitatea personal si colectiv’ a actorilor sociali, contribuie la dobindirea unui sens nou, superior gi detagat al unitafii gi coerentei de sine, * Din rauni de olesnie a lecturi textual vom introduce cu rescurarea T refernile ce provin din volurul Teron. Memoria gi cultura familial. Identiti moiple in Bana, Decupa} din arhiva, Prosectul A TreiaEuropt", Gripul de Antoploge tone ‘ral, Tiigoara, {998; cu Crefernfele din volural S. Vultr (ed) ~ Lum’ th destne, Nemira, Bucuresti, 2000; iar ea A cele ce rowin exclusv din ariva Grupa de antroploge store orl preciznd numele intrvievatlu i ocliare intervuh Exemplar din aceatdperspectia se infaieart povesien acleasHaith Cobilanschi, C, p. 309-330, la care metabolism ‘xu ara se rdneye din inden: .Doarme,tine-ne pe ty impreuna!”, cu cae infrund toute privaunile vii, dar prin fare zbindeste mere allt de faralla sa, 5 fle feria tn polidatutyordiscrimdsler. 14prin activarea unei configurafii narative, Mai mult, cind istoria covirseste memoria, agadar atunci cind trauma copleseste re-amintirea, naratiunea identitari devine o armi impotriva sorti, folositi pentru reconstruirea ,buna” si echilibrata a sensului vieti sia rolutui rezervat actorului individual sau colectiv in refeaua evenimentelor, prin intermediul acclui self narativ evocat intia oard de K. i M. Gergen (1988). De altel, noi dezvoleim infelesul lui ceea ce suntem prin infelesu atribuit raportiri noastre la nofiunea de bine”. Legatura dintre notiunea de ,bine”, injelegerea de sine, tipurile de povestiri prin care acordém Sens proprici vieti si conceptile societitit despre ,implinirea personala” se dezvolt laolalté in ,pachete desfieute” (lonse packeges), pe care fiecare comunitate le accesibilizeazi prints-o logic’ implicit (Taylor, 1989, p. 105), Astfel, subiectii care anima narajiunile retrospective aduc in prim plan propria ordine normativi sinitoasi, ,binele” nepervertit dobindit in familie, regasit indeosebi in valorile .zmincii” si ajutorarii ccluilalt”, prin angajarea unei identtafi narative eliberatoare (Ricocut, 2001, p. 291-302). lati cum, chiar conffuntat cu ameninarile unui climatistoric degenerat, care a provocat rupturi sociale abrupte si radicale, subiectul individual sau colectiv descopera necontenit resurse pentru a-i construi o identitate socialé impliniti. $i in cercetarea noasta, criteriul referenfial al ,sinelui” apare cu o proiectie puternic pozitiva, confirmind teoriile identtafii sociale, care argumenteaza rolul hotirtor al respectului de sine in echilibrul interpersonal si cdutarea unei identitati sociale onorante in cadrul grupului de apartenenta (laytel, 1974; Tayfel, ‘Tumer, 1979, 1986). O asttel de strategie se realizeaza prin strategti narative diverse, indeosebi prin diferentiere de out-group, ,celilalt” oscilind intre alteritatea radical (,e alti ume”) si similaritatea totalé (,sunt ca si noi"), dar in toate subiectul consolidindu-si un ansamblu de valori mostenite care se supun mai degraba duratei lungi istorice (Braudel, 1969/1996) si care dau viata ‘unui ethos al locului care supraviefuieste tuturor cutremurelor elipei Imaginar identitar in vestul Romaniei Neindoielnic, Banatul, unitatea de analizA de referintS a cercetiri noastze, se dovedeste a fi un spatiu al interferentelor si interculturalitatii, Anticipate de lucrarile unei adevarate scoli de istorie bindjeand din secolul XIX, care ii are ca exponenti principali pe Paul Iorgovici, Constantin Diaconovici Loga, Damaschin Bojinci sau Eftimie Murgu, multe din studiile prezentului i atest deschiderea atitudinald interetnicd si interconfesionala,pluritinevismal si pluralismul cultural (Leu, 1993, 1996a; Leu, Albert, 1995; Neumann, 1997). in regiune, conform recensimintului din 1992 si Anuarului statistic din 1998, la 1,35 milioane de locuitoi, peste 250.000 sunt reprezentati de alte etnii care conviefuiesc alituri de cea roménd, formati din 1,1 milioane (fat de 593000 in intreg Banatul le 1910). Citeva dintre acestea au avut un rol semmificativ in , indeoscbi cca german (svabii), de aproximativ 38000 {aflaté in scdere dramaticd fafa de 1910, cind numarul lor se apropia de 380000), cea maghiard de 125000 (222000 in 1910) si sirba de 23000 (fay de 285000 in intreg Banatul istoric 1a 1910, marea ‘majoritate, aproximativ 200000 fiind ins situati in jumitatea sudic3 a comitatului Torontal, astizi in Tugoslavia)’, {n pofida unei primiri rezervate in anii de inceput, teptat, odatd cu sfirsitul secolului XVI, sneamful” devine ,al nostra” (Leu, 19966, p. 242), constituind un reper idemttar apreciativ pentru tof Ceilalti locuitori ai regiunii (Dumistricel, 1996; Leu, 1996b, Chelcea, Lajea, 2000, p. 75-86), jucind rolul unui pedagog social, promotor al unui model economic viabil, intemeiat pe munca si consecveng’ plstrat pind astizi. Toate celelalteetnii ale locului au conviefuit pin la sfigital celui de-al doilea nizboi mondial {ntr-un spatial inelegerii si comunicérii reciproce, in care asocierie identitare erau mult mai pregnante decit divizarle. Dupa 1947 indeosebi, in urma mutatilor demografice impuse provinciei de noua putere politica ~ prin deportar si transmutiri in mas& ~ echilibrul identitar al Banatului a fost considerabil afectat (Vighi, 1994; Vatur, 1997, 20002, 2000b; Cheleea, Latea, 2000). Cei calificali de loealnici dept _colonist”— venii din zone invecinate precum centrul sau nordul Ardealului ~ sau ,vinituri” — mai ales rmoldovenii si oltenii ~ vor lua locul multor germani deportati sau emigrati, generind un fenomen cu consecinge importante intr-o economic a schimbului simbolic intr diferteleidentiatiregionale sau etnice ale provinciei, Mai ales in ulimit ani ai regimului Ceausescu, cind emigrarea gvabilor devenise o politica Incurajata fatig de catee stat, sau in ani tranzifei, cind liberalizarea politica a generat un adevarat exod al germanilor, harta identitari a Banatului s-a modificat abrupt, dincolo de pragul critic acceptabil unei robilititi sociale naturale. Procesul a fost insotit de uncle fenomene perverse, care, dincolo de prezervarea unui ethos regional pe baza vechiului model axiologic a produs noi hibrizi valorici si a provocat fenomene de descalificare identitara a ,intruslor”, substituind, ca in metabolismul oricarui stereotip, informatia individualizanta dobindité prin contact nemijlocit cu ,celilalt” pe baza uni istorii a relatiei impartisita, cu informatia categoriald confectionata mediat prin intermediul stereotipului regional "informatie stati eorespuneatorerecensiminilu din 1910 ay fost preluae din coca de docurente 1918, Dexbvryirea utd nasional staal a poporuuiromén. Recunoasterea el intemapional, volun 5, Editura tinged) Encslopedies, acute, 1986, p. 532-540 15 "Ce eeeprin activarea unei configurafit narative, Mai mult, cind istoria covirseste memoria, agadar atunci cind trauma copleseste re-amintirea, naratiunea identitari devine o armi impotriva sorti, folositi pentru reconstruirea ,bund” si echilibrata a sensului vieti sia rolutui rezervat actorului individual sau colectiv in refeaua evenimentclor, prin intermediul acclui self narativ evocat intia oari de K. i M. Gergen (1988). De altiel, noi dezvoltim infelesul lui ceea ce suntem prin infelesu atribuit raportiri noastre la notiunea de bine”. Legatura dintre notiunea de ,bine”, injelegerea de sine, tipurile de povestiri prin care acordém sens proprici viei si conceptile societiit despre yimplinirea personala” se dezvolta laolaltd in ,pachete desficute” (lonse packeges), pe care fiecare comunitate le accesibilizeazi prints-o logic’ implicit (Taylor, 1989, p. 105). Astfel, subiectii care anima narajiunile retrospective aduc in prim plan propria ordine normativi sinitoasi, ,binele” nepervertit dobindit in familie, regasit indeosebi in valorile ,zmincii” si ajutorarii cchuilalt”, prin angajarea unei identtafi narative eliberatoare (Ricocut, 2001, p. 291-302). lati cum, chiar conffuntat cu ameninfrile unui climatistoric degenerat, care a provocat rupturi sociale abrupte si radicale, subiectul individual sau colectiv descoperd necontenit resurse pentru a-i construi identitate socialé impliniti. $i in cercetarea noasta, criteriul referenfial al ,sinelui” apare cu o proiectie puternic pozitiva, confirmind teoriileidenttafii sociale, care argumenteaza rolul hotirtor al respectului de sine in echilibrul interpersonal si cdutarea unei identitati sociale onorante in cadrul grupului de apartenentd (laytel, 1974; ayfel, ‘Tumer, 1979, 1986). O astfel de strategie se realizeaza prin strategti narative diverse, indeosebi prin diferentiere de out-group, ,celilalt” oscilind intre alteritatea radical (,e alti lume”) si similaritatea totalé (,sunt ca si noi), dar in toate subiectul consolidindu-si un ansamblu de valori mostenite care se supun mai degrabi duratei lungi istorice (Braudel, 1969/1996) si care dau viata ‘unui ethos al locului care supraviefuieste tuturor cutremurclor elipei Imaginar identitar in vestul Romaniei Neindoielnic, Banatul, unitatea de analizA de referintS a cercetisi noastie, se dovedeyte a fi un spatiu al interferenfelor si interculturalitatii, Anticipate de lucrarile unei adevarate scoli de istorie bbindjeand din secolul XIX, care ii are ca exponenti principali pe Paul Iorgovici, Constantin Diaconovici Loga, Damaschin Bojinci sau Eftimie Murgu, multe din studiile prezentului fi atesti deschiderea atitudinald interetnica si interconfesionala,pluriinvismul si pluralismul cultural (Leu, 1993, 1996a; Leu, Albert, 1995; Neumann, 1997). In regiune, conform recensimintului din 1992 si Anarului statistic din 1998, la 1,35 milioane de locuitori, peste 250,000 sunt reprezentai de alte etnii care conviefuiesc alituri de cea roména, formata din 1,1 milioane (fata de 593000 in intreg Banatul le 1910). Citeva dintre acestea au avut un rol semmificativ in istoria regiuni, indeosebi cca germani (svabii), de aproximativ 38000 {aflaté in scddere dramatic fafa de 1910, cind numarul lor se apropia de 380000), cea maghiard de 125000 (222000 in 1910) si sirbi de 23000 (fay de 285000 in intreg Banatul istoric 1a 1910, marea ‘majoritate, aproximativ 200000 fiind ins situati in jumitatea sudicd a comitatului Torontal, astizi in Tugoslavia)* in pofida unei primi rezervate in anii de inceput, treptat, odatd cu sfisitul secolului XVI, sneamful” devine ,al nostra” (Leu, 19966, p. 242), constituind un reper idemttar apreciativ pentru tof Ceilalfi locuitori ai regiunii (Dumistricel, 1996; Leu, 1996b, Chelcea, Lajea, 2000, p. 75-86), jucind rolul unui pedagog social, promotor al unui model economic viabil, intemeiat pe munca si consecven’ plstrat pind astizi. Toate celealteetnii ale locului au conviefuit pin la sfigital celui de-al doilea rizboi mondial {ntr-un spatial inelegerii i comunicérii reciproce, in care asocierie identitare erau mult mai pregnante decit divizarle. Dupa 1947 indeosebi, in urma mutatilor demografice impuse provinciei de noua putere politica — prin deportar si transmutéri in mas& ~ echilibrul identitar al Banatului a fost considerabil afectat (Vighi, 1994; Vatur, 1997, 20002, 2000b: Cheleea, Latea, 2000). Cei calificali de loealniei dept _colonist” ~ venti din zone fnvecinate precum centrul sau nordul Ardealului ~ sau ,vinituri” — mai ales tmoldovenii si oltenii ~ vor lua locul multor germani deportati sau emigrati, gencrind un fenomen cu consecinge importante intr-o economic a schimbului simbolic intre diferteleidentiatiregionale sau etnice ale provinciei, Mai ales in ulmi ani ai regimului Ceausescu, cind emigrarea svabilor devenise o politica Incurajata fatig de catee stat, sau in ani tranzitei, cind liberalizarea politica a generat un adevarat exod al germanilor, harta identitari a Banatului s-a modificat abrupt, dincolo de pragul critic acceptabil unei robilititi sociale naturale. Procesul a fost insotit de uncle fenomene perverse, care, dincolo de prezervarea unui ethos regional pe baza vechiului model axiologic a produs noi hibrizi valorici si a rovocat fenomene de descalificare identitara a ,intruslor”, substituind, ca in metabolismul oricarui stereotip, informatia individualizanta dobindité prin contact nemijlocit cu ,celilalt” pe baza uni istorii a relafei impartisita, cu informatia categoriald confectionata mediat prin intermediul stereotipului regional * informal statisti eorespunedtorerevensiminilu in 1910 ay fost preluae din cola de docurente 1918, Dexia siti najional staal a poporuuiromén, Recunodstrea el internaponal volun 5, Editura Sines Encsiopedes, Bucurep, 1986p. 832-540. 15 i eee ee ag ee: (Fiske, Taylor, 1991; Judd, Ryan, Parke, 1991; Drozda-Senkowska, 2000, p. 135). S-a ajuns ta situaia neobignuiti ca subiccti de etic romana care se considerau ,ai locului” sa fie foarte critci la adresa Fdentitigilor regionale de origine ale ,noilor veniti", activind mecanismul perceptici stimulilor complecsi (Doise, 1973; Tajfel, 1982; Sedikides, Scholper, Insko, 1998). Acesta explic’ de ce in configurarea in- smopului, subiectil se definestecAutind atrbutele care tl apropie de cei ,asemenea lui” din grupul de apartenenti si pe cele care il separa de cei din out-grup. intrucit pentru bandfean in-grupul era format inevitabil din reprezentanfii unui speciru etic divers, datoriti eterogenitiit etnice si pluralisenulsi cultural conturate istoric de timpuriu, tiparul psihosocial al diferente i parte din explicaji. Asadar, putem aprecia c4 daca imaginea ,neamfului” sau ,sirbului” pentru bindjean este mai pozitiva decit cea a ,olteanului” sau ,moldoveanului”,faptul se datoreaza in bun masur& acestei forfiri a dinarmicii demografice si a mobilitiii sociale naturale de etre factoral politic. [ Constatarea privitoare la diferenta reprezentationalé evocaté mai sus poate fi sugerata de analiza comparativa a imaginii ,ccluilalt etnic” si a ,ccluilalt regional” rezultata in urma analizei deconstructive efectuate prin parcurgerea csantionului de ,povestri ale vei” [vezi tabelul nr. 4 gine. 5: interregionale isi poate afla 0 eben 4 Aulohcteroimayinen cui prin intermedia eterno vloice portvlnegatve: 3 2| g| & #| g| & men) 3) | 3) 2] # é| i i Llano) « i isteveva ta Ronde TTT2] STS FOTO O] Oo] tT zo op zo p zy apoyo Gama TPT TAA OT OOF TT Pop op op Opss]O Q wager [TPO]A} TOTO] ToL oo] oe] opal opopopoqofoyo | Baar [2 ]32{ 0/3] T}ZPOTS IPO] opoTipopo| Tp ree TPE PPP epepe pope fe pepeye pepe ey ty 4 l Foal 7 a fn tabelul de mai sus au fost insumate refertile inter sau intra-etnice din discursul retrospectiv, . precizindu-se ponderea valorilor pozitive, respectiv negative. O prima constatare ce merit mentionatd in | legiturd cu raportirile valorice privitoare la ,celalalt”etnic este tonalitatea lor predominant pozitiva (72 de menjiuni pozitive si 47 negative). Cea mai frecvent mentionati este valoarea v10 ~ ,putere de ‘comunicare”,tradusa in text prin expresia ,buna infelegere”. De cele mai multe ori povestitorul recurge la aceasti apreciere referindu-se la mai multe etm conlocuitoare. Citevailustriri sunt convingdtoare:, ine ma ingeleg cu romdnii, eu ungurii si cu toate neamurile” (Buda Terezia, german’, T, p.19); deci asa, einic n-avem neingelegeri”, sau ,,avem si unguri, avem si germani, avem $i roméni, cei mai multi sunt roman, $1 aiet mw e mict 0 problema, ca atct de mulft am traim asa, cu alte nattonalitap. 1 Banatul stip cum este, sau obisnuit me numai bulgari, ci i ceilalp.” (Ioan Vasilcin, bulgar, T, p.153). De altel, se subliniazi, , problema aceasta a diferentei de origine si de confesiune n-a fost niciodatd, ca sa spunem aga, un impediment” (Nicolae Nacov, bulgar, T, p.145), pentru c& aici, in Banat, nu era diferent: rom, ungur, german, sérb, eu ffi ne-am infeles foarte bine." (Berta Kurancey, maghiars, T, p.12% A, 23/17, p. 45), de accea acolo asa era atuncea, tofi eam la fel, indiferent ce copil era, de intelectual, saw de muncitor, sau ungur sau romén, orice, oricine era, eram tofi impreund si tof ne intelegeam bine.” (Maria Gherman, romanca, T, p.70) Se poate remarca, totodats, din evaluirile globale de mai sus e tne ,se privese” in general cu bundvoin(, iat ,celdlalt” privilegiat, in cazul romanului bandjean este sneamful” si reciproe. Doar .tiganit” au parte de un portretclar negativ, chiar daci policrom, constuit identitar’ mutual 16 a ee Adintr-o perspectiva etica (Pike, 1967; Berry, 1969, Berry et al., 1997; Iu, 1997). Merita ins’ sermnalat ci, inpofidaviriuni crtice la adres acestei et, in citeva rinduri apare mentionaté himiciaacestora", apoi -fricirea",,buna injelegere" ori ,buna disporitie". Dar tisiturile negative se impun in portretl etic al ~tiganilor”, centrale fiind evocarile frecvente ale ,hotiei ¢i necinstei” de care dau dovada, ale ,murdariei”, “grosolinii” $1 prostie, ale ,izolir sociale” st ,dezangajait in activitate, lene". Ne aflim in fafa una Stereotip etnic polarizat, dar ni se sugereazi prezenfa unor tsituri mai pujin radiate decit in ccle regisite in sterotpul etnie general roménese privitor la etnia rom, mai infens deprecativ, conform studilor recente realizate cu tehnici difeite, precum scala lui Bogardus sau testul Berkeley (Chelcea, 1994; Vastescu, 1997) Jn ceea ce priveyte oglindirea identitard interegionald, aceasta se structureazi in jurul stereotipuli autoreferental putemnic apreciativ,regisit in chigeul retoric ,Tot Banani fruntea!”, Pe baza Se putem rman trasaree contururilorauto-imagini, asa cum reese din discursuile poveStitonilr [vezi tabetul ar. 5} Tabelul Ina; Bindtean 5 lentitare interregionale Total «2627 Prin urmare, mentiunile inegistrate despre Banat i despre ,binijeni" sunt cvasi-pozitve. Cel rai des este invocat wconfortl”, ,bogata, stuatia material prosperd”: Ne ducem in Banat ed acolo is famenit bogasi si avem de Iueru, ziceau oltenti” (Aurica Boceanu, T, p25), ,dndfemit au fost ‘majoritatea oameni instar” (Martin Bolovedea, 1, p.¥8). Alte tasitunt auntie sunt ,Admicia” binafenilor, ,apropierea de natura” — ,,...erau foarte legati de pamént $i il ingrijeau"” (Nadia Wilduc, T, p24), Ottenia este valorizati puternic negatir, devenind polul opus al referinfelor identitare imerregionale. Sunt evvcate precumpanitor ,condifle snodeste” si jorizontul Tunitat", yandryinivea”™ locuitorilor acestei regiuni, ca note definitorit ale stereotipului regional, alimentindu-se puterea argumentativa a mesajului diferenfiator rezumat de unul dintre intervievati in formula: tangens ceulturald intre olteni $i bindjeni n-a prea fost” (Martin Bolovedea, C, pg. 196). Asifel, se constituie alteritatea extrema, aga cum reiese din memorabila relatare a Aurichi Boceanu, care deserie intlnirea soacrei sale din Oltenia cu Banatul prin cuvintele: Awa, (..) noi suntem ix alta fara?” (A. Boceam, C, pg. 26; A, 3/7, p. 51). Stereoripul regional moldovean este negativ, dar mai moderat depreciativ decit cel oltean Trisiturile sale principale reunesc .conditile modeste. sirdcia” cu suferinja” si .dezorientarea”, sugerind prezenfa unei identitafi traumatice recunoscute ca atare de ,bandtean”, fenomen cu atit mai pregnant in cazul imaginii ,basarabeanului”, cel msi adesea marginaliza, insoyitor al ,bandfeanului” in perioada refugiului sau a deportiri, Este surprinzator cum ,basarabeanul” devine romanul cel mai prefuit dde ,binijean”, prin intermediul recunoasterii valorilor solidartati, cici ,ajutorarea” apare central. in elaborarea imaginii, alituri de ,raportarea religioasa” si ,angajarea in activitate”. Chiar si valorile orientate negativ exprima interiorizarea accluiasi destin dramatic de cétre povestitor, cici valorile care se impun ipostaziazi ,condiiile modeste, siricia”, proprii deportiilor, cu ,,suferinfa” ce le-a insofit, conturind un portret incdrcat cu compasiune. Pe ansamblu, inst, daci excludem aprecierile axiologice din cadrul autoimagini, referingele Ia ,celatalt regional” sunt limpede mai crtice (9 pozitive, 26 negative) decit cele privitoare la celal etnic” Desigur, datorit limitelor esantionaiii si numérului redus de subiecfi naratori, am preferat si retinem doar frecventele de aparitie ale diferitelor valori pozitive sau negative asociate portetelor identtare, iar imaginile reeultate au constituit mai degrabi un portret tendinfd, pe baza ciruia sau {ntemeiat ipotezele cercetérii mai ample ulterioare.‘Aceasta din urmi (Gavreliue, Reisz, Branea, 2002)', desfiguraté in a doua jumétate a anului 2001 pe un esantion reprezentativ de 1057 de subiecti proveniti din judefele romdnesti ce apartin, Euroregiunii Dunae-Cris-Mures-Tisa, se bizuie in bunl miisurd afinititile de asociere ale frontierelor ge0-culturale evocate in studile Tui D. Sandu (1996, p. 228-254; 1999a, p, 143-148), Indirect, prima etapa a analizei valiitiit ipotezei formulati anterior (,Pentru binajean, imaginea ,celuilat etnic” este mai favorabils decitimaginea ,celuilalt regional”) a fost parcursi prin construirea nui scenariu proiecti in registrul universului de reprezentiri politic. Iti inrebarile din chestionar de interes pentru ipoteza roast, rezultatele corespondente [vezi tabelul nr. 6 1 7} Tabelul nr. 6 (Q37: Ati vota pentru un candidat la primate care provine din? _ Da Nu Rang Difeicnja scout — —|____. |Yangulut prim __ Tudetul dvs 7 ‘Alt judet invecinat 2 2 Transilvania 3 3 28 Oltenia 65 S {60 | Mantenia 3 a 4 57 (Moldova a 6 Te 1 Tabelul nr. 7 Q38: Ati vota pentru un candidat la primarie care este de etnic? Dien sean] rangului prim 0 B Se observi cum diferentele fai de scorurile rangului prim sunt sensibil mai mari pentru candidatul ,oltean”, ,zmuntean” sau ,moldovean” comparativ cu toate celelatte raportiri interetnice, cu except ,figamului"[vezi gi figura nr. 6} Figura nr, 6 Ati vota pentru un candidat la primdrie care este (provine din)?” faba lows smuntean ‘maghiar bulgar| ‘ransivanean 2 * Cerceurea sa integratproiccului Obersatoral de poi’ regionae gi ewroegionale, delat in ntervalulaprile-eplembrie 2001, eu suport nana al, America's Development Foundation”, icctor de proiect: D.Brane, tn care coordonarea cers sin Sciologicea fos realizatlImpreund cu lect R. Rese de la Universitatea de Vest din Timifoara 18Neindoieinic, ne aflim doar in fata unui set de atitudini sociale — propriu raporturilor electorale — si unui registra al realititii sociale ~ lumea valorilor politice si a actorilor ei -, care nu pot oferi decit 0 orientare preliminard, aproximativa, privitoare la identitiile etnice si regionale. Din acest motiv am recurs la aplicarea unui instrument standardizat, valorificat deja in studiile romanesti asupra reprezentarit sociale a raporturilor interetnice (Chelcea, 1994) — scala distanjei sociale a lui E. Bogardus, reconfigurind-o pentru evaluarea, alituri de versiunea clasicd, a ,celuilalt etnic”, si pe cea a ,celuilalt regional” [vezi tabelul nr. 8]. ‘Tabelul nr, 8 — Aledtuirea sealet distantei sociale a lui E. Bogardus -Marcafi cu x afirmafiile cu care suntefi de acord” ‘Acceptati Molioveen Si ceion ea Séavel preten april Sé-avetvecini de locungs ‘Si abl ceutenia dvs. Ste num viataton nara 'Sé ie expulzatday afar din ra da a ‘Am apelat, mai apoi, la construirea unui indice expresiv, cl mai sugestiv dintre ceilalti indict potenfiali in a evalua natura $i intensitatea raporturilor interpersonale dintre subiectii cu identtiti sociale Giferite. Ne referim la indicele caliafi contactelor sociale (ICCS), ce poate si dobindeasca valori tne (— 2) si (25). Valoarea minim semmificd respingerea radicala a identitatii sociale (etnicé sau regionala) particularizate, prin acceptarea expulzarii din tari a ,celuilalt”, iar cea maxima reprezinta atitudinea social cea mai generoasa fata de alteritate, prin acceptul principial al intemeierii unei familii cu un reprezentant al respeetivului out-grup. in tabclul de mai jos am ordonat ICCS pentru subicetii romani care formeazd subesantionul romanesc, dar si pentru egantionul global (vezi tabelul nr. 9]. Lista cuprinde att aitudinile fad de grupuri etnice, ct si faf2 de grupuri regionale. Previzibil, scorurile cele mai favorabile au fost atribuite categoriei identitare generice a in-group-ului (,romn”), respectiv categorilor regionale care apartin unei arii culturale de apartenenji (.binatean”, ,ardelean”) pentna cei mai multi dine membeti populatiei chestionate. in ierarhia ICCS, calitatea de identiale regional’ roméneascl ni ¢garanteaz o plasare pe un rang superior in dauna identittilor etnice neromiinesti, Astfel, “germanul” sau “sirbul”, de exemplu, obtin un scor superior fafé de toate celelalte identitiji regionale. Totodati, “moldoveanul” reprezintd identtatea regionala cea mai stigmatizatd rezultata prin operationalizarea acestui instrument de cercetare. Constarea se impune si mai pregnant in cazul esantionului global, unde ,olteanul” si ,moldoveanal” pierd un rang fafé de subesantionul romiinesc, in dauna ,maghiarilor” si bulgarilor”. Totusi, grupul identititilor regionale si etnice, atele decit cele ale in-group-ului cercetat, obtin cu o singura exceptie, scoruri apropiate, consttuind un grup median relativ omogen. Aceasti constatare ne indreptajeste si afirmam c&, in afara cazului menfionat, ne aflém intr-un spatiu social al raportuiloridenttare nediseriminativeOO ee ee nie / regione | shpat 1 =| Rang epantion, Moldova 3507 3 C3856 Maghier Fo Tres 10S 7 1 Bugar [1805 [Tas Tras [| iz [Ten Toot | 10.0935 Taree [| o : : Excepfia evocatl este cea'a “figanului", puternic respins de cftre subiectii chestionafi. fn cazul atitudint fal de acest grup etnic nu s-au putt inregistra nici un fel de corelatiirelevante cu virste, gel, rezidenta si scolarizarea intervievatilor. Astfel, respingerea “tiganului” nu se localizeaza preponderent intr-o categorie socio-demografica anume, ci se distribuie omogen pe intreaga populate. Gradul de respingere diferi in nuanjat in functie de einie, Daci mu se poate sesiza o diferen{a insemnata intre subiectii romani, maghiari si germani (valori inre 10.52 gi 10.00), se inregistreaz o mai mare intolerant fata de “tigani” in cazul sirbilor (9.00) si in special al croafilor (3.22). Celelalte grupuri etnice sunt reprezentate printr-un numar prea redus de subiecfi pentru a putea fi articulate inferenfe comparative. O analiza a ICCS fafa de ,tigani pe grupuri de vitstd duce la decelarea unei mai mari intolerante in cazul color de peste 65 de ani (8.25), dar jun punctaj sub medie al mai tneri, sub 35 de ani (9.84). Chestionati din mediul rural (10.89), precum $i din mediul urban mic (12.04) sunt mai permisivi fata de “tigani”, decit cei din urbanul mare (8.98) si mediu (8.30). Mai ml, studiile superioare mu se dovedese un predictor al lunei toleranfe sporite, valoarea ICS find chiar mai redusi in comparafie cu alte nivele educationale (©.22). Scorul cel mai ridicat este inregistrat la cei cu studii postliceale (12.80). Totodats, femeile se dovedesc mai putin tolerante fajd de “tigani” decit barbatii (9.03 fafh de 10.99). In potida acestor discrepanje relative furnizate de ICS, merit totusi subliniat cS rezultatele din vestul fii sunt mai favorabile decit cele obfinute la adresa ,jiganilor” pe un esantion national, unde scorul acestui grup etnic este ICCS=7.32 (Cheleea, 1994, p. 238). Banatul se ipostaziaz8 astfel, gi prin intermediul acest indicator al calititil contactelor sociale, ca un spafu al intercomunicarii etnice fertile, fapt atestat gi de mediile asociate etniilor, care sunt superioare celor objinute la nivel national (unde, cu excepfia germanilor, $i ei mai ,efavorizati” pe esantionul najional, cu (18,46), celelalte ein se incadreaza inre (15, 6) ~ armen - si (13.0) - tari. incercind si urmanm diterenfa dintre amaginea identitara mat apreciativa construta de Jocuitorul din vestul tii la adresa ,celuilalt etnic” spre deoscbire de ,celilalt regional” am realizat 0 operatic suplimentara. Astfel, am eliminat identitatile ctnice/regionale polare: pe de o parte, cca singularizanté a figanului”, care se abate de la omogenitatea identitara invocati anterior, pe de alt parte cea care reuneste {dentitatca generic& inglobanté (roman), precum si pe cele proprii in-grupului (,bansjean”, ,ardclean’) ‘In urma unei asemenea filtrari — ilustrat cu simbolul * pe esantionul global gi pe subesantionul roménese in tabelul nr. 9, am construit dous variabile = prima (v etnica gsm) reuneste media aprecierilor efectuate la adresa celor mai relevante trei identi emice ale zonei, deopoteivi ca pondere demograficd gi ca intemnitate a rolului storie pe care I-au Jjucat in acest spariu cultural (,germanii", ,sibii” si smaghiari") ~ ce-a dea doua (v regionala) exprimi evaluirile ocalizate asupra cclor trei identititi regionale romnesti relevante,altele decit cele auto-referentiale (,moldovean”, ,muntean”, ,oltean’”) Reaultatele obginute pe esantionul global atesté o diferent semmificativa intre imagines ,celuialt etnic” (v etnica gsm) si a ,celuilat regional” (v regional): tops 7.822; p= 0, 000. Mai mult, $i pentru 20subesantionul format din subiectii de etnie romana se poste pune in evident’ o diferent semnificativi intre evaluarea celor doud tipuri identitare: tg197~4,836; p=0, 000. Prin urmare, pentru roménul din vestul firii identificarile in termeni de etnie — cu exceptia ~tiganului” ~ sunt mai generoase dectt cele in termeni de regiune. Asocierea cu categorile de ,german”, “maghiar” sau ,sirb” genereazA pentru subiectul evaluator o grila de asteptare mai pozitiv’ decit asocierea u categorile de ,mmntean”, ,oltean” sau ,moldovean”. intrucit cu ,celdlalt etnic” romanul acestor locuri a avut o istorie comuni ne-mediat, granija diferentierii ocoleste criteriul etniei, punindu-se in discutie fnck 0 dati teorile etocentrist-substantaliste care postuleaz ch etnicitatea asiguri mucleul tare al identitfii sociale a subiectului. De altfel, faptul cd etnicitatea este o realitate precumpanitor construiti social si mu una substantialé este dovedit si prin strédania, uncori memorabila, a reprezentantilor anumitor cinii - bundoari figanii”, in pofida numeroaselor evidente contrariante, precum integrarea in comunitifi tipic tiginesti, de la rezidenfa pind ta practici si ritualuri sociale specifice - de a argumenta in fata psihosociologului cercetitor ,.germanitatea” sau ,romdnitatea” lor, adicd apartenenja la o identitate socialé care le ingiduic depasirea stigmatizarii si construirea unei noi identtati pozitive. Anticipind astfel de tendin{a am solicitat deliberat prin chestionarul pe care lam alcituit declararea etniei celui investigat (Q45) si nu recunoasterea acesteia dintr-o lista a etnilor corespunzatoare regiunii. Din acest motiv, intr-un esantion de 1057 de subiecti doar 9 (0,9%) s-au declarat ,tigani", sensibil sub ponderea reali a etniei respective in zona (aproximativ 3%, adicd in jur de 32.000). Fenomenul nu s-a produs $i la restul etniilor, ale céror ponderi in esantion se regasesc cu acuratefe in populatia totalé a regiunii, fapt ce sugereaza c& in cazul lor mu se manifesta o discrepanfa resimtiti ca impovardtoare intre propria imagine de sine yi imagines ,veluilalt” despre sine care 9 iiupund 0 recoustine idewtitar’ radical Rezumind, teritoriul de cunoastere investigat ne dezvaluie prezenta unei realitati caracterizate prin continue reconstrucfi identitare in functie de determinanfii social-politic, dar si chipul unei lumi in care diverstatea gi eterogenitatea au asigurat o dinamicd istoric& naturals, dincolo de barierele etnice, intr- tun context al pluralismului valoric, hrinit de un ethos al locului care incurajea2d infelegerea, comunicarea si cooperarea intercultural. Deturnarca dinamicii istorice firest, ins, indeosebi dup comunizarca tari, prin exacerbarea tendinjelor omogenizatoare la nivel social, precum si prin dezagregarea ectilibrului demografic si simbolic generati de fenomenul transmutiri in masi @ unor integi straturi populafionale, a provocat clivaje identitare care, fird s& altereze deptin tiparul relational intercultural, Iau tensionat considerabil. Depisirea unei asemenea stiri de Iueruri potential primejdioase se poate tealiza, credem, prin schimbarea formulei ideologice a raportiii ,centrului” la realitaile locale gi provinciale, potrvit unei ideologié policentrice, care si mu mai postuleze hegemonic si si regularizeze administrativ int-o manieri uniformizanté ,calea de urmat” — un asemenca proces s-a dovedit deja picrzitor -, ci si \curajeze comunititile ca pe baza mostenirii lor culturale si-si identifice si si se angajeze, conform nevoilor specifice, pe drumul propriu. Rolul ,centrului” ar putea deveni ~ dintr-unul autoritar ~ unul de ‘moderator al dialogului intercomunitar, asigurind un cedru al cooperarii si al proiectelor comune necesare la nivelul intregii societifi omanesti Geografie identitara, marginalitate simbolici si asteptare social ‘Vom incetca, in incheierea studiului pe care vi-l propunem, si argumentim suplimentar asupra ‘nscmnitifiirecehibibrariiraportului ,centri”-rcalitate local prin analizarca ultimei trésdturi responsabile pentru explicarea fenomenelor identitare care a fost evocaté la inceputul prezentérii noastre, prin iniietea inci discutii privitoare la doud resurse sociale exceptionale, aflate in mare suferintd astizi in humea roméncascé: increderea si speranfa sociala. Capitalul social, privit ca si cultura 2 tolerantei si inerederii care stimuleaz’ participarea civics (Inglehart, 1997, p. 188) san ea reunite a clementelor proprii organizarii sociale, de tipul refelelor, normelor si increderii care incurajeaz coordonarea si cooperarca reciprocé a actorilor sociali pentru obtinerea unor beneficit mutuale (Putnam, 1993, p. 36) se structureazi {in bund misura in jurul acestor energii individual gi colective. Ele se regasesc in increderea in ,celdlalt” iin ndidejdea ci actiunea in care subiectul se angajeaza poate $d fie incununaté de succes, destinul su se poate implini, cici intre efortul gi finta sa nu se vor interpune instanfe — de tipal organismelor birocratice — care sé-i inhibe activitatea. Mai mult, cum in orice refele sociale existi relat inegale intre actori, intr societate cu un grad mare de ineredere gi cu o speranta social consistenta e de presupus c& entittile intermediare situate intre subiectul individual sau colectiv si instanfele supraordonate — de tipul autontijilor politice ~ mai degrabé decit si-l descurajeze, incurajeaza reusita subiectul si i sporesc resursele activate in conduita sa sociald, dup cum subiectul insugi se asteapta si fie stimulat, si mi dezangajat. Cele dou concepte au fost operationalizate printr-o serie de indicatori particulari. Astfel, primal indicator exprima asteptarle subiectului fafa de ,celélalt”, exprimate in formule foarte generale, precum ,increderea in alfi oameni" (de unde si numele de ineredere gencralizaté), sau in formule focalizate pe instanfe specifice (increderea in ,functionarul din administratie”, primar”, guvern”, 2 i ee meesparlament", .presedinte”). Cel de-al doilea ilustreaza, insi, fie asocierea cu o orientare existential preponderent proiectiva (,simt e& miine va fi mai bine”), exprimind o speranta socialé vitalizantA, fie cu 0 orientate existentialé regresivd (,prezentul e dezamigitor, odinioara era mult mai bine"), ipostaziind 0 speranti socialé deficienté. in cazul primei versiuni, subiectul consticntizeaza si se’ centreazi pe ‘oportunitatileoferite de mediul social (,se poate face”) in defavoarea piedicilor(,sigur nn se poate; nu are nici un rost si m& angajez in efort”) Existi deja o colecti de studi care atestd c& un capital social ridicat constituie un temet solid al democratic iar wn capital social diminuat este specific societiilor dezechilibrate, caracterizate print-o conflictuaitate accentuatS gi un dialog social precar, de genul socictitilor icsite de curind de sub povara toialitarismelor (Putman, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995; Misztai, 1996; Braitwaite, 1998; Sandu, 19996, Bidescu, 2001). Prin urmare, dilema principialé care se nayte este urmétoarea: daca exist un consens asupra necesitifi,intirii noastre in structurile euro-aflantice”, putem intra in Europa" oricimy? Ni sar euves are, si facem acest pas nu doar cu ansamblu legislativ $i institutional racordat formal la cel european, ci cu un orizont valor, atitudinal si comportamental care si fie propriu modelului democratiei liberale? Si zu s-ar impune, totodatd, si reclidim capitalul social prin intermediul increderii si sperantei sociale, £13 de care orice proiect de anvergurd, inclusiv celal integrari, se va dovedi zadarnic? Pind cind instanjele politice si sociale semnificative vor oferi rispunsurile adecvate acestor provociri, o minima radiografiere a indicatorilor evocati mai sus ar fi bineveniti. Astfl, investigaii pe esantioane reprezentative la nivelul populajiei roméinesti organizate de instiutile de sondare a opiniei publice din tard gi strdinitate ~ de tipal Barometrului de opinie publics (BOP) sau al sondajclor European Values Surveys (EVS) on World Values Surveys (WVS) ~ au colechionat 0 serte de intormatit concludente®, Cercetirile din intervalul 1993-2001 estimau increderea generalizata din Romania la nivele descurajante, malt sub media europeand, De exemplu, o analizd comparativa a nivelului de incredere generalizati efectuata pe un esantion de 28 de fri de pe continental nostru in anul 1999 ne ofera tuimitoarele tepere (vezi tabelul nr, 10}. Desi rezultatele acestui indicator cunose 9 auunnité diuamicd temporal, diferentele relative dintre Rominia si celelalte grupe de fiti se conserva in ultimul deceniu intr-un registra descurajant. Tabelul nr. 10 — Nivelul de incredere generalizati in Europa rEVS/1999 1% ‘Austria Lituania Belgia Tuxemburg Bulgaria - Malia [Croatia “Marea Britanie Olanda Polonia Romania Rusia 38__[ Slovacia [Sh Suedia [33__| Ueraina [17 [Ungaria Plasati in registra comparativ, Roménia se caracterizeazi printr-o nefericiti singularitate, situindu-se ,detasat” pe ultimul loc al nivelului de incredere generalizati, cu un scor de 2 ori mai redus decit media firilor fost-comuniste (21%) si de peste 3,5 ori mai scizut decit al medieifarilor occidentale ce promoveaz’ modelul democratiei liberale (36%), exprimind prezenja deficient a acestei resurse sociale. Totodata, in privinja identficari orientiri proiective sau regresive, relevanti este intrebarea care revine in multe dintre chestionarele aplicate prin intermediul Barometrului de opinic public&: ,Cum merg Iucrurile in jara?". Raspunsurile potare (,tntr-o directie bund” / “int-o directie gresita”) sunt edificetoare in a ilustra tendinja evocata mai sus. Rezultatele ultimilor ani in care ,direcfia” este apreciati ca fiind * Vom prezenta rerltatele sondsjelorfolosindu-ne de wrmétonrele baze de date gi urse documenta: pent Baron Je eine publica, din wwew os miomana/Programe/Barorctu, ar penru EVS WS din wow leper umich edbund” oscileazi intre 12% - in perioade ,normale”, situate in % din ciclurile electorale - gi 37 % - in perioada imediat post-electoral , dar mu mai intins ‘temporal de % din cictul electoral, cu inregistrarea ‘maximului in 2001. Asadar, si in momentele de efuziune proiectiva se inregistreazi un decalaj grav dintre aspirati gi realititi, la BOP din mai 2001 Bananul exprimfnd cea mai intens& nemultumnire regionals fat de evolutia situatiei socio-economice (peste70%). Asociind acest tipar evaluativ regional cu nivelul de incredere generalizati ~ un indicator care presupune interactiunea sau imaginarea interactiunii nemijlocite cu ,celalalt”- se poate observa cum Banatul dispune in mai mare mAsuri decitcelelalte provinct istorice romanesti de acest capital social [vezi tabelul nr 11). ‘Tabelul nr. 11 - Nivelul increderii generalizate pe regiuni istorice - BOP. mai 2001 ‘»Dvs. credefi ci se poate avea incredere in cei mai mulfi dintre oameni?” ~ Raspunsuri posibile: ate Regiuni orice J municipal redare gencralizatl | Rang Bucuresti spunsul .Da" Translvania 30 7 Crigana-Maramares 2 5 Banat — at ‘Muntenia 30 6 ‘Oltenia = 34 4 Dobrogea_ 35, 3 Bucuresti a7 > {Jn consecings, tiria gi sursa nennuljumiti faph de , directa in care merg Iucrurile” nu se asociaz& soamenilor locului, fata de care bandjeanul manifesta cel mai ridicat prag al increderii generalizate, ci ‘nei enttitiexterioare. .centrul”, cu care regiunea intretine raporturi mediate inechitabile. Marginalizarea simbolic& a locuitorilor din aceasta parte atari este insotité de 0 geografie identitara in care reprezentarile sociale ale vestului mai dezvoltat", dar insuficient sustinut, chiar ,boicotat’, se confrunta cu imaginea unui centru balcanizat”, ,incapabil si infeleaga problemele noaste” si care, in consecinta, .tefuza sA ne sprijine” — iaté aproape un recitativ enunfat in focus-gruputile realizate deopottiva cu principalii actori ai Vieli publice locale, dar i cu oamenii obisnuiti (Gavreliue, Reisz, Branea, 2002). Tntensitatea acestei nemulfumiti fat de ,centra” poste fi pusi in evidentd, in cercetarea pe care am organizat-o in iulie 2001, prin gruparea réspunsurilor polare (pozitive, favorabile, respectiv negative, defavorabile) si eliminarea variantelor mediane moderate de rispuns ale subiectilor [vezi tabelul nr. 12, 13, 14 51 figura nr. 7) ‘Tabelul nr. 12 (34: Cum apreciagi eX trateaza guvernul de la Bucuresti problemele judefului nostru? (Camndiferense 3% implicare at a ‘Tabelul nr. 13, (Q39: Cit de muljumit sunteyi de urmétoarcle instituii? Presedinte | Guvern Parlament | Consiliu | Primar Consiliu | | inden tal Foarte B% B% 30% 40% 26% 37% nnemultumit, snemaljumit ie Z Muttumit, | 32% 28% 19% 31% 39% foarte noulfurnitFigura nr, 7 Gradul de mulfumire fay de autoritatile politice: [Et nema, nemutars presednie quvem pafament consilu pimar const csetean toca Tabelul nr, 14 40; Hotari le care se jau in capitala frii sunt <—o [in beneficial regiunii noastre 14% Tn defavoarea regiunii noasire = 135% Aceste rezultate, desi influenjate de valul asteptarilor pozitive in urma alegerilor ~ studiul s-2 derulat chiar in primul sfert al ciclului electoral ~ ilustreazi respingerea severi a autortitilor potitice asociate ,centrului" (,parlament", guvern”, .progedinte"), dar gi aprocierea instanfei politice locale cu care subiectul intretine un raport ne-mijlocit (,primarul”). Conducstorul local ales direct de cétre cetateni devine singurul actor politic pentru care aprecierile depasese pragul de 50% pentru iniregul esantion. Constituind in egala misuri un indicator al increderii $i al speranjei sociale, investtia apreciativa a subjcctului in autoritatile locale se diminucazi pe misura indepirtirii de modelul de autoritate personalizat al ,celuilalt institutional” care poate fi controlat si responsabilizat (de genul prinwuluiedil al localitiqi), cate modelele de autoritate care imprumutd unele din caracteristicile autoritailor centrale gi in care responsabilitatea alesilor si gradul de a-i controla simbolic devin tot mai difuze (precum ,consiliul judefean”). Cu toate acestea, global se manifest o neta diferentere intre nivelul de muljumite atribuit autoritatilor locale, superior celui rezervat autorititilor centrale. In concluzie, asteptirile sociale ale bandtenilor, in particular, si ale locuitorilor din vestul Rominiei, in general, exprima cu limpezime nevoia de reevaluare a raportului ,centru”-realitate local, prin recunoasterea i valorizarea rolului lor de actori sociali autonomi, cu 0 mostenire cultural §i istori distineta, indreptapi sa isk elaboreze pe baza capitalului social favorizant ia ethosului specific, propritl proiect al afirmirii de sine, In fond, asemenes Banatuloi, ,Romfniile” astfe] recunoscute, reghsite gi reinvijate si dialogheze dincolo de orice revendiciri hegemonice se vor apropia autentic intre ele, cultivindu-si propriile identitaji si conturind, dupa atitea travalii modemizatoare neimplinite, teritoriul tunei ,Roménit" dispus8 s8-i asume pluralismul gi etetogenitatea sa ca pe un avantaj strategic $i nu ca pe © povara. Pe aceasti din urma ,Roménie” o asteapta, de atta timp, ,Europa”.Bibliografie: Abric, J. C. (1994), Représentations sociales et pratiques. Paris: PUP. 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London: Sage, vol. 1, 1-20. aDifferent premises for two Romanian regions: The type of democratic community ‘The two regions that will be compared in this analysis are Transylvania? (Region 1) and the rest of the country (Region 2), excluding the capital, Bucharest. As it will be discussed below, this choice maximizes differences in terms of the type of cultural heritage prevalent in the two regions. Bucharest, which is not a part of Transylvania, is excluded from the analysis because of the specific socio-demographic characteristics ofits infabitants It is important to note that migration between these two regions has been modest. Therefore, I exclude the possibility of a homogenization of political values and attitudes via a massive exchange between the respective sub-populations. According to the last census fiom 1992 less than 5% of the population in Transylvania was bom outside this region, whereas the share of native Transylvanian living in region 2 was negligible, In 1966 and 1977 the coresponding values were even lower, and after 1992 migrtion between repions decreased further, (Roti and Mezei 1999) modernity before WW IE 1. Transylvania was part of the Habsburg Empire until 1918, whereas the rest ofthe country belonged to the | Ottoman Empire until 1877, after 1877 it remained independent | 2. Transylvania was more heterogeneous in terms af ethnicity and religious denominations than region 2. In 1930, 57.8% of Transylvanian inhabitants were Romanians, compared to 88.5% in the rest of the country (including Bucharest with 81.2%) (Livezeanu, 1995: 20,226). In 1857 about half of the Romanians from Tiansylvania weie Greck-Catholics and the other half were of Orthodox denomination. Most of the non Romanian ithabitants of Transylvania were Catholics and Protestants, whereas more than 90% ofthe Romanians | tom te es of he cout wre Or elves tars, Semen ad Pa, 196 101). The Grek Catholic Church was established in Transylvania in 1700 when the Habsburg regime persuaded the’ local Orthodox clergy that their acceptance of the Catholic dogma andthe authority ofthe Pope would earn them a stats equal othe Catholic and Protestant clergy. The communists abandoned the Greek Catholic Charc in late ) 1948, and forced it to merge withthe Orthodox Church (Stan and Turcescu 2000; 1482) 3. Several characteristics of the Transylvanian socio-economic development point to the fact that | Transylvania entered the twentieth century on a significantly higher level of socio-economic modemity than region 2 (ie. the rest of the country), and that this difference began to evolve before 1900 and is still persisting. ? Currently, the name “Transylvania” does not has any administrative meaning and historically it does not refer to exactly the same territory as today. In this analysis “Transylvania” includes the regions Banat, Crisana- Maramures and Transylvania, which are identified by the codes 5, 6 and 7 in the World Values Surveys data 4 NESEa) In Transylvania birth rates started to dectease around 1880, 1c, about 30 years earlier than in region 2, and atthe same time as in Italy, Hungary, Serbia and Poland. This difference between Transylvania and region 2 still exists (Muresan 1999:179-180, Ghetau 1997:15) and it is also persistent when ethnic non-Romanians are excluded from the analysis. (Rotariu 1993) 'b) The literacy rate was higher in Transylvania than in region 2: 51.1% compared to 39.3%, in 1897-1912, and 67% compared to 55.8%, in 1930 (Livezeanu 1998:48). If we accept tha higher levels of socio-economic modernityare generally connected with fore] wo suppor democrat valué|we expect a greter prevalence demverae aiudes among Ie population of Transylvania. ‘The results of 1990, 1992 and 1996 general elections seem to support the idea that significant differences between the two regions with respect to politcal values exist, and that these differences survived the leveling power of the communist regime, The most successful party in these elections, the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR)’, won significantly different shares of the electorate in the wo regions. (Table 2.) a Table 2. The electoral support for PDSR in 1990, 1992 and 1996, %, Romania IY 20) — 1996%) Region I 43.58 8.89 11.76) Region 2 79.07 3 24.21) 28.96) ‘The Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR), the largest party coalition d 1g 1992 - 2000, which in general favored a faster reform of political and economic institutions than the PDSR did, enjoyed significantly greater support in Region 1 than in region 2. Fven if we control for ethnic heterageneity and the size af local community, significant differences between the two regions still remain (Table 3). Table 3. The effects of region and size of locality on the proportion ofthe Romanians who voted in 1996 general eleerions for PDSR, and CDR respectively, in two multiple regression models fects on votes for PDSR" Effects on votes for CDR" Standardized Standard ‘Standardized Standard Error coefficient Exror coefficient Region! 0.70 037 033 034 Size of locality’ 0.14 0.01 0.19 0.01 i Notes | * the unit of analysis is locality of residence. * the dependent variable inthe first regression model is the proportion of votes for PDSR. “the dependent variable in the second regression model isthe proportion of votes for CDR. Region: people from the Region I are coded ‘1’, those from the Region 2, 0". * Size of locality the number of Ror Yo Arex4. Empirical analysis Contrary to the theory of durable cultural traditions and their influences we might presume that institutional } | arrangements characteristic for the communist regime suppressed any cultural effect. In democratic societies the | * Fespectve icsiatioal design is at iit infloenced by cull factors. Under an authoritarian regime, and especially in countries under a strong Soviet influence, the existing rules and laws are rather disconnected from popular politcal values. Here, attitudes of the national political elites and their relations to the Soviet ruling class are probably of more influence for the shape of the present system than values popular emong the population in ‘The two Romanian regions are predestinated to test the two hypotheses since the implementation of policies did not vary systematically across Romania. Differences between the two regions with regard to attitudes towards and support for democracy may therefore be rooted in a more distant past. Most of my dependent variables describe citizens’ attitudes towards democracy and serve as criteria for the distinction of different types of political communities (Dieter Fuchs and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 2000). The ata was taken from the Romanian World Value Survey (1993, 1998), and from the Romanian Public Opinion In my analysis I will proceed as follows: First, I discuss socio-economic standard variables for region 1 and 2. Second, regional differences with regard to atitudes towards democracy will be discussed. Third, I will focus Barometer Surveys. | fon generational influences, ie. T will discuss variations of the relationships between region and dependent variables across cohorts, The distribution of the surveyed attitudes and behavioral dispositions in the two Romanian regions are presented in Table 4 - 6. Table 4. Empirical evidence of citizen support of a set of eriteria for denaeree community, 1998, Sted 7 Romania Rerigdinane. “reectie ippeitie: Babs. ig Zi Rebtl Gy, DEM AUT Ps car VI TAW Romania oe gh as 138 779 778 1 Region | GED! Gad BD! Gv Ue? BDE- Region 2 ws | EO t63 i DEM. Support of demeratic tule, AUT: Suppost of autocratic rule, PSC, Support of political system of one"s own country; CGI: Confidence in governmental institutions; VIO: Megitimacy of violence; LAW: Law abidingness. Cell entries are percent positive support. at cultural level 1998, %o, Romania Table 5. Citizen suppor of different pes pf democrasic community at cultural level, 1 Be “Romania Region 1 Region 2 ¥ Umsil 1992, the PDSR was called the Democratic Front of National Salvation (FDSN),entries ae percent postive suppor. Table 6. Citizen support for diferent types of democratic community at structural and process level, 1998, 2%, mnt jan esries Romania Late ponds "SET sud oat Toa # Region wea Gey Tite Region 2 55.2 37.9 58% PRO: private ownership; MAN: management of enterprise, PMO: political motivation; CIV: civie engagement, Cell entries ate percent positive support. A very broad conclusion after a simple comparison between the two Romanian regions is that differences ‘in region | and ciizens fom this region do sot show less support for etatist values than peopl from region 2 _ exist, but not the ones predicted by the theory of the Jongue durée. Democratic atitudes are not more prevalent a f On the contrary, there are significant differences in favor of Region 2 with regard to 5 support for democracy (DEM), lack of support for autocratic rule (AUT), andthe rejection of violence asa legitimate politcal measure oases sae es area pronounced individualistic work ethic (WET), and a lower level of suppor for private ownership (MAN) than citizens from the second region. The only variables for which eiizen from region I'score higher than citizens en ee eee rea] Tn ee ee than in region 2, the same is true for citizens who signed petitions, participated in boycotts, and took part in demonstrations. Ideally, we should compare similarly structured populations for every independent variable. WVS data allows contralling for effects of the level af formal education, the size of the local community, age and ethnicity. Table 7 shows the effect of region for each dependent variable with at least four response categories, estimated in a multiple regression model. Effects of region on dependent variables with two response categories, such as, ‘membership in associations, generalized (rust, signing petitions, participating to boycotts, and taking place in demonstrations, arc estimated with a logistic regression model (Table 8.) Table 7. The effect of region on indicators for the quality of a democratic community, in multiple regression models‘, Romania ; Dependent variable ‘fandardized coefficient oF t REGION DN PEG ols AUT bp. epetbtrr acter 11 PSC 0.04 cor ’ 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.02 O11 0.06 0.07 0.04Notes: "each row describe a multiple regression model; dependent variable is specified in the first column, cell entries in the second and third column describe the effect of REGION ("0" for Region 1, "1" for Region 2) on dependent variable. DEM: Support of democratic ale; AUT: Support of autocratic rule; PSC: Support of political system of one’s ‘own country; CGI: Confidence in governmental institutions; VIO: legitimacy of violence; LAW: Law abidingness, SRE: Self-responsiblity; SOL: Solidarity; TRU: Trust in others; WET: work ethic; ETO: ethic tolerance; PRO: private ownership: MAN: management of enterprise; PMO: political motivation; Table 8. The effect of region on political values and behavior, in logistic regression models", Romania Dependent variable b coefficient of REGION Standardized Exp error cv ae 10200 ~C~”~C«C NS 27 | Trust diaz ou? 102 ‘Notes: “each row describe a logistic model; dependent variable s specified in the frst column, cel entries in the second, third, and forth column describe the effect of REGION ("0" for Region 1, "1" for Region 2) on | dependent variable. ‘TRU: Trust in others; CIV: civic engagement. The multivariate model confirms the results of the bivariate analysis: The hypothesis that the population of Region | is more democratically oriented than inhabitants of Region 2 is not simply rejected but rather reversed. { { There are several possible explanations for this finding: Ie may be the case thatthe two regions were more similar inthe distant past than we assumed and, therefore, there was no significant difference that could survive “he communist regime, But it may also be the case that different politcal belief systems existed until the end of ‘WW Il and that they disappeared under the leveling effect of the totalitarian regime. Its new institutions inspired ~ (and Sometimes implemented) by the Soviet Union ...epresented a much stronger call for uniformity than the | Ottoman, Russian, Habsburg or German empires had ever dared - or, for that ater, wanted - to raise." >) “Werglund and Aarebroi 1997: 152), ; Another empirical test would allow us to reduce the range of possibilities to some extent. An analysis of the relation between region and democratic attitudes by cohort, ic. those bom before the communist period and those bom afterwards,’ may help to decide whether there have never been significant differences between the two regions or wether the leveling fle of the postwar instnonl sings etngised these diterenes, If the elderly in region 1 tend to be "better democrats" than the elderly in region 2, ve have found atleast some support fora historical differentiation that did not survive communist rule, In all other cases, we are left with two distinct possibilities: 1) Before WW IL the two regions did not vary with regard to prominent values and belies to the expected extent, or 2) the leveling effect of communist institutions was 60 strong that it cancelled even effect of an early socialization. 60 years of age at the time of survey was used as a threshold between the two cohorts.The overall result of this analysis is that people from the Region 1 who were bom before the communist period do not tend to display more democratic attitudes than the elderly in region 2.5 However, there is one indicator with a discriminative distribution across the two regions, and that can be employed a a criterion to clasify npes of democratic commanity. According to the results of the 1998 Romanian WVS data, Region 1 hosts a significantly higher share of citizens who are members in voluntary | ‘organizations than Region 2, The share of active membership in at least two organizations is 15.2% in Region | compared t0 3.8 2. Although the questions on membership are proved to be among the least reliable survey questions in Romania’, all available surveys document a marked advantage for Region 1 (Bdescu 2003). Is the civil society thus more deeply rooted in Region 1 than in Region 2, or is this difference determined by other, non-cultural, factors? If the analysis is extended to other forms of civil activity, similar discrepancies between the wo regions are revealed. People who signed a petition, cook part to a boycott or participated 10 & demonstration are to be found more often in Region | than in Region 2 (ef. Table 9.) \ Table 9. Types of political participation, 1998, 9%, Romania Petition (%) Boycotts (4) Demonstrations (%) Romania 17% 3 20 Region 1 A 19.5 44 23 Region? SS 12.3 21 178 Which factors account for this difference? There are three conditions for a broad extension of participatory to mobilize civil activities (Verba, Schlozman and processes: Civil values and attitudes, Brady 1995), In our case, it is hard (o determine whether values play a significant role in explaining, the discrepancy between the two regions, The different levels of voluntary membership and participation between the two regions may be entirely the result of bettersdeveloped recruitment and mediation networks in region 1 ‘There are some arguments in favor for this explanation: First, there are altitudes and values usually associated with the notion of a civil community, which should be positively correlated with volunteering and participation (Putnam 1993). Yet the prevalence of these attitudes does not vary between the two regions in the expected direction (of, Table 5.). Second, Region 1 is indeed characterized by betterdeveloped social networks than Region 2 (Sandu 1999), Thus, the flow of information between citizens, which in turn influence their capacity of “being mobilized for civil activities, is more intense in Region 1 than in Region 2, Third, a significant share of voluntary membership is tied 10 the existence of non-governmental organizations. A majority of these “organizations was established with foreign aid from Western Europe, and many still depend on external support 3 In each of the loglinear models that included REGION, AGE, and an indicator for democratic attitudes, the third order effects were not significant at the 0.05 level. | * There are large differences between survey results on membership in at least one voluntary association due to the way questions are asked. In eight national surveys, the minimum is 3.7% and the maximum is 25.7% (Badescu 2001) | , (a‘Kuti 2001, Dakova at all. 2000). Region 1 hosts a considerably larger number of NGO's than Region 2 does, and this is probably a result of geographical convenience’. To summarize this section, different levels of civil activism in the two regions do not necessarily imply a samilarly distinguished distribution of democratic values, but may be rooted in different levels of the lopment of social and administrative infrastructures, Conclusions If democratic attitudes and pattems of behavior are among the most important infTuences upon the quality and ‘the speed of the process of democratization, then the question about their resistance to institutional change has a ear significance. The analysis of changing cultural orientations under the influence of a communist regime and 4s specific institutional settings might provide insights into potentials as wel as imitations for the transition to a beral democracy. The historical legacy theories assert that cultural factors shaped by the societal and institutional design of the —— ea ‘re-communist era have been transmitied int the present. There are two categories of explanations with regard wo de way in which different distributions of values among communities are preserved overtime. The frst ove ‘amples that different distributions of values between two populations are persistent over time, even in two communities that faced the same radical change of institutional setings and societal esources.® Another version Z__ of this type of explanation does not rely on the assertion that values are immutable but states that their reciprocal relationships with institutional design and societal resources are significant. ‘The analysis in this chapter focused on two Romanian regions that, according to Huntington's (1996) thesis ofa cultural divide within Europe, are border areas of two diferent types of civilization. If we assume that this url divide has Tasting effect that is expresed ina distint distribution of democratic values and pattems of retains, the two regions aze expected to show significant variations in terms of the quality and the type of democratic community they host: 1) They belonged to different empires - one to the Habsburg, the other to the Ouoman empire, 2) they had very different distributions of religious denomination and ethnicity - one dominated by Roman and Greek Catholics, whereas the other tepion hosted a large majority of Orthodox believers, and 3) their levels of social and economic modemity before WW II varied significantly. However, the distribution of values does not fit the expectations based on the historical legacy theories. ‘This finding indicates that at least one of the two assertions on which the historical legacy approaches are grounded, cannot be applied to the Romanian case: * Region 1 is closer to the West European countries, and has also more flight connections to the capital city and w forcign destinations. * Robert Pumam's study on regional differences in Italy (1993) is an example for this category. 10 eeeee eee cere 1. The distribution of values and attitudes in the pre-comnmunist era can be derived from historical circumstances, such as the empire a region belonged to, the dominant religion or the level of socio-economic ‘modernity. This assumption might be especially problematic for neighboring regions that belonged to different empires, since the diffusion of attitudes and lifestyles cannot be sufficiently excluded (even if migration seems to be of no importance during the last 25 years). 2. The distribution of values and attitudes in the pre-communist era has been transmitted into the present (whatever the transmission mechanisms may be). If the first assumption is true, one would expect that at least in the case of the elderly, ie, those who were bom before the WW II the expected difference can be detected. However, my analysis has shown that it does ymmunist values is false, or the leveling effect not, and, therefore, either the assertion of existing different p of communist institutions cancelled early socialization experiences, The more general implication is that the potential for democratic changes in East European countries is not primarily determined through historical legacies. Only if we take into account more detailed information about the distant past, the specificity of the national communist regimes and the characteristics of the post-communist al community will evalve ) —List of Tables Table 1. Level of satisfaction with the democratic process, 1998, %, Romania 3 Table 2. The electoral support for PDSR in 1990, 1992 antl 1996, %, Rumania... ‘Table 3. The effects of region and size of locality on the proportion of the Romanians who voted in 1996 _zeneral elections for PDSR, and CDR respectively, in two multiple regression modele* nnn S Table 4. Empirical evidence of citizen support of a set of criteria for a democratic community, 1998, %, Romania 6 ‘Table 5. Citizen support of different types of democratic community at cultural level, 1998, %, Romania.....6 Table 6. Citizen support for different types of democratic community at structural and process level,1998, %, a ‘Table 7. The effect of region on indicators for the quality of a democratic community, in multiple regression ‘models’, Romania . 7 ‘Table 8, The effect of region on political values and behavior, in logistic regression models", Romania wv.n.8 Table 9. Types of political participation, 1998, %, Romania,References Badescu, Gabriel, 1999: Miza politicd a increderii in Sociologie roméneasca. New series 2/1999. pp. 97-123 Badescu, Gabriel, 2003: incredere si democratic in firile foste comuniste. in Pop, Lucian (ed.). Valori ale tranzitiei O perspectiva empiried lagi: Polirom. forthcoming Berglund, Sten! Aarebrot, Frank. 1997. The political history of Easter Europe in the 20th Century: The Struggle between Democracy and Dictatorship. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar : Dakova, Vera/ Dicussi, Bianca / Hyatt, Jeany/ Socolovschi, Anca, 2000. Review of the Romanian NGO Sector. Strengthening Donor Strategies. Report commissioned by Charles Stewart Mott Foundation and Charity Know How (CAF). Fuchs, Dieter and Edeltraud Roller. 1998. Cultural conditions of the Transition to Liberal Democracy; in Bares, Samuel H/ Simon, Janus (eds.): The Postcommunist Citizen. European Studies Series of the Hungarian Political Science Association and the Institute for Political Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Budapest: Erasmus Foundation and Hungarian Academy of Sciences. pp. 33-77 Fuchs, Dieter/ Klingemann, and Hans-Dieter, 2000: Eastward Enlargement of the European Union and the Identity of Europe, Discussion Paper, Wissenschaftzentrum Berlin fur Sozialforschung, Fuchs, Dieter, 1999: The Democratic Culture of Germany; in Noris, Pippa (cd.): Critical Citizens. Global ‘Support for Democratic Government, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 123-145 Ghetiu, Vasile, 1997: Evolutia fertiltitii in Romnia, De la transversal Ja longitudinal: in: Bibliotheca Demographica, No. 5/1997. Romanian Academy. pp. 8-17. ‘Huntington, Samuel P,. 1996: The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. New-York: Simon & Schuster. Inglehart, Ronald, 1997: Modernization and Postmodenization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kuti, Eva, 2001: Nonprofit Organizations as Social Players in the Period of Transition: Roles and Challenges. unpublished manuscript. Lipset, Seymour M., 1959: Some Social Requisites of Democracy; in: American Political Science Review, vol. 53. No. 1, pp. 69-108. Lipset, Seymour M., 1994: The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited; in: American Sociological Review, vol. 59. No. 1, pp.1-22. Livezeanu, Irina, 1995: Cultural Politics in Greater Romania, Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930. Ithaca: Comell University Press Muresan, Comelia, 1999: Evolutia demografic& a Rominiei. Tendinte vechi, schimbari recente, perspective (1870-2030), Cluj-Napoca: Presa Universitara Clujeand, Putnam, Robert D. (with Robert Leonardi and Raffuella Y. Nanett), 1993: Making Democracy Work: Civie Tradit ns in Moder Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press Reisinger, William M., 1999: Reassessing Theories of Transition away from Authoritarian Regimes: Regional Patterns among Postcommunist Countries, Paper Presented at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 15-17. 1999. Chicago. RBaEeAeSBHKEeHEEEESEESEEHEE SB HEEE ES B aRobrschneider, Robert, 1999: Learning Democracy. Democratic and Economic Values in Unified Germany. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rose, Richard/ Mishler, William! Haempfer, Christian, 1998: Democracy and its alternatives. Understanding, Post-Communist Studies. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. Rotariu, Traian/ Mezei, Elemer, 1999: Asupra unor aspecte ale migrafiei interne. Sociologie roméneasca. Serie noua 3 / 1999, pp. $39 Rotariu, Traian/ Semeniue, Maria/ Pab, Iulian, 1996; Studia Censualia Transilvanica, Recensimntul din 1857. Bucuresti: Editura Staft Rotariu, Traian, 1993: Aspecte demografice in Transilvania, la inceputul secolului al XX-lea. Sociologie Roméneasea. Vol. 4., Nr. 2, pp. 171-186. ‘Sandu, Dumitra, 1999: Spatiul social al tranzitiei, lagi: Potirom ‘Stan, Lavinia/ Turcescu, Lucian, 2000: The Romanian Orthodox Church And Post-Communist Democrartzation. Europe-Asia Studies. Vol. 52, No. 8, pp. 1467-1488. Téka, Gabor, 1995: Political Support in East-Central Europe; in: Klingemann/ Fuchs, Dieter (eds.). Citizens and the State: Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 354-383. Verba, Sidney/Schlozman, Kay LJ. Brady, Henry B, 1995: Voice and Equality. Civie Volunteerism in American Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press Wagner, Peter, 2001: Transformation in Eastern Europe: Beyond “East” and “West”. unpublished manuscript.SOCIAL TRUST AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE POST-COWMUNIST SQTHIELES Gabriel Baden (Apeormattsly’7,7077 words, inctacing: wibliograpiy)) Recent assessmenttafitettanstiomprasesses i ttixersconmnisstacilicetand drayeeenndht: increasing divessity inthe quali: andloxteen fit demoacatizasion; (ax Cananhers 2002, Ruprik 2000, Kacatapey THT} One posi categoey offsreneats at account fi this wavitiomsahteste the bevel of social capital in these counties. In is 1993 book, Putnam deplones the ft that “propesal strengthciing matket economies ani Wemoeraicinsttations 6f developing auld transitional counties} center almost exclusively on deficiencies in financial and human capital.” Putnam 1993:"38) He considers that the deficiencies in social eapitalin these countries ae at least as alarming, and asks, 28 solution, for more efforts to encourage ‘social capital formation’ by ‘patiently reconstructing those shards of indigenous civic associations that have survived decades of totalitariun rule” (Putnam 1993: 39), In studies that followed Putnamn’s book, socal trust, which in most conceptuslizations of social capital is considered as one of is basic components (e.g. Ostrom and Ahn 2001; Newton 1997: 576), has been shown to have different distributions within the populations of the post-communist soviti¢s than within those of consolidated democracies, More specifically, the proportions of people who sfate that “most people can be trusted”, are found to be systematically lower in surveys conducted in the East than in those conducted in Westem Europe (@.g. Nomis 2001: 11), This chapter will focus on one category of consequences that trust may have on transition within the former communist countries. The main assertion is that generalized trust is a resource for democratization processes. The fact that a high lovcl of trust is linked to more involvement info association life has received justification, both theoretically and, in the case of some Wester nations, also empirically (eg Putnam 1993, 2000; Stolle 1998; Brehm and Rahn 1997), Itis highly debated what isthe direction of the causal arrow hetween the two terms, but, in most studies, generalized trust has something to do, even when the effect of other factors is controlled, with hip to associations.’ Yet, finding a similar ‘Positive correlation in the case of the East European countries is less straightforward. In fact, atthe macro level, West and Fest differ significantly with respect ofthe way that trust and membership are inked. Across different data and measures, the relation is positive among the Westem countries, and. non- positive among the Eastern My aiim in this chapter is to demonstrate that a more detailed methodological treatment leads toa different image then one produced by macro-level analysis, showing, in ft, important similarity across both West and East-European countries, Thus, when an analysis is performed at an individual level and the effect of ‘contextual factors at a national level is controlled, in any of the thirteen ex-communist countries under study itis found that volunteer members in associations tend to be more trustful than ordinary citizens. Stil, the relationships are generally weaker in transitional countries thar! in westem ones, will analyze ‘two possible lines of argumentation: the validity problems of the standard measure of generalized trast, and specific attributes of velunizer associations which arc linked to the sthnic eontoxt, could cach decrease the intensity of the observed relation between trust and membership. Finally, | will discuss the elationships among activity in associations, civil society and democracy, within the former comrainistcontnties. Twill argne that espite of the fact that nat all volunteer ‘organizations are democratic, the overall effect of civie engagement on democracy is positive in each of these countries, By adding this result to the fact that trustful people are more likely to volunteer in associations, { conclude that generalized trust is an important ingredient for successful democratic transition. SOCIAL TRUST AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT Classe erature on political culture implied that interpersonal trust promote well finetioning of democratic processes and stability of democratic regimes (Inglehart 1999: 103), An important part ofits reasoning is based cn the assertion that must is a resource for collective action. Citizen activism is significantly affected by the capacity of citizens to identify common goals and to pursue them in Gabriel Ravlesen and Esie Uslaner (eds), Social Cupital and the Transition to Democracy. Routledge, 2003,209 collectively. Firs, it is expected that more trustful citizens become ermbedlded in denser and more extended social networks. Social tust, in particular, may have the potential to inerease the connectives through networks that favor mobilization for participatory acts. Second, a high level of social trust seems to ease empathy towards other interest. by identification with their own. Finally, formal models and experiments showed that more trast citizens tend to be better in overooming collective action dilemmas (eg. Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994), An accurate empirical check of the causal relation fiom social trast to citizen activin is especially problematic because of the dificulty im measnnng the fater term One possible strategy 1 to focus on. ‘volunteer membership to associations, considered as an important component, but also as a proxy ofa larger range of etizen participatory ats, It certainly misses a broad category of relevant activities, consisting of ad hoe or in regular but uninstittionalized colective behavior, which are by no means negligible for democratic processes (eg, Tarrow 1994; Foley and Ealwardls 1996; 47), However, itis Aifficul to track these activities by standardized interviews, and even more to make their meastires comparable across different societies. The analyses inthis chapter will ely mainly on estimations of ‘volunteer membership in associations, 2s recorded in the 1990-3 and 1995-8 World Values Surveys, in the 1999 European Values Surveys, and in several surveys representative ofthe Romenian and Moldovan public® itis widely acknowledged that coca capital ean produce not only social ads but also social bas (e. Portes 1998). Social capital has the potential to empower groups of peoplc for any hand of collective action, which sometimes have desirable consequenes for their parxpants and bad consequences for other groups. The former eommunist countries tend to be characterized by low level of social eapital on some of ts dimensions, and by high level on some of the other, Ethnic heterogeneity, more prevalent traditional social relations, the numerous cases of ineffective state institutions, have enhanced the role of personal networks (e.g. Rose 1998); but in the same time, have lowered interpersonal and institutional ‘must (see Rartkowshi, chapter eleven, this volume). Especially the multi-ethnic character of a society sould significantly influence the equation between trust, evie engagement anv democratization, This 1s because not all associations are necessarily good for democracy. A high membership in groups that stress ethic cleavages could enhance the level of conflict in society and undermine those ecllctive actions ‘wich cut across ethnic lines (see Dowley and Silver, chapter seven, this volume) ‘Therefore, the effet of trust on democracy, mediated by involvement in associations, depends on which of the following statements holds true (G) social trust is a resource for any association, including the ones that can be harmful for democracy ©) social trust tends to influence membership only selectively, having a stronger impact for those associations that have a net posttive effect on démocratization, The later case is more congnent to the assertion of a significant role of socta trast than the fits, especially in the case of societies where the number of undemocratic associations is significant. An ‘accurate empirical testing should consequently be able to distinguish between associations that are “good” ‘or “bad’ in terms of their democratic effects. However, not only is information on activities performed by’ associations in the ex-communist sovitics scarce but, as # wal discuss later, assessing the net democratic, efféct of a certain type of activity ismot straightforward, ‘The available data will allow me to examine how the intensity of ink between social trust and membership changes across different settings. Although constrained by design, thé analysis will provide sotte tentative interpretations regarding the mechanies of causal relation between trust and aetivity in associations, CIVIL SOCIETY, VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS AND DEMOCRACY While almost absent fiom intellectual and political life for nearly « century and a half, the concept of civil society gained a widet usage during the "70s regarding Eastern Eurdpe. The fall of communism has brought a new sitiation where the term embraced additional meanings and, mostly asa result of developments inthe social capital field raised new expectations conceming its explanatory power (Foley and Edwards 1998). Wathin and with regard of the ex-communist eountnes, the language of ex soci hhas become a visible but poliscmic part of the discourse of politicians, academics, business leaders, foundation executives, and citizens. Kor many actors that oversee democratic transition within the region, ‘avi soctety reters to “dynarme webs of mterrelated nongovernmental institutions’ (Keane 199K: 6)."t hts, ‘rom this perspective, the level af development of ervil society can be assessed by looking af the number210 of nongovemmental organizations, the mumber of people involved in their activites, and by various aspects regarding theis activity. For others, eivil society and nongovernmental sector do not necessarily ip. Timothy Garton Ash, for instance, considers as an open question whether in Eastern Europe nongovernmental organizations are ‘like seeds to the beautiful turf of civil society or like that thing called snot grow.” (2000; 400). Mark We considers volunteer behavior as central fo a definition of civil society in this way excluding a significan ‘part of nongovernmental associations that are active in the Fast European conntries. He makes the distinction between ‘pure’ associations, and associations that are ‘of “civil society, but net *in” civil he former consists in orvanizations, within whic 1 later are organizations that mediate hetween *p partias and unions are two min examples forthe eategory of mediating forms of associations (Warren 2001: 58). In this perspective, the proportion of people volunteering in associations, other than parties and nions, provides evidence on how developed eivil saciety is in a eartain country, nation to enather. itis well documented that e large vari among the western nations, regerding the amount and type of membership in civil society organizations (e.g. Aurts 1995; Perlmutter 1991) Fast-Euiopean otintsies present certain specificity but, also a huge variance among themselves, in both ‘and quality. Clear differentiation existed during the communist period Tisnvineann 2001), and there are compelling arguments that a previously more developed eivil society accounts ata large extent the one hand, countries such as Poland, and saxty 2 2 sant smount of population involved in “organizations, formal and informal, that retained a high degree of antonomy from the state (Avato 2000 h2} Poland stands at one extreme with up to ten millinn people in Solidarity movement, snd also the ‘only non-state higher education institite in commmmnist East Europe, a catholic university, Similarly, in “Hungary there were some officially aqcepted and even supported nonprofit organizitions, such as trade unions, Red Cross, Adult Education Society, Patriotic Front, Chamber of Commerce, ee.. and a large variety of voluntary associations (e.g, fishermen's, huniers' associations, sport clubs, pet fans societies, voluntary fre brigades, amatenr theatre groups, yonth clubs, intellechuals' organizations, folk dance honses, et.) considered to be harmless and therefore tolerated by public authorities (Kuti 2002). ‘On the other hand, the former soviet countries, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania, were af the other extreme, ‘with very limited autonomous activity of groups of peaple (Nelson 1996; Sampson 1996). In Romani, for instance, a number of nongovernmental ospanizations were allowed fo exist, some af them even with Intemational fiiation. They inctnded traditional craftsmen, philaelists, sport clubs, or associations for people with disabilities. A fow of them, such as the Writers’ Union, were influent enongh to nagatiate pivileges for their members, but ther influence on policies were either insignificant cr uncivie (Verdery 1991). A special ease is that ofthe so called “Cenackal Flacara’, which consisted in-a series of gatherings taking place in all major eities, and onganized hy a poet clase t6 the circles of power. The andience, eonsisting in yonng people, sometimes in mimber of tens of thousands, was enconraged to sing, dance, create literature, *Cenachol Flacara’ can be regarded as an associative movement, providing support for social and cultural exchanges, but in the same time as an instrument of mobilization by the cormmunist regime in favor of nationalist values, (Stoiciu 2001), ‘The type and amount of civil society in the past is relevant heeanse same ofthe old organizations have ssnrvived over time and count 2s part of eivl society in the present. n addition, some of the ek orientations and knowledge aesquired during the past membership have been employed in the ‘organizations, or transmitted through tammy soctalrzation, No less important is the fact that population and of the officils towards te civil society have been influenced by its degree of development anal hy its role played ime the cormrmmist regime. In Fingary, for instance, “governments did not tmst [associations] at all, the most dictatorial anes even tried to completely eradicate them, but they were held in high estocm hy citizens.” (Kni 2002), Romania presents n ease where civil society type of organizations has been facing mainly negative attitudes throughout the transition period,’ whereas in the Czech Republic the positive view that surrounded civic associations atthe beginning of 1990s has been replaced by a climate of distrast and lowv esteem fram oth public and political representatives (Prié etal 199815) 7 ‘One consequence of the extremely diverse picture of civil societies and of their dominant definitions across ex-communist nations is that validity ofthe comparative mensures for both civil society and civieau engagement, and, consequently, their relationships with trust can be influenced by factors that are country specific, There are three main mechanisms through which valunteer associations might produce democrats effets ‘na transitional society: Social leaming effects, Associations may contribute to forming and enhancing those attitudes, imowledge and skills on which democratic practices are based (e.g, Putnam 1995: Hooghe 1999) White sm westem nations family, school, place of work and friends provide important instances for transmitting emnocratic capacities, citizens of the East-European nations cannot rely atthe same extent on such mechanisms, which are mote resistant to change over time and, in their countries, sil bear undemocratic ‘saces. Less influenced by local tradition, and frequently bringing an import of erganizational practices from their westem counterparts, volunteer assocsiions in transitional sociches have an important potential to develop cognitive and deliberative skills, civic vires and a sense of efficacy 2. Public sphere effets. Associations in general, and volunteer ones in particular, provides “the social infrastructure of public spheres that develop agendas, test ideas, embody deliberations, and provide voice” (Warren 2001: 61), 3 Institutional effects. These are the more established effects of associations on democratic govemance (eg Foley and Edwards 1996). Associations speak an behalf of groups of citizens, contributing in this ‘way to the ageregation of individual judgment and to representation of collective decisions. In addition, asscciations have the capacity to affect state and market by organizing demonstrations, strikes and civil disobedience. Civic associations in the Fastern-European countries have become known mostly because of the role played during the fall of communist regimes, and, later, oftheir censtant input to shaping the new institutions. How strong are these effects, and what is the relative importance of each for the transitional countries remain unanswered here. Although I filly acknowledge that not just vohinteer but also non-voluntesr associations have the potential to influence democratic processes, and that their ntinence can be sometimes negative (Schmitter 1997: 248), [will ely on the assumption that in each of the new democratic polity benefits from the activity of volunteer associations tend to exceed loses. EMPIRICAL TESTING: MACRO-LEVEL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SOCIAL TRUST AND MEMBERSHIP TO ASSOCIATIONS ‘The relationship between social trust and volunteerism, measured at a country level, has been consistently found to be positive in Westem nations (eg, Norris 2001). In the 1999 European Values Survey. the correlation is 0.30 forall conntrias, and has the same value when the elation is limited to the West- European ones. n the case ofthe former communist countries the same relation displays @ completely different pattern (Figure 1), which is summarized by a correlation of -0.24 ~FIFURE | NEAR HERE~ What could explain this difference bétween the new and the established European democracies? It could be that social trust has different effects on civic involvement across the two categories of counties, Nevertheless, itis possible that specificity is only apparent, having in fact processes that are sirilar but reflected by distorted mstruments. Measurement errors, model under-spocifcation, statistical assumptions that are not respected, could each potentially explain why results are different at an aggregate level between the two categories of counties. Another difference between East and! West is that both meastres of social trust and volunteer mesnbership tend to show less stability over time in the case of transitional conntries (Table 8.1. snd Table 82). Is this the result of a fister pace of change within the new democracies, o itis mostly a reflection of problems in ‘operatianalization and collecting data, which are specific to these countries? The next two sections ofthis chapter wil investigate several measnrement aspects regarding the two key concepts of this analysis, ~TABLE 8.1. NEAR HERE— ~TABLE 8.2. NEAR HERE~212 MEASURING CIVIC ENGAGEMENT Identifying people who did volunteer work in associations isa difficult task, particularly when standardized interviews are used as a tool. Several results of an overview of the estimates of voluntest membership among the Romanian public, could also apply at some extent to other post-communist counties 1. Slight vatiations in the way that questions are asked, eticit lange variations in the proportions of respondents who acknowledge their voluntecr behavior. Table 8.3, shows estimates between 3,7 percent and 23.3 percent. Because they are close in time, within few years or even months, differences are not likely fo be attributable to changes in actual membership. ~TABLE 83, NEAR HERE~ 2. Assessments which are based on other data than national representative surveys (eg. surveys on associations, qualitative interviews, official statistics) suggest thatthe proportion of Romanians who ‘volunteer in associations is closer to the lower estimates resulting from survey data (Bidescu 2002). That indicates that most measures based on national surveys inflate the real proportion of members. One ‘possible reason is that the notion of association, as well as that of volunteer membership, have a wider ‘meaning for some of the survey respondents then i s intended * One of the important implications is that any correlation between membership measured by a citizen survey and another variable is ikely to be underestimated. MEASURING SOCIAL TRUST ‘Trustis no less difficult to measure in a comparative study than membership to associations. First, cross- national surveys rely on the assumption of equivalence among transtations, which in the questions used to assess the level of trust may not be accurate enough. A study on nine surveys conducted in Romania that contained various items of generalized trust, inchuding three different translations ofthe same dichotomous question used in the World Values Surveys and Furopean Values Surveys, showed significant variations of results induced by small changes in wording (Badeseu 2002), We can assume ‘fom this that translations of the same item in different lmguages ean produce even more different estimates of the proportions of trasters in those societies, A.second problem associated with the assessment of the level of trast is that of validity. thas been long, assumed that survey questions of social trast, such as the standard one--"Gencrally speaking, do you believe most people can be trusted or can't you be too careful in dealing with people?” which is asked in the WVS and EVS, are operationalizations of that type of trust which is praised fora broad range of benefits, especially the ones that involve solving collective dilemmas. Only recently, has it been argued that trust is mult-dimensional, and that its dimensions are distinet from each other empirically as well as, analytically. Moreover, the type of trust that “helps us get things done” in general, and has the potential to increase membership in associations in partioular, was found to be largely similar with the one which is ‘measured by the standard question (Ustaner 2002: Ch. 5), Trust in strangers and trust in people whom the subject knows (relatives, fiends) or share some stabutes with (people of the same ethnicity, odnfession) are shown, using survey data on American public, to have distinctive empitical manifestations (Uslanes 2002: ch 3). However, the public fiom the post-communist societies presents several characteristics that may influence their representation of ‘the other people” whom they ore asked to evaluate in terms of trust. In comparison with the Westem werld, the former ‘commanist nations fend to have at the present « much lower intemal mobility and, in most cases, an almost non-existent immigration. in addition, they have a larger proportion of people living in rural localities, which tend to be small, characterized by extended kinship relations, and low interaction beyond their borders. ‘Most people” could have a different meaning for someone whose contacts are almost exclusively with relatives and people who has known for a significant period of his lif, than for @ person vwho has moved several times, had travel extensively, and lives in places that undergo tepid changes in their social structure asa result of migration and immigration, The former category of people is better represented in the East, whereas the later has a lager proportion in the West. These differences make plausible that respondents from the former communist nations are influenced in their assignments of “other people” as trustworthy or untrustworthy, not only by their level of tustin strangers, as it was shown to be the case of the American public, but also by thei level of partcularistic trust a |23 Itis also true that people from the East have been exposed to interactions with people unlike themselves, in two categories of eicumstances that are largely specific to their societies. First, most of the communist societies underwent a fast process of urbanization which entailed a significant internal migration. Its extent and timing varied from one country to another, but it had in common the fact the large number of people moved fia tke :usal places to then fast growing towns, replacing the traditional thick and sinble ties with different types of social relations. Second, the former communist societies tend to be ethnically diverse, and, as a result, any citizen has a significant chance to know groups of people who share common atiributes, such as language, customs, sometimes denomination, contrasting with hither own. Given all ofthese attributes that are specific to the former communist countries, presenting in the same. ‘ame a lange variation across them, it would be no surprise ifthe validity of ‘trust in other people” question, as an indicator of social trust, uctuates from one society to another, With this likely variance in mind, I will evaluate how social trusts estimated by different survey questions by using the data of a survey representative for the Romanian adult population, the October 1999 Romanian Barometer Survey, one ofthe few in the post-communist countries that ask about trusting specific groups. This survey provides indicators about trust in other people, people of other ethnicity, people of other relizion, other Romanians, family members and neighbors. t wall use structural equation ‘models in order to test if the six observed measures can be considered as manifestations of two latent concepts, the notion of trstin strangers and that of partcularized trust, respectively. More specifically the questions asking trast in family and trst in neighbors are expected to be significantly stronger correlated to one of the latent variables than with the other. Because both questions refer to people about ‘whom the subject has at least some degree of familiarity, the first factor would be considered as a ‘measure of particularized trust Similarly, I assert that the questions asking trust in peaple ofa different ethnicity and trust in people of a different religion are stronger correlated with the second latent variable. Following Uslaner’s argument in. his analysis on the U.S. data, this late factor will be considered to be a measure of trust in strangers slaner 2002: Ch.3). Trust in people of the same ethnicity is also expected to correlate more to the Variable of particularized trast and less with trust in strangers, Because in the Romanian society ethnicity has been a salient issue during the last ten years, and also the public is well aware ofits role played in some neighboring countries asa source of violence, war and feritorial disputes, it wonld not be a surprise to find that subjects tend to consider the others ethnicity as a relevant attribute in judging its level of ‘trustworthiness. In other words. the tendency to put faith in own family or nsighbors. that is people on ‘whom the subject has previous knowledge, may work similarly in the ease of people with whom the subject had no previous contacts but share a common attribute, considered as important. Table 8.4, summarizes the main results of data analysis. Consistent to expectations, five ofthe six measures of trust are significantly influenced (p <.05) by enly one or another of the two latent variables. The levels of tust in people of other ethnicity and in people of other religion are strongly correlated with the “trust in strangers” factor (0.74 and 0.66 respectively) and not significantly correlated with particularized trust. Trust in own family, in neighbors and in people of the same ethnicity are positively correlated with the “particularized trust factor (0.34, 0.56 and 6.72, respectively) and not significantly correlated with trast in strangers. The only measure of trust that is eorelated with both factors is trust in ‘other people. This is different from the finding of the U.S. data that particularized trust has a stronger effect on this variable than trust in strangers (0.30, compared to 0.19), Another dissimilarity is that the {ag fits have a stonmer corelaton nthe Romanian data thn inthe US. one (0.61, compared to ‘The overall result shows more similarity than dissimilarity. which is remarkable giving the difference in the wording of questions and statistical technique. Ifthe same result holds in two largely different societies, then the possiblity of its generalization to other contexts is significant. However, the difference, should make us cautious when comparing countries based on the standard trust questions. If trast in strangers has a stronger influence than particularized trust on the quantity and quality of social involvement of citizens in democratic societies, then we should expect thatthe standard vasiable on trust {is more usefil in explaining, domoerotization whore itis a better mcasurs of trust in strangers ~TABLE 8.4, NEAR HERE—wr 24 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL TRUST AND VOLUNTEER MEMBERSHIP. AT AN INDIVIDUAL LEVEL Performing individnal level analyses, separate far cach country, has several advantages over stucying ‘only one country level model of the relation herween generalized trust and vohinteerigm On the one hhand, i solves what statistical analysis describes as “ecological cosrlation problems” (Hckfeldt and Sprague 1993). On the other hand, it controls for any of the country level effects, including the ones induced by translation specificity. ‘When the strength of the two variables is compared aeross countries, there is another statistical aspect that needs to be taken into consideration. Standard coefficients, such as Pearson correlation, tend to underestimate the intensity of relations between vatiables having non-normal distributions. This is exactly the case with both membership to associations and generalized trust. In almost every country under study, trusters and members are less than half of the total, but in transitional countries their proportions are, on the average, closer to zero, Therefore, the relationship between the two variables has to be assessed with statisti that axe not influenced by their distributions, Table 8.5. summarizes the polichoric correlations and odds ratio-s for each of the Fast European country, 2s well as for their pooled sample and for the pooled sample of West European countries. “TABLE 85, NEAR HERE— ‘Table 85. shows a picture substantially different from that emerging from the country level analysis Thus, in none ofthe thirteen. East-European countries der studs.is the relationship. between tnist and... ‘membership negative, and in eight of them is signifieantly positive fp < 0.05). This result suggests that the underlying social mechanistn linking trust and eivie engagement operates in similar ways indifferent contexts. The countries af Eastern Europe, having diverse results in their democratic consolidation andl having quite different structure and size of civil society, and those of Westem Europe, al display remarkable similitude from this point of view. Stil, the relationship tends to be weaker in transitional countries than in the westem one, Two possible explanations have been already mentioned: the validity problems of the standard measure of social trust. as well as specific attributes of volunteer associations ‘Which are linked to the ethnie context, could decrease the intensity of the observed relation berween Mast and membership, Iwill analyze cach ofthese two assertions First, I will take again the case of Romania, one ofthe four countries having a positive but not statistically significant relation. As T showed in the previous section, the standard measure of socal trust haa in its case a stronger correlation with a latent variable of particularisic ist than with ne of trust in strangers. Texpect, then, that the comrelation between volunteer membership and the latent variable of trust in strangers, which { argued above provides a better operationalization than the standard question of tus, is not only positive, bu also stronger than correlations of memthership with standard question and with the latent variable of partcularistic trust, indeed, a structural equation model that includes these variables shows a statistically significant relation from zrust in strangers to membership (beta = 0.10; t= 3.7), and @ non-significant relation ftom particularistic srast to membership. ‘This result suggests that for Romania, and pethaps also for other post-communist countries, better measures of socal trust would lead to stronger positive relations with vatuuteer membership in associations, Second, will analyze how the intensity of comretation between trust and membership is influenced by ethnic eontext. One possible reason for having such an influence is thatthe sinucture of civil society may not be the same in ethnically homogenous countries as in those with larger groups of ethnic minorities. ‘Thuis, the proportion of associations whose fimotioning is based on ethnic division is ikely to be higher when the proportion of ethnic minorities is higher. At the same time, | expect that this kind of | associations do not benefit from a higher level of social trust, therefore the proportion of trusters among their members would not be higher than among non-members. As a remult, the overall comelation between, ‘rust and membership in any association, should be lower in societies with a higher proportion of ethnic minorities. “The ethnic context could also influence the validity of social trust survey question, More ethnic diversity results in more exposre of the respondents to ‘people unlike themselves” and may increase the chanswe that ‘other people” means strangers instead of people with whom the subject has regular interaction ‘Therefore, | expect that the standard question of trust Works better when the respondents live in rulti- ethnic communities. A consequence would be that the observed correlation between membership and trust is more intense when ethnic diversity is higher26 influence the extemal effects of associations—a » but itis not These results shows that level of democratization my ‘higher potential for mobilization across ethnic lines being associated with less democra zine to the total number of people involved in organizations which stress on ethnic difference, CONCLUDING REMARKS There isa link between social trust and civic engagement and it displays remarkable similarity across @ variety of contexts. The malysis presented here shows that in each of the thitcen post-commmnist sociztiss considered, citizens who are more trustful of other people are more likely to be volunteer ember int associations. ‘The sume result holds in the most successful cases of democratization, as well the least successfil ones, Neither past attributes of civil society nor its present level of development o influence the strength of relationship between trust and membership. This study indicates, creever, two important reasons for dissimilarity among the new democracies, and between them and the ‘der democracies. One relates to the validity problems of the measures that are regularly employed in the ‘oss-nafional research, A latge error of the estimate of either social trust or membership, tends to decrease the observed strength of relationship between the two, and the size of the error tends to be higher in less moder societies. The second reason concerns the type of volunteer associations that exists in a country. Although, data analyzed in thas chapter does not provide mntosmation about the structure and activities of any of the associations, it suggests that some of them do not benefit from having trustful ‘members at the same extent as the others, Moreover, it shows that a high proportion of ethnic minorities inva society elicits a larger proportion of members to the type of otwanizations which do not vale trust in ther people ‘Thore is a large agrecrnent.in studies that have analyzed the eausal mechanism between social trust and ‘vohinteer membership that correlation is not due exchusively toa causal attow fiom membership to trast, but rather to the opposite one. 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Tismancan (ede) Berweon Pare and Future, The Revolutions of 1989 and their Aftermath, Central Buropean University Press. ‘Sampson, S. (1996) “The social life of projects. Importing civil society to Albania.” in C. Hann and E, Dunn (eds) Civil Society: Challenging Western Models, London: Routledge. Sandu. D. (1999) Spatiul social al trancities asi: Poirom ‘Schmter, PC. (1997) "Civil Society East and West” in I. Diamond and M. F. Plattner (eds) Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press Dahrendorf, R. (1990) Reflections on the Revolution in Europe. Chatto & Windus. Stoiciu, A, (2001) ‘Making Civil Society Work ~ Romania 2001.” available at itp /svwew idee ro/new18 * 1] Stolle, D. (1998) ‘Bowling Together, Bowling Alone: The Development of Generalized Trust in ‘Voluntary Associations,” in Politieal Psychology, 19: 497-526. ‘Tisméneann, V. (2001) "Understanding the Balkans.” Review of M. Glenny The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999, in Tikkun, Mas! Apr, Vol. 16 Issue 2 Ustanes, E. (2002) The Moral Fenondations of Trust, New York. Verdery, K. (1991) National ideology under socialism. Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu's Romania, University of California Press ‘Warren, M. F. (2001) Democracy and Association. Princeton: Princeton University Press Whiteley, P.F. (1999) “The Origins of Social Capital" in J. W. van Deth, M.Maraffi, K. Newton and F. Whiteley (eds) Social Capital and European Democracy, London: Routledge Yamagishi, 7 and Yamais, M. 2994) Tristand Commitment in the United tates and Japan? in ‘Motivation and Emotion 18: 129-66, ! eT"4 Table 8.1. Comelations between agar za 1990 World Valuos Surveys, 1995 World Values Surveys and 1999 European Valuss Sur 1990 Ws, SWVS 990 WVS 1995 WVS, ations botwcen proportion of members in 990 Would Values Surveys, 1995 Would Valisk Strveys and 1958 Easopean Valeo Surveys. Estlassted proportion of merabers { Adak ee20 Table 84, Structural model with two fatent variables for trust, Trust in Straneers, and “Faust People of Other Ethnicity “Taist People of Other Religion of Similar Ethnicity Notes: Entries are standardized coefficients (Lambda-X); maximum modification index for the coefficients constrained to zero ie 1.4: Compatative FI Trvtex (CD) = 0.99; Adiusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFT) = 99, Correlation between the two latent factors = 0.61 Table 85, Relationships between social trust and volunteer membership to association: ‘Relationships bet and “anter members p Country polichoric odds ratio" _ 7 __corretation Bulgaria Oi ie Croatia 025" 2s Conch Republic o1ae ise Estonia aM la sngary one 20" Latvis 0.07 Uithuania 0.10 Poland 016" Romani 095 ee a a Slovekie 020" Slovenis 915" Ubraine x 003 ‘pooled sample for Fasten Europe 0.108% ; 02s Notes: peo * peas * Odds ratio indicates, in this ense, with how many times is the chance that a mustfil person iswvohantesr; higher then the chance that a non-trustful is a volunteer Table 8.6, Correlations between social trust and trust in strangers across several categories of population, defined by the proportion of ethnic minorities and fype of locality. = 194 yg fo FEE tanto & Total oa= 2 g a = © West European 3 countries Ss — 5 © excommunist 5 ‘countries proportion of trustful people (%) Souree: Calculated using European Values Survey! ‘NOTES: ‘Whee menbership ie weated witereatte, tis eal i constant across different da analyses (2 Whiteley 1999; Pree 1995 and 2000) If iltret pes ofeivic engages! se cansidered voparuuly, bai found Wo have sous positive corrluion sth eeabersh to some ssonfaiom, burweaker effet wb mercer ro eome ater, In any 2 several msocivons fom Sreeden me Centar. Deter ale ara tht more dvece, more engaged md thore with wesk es, neconmodse more "rong people’ (1996: 821) In analyzing survey data repesetaive forte American public, Fic Uslaer find tat Gus avons ‘sredictoe for erabership to several types of reizatns, sucks busier el cult rows, ut Cet only eal positive sffectom etic ronp involvement, anno imp at al on either church or cies sop messbrship sles 2002: Ch), The survey und in his chop, al their sbreviaion, ae a follow: 1990-3 and 195-3 World Values Surveys {WS}, 1998 ‘Farapean Ves Sirveye (°VS) May 1999, Orisher 199, Nay 2000, Noverher 2060 Romanian Pie pinion Rarometrs {BOP} = Romanian rational saves condaciad in December 1996 by Pal Sam andthe ahr QUPC), a sarvey conducted in ‘peak 2 inten gt aes conned bere oa ie Repl of Moldova) ty Be le, Pt Sm ‘nmi Mari the hor © Ip May 2001 Public Opinion Barometer survey, respondeats were asked o state thir level of confidence in several into nd ‘types of organizations. Inthe list of sixteen instinsions, NGO-s are placed onthe fourteenth postion, having a proportion of 73.8 perce ofrespuutui th expressed a low coufideace in tiem, Fr instance, the mere church atendance, tho aay acccintional component is somtimes waderstood by responders ne oliucer meubership to am arsociuion Similry, afilition to housing ameciaions, to whom all Romanians living ia ‘codons belong--abot on sid oe total population, is sometimes considered as voluteer membership, atioaph in vas spr of cme on vet jon obosng wonton norte bs servi, sch ening en te en: * For inane, Moldavia i epreseated in alicial sti as having u dominant ect of 61.5 perceut, consisting in Moldaviane ‘and Romans, ihe ho eegories are diatingiched, te previo proportion wl be replaced 9 about 55 parce! of Moldavians, ‘Comectons cm also be ae with eset of Roma inhibits, Ts re average exit for Rama ivng fn Roxana eve fies higher tba Be official one, based on the 1992 cen (Gheorghe a al, 2000), See the chpter of Dowley and Silver for definition of iments or mare detailed explanation st yy seeedombonse ons, * For this analysis, courier are split in we calesoier: mote demacraie-thoe for which the Freeda Hoare dex ees than 3, sad ex democratic te reat oftenPolitice vepresinta Istorta indirjiril de a refuza fatalitatea eyecului. In 22 de bric 1989, nu ne venew si ereder sedpat de Ceausescu. in 12 ianuarie 1990, nu ne venea si credem cd spectrul comu- nismului a disparut. in 29 ianuarie 1990, nu ne venea si credem cd noua putere vrea sh ne conduci cu accleagi metode cu care comunistii bolsevizasera fara dupa 1945. Incepind cu mineriadele gi sfirsind cu simbolica instigare la linsarea Opozifiei din 1 decembrie 1990, tot anul 1990 nu a reprezentat, parc, decit derularea rapida a perioadei 1945-1947, Bazele a ceea ce am numit in acest volum yregimul Hiescu atunci au fost puse si noi, azi, suntem condusi potrivit logieii uneimentaliti de consolidare a modelului colect autoritar de societate. Polite inceared si ofere radiogratia acestei mentalitifi. in acelasi timp, su- gereard ci iesirea noastra din epoca deplinei culpabilitaqi este posibita: num: prin respingerea ideii de Stat atotputer- nic si prin recentrarea comunitii noas- tre pe ideea de libertate si de valoare a individualitai. HR PATAPIEVICL | ISDN 973-28-0675-3 | 4 ania sl ane sammenae eS eC lh oHMAN actu, IL UNedes cow ves eH ra er rl tener) niaginea sub senmitl chrela an seris este unnate cea (2h conjnuta, sper ed a ingles aces hic, este riguros indiferent). Am in fat’ o succesiune nesfirgita de oameni. De departe vazuti,ei sunt ca 0 past’. Par sgranulatia insdgi a materialului, fie cind ii privim la mi- croscop flecind i privim prin neta, Undeva a milo ar cumva in apropierea materialului pe care sunt de- senafi (si impietrii) oamenii, exist’ o distanja optima este dislanfa la care se pot vedea detaliile. Numai de la aceasti distanfé individualul este posibil. Pentru Dia- vol, ca sl pentru ,t8cerea acestor spatii infinite”, noi nu suntem indivizi,’suntem granulatia materialului. Dar pentru acea transcendent bund, pe care o numim in- deobste Dumnezeu, noi suntem vizihili sub forma de suflete personale si lipsite de moarte ‘Am scris pentru Perjo aceste texte gindindu-ma per- manent numiai la distanja optim’ de la care Dumnezeu pentru a ne face vizibili, ne priveste. 7 na th 10 Anatomia unei calastrofe® Doamnelor, Domnisoarelor si Domnilor, Titlul comunicarii mele este Anatontia unei catastrofe Pentru un discurs tinut in fafa unei audiente de oameni savanti, titlul ales de mine este deopotriva prea preten- tios gi! prea, cum s& spun, pripastios. Este pretentios pentru ci, dest vorbesc de o anatomic, nu am in fond Fici o descriere definitiva sé va propun: aici nu veti auzi nimic cu adevarat stiintific. Este prapastios pentru a, daci e vorba de o catastrofa, ea nu este una obiec: tiv’, cum sunt buniioara ,catastrofele” de care se ocup& teoria catastrofelor, elaborat’ de matematicianul René Thom, ci una pur subiectiva: imi dau foarte bine seama c& alti observatori ar putea spune ca aici nu este vorba de nici o catastrof. Nu mai putin, probabil c& vor f citiva oameni in aceastd sala care si admit cu mine ci modul in care societatea romaneasci a iegit din cei 50 de ani de dictatura comunisti poate fi descris in ter meni de catastrofi. Este, cel mai Vizibil, o catastrof’ de civilizatie: de la ruina economiei la dezastrul relatiilor publice, Romania postcomunista arati ca o fara devastat deopotriva de ~ Comunicare finuté la Al Tllea Congres International al Asociafet sihiairilor Liberi (30 septembrie 1994) si publicata sub tithul ,Anato- ia unei catastrofe” in dous numere succesive din revista 22: nr, 4 (44), 12-18 octombrie 1994, p. 13 si nr. 42(245), 19-25 octombrie 1994, p.11 79un razboi si deo ocupagic. —steatnd sau taterna, ew vrefi s-0 luafi Dar este gio catastrofa mai pugin vizibila, pe care ag numi-o idevtifart: paraginii materiale din jur ii core: punde dezolant de preciso recrudescensX a mitociniei sufletesti, o lips de maniere sociale, 0 instinctiva voci- ferare de tip tata, 0 coniventa agresiva cu moravurile Joapei, care, toate impreuna, tradeaza o criza de identi- tate profunda, Teza comunicarii mele se refera la ceea ce eu percep a fi o catastrofit identitari: si voi incerca sA supun atentiei Dumneavoastra ideea cé noi traim azi constiinta prabu- sirii modelului identitar pe care elitele intelectuale si politice romanesti au elaborat incepind cu prima ju- mitate a secolului al XIX-lea, model identitar pe care 0 politica fericita I-a facut s rodeasca sub forma marilor si auroralelor momente ale istoriei noastre nationale dina doua jumatate a aceluiasi secol. Am sa incep de la o perceptie nemijlocita care, poate, se va bucura de incuviinjarea Dumneavoastra: Roma- nia posttotalitara este — de la oameni pin’ la institufii, de la snatatea naturii pin’ la eficacitatea economiei — o puragind. intrebarea imediata este, fireyte, cine e autorul acestei paragini: Raspunsul, cum probabil va asteptati, nu implics © persoand anume, ci, cum probabil nu va asteptafi, implicd ceea ce in termeni medicali se numes- te o anamneza: adica o reevaluare istoricd. Si vA supun atenfiei doud cii de prezentare a simptomatologiei: (i) prima cale sustine c& sursa catastrofei este momentul dificil in care s-a produs bolsevizarea {&rii, moment care corespundea unei prefaceri interne a modelului identitar romanesc; (ii) a doua cale de alcatuire a simp- tomatologiei sugereaz& c&, din vari motive, fuziunea dintre modelul identitar al elitelor care au creat Statul roménesc modern $i fipul identitar al maselor faranesti — care au fost chemate pentru prima oard la expresie 81politic’ prin votul universal acordat in 1919 — a repre Zentat un esec de proportii; iar acest egec a paralizat pe termen lung rezistenta fibrei sufletesti la ispitele magi- ce ale autoritarismului. Teza nesansei istorice Potrivit primei anamneze, sursa catastrofei este bol- sevizarea {2rii intr-un moment dificil. Dificil, in ce sens? Ca sa intelegem acest aspect, vi propun s& aruncdm 0 scurtd privire asupra originilor istoriei moderne la roméni. in 1829, an cunoscut la noi dup numele picii de la Adrianopol, Principatele romane capita dreptul de a iesi de sub monopolul comercial turcese si de a po- seda autonomfe administrativa. E poate util sa reamin. tesc c& aceasta deschidere a fost obtinuta sub ocupatie ruseasc’, dupa cum sub presedintia unui consul gene- ral rus, Minciaki, presedinte asupra divanurilor Moldo- vei si Tari Roménesti, s-a redactat si prima constitutie moderna a romanilor, mi gindesc la Regulamentul Orga- nic. Din acest moment, 1829, initiativa istorica este pre- luaté, in Principate, de logica modernizarii capitaliste, care implica aparifia yi consolidarea anumitor insti tutii-cheie: si anume, a institutiilor statului laic occiden- tal, a pietei libere si a societatii civile. in termeni de filo- sofia culturii, institutiile tari au trebuit s& treac’ intr-un timp foarte scurt de la orizontul organicist hieratic bi- zantin la rigorile contractual individualiste carolingie- ne. S& subliniem c4, din punct de vedere metafizic, Oc- cidentul latin paraseste definitiv orizontul intelectual bizantin o data cu formularea argumentului ontologic de citre sfintul Anselm de Canterbury in 1078. Acum, din punct de vedere istoric, distanja tempo- ral& dintre institufiile bizantine si cele carolingiene era de citeva secole. Acest decalaj a fost resorbit in numai citeva decenii prin activitatea institutionala a generatiei 82 pagoptiste, Oamenii acested generafii au fost formagi in marile centre universitare occidentale, au apartinul ce+ lor mai influente loji masonice ale vremii si au putut astfel dispune, pentru acfiunea lor politica, de subtile pirghii de sprijin internafional. Europa era cu Tarile Ro- mane pentru ci elita politic’ romaneasca se afla deja in Europa. Cel mai puternic aliat al destinului romanesc, pina dupa Pacea de la Versailles, au fost legaturile per- sonale, masonice sau de alt natur’, pe care clasa noas- tra politic’ le-a intretinut cu virfurile de decizie ale po- liticii europene. Acestea fiind spuse, trebuie s4 spunem apisat ca ideile si energia acestei generat (si a continu- atorilor ei) au realizat cea mai spectaculoasa revolutie institutional romaneasca. Din punct de vedere cultu- ral, rezultatele acestei renasteri institutionale au fost decisive pentru formularea conceptului modern de cul- turd romaneasca. in fond, intreg confinutul creatiei cul- turale romanesti moderne este legat de aceasta fertila innoire institutionala. Dar, akituri de decalajul dintre virstele stilurilor insti- tutionale bizantin gi carolingian, mai exista unul, inc’ mai semnificativ: acela dintre virsta istorica a institusii- lor care se creau atunci dup& model occidental si virsta istorica a majoritapii populatiei romanesti, care era, la acea dati, un popor de jarani in proportie de peste 90%. Pierre Chaunu afirma undeva cé 85% din locuitorii Europei clasice traiau nu in secolul al XVIFlea, ci in ca- drul, de mai multe secole neschimbat, al comunitatii senio- riale. bine, peste 80% din locuitorii Statului modern roménesc traiau, la sfirsitul secolului al XIX-lea, intr-un timp pe care Lucian Blaga |-a numit, oarecum metafo- rig, pre-isloric, iar Mircea Eliade, dintr-un punct de vede- re etnologic-religios, neolitic. Recumind, daci Occiden- tul secolului al XVIL-lea cunostea un decalaj intern de virstd istoric de citeva secole, Romania de la sfirsitul secolului al XIX-lea traia un decalaj intern de virst’ is- torick de mai bine de, 8 zicem, un mileniu 83EH limpede ed nici un Stil moder nu poate fanefiona satisfaedtor cu o populate predominant ,neolitica” Economic vorbind, gospodaria, centrat’ autist pe fami- lie gi pe schimburile intrasatesti, trebuia inlocuitd cu o economie bazatd pe liberul schimb al une piete care nu mai era centrala pe sal sia cérei logica pretindea s& nu mai fie centrata, in principiu, nici macar pe statul natio- nal. Din punct de vedere politic, un popor de {&rani atemporali trebuia transformat intr-o natiune istorics de cetateni. Satul, adica, trebuia transformat intr-un Stat bazat pe principii radical diferite de cele ale socie- tAtii sdtesti traditionale. Acest proces poate fi descris prin urmatoarea imagi- ne intuitiva: sufletul rural romanesc fusese solidar cu trupul Satului; schimbarea istoric& produs& de moder- nizarea accelerati a Romaniei a impus acestui suflet rural sa isi schimbe adapostul, adic’ trupul in care pind atunci traise. Si anume, sufletul romanesc a trebuit sA treacs din trupul Satuini traditional firsnese in trupul Statului capitalist modern. Procesul prin care un acelasi suflet trece in mai multe trupuri succesive este descris in morfologia religiilor sub numele de metensomatoz@. Fireste, aceasta trecere implicé o norma si foarte dure- roasa adaptare cultural: este, in mic, un soi de nowt etnogeneza cultural. Din acest motiv, procesul moder- nizarii a reprezentat 0 adincd prefacere identitara. Nua fost, in opinia mea, o schimbare de arhetip identitar, ci una de atribut identitar. Imprejurare tradus& prin con- vulsiile la care a fost supusa constiinfa identitard roma- neasc&. Oricine inspecteazé literatura chestiunii specifi- cului national — care este, in fond, singura tema centra- Ida culturii noastre — igi poate da seama de caracterul dramatic al pretacerii identitare si de protundele stisieri launtrice care au insotit-o. Avind acum imaginea metensomatozei in minte, pot formula rezultatul primei anamneze in felul urmator: momentul istoric precis in care s-a produs catastrofa bolsevi- 84 sarié Rumaniet a foes exact cel In care provesul tecerié sujle tiului rival neolitic ce la trupul sttese ta eel statal era toca in curs de desfigirare, Or, ocupagia sovietica a pornit, imediat dupa 1945, la distrugerea sistematicd a celor dous ad&posturi trupesti: trupul Satului a fost distrus printr-o colectivizare forlata, prin depurtari sociale, confiscari de bunuri, asasinate si prin destrimarea rin- duielii umane satesti, iar Statul democratic capitalist a fost inlocuit cu Statul totalitar colectivist. Cit despre so- cietatea civila, printr-o represiune singeroasi nemaiin- tilnita in istoria romaneasca, aceasta a fost fie eliminat3, fie transformata intr-o clientela inspaimintata si supu- si. Sufletul, potrivit imaginii propuse, a rdmas vagant. Acesta este momentul in care Statul totalitar gi-a in- ceput actiunea de reconvertire si modelare int masit a su- fletului roménesc. Stie oricine ca scopul unui regim totalitar este de a transforma o nafiune de cetafeni liberi intr-o populatie de sustinatori fanatici, fidel aservits principiului autist al Conducatorului. Combinind represiunea violent cu servitutea economica, adic& indemnurile bitei cu per- suasiunea mizerici, regimul comunist din Romania a reusit si impuna ritdcitorului suflet colectiv acea mo- delare care corespundea cel mai bine intereselor sale de aservire si dominare total. Surprins intre doua intru- pari succesive, fragilitatea sufletului vagant a fost ex- trem§; ceea ce a facut ca si ravagiile aservirii totalitare si fie; la el, mai pronuntate. Astfel s-er putea explica, potrivit primei anamneze, pululatia omului nou in pei- sajul postdecembrist. In esenta, slaba noastra rezisten{a Ja ravagiile totalitare a fost un ghinion: o nesansa istori- 4. Aceasta cale de a ne reaminti cine suntem are drept corolar teza optimist potrivit cdreia, daca bolsevizarea irii s-ar fi produs dupa schimbarea atributului identitar (altfel spus, dupa incheierea cu succes a metensomato- zei), atunci prezenta statistic’ a omului nou, in Roma- nia, ar fi fost mai redusa, iar paragina noastra politic’, sociala si institutionala — mai putin dramatic’, 85Avantajele subiective ale tezei negansei istorice sunt multiple. in primul rind, ne permite s% dam vina pe al- fii: de vind a fost razboiul si spiritul cedarilor de la lalta; de vina au fost sovieticii si lipsa de simt national a co- munistilor din interior, care si-au tradat fara, facind jo- cul intereselor sovietice in Romania (aici e rituals men- tionarea numérului mare de alogeni in structura inifia- 13 a Partidului Comunist din Romania). in al doilea rind, ne permite s8 explicim degradarea catastrofali a comportamentului social prin imecanisme subtile yi incontrolabile, cum ar fi afirmafia c& sufletul nostru co- lectiv a fost supus unei reeducari represive de tip ,,fe- nomenul Pitesti. Dac’ inversiunea psihica era obfinuta de tortionarii de la Pitesti printr-o indoctrinare efectua- 18 pe carnea deschis4, la propriu, prin tortura, alterarea psihicd a sufletului nostru colectiv s-ar fi obtinut prin combinarea celei mai sfruntate si mai mincinoase pro- pagande cu o represiune social sistematica si difuza. Al treilea avantaj subiectiv st& in imprejurarea ci aceas- t4 anamnezé favorizeaz4 foarte populara teorie, printre roméni, a conspiratiei antiromanesti universale. Orica- re din aceste trei ,avantaje subiective” nu se bazeaz pe vreun fals: in grade diferite. fiecare participa la o forma sau alta a adevarului istoric. Din punctul meu personal de vedere, dezavantajul moral major al acestui tip de anamnezA priveste imposibilitatea de a funda in ea un sentiment lipsit de ambiguitate al responsabilitatii indi- viduale. Alfii sunt de vin’, noi am fost doar victime, Komania e mereu prost plasatd, toata lumea ne urdste gi aga mai departe, la nesfirsit. Teza modernizarii esuate in fine, existé si un alt tip posibil de anamneza. Primul gen de reevaluare istoric& vorbea de vointa de _Adentitate moderna” a elitelor, dar nu sufla nici 0 vor- 86 ba despre rezistenja la modernizare a celor 80 de pro cente rurale. Anamneza pe care 6 propun acum porney- te, dimpotriva, de la pozitia antioccidentala gi antimo- dernisté a unei insemnate parti a elitelor intelectuale roménesti si are in vedere rezistenta ,Romaniei profun- de“ la occidentalizarea modelului sau identitar. Potrivit acestei viziuni, revolutia institutional realizata prin crearea Statului romanesc modern nu a fost nimic altce- va decit un atac la specificul national, o opera de strica- re a sufletului nostru traditional. Dup3 Nicolae lorga, constitufia romanilor trebuie extras& nu din modelele occidentale contemporane, ci din ideile fundamentale pe baza crora traieste constiinta noastra, izvorite ,,din constiinta populara [de] la 1300”. Potrivit autorilor care au ilustrat, cu deosebit talent literar, aceasta viziune re- gresiva, in special democratismul si individualismul occidental erau vazute ca deosebit de periculoase pen- tru integritatea spiritului national, invariabil conceput ca taranesc, ortodox, colectivist si devalmas. Aceasta tra- ditie de interpretare pleaca de la ideea c& Statul roma- nesc modern reprezenta o transplantare straina, fara aderenta la specificul national, ba chiar una contrara in- clinatiilor reale ale ,Romaniei profunde”. Pe scurt, cri- ticit modernizarii Romaniei au crezut cu totii c& sufletul rominesc este incompatibil cu spiritul modernitittt, a cirui descoperire, incepind cu secolul al XVIl-lea, este dato- rata in intregime Occidentului. Altfel spus, schimbarea de atribut identitar propusa de adepfii modemnizarii Ro- maniei era interpretata de criticii ei ca 0 desfiinjare iden- titar’. Argumentul cel mai des invocat era inadecvarea formelor imprumutate la fondul autohton, iar procesul schimbarii atributului identitar era descris, de criticii modemnizarii, in termeni de violensa si dezradacinare Este foarte adevarat cA opera generatiei pasoptiste a fost 0 opera de impunere institufionala, o opera de im- port masiv al unor forme si proceduri institutionale in- ventate aiurea. Nu mai putin, orice gref este strdind de 87organismiul eareia i se aplich, dar succenul Wansplanta rif implicd asimilarea ci, in eircuitul functional al orga nismului, ca pe un organ propriu. Din acest motiv, revo. lutia institutionala impusi de generatia pagoptist’ a trebuit s4 fie, in partea ei cea mai remarcabild, o oper’ de creatie organici. Este ins& perfect adevarat c& la aceast’ opera cele 80 de procente féranesti nu au parti- cipat legislativ in nici un mod, in special datorits votu- Jui cenzitar care era atunci in vigoare. Las in seama fiec&ruia dintre Dumneavoastrs si aprecieze daca votul cenzitar a diunat sau nu invent&- rii $i crearii RomAniei moderne. in ce ma priveste, eu cred ci modernizarea Romaniei a fost posibil& datorit’ ‘ntilnirii fericite dintre un sistem bazat pe votul cenzitar si o clas’ supusé censului care a fost deopotriva inteli- gent’, devotata sincer ideii de progres national si, in plus — ,amanunt’ indispensabil —, generoas& Ei bine, punctul nodal al celui de-al doilea mod de a reevalua simptomatologia istoric’ a paraginii noastre nationale sta in semnificatia acordat& votului universal. ‘SA reamintim ca, daca inainte de RAzboiul de intregire votau numai in jur de o suta de mii de oameni, in 1926, spre pilda, votau 3,5 milioane. A fost acest imens pro- gres numeric si un progres politic? Anamneza moder- nittii esuate sustine ci nu. O data cu iesirea la vot a »Roméaniei profunde”, viata social’ romaneasca a cu- noscut © brusci degradare politic’, ce s-a accentuat continu, fara solutie de continuitate, pind dincolo de ultimele alegeri libere, care insa au fost grosolan falsifi- cate, din 19 noiembrie 1946. Votul universal a adus in viata politic’ romaneasc’ populismul, autoritarismul si ideea nefericita c& existenta unui lider carismatic este indispensabila desfasurarii unei vieti politice eficace. in fond, se credea ci eficacitatea si moralitatea politica sunt strins legate de desfiintarea parlamentarismului si, revenind la relatiile voievodale, de adoptarea dictaturii personale a unui personaj intelept si iubitor de neamul diy cate a teat Mentatul colectiv actin ta lumina ated de votul antvernal coven ning liticniea vletit publice, in sensul anor feprezentart police arhaice, pulernie mi lologizate. Logica invaziel vielii publice cu aceste re- prezentari arhaice pretindea, in fond, revenirea vietii Publice la forme de viafa colectivist-comunitare. Fireste 4 politica se reajusta potrivit acestor noi reprezent&ri, care favorizau asteptarea salvarii de la un conducator carismatic, capabil si taie nodul gordian parlamentar prin magia solusiei autoritare. Nu era decit foarte nor- mal ca acest mental arhaic si mitologizant s& priveasca violenfa exercitat& direct in numele colectivitatii cu simpatie si aprobare. Spre exemplu, inscrierile in par- tidul legionar au cunoscut cresteri masive dupa fiecare act de violenfa politic’ a acestora. La sfirsitul anilor '30, sub presiunea elitelor intelectuale si politice care res- pingeau democrafia si individualismul si, bineinjeles, datorita sprijinului popular pentru solutia politica auto ritard, aproape tofi romanii credeau ca salvarea Roma- niei poate fi gasita numai prin instaurarea dictaturii si prin renunfarea la Statul individualist si democratic al Pasoptistilor. Este ceea ce, in fond, s-a si intimplat ince- pind cu 1948, imediat dupa alungarea de pe tron a Re gelui. E drept cd nu a fost tipul de dictatura pe care ro- manii din “40 0 doreau, dar a fost o tiranie absolut’, exact ca in Rusia, asa cum 0 voia un personaj, la vremea lui ridicol, imaginat de Caragiale. Potrivit acestei anamneze, usurinja bolsevizarii Ro- maniei s-ar fi datorat esecului generatiei pasoptiste, le- gitimata prin votul cenzitar, de a crea o solid societate civilé democraticd, in stare si confere legitimitate ur- masilor ei politici si tn condifiile votului universal. Joseph Schumpeter, cunoscutul istoric al gindirii economice, spunea spre sfirsitul vietii, cu amaraciuie, ca sistemul capitalist este un imens succes economic, dar, din punet de vedere sociologic, este un esec. De ce? Pentru ca be- neficiarii lui, in ciuda prosperitafii, nu se gindesc decit 89cum s4 il schimbe cu alte sisteme, considerate mai echi- tabile gi cate, toate, sunt bazate pe contrariul spiritului intreprinz&tor capitalist, si anume pe eliminarea sau controlul concurenfei si pe colectivism. Astfel cA, in fond, efectele dezastruos de profunde ale bolsevizarii sar datora insuccesului social al modernizarii Roma- niei. Potrivit acestei interpretari a simptomatologiei, singurii aparatori ai democratiei romanesti au fost elite- le politice democrate, un numar restrins de intelectuali, parjile cele mai instarite ale societatii (nu prea nume- roase) i, in fine, Regele. Or, regimul comunist a distrus cu sistema exact aceste puncte de sprijin ale societatii democratice romanesti, singurele care fceau Statul mo- dern s& traiasca. Bolsevizarea farii a inceput, de aceea, prin inlaturarea Regelui, a continuat cu depasedarea si deportarea sociala a celor avuti, si s-a desavirsit atit prin asasinarea elitei politice romanesti in intregul ei (nu doar cea democrat) cit si prin intemnitarea, intimida- rea sau coruperea intelectualilor de orice orientare. Ce a rémas in temnita din afara puscariilor a fost un aluat usor modelabil de catre diabolica inginerie social’ co- munist&. Iar rezultatul este inc foarte vizibil si azi: 0 populatie muncita de instincte politice primitive, aser- vita unor reprezentari politice care seaman& mai degra- ba unor reflexe conditionate decit convingerilor unui om liber, gi care, din aceste motive, se zbate, cu incoc rente dificultati, s alcdtuiasca, potrivit unui contract social reinnoit, o societate civila viabila si stabila. Jude- cind dupa evolutille politice pe care le avem deocam- daté la dispozitie — si anume plebiscitarea constant a unui despot care se declara luminat si care, intr-un lim- aj poleit, prezinta ca optime pentru romani institutiile rezultate din bolsevizarea tari —, rezultatele stridaniei de a refacc socictatca civilé nu sunt prea incurajatoare. Astfel examinata istoria recent, ea pare sa dea dreptate ctiticilor operei de modernizare intreprinse de pasop- tisti: fuziunea dintre modelul identitar al elitelor care au 90 si creat Statul romanesc modern gi tipul identitar al mase- lor faranesti a reprezentat un esec de proportit; comunita- tea {rneasca nu a putut fi transformata intr-o societa- te civila de cetateni, iar acest esec e responsabil de fap- tul c& masele, la noi, vor in continuare autoritarism si conducere carismatics. Printre temele populiste cu cel mai mare impact clectoral se numar atit dispreful faté de ,vorbaria” si_,ineficacitatea” parlamentarismului, cit si cererea de a ingradi initiativa privat, considerata afi ,anarhica” si_,sélbatica”, in limitele unui foarte pri- zat egalitarism al invidiei Pe linga unele dezavantaje, care sunt prea evidente pentru a le mai enumera, avantajele obiective ale unei anamuneze bazale pe leza modernila{ii epuate imi par a fi urmatoarele: (a) anamneza esecului, spre deosebire de anamneza nesansei, nu recurge la notiunea delicata de boala psihica a colectivitaii; (b) evita vulgata patrio- ticd a istoriei nationale; (c) in fine, focalizeaz sursa ca- tastrofei asupra noastra ingine gi ne face direct respon- sabili de acfiunile noastre. Doamnelor, Domnisoarelor si Domnilor, Inainte de a trage concluziile sub forma unui por- tret-robot al omului nou, va rog s8-mi permitefi s& fac un scurt rezumat al tezelor pe care le-am dezvoltat in fafa Dumneavoastra. Am sugerat la inceputul expune- rii mele ca simptomatologia paraginii romanesti de azi poate fi integrata unui diagnostic pornind de la doua tipuri diferite de anamneza istorica 1. Potrivit ananmezei nesansei istorice, azilul incoerent de indiferenfi, nebuni, abulici si borfasi cu care seama- n& azi Roménia a fost construit de sovietici si de acolitii lor interni, iar perfectiunea lui se datoreaz4 surprinde- 1Hi sufletului colectiv roman matoza ratata intr-un act de metenso- este rezultatul (ad it : m lesea in, Jetta Komaniei profunde” de a adopta ee identitar modern. Altfel spus, cauz trebuie cdutata in L Si ‘ Sus, cauza tr ie cAutat® face acceptabila Romaniei ¢ méniei liberale. Dacd. major Rese, azi, are instincte autorit Dar, indiferent de tez; * or ee] in privings nent de teza pe care afi dori si 0 adoptati P 7 uman respingai confine in form Si re a nis a lana ula sa sufleteasci niste mutatif narecans pice, pe care, in incheiere, as dori 2a ‘ar, dezle- in ined dori sa | le enum Bat de orice intenfie sistematic’, in fata Dumneavoasirs * nici o distrugere nj ‘ugere nu i se pare prea mare daca el rami. ne neatins; * gonsidera Casa Poporului o clidire in industria grea creata de N.C Imindrie patriotic; ae * deoarece resimte 0 fric& m: e simte o fric& maladiva de concurenta feehidere liber rede cdvom fin slewing vom izola temeinic de toti s e tmind asta ,independenta tari” gi spatringe ngage . asta ,independenta tari” si, patri : Promiscuitatea mizeriet il satisfaces nn POM’ mireats si vede "scu un motiv de 92 «© simte urd fats de prosperitatea vecinului gi fermen. tea’ in sine un resentiment social latent, cu atit mai riscolitor cu cit este de fapt indreptat impotriva tutu: ror; + urdste capitalismul si detest’ proprietatea privati a altuia; * se simte mereu inselat si dispretuit si * e capabil de indltare sufleteasca numai prin interme- diul locurilor comune, pentru care are un cult securi- zant; * lozincile il fac patriot, muzica tigdncasca il face 98 vi breze, toate actele politice ti par consecinta unui complot; * elitele intelectuale ii trezesc neincredere, detesta lu- , crurile de care nu e capabil si le dispretuieste pe cele © De care stie si le faci, motiv pentru care sfirseste prin ale face pe toate egal de prost; + e fascinat de violent&, adord cu urd cizma care il stri- veste, invidiaz’ ugurinta escrocilor de a extorca frau- dulos bani si * ii sustine politic numai pe cei care ii lingusesc defectele; * are o neintoarsa antipatie pentru partidele istorice i pentru Rege, iar pe definufii politici fi detest’ pentru ca, daca sunt vinduti americanilor, el nu stie cum s& se vinda acestora ca si primeasca la rindul lui bani, iar dacé nu sunt vinduti, ii detest’ pentru idealismul lor, care pe el, pentru c& e incapabil de idealism, i irita pina la violent; * in fine, crede ca politica inseamné ca Statul si le dea tuturor bani si nu cunoaste alti dusmani in afara de oamenii prosperi— in tara, si ungurii — in afara ei; * mai crede cé tara are nevoie de un voievod blind cu oamenii de bine si nemilos cu raii, ca partidele politi- ce sunt inutile, c& democratia inseamna dezordine iar libertatea delincvent’ si c¥, in general, * toti ar trebui trimigi la munca facut cu palmele, cici orice alta munca e parazitara 93Keyed nd y PUN, Ws Hehe salfit. To une git 8 lista pant lle 1 pout fh orient i identitara de Pe unt Prost disp ani leimi pare 3 inceputul conferinfei me. afin pling destagurare, amester inextriceb Poate fi pentru min este, in momenta ae eetingere si triumt eae noastrddevomany, © 8 I aja istry goog ae * fF nenoroc 10 istoric Despre noroe § Zeit Marin Preda a facut celebra expresia timpul n-a mai aout ribdare. Este 0 formulare deopotriva fericita si ‘exact’. Cred cu oarecare team ca exista intr-adevar in viatasfiec&ruia dintre noi un moment incepind de la care, din motive obscure, totul incepe si ne meargi de-a-ndoaselea. Anticii au atribuit geloziei zeilor aceas- 1a infoarcere-impotriva a destinului. Potrivit lor, zeii trebuiau periodic darnifi cu jertfe pentru a le abate aten- fia de la fericirea muritorilor prea norocosi. Din motive pe care imi este greu sa le limuresc acum, cred c& si nafiunile au momente de la care ince- pind timpul inceteazt sit mai aibd ribdare cu ele. Nu stiu daca gelozia zeilor este aceea care decide rasturnarea norocului sai, mai degraba, lucreaza aici iresponsabili- tatea, prostia, ingimfarea si egoismul celor care se in- timpla s4 fie in fruntea unei fri. Marx, Spengler si ,stiinta” Privind Ja istoria noastré de dupa 1848, sentimentul meu dominant este uimirea si entuziasmul. Aproape nu exista vreo dorintd romaneasca conceputa In viltoa- * ,Despre norot gi nenoroc in istorie", 22, anul VI, nr. 29 (283), 19-28 julie 1995, p13. e cs} creamer pat regret tt