Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Telecom Reform in India PDF
Telecom Reform in India PDF
elecom Refor
m:
Indiass TTelecom
Reform:
A Chronological Account
Series Editors:
Aasha Kapur Mehta, Pradeep Sharma
Sujata Singh, R.K.Tiwari
2006
Table of Contents
1
Introduction
Conclusion
15
Epilogue
16
Appendices
19
References
35
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ADC
IP
BICP
ISP
BSNL
IUC
CA
Certifying Authorities
MOC
Ministry of Communications
CCA
MOCIT
CDMA
CdoT
MTNL
COAI
NFAP
CMSP
NLDS
CPP
NTP
DEL
PCO
DoT
Department of Telecommunications
PSTN
DTS
RIO
FDI
SDCA
FICCI
SSA
TDSAT
TRAI
GSM
UASL
GOT-IT
USOF
HFCL
VSNL
WLL
ICICI
ICT
WPC
ILD
WTO
GMPCS
India
elecom Refor
m:
Indiass TTelecom
Reform:
A Chronological Account
Mahesh Uppal with S.K.N. Nair and C.S. Rao1
1
Introduction
The telecom sector occupies a special area of interest for
students and analysts of Indias economic reforms, because of the lead role it played in drawing private investment, the institutional changes that the process involved
and the dramatic results achieved in terms of availability
and access. A chronological recording of Indias telecom
reforms is invaluable for a complete understanding of the
tortuous reforms process and the clash of interests among
existing and new participants and mid-course policy corrections.
By end 2003, positive trends resulting from the reforms,
like accelerated growth in penetration levels and fall in tariffs, were already in evidence (see Tables 1 to 6). The level
of telephone penetration, which was less than half of one
percent in 1991, had increased to about 4 per 100 of population in terms of fixed line phones. (This growth index
has crossed 10, taking both fixed and mobile phone subscribers into account). However, the sharp increase in sub1
This study was conducted as part of the UNDP funded economic reforms programme under which the NCAER Centre for Infrastructure and
Regulation has been set up. Dr. Mahesh Uppal authored the main body of the report. The chronology and statistical tables accompanying it were
compiled under his supervision. He was assisted by Ms. Ramneet Goswami, Research Associate, NCAER Centre for Infrastructure and Regulation.
The introductory and concluding sections of the Report are contributed by S.K.N. Nair, Adviser, NCAER. Ms. Nandini Acharya, Research Associate
assisted with data and verification. The note on Information Communication Technology and Poverty Alleviation in Appendix II was written by Dr.
Ch. Sambasiva Rao, Associate Fellow, NCAER. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views
of GOI, UNDP or IIPA.
The TTelecom
elecom Policy Evolution: A
Background
Indias telecommunications reform programme has been
underway since the late 1980s when the governments
monopoly in manufacturing telecom equipment was discontinued. However, the more substantive reform was the
progressive deregulation of the services sector, from a situation where the Government of Indias Department of
Telecommunications (DoT) was the policy maker, operator and regulator, all in one. DoTs success in this role was
mixed. The network grew significantly, but in comparison
to most countries, India remained far behind with long
waiting lists and poor service quality.
Early attempts to reform the services were modest, with
the opening of some value-added services such as electronic mail, audio-text, etc., to private sector players. This
was followed by an attempt to allow private sector players to enter the mobile service sector. This exercise, and
the litigation that ensued, reflected the first signs of the
challenge that lay in ad hoc changes to telecom policy with-
Introduction
By early 1997, virtually all private cellular licensees had begun operations. Basic services, with only six licensees, were
slow to begin and were able to start operations only in
1999, because of delays and uncertainties occasioned by
disputes on licensing terms.
The High Court directed the matter be moved to the Telecom
Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), which had been set up
in early 1997. TRAI quashed the impugned order of the DoT.
In the proceedings before TRAI, the main argument offered
by DoT, which had only weeks ago helped set up TRAI, was
that the latter had overstepped its jurisdiction. This was to
become a pattern in its dealings with TRAI.
The situation was repeated a few months later. The Mahanagar
Telephone Nigam Ltd. (MTNL) announced its plans to start
mobile services in October of the same year and barely a
year after new private players had entered the mobile market,
following the auctions for cellular licenses, which forbade the
public sector to bid. MTNL and the government argued that
license documents had expressly retained the governments
right to enter the mobile centre.
Cellular Operators Association of India (COAI) moved
TRAI to challenge MTNLs right to provide cellular services on the grounds that its members were promised
duopoly rights.
TRAI in its judgement in February 1998 agreed that it was
the governments right to give licenses to operators, but
the bodys recommendations on need and timing were
required, before MTNL could be allowed to enter the
mobile market. MTNLs license or its terms were unavailable. TRAI refused to allow MTNL to provide mobile
service. Again, the government argued that TRAI had no
jurisdiction on the matter and moved the High Court.
A new set of issues emerged after private sector operations began in full swing. The operators faced huge costs.
In particular, the investments required to set up infrastructure were huge, as were the license fees bid by operators.
The entry costs for customers to use the service were low,
but charges paid by users to make and receive calls, were
Introduction
In 1998, there was bitter litigation between the government and private operators. A veritable whos who of Indian legal luminaries argued telecom cases in the Delhi High
Court . The government stand was upheld in the case of
MTNLs entry as well as in the claims of damages lodged
by the private operators.
In response to concerns of private operators and investors about the viability of their businesses, a high powered
government committee led by Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission was announced by the Prime Minister in
late 1998. The committee was asked to make recommendations for a new telecom policy and for resolving issues
facing basic and cellular operators.
The government group prepared a draft National Telecom
Policy in early 1999. The policy draft sought to address
many of these concerns. In a move unprecedented for
government processes in the sector, more reminiscent of
TRAI consultative processes, the document was made available on the Internet for wider feedback on the proposals.
The Prime Minister took charge of the Ministry of Communications in August 1999. A formal announcement of
the New National Telecom Policy (NTP-99) was made in
April 1999. The move to a revenue sharing regime from
the license fee commitments made by operators was now
official. Unlimited competition would be allowed in all
services except those, like mobiles, which were dependent
on spectrum availability. Technology restrictions were lifted.
The controversy over BSNL/MTNLs entry in cellular services ended by the document specifying that government
2
Key Regulator
Regulatoryy Issues
Convergence
The NTP-99 also spoke of the convergence of communications technologies and the need to have a policy that
could exploit it advantageously.
On August 11, 2000, the government received the draft
report of Sub-Group on Convergence. The group proposed a Convergence Law and suggested a common regulatory body for India for content and carriage, i.e., broadcasting and telecommunications. The report received a
mixed response from sector players and experts. This was
in part, because it did not, as it was perhaps not mandated
to do so, deal with the large number of extremely contentious licensing issues that would result during the move to
a converged policy environment in which carriage and
content would be treated in an integrated manner.
It was surprising to notice the relatively low profile manner in which the Information Technology Act 2000 was
passed. The Act gave legal sanctity to electronic transactions. It also created the office of Controller of Certification Authority (CCA) to regulate Certifying Authorities (CA)
who would assign digital signatures and other instruments
of authentication. The retiring Director of DoTs Centre
for Development of Telematics (C-DoT) was appointed
as the first CCA.
The Cabinet approved the Communications Convergence
Bill 2001 drafted by the committee. It also approved the
repeal of The Indian Telegraph Act 1885, The Indian Wire-
less Telegraphy Act 1933, Telegraph Wire Unlawful Possession Act 1950, The Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act 1995 and the Telecom Regulatory Authority of
India Act 1997. The Bill, ambitious in intent, was unprecedented in leaving no role for the government in licensing.
However, experts criticised it for being too general and
not dealing with transition arrangements as also with issues
relating to economic regulation. (The Bill was introduced
in Parliament and was also reviewed by a Parliamentary
Committee, but lapsed with the dissolution of the 13th
Lok Sabha before it could be made into law).
Related, indirectly at least, to the same issue of convergence, the government announced the merger of the Ministry of Information Technology (MoIT) and Ministry of
Communications (MoC) on December 22, 2001. The new
entity is now called the Ministry of Communications and
Information Technology (MoCIT). The merger, much
discussed and debated, brought together MoC and MoIT.
However, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting
was left out of this attempt at dealing with the convergence of communications technologies.
and the replacement of all but one members of the erstwhile body.
The first instance of the new reality was a review by TRAI
of the previous bodys recommendation, in late 1999.
TRAI had then asked the government to allow open entry,
in the national and international long distance services on
payment of a fixed fee. The review by the new body agreed
with the government view and favoured a limited number
(3) of players and auction for these licenses. The new recommendations were made three months after their taking
office in February 2000 and reversed those made less than
six months earlier. This was ominous.
A major dent in the credibility of a body that had accommodated the government position was to come just three
months later. The government itself did a somersault on
long distance licensing. In mid July 2000, the Prime Minister announced a decision that implied that the government
had chosen to accept the dissolved TRAIs recommendation on the subject, in toto.
More controversy followed and raised concerns about the
independence of the new TRAI. In November of its first
year, the body issued a consultation document laying the
grounds for the introduction of a limited mobility service
to be provided by basic operators in their Short Distance
Charging Areas (SDCAs) where local call rates apply. The
subject of limited mobility, provided using fixed line wireless infrastructure of basic service providers, had come up
about a year earlier. The government had told the regulator then that it considered such mobile services using a
handset unacceptable, since they would overlap with services of licensed cellular operators.
So there was widespread concern, especially among GSM
cellular operators, when TRAI, in November 2000, issued
a consultation paper on Policy Issues Relating to Limited
Mobility by use of Wireless in Local Loop Techniques in
the Access Network by Basic Service Providers. The consultation paper had argued that the limited mobility service using WLL (F) - WLL (M) for short-distances would
add value to fixed line services and provide cheap mobility to basic service users at fixed line prices. It argued that
8
The government immediately accepted TRAIs recommendations and issued guidelines for a new unified access service license (UASL) in November 2003. All fixed line operators paid fees for unified licenses shortly thereafter. The
action to enforce the scope of licensed limited mobility
services to SDCAs was left in abeyance till the decision to
unify the licenses was taken in November 2003.
Interconnection
Interconnection is one of the most problematic areas in an
environment with multiple operators competing with each
other. There is broad consensus in international regulatory
circles that new operators must be provided interconnection to an existing network at a price, which is cost based
and is provided in a timely fashion. In India, interconnection was a part of the license agreement that specified actual amounts, if any, that each party could charge the other.
This was a blessing in disguise.
The license agreement route to setting interconnection terms
meant that newcomers were saved most, though not all,
of the interminable wait and negotiation to connect to the
incumbents network when they needed to get their services off the ground. The disadvantage was, of course,
that the actual charges for interconnection in the license
agreements were in most cases without a known basis. In
addition, there was a tendency to confuse user tariffs and inter
operator tariffs, i.e., interconnection charges. Thus some relatively technical decisions became the subject of often uninformed debate and speculation. A case in point was the way
in which TRAI was made to revise its stand on the CPP regime for mobile services. The CPP regime was struck down
by the High Court when it was first instituted on the grounds
that TRAI had no right to revise provisions of a license agreement between an operator and the government.
TRAIs first intervention in this area was in November 1997
when a set of principles and methodologies to be followed were posted for discussion.
TRAIs first comprehensive tariff order in March 1999 stated:
Through this Order, the Authority also wants to send a
signal to investors in this sector about the direction of
telecom pricing reform, the main elements of which will
be: service providers, and through them customers, will
be provided enhanced flexibility for pricing and giving alternative tariff packages to customer.
On the need for tariff rebalancing the document went on
to say:
The Authority has considered the pros and cons of undertaking tariff re-balancing now. It came to the conclusion that tariff re-balancing cannot be achieved in one
step, and further that the first step in this regard cannot
be postponed if the policy of introducing private service providers has to succeed. In fact, the Authority believes that this should have been undertaken even before
introducing competition in this sector. The growth and
development of this sector will not be sustainable without this reform.
By this formulation, the Authority had set a clear agenda
for the sector.
The Authority faced immediate opposition from the Minister for Communications, who directed that the whole order be kept in
abeyance till further notice.
11
Spectrum Management
Spectrum availability in India is arguably a bigger issue these
days since mobile services that use wireless technologies had
little demand or indeed supply till 1995. Fixed line infrastructure was the more dominant mode of connectivity and the
need for spectrum was limited. The agency dealing with spectrum issues, i.e., Wireless Planning and Coordination (WPC)
has been criticised occasionally for its relatively outdated and
slow processes. However, its role has been less contentious
than that of DoT with which it has a looser connection.
WPC reports to the government through the member (Technology) Telecom Commission, but otherwise works relatively
independently of the DoT.
In the context of the telecom reform of the 1990s, the role
of the WPC started when mobile operators were first licensed. They each had 4.5 Hz of spectrum allotted to them.
In 1996, the Telecom Commission approved an increase
in frequency allocated in the 800/900 MHz band from 4.5
MHz to 6.2 MHz in the four metros, to accommodate the
rapid increase in cellular subscribers.
This was followed by a waiver by the government on
November 4, 1997 of an annual royalty charge of Rs. 1,200
per cellular subscriber with prospective effect. The waiver
was later (1999) applied with retrospective effect for the
period July 20, 1995 to August 27, 1997.
Mobile operators as well as some others have made several representations to the government in recent times, about
the small amount of spectrum available for services. The
13
Meeting a long pending demand for spectrum by cellular operators, WPC issued an order in February 2002 to
allocate additional spectrum to cellular operators. Rules
proposed for the additional allocation of spectrum included:
14
3
Conclusion
The absence of a well thought-out initial plan and strategy
comes through clearly as the main reason for much of the
problems that arose in Indias telecom reforms. This in
turn was linked to confusion with regard to three distinct
objectives - promoting new investment, efficiency through
competition and fiscal concerns - which influenced decision-making at various stages of the process.
The relationship between the DoT and the regulatory agency
introduced through reforms was another area of weakness
that contributed to uncertainties and delays. It is noteworthy
that clarity on the basic issues was eventually brought about
only through the recommendations of task forces and groups
(reporting to the Prime Minister) culminating in NTP-99.
But further problems cropped up on account of the entry of
new wireless-based technologies, in particular, the way this
entry was handled. This led to disputes and eventually to renegotiations of the terms of licenses already awarded for fixed
line and mobile services, a process that again turned out to be
messy. As a partial fall-out, moves towards consolidation
through mergers and acquisitions have also come about.
These developments notwithstanding, the process of reduction in tariffs was initiated by the regulator and was soon
15
4
Epilogue
Between December 2003 and December 2005, several further developments have taken place in the field of telecom
reforms, of which the important ones are dealt with below.
16
Epilogue
Opening of Inter
net TTelephony
elephony
Internet
and Further Liberalisation of
National Long Distance Services
In December 2005, the government also announced a virtually free entry, at a vastly reduced fee of Rs. 25 million, to
Indias long distance telephony services, both national and
international. Along with this came the removal of earlier
controls on Internet telephony, meeting a long-standing
demand. The removal of restrictions on Internet telephony
is likely to especially help future rural subscribers, since a
much larger proportion of their calls in long distance.
18
Appendix I
Chr
onology of Indian TTelecom
elecom Refor
m
Chronology
Reform
1990, December: A high level committee headed by Dr. M.
B. Athreya was set up to recommend the most appropriate
organisational structure for the management of telecom services in the country. The committee recommended that the
DoT be split into four corporate entities, value added services should be thrown open to competition by public or
private enterprises, co-operatives etc. Small entrepreneurs must
be encouraged in installation, cabling, closed user networks
and subscriber premises work, for greater efficiency and
employment generation. Importantly, policy and regulation
should be separated from operations.
1991-1993: The beginnings of private sector participation
in telecom services. The sub-sector of value added services was opened up to private investment in July 1992.
These included:
Cellular Mobile Radio Telephone
Radio Paging
Electronic Mail etc. services
1992, January 20: DoT invites technical bids for cellular
mobile telephone services in Delhi, Mumbai, Calcutta and
Madras.
1992, July: Value added services opened to private investment by DoT. These include e-mail, voice mail, 64 Kpbs
private data services, audio text and video text services,
radio trunking services, cellular mobile services, radio paging
services, and video-conferencing.
1992, October 12: The Minister of Telecommunications
announces the list of metro cellular licensees. The metro
1995, March 15: The Gupta Committee makes recommendations regarding the restructuring of DoT.
1996, November: DoT allows assignability of cellular licenses, meeting the demand of financial institutions.
1998, July 16: The Delhi High Court, holds that the power
of the government to grant or amend a license is not subject to the recommendation of TRAI, nor are these recommendations mandatory in nature.
1998, October 8: DoT announces extension of the cellular license period from 10 to 15 years for Circle operators.
1999, July 6: Union Cabinet clears the migration of existing licensees to NTP-99.
2000, May 15: Newly reconstituted TRAI revises recommendations on the opening up of national long distance
to private competition to suggest that the number of players be restricted to four in addition to the incumbent. Recommends bidding for licences.
1999, September 17: TRAI issues an order for the commencement of CPP for cellular mobiles from
1st October 1999.
tory body for India for content and carriage i.e., broadcasting and telecommunications.
2002, April 18: DoT issues notification for spectrum usage charges for microwave access and backbone.
2001, December 22: Ministry of Information Technology and Ministry of Communications merge to create
Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting left out.
2001, December 28: BSNL responds to the STD tariff
cut announced by IndiaOne (Bharti Telesonic) and announces
an even sharper cut of up to 62.5 percent in STD tariffs.
2002: Internet subscriptions cross one million.
2002, January 5: Minister of Communications approves
National Frequency Allocation Plan (NFAP) for optimal
utilisation of frequency spectrum.
2002, February: Tata acquires management control of
VSNL after the government sells the major part of its
stake in VSNL.
2002, February 20: TRAI submits recommendations on
introduction of Internet Telephony (IT).
2002, March 15: TDSAT rules that the introduction of
WLL (M) services is a policy decision of the government
and consequently not subject to review by the Tribunal. It
dismisses COAI petition seeking to prohibit fixed service
providers from offering any type of mobile services.
2002, March 21: ISPs allowed to provide the service on
payment of additional license fees. However, incoming IP
calls may not be terminated on the phone network.
2002, March 27: DoT issues guidelines on Universal Service
Obligation (USO). Announces the creation of Universal Service Obligation Fund (USOF) starting April 1, 2002.
2002, April 1: Opening of International Long Distance
service to competition; VSNL monopoly ends.
2002, April 5: TRAI issues consultation paper on Reference Interconnect Offer (RIO).
24
2003, July 16: TRAIs consultation paper on Unified Licensing for Basic and Cellular Mobile Services.
2003, August 8: TDSAT pronounces split (2 1) judgement on the legality of WLL (M). Majority decision of the
bodys two administrative members accepts WLL (M) service is legal, but says government decision to allow it was
taken in unseemly haste and further that TRAI should have
levied additional fees. Dissenting minority judgement (that
of the Chairperson of TDSAT, its only judicial member)
says WLL (M) service is illegal and that decisions were
taken for extraneous reasons.
2003, October 27: TRAI recommendations on WLL
(M) issues pertaining based on Honble TDSATs order
stipulate additional entry fees for WLL (M) players based
25
Appendix II
Infor
mation Communication TTechnology
echnology
Information
and Poverty Alleviation
Expert studies attribute the high incidence of rural poverty in India to:
(a) lack of proper income generating activities and opportunities in villages,
(b) Inadequate infrastructure facilities and
(c) Ineffectiveness of existing government agencies in the
fields of health, education, agriculture extension services etc.
Information and Communication Technology is a tool that
lends itself to addressing all the three areas, so as to realise
the goal of speedy alleviation of poverty.
Government programmes aimed at addressing rural poverty fall into three broad categories:
(a) Providing basic infrastructure in rural areas, e.g. setting
up new schools, health facilities, rural roads, drinking
water supply and electrification,
(b) Promoting rural industries, increasing agricultural productivity and providing rural employment and
(c) Policies aimed at providing productive resources that
in turn help raise the incomes of the poor.
Problems of design, implementation and monitoring and
overall inadequacy of resources undermine the effectiveness of these programmes.
On the design side, centralised planning leads to the same
policies being applied in different geographic areas with-
26
out taking into account variations in agro-climatic conditions, skills of rural population, access to social infrastructure and literacy levels. On the other hand, decentralised
planning also lacks effectiveness where it is not supported
by regional databases and tools for spatial planning.
With regard to implementation, problems are posed by a
multiplicity of agencies involved in the process. Lack of
co-ordination among different government departments
implementing such programmes dilutes the benefits derived at the grass root level. Lack of co-ordination is often
caused by want of reliable communication systems.
The other main hurdles of programme implementation are
the unwillingness of programme workers to stay in the field
and lack of proper supervision. The records maintained by
programme workers are suspect, because they are not updated through actual contacts with the target population.
Manual reporting systems have also been ineffective due to
the enormity of data, adding up to difficulties in monitoring
large programmes. These problems compound the inherent
drawback posed by inadequacy of resources.
Effective poverty alleviation strategies, on the other hand,
are characterised by micro level planning, effective supply
of credit to the poor, improved management of government run poverty alleviation programmes and building
networks of self-help groups amongst the rural poor with
the active involvement of local non-governmental
organisations. Grass root intervention is identified as a necessary factor of poverty alleviation.
Information Communication
Technology (ICT) as a TTool
ool for
Poverty Alleviation
Telephony provides the basic infrastructure for applications
denoted by the term Information Communication Technology (ICT), in particular, the use of Internet-based
programmes. ICT is now identified as a key element of poverty alleviation in rural areas. Five channels of ICTs impact on
rural poverty have been identified and discussed. These are.
i.
ii. Improves the Market Connectivity: ICT increases connectivity to the market that would facilitate the realisation
of economic benefits in terms of getting suitable prices
for rural produce and also creating employment opportunities. Market information on prices of agricultural outputs and inputs, as well as the consumer products required in rural areas, protects people from exploitation by middlemen. Industries located in rural
areas, or dependent on rural produce (such as sugar)
maintain the smooth, timely flow of inputs and in turn
meet market requirements of their output.
iii. Accountability and Good Governance: ICT facilitates better
monitoring of public administration, social services
and development programmes. Information has often been described as one of the most effective tools
in the hands of citizens. It not only helps them fight
corruption and arbitrary exercise of power in the structures of government, but also to participate in governance. Communication facilities help better governance
by fostering better relations between the public administration and citizens. Similarly cheaper governance
through replacement of paper by electronic means of
exchanging information can be achieved by communication facilities. Governance can also be made more
effective by reducing the response time of the government to local issues.
iv. Creation of New Income Generating Activities: ICT increases
productivity and extends the sphere of economic activity
in rural areas. Communication facilities, combined with
information technology, create new economic activities
and opportunities for the educated rural youth (e.g., as
tourist guides, ICT service centre operators, data processing professionals and content developers etc.). It also
increases the efficiency in performing existing activities
by reducing the costs of transactions and processes. Thus
the efficiency, especially of small business units in rural
areas, is increased with the use of ICT.
v
a. Basic Literacy and e-literacy: Basic education and knowledge of information technology among the rural
population are keys to exploiting the benefits of ICT.
b.
c.
f.
g.
Content, applications: Information on livelihood or direct earnings makes people flock to ICT facilities.
Therefore, applications of ICT that lead to income
generation are a must for inducing people to use ICT
facilities.
h. Process re-engineering: Various departments of the government need to undergo a considerable process
reengineering exercise to improve their own information processing methods and quality of services to introduce e-governance and citizen-centric services.
It can be observed that there is some overlap in the critical
success factors and complementary factors. Regardless of
classification, both sets of factors have a bearing on the
use of ICT facilities for poverty alleviation. It would also
28
to join the national socio-economic mainstream by providing internet connectivity and making the delivery of
citizen services efficient. In addition to Government to
Citizen services, CICs provide Internet access and e-mail,
printing, data entry and word processing and training facilities for the local population. An enlarged scheme that
would extend to the whole country has also been announced.
Another notable experiment done by the central government is the Community Information Centre (CIC) Project
that was started in January 2000 as a measure to speed up
economic development in the north-east region. The main
objective of the project was to help the north-eastern states
These facilities are bringing the remote and backward areas of the country closer to the national mainstream through
efficient and faster information flow. The issue of the
sustainability of these models in the long run has also been
experimentally tested.
29
Appendix III
Type B Circle
Type C Circle
Andhra Pradesh
Haryana
Assam
Gujarat
Kerala
Bihar
Karnataka
Madhya Pradesh
Himachal Pradesh
Maharashtra
Punjab
Orissa
Tamil Nadu
Rajasthan
North East
30
Bihar
33636
28803
0
332253
260261
209860
364662
26881
Himachal
Pradesh
Jammu and
Kashmir
Jharkhand*
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya
Pradesh
Maharashtra
North East-I
Orissa
67799
1113937
Haryana
North East-II*
450799
Gujarat
40638
108756
Assam
Chhattisgarh*
340241
91-92
Andhra
Pradesh
Andaman
& Nicobar
Circle/
Metros
80659
32384
431798
278156
305605
375043
31809
40658
129884
496762
131670
48742
379892
92-93
0
95742
41584
502692
350693
377805
434456
34378
47688
153227
576037
166059
60203
443170
93-94
116763
50271
610976
452657
436741
507995
41627
58697
195020
658224
203248
73653
509027
94-95
135401
58960
766734
541276
644003
527201
46610
80046
242028
780731
247316
86756
647305
3757
95-96
166415
75393
984698
622551
681234
783697
52598
110258
294514
915563
280431
107051
797326
5077
96-97
8272
98-99
399093
161531
428395
89362
181886
209996
100643
1290852
266098
116479
800784
717844 1529555
887572 1227683
1019176 1084019
72964
145505
357106
1130647 1292440
345711
139977
1000423 1167419
6818
97-98
334273
151595
941136
1874903
1464685
1355084
107863
225103
524565
1547828
502221
211906
1572399
15773
99-2000
Select TTelecom
elecom Statistics
423309
195396
1095952
2331793
1829400
1705139
130021
285130
642001
1921850
627400
273068
2227487
24463
2000- 01
526416
244670
1263118
2976906
2256555
2161583
173533
346891
794194
2398691
891796
338328
2838418
30076
2001-02
Contd...
641226
119930
169437
3643422
1145511
2690584
2586724
372533
222811
435642
983896
2833880
258196
756842
420942
3131544
33034
2002-03
31
32
154887
286632
329301
64257
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Uttar Pradesh
(East)
Uttar Pradesh*
(West)
Uttaranchal*
West Bengal
78550
482973
353875
233980
267330
95742
791222
898390
300634
699097
Mumbai
(MTNL)
274426
688830
All India
258882
Kolkata
(BSNL)
605272
208452
520562
Delhi
(MTNL)
186473
Total
174296
Chennai
(BSNL)
Metros
68806
390383
312559
183899
233827
80659
208294
Punjab
Total
67799
Table 1 Contd...
Orissa
8025586
2423318
1035569
335020
813850
238879
5602268
92049
542303
417564
309115
326338
116763
236358
534811
520852
906317
645138
745945
209996
314426
654547
686212
1165806
755560
890495
266098
415851
809464
872897
1523415
927005
1083964
334273
3395691
1440785
445514
1167010
342382
4379756
1782181
618385
1511130
468060
4581634
1855629
672278
1551111
502616
5131756
2012410
852598
1641503
625245
159181
416645
393284
671412
494410
570966
166415
2869999
1240618
380407
966940
282034
6925305
113145
658593
524308
393738
427397
135401
742905
1220249
1400258
2477366
1326286
1543449
526416
992849
311753
1147714
1674579
2779709
1591284
1923014
641226
6476446
2347302
1229637
1979856
919651
6831419
2428183
1312532
2065803
1024901
5828608
2213388
1029121
1818236
767863
541131
994004
1106574
1926967
1109400
1292252
423309
Local PCOs
Trunk PCOs
1993
100,526
20,436
41,391
61,827
1994
117,416
21,384
57,119
1,781
80,284
1995
143,002
87,543
2,010
89,553
1996
161,424
116,532
2,694
119,226
1997
184,291
157,333
3,554
160,887
1998
210,495
213,385
4,060
217,445
1999
243,052
272,989
4,639
277,628
2000
287,994
355,390
5,567
360,957
2001
361,196
490,505
8,374
498,879
STD/ISD PCOs
Highway PCOs
Total2
Trunk PCOs have been merged into Local PCOs after 1994
Totals of PCOs with STD facility
Source: Indian Telecommunication Statistics 2002
1.
2.
No. of
DELs (Supply)
(Million)
Annual
Growth
(Percent)
Waiting List
(Million)
Total Demand
(Supply +
Waiting List)
(Million)
Annual Growth
Total
Demand
(Percent)
1991
5.07
10.6
1.96
7.04
11.6
1992
5.81
14.5
2.29
8.1
15.1
1993
6.8
17
2.85
9.64
19
1994
8.03
18.1
2.5
10.52
9.1
1995
9.8
22.1
2.15
11.95
13.6
1996
11.98
22.3
2.28
14.26
19.3
1997
14.54
21.4
2.89
17.43
22.3
1998
17.8
22.4
2.71
20.51
17.7
1999
21.59
21.3
1.98
23.58
15
2000
26.51
22.8
3.68
30.19
28.1
2001
32.44
22.3
2.92
35.35
17.1
2002
37.70
16.2
1.69
39.39
11.4
2003
40.75
8.1
1.81
42.56
8.1
2004
43.23
6.1
1.79
45.02
5.7
33
(Rs.in Millions)
1993
1994
1995
1996
Inflow
21
161
2,228
9,876
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
84,806 95,621
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Number
185,136
216,632
267,832
310,687
340,640
374,605
408,922
468,862
514,287
521,468
1997-98
Mobile
Phones
794,232
1998-99
1,070,603
150,000
1999-00
1,599,364
350,000
2000-01
3,107,449
650,000
2001-02
5,478,932
1,130,000
2002-03
10,480,430
1,699,000
2003-04 (Sept.)
18,306,142
2,942,000
Year
Source: www.coai.com,
2.
Source: www.exhange4media.com
1.
34
Internet
Subscribers
25,000
References
Asian Development Bank (2001) Information and
Communication Technology (ICT) Strategies for Developing
Countries, Executive Summary of Proceedings, 21-27 February,
Singapore.
Bhatnagar, S., and Schware, R. (eds.)(2000) Information and
Communication Technology in Development: Cases from
India, Sage Publications.
Department of Information Technology (2005) E-Governance:
Driving the Vision of the NCMP, Vision & Approach,
Presentation made at 8th National e-Governance Conference,
3rd-5th February, Bhubaneswar, India.
Hanna, Nangy K. (2003) Why National Strategies are Needed for
ICT-Enabled Development, ISG Staff Working Paper, No.3.
35