Analysis

April 14, 2015

Summary: Turkey and Kurdish

politicians are too far committed
to the Kurdish peace process to
easily backtrack on it. Strategic
calculations account for the
continuation of the process
on both sides. The fact that
the process has overcome
many challenges illustrates its
resilience and the resoluteness
of the parties. Nevertheless,
there are still a number of
factors that have the potential
either to terminate or delay it.
Regional developments, the
electoral performance of the
pro-Kurdish HDP, the overall
election atmosphere and parties
calculations about it, and
divergent conceptualizations of
the place of the process in the
debate on a new constitution
and political system are the
main potential spoiling factors.
Successful completion of the
process necessitates the actors
involved work toward overcoming
these factors.

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Kurdish Peace Process: From Optimism

to Uncertainty and Whats Next?
by Galip Dalay
Introduction
The Kurdish peace process has experienced some momentous developments, both negative and positive,
in recent times. On one hand, the
process has appeared to be on the
verge of collapse. At no other time
since the process was initiated in
the closing days of 2012 had its fate
seemed as dim as it was during the
ISIS siege of Kobane (a Syrian Kurdish
town bordering Turkey), especially
between September - November 2014.
The waves of protests to protest both
Turkeys inaction and the so-called
Islamic State group that rocked the
country during this time resulted in
more than 50 deaths.
Likewise, since the initiation of the
process, a rare clash occurred on
April 10, 2015, between the PKK
and Turkish armed forces. Each side
offered their own account of the
events, with different numbers of
fatalities and wounded. Government
officials and the pro-Kurdish representatives have accused each other
of insincerity, sacrificing the peace
process for electoral gains. This recent
incident is testing the resilience of the
process and resolve of the actors.
On the other hand, both government
officials and representatives of the

Kurdish side, starting in December,

spoke of a conclusive deal in a matter
of months. For the first time, the sides
sat together in front of cameras on
February 28, 2015, to declare that the
process had reached a critical phase.
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader
Abdullah calan called upon the PKK
to convene an extraordinary congress
to lay down arms, not a mere truce
or withdrawal outside Turkey, and
the government indicated its willingness to reciprocate with commensurate legal and political action. In this
meeting, pro-Kurdish Member of
Parliament Sirri Sureyya Onder read
aloud calans ten-point letter, which
the Kurdish side hoped would form
the basis of negotiations between the
government and the Kurdish Movement.
For its part, the government seemed
to give its consent to the establishment
of a third-eye monitoring committee
to oversee the negotiations, which
has been a long-standing demand
from the Kurdish side. Soon after
these developments, President Recep
Tayyip Erdoan publicly expressed
his disapproval of the meeting, of
the reading aloud of calans letter
in the presence of government officials, and of the establishment of a
monitoring committee. In response,

Analysis
pro-Kurdish Peoples Democracy Party (HDP) members
levelled scathing criticism at Erdoan. The scope of their
criticism was not confined only to Erdoans recent remarks,
but to his overall role in the political system. Such stern
exchanges dispelled built-up optimism. A review of this
whole period reveals the main components of the foreseen evolution of the process: regional developments and
political calculations geared toward the upcoming general
elections. Regarding the latter, it is not only about what
results the parties expect from the elections; it is also about
to what extent the Kurdish movement will be capable of
transforming its political identity from a pro-Kurdish one
to that of a left-wing political party appealing to a broader
segment of society in Turkey, and whether the ruling Justice
and Development Party (AKParty) will muster sufficient
support not only to continue with its single-party governance but also to change the political system from parliamentary to presidential.
Election Atmosphere: The Political Context
of the Acrimonious Exchanges
Turkey has already entered an election period, which
has its own unique dynamics. Given the decisive nature
of this election for both the governing AKParty and the
pro-Kurdish HDP, it is obvious that the peace process
will not be smooth until Turkeys elections are finished.
Instead of ringing alarm bells, one needs to put the
language of the peace partners into this broader electoral
context. The government needs to make a distinction
between an aspiring left-wing opposition party and the
political wing of the Kurdish national movement, which
is the partner in Turkeys desired grand peace plan. The
left-wing oppositional side of the HDP is pitted fiercely
against the governing AKParty, as it looks for ways to
pass the 10 percent election threshold to enter parliament
by situating itself as the party most adamant in opposition to Erdoans presidential ambitions. This side of the
partys politics was made clearest when HDP Co-Chairman
SelahattinDemirta delivered the shortest parliamentary
group speech of the day on March 17 by declaring Mr.
Erdoan, as long as HDP supporters exist in this land,
you will never fulfil your ambition of becoming executive
president...1 Moreover, the HDPs election results will have
1 In Turkey, all parties represented in the parliament hold a parliamentary group meeting
every Tuesday. This meeting serves as a platform for the party leader to deliver a lengthy
speech on the political and economic developments of the previous week.

The government needs to make

a distinction between an aspiring
left-wing opposition party and
the political wing of the Kurdish
national movement, which is the
partner in Turkeys desired grand
peace plan.
a significant impact on the peace process. If it passes the 10
percent election threshold, it will have even greater motivation to pursue the successful completion of the process. Yet
if it remains below the threshold, pursuing further peace
talks might not be its post-election priority. It will have
an internal debate on its future political course, which in
return may cause some temporary setbacks and delays.
Nevertheless, even in this scenario, the Kurdish Movement
is unlikely to abandon the negotiation table.
A similar distinction needs to be made by the Kurdish
political movement as well. They recognize that the
AKParty is their best option for a negotiating partner, and
for the foreseeable future the only option, for a political
and peaceful settlement of the Kurdish issue. On the other
hand, the AKPartys ambition to win the next election with
a majority that will facilitate the continuation of its singleparty rule overrides its concern to keep the Kurds happy in
the short run. This is especially true for Erdoan. He sees
this election as a hurdle that needs to be overcome in order
to bring Turkeys real decision to the table: a vote to change
the political system from a parliamentary to a presidential
system. In this regard, he sees the support of the nationalist
constituency essential. It was the support of this constituency that made it possible for Erdoan to win last Augusts
presidential elections in the first round. This accounts for
Erdoans recent nationalist rhetoric.The increasingly fiery
language of the actors, therefore, need to be understood
within the framework of the upcoming local elections. Once
the election fever is over, the need for such a language will

Analysis
dissipate and the process is likely to gain new steam after
the elections, unless Turkey heads for a referendum on the
change of political system. As long as this is recognized as
such and managed accordingly, it is unlikely to yield any
major negative repercussions for the process, other than
causing some delays in the mid and long term.
Peace, a New Constitution, and a Change of Political
System, or the Other Way Around?
This political context may explain increasingly acrimonious exchanges between the Kurdish and the government
sides (including the president), but it does not completely
account for the divergent positions taken by the government and president vis--vis recent developments. The
presidents public critique of some of the governments
planned steps in the process, such as setting up the monitoring committee, has been a point of friction. There are
a multiplicity of factors that account for Erdoans reactions, but two factors seem to play the primary roles.
First, such interventions intend to demonstrate who the
ultimate decision-maker in Turkey is, irrespective of his
positions constitutional power and role. Second, Erdoan
appears to want to establish an unbreakable link between
the final settlement of the Kurdish issue, the adoption of a
new constitution, and the switching of the political system
from parliamentary to presidential. He disapproves of the
detachment of these three elements from each other. Speedy
advances in the peace process ahead of the real debate on
Turkeys political system will weaken the argument in favor
of the presidential system, since one of the main pro-presidency arguments has been that it will be more effective in
dealing with Turkeys major issues, such as Kurdish issue,
than the parliamentary one has been.
In contrast, the government is also conscious of the fact
that the settlement of the Kurdish issue requires the adoption of a new constitution, yet it does not seem to regard
the changing of the political system as an essential element
in the peace process. Depending on the composition of the
parliament after the election, such divergent views might
prove inimical to the further advancement of the process
when the debates begin on the adoption of a new constitution and introduction of a new political system. Moreover, this will beg the question as to who has the ultimate
authority to decide on the evolution of the peace process.
Such a divided executive authority is likely to bode ill,

Speedy advances in the peace

process ahead of the real debate
on Turkeys political system will
weaken the argument in favor of
the presidential system.
especially if this divided executive authority couples with
a divergent conceptualization of the place of the peace
process in the broader debate on the adoption of a new
constitution and changing of political system. In this case,
the peace process will suffer a setback.
Regional Context: The Make or Break Point
Since the commencement of the Arab Spring, the PKK has
heavily invested political capital in the Kurdish part of Syria,
more popularly known by its Kurdish name, Rojava. The
PKK does not regard Rojava as a separate case; rather, it
views the area as intrinsic to its regional strategy, including
its political calculations vis--vis the peace process. Hence,
developments in Syria function as a make or break point for
Turkeys Kurdish peace process. This point was conspicuously confirmed when the Kurdish Movement initiated
waves of protests on October 6-8, 2014, which resulted in
the deaths of more than 50 people and brought the whole
peace process to the verge of collapse. This dimension
requires a more thorough examination to come in a future
On Turkey series piece.
All in all, Turkish and Kurdish politicians are too far
committed to the Kurdish peace process to easily backtrack
on it. Strategic calculations account for the continuation of
the process on both sides. The fact that the process has overcome many challenges illustrates its resilience and the resoluteness of the actors. Nevertheless, there are still a number
of factors that have the potential either to terminate or
delay it. Regional developments, the electoral performance
of the pro-Kurdish HDP, the overall election atmosphere
and parties calculations about it, and divergent conceptualizations of the place of the process in the debate on a new
constitution and political system are the main potential

Analysis
spoiling factors. To avoid the above-mentioned delaying
and terminating factors, in the aftermath of the election,
the government should establish the third-eye monitoring
committee, release sick prisoners (another demand of the
Kurdish side), make some gestures of good will towards
Rojava, and swiftly undertake other legal/political steps.
To reciprocate, the PKK should convene its disarmament
congress and implement what it has declared that it will do,
which is lay down arms and terminate the armed struggle
against Turkey. These steps will dispel the current uncertainty surrounding the process and once again put it on
solid ground.

The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the

views of the author alone.

About the Author

Galip Dalay works as a research director at the Al Sharq Forum and
is a senior associate fellow on Turkey and Kurdish affairs at the Al
Jazeera Center for Studies. He previously worked as a visiting fellow at
the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin
and as a political researcher at SETA Foundation in Ankara. He is
book-review editor of the quarterly magazine Insight Turkey. In addition, he is blogger for Huffington Post.

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