Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PALS Political Law
PALS Political Law
B. Parts
C. Amendments and revisions
In General (Art. XVII):
By Congress as Constituent Assembly
Gonzales v. Comelec (1967)
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for
the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be
held on the same day that the general national elections shall be held. Gonzales challenged the propriety
of the act.
The SC upheld RA 4913. Congress has legislative power which is plenary in nature but the power to
amend the Constitution is not included. The power to amend is within the constituent power of the
people. The Congress possesses constituent power as it is a delegation of the people of their constituent
power.
By Constitutional Convention
Imbong v. Comelec (1970)
The 1971 Constitutional Convention Act was enacted by Congress acting as a legislative body. Imbong
challenged its constitutionality. The SC upheld the act. The power to enact the implementing details of the
Constitutional Convention -- as opposed to the exclusive authority of Congress as a Constituent Assembly
to call for the ConCon -- is within the competency of Congress exercising its comprehensive legislative
power, as long as the statutory details do not clash with any specific provision in the Constitution.
Congress continued to exercise its legislative powers even if it was already the Constituent Assembly and
it did not abandon its legislative duties.
By Peoples Initiative
Santiago v. Comelec (1997)
Republic Act No. 6735 provided for the system of initiative and referendum for local legislation and
national statutes, without providing for initiative for the amendment of the Constitution. A petition was
filed to amend the constitution regarding term limits. However, the SC held that the constitutional
provision on people's initiatives under the 1987 Constitution (Article XVII 2) required implementing
legislation to be executory. R.A. 6735 lacked the implementing rules for people's initiatives and such lack
could not be cured by Comelec providing rules. Congress also could not delegate its legislative authority
to Comelec, so Comelec could not validly promulgate rules on the matter as it was not empowered to do
so under law.
D.
E.
F.
G.
Separation of powers
Checks and balances
Delegation of powers
Forms of government
1. De jure v. De Facto
2. Presidential v. Parliamentary
3. Unitary v. Federal
District Representatives
Reapportionment
and
questions
on
Apportionment
and
Constitutional Provision
Meaning
Requirement
CREATION,
DIVISION,
MERGER,
ABOLITION,
ALTERATION
OF
BOUNDARY OF LGUs
Article X, Sec. 10
Concerned
with
commencement,
termination,
and
modification of an LGUs
corporate existence and
territorial coverage
criteria established in
Local
Government
Code
population of at least
250, 000 shall have
one representative.
Result
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT
No legal personality
Purpose:
representation
Approval
by
a
majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in
the political units
affected
LOCAL GOVT UNIT
Political subdivision
Can discharge govt
functions
Has political and
economic effects on
inhabitants
Has own IRA; can
generate
own
revenue
Following the Constitution, the total number of seats allocated to party list is in reference to the
seats for representatives of legislative districts. The combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party-list. This ceiling is provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(2).
10
11
However, the SC held that Martinez and Bautista were not covered by the privilege. Parliamentary
immunity granted to the members of the legislature and the Constitutional Convention was never meant
to shield them from criminal liability, only to protect them from possible harassment. Any privileges
extended to the legislature should not harm the State. Immunity from arrest does not cover any
prosecution for treason, felony and breach of peace. Here, petitioners are charged with felonies; hence,
the immunity does not apply to them.
Speech and Debate
Jimenez v. Cabangbang (1966)
Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National
Defense. He caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the Philippines, alleging that there
were plans to hold a coup dtat. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang for damages due to the
Cabangbangs libellous statements. In response, Cabangbang invoked the parliamentary immunity from
suit.
The SC held that he was not entitled to the privileges. The expression "speeches or debates herein" in Art.
VI 15 (1935 Constitution) only refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their
official functions, such as speeches (sponsorship, interpellation, privilege uttered in Committees or to
Congress in plenary session), statements and votes cast while Congress is in session, as well as bills
introduced in Congress. It also includes other acts performed by the same either in or out of
Congressional premises while in the official discharge of their duty when they performed the acts. It does
not include acts not connected with the discharge of their office.
12
The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 that allowed the Mayor of Olongapo City to be
appointed as Chairman of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority was challenged on the ground that it
violated the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other
government posts.
The SC agreed and declared the provisions unconstitutional. Art. IX-B 7 of the Constitution expresses
the policy against concentrating several public positions in one person, so that a public official may serve
full-time with dedication and efficiency. While the provision allows appointive officials to hold multiple
offices within limits, par. 1 for elective officials is more stringent in not allowing exceptions unless the
Constitution itself says so. While the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains
throughout his tenure/incumbency, the official may resign first from his elective post to cast off the
constitutionally-attached disqualifications. The respondent does not automatically forfeit his elective
office when he is appointed to another position.
Quorum and Voting Majorities
Avelino v. Cuenco (1949)
Senator Taada invoked his right to speak on the Senate floor to formulate charges against then Senate
President Avelino. However, Avelino and his camp employed dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall
Taada from delivering his piece. Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder.
13
Avelino banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately followed by his
followers.
The remaining members voted to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the
Senate. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate
President. This was unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippines
the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding
before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President.
On the issue of quorum, the SC held that as there were 23 senators considered to be in session that time
(including Soto, excluding Confesor), twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three
senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, the
House does not mean all the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute the House.
There is a difference between a majority of all the members of the House and a majority of the House,
the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of
the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at
least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt about Quorum then,
and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for
Cuenco, one against and one abstained
Discipline of Members
Osmea Jr. v. Pendatun, et al. (1960)
Congressman Osmea Jr made a privilege speech entitled, A Message to Garcia, in which he accused
Garcia of corruption. A Special Committee was formed through House Resolution 59, to investigate and
discipline Osmea. Osmea asked for the annulment of the resolution on the ground of infringement
upon his parliamentary immunity through a petition for declaratory relief.
The SC denied his petition. The rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation,
modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded
by the legislative body.
14
The SC ruled that it did not have the power to inquire into allegations that Congress failed to comply with
its own rules while enacting a law when no constitutional provision or rights of private individuals were
violated. Within the limits of constitutional restraints, fundamental rights and a reasonable relation
between the means of proceeding and the intended results, all matters of methods for internal
procedures are open to the determination of the House and cannot be subject to judicial inquiry. There
was no grave abuse of discretion, only a matter of internal procedure.
Garcillano v. House Committees (2008)
A legislative inquiry was carried out regarding the Hello Garci tapes in relation to election fraud. The
propriety of the legislative inquiry was challenged based on the non-publication of the Senate rules of
procedure in accordance with Art. VI 21.
The SC struck down the proceedings for lack of publication of the rules. It would be an injustice if a citizen
is burdened with violating a law or rule he did not get notice of. It consists of publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines (Civil Code Art. 2) and the law
shall only take effect 15 days after said publication. Publication via the Internet alone is considered
invalid since the provisions state that the rules must be published in the OG or in a newspaper. According
to RA 8792, an electronic document serves as the functional equivalent of a written document for
evidentiary purposes. Thus, it does not make the Internet a medium for publishing laws, rules, and
regulations.
The rules must also be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of 12 Senators as it is a
continuing body independent of the Senate before it, and its own rules state that they expire after every
Senate.
Santiago v. Sandiganbayan (2001)
Defensor-Santiago was preventively suspended by the SB for 90 days in accordance with RA 3019. She
assailed the SBs authority to do so, claiming contravention of Art. VI, Sec. 16(3) which provides for
suspension only for 60 days max.
The SC held that the SB had the authority to suspend Santiago. Suspension in Art VI, Sec. 16(3) is different
from preventive suspension under RA 3019, Sec. 13. Preventive suspension is not a penalty and thus is
not a suspension under the purview of the Constitution.
15
House-imposed sanction
Penalty for disorderly behavior to enforce discipline, maintain order in proceedings
or vindicate honor and integrity
o RA 3019, Sec. 13:
Prevent accused from influencing witnesses
Prevent tampering with documentary evidence
Prevent committing further crimes while in office
Sessions
Regular Sessions
Special Session
Restrictions
Adjournment for more than 3 days
As to venue
Emergency Sessions
Vacancy in Pres/ VPres office
Ability of President to discharge powers and duties of office
Presidential proclamation of martial law or suspension of habeas
corpus
Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments
Powers of Congress
16
the public agency to apply it. With this standard, the executive or administrative agency designated to
carry out the legislative policy may promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
General Plenary Powers
Legislative Power
Substantive Limitations
Express Substantive Limitations
Bill of Rights
Appropriations
Taxation (infra)
Public Money in a Special fund
Increase of appellate jurisdiction of the SC without its advice
and concurrence
Granting title of royalty or nobility
Implied Substantive Limitations
Delegation of legislative powers
Criterion of valid delegation
Law fixes a standard, the limits of which are determinate and determinable to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions
Undue delegation of legislative power
17
sufficiently precise standard to avoid the violation. The phrase as the public welfare may require is
so overbroad that it rests in the President a virtually unfettered discretion that is tantamount to a
delegation of legislative power. For the President to create municipalities will be for him to exercise the
power of control over local government units denied to him by the Constitution.
Proper delegation by express authority of the constitution
Delegation to the president to fix tariffs, rates, etc.
Garcia v. Executive Secretary (1992)
EO 475 (reducing the rate of additional duty on all imported articles from 9% to 5% according to their
value, except for crude oil and other oil products which continue to have a 9% additional duty) and E.O.
478 (which laid a special duty on imported crude oil and oil products) were constitutionally challenged.
The SC upheld the validity of the EOs. Under Art. VI 24 of the Constitution, the enactment of
appropriation revenue and tariff bills is within the province of the legislative and not the executive
branch. Art. VI 28(2) allows Congress to authorize the President to fix within specific limits, among
others, tariff rates and other duties. There is explicit constitutional permission to allow the E.O.s to be
issued. The Tariff and Customs Code also laid down sufficiently determinate benefits for the valid
delegation of legislative power.
Delegation to the President in times of war or national emergency
Delegation to Local government
Delegation of power to carry out defined policy to prescribe standards
Rafael v. Embroidery Board (1967)
RA 3137 (creating an embroidery and apparel control and inspection board and providing for a special
assessment to be levied upon all entities engaged in an amount to be fixed by the Board) was
constitutionally challenged for being an undue delegation of legislative power.
The SC upheld the law. Article XVI 4 (2) sets a reasonable basis under which the special assessment may
be imposed. The true distinction between delegation of power to legislate and conferring of authority as
to the execution of the law is that the former involves a discretion as to what the law shall be, while in the
latter, the authority as to its execution has to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
Osmea v. Orbos (1993)
PD 1956, which empowered the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve the increase of fuel prices or
impose additional amounts on petroleum products which proceeds shall accrue to the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was established to reimburse ailing oil companies in the event of
sudden price increases. The decree was challenged on the ground of undue delegation of legislative
powers to the ERB.
18
The SC upheld the PD. The provision conferring authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on
petrol products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. The standard to
which the delegate of legislative authority has to conform may be implied from the policy and purpose of
the act, not only spelled out specifically. The challenged law sets forth a determinable standard that
governs the exercise of power granted to the ERB.
Promulgation of Internal Rules and Regulations
Prohibition Against Passage of Irrepealable Laws
Procedural Limitations (see part on Legislative process for more detail)
Oversight
1. Congressional Scrutiny
2. Congressional Investigation
3. Legislative Supervision
Question Hour (Art. VI, Sec. 22)
Legislative Investigations
Arnault v. Nazareno (1950)
A legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong
estates was undertaken. During the Senate investigation, one witness, Arnault, refused to reveal the
identity of the representative of the vendor to whom he delivered money, at the same time invoking his
constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution holding Arnault in
contempt and ordered him imprisoned in the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned. Arnault
petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus.
The SC did not issue the writ. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of
the legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer
any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject to his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The question subject of the refusal for which the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is
pertinent to the matter under inquiry. It is not necessary for the legislative to show that every question
addressed to a witness is material to any proposed legislation, but it is required that each question be
pertinent to the matter under inquiry. If the subject of investigation before the Committee is within
legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness relates to the subject, obedience
to the process may be enforced by the Committee by imprisonment. The power to hold a non-member of
Congress in contempt is a power necessary to enable Congress to perform its function without
obstruction. Therefore, the Court finds no sound reason to limit such power which has already been
recognized as an appropriate auxiliary power of Congress.
19
20
is vested as a collegial body as co-equal branches of government. For 1, the requirement for Presidential
consent is limited only to appearances of department heads in the question hour but not in inquiries in
aid of legislation unless a valid claim of privilege is made by the President or Executive Secretary.
Although some executive officials hold information covered by executive privilege, there can be no
implied claim of executive privilege thereby exempting some officials from attending inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress has a right to know the reasons behind the claim of executive privilege before an
official would be exempt from the investigation.
Act as Board of Canvassers for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections
Call special election for President and Vice-President
Revoke or extend suspension of privilege of writ of habeas corpus and
declaration of martial law
Approve presidential amnesties
Confirm certain appointments
Cf. Commission on Appointments (Art. VI, Sec. 18)
Concur in treaties (Senate)
Bayan v. Zamora (2000)
The VFA was challenged on the ground of Art. XVIII 25 on military bases in the Philippines.
The presence of U.S. Armed Forces in the Philippines pursuant to the VFA is allowed under Art. XVIII 25
for 2 reasons:
1. The VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the U.S.
since it was attested and duly certified by a U.S. government representative. That it was not submitted for
advice and consent of the U.S. Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international
agreement/treaty recognized by the U.S. since it is a matter of internal U.S. law, where the U.S. submits to
its Senate policymaking agreements for advice or consent, while those that further implement these
policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress within 60 days of ratification.
2. Joint R.P.-U.S. military exercises fall under the provisions of the earlier R.P.-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty
of 1951 that was signed and duly ratified with both countries senates concurring; the VFA is simply an
implementing agreement to the main Military Defense Treaty, so it was not necessary to submit it to the
U.S. Senate, but only to its Congress. This is why the U.S. certified it as a binding international agreement
(treaty) that substantially complies with Art. XVIII 25.
21
6.
22
The SC upheld the Act. Commonwealth Act 567 was not purely an exercise of taxing power but was an
exercise of the police power, since tax was levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for
rehabilitating and stabilizing the threatened sugar industry. It is rational that the tax be taken from those
who will benefit when it is spent. It is inherent in the power to tax that a state is free to choose who to
tax.
Tan v. Del Rosario (1994)
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of RA 7496 (Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme)
amending certain provisions of the NIRC and RR No. 2-936 promulgated by respondent pursuant to RA
7496.
The SC upheld the RA. The contention that RA 7496 goes against the constitutional requirement that
taxation be uniform and equitable ignores that such a system of income taxation where single
proprietorship and professionals be taxed differently from corporations and partnership had long been
the prevailing rule. Uniformity of taxation merely required that all subjects of objects of taxation
similarly situated were to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities and did not discount
classification as long as:
the standards are substantial making real differences;
the law applies, ceteris paribus, to both present and future conditions; and
23
24
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications
privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized
in Philippine jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational
proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos
Cabinet. And,
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege
and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Aside from these, other executive privileges include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
25
The SC upheld the decision. However, while it was correct to rule that the payment of compensation was
not allowed, the prohibition against multiple offices was not interpreted to apply to posts of executive
officials in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law as required by the primary function of their office
and without additional compensation. The term ex-officio referred to authority derived from official
character, not merely conferred upon the individual character but rather annexed to the official position.
However, since the position is an actual and legal part of the principal office, it followed that the official
concerned had no right to receive additional compensation for services in the same position since the
services were already paid for by the compensation attached to the principal office.
Powers and Functions of the President
Executive Power
Power to execute laws
Ople v. Torres (1998)
AO 308 was issued, adopting a national computerized identification system. Ople challenged the AOs
constitutionality.
The SC struck down the AO. Executive power to enforce and administer the laws into practical separation
is vested in the President. As Chief Executive, the President is also granted administrative power over
bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively. Administrative
power is concerned with the work applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
constitutional organs. However, the administrative order should be issued in relation to specific aspects
in the administrative operation of the government. It should not impair citizens rights and privileges or
impose a duty on them, and must not substitute for general policy-making that Congress enact as laws.
Power of Appointment
In general
Sarmiento v. Mison (1987)
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of the
Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed
the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.
The SC upheld the appointment. Positions to be filled by the President by appointment are divided into 4
groups:
1) heads of executive department, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in the Constitution,
2) all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law,
26
27
The Chief Executive may delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not
command that he perform in person. The President is not expected to perform in person all the
multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary
unit which assists the President.
Buklod ng Manggagawang EIIB v. Executive Secretary (2000)
President Corazon Aquino created the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to primarily
conduct anti-smuggling operations in areas outside the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In the year
2000, President Estrada issued an order deactivating the EIIB. He subsequently ordered the employees of
EIIB to be separated from the service. Thereafter, he created the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force
Aduana, which EIIB employees claim to be essentially the same as EIIB. The employees of EIIB, through
the Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, invoked the Supreme Courts power of judicial review in questioning the
said orders. EIIB employees maintained that the President has no power to abolish a public office, as that
is a power solely lodged in the legislature; and that the abolition violates their constitutional right to
security of tenure.
The SC upheld the reorganization. As a general rule, the power to abolish an office is lodged with the
legislative. However, the Presidents power of control may justify his deactivating the functions of a
particular office or certain laws may grant him the broad continuing authority to carry out reorganization
measures for reasons of economy and productivity.
c. Supervision of Local Governments and Autonomous Regions
Pimentel v. Aguirre (2000)
President Ramos issued AO 372 The Adoption of Economy Measures in Government for FY 1998, which
required LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% for their authorized regular appropriations of nonpersonal services. Subsequently, President Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section 4 of AO 372 reducing
to 5% the amount of the internal revenues allotment (IRA) to be withheld from the LGUs. The
constitutionality of the directive to withhold 10% of this IRA is challenged for being in contravention of
Section 286 of the Local Government Code and of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, providing the
automatic release of its share in the national income revenue.
The SC upheld Section 1, which directed the LGUs to reduce expenditures, as being part of the Presidents
supervision over local government. Supervision is meant to oversee, while control meant to power to
alter what a subordinate has done and substitute ones judgment. The Chief Executive wields no more
authority than that of checking whether local government were performing their duties as provided by
Constitution and statutes. But LGUs continue to be agents of the national government.
28
However, Section 4, which withheld 5% of the IRA from LGUs was struck down for being
unconstitutional. It is a basic feature of local government autonomy that their share of the IRA should be
automatically released.
Military Powers
IBP v. Zamora (2000)
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Art. VII, Sec. 18 of the Constitution, President Estrada,
in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
The SC upheld deployment of the Marines. Calling out armed forces is discretionary power solely vested
in the Presidents wisdom but the matter may be reviewed by the Court to see whether or not there was
grave abuse of discretion
Here, the deployment of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian
law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the
Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render
logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military
authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP
does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious
incursion of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Article XVI, Sec. 5(4) of the
Constitution.
Lansang v. Garcia (1971)
Two hand grenades were thrown at a Liberal Party caucus in 1971, killing 8. Pres. Marcos issued PP 889
which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail
the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al. were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for
interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al. questioned the validity of the suspension of the privilege of
the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites
The SC found that there was valid basis for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The requirements for such a suspension are:
1. Invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof
2. Public safety requires the suspension.
Here, the existence of the New People's Army is proof of rebellion regardless of how small it is.
The absence of any other incident after the bombing is not proof of lack of rebellion.
29
30
Pardoning Power
a. Nature and limitations
b. Forms of Executive Clemency
Diplomatic Powers
a. Contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans
b. Deportation of undesirable aliens
Residual Powers
Marcos v. Manglapus (1989)
Imelda Marcos wanted to return home from Hawaii. Her return was prevented by Pres. Aquino. She
invoked her rights to travel and abode.
The SC upheld the decision to prevent her from returning to the Philippines as an exercise of the
Presidents residual powers. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor
judicial has to be executive. The President's residual power is for protecting people's general welfare,
preserving and defending the Constitution, protecting the peace, attending to day-to-day problems. Even
the Resolution proposed in the House urging the President to allow Marcos to return shows recognition
of this power. Residual powers are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty to safeguard and
protect general welfare.
Powers relating to appropriation Measures
Delegated powers
Veto power
C. Rules on Succession
a. Constructive Resignation
b. The Vice President
c. Right of Succession and Membership in Cabinet
Estrada v. Desierto (2001)
After the events of EDSA II, whereby President Estrada left Malacaang and Gloria Arroyo was sworn in
as President, Estrada filed a petition for prohibition to enjoin the Ombudsman from proceeding with any
cases against him and to declare him to still be the incumbent president.
31
The SC denied the petition, holding that Estrada had constructively resigned, because both elements of
resignation were present, namely:
1. Intent
2. Acts of relinquishment (calling for snap election in which Estrada would not be a candidate, listening
to Pimentel's advice for resignation, negotiation for peaceful and orderly transfer of power, declaring
his intent to leave without anything about reassuming the presidency, etc.)
As for prosecution of cases against him, resignation or retirement is not a bar to prosecution. Neither was
there a pending impeachment case when he resigned; if this were a bar to a criminal prosecution, then he
would be perpetually immune. Finally, Congress has already recognized Arroyo as the new President, and
so the decision can no longer be reviewed by the Court.
32
V. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Concepts
Judicial Power.
33
34
35
Judicial Restraint
Appointments to the Judiciary
Supreme Court
En banc and division cases
Procedural Rule-making
Administrative Supervision over Lower Courts
36
37
immediate suspension and control over national and local officials or employees, including members of
any national and local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government, required by law to
perform duties relative to the conduct of elections.
Daza v. Singson (1989)
The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting in a political realignment in the
lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew
the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber
elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of the original members except Daza who
was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned such replacement on the ground that the LDPs reorganization
was not permanent and stable.
The SC disagreed. The LDP has been existing for more than one year and its members include the
Philippine President, and its internal disagreements are expected in any political organization in a
democracy. The test that the party must survive a general congressional election was never laid down in
jurisprudence. The Court ruled in favor of the authority of the House to change its representation in the
CoA to reflect at any time the permanent changes and not merely temporary alliances or factional
divisions without severance of loyalties/formal disaffiliation that may transpire in the political
alignments of its members.
Guingona v. Gonzales (1992)
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the Senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKASNUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To fulfil the requirement that each party must have a
representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political
party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators elected. The result of the computation under that formula was
that 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LPPDP-LABAN would be part of the COA. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from
their party; he rounded 7.5 up to 8; and decided that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the
same party in the CoA. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged
that the compromise is against proportional representation.
The SC agreed that the proposed membership was unconstitutional. The proposed scheme does not
comply with the requirement that 12 senators be elected on the basis of proportional representation of
the political parties in the Senate; to disturb the resulting fractional membership of political parties in the
CoA by adding together 2 halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation
since it gave the LDP an added member by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political
party, which is deprived of representation.
Instead, the correct rule is that in Coseteng v. Mitraa political party must have at least 2 senators in the
Senate to have a CoA representative.
38
39
40
The constitution of the Philippine Islands guarantees to every citizen his liberty and one of his liberties is
the liberty to contract. The law would deprive Pomar and all other entities employing women of the said
liberty, without due process of law.
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (1919)
Rubi filed a petition for habeas corpus after he and the rest of the Mangyans of Mindoro were relocated
by the Government. The SC did not grant the petition. It held that the relocation of non-Christians was a
valid exercise of the police power.
NDC and AGRIX v. Phil. Veterans (1990)
PVB attempted to foreclose a mortgage of Agrix, but the latter company invoked PD1717, rehabilitating
Agrix and declaring all its obligations cancelled and its mortgages extinguished. The SC struck down the
PD. There was not a sufficient public interest involved. The cancellation of the obligations was violative of
due process, because it extinguished property rights and impaired contracts.
Balacuit v. CFI, 163 SCRA 182 (2 Bernas 41) C2 (1988)
The Municipal Board of Butuan City issued Ordinance 640 to address the complaint of parents that it is
too financially burdensome for them to pay the full admission price for their children. The Ordinance
provided that admission tickets for movies, public exhibitions, games, contests, and other performances,
should be sold at half the price for children between 7 and 12 years of age. Violators would be penalized
with imprisonment and/or a fine.
The SC ruled that Ordinance 640 is an invalid exercise of police power and, as a consequence, it violates
the due process clause of the constitution. A valid exercise of police power requires that it should be for
(a.) the publics interest, (b.) the means employed should be reasonable and it should not be oppressive.
Here, the court did not find a tangible link between the ordinance and the promotion of public health,
security, morals, or welfare. Furthermore, the means employed were judged to be unfair since they
unjustly prejudice the affected businesses by restraining their right to trade and even violating their right
to enter into contracts.
Agustin v. Edu, supra.
The proposed measure to compel each vehicle to supply reflective safety devise is a valid exercise of
police power, it having been issued in order to protect public safety.
Ople v. Torres, supra.
The proposed national ID system violates the right to privacy of each individual, as it does not safeguard
the information therein contained.
White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, supra.
The prohibition against quick-time stays in hotels is unconstitutional, being violative of due process and
the right to privacy. While upholding morals is a valid state purpose, there are other purposes for renting
a hotel for less than 5 hours. As an unreasonable means towards a valid end, the ordinance is
unconstitutional and void.
3. Constitutional and statutory due process
4. Hierarchy of rights
PBMEA v. PBM (1993)
The Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization carried out a mass demonstration at Malacaang
on March 4, 1969 in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police department, against the wishes of
41
the PBM management. PBMEO was found guilty of bargaining in bad faith and its officers were ordered to
be dismissed.
The SC did not agree. The demonstration was not a strike; it was an exercise of their rights to engage in
concerted activities for ... mutual aid or protection." Thus, the companys action constituted as
interference to their right to engage in concerted activity. While it is true that PBMs right to property
was infringe, such rights must be weighed against the human rights of the workers. In the hierarchy of
rights, human rights outweigh mere property rights.
5. Judicial standards of review
6. Void-for-vagueness doctrine
D. Equal protection
People v. Vera (1937)
Cu Unjieng applied for probation after being convicted by the trial court in Manila. Judge Tuason of the
Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office (IPO). The IPO denied the application.
However, Judge Vera upon another request by Cu Unjieng allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The
City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because
it is in violation of Sec. 11 of Act No. 4221 which granted provincial boards the power to provide a system
of probation to convicted persons. Nowhere in the law is it stated that the law is applicable to a city like
Manila.
The SC struck down the law for being unconstitutional. The provincial boards are given absolute
discretion which is violative of the Constitution and the doctrine of the nondelegability of power. Further,
it is a violation of equal protection provided for in the Constitution. The challenged section of Act No.
4221 means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system
of probation within their locality. This would mean that convicts in provinces where no probation officer
is instituted may not avail of their right to probation.
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City (1968)
The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing on any and all productions of
centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to
one per centum (1%) per export sale to USA and other foreign countries. Payments for said tax were
made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. The company filed before the CFI of Leyte a
complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor alleging that the
ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity
of taxation.
The SC ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The equal protection clause applies only to persons
or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation,
subject to the Cayat requisites. A perusal of the requisites shows that the questioned ordinance does not
meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
and none other. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central for the coverage of the tax.
People v. Cayat (1939)
Cayat was fined for possessing A-1-1 gin in contravention of the statute prohibiting non-Christian tribes
from possessing liquors aside from native wines and liquors. He challenged the statute on the ground of
violation of equal protection.
The SC held Act constitutional, as there was a valid distinction. This case laid down the classic requisites
for reasonable classification, namely
1. It must rest on substantial distinctions which make real differences,
2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law
42
43
warrant was issued, none of the articles in the warrant were found. Rather, a Colt Magnum and 18 live
bullets were found, which are now the bases of the charges against Roan.
The warrant was void for absence of examination of the applicant. Even consent to the search cannot cure
the invalidity of the warrant. As a result, the evidence gathered thereby is inadmissible. The plain view
rule does not apply here. The weapon did not just appear. It was searched for by the authorities.
Valmonte v. Villa (1989)
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to
Letter of Instruction (LOI) 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP. As part of its duty to
maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. Valmonte et al. sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere
as unconstitutional.
The SC upheld the LOI. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela may be
considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Between the inherent
right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a
warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
Aniag v. COMELEC (1994)
In preparation for the 1992 national elections, COMELEC issued a resolution ordering a gun ban and the
summary disqualification of candidates found to be engaged in gunrunning, using/transporting firearms,
etc. Due to this, petitioner was asked by the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Reps to surrender the
firearms issued to him by such office. Petitioner ordered his driver, Arellano, to deliver the firearms to
the Batasan Complex. However, the PNP already set up a check-point about 20 meters from the Batasan
entry. The car was searched, the firearms seized and Arellano was detained (but later released for his
meritorious sworn explanation. Petitioner Congressman then went to the Office of the City Prosecutor to
explain that the driver was just returning the firearms and that Arellano was neither a
bodyguard/security officer. However, COMELEC still ordered the filing of Information against petitioner
and his driver.
The SC ruled that the search and seizure was invalid. It may be valid even if not authorized by authority,
provided that the search conducted at police or military checkpoints which we declared are not illegal
per se, and stressed that the warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the
vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle
is merely limited to a visual search. Also, a warrantless search could only be resorted to if the officers
have probable cause to believe BEFORE the search that either 1) the motorist was an offender or that 2)
the evidence related to the crime will be found in the vehicle searched.
1. Concept
Guazon v. De Villa (1990)
Guazon and the other petitioners claimed to be victims of saturation drives held by the military and
police. The SC held that the saturation drives were unconstitutional, for having infringed on the right
of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures.
2. Warrant requirement
a) Requisites
44
45
46
deprives him of his right to free speech and information, since posting/placing such material or
property expresses his political views or the candidates he believes in.
US v. Bustos (1918)
In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, then prepared
and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging the
justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for
his removal. The complainants charged that the justice of the peace solicited bribe money in
consideration of favorable decisions. Criminal action was filed against the petitioners, charging that
portions of the petition presented to the Executive Secretary were libelous.
The SC acquitted Bustos et al. Express malice was not proved by the prosecution. Good faith
surrounded the action of the petitioners. Their ends and motives were justifiable. The guaranties of a
free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the
law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit
subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as
any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled.
In Re: Jurado (1995)
Emil Jurado is a columnist-lawyer who wrote several articles about improper transactions in the
judiciary. CJ Narvasa issued an administrative order creating an ad hoc committee to investigate
corruption in the judiciary. Jurado was one of those invited to appear before the committee and to testify
as to his knowledge as he had a lot to say about the topic in his columns. He refused. Some of the subjects
of his writings also wrote to the SC saying that what he wrote were lies and asked the Court to take
appropriate action.
Doctrine: False reports about a public official or other person are not shielded from sanction by the
cardinal right to free speech enshrined in the Constitution. Even the most liberal view of free speech has
never countenanced the publication of falsehoods, specially the persistent and unmitigated dissemination
of patent lies.
a) Prior restraint (censorship)
Franciso Chavez v. Secretary Raul Gonzalez (2008)
After the 2004 National Elections, a controversy came out after cassette tapes that allegedly recorded
conversations involving PGMA and Garcillano went on air. Given that such conversations were being
aired all over broadcast media, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye and the NTC, on separate occasions, issued
warnings against broadcast companies to stop airing such information. Chavez asked that such warnings
be declared null and void for violating freedom of speech, expression, and the press. The Court agreed
with the petitioner given that the warnings, which were content-based restrictions, failed to pass the
strict scrutiny standard and the clear and present danger test. The evidence of the respondents fell short
of satisfying such standards required.
People v. Perez (1923)
Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, met with Ludovice, and during their discussion said
The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad
thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence." Leonard Wood was the Governor-General of
the Philippine Islands. He was convicted of sedition.
The SC upheld the conviction. A seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the rights of the
Filipino people and on American sovereignty. Perezs words were seditious. Criticism, no matter how
47
severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, but
when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech
and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the
prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the Constitution and the laws, and the existence of the
State.
Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans (1985)
Radio station DYRE, owned by Eastern Broadcasting, filed a petition to compel the respondents to reopen
the station after it was summarily closed on grounds of national security. It was allegedly closed on the
charge that it was used to incite sedition. No hearing was held and no proof was submitted to establish
the factual basis for closure.
While the case became moot and academic upon the withdrawal of EBC, the SC issued certain guidelines
for similar circumstances:
1. The seven requisites of administrative proceedings in Ang Tibay v. CIR should be followed before a
broadcast station is closed or its operations curtailed.
2. While there is no controlling and precise definition of due process, it furnishes an unavoidable
standard to which government action must conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty, or
property, in each appropriate case, may be valid.
3. Media is entitled to the broad protection of freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for
limitations on freedom of expression is the clear and present danger rule that words are used in
such circumstances and are of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
4. Broadcasting has to be licensed. The freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser
in scope than print media. This is because (1) broadcast media is more pervasive, and (2) easily
accessible to children. Because of its pervasiveness, the impact of inflammatory or offensive speech
on people would be difficult to monitor or predict. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio (and
television) audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze, and reject the utterance.
5. The clear and present danger test must take the particular circumstance of broadcast media into
account. There has to be a balance between the governments right to be protected against broadcasts
which incite listeners to overthrow it, and the peoples right to be informed.
6. The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy.
7. Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and
freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution. (Sec. 1 and Sec. 4, Art. III).
SWS v. COMELEC (2001)
SWS and Kamahalan Publishing seek to enjoin COMELEC from enforcing Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair
Election Act) which prohibits the publishing of election surveys 15 days before the election of national
candidates and 7 days before the election of local candidates. The petitioners wish to publish surveys
covering the entire election period and argue that the resolution violates their right to free speech and
expression. The SC held that the resolution is invalid as because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though
such suppression is only for a limited period, and that (3) the governmental interest sought to be
promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
b) Subsequent punishment
2. Content-based and content-neutral regulations
a) Tests
b) Applications
48
49
circumstances of the case and that the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense
of the community reached by it."
3. Facial challenges and the overbreadth doctrine
4. Tests
5. State regulation of different types of mass media
6. Commercial speech
7. Private vs. government speech
8. Hecklers veto
H. Freedom of religion
1. Non-establishment clause
Aglipay v. Ruiz (1937)
Gregorio Aglipay, the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, filed for a writ of prohibition
against Juan Ruiz, Director of Posts, to stop him from selling postage stamps which commemorated the
33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Catholic Church in Manila. Petitioner alleges
that this violates the Constitutional provision prohibiting the use of public money for the benefit of any
religious denomination. The Court denied the petition. The Director of Posts acted by virtue of Act No.
4052 which appropriated 60,000 pesos for the cost of printing of stamps with new designs. The stamps
themselves featured a map of the Philippines. The governments goal was to promote the Philippines.
There was no religious goal. The proceeds of the sale of the stamps also went to the government and not
to any church.
Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos (1994)
The officers of a civic organizationSamahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikaylaunched a fund drive to
renovate the chapel of Bgy Tikay in Malolos, Bulacan. Chairman Martin Centeno and Vicente Yco
approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles and solicited P1500 from her. This was done without a license
from the DSWD. Angeles filed a complaint, and because of that, an information was filed against Centeno,
Yco, and Religio Evaristo for violating Presidential Decree 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law.
On the infringement of religious freedoms, the SC discussed the dual nature of legislation on the subject
of religion. On the one hand, it prevents the compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed. On the
other, it protects the free exercise of any chosen form of religion. Thus, there are two constitutional
freedoms regarding religionthe freedom to believe and the freedom to act on the basis of ones belief.
While the former is absolute, the latter can be subject to regulation for the protection of society.
In this case, the state may protect the public from fraudulent solicitation by requiring those who solicit to
establish identity and authority to solicit. Even though the regulation resulting from such a policy may
infringe religious acts, it is not invalid because the general regulation protecting citizens from unjust
solicitation is not open to any constitutional objection.
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union (1974)
Victoriano is a member of Iglesia ni Cristo who is an employee at the Elizalde Rope Factory, and a
member of the Elizalde Rope Workers Union. The company and the union are in a closed shop agreement
where all employees must be a member of the collective bargaining union in order to maintain
employment. RA 3350 was passed which states that CBAs shall no longer cover members of any religious
sects which prohibit affiliation in any labor organization. The union assails the constitutionality of RA
3350 because it infringes on the right of association, impairs contracts and discriminates in favor of such
members of religious sects. The Court upheld the constitutionality of RA 3350 because (1) the Union
misread the law, which actually does not prohibit association, but only reinforces a persons right to
refrain from association, (2) the right to religion is superior over contractual rights, and (3) the
50
government may pass laws in pursuit of a valid secular cause even though this may be beneficial to some
religions.
American Bible Society v. City of Manila (1957)
American Bible Society (ABS) is a nonstock, nonprofit, religious missionary corporation distributing and
selling bibles/gospel portions in the Philippines. ABS was informed that it has to comply with Ordinance
No. 3000 (obtain a mayors permit) and Ordinance No. 2529 (pay municipal license fee for the period
covering 1945 to 1953 and amounting to 5, 821.45). ABS paid in protest and filed a case to declare said
Ordinances void and to seek a refund. Trial court dismissed case. SC ruled that Ordinance 3000 is valid as
it merely requires a mayors permit. Ordinance 2529 is also valid but cannot be made to apply to ABS
because such license fee constitutes a restraint in the free exercise of religion. The constitutional
guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right
to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right could only be justified like other
restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is clear and present danger of any
substantive evil, which the State has the right to prevent.
Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent (1993)
Petitioners in this consolidated petition are high school and elementary students from Cebu who were
expelled for not participating in the flag ceremony of their schools. They are represented by their parents.
As Jehovahs Witnesses, they consider the flag as an idol which, according to their religion, should not be
worshipped. They believe that the flag ceremony is a form of worship which is prohibited by their
religion. Respondents counter by invoking RA 1265, Department Order 8 and the ruling of Gerona v.
Secretary of Education which upheld that all students should participate in the flag ceremony. The Court
reversed the Gerona ruling and ruled in favor of the petitioners. Expelling them based on their religious
beliefs would be a curtailment of their right to religious profession and worship and their right to free
education.
Iglesia Ni Cristo v. CA (1996)
The Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) operates a TV program titled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo. The Board of Review for
Motion Pictures and Television classified such program as rated X, being not fit for public viewing as it
offends and constitutes an attack against other religions. The SC held that INC is protected by Art. III, Sec.
4 of the Constitution. The Board failed to show any imminent or grave danger that would be brought
about by the telecast of the show. Also, the show itself is not an attack against, but rather a criticism of,
other religions. Such ground (i.e., criticism) is not a valid ground in order to prohibit the broadcasting of
the show. SC also affirmed MTRCBs power to regulate these types of television programs citing the 1921
case of Sotto v Ruiz regarding the Director of Posts power to check as to whether or not publications are
of a libelous character.
German v. Barangan (1985)
German et al. converged at JP Laurel Street in Manila to hear mass at the St. Jude Chapel, which is near
Malacaang. Respondents Barangan and Lariosa blocked them, saying that (1) their actions show that
they are not there to hear mass, but to stage a demonstration, and (2) the security of President Marcos is
of utmost concern. Petitioners filed a case, saying that Barangan and Lariosa impaired their constitutional
freedom to exercise religion. The SC held that this freedom is not absolute. Good faith is required to
validly exercise this freedom, and the facts show that the petitioners are not exercising good faith. Also, if
the freedom clashes with a social or national interest, which in this case is the safety of the President,
then the former must yield to the latter. Hence, the petition was dismissed.
51
52
53
must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups, 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and
reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for purposes of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations
having the same purpose and their successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not the person.
Membership of these organizations to be unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired with the intent
to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. Thus it is the element of membership with
knowledge that is punishable. Further, the statute is prospective in nature.
PBM Employees v. PBM, supra.
A demonstration against the abuses of police is protected as an exercise of the right to peaceably
assemble to petition the government for redress of grievances.
JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing (1983)
JBL Reyes, in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a permit to rally from Luneta Park
until the front gate of the US embassy. Manila Mayor Bagatsing denied the petition. The mayor claimed
that there had been intelligence reports that indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless
elements. He thus issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within a 500-meter
radius of the US embassy.
The SC struck down the ordinance. While under international law, the receiving state is tasked with the
protection of foreign diplomats from any lawless element, and while the Vienna Convention is a
restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law, the same cannot prevail over the
Constitutional rights to free speech and to peaceably assemble.
L. Eminent domain
People v. Fajardo (1958)
Fajardo was convicted for violating an ordinance which penalized the construction of a building that
destroys the view of the public plaza. The SC struck down the ordinance, ruling that it is unreasonable
and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own
property; thus, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property
without just compensation.
Republic v. PLDT (1969)
The BOT is a government arm engaged in the operation of telecommunication services in the country by
utilizing such facilities as may be available in the area. After its creation, the BOT set up its own
Government Telephone System (GTS) by renting the trunk lines of PLDT. BOT entered into an agreement
with RCA Communications (a telecommunications company in the US with a domestic station in the
Philippines), associate of PLDT, for joint overseas telephone service whereby BOT would convey overseas
calls received by RCA to local residents. PLDT complained to the BOT that it violated their agreement
since the trunk lines were used not only for the use of government offices but even to serve the general
public in competition with the business of PLDT. When plaintiff failed to reply, PLDT disconnected the
lines rented by plaintiff. The plaintiff commenced suit against PLDT to execute a contract for the use of
the facilities of PLDT's telephones system under such conditions as the court may consider reasonable.
The SC held that: The state, may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership
upon payment of just compensation; there is no reason why the state may not require a public utility to
render services in the general interest provided just compensation is paid.
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
a) Foreign laws
2. Application
3. Immunity statutes
T. Involuntary servitude and political prisoners
US v. Pompeya (1915)
An ordinance was passed, in accordance with Act 1309, requiring every able-bodied male resident of the
municipality of Iloilo to render service on patrol duty. Pompeya was convicted for refusing to render such
service. The SC upheld Act 1309 and the ordinance, holding that the power exercised under the
provisions of Act No. 1309 falls within the police power of the state and that the state was fully
authorized and justified in conferring the same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that,
therefore, the provisions of the said Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation of the
rights of the persons affected thereby, in accordance with the time-honored obligation of the individual to
assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his community.
62
elements of estafa are not present. Furthermore, she contended that no person should be imprisoned for
non-payment of a loan of a sum of money.
The court held that the judge committed grave abuse of discretion. Serafin did not commit any offense as
her debt is considered a simple loan granted by her friends to her. Under the Constitution she is
protected from imprisonment.
W. Double jeopardy
1. Requisites
People v. Obsania (1968)
Obsania was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of Balungao. His counsel moved
for the dismissal of the charge for failure to allege lewd designs in the information. Said motion was
granted. From this order of dismissal, the prosecution appealed.
The SC held that there was no double jeopardy in this case. In order that the accused may invoke double
jeopardy, the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution
a)
b)
c)
d)
valid complaint,
competent court,
the defendant had pleaded to the charge,
defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
Here, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Court judge upon the defendant's motion to
dismiss. The doctrine of double jeopardy does not apply when the case is dismissed with the express
consent of the defendant. The dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense
because his action in having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or
privilege for the reason that he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and
rendering a judgment of conviction against him.
People v. Relova (1987)
The People of the Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an
information for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the
petitioners motion for reconsideration. Opulencia was charged under a Batangas ordinance for installing
illegal electric wiring devices. The case was dismissed. Two months later, he was charged for theft of
electricity under the Revised Penal Code. The Court dismissed the complaint on the ground of double
jeopardy.
The SC held that double jeopardy had attached in this case. The Bill of Rights gives two instances or kinds
of double jeopardy. The first would be that No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense and the second sentence states that If an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance, the
conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the same act. In the case at bar, it was evident
that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the second kind or definition of double jeopardy
wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. It further explains that even if
the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that the first charge constitutes a violation of an
ordinance and the second charge was a violation against the Revised Penal Code, the fact that the two
charges sprung from one and the same act of conviction or acquittal under either the law or the
ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other, thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy.
2. Motions for reconsideration and appeals
3. Dismissal with consent of accused
63
64
VIII.
CITIZENSHIP
65
The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the same
time to forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers, and thereby
obtain efficiency and prevent disposition. However, the maxim of delegatus non potest delegari or
delegate potestas non potest delegari is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of
powers. With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency
toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the
court.
Manila Electric Company v. Pasay Transportation Company, Inc. et al. (1932)
In question is the validity of Section 11 of Act No. 1446 which provided that members of the Supreme
Court shall sit as a board of arbitrators in cases where any franchise or right of way is granted to any
person or corporation other than an original grantee.
The members of the Supreme Court cannot sit as a board of arbitrators to resolve disputes between
public utilities. The issue is not whether or not there has been a delegation of legislative authority to a
court but rather whether or not the members of the Supreme Court have the legal right to sit as a board
of arbitrators and act in such capacity.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our
government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as
the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other
department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers
expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members
should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty
not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions.
66
67
The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. Congress may delegate
to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details of the execution of the law. For such
to be valid, the law must be complete in itself and it must fix a standard to which such delegate must
conform in the performance of his duties.
Edu v. Ericta (1970)
The Reflector Law and the administrative order issued to implement it were assailed as an undue
delegation of legislative power.
To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be
directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its
functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what the scope of his authority is.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that
the legislature itself determined matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy.
Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor and Employment (1981)
FTWU alleged that the delegation to the Minister of Labor and Employment the power and discretion to
assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration to the NLRC constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power.
The regulations made to implement a legislative policy should be germane to the purpose of the law and
the regulation should not be in contradiction with it, but conforms to the standards that the law
prescribes. The strict non-delegation rule enunciated in People vs. Vera may be considered too rigid and
inflexible, especially for the social and economic legislation needed by the times.
PHILCOMSAT v. Alcuaz (1989)
NTC which was granted by EO 19 with the jurisdiction, control and regulation over PHILCOMSAT reduced
PHILCOMSATs rates by 15%.
In the delegation of rate-fixing power of the legislature, the only standard which the legislature is
required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and
just. EO 546 which created the NTC limited it by the requirements of public safety, public interest,
reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a
valid delegation of legislative power.
Chiongbian v. Orbos (1995)
RA 6735 gave the President the power to merge the regions that did not opt to join the ARMM. Thus,
through an Executive Order, the President reorganized the cities and the provinces which did not opt to
join the ARMM, into new regions. The law was assailed to be an undue delegation of legislative power
because it does not provide a standard for the exercise of any power delegated.
A legislative standard need not be express. It may simply be gathered or implied, and may be embodied in
other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation. The standard for the power to
68
merge existing regions is also to be found in RA 5345 giving the President the power to reorganize the
Executive department to promote simplicity, economy, and efficiency in the government.
ABAKADA v. Ermita (2005)
A proviso in the VAT Reform Act states that the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12% is at issue on the
ground that it constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers to the President.
The proviso is constitutional. There is only a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement/administration of the 12% increase is contingent. While the power to tax cannot be
delegated to executive agencies, details as to the enforcement/administration of an exercise of such
power may be left to them, including the power to determine the existence of facts on which its operation
depends.
Permissible delegation
a. Ascertainment of fact
Lovina v. Moreno (1963)
RA 2056 was assailed to be unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications with sweeping, unrestrained, final, and unappealable authority to pass upon the issues
of whether a river or stream is public and navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such waters and is
constitutive as a public nuisance, and whether the law applies to the state of facts.
RA 2056 does not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works.
The mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply
the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may
affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers.
b. Filling in of details
Alegre v. Collector of Customs (1920)
Act 3263 which created and empowered the Fiber Standardization Board to determine the official grades
of Philippine fibers, and which imposed a limit on exports of fibers without certification by the Fiber
Standardization Board was assailed to be unconstitutional on the ground that it was an invalid delegation
of legislative power.
The power delegated to the board was merely to enforce the intent and purpose of the law. The
legislature itself could not grade, inspect, and bale the hemp, and so the Fiber Standardization Board was
properly vested with the administrative power to do so and embody the purpose and intent of the law.
69
70
Issuances must remain consistent with the law. EO 41 was very explicit, requiring nothing more than a
simple application of its provisions.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. CA (1995)
DAR issued an administrative order permitting the opening of trust accounts or the earmarking of a sum
by the LBP, in lieu of depositing in cash or LBP bonds in an accessible bank designated by DAR the
compensation for the land taken under RA 6657.
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 explicitly provided that the deposit must be made in cash or through LBP
bonds. Compensation cannot be made through earmarking or the establishment of a trust fund. The
power of administrative agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary
to this, administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment. Settled is the
rule that administrative regulations must be in the harmony with the provisions of the law.
GMCR v. Bell Telecommunications (1997)
NTC is a collegiate body, requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the commission in order
to validly decide a case. Corollarily, pronouncements issued solely by the Chairman/Commissioner are
contrary to law. Administrative regulations derive their validity from the statute that they were intended
to implement. They must not restrict, expand, diminish, supplant or modify the law.
Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority (1998)
PCA issued a resolution declaring that it is withdrawing from all regulation of the coconut processing
industry in that its regulation would only be limited to monitoring. PCA was charged to carry out the
States policy to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and palm oil
industry. PCAs resolution disregards such legislative purpose. Any change in the policy must be made by
the legislative department of the government. It is beyond the power of an administrative agency to
dismantle it.
Ople v. Torres (1998)
Administrative Order 308 (Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System) is null
and void for being unconstitutional as it does not merely implement the legislative policy of the
Administrative Code but establishes a computerized reference system which requires a delicate
adjustment of various contending state policies. An administrative order may not unilaterally impose a
new legislative policy.
Philippine Bank of Communications v. CIR ( 1999)
Memorandum circulars are in the nature of administrative rulings, and while given great weight, are not
conclusive and may in fact be ignored if they are erroneous. The State cannot be estopped by the
mistakes or errors of its officials or agents.
71
72
specified by Congress. Publication in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation is required
before laws can take effect.
Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (2008)
Although the circulars were issued before the 1987 Administrative Code was enacted, such circulars
were not exempt from the publication requirement because the Administrative Code required that
existing rules must be registered within 3 months from the date of the Administrative Codes effectivity.
Publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules intended to enforce
or implement existing laws, may have binding force and effect. Such requirements were put in place as
safeguards against abuses on the part of the lawmakers and as guarantees to the constitutional right to
due process and to information on matters of public concern.
Board of Trustees of GSIS v. Velasco (2011)
The assailed resolutions pertain only to internal rules to regulate GSIS personnel, thus, there was no need
to comply with the publication or filing requirements. According to the UP Law Centers guidelines,
interpretative regulations, and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public need not be filed with the center.
Interpretative Rules
Hilado v. Collector (1956)
While the Collector had the authority under the NIRC to issue circulars as an interpretation or
interpretative regulation of the code, the Secretary of Finance is empowered to revoke, repeal, or
abrogate the acts or previous rulings if such were based on an incorrect construction of a statute. There
are no vested rights to be taken from a wrong interpretation of the law. An administrative officer cannot
change a law enacted by Congress.
Victorias Co. vs. Social Security Commission (1962)
Rules and regulations issued by an administrative agency are binding on courts so long as the procedure
fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the
legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with its innate wisdom. On the other hand,
administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally
determine what the law means.
Peralta v. CSC (1992)
When an administrative agency or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it
merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory,
for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. Administrative construction is not
necessarily binding upon the courts. However, action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set
aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.
73
74
75
postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature. Its exercise by administrative bodies
has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. The exercise of that power
by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid.
Catura v. CIR (1971)
CIR, in connection with a complaint filed for unauthorized disbursement of union funds, issued an order
requiring and directing the petitioners who were union officers, to deliver and deposit to the Court all
the said Association's book of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and
other documents related to the finances of the said labor union at the hearing of this petition x x x. The
Court recognized the power of the administrative agency to issue subpoenas even if there was no explicit
statutory grant because it was necessary to assure the effective administration of the statute involved.
Tolentino v. Inciong (1979)
NLRC Chairman Inciong issued subpoenas requiring Tolentino and CFI Judge de los Angeles to appear
before NLRC to explain why they should not be held in contempt for trying to use old society tactics to
prevent union election duly ordered by the NLRC under PD 21.
The subpoenas were beyond Inciongs power to issue. The concern of Inciong that the objectives of the
law should be attained did not warrant his exercise of a power which was not conferred. The competence
"to hold any person in contempt for refusal to comply certainly cannot extend to a judge of the court of
first instance.
Warrants of arrest, administrative searches
Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board (1963)
Deportation Board issued warrants of arrest against Qua Chee Gan and 6 others, all aliens, who were
charged with the unauthorized purchase/remittance of U.S. dollars, as well as attempted bribery of a
Central Bank official and a U.S. Air Force captain to evade prosecution.
The Presidents power to investigate may be delegated, so the Board may conduct the investigation as the
authorized agent of the President. But it was not clear whether the Presidents authority carries with it
the power to order the arrest of the alien complained of. Assuming that the President possesses such a
power, he cannot validly delegate it because the discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or
not is personal to the one upon whom the authority devolves. Official functions requiring the exercise of
discretion and judgment may not be delegated.
Vivo v. Montesa (1968)
Immigration issued warrants of arrest against 7 persons for the purpose of bringing them before the
Commissioner to show cause why they should not be deported for fraudulently entering the country.
The issuance of the warrants of arrest by the Immigration Commissioner and the arrest pursuant to such
administrative warrant are in conflict with Bill of Rights as warrants may only be issued by a judge. The
arrest of a foreigner necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when there is
already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the
76
power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable
that the alien be arrested.
Santos v. Commissioner (1976)
Santos was arrested by virtue of warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Immigration while his deportation case was pending. The Qua Chee Gan ruling was applied. The
Commissioner cannot issue a warrant of arrest for purposes of investigation. But the Commissioner can
issue it if there already was a deportation order.
Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago (1988)
Petitioners were charged for committing acts of pedophilia. A warrant of arrest was issued by the judge
and they were apprehended. They however questioned the authority of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation to arrest and detain them.
Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a
preventive measure. It is summary and nature and therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in
accordance with ordinary court proceedings. What is essential is that there be a specific charge against
the alien intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a
counsel if desired. The charge must be substantiated by competent evidence, hearsay evidence may even
be admitted.
Lucien Tran Van Nghia v. Liwag (1989)
Lucien, a French national was arrested without a warrant. He contended that the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation had no power, authority, or jurisdiction to cause his arrest because it was
made in violation of Art. III, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
Although the requirement of probable cause to be determined by a Judge does not extend to deportation
proceedings, there should still be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported;
a fair hearing should be conducted with the assistance of counsel, if desired; and the charge should be
substantiated by competent evidence.
Salazar v. Achacoso (1990)
Petitioner was charged with illegal recruitment. Law enforcers went to her residence where it was
discovered that she was operating a dance studio. Documents and other personal property were seized.
The warrant was not issued by a judge, but by the Secretary of Labor; and, assuming that the Secretary of
Labor is authorized to issue warrants, the same is invalid for being general.
Board of Commissioners (CID) v. De la Rosa (1991)
28 years after Gatchalian was admitted as a Filipino citizen, the Board of Commissioners issued a mission
order/ warrant of arrest against him so he could be investigated for violating the Immigration Act.
77
The Board cannot issue warrants of arrest for investigative purposes. In implementing the Immigration
Act, the Commissioner of Immigration could issue warrants of arrest only after the Board determined the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien.
Imposition of Fines and Penalties
Civil Aeronautics Board v. PAL (1975)
PALs flight from Tuguegarao to Manila made a flagstop in Baguio City to pick up 20 passengers who
could not be accommodated in its regular flight. This was done without the prior approval of the Civil
Aeronautics Board. The CAB issued a resolution imposing a fine.
CAB was fully authorized by law [R.A. 776 Civil Aeronautics Act] to impose fines in the nature of civil or
administrative penalties for violation of its rules and regulations, but not to impose fines in the nature of
criminal penalty, which can only be done by courts of justice.
Scotys Dept. Store v. Micaller (1956)
Scotys Dept. Store was found by the CIR to have committed unfair labor practice and ordered to reinstate
Micaller, pay backwages and pay a fine.
CIR could not impose fines or other penal sanctions because it did not have jurisdiction over criminal
cases, as giving it such jurisdiction would be in contravention of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
RCPI v. Board of Communications (1977)
Diego Morales and Pacifico Innocencio separately filed complaints against RCPI before the Board of
Communications (BOC) alleging that RCPI is liable to them for damages for its failure to deliver certain
telegrams meant to inform them of the deaths of their close relatives. The BOC imposed a fine on RCPI
pursuant to Sec. 21 of the Public Service Act.
RCPI cannot be made to pay the said fine because a fine can only be imposed on a public service that
violates the terms and conditions of any certificate or any order, decision or regulation of the
Commission. If the Morales and Inocencio suffered injury allegedly due to RCPIs contractual breach, their
recourse should have been in the courts.
Perez v. LPG Refillers (2006)
A circular issued by the DOE implementing BP33 which provided penalties for enumerated acts therein
was being assailed for not being in conformity with the law it seeks to implement.
Circular is valid. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, defines what constitute punishable acts involving petroleum
products and sets the minimum and maximum limits for the corresponding penalties. The Circular
merely implements the said law, albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers,
marketers, and dealers.
78
Administrative Procedure
Due Process
While administrative agencies may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements, this does not mean that they can entirely disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process.
79
80
81
a. The right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondents legal rights;
b. A real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and
evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights;
c. A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and
d. A finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration
during the hearing or contained in the records, or made known to the parties affected.
A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. v. Office of the President (2010)
Due process does not always require a trial-type proceeding. Litigants may be heard through pleadings,
written explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral arguments. The standard of due process that
must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not
ignored. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. Any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing of an MR.
Gannapao v. CSC (2011)
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be
safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party
was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process. In this
case, petitioner availed of all legal remedies available to him and was allowed to present evidence to
defend himself, thus there was no denial of due process.
Notice and Hearing
When required
National Development Corp. v. Collector (1963) When required by law
Pursuant to a charge of violation of the Tariff and Customs Act, C.F. Sharp & Company, was imposed a
fine. Its request that the case be set for investigation and hearing was denied by the Collector of Customs.
Collector committed grave abuse of discretion in imposing the fine without the benefit of an investigation
or hearing, as requested. Under the Tariff and Customs Code, in order that an imported article or
merchandise may be considered a cargo that should be manifested, it must first be so established,
because there are other effects that a vessel may carry that are excluded from the requirement of the law.
And even if customs authorities have claimed that an article or merchandise is NOT within the exception,
it does not automatically make the vessel liable. It is still necessary that the vessel, its owner, or its
operator be given a chance to show otherwise
Bautista v. Workmens Compensation Commission (1979) When making quasi-judicial decisions
Bautistas claim was dismissed by the Department of Labors Workmens Compensation Commission due
to his and his counsels repeated non-appearance at 3 scheduled hearings of the case. Bautista was
deprived of due process by the hearing officer. It was proven that he and his counsel were not duly
82
notifiedeither they were not notified at all, or they received notice too late, only after the scheduled
dates of hearing. The Commissions rules require giving of reasonable notice of hearing to each party
interested, which is done by serving upon him, personally or by registered mail, a copy of the notice,
either at his last known post office address or through his counsel. The purpose is to ensure observance
and protection of an interested partys right to a hearing. The actions of the hearing officer and the
Commission are a foul blow to the Constitutions social justice clause and injunction for the State to afford
full protection to labor. The government, especially labor agencies, has an obligation to give meaning and
substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man.
Equitable Banking Corp. v. NLRC (1997) When terminating employment
Sadac, VP of Equitable Banks Legal Department was accused of abusive conduct, inefficiency,
ineffectiveness, mismanagement and decisiveness. Bank Chairman sent him a memo stating that instead
of conducting a formal hearing, the bank would instead wait for his voluntary resignation. Sadac filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal. He was denied due process. Bank ignored the procedural requirements for
terminating employment (notice apprising the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought, and another notice informing the employee of the employers decision to dismiss
him). The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain ones side.
But meetings in the nature of consultation or conferences are NOT valid substitutes for the proper
observance of notice and hearing.
Felix Uy v. CoA (2000) When making quasi-judicial decisions
The COAs finding of bad faith, and thus personal liability on Governor Paredes part, was based solely on
the MSPBs decision, which did not meet the quantum of proof necessary to overcome the presumption of
good faith. The COAs power to decide administrative cases involving expenditure of public funds
involves the quasi-judicial aspect of government audit, which means that proceedings before it must
comply with the fundamental requirements of procedural due process. These were not complied with,
since Governor Paredes was never made a party to nor served a notice of the proceedings before the COA.
It would be unfair for the COA to hold him personally liable for petitioners claims, amounting to millions
of pesos, without giving him an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in his defence.
83
Bisschop v. Galang (1963) When deciding applications for extension of stay of aliens
Bisschop, an American citizen, applied for extension of stay in the Philippines. Commissioner Galang
advised Bisschop that his application had been denied by the Board of Commissioners and that he should
depart within 5 days. Bisschops counsel requested a copy of the Boards decision, but was told that in
such cases, for reasons of practicability and expediency, no formal decision was promulgated.
First, Commissioners of Immigration are not required to conduct formal hearings on applications for
extension of stay of aliens. Since the law is silent as to the procedure in such cases, courts have no
jurisdiction to review the purely administrative practice of immigration authorities of not granting
formal hearings therein. A day in court is NOT a matter of right in administrative proceedings. In certain
administrative proceedings, the right to notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law.
Commissioner Galangs letter advising Bisschop to depart in 5 days was a mere formality and far from
final. The requirement to leave before the start of deportation proceedings is only an advice to the party
that unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be compelled to take steps for his expulsion. Second,
Commissioners of Immigration are NOT required to promulgate written decisions in cases involving
extension of stay of aliens. There is nothing in immigration laws which require the Board to render
written decisions in such cases.
Pollution Adjudication Board v. CA (1991) When public interest so requires
Pollution Adjudication Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar Textile Finishing Corporation to
cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations, which were discharging
untreated wastewater directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in certain situations, wherein the
ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests through the exercise of police power. In the case at bar, the ex parte Order was proper because
stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive wastes into Philippine waters should not wait until
protracted litigation over the correctness of such orders has run its full course. Industrial establishments
are not constitutionally entitled to reduce their costs/expenses and increase their profits by putting the
public interest at risk by disregarding the requirements of anti-pollution statutory and regulatory
provisions. Solar may contest the correctness of the ex parte order in a public hearing before the Board,
where it would have the opportunity to controvert the basis of such order. That such an opportunity is
subsequently available is really all that is required by the due process clause of the Constitution in
situations like the case at bar.
84
While the order does not make its own discussion of the evidence or its own findings of fact, such is not
necessary if the court is satisfied with the report of its examiner which already contains a full discussion
of the evidence and the findings of fact. The situation would be different if the court disagrees with the
report, in which case it should state the reasons for its disagreement. When the CIR refers a case to a
commissioner for investigation, report, and recommendation, and at such investigation the parties were
given an opportunity to be heard, the requirement of due process is satisfied.
Serrano v. PSC (1968)
The Public Service Commission (PSC) made a joint decision passing on the claim of 99 applicants for
certificates of public convenience to operate a taxicab service. It granted certificates to 60 applicants, as
listed in the decision. With regard to the remaining applicants, the decision stated "the applications not
included in the list of those granted are either [dismissed] for lack of interest or failure to prosecute or
[denied] for failure to qualify". Serrano challenged the PSC decision on the ground that the decision does
not clearly state the facts as to each case regarding the qualification and financial ability of the applicant
and the other factors constituting the criterion used as basis in granting the application.
The Constitutional provision which mandates that a decision must clearly and distinctly state the facts
and the law on which it is based only applies to courts and not to administrative agencies. However, the
non-inclusion of the administrative tribunal within the scope of the Constitutional provision does not
warrant the summary disposition of Serrano's application. In Ang Tibay, it was held that an
administrative tribunal must not disregard the requirement of due process, and that as a matter of due
process, the administrative tribunal must render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.
Solid Homes v. Laserna (2008)
Laserna filed a complaint against Solid Homes for delivery of title and execution of deed of sale before the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). HLURB arbiter rendered a decision which was
appealed to the HLURB Board and subsequently to the Office of the President. The Office of the President,
in its decision, merely adopted by reference the findings of the Board.
The Constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of
memorandum decisions which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in
decisions of inferior tribunals. In Francisco vs. Permskul, the Court laid down the conditions to make a
memorandum decision valid:
1) it should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an
annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision; and
2) it is resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties and
easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will
require an extended discussion of the laws involved.
The Constitutional mandate need not apply to decisions rendered in administrative proceedings, as in
this case; it applies only to decisions rendered in judicial proceedings. The rights of parties in
administrative proceedings are not violated as long as the constitutional requirement of due process has
been satisfied as laid down in Ang Tibay. There is no requirement that the decision must express clearly
85
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. For as long as the administrative decision is
grounded on evidence, and expressed in a manner that sufficiently informs the parties of the factual and
legal bases of the decision, the due process requirement is satisfied.
Department of Health v. Camposano (2005)
An administrative charge was filed against Camposano, et al., employees of the DOH, for Dishonesty and
Grave Misconduct in connection with an alleged anomalous purchase of certain medicines. PCAGC issued
a resolution finding Camposano, et al. guilty, and recommending their dismissal. Relying on the
recommendation by the PCAGC, the DOH Secretary, issued an order dismissing Camposano, et al.
PCAGC does not have the power to impose any administrative sanctions directly; its authority is limited
to conducting investigations, and preparing findings and recommendations. The power to impose
sanctions belonged to the disciplining authority, which is the DOH Secretary, who had to observe due
process prior to imposing penalties. The Secretary's decision in this case, did not comply with the 6th
requisite stated in the Ang Tibay case. The actual exercise of the disciplining authoritys prerogative
requires a prior independent consideration of the law and the facts. Failure to comply with results in an
invalid decision. The disciplining authority should not merely and solely rely on an investigators
recommendation, but must personally weigh and assess the evidence gathered.
American Tobacco v. Director of Patents (1975)
Petitioners challenge the validity of the amendment of Rule 168 of the Rules of Practice before the
Philippine Patent Office, which authorized the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of the
office to hear inter partes proceedings, because under the law, the Director of Patents must personally
hear and decide the cases.
The power conferred upon an administrative agency to issue such regulations as may be deemed
necessary in order to carry out its purposes is an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular
function, unless it is withheld by express provisions of the law. It could hardly be expected, in view of the
magnitude of the Director's responsibility, to require him to hear personally each and every case pending
in his office. While the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency or officer vested by
law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision
of the administrative agency or officer will be made. It is sufficient that the judgment an discretion finally
exercised are those of the officer authorized by law.
Albert v. Gangan (2001)
It is a basic tenet of due process that the decision of a government agency must state the facts and the law
on which the decision is based. COAs decision merely stated conclusions of law while facts and
circumstance regarding the disallowance were missing, inaccurate, or incomplete. There has to be factual
basis why the expenditure is alleged to be fraudulent or why was there a misrepresentation.
Arocha v. Vivo (1967)
When the BOC first acted on the case of Gatchalian, its members acted independently, as shown by the
different dates they have expressed their votes. They did not actually meet to discuss, and vote on the
case. Individual action by members of a board plainly renders nugatory the purpose of its constitution as
a Board. The powers and duties of boards and commissions may not be exercised by the individual
86
members separately. Their acts are official only when done by the members convened in session, upon a
concurrence of at least a majority and with at least a quorum present.
Neria v. Commissioner of Immigration (1968)
Promulgation means "the delivery of the decision to the Clerk of Court for filing and publication". Based
on the Immigration Rules and Regulations, promulgation takes place even before the decision is written,
and a copy is served on the alien. The date of promulgation is the date when the BSI voted and resolved to
admit an alien, and this date can be ascertained from the minutes of the proceedings of the BSI.
Realty Exchange Venture Corp. v. Sendino (1994)
Sendino filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against REVI with the Office of Appeals,
Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the HLURB. HLURB rendered judgment in favor of Sendino.
REVI contended, among others, that the decision cannot stand because it was not rendered by the Board
of Commissioners en banc.
The Board is specifically mandated by its governing law to adopt rules of procedure for the conduct of its
business and perform such functions necessary for the effective accomplishment of its above mentioned
functions."There is nothing in the provisions of the EOs defining the powers and duties of the Board
which denies or withholds the power to delegate adjudicatory functions to divisions for the purpose of
effectively carrying out its administrative responsibilities and quasi-judicial powers.
Jurisdiction
Go Tek v. Deportation Board (1977)
Go Tek was arrested during a raid of a suspected guerilla unit. Fake dollar checks were also found in his
possession, causing him to be charged with illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and
other instruments of credit under Art. 168, RPC. A case for his deportation proceeded simultaneously
before the Deportation Board.
Deportation Board had jurisdiction to investigate Go Tek despite the fact that he has yet to be convicted
of the criminal charge against him and despite the fact that his alleged acts do not fall under the
enumeration of the grounds for deportation in Sec. 37 of the Immigration Law. Under the law,
deportation may be effected either by order of the President after his or his agents due investigation or
upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or his designated officer after the Board of
Commissioners determination of the existence of a ground for deportation. Section 69 does not
enumerate grounds for deportation. It merely provides that the Deportation Board is authorized to
conduct investigations on possibly deportable aliens and forward its recommendations to the President.
The Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of facts which warrant the deportation
of aliens. An executive order of deportation is not dependent on a prior judicial conviction. Conviction or
acquittal of a criminal charge does not constitute res judicata in the deportation proceedings.
87
88
investigation, they were dismissed. The DECS Secretary affirmed the dismissal. The teachers submitted
sworn statements to the CHR impugning their dismissal.
The CHR has no power to exercise adjudicatory power. The most that can be conceded to the CHR, under
the Constitution is the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. However, fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function
of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. Hence, merely having the power to
investigate, the CHR should not try and resolve the matter involving the public school teachers alleged
dismissal without due process. The issues involved in the controversy are clearly within the original
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education as provided for by the Civil Service Law and also within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Simon v. CHR (1994)
A Demolition Notice was sent to the North EDSA Vendors Association, Inc. from the Office of the Quezon
City Mayor. The squatters-vendors filed a letter-complaint with the CHR asking the latter to enjoin the QC
Mayor from pushing through with the demolition, which the CHR did.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Cario v. CHR that it is only the first of the CHRs constitutionally
enumerated powers that bears resemblance with adjudication - but that resemblance does not equate to
adjudication. It was not the intention of the Constitutional Commission to make the CHR a quasi-judicial
body.
Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA (1994)
The Caloocan City Government was operating a dumpsite which was polluting the nearby creek/tributary
of the Marilao River. The LLDA issued a cease and desist order against it. On the other hand, the RTC of
Caloocan issued a cease and desist order against the LLDA. The controversy was brought before the CA,
which held that the LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the
operation of the dumpsite.
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board, except
in cases where a special law provides for another forum. The LLDA, is specifically mandated under RA
4850 to carry out the national policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced
growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces with due regard for ...the prevention of
undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant of power, the
LLDAs jurisdiction was correctly invoked in this case. The LLDA must also be deemed to possess the
power to issue cease and desist orders. While it is true that it was not expressly conferred such a power,
its enabling laws granted it the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of
pollution".
Union Bank v. HLURB (1992)
A condominium buyer purchased a unit without knowing that the whole condominium project had been
mortgaged to Union Bank. The mortgage was foreclosed and the property was sold to Far East Bank at
public auction. The buyer filed a complaint for annulment of Far Easts title to the unit. Union Bank and
Far East Bank alleged that the HLURB had no jurisdiction.
89
HLURB has jurisdiction. The relevant laws in this case include: PD 957, which gave the NHA exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business; PD 1344, which gave the NHA the exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving unsound real estate business practices; and EO 648, which
transferred the above-mentioned functions to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (later
became the HLURB). The jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad enough to
include jurisdiction over complaints for specific performance of the sale, or annulment of the mortgage,
of a condominium unit .
Mateo v. CA (1995)
Several Morong Water District (MOWAD) employees filed a complaint against their general manager
Edgar Sta. Maria. The MOWAD board members conducted an investigation and placed Edgar under
preventive suspension. Eventually, Edgar was dismissed causing him to file a special civil action for quo
warranto and mandamus before the RTC.
The RTC does not have jurisdiction. MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to PD 198.
The SC has previously held that employees of GOCCs with original charters, such as MOWAD, fall under
the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. Under PD 807, EO 292 and Memorandum Circular No. 44
(1990) of the CSC, the party aggrieved by an action of the government involving termination of services
may appeal to the Commission within 15 days of the action. Thereafter, the final resolution of the CSC
may be appealed to the CA. The Civil Service Commission under the Constitution is the single arbiter of all
contests relating to the civil service. Thus, RTCs have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving
dismissal of officers and employees covered by the Civil Service Law.
PAL v. Civil Aeronautics Board (1997)
Grandair applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) with the CAB and
requested for a Temporary Operating Permit (TOP). PAL opposed the application alleging that the CAB
had no jurisdiction to hear the application since Grandair did not have a franchise to operate from
Congress. CAB denied the opposition and approved the issuance of the TOP.
The CAB has jurisdiction. The CAB is expressly authorized under RA 776 to issue a TOP or a CPCN upon
its own initiative. Nothing in the said law negates the power to issue the said permit before the
completion of the applicants evidence and that of the oppositors in the main petition. There is also
nothing in the law or the Constitution which indicates that a legislative franchise is an indispensable
requirement for an entity to operate as a domestic air transport operator. Although the Constitution
recognizes Congress' control over any franchise, certificate or authority to operate a public utility,
Congress has seen it fit to delegate this function to government agencies, specialized particularly in their
respective areas of public service. A reading of RA 776 reveals the clear intent of Congress to delegate the
authority to regulate the issuance of a license to operate domestic air transport services to the CAB.
Eristingcol v. CA (1999)
Eristingcol was building a house in Urdaneta Village but the homeowners association meted a P400,000
penalty against her for violating certain provisions in the associations Construction Rules and
Regulations. Eristingcol filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of these rules before the RTC but the
Association alleged that RTC does not have jurisdiction over the complaint.
90
The RTC does not have jurisdiction. A scrutiny of Eristingcols allegations reveals that the nature of the
controversy only superficially delves into the validity of the Construction Rules. The crux of the complaint
is actually the associations supposed arbitrary implementation of the Construction Rules against her. EO
535, which created the HIGC, transferred to it the regulatory and administrative functions over
homeowners associations originally vested with the SEC. Upon the enactment of RA 8763, the powers
and functions of the HIGC with respect to homeowners associations were again transferred - this time to
the HLURB. Thus, based on the allegations of the complaint, it is the HLURB - not the RTC - which has
jurisdiction over this case.
Deltaventures Resources, Inc. v. Cabato (2000)
Deltaventures filed a complaint for injunction with the RTC reiterating the same allegations in a third
party claim in a case pending before the NLRC. RTC held that it cannot issue an injunction against the
NLRC and that the NLRC retains the authority over all proceedings in relation to the execution of its
decisions.
Deltaventures should have filed its third party claim before the LA. The NLRCs Manual on Execution of
Judgment provides the mechanism for a third-party claimant to assert his claim over a property levied by
a sheriff on account of a labor judgment. The broad powers granted to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
under the Labor Code should be deemed to vest in them jurisdiction over incidents arising from, in
connection with or relating to labor disputes, to the exclusion of other courts. Moreover, the Labor Code
explicitly prohibits the issuance of any injunction or restraining order in any case involving labor
disputes by any court or other entity.
Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil (2002)
The Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) received several complaints from certain members of the
Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc. (DARBCI) alleging mismanagement and/or
misappropriation of funds by the then incumbent officers and members of the board of directors of
DARBCI (respondents). Before the respondents could file an answer, the CDA ordered the funds of
DARBCI to be frozen prompting the respondents to file a petition for certiorari before the RTC primarily
questioning CDAs jurisdiction to resolve the complaints.
Sec. 3 of RA 6939 enumerates the powers, functions and responsibilities of the CDA. It can be gleaned
from this provision that the authority of the CDA is to discharge purely administrative functions.
Nowhere in the law is CDA expressly granted the authority to adjudicate cooperative disputes. A review
of the deliberations by both chambers of Congress prior to the enactment of RA 6939 shows that the
intent of the legislature was not to vest quasi-judicial authority upon CDA. Thus, the CDA is devoid of any
quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate intra-cooperative disputes and more particularly disputes as
regards the election of the members of the Board of Directors and officers of cooperatives.
De Jesus v. COA (2003)
An auditing team from the Commission on Audit (COA) audited the accounts of the Catbalogan Water
District (CWD) and discovered that members of CWD's board granted themselves certain benefits. The
COA issued notices disallowing the payment of the allowances and bonuses granted to the members of
the board, on the ground that the payments run counter to PD 198, or the Provincial Water Utilities Act.
The members of the board question the jurisdiction of COA to disallow the payments.
91
The Constitution mandates the COA to audit all government agencies, including government-owned and
controlled corporations. A water district is a government-owned and controlled corporation with a
special charter since it is created pursuant to PD 198. Thus, CWD is subject to the jurisdiction of COA. COA
did not usurp the functions of the LWUA. To hold otherwise would lead to a situation where the board of
an administrative agency, by the mere act of issuing a resolution, can put to naught the broad and
extensive powers granted to the COA by the Constitution.
CSC v. Alfonso (2009)
A complaint was filed against Alfonso, the director of the human resources department of the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines (PUP), charging him with violation of the Civil Service Law. He allegedly
included himself in a special order for overnight services which allowed him to make considerable
earnings for allegedly working for 24 hours straight daily, for 3 weeks. The Civil Service Commission
(CSC) issued a resolution formally charging Alfonso with Grave Misconduct, and imposing a 90-day
preventive suspension on him. Alfonso argued that the CSC had no jurisdiction because the PUP Board of
Regents has the exclusive authority to appoint and remove PUP employees.
As the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC has jurisdiction to supervise the performance
of and discipline, if need be, all government employees, including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters such as PUP. All PUP officers and employees, whether
they be classified as teachers or professors, are deemed, first and foremost, civil servants accountable to
the people and answerable to the CSC in cases of complaints lodged by a citizen against them as public
servants. While there are laws which allow the creation of disciplinary committees in different agencies
of the government to hear and decide administrative complaints against their respective officers and
employees, such cannot be interpreted as having divested the CSC of its inherent power to supervise and
discipline government employees. To hold otherwise would not only negate the very purpose for which
the CSC was established, but would also impliedly amend the Constitution itself.
Shell v. Jalos (2010)
Shell and the Republic of the Philippines entered into a service contract for the exploration and extraction
of petroleum. As a consequence of which, Shell constructed a pipeline from its production platform to its
processing plant. Jalos, et al. filed a complaint for damages against Shell with the RTC, alleging that they
are fishermen, and that Shell's construction of the pipeline adversely affected their livelihood. Shell
argued that the case is a pollution case, thus the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has primary
jurisdiction over the controversy.
While the complaint did not use the term pollution, the acts it alleged constitute pollution as defined in
the law (PD 984). In determining Jalos, et al.'s complaint for damages, the proper tribunal must
determine whether or not the operation of the pipeline adversely altered the coastal waters' properties
and negatively affected its life sustaining function. The power and expertise needed to determine such
issue lies with the PAB. The definition of the pollution" connotes the need for specialized knowledge and
skills in determining the presence, cause, and effects of pollution. These knowledge and skills are not
within the competence of ordinary courts. Resort must first be made to the PAB, which is the agency
possessed of expertise in determining pollution-related matters.
92
93
94
civil action prescribed by law. Generally, acquittal in a criminal case does not carry with it relief from
administrative liability. The administrative case may proceed independently of the criminal action for the
same act or omission and requires only a preponderance of evidence to establish administrative guilt.
Tan v. COMELEC (1994)
Tan, as the City Prosecutor of Davao, was designated by the COMELEC as the Vice-Chairman of the City
Board of Canvasser of Davao City. Garcia won the mayoralty elections, and his rival candidate, Alterado,
filed a number of cases questioning the validity of Garcia's proclamation. The electoral protests were
eventually dismissed. Alterado filed with the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for Falsification of Public
Documents against Tan. Alterado also filed with the COMELEC an administrative complaint against Tan.
Tan moved to dismiss the administrative complaint in the COMELEC on several grounds, among which is
forum-shopping.
Dismissal on the ground of forum-shopping is untenable. The investigation then being conducted by the
Ombudsman on the criminal case, on the one hand, and the inquiry into the administrative charges by the
COMELEC, on the other hand, are entirely independent proceedings. Neither would the results in one
conclude the other. An absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution or
vice versa.
Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman (2000)
An administrative case for serious misconduct and/or fraud or wilful breach of trust was filed against
Ocampo with the Ombudsman. He did not file his counter-affidavit, and was later dismissed. On his MR,
he alleged, through a manifestation that his criminal case for estafa based on the same facts was
dismissed by the RTC.
Dismissal of the criminal complaint only means that there was failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt on the part of the accused. The quantum of evidence required in an administrative proceeding
(substantial evidence) is different from that in a criminal proceeding (proof beyond reasonable doubt).
Considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, procedure followed and sanctions imposed in
criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions of one body should not necessarily
be binding on the other.
Millares v. Go (2001)
An administrative complaint for grave misconduct based on the charge of double homicide resulted to
Millares dismissal from service. However, the criminal case for homicide that was filed against Millares
based on the same facts was dismissed.
Factual findings of administrative agencies, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
conclusive upon the Court. Criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters
such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.
Ferrer v. Sandiganbayan (2008)
Ferrer was charged with a violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019.The Office of the President absolved him of
administrative liability, but the Sandiganbayans second division refused to grant any of the reliefs he
sought including a motion for reinvestigation, motions for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari, and a
95
motion for re-evaluation of a finding of probable cause. The dismissal of an administrative case does not
necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of
the administrative complaint.
Acuzar v. Journal (2010)
Jorolan filed an administrative case against Acuzar before the Peoples Law Enforcement Board, charging
Acuzar of grave misconduct for allegedly having an illicit relationship with Jorolans minor daughter. He
also filed a criminal case against Azucar for violation of the Child Abuse Act. PLEB found Acuzar guilty
and ordered him dismissed from the PNP.
Criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from one another. Criminal cases require
proof beyond reasonable doubt, while administrative cases only require substantial evidence. They could
proceed independently of each other. The PLEB correctly exercised jurisdiction over the case, it being the
administrative disciplinary body tasked to hear complaints against erring PNP members.
Rules of Evidence
Philippine Movie Picture Workers Association v. Premier Production (1953)
The company filed a petition with the CIR seeking authority to lay off 44 of its workers. The CIR
conducted an ocular inspection of the studios and its premises, and on the strength of its findings,
authorized the lay-off of the workers.
The workers were still entitled to hearing. Ocular inspection is not equivalent to a trial or presentation of
evidence, as it is only an auxiliary remedy. Nevertheless, conducting an ocular inspection in order to
resolve an issue is not expressly prohibited.
Estate of Florenciano Buan v. Pambusco (1956)
Buan applied for a certificate of public convenience with PSC. PSC ordered a survey of passenger traffic to
determine the necessity of such CPC. It stationed at two strategic places two of its checkers who
determined the number of passengers for one week. The checkers later submitted their findings. PSC
then denied Buans application.
The sending of checkers for purposes of observation was justified. An administrative agency may act on
its own and use methods which will enable it to obtain substantial evidence. The court is not required to
examine the proof relied upon by agencies in their decisions de novo.
Rizal Light Co. v. Municipality of Rizal (1968)
On the basis of the evidence adduced from an inspection made by PSCs engineers on Rizal Lights electric
plant, and after the latters failure to appear in hearings and to submit evidence, PSC revoked Rizal Lights
CPC and granted one for Morong Electric.
The Court is not required to examine the proof anew, and the revocation made by PSC was valid. When
prosecuting and investigating duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body such as the PSC,
96
said body may make steps it believes appropriate for the proper exercise of said duties, particularly in the
manner of informing itself whether there is probable violation of law and/or its rules and regulations. It
may initiate an investigation, file a complaint, and then try the charge as preferred. So long as the
respondent is given a day in court, there can be no denial of due process, and objections to said procedure
cannot be sustained.
Borja v. Moreno (1964)
Borja allegedly closed the Matlaue, a public river located in his private land, in violation of a law. He was
subjected to an administrative complaint by the DPWC which ruled against him. Later, the trial court
granted Borjas request and declared null and void DPWCs decision.
There was substantial evidence to support that it was indeed a public navigable river, and if there is
substantial evidence to support the findings of an administrative official in matters within its
competence, the courts are bound to look no further - not even to consider evidence of a preponderant
nature. The court, however, did not overturn the trial courts decision because the investigation wherein
the evidence was received was conducted with manifest disregard of due process.
Maceda v. Energy Regulation Board (1991)
In line with the hearing regarding the provisional increase in oil prices, ERB prescribed that testimonies
were to be in affidavit form and that Caltexs cross-examination be deferred to allow other applicants for
the increase to present their evidence first. Maceda objected to this order alleging that it resulted in a
violation of his right to due process.
The exercise of this discretion in the order of testimony out of the order prescribed by the rules is not
improper, because such a relaxed procedure is especially true in administrative bodies. In the broad
interest of justice, the administrative body may, in any particular manner, except itself from technical
rules and apply such suitable procedure as shall promote its objectives.
Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottles Phils. Inc (2003)
62 Coke employees filed a complaint for ULP but failed to attend the scheduled mandatory conferences or
to submit their affidavits so the claims of 52 of them were dismissed. The Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision ordering reinstatement and full backwages. However, the CA ruled that the affidavit of 7 out of
the remaining 10 should not have been given probative value for their failure to affirm the contents
thereof and undergo cross-examination.
It was proper to ascribe evidentiary value to the affidavits despite the failure to affirm their contents and
undergo cross-examination. The NLRC is not bound by technicalities of law and procedure. It was
conferred by law the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Trial-type hearings
are not even required. Rules of evidence are also not strictly observed in proceedings before
administrative bodies where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only.
Note: This decision seems contrary to the Administrative Code which, in Sec. 12, (3) provides that every
party shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses presented against him and to submit rebuttal
evidence. However, it must be remembered that Art. 221 of the Labor Code explicitly states that the
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and
intention of this Code that the Commission and its members shall use every and all reasonable means to
97
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law and
procedure, all in the interest of due process.
Civil Service Commission v. Colangco (2008)
Colangco took and passed the professional board examination for teachers and was later appointed as a
teacher. Thereafter, CSC made an investigation and found Colangco guilty of dishonesty and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service because it was not him who applied for and took the exam.
CA ruled that photocopied documents used by CSC should have been authenticated and that only
documents or public records duly acknowledged or certified could be presented in evidence without
further proof.
CSC cases do not require strict adherence to technical rules of evidence, so it validly considered the
admissibility of such evidence. Moreover, CSC ensured that Colangco was accorded due process during
the investigation and that there was substantial evidence supporting the finding that he was guilty.
3. Fact-finding, investigative, licensing and rate-fixing powers
98
general rule, a public utility must be afforded some opportunity to be heard as to the propriety and
reasonableness of rates fixed for its services by a public service commission.
Manila International Airport Authority v. Airspan Corp. (2004)
MIAA is an attached agency of the DOTC and as such, Section 9, Chapter 2, Book VII of the 1987
Administrative Code applies to it, which provides that no rule or final order involving the fixing of rates
shall be valid unless the proposed rates have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at
least two weeks before the first hearing thereon.
Licensing Function
Gonzalo Sy Trading v. Central Bank (1976)
A license is not a contract between the sovereign and the licensee and it is not a form of property to
which the constitutional prescription against impairment of the obligation of contracts may extend. A
license is a special privilege of a permission or authority to do what is within its terms.
99
100
constitute infringement and unfair competition under the Trademark Law. On motion by Conrad, the RTC
dismissed the case on the ground that the BPTTT has jurisdiction considering the American company had
already filed a cancellation case against Fitrite and Victoria with the BPTTT.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not applicable in this case. The issue involved in the administrative
case is different from that of the issue before the RTC. In the administrative case, the issue is whether the
trademark of Fitrite/ Victoria is subject to cancellation. In the case before the RTC, the issue is whether
Conrad's acts constitute infringement of Fitrite's trademark.
Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA (2000)
Parcels of land owned by petitioner were taken by the DAR for distribution pursuant to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It was dissatisfied with the valuation of the land so it filed a
petition for a determination of just compensation for its property with the RTC. The RTC dismissed the
petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the
orders of the DARAB.
Pursuant to Rule XIII, Sec. 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the decision of the Adjudicator on the
land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable
to the Board but shall be brought to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court within 15 days from
receipt of the notice thereof. Since Veterans petition in the RTC was filed beyond the 15-day period, the
RTC correctly dismissed the case.
101
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
l.
m.
n.
o.
p.
q.
102
103
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies which mandates that relief should first be sought
from the highest or most superior administrative agency, the likes of the Cabinet, may prove that a resort
to the courts would be unnecessary thereby preventing the courts from being swamped by a resort to
them in the first instance. Also, courts should be reluctant to interfere with administrative action prior to
its completion or finality, the reason being that in the absence of a final order or decision, the power of
the administrative agency concerned has not been fully exercised and there can be no irreparable harm.
Quasha v. SEC (1978)
Quasha challenged Manila Polo Clubs conversion to a proprietary club and asked for a TRO. SEC denied.
He went to the SC who granted such TRO.
Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply. Appeal to the SEC would not be a plain,
speedy, adequate remedy. Considering that it was the holiday season and that he was trying to beat the
deadline, the petition direct to the SC was proper.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan (1996)
PCGG issued sequestration orders against Sipalay and Allied. They assailed such orders. It was only 7
years after that PCGG filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to exhaust all administrative
remedies.
The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply. There was no absolute necessity of
appealing respondent PCGGs resolution to the Office of the President. Official inaction or unreasonable
delay, as heretofore intimated, is one of the exceptions to the rule on non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies. The other exception is where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine,
consisting in the PCGGs being guilty of estoppel by laches.
Paat v. CA (1997)
The de Guzmans truck was confiscated by the DENR. After failing to provide an explanation, the order of
confiscation was affirmed by the DENR Regional Executive Director. They filed a letter of reconsideration,
which had a pronouncement that if it be denied, then the same letter must be considered an appeal to the
DENR secretary. True enough, the Regional Director forwarded the letter as an appeal. Pending
resolution however, the de Guzmans filed a replevin suit before the RTC Cagayan.
The statement in the reconsideration letter re: an appeal meant that the de Guzmans knew they had other
forums to go to for exhaustion of administrative remedies, before they could come to court. The RTC,
then, did not have jurisdiction to issue a replevin.
Lopez v. City of Manila (1999)
The City Council of Manila enacted Manila Ordinance No. 7894, entitled An Ordinance Prescribed as the
Revised Schedule of FMVs of Real Properties of the City of Manila. With the implementation of the
ordinance, the tax on the land owned by Lopez was increased by 580%. Lopez filed a special proceeding
for the declaration of nullity of MO 7894. On the same date, Manila Ordinance No. 7905 amending
Ordinance 7894 took effect, reducing by 50% the assessment levels. The trial court dismissed the
petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
104
The case does not fall under the exception to the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies. General
Rule: Where the law provides for the remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or
officer, relief to courts can be sought only after exhausting all remedies provided. The reason rests upon
the presumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error, may
amend its decision on a given matter and decide it properly. Exceptions: With regard to questions on the
legality of a tax ordinance, the remedies available to the taxpayer are provided under Sections 187, 226,
and 252 of RA 7160. Also, the subsequent amendment of MO 7894 has rendered Lopez petition, moot
and academic, for his failure to amend his cause of action.
Garcia v. CA (2001)
An administrative complaint was filed against Garcia. While the case was pending, he filed for a TRO to
enjoin the proceedings of the administrative case. The trial court granted the TRO and subsequently a
writ of preliminary injunction.
Garcias petitions, while the administrative case was pending, were in violation of the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. While there are exceptions to that general rule, the case does not
fall under the exceptions. The court also ruled that the trial court gravely abused its discretion by
granting Garcias motions.
DAR v. Apex Investment (2003)
Apexs lands were subjected to CARL. But DAR Notices of the acquisition were not received by Apex
because it changed its office when it became SM investments and the Notices were sent to the old office
address. Apex only learned of the acquisition in a newspaper. It filed a protest and a supplemental protest
with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office. It was only more than a year after that PARO forwarded the
protest to DAR. DAR only made Apex submit documents which were already attached to its Protest.
Meanwhile, Apexs TCT has been cancelled and transferred to an alleged farmer-beneficiary. Apex filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA.
The aggrieved landowners were not supposed to wait until the DAR acted on their letter-protests (after it
had sat on them for almost a year) before resorting to judicial process. Given the official indifference
which, under the circumstances could have continued forever, the landowners had to act to assert and
protect their interests.
Smart v. NTC (2003)
Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, NTC promulgated rules and regulations on the billing
of telecommunications services. Petitioners-communications companies filed an action for declaration of
nullity of the billing circulars. The NTC moved to dismiss the case for failure of petitioners to exhaust
administrative remedies.
The trial court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the civil case. Judicial power includes the authority of
the courts to determine the validity of the acts of administrative agencies. In questioning the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust
administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the
assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. In like manner, the doctrine of
105
primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory function.
Estrada et al. v. CA (2004)
Estrada, Canilang, and Lim as concerned citizens and taxpayers, filed before the Olongapo City RTC a
complaint for Injunction and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and TRO against
respondent Bacnotan Cement Corporation and 4 other parties. They alleged that BCCs cement plant is a
nuisance as it will cause pollution, and prayed that BCC be restrained and prohibited from operating it.
BCC filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Estrada et al. failed to exhaust administrative remedies before
going to court, i.e. they should have gone to the DENR via the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) first,
which renders their complaint dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. RTC denied BCCs
motion to dismiss and granted Estrada et al.s prayer. CA set aside the RTCs order, and lifted the writ of
injunction and dismissed the complaint insofar as BCC was concerned. Estrada et al. filed a petition for
review on certiorari before the SC.
Estrada et al. failed to exhaust administrative remedies before going to court, which renders their
complaint dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. The case is NOT one of those recognized
exceptional circumstances where prior resort to administrative agencies need not be made before going
to court. There is NO basis to their claim that their immediate recourse to the regular courts is justified
because they were in danger of suffering grave and irreparable injury from the operation of BCCs cement
plant, and the DENR is powerless to grant them proper relief. The DENR, via the Pollution Adjudication
Board, has the power to grant Estrada et al. the proper relief.
Regino v. PCST (2004)
Regino (student) filed a Complaint for damages against PCST and two of its teachers for having
disallowed her from taking final examinations allegedly due to her refusal to buy tickets for the schools
fund raising campaign. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. According to respondents, the question raised involved the determination of the wisdom of an
administrative policy of the PCST; hence, the case should have been initiated before the proper
administrative body, Commission of Higher Education (CHED).
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no bearing on the present case since Regino is
not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST. Also, exhaustion of administrative remedies is
applicable only when there is competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter
complained of. In this case, the CHED does not have the power to award damages. Hence, Regino could
not have commenced her case before the Commission. Lastly, the exhaustion doctrine admits of
exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial
court. Regino's action for damages inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil
Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts.
Flores v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan (2005)
An administrative complaint was filed against Mayor Flores with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The
Sanggunian issued an Order recommending to the Governor the preventive suspension of Flores. Flores
wrote a letter to the Governor asking to veto the Order. Without filing for reconsideration of the Order,
or waiting for the Governor's action, he filed a petition for certiorari with the CA to nullify the Order. The
CA dismissed his petition for failure to exhaust all administrative remedies.
106
Flores still had remedies within the administrative machinery. He could have filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order. He could have also waited for the Governor to act on the matter,
considering that the Governor is the one empowered by the law to impose preventive suspension. Having
failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies, the intervention of the courts should not be
resorted to.
CSC v. DBM (2005)
The Civil Service Commission (CSC) filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court seeking to
compel the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to release the balance of its budget for fiscal
year 2002. DBM opposed arguing, among others, that CSCs petition must be dismissed because the latter
failed to exhaust administrative remedies as it could have sought clarification from DBMs Secretary
regarding the extent of its fiscal autonomy before resorting to court action.
The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only where there is an express legal provision
requiring such administrative step as a condition precedent to taking action in court. As the CSC is not
mandated by any law to seek clarification from the Secretary of Budget and Management prior to filing
the present action, its failure to do so does not call for the application of the rule.
Obiasca v. Basallote (2010)
Jeane was appointed to Administrative Officer II and she immediately assumed the duties of her office.
She later learned that her appointment was never transmitted to the CSC for approval because of a
requirement imposed by the Superintendent of Schools that she failed to submit. Rather than aid her in
the submission of this requirement, the principal of her school refused to affix her signature and the
Superintendent advised Jeane to just go back to being a teacher. Barely two months later, Arlin was
assigned to the position of Administrative Officer II. Jeane complained to the CSC, which eventually
recalled Arlins appointment and approved Jeanes appointment. Arlin went up to the CA right away,
forgetting to file an appeal to the CSC resolution which then became final.
SC struck his petition down on this ground as well as on substantive grounds. One must exhaust
administrative remedies provided by law before resorting to the courts.
Factors affecting finality of administrative decisions
1. Failure to seasonably file a Motion for Reconsideration within the period provided for by law or by
the rules of procedure duly issued by administrative bodies. (Fortich v. Corona, (1998)).
Compliance with the period is not only a mandatory but also a jurisdictional requirement.
(Antique Sawmill Inc. v. Zayco, (1960))
2. Decisions of administrative officials which are not clearly wrong will not be interfered with by
courts. (Sotto v. Ruiz ,(1921)) However, judicial review is available if the decision is rendered in
excess of authority. The availability of judicial review remains despite the absence of a statutory
provision to that effect. (Uy v. Palomar, (1969))
3. Decisions or orders issued by administrative agencies or officials in the exercise of administrative
functions are generally not interfered with by courts because such bodies are generally better
equipped technically to decide administrative questions and non-legal factors, such as
government policy on the matter. (Manuel v. Villena, (1971)). However, if the administrative
official has gone beyond his authority or the decision was vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake,
107
judicial review is proper (Manuel v. Villena, (1971)). In addition, judicial review has also been held
to be proper in case the administrative official has exercised grave abuse of discretion or if an
error of law, fraud or collusion attended the decision (SMC v. Secretary of Labor, (1975)).
4. Findings of fact of administrative agencies which are supported by substantial evidence are
accorded great weight and respect on appeal. (UCPB v. E. Guanzon, (2009)) Thus, if the findings
are not supported by substantial evidence, the court can make its own independent evaluation of
facts. (UCPB v. E. Guanzon, (2009))
Summary of grounds when judicial review is valid despite finality of administrative decisions:
Decision is clearly wrong.
Decision is manifestly arbitrary, capricious or unjust.
Decision is not based upon any reasonable interpretation of law.
Administrative body or officer has gone beyond statutory authority.
Administrative agency exercised unconstitutional powers.
Decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake.
Lack of jurisdiction.
Grave abuse of discretion.
Decision violates or fails to comply with some mandatory provision of law.
Fortich v. Corona (1998)
The Quisumbings 144 hectare- land was previously covered by the CARP, but an ordinance was passed
converting some areas, including their land, into an industrial zone. Several government sectors
approved the application for conversion, including the Office of the President. DAR filed a motion for
reconsideration but did not make it within the reglementary period, so it filed a second MR. Pending
resolution of the second MR, the Sumilao farmers who were the supposed beneficiaries of the land under
the CARP staged a hunger strike in front of DAR, which led the Office of the President, through Deputy
Executive Secretary Corona, to issue a Win-Win Resolution modifying its earlier decision after it had
already been final and executory, and which reduced the land to be converted to 44 hectares.
Since no one had seasonably filed an MR of the first decision, it had already become final and executory.
Thus, the Office of the President had already lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case and to modify its
decision. It could also not have entertained the second MR because AO No. 18 and the Rules of Court
provide that only one MR is allowed. Even if the second MR was allowed under exceptionally
meritorious cases, it could not have been entertained because the first MR was not seasonably filed,
thereby allowing the first decision to lapse into finality.
Antique Sawmill Inc v. Zayco (1960)
Zayco appealed an order of the Secretary of Agriculture to the Office of the President 50 days from the
receipt of the order sought to be reconsidered, which was beyond the 30-day reglementary period. Zayco
contends that the period provided by the rules is a mere procedural technicality which, at least in
administrative proceedings, may be liberally construed.
Compliance with the period provided by law for the perfection of an appeal is not merely mandatory but
also a jurisdictional requirement. Failure to comply with the reglementary period has the effect of
rendering final the judgment of the court. That administrative rules and regulations have the force of law
and can no longer be questioned, because public interest requires that proceedings already terminated
should not be altered at every step.
108
109
While the NLRCs action was summary, it did not amount to a denial of due process. Both the mediatorfact finder and the NLRC decided the case on the basis of the companys investigation. It was evident from
the mediator-fact finders report that he had considered all the facts and evidence presented by both
parties, and, more importantly, that they no longer intended to present further evidence on the matter.
Because of this, it was proper for the NLRC to exercise its power of arbitration, and after assessing the
evidence before it, render a decision.
UCPB v. E. Guanzon (2009)
EGI filed with the BSP an administrative complaint against UCPB, et al. for the commission of
irregularities and conducting business in an unsafe or unsound manner. The BSP Monetary Board, in a
letter-decision, dismissed the administrative complaint of EGI. On appeal, the CA set aside the BSP letterdecision and remanded the case to the BSP Monetary Board for further proceedings. UCPB argued that CA
erred in disregarding the findings of fact of the BSP Monetary Board which should be accorded great
respect.
Although, as a general rule, findings of facts of an administrative agency, which has acquired expertise in
the particular field of its endeavor, are accorded great weight on appeal, such rule cannot be applied with
respect to the assailed findings of the BSP Monetary Board in this case. Rather, what applies is the
recognized exception that if such findings are not supported by substantial evidence, the Court can make
its own independent evaluation of the facts. Here, the factual findings of the BSP Monetary Board in its
letter-decision were not supported by substantial evidence.
110
c. ELECTION LAW
A. Suffrage
Suffrage is the right to vote in the election of officers chosen by the people and in the determination of
questions submitted to the people. It includes election, plebiscite, initiative, and referendum. (Nachura,
2009)
When the right of suffrage is exercised
1. Regular Election
Provided by law for the election of officers either nation-wide or in certain subdivisions thereof,
after the expiration of the full term of the former officers
ALU v. Letrondo-Montejo (G.R. No. 111988, 1994)
Employees of AMS Farming Corporation wanted to go on holiday on the date set out for the SK
elections, claiming that this was a regular election deemed holiday in their CBA. The Court agreed,
ruling that the fact that only those between 15 and 21 take part in the election for members of the
SK does not make it any less a regular local election. The Constitution provides, for example, for
the sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives of, among others, women and youth.
Only voters belonging to the relevant sectors can take part in the election of their representatives.
Yet it cannot be denied that such election is a regular national election and the day set for its
holding, a holiday.
2. Special Election
One held to fill a vacancy in office before the expiration of the full term for which the incumbent
was elected
3. Plebiscite
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Section 10 of the Local Government Code No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected.
Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections within 120 days from the date
of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes
another date.
Padilla v. Comelec (1992)
R.A. 7155 was enacted creating the municipality of Tulay-na-Lupa. Pursuant to the law and the
Constitution, a plebiscite was held. The Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and
111
disapproval of the creation of Tulay-na-Lupa. Governor Padilla filed a case to set aside the
plebiscite conducted and to have a new one conducted. He argued that the plebiscite conducted
was invalid because a plebiscite should be conducted only in the political units affected, i.e. the 12
barangays comprising Tulay-na-Lupa, to the exclusion of the remaining portions of the mother
unit. The meaning of the phrase political units directly affected is not limited to the political
units being taken together to make a new LGU. It refers to the residents of the political entity who
would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof, i.e. the entire mother
unit.
Miranda v. Aguirre (1999)
In 1994, R.A. 7720 converting the Municipality of Santiago into an independent component city
was passed and later ratified in a plebiscite. A mere four years later, R.A. 8528, amending R.A.
7720 was enacted, changing the status of Santiago to a component city. Miranda et al. challenged
the constitutionality of the latter law, because it did not contain a provision which submitted the
law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite. R.A. 8528 was declared
unconstitutional for failing to comply with the requirement of plebiscite. A plebiscite is still
necessary even if it involves just the reclassification from independent component city to
component city. A reading of the constitutional provisions shows that the acts of creating, dividing,
merging, abolishing, or substantially altering boundaries of LGUs involve a common denominator:
material change in the political and economic rights of the LGUs directly affected and their
inhabitants.
4. Initiative
Section 3(a) of R.A. 6735 (The Initiative and Referendum Act)
The power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislation through an election called for the purpose.
Three Kinds of Initiative:
a. Initiative on the Constitution
b. Initiative on national legislation (statutes)
c. Initiative on local legislation
Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, 1997)
A lawyer filed a petition to amend the Constitution with the COMELEC. The Court explained that
the Constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by a law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed. R.A. 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
112
5. Referendum
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC (1996)
After the Garcia v. COMELEC case was decided by the SC, eventually, the COMELEC scheduled a
referendum for the electorate to vote on the petition of Garcia, Calimbas, et al. The SBMA filed suit
against the COMELEC, seeking to prevent the holding of a referendum. The SC ruled in favor of the
SBMA and held that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. In its assailed resolution,
the COMELEC was preparing for a referendum when it was clear that the petition of Garcia,
Calimbas, et al. was one for initiative. The SC clarified that initiative is different from a
referendum. Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject
them at polls independent of the legislative assembly. Referendum is the right reserved to the
people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and
which, in most cases, would, without action on the part of electors, become a law.
113
114
4. Any person who did not vote in two successive preceding regular elections as shown by their voting
records. For this purpose, regular elections do not include the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections;
5. Any person whose registration has been ordered excluded by the Court; and
6. Any person who has lost his Filipino citizenship.
Section 28 of R.A. 8189
Any voter whose registration has been deactivated may file with the Election Officer a sworn application
for reactivation of his registration in the form of an affidavit stating that the grounds for the deactivation
no longer exist any time but not later than 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special
election. The Election Officer shall submit said application to the Election Registration Board for
appropriate action.
Yra v. Abano (G.R. No. 30187, 1928)
Abano was a native of Meycauayan who studied in Manila, where he was registered to vote. After
completing his studies as a lawyer, Abano returned to Meycauayan and ran for office though his
cancellation of voters registration in Manila was denied because of his failure to deposit in the mails
on time. In ruling in Abanos favor, the Court explained that the registration of a voter does not
confer the right to vote; it is but a condition precedent to the exercise of the right. Registration is a
regulation, not a qualification.
D. Inclusion and exclusion proceedings
Section 34 of R.A. 8189 (Petition for Inclusion)
Any person whose application for registration has been disapproved by the Board or whose name has
been stricken out from the list may file with the court a petition to include his name in the permanent list
of voters in his precinct. The petition may be filed any time except 105 days prior to a regular election or
75 days prior to a special election. The petition must be accompanied by (1) a certificate of disapproval of
his application; and (2) proof of service of notice of his petition upon the Board. The petition shall be
decided within 15 days after its filing.
Section 35 of R.A. 8189 (Petition for Exclusion)
Any registered voter, representative of a political party, or the Election Officer may file with the court a
sworn petition for the exclusion of a voter from the permanent list of voters giving the name, address,
and precinct of the challenged voter. The petition may be filed at any time except 100 days prior to a
regular election or 65 days before a special election. The petition must be accompanied by proof of notice
to the Board and to the challenged voter. The petition shall be decided within 10 days from its filing.
Section 32 of R.A. 8189 (Common Procedure)
1. A petition for inclusion, exclusion, or correction of names of voters shall be filed during office hours;
2. Notice of the place, date, and time of the hearing of the petition shall be served upon the members of
the Board and the challenged voter upon filing of the petition;
3. A petition shall refer to only one precinct and shall implead the Board as respondents;
4. No costs shall be assessed against any party in these proceedings. However, if the court should find
that the application has been filed solely to harass the adverse party and cause him to incur expenses, it
shall order the culpable party to pay the costs and incidental expenses;
5. Any voter, candidate, or political party who may be affected by the proceedings may intervene and
present his evidence;
115
6. The decision shall be based on the evidence presented and in no case rendered upon a stipulation of
facts. If the question is whether or not the voter is real or fictitious, his non-appearance on the day set for
hearing shall be prima facie evidence that the challenged voter is fictitious; and
7. The petition shall be heard and decided within ten days from the date of its filing. Cases appealed to the
RTC shall be decided within ten days from receipt of the appeal. In all cases, the court shall decide these
petitions not later than 15 days before the election and the decision shall become final and executory.
Section 33 of R.A. 8189
The Municipal and Metropolitan Trial Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases
of inclusion and exclusion of voters in their respective cities or municipalities. Decisions of the Municipal
or Metropolitan Trial Courts may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Regional Trial Court within
five (5) days from receipt of notice thereof. Otherwise, said decision shall become final and executory.
The regional trial court shall decide the appeal within ten (10) days from the time it is received and the
decision shall immediately become final and executory. No motion for reconsideration shall be
entertained.
Domino v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 134015, 1999)
Domino ran for Congress in Sarangani but his opponent filed a petition to cancel his certificate of
candidacy and claimed he had failed to meet the residency qualification. The COMELEC disqualified
Domino and cancelled his certificate of candidacy. Domino questioned the COMELECs jurisdiction
and offered up as proof of residency the MeTC of Quezon Citys factual findings that he was a resident
of Sarangani. The Court ruled that it is not within the competence of the trial court in exclusion
proceedings to declare the challenged voter as a resident of another municipality. The jurisdiction of
the trial court is limited only to determining the right of the voter to remain on the list of voters or to
declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in which he is registered,
specifying the ground for the voters disqualifications. The power to order the change or transfer of
registration from one place of residence to another rests with the Registration Board.
E. Political parties
Section 3(c) of R.A. 7941 (Party-List System Act)
A political party is an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles, and
policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public
office. It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
Section 3(d) of R.A. 7941
A sectoral party is an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas works, and other similar sectors) whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector.
Section 3(e) of R.A. 7941
A sectoral organization is a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar
physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests, or concerns.
116
117
F. Candidacy
1. Qualifications of candidates
For President and Vice President (Article VII, Section 2 of the Constitution)
1. Natural-born-citizen
2. At least 40 years old on the day of the election
3. Able to read and write
4. Registered voter
5. Resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding the day of the election
For Senator (Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution)
1. Natural-born citizen
2. At least 35 years old on the day of the election
3. Able to read and write
4. Registered voter
5. Resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the
election
For District Representatives (Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution)
1. Natural-born citizen
2. Registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected
118
3. Resident of the same district for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day
of the election
4. Able to read and write
5. At least 25 years old on the day of the election
For Elective Local Officials (Section 39 of the Local Government Code)
1. An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a
resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to
read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
2. Candidates for the position of governor, vice- governor or member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, or Mayor, vice-mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
3. Candidates for the position of Mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component
cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
4. Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan must
be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
5. Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay must be
at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
6. Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of age but not more
than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
2. Filing of certificates of candidacy
Sinaca v. Mula (G.R. No. 135691, 1999)
In the May 1998 elections, petitioner Emmanuel Sinaca was a substitute candidate for the mayoral
post of the LAKAS Matugas Wing after their original candidate, Teodoro Sinaca, Jr., was disqualified
for being convicted of bigamy. In ruling that Emmanuel Sinaca was validly substituted for the original
candidate, the Court explained that a certificate of candidacy is a statement of a person seeking to run
for a public office certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is
eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs if he belongs to any, and his
post-office address for all election purposes being well-stated.
119
a) Effect of filing
Section 11 of R.A. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369
Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a
candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided,
That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall effect only upon that start of the
aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers, and employees in governmentowned or-controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and
must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certification of candidacy.
Section 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
Section 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
If a person files two certificates of candidacy, each for a different office, the person shall not be eligible
for either office. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificate of candidacy,
the person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for
which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices.
Quinto v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 189698, 2010)
The petitioners were appointed officials who intended to run in the elections. Prior to the elections,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678 pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. 9369, which amended Section 11
of R.A. 8436. The third paragraph of Section 13 provided that all persons holding a public appointive
office would be considered ipso facto resigned from office upon filing of his certificate of candidacy.
The petitioners argued that this provision violated equal protection. Although initially the Court
agreed with them, upon MR it ruled that the provision and the COMELEC Resolution were valid.
b) Substitution of candidates
Section 13 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
If after the last day for the filing of a certificate of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered
political party dies, withdraws, or is disqualified for any cause, he may be substituted by a candidate
belonging to, and nominated by, the same political party. No substitute shall be allowed for any
independent candidate. No person who has withdrawn his candidacy for a position shall be eligible as
substitute candidate for any other position after the deadline for filing of certificates of candidacy.
c) Ministerial duty of COMELEC to receive certificate
Section 8 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
The receiving officer shall have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the
certificates of candidacy or nomination by registered political parties or coalition of political parties on
or before the deadline for filing of certificates of candidacy, provided said certificates are under oath
and contain all the required data and in the form prescribed by the Commission.
EXCEPTIONS: When the COMELEC may refuse or cancel a certificate of candidacy (as found in B.P. 881)
1. Section 68 (when candidates are disqualified)
120
121
122
G. Campaign
Section 79 of B.P. 811
(a) The term candidate refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has
filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or
coalition of parties;
(b) The term election campaign or partisan political activity refers to an act designed to promote the
election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate;
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election
of any candidate for public office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the
election of any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
The foregoing enumerated acts if performed for the purpose of enhancing the chances of aspirants for
nomination for candidacy to a public office by a political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties shall
not be considered as election campaign or partisan election activity. Public expressions or opinions or
discussions of probable issues in a forthcoming election or on attributes of or criticisms against probable
candidates proposed to be nominated in a forthcoming political party convention shall not be construed
as part of any election campaign or partisan political activity contemplated under this Article.
1. Premature campaigning
Section 80 of B.P. 881
It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or
association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during
the campaign period: Provided, That political parties may hold political conventions or meetings to
nominate their official candidates within thirty days before the commencement of the campaign
period and forty-five days for Presidential and Vice-Presidential election.
Penera v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 131613, 2009)
Penera was disqualified as a mayoralty candidate for engaging in election campaigning before the
campaign period. The Court ruled in her favor. A candidate is any person aspiring for or seeking an
elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy. Any person who files a certificate of
candidacy within the period for filing shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Accordingly, a candidate is only liable
for an election offense for acts done during the campaign period, not before. Any unlawful act or
omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period, when
partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate. Before the start of the campaign period, the
same partisan political acts are lawful.
123
2. Prohibited contributions
Section 94(a) of B.P. 881
The term contribution includes a gift, donation, subscription, loan, advance or deposit of money or
anything of value, or a contract, promise or agreement to contribute, whether or not legally
enforceable, made for the purpose of influencing the results of the elections but shall not include
services rendered without compensation by individuals volunteering a portion or all of their time in
behalf of a candidate or political party. It shall also include the use of facilities voluntarily donated by
other persons, the money value of which can be assessed based on the rates prevailing in the area.
Section 95 of B.P. 881
No contribution for purposes of partisan political activity shall be made directly or indirectly by any
of the following:
(a) Public or private financial institutions: Provided, however, That nothing herein shall prevent the
making of any loan to a candidate or political party by any such public or private financial institutions
legally in the business of lending money, and that the loan is made in accordance with laws and
regulations and in the ordinary course of business;
(b) Natural and juridical persons operating a public utility or in possession of or exploiting any
natural resources of the nation;
(c) Natural and juridical persons who hold contracts or sub-contracts to supply the government or
any of its divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities, with goods or services or to perform
construction or other works;
(d) Natural and juridical persons who have been granted franchises, incentives, exemptions,
allocations or similar privileges or concessions by the government or any of its divisions, subdivisions
or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations;
(e) Natural and juridical persons who, within one year prior to the date of the election, have been
granted loans or other accommodations in excess of P100,000 by the government or any of its
divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities including government-owned or controlled corporations;
(f) Educational institutions which have received grants of public funds amounting to no less than
P100,000.00;
(g) Officials or employees in the Civil Service, or members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; and
(h) Foreigners and foreign corporations.
It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or receive any contribution from any of the persons or
entities enumerated herein.
124
125
4. Limitations on expenses
Section 13 of R.A. 7166 (An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for
Electoral Reforms)
The amount that a candidate or registered political party may spend for election campaign shall be as
follows:
1. For candidates. - Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice-President; and for other candidates
Three Pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where he filed his
certificate of candidacy: Provided, That a candidate without any political party and without support
from any political party may be allowed to spend Five Pesos (P5.00) for every such voter; and
2. For political parties. - Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency or
constituencies where it has official candidates.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding any contribution in cash or in kind to any
candidate or political party or coalition of parties for campaign purposes, duly reported to the
Commission shall not be subject to the payment of any gift tax.
5. Statement of contributions and expenses
Section 14 of R.A. 7166
Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within 30 days after the election, file in
duplicate with the offices of the Commission, the full, true, and itemized statement of all contributions
and expenditures in connection with the election. No person elected to any public office shall enter
upon the duties of his office until he and the political party that nominated him has filed the statement
of contributions and expenditures required by law. Except candidates for elective barangay office,
failure to file the statements or reports shall constitute an administrative offense. For a second or
subsequent offenses, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
Pilar v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 115245, 1995)
Pilar ran for a position in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Isabela but subsequently withdrew his
candidacy. The COMELEC fined him for his failure to file his statement of contributions and expenses.
The Court ruled in favor of the COMELEC and explained that candidates who withdrew after the filing
of their certificates of candidacy are still required to comply with the filing of statement of all
contributions and expenses.
H. Board of Election Inspectors and Board of Canvassers
1. Composition
Section 164 of B.P. 881
At least thirty days before the date when the voters list is to be prepare in accordance with this Code,
in the case of a regular election or fifteen days before a special election, the Commission shall, directly
or through its duly authorized representatives, constitute a board of election inspectors for each
precinct to be composed of a chairman and a poll clerk who must be public school teachers, priority to
be given to civil service eligibles, and two members, each representing the two accredited political
parties. The appointment shall state the precinct to which they are assigned and the date of the
appointment.
126
127
128
129
5. Election protest
Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804
Section 1
The Commission on Elections, through any of its Divisions, shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all election protests involving elective regional (the autonomous regions), provincial, and city
officials.
Section 2
A petition contesting the elections or returns of an elective regional, provincial, or city official shall be
filed with the Commission by any candidate who was voted for in the same office and who received
the second of third highest number of votes or, in a multi-slot position, was among the next four
candidates following the last ranked winner duly proclaimed, as reflected in the official results of the
election contained in the Statement of Votes. The party filing the protest shall be designated as the
protestant; the adverse party shall be known as the protestee.
Section 3
An election protest or petition for quo warranto shall be filed directly with the Commission in ten (10)
legible copies plus such number of copies corresponding to the number of protestees, within a nonextendible period of ten days following the date of proclamation. Each contest shall refer exclusively
to one office but contents for offices of the Sangguniang Pampook, Sangguniang Panlalawigan or
Sangguniang Panglungsod may be consolidated in one case.
Section 4
Service and filing of pleadings, including the initiatory petition and other papers, shall be done
personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the Commission, a resort to other modes of
service must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done
personally. A violation of this Rule shall be a cause to consider the pleading or paper as not filed.
Section 5
An election protest shall be verified by an affidavit stating that the affiant has read the petition and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of affiant's own knowledge or based on authentic
records. A verification based on information and belief or upon the knowledge, information and
belief is not a sufficient verification. The protestant shall personally sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping which must be annexed to the election protest. An unverified petition or one with
insufficient verification or unaccompanied by a certificate of non-forum shopping shall be dismissed
outright and shall not suspend the running of the reglementary period to file an election protest.
Section 6
The pendency of a pre-proclamation controversy involving the validity of the proclamation as defined
by law shall suspend the running of the period to file an election protest.
130
6. Quo warranto
Section 253 of B.P. 881
Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or
city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a
sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the
results of the election. Any voter contesting the election of any municipal or barangay officer on the
ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for
quo warranto with the regional trial court or metropolitan or municipal trial court, respectively,
within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.
Section 7 of Rule 6, COMELEC Resolution No. 8804
An election protest or petition for quo warranto shall specifically state the following facts:
a) The position involved
b) That the protestant was a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been
voted for the same office.
c) The date of proclamation; and
d) The number of votes credited to the parties per proclamation.
An election protest shall also state:
e) The total number of precincts of the region, province or city concerned;
f) The protested precincts and votes of the parties in the protested precincts per the Statement of
Votes By Precinct or, if the votes of the parties are not specified an explanation why the votes are not
specified;
g) A detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of showing the electoral frauds,
anomalies or irregularities in the protested precincts.
Villamor v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 169865, 2006)
Villamor won as mayor and his opponent filed a pre-proclamation protest. Not content, his opponent
also filed an election protest. The Court ruled in Villamors favor and explained that the filing of an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto generally has the effect of barring the subsequent filing
of a pre-proclamation controversy or petition to annul proclamation. It also amounts to the
abandonment of any pre-proclamation controversy or petition to annul proclamation filed earlier,
depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the
validity of his proclamation. Once the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction over an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be decided in the case
itself and not in another proceeding.
Dumayas, Jr. v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 141952-53, 2001)
Dumayas and Bernal were rivals for a mayoralty post. After moving (in a motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC) to declare Dumayas proclamation invalid, Bernal filed a case for quo warranto
against him. The Court dismissed Dumayas petition, which claimed that by filing the quo warranto
Bernal had abandoned his motion for reconsideration. In certain cases, a pre-proclamation
controversy may still proceed notwithstanding the filing of an election protest or petition for quo
warranto, to wit:
1. What is filed in not really a quo warranto or election protest but a petition to annul a proclamation
2. Quo warranto is not the proper remedy
3. The BOC is improperly constituted
131
4. The filing of a quo warranto or an election protest is expressly made without prejudice to preproclamation contest, or is made ad cautelam
5. The proclamation is null and void
J. Prosecution of election offenses
Section 261 of B.P. 881 enumerates and details 30 different election offenses. Please consult codal
for full list.
132
d. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
A. PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
1. CONCEPT
a) Distinguished from government-owned or controlled corporations
Province of Negros Occidental v. COA (2010)
Facts: The Commission on Audit (COA), in conformity with Republic Act 6758 (concerning the policy of
standardization of compensation), did not allow the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental to
implement its Resolution 720A which allocated the provinces retained earnings to the health care and
hospitalization of provincial officials and employees. COA says such allocation would require the
approval of the President.
Doctrine: Presidential approval is not required as it applies only to government offices/agencies,
government-owned and controlled corporations and their respective governing boards which are under
the control of the President. LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the President,
and as such, the President's authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are
faithfully executed. The President cannot lay down the rules, nor can he modify or replace them.
2. CLASSIFICATIONS
a) Quasi-corporations
MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association (2000)
Facts: The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) sent a letter to the Bel-Air Village
Association requesting the latter to open its private road (Neptune street) to the public and informing it
that its perimeter wall adjacent to Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
Doctrine: The MMDAs power is limited to administration and implementation of metro-wide services in
Metro Manila and is not a Local Government Unit nor a public corporation endowed with legislative
power nor police power to enact ordinances for the closure or opening of roads. It can only lay down
policies and coordinate with various agencies, as well as the private sector.
MMDA v. Dante Garin (2005)
Facts: Atty. Garins drivers license was confiscated by the MMDA for illegal parking in Manila, pursuant
to Sec. 5(f) of Republic Act 7924 granting the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke
drivers licenses without need of any other legislative enactment.
Doctrine: The MMDAs power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses is construed to mean
enforcing existing traffic rules and regulations and thus, it can only can only confiscate or suspend
drivers licenses pursuant to existing traffic laws and regulations enacted by Congress or, in this case, the
City of Manila and not without need of any other legislative enactment. The MMDA is not a political unit
of government and does not possess police power nor the power to legislate.
133
134
Doctrine: Zoning classification is an exercise by the local government unit of its police power and not the
power of eminent domain. Per Sec. 20 of the Local Government Code, the authority to reclassify land
primarily resides in the sanggunian of the city or municipality, and as the Ordinance has already
reclassified the land in this case to a residential area, it is no longer covered by CARP.
3. Requisites for creation, conversion, division, merger or dissolution
Population Requirement
Aldaba v. COMELEC (2010)
Facts: : Congress enacted Republic Act 9151 creating Malolos City using the projected population rate
instead of the current population rate to meet the population criteria in the Constitution.
Doctrine: Republic Act 9151 is unconstitutional because the Constitution requires an actual population
of 250,000 at the time of the citys creation.
Territory Requirement
Navarro v. Ermita (2010)
Facts: Navarro, et al. claim that Republic Act 9355, which creates the province of Dinagat Island, is
unconstitutional because it failed to comply with the land area requirement as the said province only has
a total land area of 802.12 sq. km.
Doctrine: Republic Act 9355 is unconstitutional because it failed to meet the land area requirement of at
least 2,000 sq. km. (the area need not be contiguous) as stipulated in the Local Government Code(LGC).
The Constitution mandates that the creation of Local Government Units must follow the criteria provided
in the LGC or else it will violate of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
135
Creation by Legislation
League of Cities v. COMELEC (2008)
Facts: Congress enacted into law Republic Act 9009 which increased the annual requirement for
conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million, but nevertheless approved 16
cityhood bills exempting them from the P100 million requirement.
Doctrine: The 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional for not complying with the P100 million income
requirement. Congress can only prescribe the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government
Code and not in any other law (i.e. Cityhood laws). Since RA 9009 was enacted prior to the cityhood bills
then the cityhood bills should observe the same criteria.
136
their own, having proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective
provinces (by being tourism spots, centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of
transportation, and havens of agricultural, mineral and other natural resources).
137
autonomous regions must consist of more than one province, as the term region used in its ordinary
sense means two or more provinces. Further, it can be seen from Republic Act 6766 (Organic Act of the
CAR) that Congress never intended that a single province can constitute an autonomous region;
otherwise, the province will be composed of two sets of officials: one for the Ifugao Local Government
Unit and another set of regional officials for the CAR, both of whom will be exercising executive and
legislative powers over the same area.
Plebiscite Requirement
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC (2008)
Facts: Rogelio Bagabuyo argued that Republic Act 9371, which increased the legislative districts of
Cagayan de Oro from one to two, is not merely a legislative apportionment; hence, a plebiscite has to be
conducted per Sec. 8 of the Local Government Code.
Doctrine: A plebiscite is not required because what is involved is only a legislative apportionment. The
Constitution and LGC expressly require a plebiscite to effect any creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundary of a Local Government Unit (LGU) and since a legislative district is not a local
government unit or a political subdivision, no plebiscite is required for the creation, dissolution or other
similar actions on legislative districts.
138
principal question of the cityhood of Novaliches. Furthermore, the official statements of the
representatives from the Bureau of Local Government Finance and the NSO testifying that the combined
annual income and population of the fifteen barangays satisfied the requirements of the Local
Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations served the same purpose as the required
certifications. There was no need to consider the land area since the proposed city must comply with
requirements on income and population or land area. Though the law did not provide for a seat of
government, this is not fatal as under Sec. 12 of the Local Government Code, the City of Novaliches can
still establish a seat of government after its creation. Also, the chief executive of Quezon City, Mayor
Mathay, did not raise any adverse issue during the public hearings on the law in question, showing that
the creation of Novaliches City did not have any perceived adverse effect on Quezon City.
139
140
141
142
143
144
The Learning Center and Spouses Alfonso v. Ayala Alabang Homeowners Association (2010)
Facts: The Ayala-Alabang Homeowners Association sued the spouses Alfredo for breach of contract
because the spouses built a grade school on the property in addition to the preparatory school indicated
in the title. The spouses argued that the association had no basis to enforce the restriction in the title as
an ordinance had been passed reclassifying the land on which the grade school was built from residential
to institutional.
Doctrine: Although the land had validly been classified as institutional by the zoning ordinance, the
restriction must still be upheld because the land was situated within a residential area. The increased
traffic that would be brought about by the expansion of preparatory school (with the addition of the
grade school) would effectively prevent the adjacent property owners from enjoying their own
properties.
145
subject (i.e., the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
the interference of the State), and there was used 2) a lawful method (since the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals). The Sanggunian was compelled to take measures to protect the residents
of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan terminals. Lastly,
only the use of the properties as oil terminals was restricted, as the corporations may still use the said
properties for other purposes.
146
147
148
condemning party and the property owner consistent with such benefit. The ascertainment of the
necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land. In this case, there was no
genuine necessity for the expropriation because the sports and recreation facility envisioned to be built
was not for a public purpose but merely for the exclusive use of the residents of the Melendres
Compound Homeowners Association.
149
pursuant to an ordinance.
150
located within Metro Manila. Thereafter, Congress enacted Republic Act 7633 which restored the realty
tax exemption granted by Bayantels original franchise. The Quezon City government enacted a local
Revenue Code, imposing real property tax on all real properties in its territorial jurisdiction and thus
expressly withdrew all tax exemption privileges in general.
Doctrine: Bayantel is exempt from realty taxes on its properties that are actually, directly and
exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise. Congress may grant a tax exemption previously
withdrawn by the LGC. Despite the fact that Sec. 5, Article X of the Constitution gives local legislative
bodies the power to tax, their exercise of this power may be subject to guidelines and limitations as
Congress may provide. Thus, the power to tax is still primarily vested in Congress. Through Sec. 232 of
the Local Government Code which provides that a province or city or municipality within the
Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem tax on real propertynot hereinafter
specifically exempted, the Congress highlighted its power to thereafter exempt certain realties from the
taxing power of local government units. The use, in turn, of the same phrase exclusive of this franchise
in Republic Act 7633, which was the basis for Bayantes exemption from realty taxes prior to the LGC,
shows the intention on the part of Congress to once again remove from the LGCs delegated taxing power
all of the franchisees properties actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise.
MIAA v. CA (2006)
Facts: The Office of Government Corporate Counsel withdrew the tax exemption enjoyed by the Manila
International Airport Authority (or the MIAA, whose charter exempts it from real estate tax) arguing that
Sec. 193 of the Local Government Code (LGC) expressly withdraws the tax exemption privileges of
government-owned and controlled corporations.
Doctrine: MIAA, not being a government-owned and controlled corporation, is exempt from real estate
tax because it is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers. An instrumentality refers
to any agency of the National Government not integrated within the department framework, vested with
special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. Sec. 133 of the LGC states
that the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays shall not extend to the levy of
taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities. This
constitutes a limitation imposed by Congress on the local governments exercise of the power to tax.
Furthermore, the power of local governments to tax national government instrumentalities is construed
strictly against local governments and the rule is that a tax is never presumed and that there must be
clear language in the law imposing the tax.
151
sources of revenue and they no longer have to wait for a statutory grant of these powers. In interpreting
statutory provisions on municipal fiscal powers, doubts will be resolved in favor of municipal
corporations. In this case, the in lieu of other taxes provision does not expressly provide in clear and
unambiguous language what kind of taxes ABS-CBN is exempted from, and as a claim of tax exemption is
not favored nor presumed in law but must be clearly shown, ABS-CBN is liable for Quezon Citys
franchise tax.
152
Doctrine: Smart is liable to pay Davaos franchise tax because its legislative franchise did not expressly
provide the specific taxes from which it was exempt. The in lieu of all taxes clause in Smarts legislative
franchise did not expressly and categorically state that the exemption applies to both local and national
taxes and thus, the phrase in question must be applied only to national internal revenue taxes. Tax
exemptions are never presumed and are construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of
the taxing authority.
4. Closure and opening of roads
Favis v. City of Baguio (1969)
Facts: The City Council of Baguio passed a resolution permitting the lease of two city lots to Shell, which
caused the street used by Favis as his ingress/egress to be diminished.
Doctrine: The resolution is valid because the city is empowered by its Charter to close or reduce the size
of a city street. By the resolution, no right of the public is defeated (the portion leased to Shell not being
necessary for public use). The power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary and will not ordinarily be
controlled or interfered with by the courts, unless there be fraud or collusion. In determining the
advisability of closing a street, the municipality must consider the following: a) the topography of the
property surrounding the street in light of ingress and egress to other streets, b) the relationship of the
street in the road system throughout the subdivision, c) the problem posed by the dead end of the
street, d) the width of the street, e) the cost of rebuilding and maintaining the street as contrasted to its
ultimate value to all of the property in the vicinity, d) inconvenience of those visiting the subdivision, and
e) whether the closing of the street would cut off any property owners from access to a street.
Sanggalang v. IAC (1989)
Facts: The Bel-Air Village Association contested the action of the Mayor of Makati of ordering the
opening of Jupiter street to the public to decongest traffic and for public convenience, arguing that Jupiter
Street is for the exclusive use of Bel-Air residents.
Doctrine: The Mayors act is valid because in this case, the city has the power to open a city street for
public use. Despite loss of privacy among Bel-Air residents, more important than this is the duty of a local
executive to take care of the needs of the majority at the expense of the minority.
5. Legislative power
a) Requisites for valid ordinance
b) Local initiative and referendum
6. Corporate powers
a) To sue and be sued
153
Doctrine: The CIR has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case since the City of Manila, through the
Department of Public Services (in which the laborers worked), performed governmental functions (i.e.,
functions where it does not obtain pecuniary profit but only acts in the interest of health, safety and
advancement of the public good or welfare as affecting the public generally) and therefore acted as an
agent of the state and is immune from suit, unless it gives express consent to be sued.
Calleja v. CA (1967)
Facts: Calleja, a civil service employee whose position was abolished by the municipal council of Iriga for
lack of funds, filed an action for mandamus against the Municipality of Iriga, which was granted. A copy of
the decision was given to the Provincial Fiscal representing Iriga but the notice of appeal and appeal
bond was filed not by the Provincial Fiscal but by the municipal attorney. Calleja argued that it was only
the Provincial Fiscal who could represent Iriga.
Doctrine: The municipal attorney of a municipality is a legal officer of the municipality and thus, can
represent the same. Sec. 3, paragraph 3 (a) of Republic Act 2264 provides that the municipality may
create the office of Municipal Attorney who shall act as the legal counsel of the municipality. In addition,
the Municipal Council of Iriga passed Resolution 36 which provides that the Municipal Attorney shall be
the chief legal adviser of the municipality and has the duty to represent the municipality or any municipal
officer who is a party in a case in his official capacity.
154
situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. Here, the Provincial Board would
never have given authorization for the hiring of a private attorney. Furthermore, even if the provincial
fiscal should side with the governor in the filing of the case in question, the provincial board, whose
members are defendants in this case, can simply frustrate his efforts by directing him to dismiss the case
or by refusing to appropriate funds for the expenses of the litigation. Thus, this case falls under the
situation where a private attorney may be hired by the municipality as the provincial fiscal is disqualified
to represent it.
155
supported by Sec. 9 of the Caloocan City Charter which provides that the mayor has the power to
institute judicial proceedings to recover property and funds of the city. However, since the mayor is the
proper party to file such suits, he should necessarily be the one to sign the certification against forumshopping and not the City Legal Officer who was merely the Citys counsel and not a party to the case.
c) To enter into contracts
(i) Requisites
Vice Mayor Vicencio v. COA Chairman Villar, et al. (2012)
Facts: The new Vice Mayor, Vicencio, used Ordinance 15-2003 (authorizing then Vice Mayor Yambao to
enter into contracts for consultancy services) to also enter into a new contract for consultancy services
Doctrine: Vice Mayor Vicencio had no authority to enter into new consultancy contracts using Ordinance
15-2003, as the said Ordinance is not a continuing authority for any person who enters the Office of the
Vice Mayor to enter into subsequent, albeit similar, contracts. Sec. 456 of the Local Government Code
provides that there is no inherent authority on the part of the city Vice Mayor to enter into contracts on
behalf of the local government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor.
(ii) Ultra vires contracts
Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. Province of Aklan, et al. (2012)
Facts: Boracay Foundation, Inc. argues that the favorable endorsement of the local government units
(LGUs) of Barangay Caticlan and Malay Municipality pursuant to the consultation procedures as required
by Local Government Code (LGC) was not obtained by the Province of Aklan, and that there were no
proper consultations entered into with the concerned LGUs when the Sangguniang Bayan of Caticlan
issued a resolution stating its strong opposition on the expansion of the port facilities at Caticlan.
Doctrine: There was no proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the project. Sec. 16 of the
LGC provides that it is the duty of LGUs to promote the peoples right to a balanced ecology, and it is the
duty of national government agencies in the maintenance of ecological balance to secure prior public
consultation and approval of the LGUs for these projects. As such, the projects implementation was
illegal.
7. Liability of LGUs
Filinvest Land Inc. v. Flood-affected Homeowners of Meritville Alliance (2007)
Facts: Homeowners of Meritville filed a complaint against Filinvest Land, Inc. (developer of Meritville)
because their lots were always flooded during the typhoon season allegedly due to the latters negligence.
Doctrine: Sec. 17 of the Local Government Code makes local government units responsible for providing
basic services and facilities (including those that deal with drainage, sewerage and flood control). As it is
the Naga River which overflows and causes flooding, and as the said river is public property, it is the
responsibility of the government, particularly the city government of Las Pias City, to devise and
implement flood-control measures to address the problem.
156
157
158
159
160
161
appeal issued by the MTC in favor of Fermo, the MTCs decision proclaiming Fermo as winner of the
election was stayed and the status quo or when Laxina was occupying the office of Barangay Captain
was restored. As such, the re-taking of his oath was a mere formality, because through the stay of the
MTCs decision, it was as if the writ of execution was not issued and he was not ousted from office.
162
Doctrine: Amora should not be disqualified as Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code does not specify
that a defective notarization is a ground for the disqualification of a candidate. Furthermore, since Amora
and the Notary Public knew each other, there was no need for competent evidence of identity, and the
notary public only needs to indicate that he/she personally knows the candidate.
163
includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment, but likewise those who, after
being charged, flee to avoid persecution. Rodriguez is not a fugitive from justice as his arrival in the
Philippines from the United States preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court
and of the issuance of the arrest warrant by the same court by almost five months. There was thus no
intent to evade (which is compelling factor which causes ones flight from a particular jurisdiction) since
there can only be such when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment
or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
164
165
effect of which will be the prohibition of the person from continuing as a candidate) or to a petition to
deny due course to, or cancel, a certificate of candidacy grounded on a statement of a material
representation in the said certificate that is false (the effect of which is the cancellation or denial of due
course of the persons certificate, with the said person not treated as a candidate at all as if she never
filed a COC). A person whose COC was cancelled does not give rise to a valid candidacy and therefore
cannot be substituted by another person.
166
(ii) Jurisdiction
167
complaint was filed first with the Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman opted to assume jurisdiction over
the complaint, the Ombudsmans exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the Sangguniang Bayan
exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
168
Doctrine: The suspension is mandatory under RA 3019. Section 13 of RA 3019 provides that the
suspension of a public officer upon the filing of a valid information is mandatory. Preventive suspension
is not violative of the Constitution as it is not a penalty.
Ganzon v. CA (1991)
Facts: Mayor Ganzon, who was given a 60-day preventive suspension and three more suspension orders
due to the finding of probable cause in the ten administrative complaints that he faced, claims that the
President and his agents (in this case, the Department of Interior and Local Government) no longer have
the power to suspend a local official because the phrase as may be provided by law (in relation to the
exercise by the President of the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials) has been
removed in the 1987 Constitution.
Doctrine: The deletion of the phrase as may be provided by law did not divest the President of the
power to investigate, discipline, or remove local officials as the President can still suspend a local official
but, such must be consistent with law. Thus, Congress maintains its control over municipal corporations,
although it may delegate such power to the President. However, only one suspension order should have
been imposed in this case as ten suspension orders would prevent the mayor from performing his
functions. The suspension is not meant to serve as a penalty but merely to prevent the accused from
influencing the course of the investigation.
169
(iv) Removal
SB of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos v. Punong Barangay Severino Martinez (2008)
Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan penalized Barangay Captain Martinez by removing him from office
because of an administrative charge of Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and Violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act filed against the Barangay Captain.
Doctrine: The Sangguniang Bayan can not remove Martinez from office. Sec. 60 of the Local Government
Code provides that the power to remove elective local officials from office is lodged with the courts.
(v) Administrative appeal
Catu v. Rellosa (2008)
Facts: Rellosa, the Punong Barangay, represented one of the parties involved in a complaint against the
tenants of the building owned by the Catus after the conciliation meeting that Rellosa arranged failed.
170
Doctrine: Rellosa may appear as counsel of two of the parties subject to authorization from the
Department of Interior and Local Government. Although Section 90 of Republic Act 7160 (The Local
Government Code) provides that local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their
functions as local chief executives, punong barangays are not mentioned in this prohibition in the Local
Government Code. Therefore, Rellosa as Punong Barangay was not forbidden to practice his profession.
However, he violated the Revised Civil Service Rules, particularly Sec. 12 which prohibits officers or
employees from directly engaging in any private business, vocation or profession without written
permission from the head of the department. As punong barangay, Rellosa should have obtained prior
written permission from the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before entering his appearance
as counsel of two of the parties.
171
such publication shall be posted by the chief personnel or administrative officer of all local government
units in the designated places. The vacant positions may only be filled by the appointing authority after
they have been reported to the CSC as vacant, and only after publication. In this case, the publication of
vacancies was made even before the positions involved actually became vacant.
Montuerto v. Ty (2008)
Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan requested the Civil Service Commission to revoke the appointment of
Montuerto as Budget Officer as it was not with the concurrence of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Doctrine: Montuertos appointment was invalid. Sec. 443(a) and (d) of the Local Government Code
provides that the head of a department or office in the municipal government, such as the Municipal
Budget Officer, shall be appointed by the mayor with the concurrence of the majority of all Sangguniang
Bayan members subject to civil service law, rules and regulations.
172
173
174
Doctrine: Banate, Jr., not being a Barangay Captain and never having been elected president of the
association of barangay councils, cannot be appointed a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod as an
unqualified person cannot be appointed a member even in an acting capacity. Sec 3, par. 1 of Batas
Pambansa 51 provides that one has to be a barangay chairman and president of the barangacy councils to
be qualified. Since the appointment of Ignacios successor (Banate) is invalid, Ignacios tenure could not
be terminated on the basis of such appointment.
175
176
The use of the word involving signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of assistance or
activities having to do with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or technical assistance.
Service contracts were not banned under the 1987 Constitution.
Agrarian Reform
Urban Land Reform and Housing
Organization and Regulation of Private Corporations
Operation of Public Utilities
On Mass Media and Advertising Industry
Practice of Professions
State Operation of Private Enterprises
Agan v. Piatco (2004)
The consortium that eventually became PIATCO was awarded the NAIA III terminal project. As a
consequence, it entered into a Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement
of the NAIA Passenger Terminal III (1997 Concession Agreement). The Government granted PIATCO the
franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period and to collect the fees,
rentals and other charges in accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997 Concession
Agreement. The Agreement provided that the concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) years
commencing from the in-service date, and may be renewed at the option of the Government for a period
not exceeding twenty-five (25) years. At the end of the concession period, PIATCO shall transfer the
development facility to MIAA.
Meanwhile, the MIAA which was charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA Terminals I
and II, had existing concession contracts with various service providers to offer international airline
airport services. This led the employees of the service providers to file a petition for prohibition. Several
employees of MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the legality of the various agreements.
On the issue of whether or not the State can temporarily take over a business affected with public
interest, the SC held in this case that it could not. PIATCO could not, by mere contractual stipulation,
contravene the Constitutional provision on temporary government takeover and obligate the government
to pay reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal and/or Terminal Complex.
Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides that in times of national emergency, when the
public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed
by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest. The national emergency contemplated in that provision was defined to
include threat from external aggression, calamities or national disasters, but not strikes unless it is of
such proportion that it would paralyze government service. The duration of the emergency is the
determining factor as to how long the temporary takeover of the government will last.
177
178
The SC held that the right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a
final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and
should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets, and
similar matters affecting national security and public order.
f. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
g. EDUCATION, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS
h. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
Guidelines
Please note that there are a number of cases that come up frequently in the study of international
law because they are rich with information and helpful explanations on different aspects of
international law (e.g. North Sea Case, Nicaragua v. United States). For the purpose of this
reference material, these cases have been distilled to provide only the very basic doctrines
relevant to the subject being discussed and necessary to have a comprehensive understanding of
international law. A greater appreciation of the teachings of these cases can only be reached by
reading the cases in full.
A. International Law and National Law
International Law (IL) is a body of principles, norms, and processes which regulates the relations
of states and other international persons, and governs their conduct affecting the interests of the
international community of states as a whole. (Magallona)
The development of IL follows the actual use of rules described as rules of IL by governments. All
normal governments employ experts to provide routine and other advice on matters of IL and
constantly define their relations with other states in terms of IL. Governments and their officials
routinely use rules which they have for a long time called the law of nations or international
law. Reference by governments to international law has been part of the normal process of
decision-making. (Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 1998 Edition)
International law is that law which deals with the conduct of states and of international
organizations and with their relations inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons,
whether natural or juridical. (Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States)
179
Table 1. Comparison of International Law and National/Municipal Law (Based on the discussion in
Bernas, Introduction to Public International Law)
International
National
Source
Found in treaties and Product of local custom or of
customs
grown
among legislation
states
Relations Regulated
Regulates relations between Regulates relations between
states
individual persons under the
state
Substance
A law between sovereign A law of a sovereign over
states
individuals
Based on existing treaties, when there is a conflict between international and national law, the
rule provided in international law must prevail:
However, domestic law still has an impact on international law. As will be discussed further under
Sources of International Law, domestic law can be a source of international law if it propounds a
rule or custom generally accepted by domestic legal systems.
180
Note!
In certain cases, the ICJ will render a decision on a dispute without actually applying any of the foregoing
sources of international law. This happens when the Court declares that there is nothing on which to
give judgment, such as when the object of the claim has disappeared.
CASE
Nuclear Test Cases (New Zealand v. France, Australia v. France, 1974)
France was conducting atmospheric nuclear tests over the South Pacific, prompting complaints from
Australia and New Zealand. The Court ruled that since France, through its President and Minister of
Defense, had made several public statements that the testing would cease, the object of the dispute
ceased to exist. When it is the intention of a state making a declaration that it should be bound according
to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the state being
legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with its declaration.
SOURCES OF LAW DIFFERENTIATED
1. International Conventions refer to law-making treaties and other similar sources.
Treaties create legal obligations, the non-observance of which by individual states will not dissolve the
obligations.
Note! (Exception)
Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on Treaties
Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens)
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general
international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole
as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm
of general international law having the same character.
Examples:
The Hague Convention of 1899 and 1907 on the Law of War and Neutrality
The Geneva Protocol of 1925 of Prohibited Weapons
2. International Custom (or Customary Law) States create law by what they do in practice or by their
conduct, believing that their practice or conduct is obligatory. In order for customary law to form, States
must act with the belief that the practice is required by law, and not because of courtesy or political
expediency. (Magallona)
Elements of Customary Law
a. Uniformity, consistency, and generality of practice complete uniformity, consistency, and
generality is not required. Rather, it must be established by a party relying on this custom that this
custom has been established and is binding on the other party. (See Asylum Case and Colombia v.
Peru in case list below) Evidence of uniform, consistent, and general state practice may be
established in numerous ways, e.g. the presentation of bilateral treaties, conclusions of
international conferences, and resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.
181
b. Opinio juris et necessitatis the belief on the part of States that a particular custom or conduct is
obligatory
* On duration of practice Duration is not necessarily an element for the establishment of customary law.
(See North Sea Case below) However, it may be used as evidence of uniform, consistent, and general
practice by States.
Note! (Exception)
While a custom is coming to be established, the emerging custom will not be binding upon a state that is a
persistent objector. Evidence of the states objection to the practice must be clear and consistent. (See
North Sea Case below)
CASES
Kuroda v. Jalandoni (1949, Philippine case)
Kuroda was charged with war crimes following the Japanese Occupation. Kuroda argued that since the
Philippines was not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land
Warfare, the crimes he was charged with were not based on law. The Supreme Court ruled that the rules
and regulations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally
accepted principles of international law, hence these rules became part of Philippine law despite the
Philippines status as non-signatory to the relevant Conventions.
Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States, 1986, International Court of Justice)
Nicaragua instituted proceedings against the United States in relation to military and paramilitary
activities in and against Nicaragua. In response to Nicaraguas invocation of the customary prohibition on
the use of force, the United States argued that the customary exception to the prohibition is the right to
individual and collective self-defense. The ICJ first made a clear pronouncement as to the prohibition on
the use of force as a well-established rule in customary IL (since both Nicaragua and the United States
practiced and displayed belief in its status as law) before acknowledging that there was an exception to
this general rule.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969)
Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands were in dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf
they shared. Denmark and the Netherlands argued that the use of the equidistance principle in
delimitation was a principle of customary or general IL, binding on Germany. The Court ruled that
Germany was not bound to use the equidistance principle because this principle was not a principle of
customary law. While the Court acknowledged that a customary rule could evolve in a relatively short
period of time, what was material was whether there was extensive and substantially uniform state
practice particularly among states whose interests were specially affected. There was no evidence that
the equidistance principle was consistently used to delineate the continental shelf of states in dispute
over it. On the contrary, Germany had persistently objected to the use of the equidistance principle.
Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru, 1950, International Court of Justice)
Colombia unilaterally granted a Peruvian rebel asylum in the Colombian embassy in Peru. In defense of
its action, Colombia argued that diplomatic asylum (where the refugee is in the territory of the state
where the offense was committed) was a principle of customary law and presented numerous treaties
and conventions on extradition as evidence. While the Court acknowledged the conventions, it ruled that
182
due to the limited number of states which had ratified the conventions, diplomatic asylum was not yet a
principle of customary law.
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Advisory Opinion of the ICJ,
1996)
The question posed to the Court by the United Nations General Assembly was: Is the threat or use of
nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under IL? The Court ruled that there was no rule in
customary IL which permits or prohibits the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The Court noted that the
members of the international community were divided on the matter of nuclear weapons, making it
difficult to determine uniform practice or even opinio juris. Instead the Court held that the use of nuclear
weapons should be subject to the same rules and restraints as other weapons (e.g. necessity and
proportionality under international humanitarian law), regardless of the unique nature of nuclear
weapons.
The Case of the Paquete Habana (American Case, 1900)
During the Spanish-American War, two Spanish fishing vessels were seized by the American navy while
they were fishing off the coast of Cuba. The fishermen were treated as prisoners of war and their cargo
seized. The Court ruled that while there was no specific law, statute, or treaty exempting fishing boats
from capture during wartime, it was an ancient rule of custom that nations were to leave fishing vessels
alone. By tracing the origins of the custom, the Court found that it was a custom between civilized nations
to leave fishing vessels alone even during wartime, and this custom had ripened into a rule of
international law.
The Case Concerning the Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India, 1960)
Portugal claimed a right of passage between its territory of Damao to its landlocked territories of Dadra
and Nagar-Aveli, both of which were surrounded by Indian territory. The Court held that Portugal could
claim a right of passage based on long-standing local custom between India and Portugal themselves. A
customary rule may develop to bind two states and impose mutual rights and obligations, provided that it
is shown this was a long-held practice between the two states and accepted by them as regulating their
relations.
Salonga v. Executive Secretary (Philippine Case, 2009)
Daniel Smith was moved from the Makati City Jail to a detention cell in the US Embassy. The Court held
that it was a customary rule that foreign armed forces allowed to enter a states territory are immune
from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The VFA, which was the relevant agreement,
provided that while Smith could be in US custody pending trial, in the event of a conviction he should be
detained by Philippine authorities.
3. General Principles of Law while general principles of law may include rules of customary law, they
are primarily rules that have become so well-established and accepted that they are no longer directly
associated with state practice.
Examples:
Principle of consent
Principle of reciprocity
Principle of equality of states
Principle of finality of awards and settlements
Principle of the legal validity of agreements
Principle of good faith
183
184
185
CASE
Medellin v. Texas (American Case, 2008)
Medellin and his gang-mates were sentenced to death for the rape/slay of two little girls. He argued that
he had a right under the Vienna Convention and customary law to a review and reconsideration of his
sentence, among his evidence a declaration of President Bush that the US would comply with its
obligations under the ICJ decision in Avena. The Court ruled that the Avena decision was not enforceable
as domestic law. As provided in Article 94 of the UN Charter, decisions of the ICJ only explicitly binds
states which are a party to the case. Even an undertaking to comply with the decision is not an
acknowledgment that an ICJ decision will have immediate legal effect in the courts of UN members, but a
commitment on the part of UN members to take future actions of compliance through their political
branches.
C. Important Concepts
Other than the basic outline of international law and its sources provided above, there are a few
fundamental concepts that must be highlighted in order to solidify ones understanding of international
law.
1. Obligations erga omnes
CASES
Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company Case (supra)
An obligation erga omnes is an obligation of every state towards the international community as a whole.
It is an obligation which is the concern of all states. In view of the importance of the rights involved in this
kind of obligation, all states can be held to have a legal interest in their protection.
The Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia, ICJ Case, 1995)
Portugal instituted proceedings against Australia over the latters continuing negotiations with Indonesia
in relation to the delimitation of the continental shelf between Australia and East Timor. Portugal alleged
that Australia had violated the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination, as well as
Portugals right as the administering power. While the Court refused to rule on the case because
Indonesia was not a party, it agreed that the right of peoples to self-determination has an erga omnes
character. However, simply because a right invoked is of an erga omnes character does not mean that the
Court can acquire jurisdiction over a state which has not consented to the Courts jurisdiction in a case.
Regardless of the character of the right invoked, the Court cannot evaluate the lawfulness of the conduct
of a state which is not a party to the case.
2. Jus cogens
Jus cogens, as discussed in Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (see above), is
an absolute rule of international law. It is a general principle of law that has become so firmly established
and recognized by the international community of states as a whole that derogation is simply not
permitted. It can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character. There is no consensus as to the criteria which would enable one to identify which general
principles of law have become peremptory norms. For instance, some important provisions of human
186
rights treaties (e.g. due process) have not been clearly established to be jus cogens. (Aust, Handbook of
International Law, 2010)
Examples of accepted jus cogens norms:
Prohibition on genocide
Prohibition on slavery
Prohibition on racial discrimination
Prohibition on torture and crimes against humanity
Prohibition on the use of force
CASE
Ex Parte Pinochet (ICJ Case, 1999)
Pinochet was the former head of state of Chile accused with, among others, the crime of torture. Spain
sought his extradition while he was in London for medical treatment. In denying his immunity for the
crime of torture, the Court explained that the rule of international law prohibiting torture has the
character of jus cogens or a peremptory norm. The violation of a jus cogens norm cannot be subject to any
kind of immunity; the universal jurisdiction granted over those who violate the rule against torture is
justified by its jus cogens nature.
3. Ex aequo et bono
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are
submitted to it, shall apply:
a.
international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states;
b.
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c.
the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and
d.
subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the
rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if
the parties agree thereto.
Ex aequo et bono is a Latin phrase that roughly translates to what is fair and just and is very similar to
the concept of equity. As provided in Article 38(2) of the ICJ Statute, if the parties agree to it, then the
Court may decide a case without adhering to the existing rules of international law and resolve the
dispute according to what is fair and just under the circumstances.
187
CASES
Barcelona Traction Case (supra)
Even in municipal law, there is a clear distinction between the rights of a company and those of a
shareholder. Only the company, which has a distinct and separate legal personality from its shareholders,
may make a claim for compensation. A wrong done to the company does in fact prejudice its
shareholders, but this does not mean that both the company and shareholders are entitled to make
claims for compensation.
Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the UN (ICJ Advisory Opinion, 1949)
The UN General Assembly asked the ICJ several questions relating to whether the UN could bring claims
for reparations for itself and in behalf of its agents. The Court ruled that the UN was an international
person subject of international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties, as well as
the corresponding capacity to protect its rights by bringing international claims. The competence to bring
188
an international claim is the capacity to resort to the customary methods recognized by international law
for the establishment, presentation, and settlement of claims.
Mavrommatis Case (Permanent Court of International Justice, 1924)
Mavrommatis was a Greek national embroiled in disputes with Great Britain over concessions awarded
to him in British-controlled Palestine. When Greece brought Britain before the Court, the Court took
cognizance of the case, finding that there was in fact a dispute between two states: Britain and Greece.
The latter was claiming indemnity because Britain had acted in breach of its obligations to one of Greeces
subjects. A state is entitled to protect its subjects when they are injured by acts of another state which are
contrary to international law.
1. STATES
Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States
The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications:
1. A permanent population;
2. A defined territory;
3. Government; and
4. Capacity to enter into relations with other states.
NOTES ON QUALIFICATIONS FOR STATEHOOD
1. Territory arguably the most important qualification. There must be a reasonably stable basis for a
political community in control of a specific area. While clearly demarcated borders are not necessary,
there must be an area clearly marked as a place where a political community is established.
TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY
Sovereignty in the relation between states signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of
the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the functions of a state. It is
the principle of exclusive competence of the state with regard to its own territory. (Island of Palmas Case)
Summary of Modes of Acquiring Territorial Sovereignty (Brownlie)
1. Discovery and effective occupation after discovering territory, there must be effective
occupation, i.e. an intention to act as a sovereign over that territory (animus occupandi) as well as
the continuous display of such authority
2. Cession the transfer of territory from one state to another by agreement, usually treaty. The
validity of the cession depends on the validity of the title of the ceding state
3. Prescription occupation which must be
a. Under the title of sovereignty;
b. Peaceful and uninterrupted;
189
c. Public; and
d. Endure for a length of time
4. Accession or accretion the natural process of land transfer resulting in an increase of territory
Cases
Island of Palmas Case (PCIJ, 1932)
The Dutch and the Americans were in dispute over the island: the Dutch claimed that the Dutch East
Indies Company possessed and exercised rights of sovereignty through agreements made with the
natives; the Americans claimed that they had acquired their rights through the Spanish, who supposedly
discovered the island around the same time that they found the rest of the Philippines. The Court favored
the Dutch based on the evidence presented, emphasizing that it was not only discovery of the island that
established sovereignty, but effective occupation through the display of state authority.
Eastern Greenland Case (PCIJ, 1933)
Norway and Denmark were in dispute over the territory of Eastern Greenland. Both sides had equal
amounts of evidence with varying substance to prove their claim, but tipping it in Denmarks favor was
public acquiescence by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs as to Denmarks sovereignty over the
territory. While acquiescence is not a means of gaining title, it strengthened Denmarks claim.
Additionally, while Norway was in constant occupation of the area in dispute, there was no exercise of
state authority. What was material to the Court was not just physical possession, but the intent to
exercise state authority over an area.
Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (United Kingdom v. France, ICJ, 1951)
The UK and France were in dispute over two groups of rocky islands, both citing ancient title, treaties,
and supposedly sovereign acts. The Court ruled in favor of the UK because it proved the exercise of
jurisdiction, local administration, and legislation over the islands. The exercise of ordinary local
administration (licensing, customs, ordinary court functions, the registry of deeds, etc.) was better proof
of sovereignty than any ancient title or treaty, in the Courts view.
Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v. Malaysia, ICJ,
2002)
Indonesia and Malaysia were in dispute over two islands, both citing treaties, colonial effectivites, and
title by succession. The ICJ ruled in Malaysias favor because of its acts of administration over the
islands (e.g. its regulation on the gathering of turtle eggs and declaration of a bird sanctuary).
Eritrea v. Yemen (ICJ, 1998)
Eritrea and Yemen were in dispute over numerous islands, citing historic title (on the part of Yemen) and
effective occupation for over a hundred years (on the part of Eritrea). The Court did not award all the
islands to one claimant, instead determining the ownership of each island or island group individually. Of
note in this case is the Courts use of the Portico Doctrine: Islands nearest to coastal states (particularly
those within the states territorial sea) belong to such states.
190
191
4. Capacity to enter into relations with other states this qualification is attached to the concept of
independence, as well as an implied requirement: recognition of statehood by other states. After all, if
other states do not recognize one to be a fellow state, relations are not possible. However, it has been
argued that a new state acquires legal personality purely by its own acts in achieving the objective
qualifications of statehood, rather than through recognition by other states. If recognition were made a
requirement of statehood, some states could not be considered such on account of the refusal by some
other states to recognize their independence (e.g. Taiwan and Kosovo).
2. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
An international organization is an organization that is set up by treaty among two or more states. Since
the constitutive document of international organization is a treaty, only states are members of
international organizations. (Bernas)
An important feature of international organizations is they often enjoy immunities and privileges in order
to facilitate the effective exercise of their functions. Their powers and privileges are in turn kept in check
by the treaties that created them.
Examples of International Organizations:
United Nations
International Court of Justice
CASES
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (supra)
International organizations are subjects of international law which do not, unlike States, possess a
general competence. International organizations are governed by the principle of speciality, i.e. they are
invested by the States which create them with powers, the limits of which are a function of the common
interests whose promotion those States entrust to them. The powers conferred on international
organizations are normally the subject of an express statement in their constituent instruments.
Nevertheless, the necessities of international life may point to the need for organizations to possess
subsidiary (or implied) powers not expressly provided for in their basic instruments.
International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja (Philippine Case, 1990, G.R. No. 85750)
This involved two consolidated cases: ICMC v. Calleja and Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. International
Rice Research Institute (IRRI). In the case of ICMC, the Court affirmed the immunity of ICMC as a
specialized agency under the Charter of the United Nations. With respect to IRRI, the Court noted that
while it was not an international organization because it was the product of a MOA between the
Philippines and two private organizations, the promulgation of a Presidential Decree granted IRRI the
privileges and immunities of an international organization. The Court explained that the objective of
granting immunity to international organizations is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by
the host country in their internal workings.
World Health Organization v. Aquino (Philippine Case, G.R. No. L-35131, 1972)
A judge issued a search warrant for the personal effects of an official of the WHO. In quashing the
warrant, the Court explained that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts
should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government. Where the plea
192
of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, the judicial department must
follow the action of the political branch and should not embarrass the latter by assuming antagonistic
jurisdiction.
Department of Foreign Affairs v. National Labor Relations Board (Philippine Case, G.R. No. 113191,
1996)
An illegal dismissal case was filed against the Asian Development Bank. In upholding the ADBs immunity,
the Court cited several provisions of the ADBs Charter granting it immunity from legal process of every
form. It also repeated the doctrine in the earlier case of WHO v. Aquino and pointed out that the Charter
of the ADB was a treaty that the Philippines was a party to. In entering into that treaty, the political
branches of the Philippine government extended immunities to the ADB which could not be ignored by
the judicial department.
Jeffrey Liang (Hue Feng) v. People (Philippine Case, G.R. No. 125865, 2001)
Liang was charged with grave oral defamation. While Liang, an economist, was an agent of an
international organization, the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB was not absolute. The
immunity is limited to acts performed in an official capacity and does not cover the commission of a
crimeslander or oral defamation are not acts that can be considered as ones performed in official
capacity.
3. INDIVIDUALS
In the early days of international law, individuals were objects, or at best beneficiaries of
international law, exclusively under the control of states. (Bernas)
The international legal status of individuals is unique: it is lopsided because as far as their
international obligations are concerned, they are required to respect certain fundamental values
and may be punished as individuals for failure to do so. However, when their individual rights are
violated, they do not always have the right to bring their cases before international bodies and
instead have to rely on their own states to bring the cases on their behalf. The only exception is
when a treaty that their state has entered into or a resolution that an international organization
has adopted envisages the right of the individual to bring a case to an international body on his
own behalf. (Cassese, International Law, 2001; Bernas)
International Criminal Law can trace its beginnings to the end of World War II, when the world
was confronted with the reality that during the war millions of crimes had been committed by
individuals. The horror of the Second World War brought about the idea that in certain cases,
some acts are so horrific that compensation from the state will not suffice, and the individual
directly responsible must be punished. The earliest courts for international criminal law were
the Nuremberg Tribunal and Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal.
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1978 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions
were the next step in the development of international criminal law, though the particular
193
focus of these conventions and protocols were crimes committed in the context of an armed
conflict.
The Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal (1993) and Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal (1994) were
special tribunals under the United Nations Security Council. Again, the focus of these bodies
was the punishment of crimes committed in the context of an armed conflict. However, these
ad hoc tribunals brought back an idea that the UN had been contemplating since its creation:
the necessity for a permanent court to deal with cases of international criminal law.
The Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court was adopted by the UN in 1998.
The Four Most Serious International Crimes (as provided in the Rome Statute)
1. Genocide
2. Crimes against humanity
3. War crimes
4. The crime of aggression
194
Heads
On Consular Relations
Article 5 (summarized, trimmed
down from full enumeration):
1. Protecting the interests of the
SS and its nationals (both
individual
and
bodies
corporate).
2. Furthering the development of
commercial, economic, cultural,
and scientific relations, as well
as promoting friendly relations.
3. Ascertaining by all lawful
means the conditions and
developments
in
the
RS
commercial, economic, cultural,
and scientific life, and reporting
to persons interested.
4. Issuing passports and travel
documents to SS nationals;
issuing
visas
and
other
documents to persons wishing to
travel to the SS.
5. Assisting nationals of the SS.
6. Acting as notary, civil
registrar, in similar capacities,
and performing certain functions
of administrative nature not
contrary to RS laws.
7. Following RS procedural laws,
representing or arranging for the
representation of SS nationals
before
RS
tribunals
and
authorities.
8. Transmitting judicial and
extra-judicial documents.
9.
Exercising
rights
of
supervision and inspection in
respect of SS vessels, aircraft,
and crew.
10. Performing other functions
entrusted to a consular post by
the SS, not prohibited by RS laws
or not objected to by the RS.
Article 14: Classes of Heads
Article 9: Classes of Heads
1. Ambassadors or nuncios
1. Consuls-general
2. Envoys, ministers, and 2. Consuls
internuncios
3. Vice-consuls
3. Charges des affaires
4. Consular agents
195
End of Function
Inviolability
Agent/Officer
Article 43:
1. Upon notification by the SS to
the RS that the functions of the
diplomatic agent have come to
an end.
2. Upon notification by the RS to
the SS that it refuses to
recognize the diplomatic agent
as a member of the mission.
Article 23:
1. The RS may, at any time and
without explanation, notify the
SS that a consular officer or any
member of the consular staff is
persona non grata or not
acceptable. The SS shall either
recall the person or terminate
his functions with the consular
post.
2. If the SS refuses or fails within
a reasonable time to carry out its
obligation to recall/terminate
functions, the RS may either
withdraw the exequatur (the
declaration made by the RS
recognizing the consul of the SS
and authorizing him to perform
his function in the RS. There is
no prescribed form for an
exequatur.
3. A person appointed as a
member of the consular post
may be declared unacceptable,
without explanation, before
arriving in the territory of the RS
or before beginning his duties.
The SS shall withdraw his
appointment.
Article 25:
1. Upon notification by the SS to
the RS that the functions of a
member of the consular post
have come to an end.
2. Upon withdrawal of the
exequatur.
3. Notification by the RS to the SS
that the RS has ceased to
consider the member of the
consular staff as a member of the
consular staff.
Article 40: The RS shall treat
consular officers with due
respect and shall take all
196
Inviolability
Premises
of Article 22:
1. The premises of the mission
shall be inviolable. The agents of
the RS may not enter without the
consent of the head of the
mission.
2. The RS is under a special duty
to take all appropriate steps to
protect the premises of the
mission against any intrusion or
damage, and to prevent any
disturbance of the mission or
impairment of its dignity.
3. Premises of the mission,
furnishings, and other property
197
Immunity
Jurisdiction
Exceptions
Immunity
Jurisdiction
Article 43:
The immunity provided shall not
apply in respect of a civil action
either
1. Arising out of a contract
concluded by a consular officer
or a consular employee in which
he did not contract expressly or
impliedly as an agent of the SS;
or
2. By a third party for damage
arising from an accident in the
RS caused by a vehicle, vessel, or
aircraft.
198
Waiver
Immunity
Article 45:
1. The SS may waive the
privileges
or
immunities
provided for a member of the
consular post.
2. The waiver shall in all cases be
express, except as provided
under this Article, and shall be
communicated to the RS in
writing.
3. The initiation of proceedings
by a consular officer or a
consular employee in a matter
where he might enjoy immunity
shall preclude him from invoking
immunity from jurisdiction in
respect of any counter-claim
directly connected with the
principal claim.
4. The waiver of immunity from
jurisdiction for the purpose of
civil
or
administrative
proceedings shall not be deemed
to imply the waiver of immunity
from the measures of execution
resulting from the judicial
decision (in which case a
separate
waiver shall be
necessary).
Article 55:
1. Without prejudice to their
privileges and immunities, it is
the duty of all persons enjoying
such privileges and immunities
to respect the RS laws and not to
199
200
F. Treaties
The law on treaties is found in the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (1969)
Summary of steps to make a treaty binding upon a state (as provided in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties):
1. Negotiation
2. Giving of consent to be bound:
a. Signing of treaty
b. Exchange of instruments with the express provision that in doing so the exchanging parties
become bound
c. Ratification/acceptance/approval process of ratification varies with each State. At all times
the instrument which is proof of the ratification must be deposited with the body specified as
depositary or, if not specified, the UN Secretary General. The effect of non-deposit is that the
treaty cannot be enforced against the state by any UN agency
*Ratification in the Philippines: Section 21 of Article VII of the Constitution provides that no treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate
Every state which has signed or otherwise expressed its consent to be bound by a treaty has
the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force
(Article 18)
Pacta sunt servanda is the principle that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith (Article 26)
States may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving, or acceding to a treaty, formulate a
reservation unless
201
Treaties enter into force in a manner and date agreed upon by the parties. If there is no provision
as to how/when, the treaty enters into force as soon as consent to be bound has been given.
(Article 24) Most multilateral treaties contain provisions saying how many states must sign/ratify
the treaty before it enters into force. For example, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
was first signed in 1969 but only entered into force in 1980 because that was only when the
required number of states for it to enter into force was reached.
Cases
Lim v. Executive Secretary (Philippine Case, 2002)
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement and the Mutual Defense Treaty entered into between the
Philippines and the United States, US military personnel took part in Balikatan exercises. The Court saw
the word activities in the VFA as an intentionally broad phraseology that verbalized the parties
intentions. In so ruling, the Court applied Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which provide the standard rules for interpretation, e.g. (1) plain meaning; (2) good faith; and
(3) examination of preparatory work for the agreement.
202
Nationality is the legal bond between a person and a state. It is a relationship that gives rise to
material rights and obligations on the part of the individual and the state concerned. It is a mutual
relationship between state and individual. (Weis, Nationality and Statelessness)
203
CASES:
Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala, ICJ Case, 1955)
Nottebohm was extradited to the United States with the help of the Guatemalan government, who
considered him to be a German who had never acquired citizenship from Liechtenstein. The Court agreed
with Guatemala and explained that nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of
attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests, and sentiments, together with reciprocal rights
and duties. It is the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred is more
closely connected with the population of the state conferring nationality than with that of any other state.
Kookooritchkin v. Solicitor General (Philippine Case, 1948)
At war with Russias communist government, Kookooritchkin fled to the Philippines and filed a petition
for naturalization after 25 years of living in the country. The Solicitor General opposed on the ground that
he had failed to show that he had lost his Russian citizenship under Russian laws. The Court ruled in
favor of Kookooritchkin, finding that he was a stateless refugee who had lost all bonds of attachment to
his former fatherland, with which he had been at war prior to his arrival in the country.
H. State Responsibility
The doctrine of state responsibility is simply that if a state violates a customary rule of international law
or a treaty obligation, it commits an internationally wrongful act for which the State must be held
responsible.
The International Law Commissions Draft Articles on State Responsibility is instructive as to when
there is state responsibility.
Article 1 of the ILC Draft Articles. Responsibility of a State for its internationally wrongful acts
Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State.
Article 2 of the ILC Draft Articles. Elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission:
(a) Is attributable to the State under international law; and
(b) Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.
Article 3. Characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful
The characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful is governed by international law.
Such characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by internal law.
In general, there must be (1) an act or omission attributable to the state; and (2) a breach of an
international obligation (from any source of international law).
The ILC Draft Articles also provide for the standard of strict liability, i.e. intent, fault, or negligence is not
required for a State to be held responsible as long as breach of international law is shown. Intent, fault, or
negligence are only material in determining the amount of reparations to be made.
204
Finally, the ILC Draft Articles provides for the consequences of state responsibility:
Article 30 of the ILC Draft Articles. Cessation and non-repetition
The State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to:
(a) Cease that act, if it is continuing; and
(b) Offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require.
CASE:
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (ICJ Advisory
Opinion)
The ICJ opined that the construction of a wall by Israel, the occupying power in the Palestinian Territory,
resulted in de facto annexation which is contrary to international law, in particular the UN Charter on the
Use of Force and international humanitarian law. The Court then enumerated the legal consequences of
an internationally wrongful act: (1) full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful
act (injury may consist of material or moral damage); (2) the responsible state is under duty to perform
the obligation breached; and (3) cessation of the wrongful act if it is still continuing, as well as the
offering of assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require.
Acts of State Organs
The acts of organs or officials of a state are attributed to that state as its own acts in determining its
responsibility for internationally wrongful conduct.
Article 4 of the ILC Draft Articles. Conduct of organs of a State
1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law,
whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial, or any other functions, whatever position it
holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government
or of a territorial unit of the State.
2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the
State.
Article 7 of the ILC Draft Articles. Excess of authority or contravention of instructions
The conduct of an organ of a State or of a person or entity empowered to exercise elements of the
governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law if the organ,
person, or entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions.
CASES:
Union Bridge Company Claim (US v. Great Britain, 1924)
Harrison, the storekeeper of the Cape Government Railways at Port Elizabeth and agent of the British
government, moved Union Bridge material from Port Elizabeth to the Imperial Military Railways on
instructions he received. The Court ruled that the consignment of the material was a wrongful
interference with property, and since Harrison committed the act under instructions, such instructions
fixed liability on the British government. This liability was not affected by the fact that the act was done
under a mistake and without intention to appropriate the material.
205
206
statements of support and encouragement of the continuing detention of hostages made the militants
acts the acts of the Iranian State.
Rainbow Warrior Arbitration (1980)
French agents destroyed the Rainbow Warrior, a Greenpeace International Vessel, while it was in harbor
in New Zealand, prompting NZ to prosecute two captured French agents under the Directorate General of
External Security. A communique from the Prime Minister of France confirmed that the agents were
acting under the French governments instructions. The Court went on to determine the extent of
compensation that France would pay on account of its international responsibility.
3. Conduct of insurrectional movement
Article 10 of the ILC Draft Articles. Conduct of an insurrectional or other movement
1. The conduct of an insurrectional movement which becomes the new Government of the
State shall be considered an act of that State under international law.
2. The conduct of a movement, insurrectional or other, which succeeds in establishing a new
State in part of the territory of a pre-existing State or in a territory under its
administration, shall be considered an act of the new State under international law.
3. This article is without prejudice to the attribution to a State of any other conduct, however
related to that of the movement concerned, which is to be considered an act of that State by
virtue of Articles 4 to 9.
CASE:
Bolivar Railway Company Claim (Great Britain v. Venezuela, 1903)
After the revolution in Venezuela that brought Castro into power, Bolivar filed claims against Venezuela
and Castro in respect of obligations incurred by both the old and new governments. The Court allowed
the claims, explaining that responsibility was allowed in this case because what is involved is the same
nation. Nations do not die when there is a change of government; these changes are but expressions of a
change of national will. The nation is responsible for the debts contracted by its titular government until
the obligation is discharged. The nation is responsible for the obligations of a successful revolution from
its beginning, since such revolution represents ab initio a changing national will, crystalizing in the finally
successful result.
4. Color of Authority
Article 9 of the ILC Draft Articles. Conduct carried out in the absence of or default of official
authorities
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law
if the person or group of persons is in fact exercising elements of the governmental authority in the
absence or default of the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those
elements of authority.
207
I. Jurisdiction of States
1. Territoriality Principle
The fundamental source of jurisdiction is sovereignty over territory. A state has absolute, but not
necessarily exclusive, power to prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce rules for conduct that occurs within its
territory. This is why the determination of territorial boundaries are so important. (Bernas)
CASE:
Trail Smelter Case (Arbitration between US and Canada, 1938 1941)
The US brought Canada to arbitration over fumes discharged from the smelter of the Consolidated Mining
and Smelting Company in Trail, British Columbia. The Court reiterated the effects doctrine, where a
state also has jurisdiction over acts occurring outside its territory when the effects of the acts are felt
within it. This doctrine has two facets: (1) the subjective territorial principle, where there is jurisdiction to
prosecute and punish a crime committed within the state but completed or consummated abroad; and
(2) the objective territorial principle where there is jurisdiction to prosecute and punish a crime
commenced outside the state but consummated within its territory.
2. Nationality Principle and Statelessness
The nationality principle provides that every state has jurisdiction over its nationals even when those
nationals are outside the state. (Bernas)
Stateless persons are those who do not have a nationality. They are either de jure or de facto stateless. De
jure stateless persons are those who have lost their nationality, if they had one, and have not acquired a
new one. De facto stateless persons are those who have a nationality but to whom protection is denied by
their state when out of the state. This is the situation of many refugees. (Bernas)
CASE:
Blackmer v. United States (American Case, 1932)
Blackmer was an American living in France who was adjudged guilty of contempt for failure to respond to
subpoenas served upon him in France. The Court ruled that while he may have removed his residence to
France, it was undisputed that he continued to be a citizen of the United States. As such, he owed
allegiance to the US and the US retained authority over him, hence he was bound by its laws even though
he was a resident abroad.
208
3. Protective Principle
A state may exercise jurisdiction over conduct outside its territory that threatens its security as long as
that conduct is generally recognized as criminal by states in the international community. (Restatement
402[3])
CASES:
Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions (House of Lords, 1946)
Lord Haw Haw was an American citizen who held a British passport until 1940. During World War II, he
broadcast messages from Germany trying to convince the Allies to surrender. He was convicted of
treason in the UK because no principle of comity demands that a state should ignore the crime of treason
committed against it outside its territory. A proper regard for the states security requires that all those
who commit treasons, whether commit it within or without the realm, should be amenable to its laws.
United States v. Yunis (American Case, 1988)
Yunis was one of the hijackers aboard a Jordanian plane that had three American nationals. The United
States wanted to prosecute him and invoked the protective principle. The Court explained that the
protective principle has been strictly construed to encompass only those offenses posing a direct, specific
threat to national security. In this case, the hijackers never made any demands on the US government nor
directly threatened its security. In fact, it was almost happenstance that three American nationals were
on board the aircraft.
4. Universality Principle
The universality principle recognizes that certain activities, universally dangerous to states and their
subjects, require authority in all community members to punish such acts wherever they may occur, even
absent a link between the state and the parties or the acts in question. This principle started with piracy
but has now expanded to encompass genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and terrorism.
(Bernas)
CASES:
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (American Case, 1980)
This was a wrongful death action brought under the American Alien Torts Statute charging Pena-Irala,
then the Inspector-General of the police in Paraguay, of torturing to death a teenage Paraguayan. The
Court held that deliberate torture under the color of official authority violated customary international
law, regardless of the nationality of the parties.
Eichmann v. Attorney-General of Israel (Israeli Case, 1962)
Eichmann was a high-ranking SS officer who played a central part in the implementation of The Final
Solution that saw the persecution of millions of Jews in Europe during World War II. He escaped to
Argentina after the war and was kidnapped by Israeli agents in 1960 so he could face trial in Israel under
the latters domestic law. The Court explained that the crimes created by the Nazi Collaborators Law
always bore the stamps of international crimes, banned by international law and entailing individual
criminal liability. It is the universal character of these crimes that vests in each State the power to try and
punish any who assisted in the commission of such crimes. Jurisdiction was automatically vested in the
209
State of Israel upon its establishment in 1948 as a sovereign State. It was immaterial that the crimes in
question were committed when the State of Israel did not exist.
5. Passive Personality Principle
The passive personality principle asserts that a state may apply lawparticularly criminal lawto an act
committed outside its territory by a person not its national where the victim of the act was its national.
The principle has not been ordinarily accepted for ordinary torts or crimes, but it is increasingly accepted
as applied to terrorist and other organized attacks on a states nationals by reason of their nationality, or
to assassination of a states diplomatic representatives or other officials. (Comment on Section 402 of the
Third Restatement)
CASE:
United States v. Yunis (supra)
Citing the Third Restatement, the Court ruled that the passive personality principle (as well as the
universality principle) were sufficient grounds to establish jurisdiction over a hijacker of a plane
containing three American nationals. According to the Court, not only was the US acting on behalf of the
world community to punish the commission of crimes that threaten the very foundations of world order,
but the US has its own interest in protecting its nationals.
6. Conflicts of Jurisdiction
Since there are various accepted principles for assuming jurisdiction, more than one state may have a
valid claim to jurisdiction. American courts have attempted to develop three sophisticated modes of
resolving conflict of jurisdiction (Bernas):
a. Balancing Test when the answer to the three questions below is YES, the court will assume
jurisdiction:
i.
ii.
iii.
Are the interest of, and link to, the state sufficiently strong (vis--vis those of other nations)
to justify an assertion of extraordinary authority?
b. International Comity even when a state has basis for exercising jurisdiction, it will refrain from
doing so if its exercise will be unreasonable. Unreasonableness is determined by evaluating
various factors, such as
i.
ii.
The connection (e.g. nationality, residence, or economic activity) between the regulating
state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated;
iii.
iv.
The existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation; or
210
v.
c. Forum non conveniens If in the whole circumstances of the case it be discovered that there is a
real unfairness to one of the suitors in permitting the choice of a forum which is not the natural or
proper forum, either on the ground of convenience of trial or the residence or domicile of the
parties or of its being the locus contractus, or locus solutionis, then the doctrine of forum non
conveniens is properly applied. There are public and private interest factors that the court must
consider:
i.
Private interest factors: access to sources of proof, availability of compulsory process for
unwilling witnesses, and other personal problems which make trial easy, expeditious, and
inexpensive
ii.
Public interest factors: congestion, desire to settle local controversies at home, and having
the case tried in a forum at home with the applicable law
J. Treatment of Aliens
Extradition
Extradition is the surrender of an individual by the state within whose territory he is found to the state
under whose laws he is alleged to have committed a crime or to have been convicted of a crime. It is a
process that is governed by treaty. The legal right to demand extradition and the correlative duty to
surrender a fugitive exist only when created by treaty. (Bernas)
Extradition is the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the
disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or
criminal law of the requesting state or government. (U.S. v. Purganan, below)
211
212
213
Non-Derogable Rights
Not all rights under the ICCPR are non-derogable. As provided in Article 4 of the ICCPR, in a time of public
emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the
States Parties to the Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the ICCPR to
the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely
on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion, or social origin.
The following rights are non-derogable, meaning even in times of public emergency States Parties are
bound to their obligations under the ICCPR:
1. Right to life (Article 6)
2. Freedom from torture and other inhuman punishment (Article 7)
3. Freedom from enslavement or servitude (Article 8)
4. Protection from imprisonment for inability to fulfill contractual obligations (Article 11)
5. Protection from ex post facto laws (Article 15)
6. Right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law (Article 16)
7. Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (Article 18)
Optional Protocols to the ICCPR
1. The First Optional Protocol is a separate treaty which enables private parties (i.e. individuals)
who are victims of human rights violations to file complaints directly with the Human Rights
Committee created by the Covenant. However, complaints may only be filed against States
Parties to the ICCPR.
2. The Second Optional Protocol was aimed at the abolition of the death penalty.
3. The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
The ICESCR was adopted on the same day as the ICCPR. The need for two separate treaties was both
ideological and practical. Ideologically, the contest was between Western countries on the one hand,
which argued that their governments would have difficulty accepting economic and cultural rights
beyond those provided in their respective Constitutions and domestic laws. On the other hand, socialist
and developing countries argued that the absence of economic, social, and cultural guarantees would
render civil and political rights meaningless. The practical consideration was the notion that civil and
political rights could be implemented immediately, whereas social and cultural rights could only be done
gradually and dependently on development conditions. (Bernas)
The rights specific to the ICESCR are social welfare rights stated in detail (Bernas), notably:
1. Right to work (Article 6)
2. Right to favorable conditions of work (Article 7)
214
215
The Philippines in 2009 enacted R.A. 9851, or the Philippine Act on Crimes Against International
Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity. In it, the Philippines adopted
the generally accepted principles of international humanitarian law, including the Hague
Conventions and Geneva Conventions, as part of the law of the land.
Structure
Period
Subjects
Enforceable
rights/duties
IHL
Ancient (people have always
sought to govern the conduct of
warfare)
1. Provides only minimum Non-derogable code of conduct
standards
2.
State
sovereignty
is
recognized and states are
given leeway in enforcing
human rights
Applicable at all times
Applicable only in times of
armed conflict
Primarily concerns states in Covers the conduct of State and
their dealings with individuals non-state actors
Political,
economic,
and 1. Limits the suffering of those
cultural rights
not actively participating in the
armed conflict
2. Limits the means and
methods of warfare
216
217
Prosecutor v. Limaj (Appeals Judgment, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
2005)
Limaj and his co-accused where charged with war crimes for their acts in a prison camp. Following the
guidelines in Tadic, the Court further qualified that the criteria used to determine the existence of a noninternational armed conflict are (1) the intensity of the conflict and (2) the organization of the parties.
These criteria are used to distinguish armed conflict from banditry, unorganized and short-lived
insurrections, or terrorist activities which are not subject to IHL.
2. Core international obligations of states under IHL
Parties to an armed conflict shall respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law
(Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions)
CASE:
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (supra)
In searching for a customary rule specifically proscribing the threat or use of nuclear weapons per se, the
Court established the cardinal principles contained in IHL:
1. States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use
weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets
2. It is prohibited to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants, hence it is also prohibited to
use weapons that would cause them such unnecessary harm or uselessly aggravate their
suffering. States do not have unlimited freedom of choice of means in the weapons they use
3. Principles of IHL
a. The Principle of Distinction
Article 48 of Additional Protocol I
The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants
and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only
against military objectives.
b. The Principle of Necessity
Article 57(3) of Additional Protocol I
When a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage,
the objective to be selected shall be the attack which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian
lives and to civilian objects.
218
CASES:
Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez (Appeals Judgment, ICTY, 2001)
Kordic was convicted for war crimes committed against the Bosnian Muslim population during the
Bosnian-Croat War. In ruling against his defense of military necessity and consequent civilian casualties,
the Court explained that international customary law recognizes that collateral damage is not unlawful
per se, provided that the principles of distinction and proportionality are respected.
Prosecutor v. Galic (Trial Judgment, ICTY, 2003)
Galic was convicted of crimes against humanity for acts during the Siege of Sarajevo in the War in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. His many acts included intentionally launching attacks to spread terror among the
civilian population, which he defended as an act of military necessity. The Court convicted him, explaining
that if excessive casualties are expected to result, the attack should not be pursued. The test for
proportionality is whether a reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the actual
perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to him or her, could have expected
excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack.
Treatment of Civilians
Article 50 of Additional Protocol I
A civilian is any person who does not belong to an armed force and who is not a combatant. In case of
doubt as to whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.
Article 51 of Additional Protocol I
The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising
from military operations. To give effect to this protection, the following rules, which are additional to the
other applicable rules of International Law, shall be observed in all circumstances:
219
1. The civilian population as well as individual civilians shall not be the object of attack. Acts or
threats of violence, the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian
population, are prohibited.
2. Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals are prohibited.
Treatment of Prisoners of War
As provided in Article 4 of Geneva III, prisoners of war are:
1. Members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, including militia or volunteer corps
2. Militia or volunteer corps operating in or outside their own territory, even if such territory is
occupied, provided that (a) they are being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates; (b) they have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) they carry
arms openly; and (d) they conduct operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war
3. Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or authority not
recognized by the Detaining Power
4. Civilians who accompany the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization
from the armed forces which they accompany
5. Members of crews of merchant marines and the crews of civil aircraft of the parties to the
conflict
6. Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take
up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular
armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war
7. Persons belonging to the armed forces of the occupied territory
As provided in Geneva III, prisoners of war are entitled to several basic protections:
Article 12
Prisoners of war may only be transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power which is also a party to
Geneva Convention III.
Article 13
Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. No prisoner of war may be subjected to physical
mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are not justified by the medical,
dental, or hospital treatment of the prisoner concerned and carried out in his interest. They must at all
times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation, or insults and public curiosity.
Measures of reprisals against prisoners of war are prohibited.
220
Article 15
Prisoners of war shall be free of charge for their maintenance and for medical attention required by their
state of health.
Article 14.
Women shall be treated with all regard due to their sex and shall in all cases benefit by treatment as
favorable as granted to men.
(Also see Article 75 of Protocol I:
Women shall be held in quarters separated from mens quarters. They shall be under immediate
supervision of women. Nevertheless, in cases where families are detained or interned, they shall,
whenever possible, be held in the same place and accommodated as family units.)
4. Law on neutrality
As provided in the Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers, the law on
neutrality is as follows:
1. The territory of the neutral power is inviolable
2. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or munitions of war and supplies across the
territory of a neutral power
3. A neutral power is forbidden to allow belligerents to use its territory for moving troops,
establishing communication facilities, or forming corps of combatants
4. Troops of belligerent armies received by a neutral power in its territory shall be interned away
from the theatre of war
5. The neutral power may supply belligerents with food, clothing, or relief as required by
humanity
6. If the neutral power receives escaped prisoners of war, it shall leave them at liberty. It may
assign them a place of residence if it allows them to remain in its territory.
7. The neutral power may authorize the passage into its territory of the sick and wounded if the
means of transport bringing them does not carry personnel or materials of war.
M. The Law of the Sea
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is a body of treaty rules and customary
norms governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over
maritime regimes. It is the branch of public international law which regulates the relations of states with
respect to the uses of the oceans. (Magallona)
A vital feature of maritime law is the baseline, or the line from which the breadth of the territorial sea
and other maritime zones is measured. There are normal baselines for most coastal states and baselines
for a different category of states (i.e. archipelagic states). The normal baseline is the low-water line along
221
the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal state. (Article 5 of the
UNCLOS)
CASE:
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (supra)
In order to determine the low-water line, what is followed is the mean between the two tides, or the
low-water mark as opposed to the high-water mark.
Internal Waters
Article 8 of the UNCLOS
Waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the
State.
Examples: Bays, estuaries, ports, rivers, canals, lakes, and inland seas
Note!
In the case of archipelagic states, waters landward of the baselineother than rivers, bays, and lakes
are considered archipelagic waters (not internal waters) subject to a different maritime regime.
A state has sovereignty over its internal waters. As a general rule, therefore, no other states may enjoy
the right of innocent passage. However, there are exceptions to this rule: (1) there is a treaty granting the
right; (2) a ship is in distress and there is a risk posed against the lives of those on board; and (3) after
baselines are drawn internal waters encompass what were either territorial waters or straits used for
international navigation.
Innocent Passage
Article 18 of the UNCLOS: Passage means the navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of
crossing that sea without entering internal waters or of proceeding to or from internal waters. It may
include temporary stoppages, but only if they are incidental to ordinary navigation or necessitated by
distress or force majeure.
Article 19 of the UNCLOS: Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or
security of the coastal state. Such passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention and with
other rules of international law.
CASES
Nicaragua v. United States (supra)
The laying of mines in Nicaraguas ports was one of the grounds for the US obligation to pay
compensation. A states sovereignty extends to internal waters and airspace, and the states laws apply
over such areas. The laying of mines also hampered the states right to freedom of navigationnot just of
Nicaraguan ships, but foreign ships.
Saudi Arabia v. ARAMCO (supra)
The ports of every state must be open to foreign merchant vessels and can only be closed when the vital
interests of the state so require.
222
223
j.
Any act aimed at interfering with any communication systems, facilities, or installations of the
coastal state
224
c. The assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the master of the ship or by a
diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag state
d. Such measures as are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or
psychotropic substances
2. Exercise of civil jurisdiction
As a rule, a coastal state cannot exercise civil jurisdiction over a foreign ship (or its passengers) passing
through the territorial sea. However, there are exceptions (as provided in Article 28 of the UNCLOS):
a. When the ship itself has assumed obligations or incurred liabilities in the course of its voyage
through the coastal state
b. If civil proceedings are commenced or concluded against a foreign ship in internal waters, the
coastal state may subsequently levy an execution against or arrest the foreign ship even if it
has already left internal waters and reached the territorial sea
CASES
The Gulf of Sidra Incidents (1989, published in the Italian Yearbook of International Law)
Libya shot down American aircrafts that were allegedly conducting military exercises over the Gulf of
Sidra. Libya claimed to be protecting its internal waters, as the Gulf of Sidra was not part of the territorial
sea but was a historic bay. The notion that waters may be considered historically subject to the
sovereignty of one state is a relic of an older and obsolete regime. While the international community
might be willing to consider existing claims under highly exceptional circumstances, extravagant claims
encroaching upon the common domain of the international community (i.e. the high seas) have always
been rejected.
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (supra)
For the purpose of measuring the breadth of the territorial sea, it is the low-water mark, or the mean
between the high and low tides, which has been generally used as the starting point by states.
El Salvador v. Honduras with Nicaragua Intervening (supra)
Also in dispute in this case was the sovereignty over the Gulf of Fonseca, which lay between the three
states. The Court ruled that the Gulf was effectively a closed sea belonging communally to all three
states with the exception of each states unilaterally-declared three-mile zone. After the states achieved
independence in 1821, the waters remained undivided. The Court consequently held that the Gulf of
Fonseca were historic waters, and the three states succeeded to communal sovereignty over it.
Straits
A straight is a naturally-formed, narrow waterway that connects two larger bodies of water.
Article 34 of the UNCLOS (The legal status of waters forming straits used for international
navigation)
The regime of passage through straits used for international navigation established in this Convention
shall not in other respects affect the legal status of the waters forming such straits or the exercise by the
225
states bordering the straits of their sovereignty or jurisdiction over such waters and their air space,
seabed, and subsoil.
Obligations of states bordering straits
1. Respect the right to transit passage
The right to transit passage is the right to exercise freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the
purpose of continuous and expeditious transit through the straits used for international navigation (e.g.
between two areas of the high seas). All ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage. (Article 38 of
the UNCLOS)
Note!
The wording of the right to transit passage is important. It is the right to exercise freedom of navigation
and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit. If the ship or aircraft does not
act in accordance with this right (e.g. the ship drops anchor in the strait for reasons other than distress or
force majeure) the passage will cease to be subject to the regime of passage through straits and will
instead be subject to the regime of the territorial sea or EEZ, as the case may be. (Article 39[1][c] of the
UNCLOS)
There shall be no suspension of the right to transit passage. (Article 44 of the UNCLOS) In regulating the
right to transit passage, states may only pass laws and regulations which (a) do not discriminate among
foreign ships; (b) do not have the effect of denying, hampering, or impairing the right to transit passage;
and (c) are given due publicity. (Article 38 of the UNCLOS)
What states may regulate in relation to the right to transit passage (Article 42[1] of the UNCLOS)
a. The safety of navigation and regulation of maritime traffic
b. The prevention, reduction, and control of pollution
c. The prevention of fishing (including the stowage of fishing gear)
d. The loading or unloading of any commodity, currency, or person in contravention of
customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws
When the right to transit passage does not apply (Articles 36, 38, and 45 of the UNCLOS)
a. The strait has a high seas or an EEZ route through it which is of similar convenience
b. The strait is formed by an island of a state bordering the strait and its mainland
c. The strait connects part of the high seas or an EEZ with the territorial sea of a third state
d. The legal regime of the strait is governed by a long-standing treaty
226
227
The breadth of the territorial sea, contiguous zone, continental shelf, and the exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) is measured from the straight archipelagic baselines.
Straight archipelagic baselines join the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying
reefs of the archipelago, provided that within such baselines are included the main islands.
The drawing of archipelagic baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago.
Archipelagic baselines shall not be drawn from low-tide elevations unless lighthouses or
similar installations which are permanently above sea level have been built upon them.
The system of archipelagic baselines shall not be applied by an archipelagic state in such a
manner as to cut off the territorial sea of another state from the high seas or the EEZ.
228
2. The coastal state may exercise the control necessary to punish infringement of customs, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitary laws and regulations committed within its territory and territorial sea.
Note!
The coastal state may only undertake hot pursuit of a foreign ship in the contiguous zone if there has
been a violation of the rights for the protection of which the contiguous zone was established. (Article
111[1] of the UNCLOS)
In all other respects, the contiguous zone is an area that enjoys the freedom of the high seas.
The Continental Shelf
Article 76(1) of the UNCLOS
The continental shelf comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond the
territorial sea of a coastal state throughout the natural prolongation of the land territory to either
(a) the outer edge of the continental margin (the submerged prolongation of the land mass of the
coastal state); or
(b) 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured,
whichever is the greater.
Rights of coastal states over the continental shelf (Article 77 of the UNCLOS)
1. The coastal state exercises exclusive sovereign rights over the continental shelf for the purpose of
exploring it and exploiting its natural resources (i.e. mineral and non-living resources of the
seabed and subsoil, together with living organisms belonging to a sedentary species). No other
state may explore and exploit without the express consent of the coastal state, and if the coastal
state decides not to undertake any such activities, no one else may do so.
2. The rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation or on any
express proclamation.
CASES
North Sea Continental Shelf Case (supra)
The rights of the coastal state in respect of the area of continental shelf constituting a natural
prolongation of its land territory under the sea exists ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty
over the land. That right is inherent. No special legal acts need be performed.
Libya v. Malta (ICJ Case, 1985)
The case sprang from a dispute between Libya and Malta over the delimitation of the continental shelf
between them. The Court and the parties agreed that the division must be governed by a number of
equitable principles, among them: (1) there is to be no question of refashioning geography; (2) nonencroachment by one party on areas appertaining to the other; (3) respect due to all relevant
circumstances; and (4) equity does not necessarily imply equality and there can be no question of
distributive justice.
229
230
231
The Madrid System (as the Protocol and Agreement are referred to) makes it possible to protect
a trademark in a large number of countries by obtaining an international registration that has
effect in each of the designated contracting parties
An application for international registration may only be filed by a natural person or legal entity
having a connection (through establishment, domicile, or nationality) to a contracting party to
either the Protocol or Agreement
232
A trademark may only be the subject of an international application if it has already been
registered with the trademark office of the contracting party to which the applicant is connected
International applications are presented to the International Bureau of the WIPO through the
intermediary of the office of origin
The concern of environmental protection is not just about the atmosphere, the sea, the land, flora,
and fauna. It is also about the preservation of the cultural heritage of mankind as found in
archaeological and artistic remains. (Bernas)
233
Environmental law cases often have a human rights aspect as well, emphasizing the importance of
environmental law both on the domestic and the international fields. (Danube Dam Case; Oposa v.
Factoran, Jr., below)
CASES
Danube Dam Case (Hungary v. Slovakia, ICJ Case, 1998)
Hungary and then Czechoslovakia entered into a treaty to construct dams which Hungary later stopped
due to environmental concerns. While the Court ruled that Hungarys notice of termination was
premature, it also explained that the protection of the environment is an important part of human rights,
since a healthy environment is a condition sine qua non for numerous rights, e.g. the right to health, the
right to life.
Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. (Philippine Case, 1993)
The petitioners were minors asking the Supreme Court to order the Secretary of Natural Resources to
cancel all existing timber license agreements on the ground of intergenerational protection, suing on
behalf of their generation and those yet to be born. The Court recognized their right to bring the case. The
case emphasized that protection of the environment involves a vital human rights aspect.
The Stockholm Declaration of 1972 was formulated during a UN Conference on the Human
Environment attended by 113 states.
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration is a codification of a standing rule of international law
CASE
Trail Smelter Case (supra)
The arbitral tribunal ruled that no state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein.
P. International Economic Law
International economic law is the complex regulatory framework flowing from different sources of law
governing international economic relations and trans-boundary economic conduct by States,
international organizations, and private actors. In the interest of tangible contours, this notion is confined
to the regulation of cross-border transactions in goods and capital and the international protection of
intellectual property. (Herdegen, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law)
234