at tM HodgsonRuss Dist Di: 5187362900 Direct Facsimile: 168194745, smmeroltahodgsonrascom April 14, 2015 PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL Mark D. Gearan, Chairman New York State Gaming Commission ‘One Broadway Center Schenectady, NY 12305 Dear Chairman Gearan: Re: Report and Findings of the New York Gaming Facility Location Board On behalf of several clients that were involved in the submission of applications to the Gaming Facility Location Board (“Location Board”) pursuant to the March 31, 2014 Request for Applications (“RFA”) to develop and operate a gaming facility, objection is made to the results and recommendations made to the New York State Gaming Commission by the Location Board. Despite very specific statutory requirements, the procedure and analysis employed by the Location Board were fatally flawed, resulting in inconsistent and unsupported findings which have been the subject of various legal challenges, as well as criticism from Governor Cuomo. In addition, the selection process was tainted by an apparent conflict of interest with the Location Board’s consultant. A second, supplemental RFA — issued less than thirty-days afler the Location Board's final report and findings ~ appears to both concede these flaws and repeat them. Although the Location Board selected three applicants “to apply” to the Commission for a gaming facility license, it is the Commission that has the exclusive authority to award these licenses. For the reasons set forth below, the Commission should decline to issue any ficenses based on the current recommendations and direct the Location Board to start the entire process anew so that it may address the procedural and substantive flaws that plagued the selection process, |. BACKGROUND ing Gambling Facilities In New York State As the Commission knows, there are a substantial number of authorized gambling facilities currently operating throughout New York State. Among these facilities are nine “racinos” that combine racetracks with VLT operations, including the Finger Lakes Racetrack, the Resorts World Casino in New York City, the Monticello Casino & Raceway in the Catskills, Hamburg Gaming at Buffalo Raceway and the Batavia Downs Gaming, both in Western New York, the Empire City Casino at Yonkers Raceway in Westchester County, Tioga Downs in the Souther Tier, Saratoga Casino and Raceway in the Capital Region, and Vernon Downs in Central New York. 9 hatnad Pace + Sue 100 + Saray Srings, New York I2RS6-A048 + slope SI87962900 + facsimile 518736865 Atay + Difle © New Ynk + PlaMark D. Gearan, Chairman —W April 14, 2015 Page 2 Hodgson Russ ‘There are likewise five tribal class III and three tribal class I casinos in New York State, including facilities in Allegany, Cayuga, Cattaraugus, Erie, Franklin, Niagara, and Oneida counties. An additional tribal facility is scheduled to be opened in Madison County in late 2015. ‘The State Constitution and The Upstate New York Gaming Economic Development Act In 2012, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo proposed amending Article I, Section 9 of the New York State constitution to permit seven casino gaming facilities in addition to those already authorized under state law. The proposed amendment became effective after passage by ‘two consecutive Legislatures and voter approval in a November 2013 referendum. On July 30, 2013, Governor Cuomo signed into law the Upstate New York Gaming Economic Development Act (the “Act”), Relevant portions of the Act are codified at Article 13 of the Racing, Pari-Mutuel Wagering and Breeding Law (“PML”). The Act authorized the Commission to award up to four Gaming Facility licenses within three defined regions of the State. These regions are: Catskills/Hudson Valley (Region One, Zone Two); Capital (Region Two, Zone Two) and Eastern Southern Tier/Finger Lakes (Region Five, Zone Two). PML §§ 1310 and 1311(1). ‘The purpose of the Act is plainly set forth in its legislative findings, including the following: (1) New York State is already in the business of gambling with nine video lottery facilities, five tribal class III casinos, and three class II facilities; (2) New York state has more electronic gaming mac! in the Northeast or Mideast; (3) While the gambling already exists throughout the state, the state does not fully capitalize on the economic potential of legalized gambling; yes than any state (4) The state should authorize four destination resort casinos in upstate New York; (5) Four upstate casinos can boost economic development, create thousands of well-paying jobs and provide added revenue to the state; (6) The upstate tourism industry constitutes a critical component of our state’s economic infrastructure and that four upstate casinos will attract non-New York residents and bring downstate New Yorkers to upstate. (8) Local impact of the casino sites will be considered in the casino evaluation process; (14) As thoroughly and pervasively regulated by the state, four upstate casinos will work to the betterment of all New YorkMark D. Gearan, Chairman a4 April 14, 2015 Hodgson Rus Page 3 are ‘The Act directed the Commission to establish the Location Board to perform designated functions, including, among others, issuing requests for applications for gaming facility licenses and issuing “detailed findings of fact and conclusions demonstrating the reasons supporting its decision to select applicants for commission licensure.” PML. §§ 109-a and 1306(7). ‘The Act required the Location Board to engage in an objective, quantitative analysis of the applicants based on weighted statutory factors. PML §§ 109-a and 1306(7). Speci to “economic activity and business development factors lly, the Legislature instructed the Location Board to assign 2 70% weight (PML § 1320(1)), including: (b) maximizing revenues received by the state and localities; (©) providing the highest number of quality jobs in the gaming facility; (e) offering the highest and best value to patrons to create a secure and robust gaming market in the region and the state; (8) providing a market analysis detailing the benefits of the site location of the gaming facility and the estimated recapture rate of gaming related spending by residents travelling to an out-of-state facili lature similarly instructed the Board to assign a 20% weight to “local impact and siting factors” (PML. § 1320(2)), including: (a) mitigating potential impacts on host and nearby municipalities which ‘might result from development or operation of the gaming facility; (b) gaining public support in the host and nearby municipalities which ‘may be demonstrated through the passage of local laws or public comment received by the board or gaming applicant; Finally, the Board was required to assign a 10% weight to workforce enhancement factors, including: (a) implementing a workforce development plan that utilizes the existing labor force... 5 (b) taking additional measures to address problem gambling ... (©) utilizing sustainable development principles . .Mark D. Gearan, Chairman —W April 14, 2015 Hodgson Russ Page 4 ‘Thus, the Legislature not only imposed on the Location Board the factors to be applied in evaluating each application, but it also directed the Board on how much weight each factor should receive. The Act does not simply authorize the creation of four additional casino resorts. Rather, it sets forth criteria that must be applied by the Location Board to ensure the additional gaming facilities are sited in a way to maximize value to the State and local communities, while minimizing adverse local impacts. Rather than merely shifting existing revenue streams to new facilities, the Act seeks to “capitalize on the economic development potential of legalized gambling,”' and is premised on the finding that “four upstate casinos can boost economic development, create thousands of well-paying jobs and provide added revenue to the state.” Location Board Eligibility Det nd Final Report On December 17, 2014, the Location Board announced that it selected the following, three casino sites: . Montreign Resort Casino (Region 1) . Rivers sino & Resort at Mohawk Harbor (Region 2) © Lago Resort & Casino (Region 5) At the time of this announcement, the Location Board issued a sixteen-paged initial report. (“Initial Report”) The Location Board announced that a final, more detailed report would be issued on or about thirty days. In the Initial Report, the Location Board identified certain criterion used for determining its selection.’ Most of the criteria were set forth in the Act,* but the Report noted the following: In addition to the specific activity and business development factors set forth above, the Board developed an additional criterion as permitted under PML section 1306, subdivision 3. This criterion was that the Board consider which proposals best fulfill the intent of the Act in regard to providing economic assistance to disadvantaged areas of the State while enhancing Upstate New York's tourism industry. The Initial Report states that after “careful evaluation of each Applicant's proposal”, it determined that the selection of three applicants “would maximize prospects for PML § 1300(3), PML § 1300(4), ‘See, Initial Report, pp. 4-5. PML §1320, See, Initial Report, p. 5Mark D. Gearan, Chairman 4 April 14, 2015 Hodgson Rus Page 5 Monn’ sustained success and be in the best overall interest of the State.”* Thus, it “declined to select a fourth Applicant in the belief that a second competing new gaming facility in any of the regions would maki ficantly more difficult for any gaming facility to succeed in that region.”” The Location Board determined ~ based on the arbitrary standard it created ~ that the three selections fulfill the intent of the Act to “bring jobs and economic development to long- distressed regions of the State.” and also “increase tax revenues to New York and contribute to its tourism industry.”* The Initial Report concludes that the three sites best meet the “statutory criteria for measuring the potential for long term economic growth and sustainability.” Finally, in discussing the Location Board’s determination not to recommend any site in Orange County, the Report states that “all of the Orange County proposals resulted in a high level of cannibalization of existing downstate gaming facilities.”"” On December 26, 2014, the Governor wrote to the Commission and the Board requesting a new RFA process for the “true Southern Tier” — presumably the southem portion of Region Five, Zone Two. Moreover, he described the Location Board’s selection of the Lago Resort & Casino as an “anomalous situation” and observed that a new casino in the economically ailing Southern Tier “was the intent” of the Act.'' In response, the Location Board announced on January 13, 2015 that it voted to approve the creation of a new RFA. On March 23, the Gaming Commission approved the form of the new RFA and began to accept applications for a portion of Region Five, Zone Two. On February 27, 2015, the Location Board issued its final report and findings (“Final Report”). The Final Report contradicts several key assertions in the hi l Report. Although it claims that the Location Board utilized the statutory criteria of Racing, Pari-Mutual Wagering and Breeding Law Section 1320 (the weighting factors), it states that it “did not create numerical scores with regard to the criteria, but reached its conclusions based on a qualitative judgment after consideration of all these factors . . . and] giving a qualitative weight to categories of factors ...."!" In addition, the Location Board’s Final Report no longer contains the Location Board's prior determination that three, rather than four, casino locations would be in the best overall interests of the State. See, Initial Report, p. 8 7 ud . ow a See, Initial Report, p. UI. Joseph Spector, Region needs better casino plan for licensure, Cuomo says, Press & Sun-Blletin Jan. 19, 2015) ‘See, Final Report, p. 8-9.Mark D, Gearan, Chairman 4 April 14, 2015 Page 6 Hodgson Russ I. ARGUMENT A. The Location Board's Recommendations Should Be Rejected Since the Evaluation Criteria Did Not Comply with the State Finance Law or the Act Generally, State agency agreements are governed by the procurement rules and guidelines established by the State Finance Law.'" The goal of such procurements is to promote “fairness” in dealing with the business community.’ Accordingly, under the State Finance Law, RFAs must embody: clearly articulated procedures which require a clear statement of requirements or work to be performed; a documentable process for soliciting bids, proposals or other offers; a balanced and fair method, established in advance of the receipt of offers, for evaluating offers .. .'* 1. The Location Board Did Not Employ the Required Scoring Although the March 31, 2014 RFA invoked certain provisions from State procurement law (specifically, Section 139 of the State Finance Law), the State Comptroller has taken the position that the State Finance Law does not apply. It is nonetheless clear, that the RFA attempted to live up to the ideals of the procurement law by setting forth precise evaluation criteria and procedures. The RFA expressly incorporated the following statutory fa 70% economic activity and business development; (2) 20% local impact and (3) 10% workforce enforcement fuctors, Moreover, the Location Board indicated that it would score the applicants based on these statutory factors and make the scoring public.'° The Initial Report of the Location Board indicated that the statutory criteria were utilized. However, afier public scrutiny of the siting decision, including criticism from Governor Cuomo, the Final Report was issued and, for the first time, the Location Board stated that it “did not create numerical scores with regard to the criteria, but reached its conclusions based on a qualitative judgment after consideration of all these factors . .. {and] giving a qualitative weight to categories of factors... .""” This post-hoc disclosure undermines the integrity of the process because it bears witness to the fact that applicants were not provided with a clear statement of the requirements and evaluative factors. "PML §1312; State Finance Law (“SFI”) §163 et. Seq um" BFL flea. SFL $163.26, See Round 2 Q&A (May 14, 2014) at 11 of al Report, p. 8:9.Mark D. Gearan, Chairman 4 April 14, 2015 Hodgson Russ Page 7 Dianne The Location Board’s failure to appropriately consider the statutory factors and criteria in rendering its determination is arbitrary and capricious.'* Here, it acknowledged that it chose to rely exclusively on a qualitative evaluation, rather than employing the quantitative weighting required by the Act, or scoring the applications in a manner consistent with general procurement practice. The result of this qualitative process, discussed more thoroughly below, ‘was a siting decision that was riddled with inconsistent and unsupported findings. And the subjectivity of the qualitative process stands at odds with the goal of administering a fair and balanced process. This alone requires that the Commission decline to make any awards based on the current recommendations and direct the Location Board to start the process anew. 2. The Location Board Added Criteria Afier Applications Were Submitted ‘The Act sets forth the criterion for evaluating the RFA" as well as criterion for disqualifying RFA applicants.”” The RFA proposals were all submitted on or before 4 PM on June 30, 2014, The Location Board's final two members, including its Chair, were not appointed until after July 4, 2014, and the members did not mect as a complete Board to discuss, inter alia, the RFA until August 7, 2014, Yet, according to the Report (and the public comments of the Board members at their hearing on December 17, 2014 followed by their press conference). at some point “early in the process" but after the date offers were due, the Location Board established “additional criterion as permitted under PML section 1306, subdivision 3. “additional criterion” were not disclosed to any potential bidders, were not set forth in the Act, and were established too late to comply with the provisions of the State Finance Law. For ‘example, the Location Board considered which proposals would best provide economic assistance to disadvantaged areas of the State. This factor, crucial to a decision about what Jocation to select for an applicant’s proposal, was not disclosed prior to the submission of applications and the expenditure of hundreds of thousands of dollars. And, not only did the Location Board utilize a previously unarticulated factor in its evaluation, but it apparently elevated that factor above all others. In fact, all of the successful applications share the distinction of being sited in the most disadvantaged areas of the State, tiger v. Kirby, 81 A.D.24 642 (2d Dep't 1981) (annulling a determination of an administrative body as arbitrary and capricious where it filed to properly consider mandatory riteria); New York State Tenanis & Neighbors Coalition, Inv. Nassau Coungy Rent Guidelines Bd.,25 Mise 3d 1202(A) (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty 2006), 7d $3 A.D.3d $50 2d Dep't 2008) ("The statutory factors tha the Board must consider in making. determination are spelled out... in the statute, and the failure to consider any of those factors is fatal; Gall v. Stave of N.Y. Office of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 37 A.D34 984, 986 (3d Dep't 2007) (holding that failure to apply the statutory factors is arbitrary and capricious). PML $1320, PML $1318. See Chairman Law's comments Transcript December 17, 2014. See Final Report, p. 5Mark D. Gearan, Chairman AF April 14, 2015 Hodgson Russ Page 8 In addition, the Location Board established negative criterion that excluded (i) more than one facility in the traditional Catskills, as well as (i) the entirety of Orange County. These exclusions were not disclosed and, as a result, unfairly induced six Orange County applicants to invest significant time and financial resources in the application process. As a result, the process was far from a fair and balanced approach; rather it was replete with hidden agendas. B. The Location Board's Recommendations Were Inconsistent, Unsupported and Arbitrary and Capricious The purpose of the Act is to “boost economic development, create thousands of well-paying jobs. .. provide added revenue to the state” and “attract non-New York residents and bring downstate New Yorkers to upstate.””* Moreover, the Location Board was tasked with finding applicants that maximize “revenues received by the state and localities.’ 1. Cannibalized Revenue Does Not Saiisfy the Act's Goals Several of the successful applicants fail to achieve the stated goals of the Act. For ‘example, as several interested parties have noted, the Lago facility will draw the majority of its projected revenue from nearby existing New York gaming facilities. One of those gaming facilities, Finger Lakes Racing Association, submitted a detailed report prepared by Clyde W. Barrow, Ph.D. entitled “The Regional Market Impact of a Proposed Tyre, New York Casino: Estimated Displacement of Existing Gaming Revenues & Employment” (the “Barrow Report”), which evaluated and projected the cannibalization that would occur as the result of the construction and operation of the proposed Lago Resort & Casino. ‘The Barrow Report found that 69% of Lago Resort & Casino’s gross gaming revenues and 87% of its annual visits will be generated by residents living in the local area (0-60 minutes) and 67% of Lago’s projected gross gaming revenues will displace existing gan ity and merely transfer gaming expenditures and employment from existing gaming facilities to the proposed facility. The Barrow Report also noted that the resulting cannibalized revenue to the Lago Resort & Casino will be taxed at a lower statutory rate, which will result in an overall reduction in revenues to the State, taking into account the current revenue sharing percentages with the existing gaming facilities in the area. In addition, Finger Lakes submitted an expert analysis from Union Gaming, Analytics (the “Union Gaming Report”), which performed an independent analysis of potential gaming revenue for the proposed Lago Casino. ‘The report explains the significant ization that will occur and notes that, to reach revenue of $149 million, the Lago Casino will have to cannibalize five existing operations out of $133 million. The net result would be an increase in a mere $16 million growth in the gaming market. ‘The Union Gaming Report also concludes that significant gaming revenue will be shifted from “racinos” (Finger Lakes, Batavia Downs and Vernon Downs) to the proposed Lago Casino, which will have a severe impact on et §1300(5) & (6). et § 1320016),4 Hodgson Russ Mark D. Gearan, Chairman April 14, 2015 Page 9 the net revenue to the State, Cannibalization from racinos to the Lago Casino will not be a dollar-for-dollar redistribution as far as State revenues are concerned. The tax rate on Video Lottery Terminals (*VLTs") at racinos is higher than the tax rate for slots and table games that will apply to the proposed Lago Casino, Any revenue cannibalized from a racino will reduce the State's overall revenues from gaming because each dollar of gaming revenue at a racino brings in approximately $0.66 to the State, while each dollar of gaming revenue at the Lago Casino would bring in only $0.37 or $0.10 in revenues. According to the Union Gaming Report, the State would lose $69 million in slot revenues due to cannibalization of the existing gaming facilities, with a net State revenue decrease of approximately $22 million, This expert analysis was not discussed or evaluated in the Location Board’s decision, and stands unrebutted in the record. Even Lago’s own marketing analysis reveals that most of its projected gaming revenue will be drawn from existing New York gaming facilities.* And the failure to consider this evidence, among other things, is the subject of an Article 78 Petition filed by Finger Lakes against New York State, Similarly, the Oneida Indian Nation submitted a letter dated April 1, 2015 to the Commission which sets forth in detail the impact that this cannibalization will have on Turning Stone Resort Casino. ‘The Location Board’s failure to address these issues is particularly significant when contrasted with its express treatment of the Orange County applicants ~ the categorical exclusion of six of the sixteen applications under consideration. ‘The Location Board also eliminated two other applicants in the Catskill region based on an arbitrary standard that “only fone” could be successful, Therefore, without quantifying the benefits (since all of the Orange County facilities would provide sustained revenue to the State), the Location Board arbitrarily climinated half of the State-wide applicants on its unsupported supposition, leaving eight applicants for four licenses. Specifically, the Location Board’s Initial Report states that “all of the Orange County proposals resulted in a high level of cannibalization of existing downstate gaming facilities.”°* However, as the chart below demonstrates, Lago’s own projected cannibalization of existing facilities will be significantly greater than that of Orange County applicants rejected by the Location Board on cannibalization grounds Percentage of Cannibalized | Total Cannibalized Revenue | Profits - - _ 51% f $134 12% $798 million Caesars New York 14% $104.6 million | The Location Board further reasoned that a successful Orange County applicant ‘would cannibalize a potential, future casino selected in the Cats! % See, Initial Report, p. 11 Lago Application Exhibit V (Executive Summary) at 3. region. It backed into thiMark D, Gearan, Chairman 4 April 14, 2015 Page 10 Hodgson Rus: conclusion by first determining that selecting a Sullivan County or Ulster County applicant ‘would fulfill the intent of the Act.” This finding appears to be rooted in the Location Board’s aforementioned “additional criterion” that applicants should provide economic assistance to disadvantaged areas of the State. Once the Location Board reached that determination, the exclusion of Orange County applicants based on Sullivan County cannibalization was a foregone conclusion, As the above-analysis demonstrates, the Location Board used “cannibalization”™ as both a sword and a shield. ‘Thus, there can be little doubt that the failure to apply the same standard on cannibalization to all applicants was arbitrary and capricio 2. The Location Board Never Evaluated The Millions Of Dollars Of Tax Relief That Lago Is To Receive Nowhere in the Location Board’s resolution, selection, or final determination is there any discussion, evaluation, or mention of the millions of dollars of tax relief that Lago applied for and will receive from the Seneca County Industrial Development Agency (“IDA”). ‘On October 2, 2014, the IDA accepted Lago’s application for tax relief and, on February 12, 2015, the IDA approved an agreement for the Lago casino, which includes sales tax, mortgage recording tax, and property tax abatement, which will likely top $90 million in total relief. Such significant reduction in tax revenues to State and local governments should have been considered in light of the statutory mandate to consider the maximizing of revenues and the Act's central goal of “providfing] added revenue to the state.” Failure to evaluate tens of millions of dollars in tax relief where the statutory mandate requires significant weight be given to economic impact factors is arbitrary and capricious. 3. The Location Board Did Not Prioritize Maximizing Revenues to the State The Legislature instructed the Location Board to assign a 70% weight to ‘economic activity and business development factors”, including maximizing revenues received by the state and localities and providing the highest number of quality jobs in the gaming facility. Among the critical issues is how much tax revenue each applicant will bring to the State. Here is how the successful applicants (in bold) stacked-up against their competitors: Applicant/Project_ | ‘Tax Revenue | __Total Revenue Full-time Jobs| Region One, Zone Two (Catskill/Hudson Valley Region) _ | Sterling Forest $264.1 million $1.133 billion 3129 | Resorts World $201.4 million $758 million 2662 | Hudson Valley = - — | [Caesars New York | $188.7 million ___| $738 million 2129 | Grand Hudson Resort_| $172 million $568 million 2310 a ‘The Live! | $149.9 million $662 million 3264 Seo, Final Report, p. 14Mark D. Gearan, Chairman April 14, 2015 Page 11 Hudson Valley | $137.1 million $559 million Nevele Resort $104.8 million $336 million Montreign $103.4 million $391.6 million Mohegan Sun $69.9 million [$265 million Region Two, Zone Two (Cay — $105.4 million 889 5 ‘$82.1 mi $222.5 million 877 a Capital View Casino | $82 million ‘$227 million 769 Howe Caverns Resort _| $52.7 million $139 million 804 - Region Five, Zone Two (Eastern Southern Tier/Finger Lakes Region) 0 ion | $282 million 10-1500 [Traditions Resort ~_ [$139.5 million - [Tioga Downs $31.2 million ‘$98 million - | ‘Thus, here too the Location Board failed to apply a significant, statutory factor uniformly. In Region Five, the successful applicant's projected total revenue, tax revenue and job creation significantly exceed those of the competing applications. In Region Two and Region One, however, the successful applicant's projections for total revenue, tax revenue and {job creation do not exceed those of competing applications. In fact, in Region One, the successful applicant's projections are among the lowest in the field. In contrast, the top three applicants project tax revenue between $70 and $100 million over the projections of the Montreign facility. Because the Location Board was required to give 70% weighting to this factor, it is difficult to reconcile the recommendations in Regions One and Two. Moreover, the Location Board's acknowledgement that it did not create numerical scores, simply emphasizes the fact that the process deviated from the stated requirements. And the Location Board's apparent adherence to the 70% weighting of this factor in Region Five underscores the arbitrary nature of the procedures utilized to evaluate the proposals, For all of these reasons, the Commission should reject the Location Board’ s recommendations and direct the Location Board to begin the selection process anew. C. The Appearance of a Conflict of Interest As other interested parties have noted, the Location Board engaged an outside consultant with past ties to all three successful applicants. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, LLP (hereafter, “Taft”) signed a one-year contract for $4.9 million dollars “to provide the [Location Board] with an analysis of the gaming industry and assist with the comprehensive review and evaluation” of the applications."* According to press reports, Taft had prior connections with five of the fifieen applicants. All three of the successful applicants had ties to Taft. If these allegations are proven correct, it will cast a shadow over the entire process and call into question the recommendations of the Location Board. This alleged impropriety, in conjunction with the ‘other procedural and substantive flaws, is further evidence that the Location Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously ‘See John Harris, Casino industry: deep relationships, potential conflicts, Democrat & Chronicle (Feb. 23, 2015) at 1Mark D. Gearan, Chairman at April 14, 2015 rage? Hodgson Rus II, CONCLUSION Based on the Governor's December 2014 letter, the Location Board has opened bidding in Region Five to new applicants, but not the remaining regions. The Location Board previously stated that it “declined to select a fourth Applicant in the belief that a second ‘competing new gaming facility in any of the regions would make it significantly more difficult for any gaming facility to succeed in that region.” Yet less than three months later it reversed course and is accepting applicants for a fourth casino, but in only a portion of one region. Moreover, there is no statutory authority to reopen the process or to engage in piecemeal RFAS. For all of these reasons, the Location Board has exceeded its statutory mandate. The ‘Commission must address these errors by denying the issuance of a gaming license in order to preserve the integrity of the process. The Commission should reopen the application process for all three regions. Sincerely, Mohdled Mae, Michelle L. Merola MLM ce: John A. Crotty, Gaming Commissioner Peter J. Moscheti, Jr., Gaming Commissioner John J, Poklemba, Gaming Commissioner Barry Sample, Gaming Commissioner ‘Todd R. Snyder, Gaming Commissioner Robert Williams, Executive Director, Gar 1g Commission Wd.