Also available from Continuum hough, Alain Badiou (anslated by Olver Feltham and Justin Clemens) ‘Theoretical Writings, Alain Badlon (edited and translated by Alero Toscano and Ray Bresier) BEING AND EVENT Alain Badiou ‘Translated by Oliver Feltham1 Belonging and inclusion 2 The theorem of the point of excess 3 The void and the excess 4 One, count-as-one, unity, and forming nto 8 The State, or Metatrucute, an the Typology of Being (normality singularity, exctescence) 9 The State of the Hisworco-social Situation 10 spinoza art I Being: Nature and Infinity. Heidegger! Galileo 1 Nature: Poem or matheme? 12. The Ontological Schema of Natural Multiples and the Non-exstence of Nature 1 The concept of normality: tansiive sets 2 Natural multiple: ordinals 3 The play of presentation in natural multiples or ordinals 44 Uimate natura element (unique atom) ‘An ondial i the number of that of which ts the name 6 Nature docs not exist, 15 Infinity: the other. the rule and the Osher 14. The Ontological Decision: “There i some infinity In natural maple 1 Point of being and operator of passage 2 Succession and imit 3 The second existential seal 4 Infinity finally defined 5 The finite. in second place 15 Hegel 1 The Matheme of infinity revised 2 How can an infinity be ba? 3 The retun and the nomination 4 The arcana of quantity 5 Disjunetion at a "9 ” m 133 130 0 be be 19 M40 waz 150 131 154 156 136 161 168 165 er 169 part IV The Event: History and Uliracone 16 Bvental sites and Historical Situations 17 The Matheme ofthe Event 18 Beings Profibition ofthe Event 1 The ontologial schema of historicity and instability 2 The axiom of foundation 5 the axiom of foundation is a metaontoogical thesis of ontology 4 Nature and history 5 The event Belongs to that-which-is-not-being- ua-being 19 Mallarmé art V The Event: Intervention and Fidelity ascal/ Choice; HOlderlin/Deduction 20 The Intervention: egal choice of name for the event, logic ofthe 1wo, temporal foundation 21 Pascal 22 The Form-mltipe of intervention: there a being of coe? 23 Fadeliy, Connection 24 Deduction as Operator of Ontological Fidelity 1 The formal concept of deduction 2 Reasoning via hypothesis 5 Reasoning va the absurd 4 Tipe determination of deductive fidelity 25 wolderlin Part VI Quantity and Knowledge. The Discernible (or Constructibl): Leibniz/Gdel 26 The Concept of Quantity and the Impasse of Ontology 1 The quanthative comparison of infinite sets 2 Natural quantitative corelate of a multiple: ‘cardinality and cardinals 3. The problem of infinite cardinals ry v8 ee as 187 187 199 191 201 aia 22 240 242 Daa 27 252 255 265 267 269 m‘ngalypibedin enh ate oman © to Sel 1988 “he gh nguge laton © Case 2008 “book supe yh en My Foren Al ap of sh ne hae i eh ty SBN 0-8264-5831-9, ' ay of Congo Cag ation a 2 log re for th bak tna om he ay of ones ‘pes by ete Sees Li, oueer acd anda he USA 4 Contents Authors Preface ‘Transator’s Preface Introduction art I Being: Multiple and Void. Plato/Cantor ‘The One and the Multiple: prior conditions of, any possible ontology Pato ‘Theory of the Pare Multiple: paradoxes and ital decision ‘Technical Noe: the conventions of writing ‘The Void Proper name of being ‘The Mark 2 1 The same and the other: the axiom of extensionaty 2 The operations under condition: axioms ofthe powetset, of union, of separation and of replacement 3. The void, subtractive suture to being Part Ik Being: Excess, State of the Situation, Onel ‘Multiple, Whole/Pars, or €/. This necessary to prohibit paradoxical multiples, which i o say the ‘non-being whose ontological inconsistency has as sgn the ruin of the language. The axiom-system has cherefore 1 be such that what iv authorizes tobe considered asa set, thas everyting hat it speaks fof-sinc, to distinguish sets from anything else within this ‘every- thing’, to distinguish the mulple (which s) rom the one (which not), and finally to distinguish belng from non-being, a concept of the multiple would be requited, a criterion of the set which is ‘exduded—Is nor corteate to formulas such a8 ~f © «), formulas ‘Which induce incoerency. Benveen 1908 and 1940 this double task was taken in hand by Zermelo and completed by Fraenkel, von Neumann and Godel I was accomplished In the shape ofthe formal axiom-system, the system in which, it fs ‘order logic. the pure doctrine ofthe miles presented, such that it ca sill be used today 1 se out every branch of mathematics would insist on the fac tha, it being st theory at stake, axlomatizaton {snot an arte of exposition, but an iminsic necessity. Being-mulipe if ‘musted to natural language and to intuition, produces an undivided ‘seudo-presentaton of consistency and inconsistency. thus of being and ‘non-being, because it does no dearly separate isl from the presumption ‘ofthe being ofthe one. Yer the one and the mulhiple do not frm “unity of conraries since the fst isnot whist te second isthe ver form of any resentation of being. Axlomatzation is required such thatthe mule left the implicness of ts counting rl, be delivered without consp, that 55, withou implying the Being hee. 2°‘ng AND evENT ‘the axlomatization consists in fixing the usage of the relation of belonging, €- to which the entire lexicon of mathematics can finally be reduced fone considers that equality rather a logical symbol “The fist msjor characteristic of the Zeemelo-Fraenkel formal system {he ZF system) Is that its lexicon contains solely one relation, ¢, and therefore no unary predict, no propery in the strict sense In particu, this sytem exces any construction ofa symbol whose sense would Be to beast. The multiple implicily designated herein the form of fogic ‘tbelonging. that is, in & mode in which the ‘something = ain general resented according toa multiplicity This wil be inscribed a5. ¢ 8, ais herent off. What is counted as one snot the concept ofthe muti: here sno insertable thought of what oe-muliple is. The one s assigned. {onthe signe alone: that it the operator of denotation for the relation ‘between the something’ in general and the multiple. The sign, wnbeing ff any one, determines, in a uniform manner, the presentation of ‘something’ as indexed t the multiple. "The second major characteristic ofthe ZF system imately evokes it being, ely speaking. something’ which is thereby disposed acording to ts mulple presentation, Zermelo's axiom system contains one type of ‘rasable lone, one list of variables. When I writ‘ belongs toa 8 the ‘Sgn wand fare variables from the same Ist, and can thus be substituted for by specially indstingushable terms. If one admis, with 2 grain of sale Quine’ famous formula, be sto be the valu of variable’ one can ‘Conclude that the ZF system postulates that there s only one type of (resentation of being: the mille. The theory does not distinguish between ‘objects’ and groups of objec (as Cantor di), nor even bewween, ‘Rlements and ‘et That there i only one type of variable means all is ulpe, everyting is a set indeed, ce inscription without concept of thatwhich-s amounts to fixing i as what can be bound, by belonging. (0 the muldple, and if what can be thus bound cannot be ditingushed, in tens of the status of ts inscription, rom what tis bound toi. na € 8 only has the possibility of being an element ofthe set inasmuch as itis Stee same srptural type a thats ase ise—then that-which ss ‘uniformly pure moliplicy “The thenry thus posits that what it presents—its terms—within the “axiomatic articulation, and whose concept it doesnot delivers always of the type er that what belongs 8 mulipe is alas a multiple: and that being an ‘element is nota satus of being, an inrinsie quality, but the Shmple relation, to-be-lement-of through which a multiplicity can be “ preset ystems the aio of vis, Iho na wits ont es pf on ad ht a iar present, n the nplins es me ‘ml aly mi of mie what toy depoye The it apr cae of Ferme work nce te trace topo del th he pier hc ann he fowing pepe on em me ue he spon thatthe We akeaty 9 presed eZee Stores by ngage hese lr {atin fa tal mle The 0 spartn compen oo ab) rome fr tion pstedin thc dhe dr tg of hi axom thai pops an any sso of ene te al Pes tea tthe aed on ances el ean Inpho geo whith aematgs esse prt oF incnsen uli te whe etn on in exe the eabeny ofthe Imgg, One sl Ft of cones tha nc ee esc sna som ene hen tothe ion teens tm te sen sly ho Shed resnion ofthe on of se 1 sh 3 Som ofan inte mathematica mating to ths maps smn ton towiathe as cesed-dacs nov coste ny eer ose yds spine the even ftom operon a at ot pohing pes woh ae lane Ce om Shere beng a exes ot overs cones he ico langage eens athe ml ht ewe aly by he tes esa) wih nantes he sane? Tt oe San ron the bs a prey) cone commsins mange een lip ‘demonstrable is an element of this set: Seton ferwnihae) eh we a bod L 1 existence all language multiple ttENG AND EVENT ‘The essence of this thestr—wich alms to secure the multiple, without rulnous excess. within the grasp of language—i that it dively exiten {al for every formula A) the existence ofa multiple is automaticaly and “uniformly guaranteed: the mitiple which gathers vogether all the terms which validate the formula. Tassels paradox cuts the coherency ofthe language with a conta icon: in doingso. it undoes the exstence-mulipi-langusge triplet such {bi & insenbedunder the primacy of existence (of the existential “guantfe)—in the statement above. “ermelo proposes the same tpt but ted into a diferent knot ‘The axiom of separation says tat, given a multiple, or rather, for any _ultple supposed given (supposed presented or existent), there exists the ‘Sb-rmllpe of terms which possess the property expressed by the formula I) In other words, what i induced by a formula of the language isnot flvcely an existence, a presentation of multiplicity, but rather—on the ‘condition that theres already a presentation—the ‘separation’, within that presentation, and supported by i, of a subset constituted from the tems {thus the mullite, since every multiple is multiple of mulspls) ‘which validate the formu ‘At formal level it follows that the axiom of separation i contrast ro the preceding statement, not existential since i only infers an existence from its already-being-there in the form of some multiplicity whose preseason has been supposed. The axiom of separation says that fr any upposed given multpicty there exist dhe part (he sub-multipicty) fwhone elements validate 2) It dhereby reverses she order of the quant fer: s a universal statement, in which all supposed existence induces, fo the basis of language, an implied existence plod existence v (0) 8) (Wy) IIe a1 6 AHI we AIL 1 1 supposed existence language multiple 1m conitast to Frege’ statement which draws the existence of directly foom is) the axiom of separation, on its own, does not allow any ‘conclusion eonceming enstenc, The delaration made by is iypliative Stracture amounts to the following if there is an/a then there is a [p-ohich i « part of «whose elements validate the formula i). But is there an a? The axiom says nothing ofthis it fs only a mediation by language from (supposed) existence to (implied existence ‘what Zermelo proposes asthe language-mltiple-exisence Knot no tonger stipulates that on the basis of language the existence of a multiple sintered bt rather that langage separates out, within a supposed glven ‘existence (within some already presented multiple) the existence of sub- multiple Language cannot induce existence, solely a split within existence ‘Zermelo's axiom is therefore materialist in that it breaks with the figure of ideainguistery—sohose price is the paradox of exces+—in which the ‘existential presentation of the muiple is dicey inferred trom a well: ‘constructed language. The axlom re-stablshes that is solely within the ‘presupposition of existence that language operates—separates—and that twat i thereby induces in terms of consistent muliplicy is supported in is being. in an anticipatory manner, by a presentation Which Is already there, The existence-muluple anucpates what language retreactively| ‘separates out om It as implied exstence-mltple The power of language doesnot go so far aso institute the ‘there of, the ‘there i, I confines tel to posing that theee are some distinctions within the “there i. The prindples dilerentiated by Lacan may be remarked therein: that ofthe real there is) and that ofthe symbolic (there are some distinction). ‘The formal stigmata ofthe already ofa coun, inthe axiom of separation, isfound nthe universality ofthe inital quantifier (the frst count-as-one), ‘which subordinates the existential quantifier the separating count-25-one of language) Therelore, it isnot essentially the dimension o ses which Is resected by Zexmelo, bot rather the presentative pretensions of language. I said th Russell’ paradox could be interpreted as an exces ofthe mule over the capacity of language to present it without fling apart. One coud just a5 ellsay tha Its language which i excessive in that it sabe to pronounce properties such as —f¢ a)—it would be alittle forced to pretend tat these Droperties can inti a multiple presentation, Being inasmuch 25 is the pure multiple, subtracted from such forcing: in other words, the ruprue of langue shows that nothing can acede to consistent presenta- fon in such a manner. The axiom of separation takes a stand within ontology—its positon ean ‘be summarized quite simply: the theory ofthe multiple s general form of ”BEING AND EVENT presentation, cannot presume that Its on the bass of ts pure formal rule Slone—well-consucted properies—that the existence of a multiple (3 presentation) i inferred. Being musth sleady-there: some pure mulpe {multiple of multpes, must be presented in order forthe rate to thea Separate some consistent muliplicty, self pesented subsequently by the sesture of the inital presentation However. crucial question remains unanswered: within the frame- work of axiomatic presentation isnot on the basis of language that the fxistence ofthe multiple is ensured—that son the basis ofthe present tion thatthe theory pesents—then where isthe absolutly iil poi of being? Which inital multiple has its exstence ensured such thatthe separating function of language can operate therein? ‘This isthe whole problem of he subtractive sutute af set theory to being ‘qua being, isa problem hat langoage emnot avo, an to which i ead {us by foundering upon ts paradoxical dissolution, the result of its own, excess, Language—svhich provides for separations and compostions— anno, alone, insttate the existence ofthe pure multiple; it cannot ensure that what the theory presents is indeed presentation, Technical Not | the conventions of writing ‘The abbreviated or formal writing used in this book is based on what called Brst-order logic. Iti a question of being able to inseibe statements ofthe genre: forall terms, we have che folowing property, or there does ‘ot exist any term which has the following property’ or tis statement is true, then tis other statement i also trae,’ The fundamental principle fs that the formulations “for al’ and ‘there exists’ only aflect terms {individuals} and never properties In short the stricture i that properties are not capable, in tur, of pssesing properties (this would cary us into ‘second-order log ‘The graphic realization of these requisites is accomplished by the Mxation of five types of sign: variables (which inscribe individuals, logical co recor (negation, conjunction, disjunction, Implication and equivalence, (quantifrs (universal: "or alt, and existential “there exis’), properties oF selations (here wil only be two ofthese for us equality and belonging) and punctuatons (parentheses, braces, and square brackets) = The variables for indivkduals (or us, muples or ses) are the Greek levers fy. 8 rand, sometins, 3, We will also use indices if need be, 0 Inuwoduce more variables, such a8 as, ys et, These signs designate tas which Is spoken of that of whieh one afi this oF that. = The quantifiers ae the signs ¥ (universal quantifier) and 3 (exisen tial quantifier), They are always followed by a variable: (Vs) reads: “fo ll a’ 3a) reads "there exists= the togeal connectors ate the following ~ (negation), > mpi tion) oF (dgjunction),& (conjunction), equivalence) The telations ere = (equality) and € (belonging). They always ink fhwo variables: a= B which reads als equal to and « © B which reads‘ belongs 0B The punetaton is comprised of parentheses (), braces (1, and square brackets [ -Aformula san assemblage of signs which obeys rues of conection, These ‘ules can be stely defined, but they are irutve: it a matter ofthe formula being eadabl. For example: (7a) 38) € f) > ~@ «)] reads without a problem: ‘For all «there exists at least one such that i « belongs tof then # does not belong 1 ‘An indeterminate formula will often be noted by the letter One very important point i the following: ina formula, a variable fs cither quantified or no, Inthe formula above, the to variables « and 8 Sre quantified (universally, existential). A variable which js not ‘quantified is a free variable. Ler's consider, for example, the following formu (Wale =a) Gale 6 ve all te reads intuitively: Forall , the equality of 8 anda is equivalent 1 the {act tha there exss ay such that y belongs to and also belongs 0 Ihe formulae andy are quantified but ee. The formula in question xpress 3 property of Be namely the fat that being equivalent (0 86 Cuulvalent to such and such (3 what & expressed by the piece of the formula: ito € B) & fre ail. We wil often write A) fora formula in tehlch w is a free variable, Inuitvely, this means that the formula A Expresses a property ofthe variable . If there are 1wo free variables, one ‘artes 9). Which expresses a relation between the fre variables aand fh, ‘or example. the formula (¥)[6 € a) ot = Bi which reads ‘ally belong ‘ether tow oF to 9,0 to both of ther’ (he logical os not exclusive} ixes ' particule elation between « and. ‘We willallow ourselves, as we go along. to dfn supplementary slns on tne bans of primitive signs. For that it wil be necessary to fx via an equivalence, the possibilty of retansating these signs into formulas ‘which contain primitive signs alone. For example, the formule: Tepe (lb a) + © Al defines the relation of inclusion between ‘Cand is equivalent tothe complete formula: or all, ify belongs to ‘a then ybelongs tog is evident thatthe new writing a 86 merely an {bbrevition fora formula Aj) writen uniquely with primitive signs and in which «and 8 are ree variables, inthe body ofthe text the reading of the lormulas should not pose any problems, moreover, they wil always be introduced. Definions willbe Explained. The reader cn trust te intl sense ofthe written form.st MEDITATION FOUR The Void: Proper name of being Take any situation in particular. 1 has een sald that is structure—the regime ofthe cour-as-one—spits the multiple which i presented ther: “litt nto consistency (te competion of ones) and inconsistency the inert ofthe domain) However, incons’stency i not actually presented 35 such since all presentation fs under the law of the count. Inconsistency 35 pure mule I solely the presupposition thr prior the count the one fs not. Yet what i explicit in any situation is rather thatthe one is. In neta. a situation Is not such thatthe thess ‘the one 8 nor” can be presented therein, On the contrary, because the la is the count-as-ne, rothing i presented in a situation which is pot counted: the situation fenvelops existence with the one. Nothing Is presentable in a station ftherwise than under the elec of structure, that, under the form of the one and its composition in consistent multiplicities. The one is thereby not only the regime of stuctured presentation but also the regime ofthe pomible of presentation ie In a non-ontological (thus non-mathema teal) situation, the miles possible only insofar asitis explicitly ordered by the law according othe one ofthe count. Inside she station there no gtaspable inconsistency which would be subtracted fom the count and thus astructured. Any situation, seized in it immanence, thus reverses ‘the inaugural axiom of our entre procedure. It states that the one fs and that the pure mutiple—inconslstency—is not. This is eniely natura because an indeterminate situation, not being the presentation of presen- tation. necessarily ieniiies being wih what i presentable thus withthe possibly ofthe one {HE Yoo: PROPER NAME OF BEING tis therefore vert I wil ound the essential distinction between the tnue andthe veriical mich further on in Meditation 31) that, inside what {situation establishes as a form of knowledge, being is being in the possibilty ofthe one, I is Lebni’s thesis (What nota being i not a Doing) which Merally governs the immanence of a situation and is horizon of vert. 115 a thesis of the law. “This thesi exposes vs to the following dificuly: inthe immanence of, a situation, Is inconsistency doesnot comet light, nevertheless count {sone being an operation ie indicates thatthe one a result. Insofar as the one is 2 ret, by necessy Something’ of the multiple does not absolutely coneide with the result. To be sure there is no antecedence of, the multiple which would give rise to presentation because the later i alivaysalready-stuctured such that there is only oneness or consistent ‘lips. But this “here leaves 2 remainder: the lw im which iti ‘deployed is discernible as operation. And although there ts never anything fother—in a suaton—hon the result (everything, In the situation, i ‘outed, what thereby reslls marks out, before the operation, a must be-counted. tf the latter which causes the structured presentation 10 waver towards the phantom of inconsistency ‘f course, remains certain that this phantom—which, on the basis of the fac that beingone ress, suily unhings the one fom being inthe ‘very midst of the situational thess that only the one is—cannot in any manner be presented itsel, Because the regime of presentation is con sistent mulpldr, the result ofthe count ‘By consequence, since everything is counted, yer given that the one of the count, obliged to be a res, leaves a phantom remainder—of the lip not originally being in the form ofthe one—onte has to allow that Inside the vation the pure o inconsistent mukple sboth excued fom ‘everything. and thus from the presentation island Included, in the name of what would be’ the presentation itsell the presentation ‘nisl if what the law does not authorize to think was tinkable: thatthe one is ‘not, thatthe being of consistency Is inconsistency To put it more clearly, once dhe entrty of a situation is subject the law of the one and consistency, its necessary, from the standpoint of limmanence tothe situation that the pure multiple, absolutely unpresent- able according to the count, be nok. But Deing-nothing is as distinct from non-being as the “there iss astinc from being Justa the stats ofthe one is decided erween the (tru) thesis “here {sonenes” and the [lle thes ofthe ontologies of presence, ‘the one is sso the staus ofthe pure muiiple decided, inthe immanence of a non “toloeal situation: betseen the (sue) thesis ‘incoasstency is nothing’ ind the (fase) structurlist or legals thesis “inconsistency not” Tt i guile true that prior to the count there Is nothing Because everything is counted. Yet this being-nothingwherein resides the illegal Inconsistency of being-is the base of there being the “whole” of the “compositions of ones in which presentation takes pace aust certainly be assumed thatthe elect of structures complete, that what subzacts ise from the later is nothing. an thatthe law doesnot “counter sngular islands in presentation which obstruct is passage. In an indeterminate situation there is no tebe or subtractive presentation ofthe pre multiple upon which dhe empite of the one i exercised. Moreover ‘isis why within a situation, the search for something that would feed an Jnuition of being qua being ia search in vain, The Tog of she acu, of ‘wba the count-as-one would have forgotten’ ofthe excluded which may be postive located assign or eal of pure mulipity, san impasse—an itusion—of thought. as i i of practice. A situation never proposes Enyting other than multiples wowen fom ones, and he law of laws i that nothing limits the eet of the count. “And yet the corelate thesis also imposes sell: that there fs a being of ‘thing, as form of she unpresentable. The ‘nothing’ is wat names the Lnpeccelvable gap, cancelled then renewed, between presentation as Sanicture and presentation a truetuted-presentaton, between the one as result and the one as operation, Between presented consistency and Inconsistency as what-wil-have-been-presented Naturally it would Be pointes tose off in search ofthe nothing. Yet it mast besa that this s exactly What poetry exhausts itself doing: this is that enders poetry, even at the most sovereign point of cary, even in Esperempory affirmation, compli with death. i one must—als!—con- cede that there Is some sense in Pat's project of crowning the poets in ‘rder to then send them into exile, ts because poetry propagates the idea ‘fa inition of the nothing in which being would reside when there is hot even the ste for such intuition—they call t Nature—because every thing i consistent. The only thing we can affirm is thls every station Smplies the nothing of ts all, Bur the nothing s ether place nor aterm ‘lhe situation, For dhe nothing were a term that could onty mean one thing: that it had been counted as one, Yet everything which has been. ‘outed is within the consistency of presentation. Its thus rled out that the nothing—which here names the pure will-have-been-counted. as {iscnguishabe from the effect ofthe count, and thus disunguishable from presentation-be taken as a term, There is mot arnothing. there is ‘noting, phantom of inconsistency ‘By isl the nothing is no more than the name of unpresentation in presentation, te status of being resus from the following: one has fo admit that ifthe one resuls, then “something’—which is not an {nstualon-tem, and which is thus nothing—has not been courted, this something’ being that it a necessary thatthe operation ofthe count scone operate. Ths it comes down to exactly the same thing say that, the nothing Is the operation of the count—which, as source ofthe one. I not itself counted-—and to say thatthe nosing isthe pure multiple upon Which the count operates—which ‘in-tsel’, as non-counted, is quite Aine trom how i turns out according tothe count, ‘The nothing names that undecidable of presentation which iss unpresenable, distributed between the pure inertia of the domain ofthe multiple, and the pure transparency of the operation thanks to which there Is oneness. The nothing is as much that of structure. thus of consistency, a5 that ofthe pure multiple. thus of inconsistency. Ii sald ‘with good reason that nothing i subteated trom presentation, because it feon the bass of he laters double unsdction, dhe aw and the mulpe that the nothing isthe nothing. Foran indeterminate situation, theres thos an equivalent to what Plato named, with respect 40 the great cosmological construcion of the Timacus—an almost catnvalesque metaphor of universal presenta Wion-—the ‘errant cause’, recognizing lis extreme difculty for thought ‘What iat tak I an unpresentable yet necessary igure which designates the gap between the rsult-one of presentation and that ‘on the bass of ‘which’ there is presentation: that ithe non-term of any tality, the nen fone of any countasone, the nothing particular to the situation, the ‘unlocaizable void poin in which its manifest both thatthe situation is sutured to being and that the sharwhio-presents-iself wanders in the presentation in the form ofa subtraction from the count. I would already be inexact to speak of this nothing a point because is nether local noe slobal, bat seatered all over. nowhere and everywhere: ts such that no encounter would authorize ic 10 be eld a presentable. term wid ofa situation tls suture to its being. Moreover, I state that every structured presentation unpresets “is” voi, in the mode ofthis non-one which is merely the subtractive face ofthe count.eING AND evENT 1 say ‘old rather than ‘nothing’, beeause dhe ‘nothing’ the name of the void correlative to the gloat fet of structure (eveything f counted); itis move accurate to indicate that not-having-been-counted is also quite Teal ints currence since i snot counted as one. “Vo” indicates the failure ofthe one, the notone, in a more primordial sense than the no ofthe-whole Wis a question of names here—nothing’ or ‘void'—because being Aesignated by these names, s either local nor global. The name 1 have chosen, the void Indicates precsely that nothing is presented, no tem. and also thatthe designation of that noting occurs empty, I oes not locate structurally ‘The void is the name of being—ol snconsstency—according to a situation, inasmuch a8 presentation ves us therein an unpresentable ‘ccess thus non acces tothe acces, inthe mode of what isot-one, nor ‘Composable of ones thus what fs quliable within the situation solely a5, the errancy of the nothing tis essential to remember that no term within asuation designates the ‘void, ond that in this sense Arist quite rightly declares inthe Ply that ‘he void not f one understands by “being what canbe located within a Situation. that i aterm, or what Aristotle called a substance. Under the ‘normal regime of presentation itis veridical that one cannot say ofthe ‘oid, non-one and wnsubstantal, that is ‘wil establish later on (Meditation 17) tat for the voi to become localizable a the level of presentation, and thus fra certain type of intra situational assumption of being qua being to occur, a dysfunction ofthe fount ls required, which results from an excess-f-one, The event wil be {his ulta-one of a hazatd, on the bass of which the vod of a station i retroactively discernible. ‘But for the moment we must hold that in a situation there i n conceivable encounter with the void. The normal repime of structured situations is that of the Imposition of an absolute ‘unconscious’ of the vd, Hence one can deduce a supplementary prerequisite for ontological Aisourse,ifitexiss, and ft as Imalotain—z situation (the mathemat fea situation). 1 have already established: that ontology is necessarily presentation of presentation, thus theory of the pure multiple without-one, theory ofthe multiple of mules: {THE VOI: PROPER NAME OF BEING > that its structure can only be that ofan implicit count. therefore that fof an axiomatic presentation, without a conceptone of is terms {orithout a concept ofthe multiple) ‘We can now add that the sole term fom whi omtlgy’s compositions swith con weave hemsees i meesary he vid Le’ establish this pont. If ontology i the particular situation which presets presentation, ft must also present the law of al resentation—the ferrancy of the void. the unpresentable as non-encounter. Ontology wll, fonly present presentation inasmuch as It provides a theory of the pre sentative suture to being, Which, speaking verdcally rom the standpoint fof any presentation, isthe void in which the orginary inconsistency i subsracted from the count. Ontology is therefore required to propose a theory ofthe vod But if 15 theory of the void, ontology, in a certain sense. can omy be theory ofthe void. Tha is, fone supposed that ontology axiomaticaly presented other terms than the void-—irespective of whatever obstacle there may be to ‘presenting’ the void—this would mean thet it atin fulshed Between the void and other terms, and that fs structure thus authorized the count-as-one ofthe vod as such, according co ts specie ‘iference to fll terms Is obvious that this would be impossible, since, {5 soon ast was counted as one ins diference to the one-tll, the void ‘would be filled with this alter. If ube void is thematized, it must be according to the presentation of ls ertancy, and not in regard to some Singularity, necessarily fal, which would distinguish it as one within 3 ifferentiatig count. The onl solution is for al of the terms tobe ‘void such that they are composed from the void alone. The void is thus distibuted everyshere, and everything that is distinguished by the Implicit count of pure mulpices i a modality-according-to-the-one of the void tell, This alone would account for the fact thatthe voi, in a situation, i the unpresentabe of presentation Lets rephrase this. Given that ontology is the theory of the pure ripe, what exactly could be composed by means ofits presentative {axiom sytem? What rxiset is seized upon by the Ideas ofthe multiple whose axioms institute the legislating action upon the muliple qua "multiple? Certainly nor the one, whichis not. Every multiple is composed ‘of maltples, This i the fst ontological law, But where to sae? What {the absolutely original existential position dhe first count if cannot bea fist one? There iso question about it: the ‘rs presented multiplicity 2eING ano EvENT without concept has to be a maliple of nothing, because if it was a ‘ultipl of something that something would then be inthe postion ofthe ‘One, And its necessary thereafter, thatthe axiomaticrue solely authorize Companions onthe basis ofthis multiple-ofnodhing. which Is to say on the basis ofthe vod “Shit approach. What ontology theorizes isthe inconsistent muliple of any situation; tha the multiple subtracted from any prticulat aw trom “ny count-asone—the a-structured multiple. The proper mode in which inconsistency wanders within the whole of situation f the nothing, and the mode in which it un-presents selfs that of subtraction from the ‘oun the non-one, the vol, The absolutely primary theme of ontology therefore the void-—the Greek atomists, Democritus and his successors, ‘eat understood this—but ii also its inal theme—this was not their ew-because in te lst resort, al inconsistency unpresentble thus oid If there are ‘atoms, they are not, as the materaliss of anviguty believed. a second principle of being. the one ater the voi. bur compos tions ofthe voi self, role by the ial laws ofthe maliple whose axiom. system is lald out by ontology ‘Ontology therefore, can only count the vod as existent, This statement announces that ontology deploys the ruled onder—the consitency—ol ‘what is nothing other than the sutureo-being of any situation, the that totch presents isl insoar as inconsistency assigns it wo solely being the lnpresenable of any peesentative conssency Tt appears that in this way a major problem is resolved. 1sad that being ‘spresented as pure multiple (Sometimes shorten this perlously by saying being is muliple), being gua beng, sticly speaking is neither one noF ‘utple. Ontology, the supposed science of being qua being. being Submited tothe low of skuations, mot present: at bes i must present presentation, which isto say the pre mutple. How can it avoid deciding In respect to being qua being, n favour of the multe? It avoids doing 50 “inasmuch as its own pong of beings the void that this"multipe’ whieh Isneither one not motile, being the mulipe of nothing. and therefore, tsfaras itis concemed, presenting nothing in the form ofthe malile. 80 more than in the form of the one. This way ontology states that presentation is certainly molile, but that che being of presentation. the that which is presented, being void, is subtracted from the one/muliple dialectic “The following question then arises: f that isso, what purpose does it serve to speak ofthe void as multiple” in terms such asthe ‘multe of "THE VOI: PROPER NAME OF BEING nothing? The reason for such usage s that ontology isa sivation, and thus everything that presents lls under las, which sto know nothing Spar from the multple-without-one, The results that the vod is named as ‘multiple even i composing nothing lt doesnot actualy ft ino the intra Stuational opposition of the one and the muliple. Naming the vod as rule the only sokation let by not Being able to name it as one, given that ontology sels out as is major prin the following: the one i no. ‘but any structure, even the axiomatic structure of ontology establishes, that there are uniquely ones and mulhples—even when, asin this ase, i isin order to annul the being ofthe one, ‘One of the acts of this annulment is precisely to posi thatthe wid i multiple, hat itis the frst multiple, the very being from which any ‘multiple presentation, when presented. is woven and numbered Naturally, because the voids indiscernible s aterm (because it snot fone), its inaugural appearance isa pire act of nomination. This name fannot be specific it cannot place the void under anything that would subsume it—this would be (0 reestablish the one, The name cannot Indicate that the void is this of that, The act of nomination, being a-secifi, consumes isl, indicating nothing other than the unpreset able as such, In ontology, however, the unpresenable occis within a resentative forcing which disposes i as the nthing ftom which every thing proceeds. The consequence is that the name ofthe void is @ pure proper name, vihich sncates set, which doesnot bestow any index of fitlerence within what it refers to, and which auto-dedares itself in the form of the multiple, despite there being thing which is numbered by es Ontology commences, inelucbly, once the legislative Kdeas of the ‘multiple are unfolded, by the pure utterance of the arbitrariness of a proper name. This name, this sign, indexed to the voi, fina sense tht ‘wil lays remain enigmatic the proper name of being.MEDITATION FIVE The Mark @ ‘The execution of antology whichis to say ofthe mathematic! theory of the multiple, or et theory can only be presented in conformty with the requisition of the concept (Mediation 1) asa system of axioms. The grand Ideas ofthe mulipl are thus inaugural statements concerning variables fy, et in respect of which Its implicy agreed that they denote pare ‘ullples, This presentation excludes any explicit definition ofthe mul ple—the sole means of avoiding the existence of the One. Its remarkable that these statements are 30 few in qumber; nine axioms ot axiom- Sabiemas One can recognize in hls economy of presentation the sign that the “fst principles of being’ as Aristotle sald, are as few as they are ‘ucla. ‘Amongst these statements, one alone, strictly speaking, i existential that sits task sto directly inscribe an existence, and not to regulate 3 ‘onstruction which presupposes there already being a presented moll. ‘As one might have guesed, tis statement concer the void ‘i onderto think the singularity of this existential statement on the vod, lets first rapidly situate the principal Meas of the muliple those with a stricly operational value 1 THE SAME AND THE OTHER: THE AXIOM OF EXTENSIONALITY ‘The axiom of extensionality posts that two sets are equa (ential if the ‘multiples of which they are dhe multiple, che mules whose theoredca count as one they ensure, aze"the same’. What does the same mean? Isn't there a Gc he ‘Se? In natural and inadequate vocabulary, which distinguishes between ‘ements’ and ‘sets, a vocabulary which conceals that there are only multiples, the axiom says: ‘two sets are identical if they have the same flements’ But we know that ‘element’ does nox designate anything Intrinsic; all it inicates is that a multiple» presented by the presentation of another multiple. whichis weltten y€ « The axiom of extensionality ns amounts to saying if every multiple presented inthe presentation of tlspresented in that of, and the inverse, shen these wo multiples, and fare the same, ‘The logical architecture of the axiom concerns the universality of the assertion and not the recurrence of the sme, 1 indcates that If for every ‘multiple y, its equivalent and thus indifferent wo afi shat i belongs to ‘corto finn that it belongs of. then wand ace indstingushable and can bbe completely substituted for cach other. The identi» of multiples 5 founded on the idiferens of belonging, This is writen: (lee do be Bae ‘The differential marking of the wo Sets depends on what belongs 10 their presentations, But the ‘what’ is always a mulple. That such a ‘multiple, say y, maintains a relation of belonging with a—belng one ofthe ‘multiples from which a is composed—and does not maintain such a ‘elation with, entail that a and g are counted a different. ‘This purely extensional character of the regime of the same and the ‘other inherent 1 the natut of set theory, being theory ofthe multiple ‘withoutone, dhe multiple as multiple of multiples. What posible source ‘could there be for the existence of difeence, if not that of a multiple lacking from a mile? No particular quality can be of use to us to mack dliference here, not even that the one can be dstingulshed from the ‘multiple, Because the one i not, What the axiom of extension does i reduce the same and the athe othe trict gout af he count such that it structures the presentation of presentation. The same is the same ofthe ‘out of multiples from which all muliples are composed, once counted as However, let us noe: the la ofthe same and the othe, the axiom of ‘extensionality doesnot tell usin any manner whether anything exists Al it does efx, for any possibly existent muliple, the canonical rule ofits ilerestiation@ BEING AND EVENT 2. THE OPERATIONS UNDER CONDITION: AXIOMS OF THE POWERSET. OF UNION, OF SEPARATION AND OF REPLACEMENT It we leave aside the axioms of choice, of infinity, and of foundation ‘whose essential metaontologcal importance wil be et out later on—four ther ‘ass’ anions constitute a second category, all being of the frm: “ake any seta which i supposed existent, There then exist a second set fh construcied on the bass of a in sich a manner! These axioms are equally compatible with the non-existence of anything whatsoever, ith absolute non- presentation, because they solely indicate an existence under the condition of another existence, The purely conditional character of fexstence is again marked by the logical structure of these axioms, which reall ofthe type forall a, there exiss suc that it has defined relation toe The for all” evidendy signifies: if here exists an a. then in all cases there exists a associated to.« according to this or that rule. But the statement does not decide upon the existence or non-existence of even fone of these as. Technically speaking, tis means that the prefi—the initial ‘quantifier of these axioms fof the type oral. there exits. such that." that is, (Va)38N[ Jes dear om the other hand, that aa {axiom which allirmed an unconditioned existence would be of the type ‘there ens. such that, and would thus commence withthe existential ‘quanti ‘These four axioms—whose detailed technical examination would be of, ro use here—concern guarantees of existence for constructions of mul ples on the basis of certain intemal characteristics of supposed existent sulpes, Schematicall The axiom ofthe powers the st of uses “This axiom affirms that glven ast the subsets of that set canbe counted as-one: they area set What s 2 subset ofa multiple? Itisa multiple such that all the multiples which are presented in is presentation (which ‘belong’ ot ate also presented by the nial multiple without the nvr being necessarily tre (otherwise we would end up with extensional identity gain). The logical structure of his axiom isnot one of equivalence but one of implication. The set isa subset of «—this is writen Bc e—if, when y san element ofthat i © tis then aso element of thus y€ a. In other words, «which reads Bs included in a'—Isan abbreviation of the formal: (¥7)1y > &€ al In Meditations 7 and 8,1 will return to the concept of subset or sub smultple. which is quite fundamental, and to the distinction between Pronging (2) and inson (C) For the moment itis enough to know thatthe axiom of the powerset guarantees that ia set exists, de another set also exis that counts a one All the subsets ofthe first In more conceptual language: if a mulple i presented, then another mulipleis also presented whose terms (elements) fare the sub-mulples of the fst The axiom of union Since a miple is 2 multiple of multiples, ti legitimate to ask if the power ofthe count via which « mulpe s presented also extends to the ‘unfolded presentation of the multiples which compose it. grasped in turn ‘ss multiples of mitipls. Can one internally distrinate the moltiles out fof which » muitiple makes the one of the result? This operation ist {nverse of that guaranteed by the axiom af the powese. ‘The latter ensues thatthe multiple ofall the reproupings is counted as ‘one; that i, the mip of al the subsets composed fom miles which belong to 2 given multiple, Thre is the resul-one (the set) of all the posible compoidons—all the inclusions-—of what maintains with a given set the relation of belonging. Can systematically count the decompositions ofthe multiples that belong toa given multiple? Because fa multiple isa ‘muliple of multiples, then ts also a moltiple of muiples of muiples of smulipes, ete ‘This i 8 double question: 4, Does the count-as-one extend 1 decompositions? I there an axiom of dssemination just a there is one of composition? 2s there a halting point—given thatthe process of dissemination, as we have just seen, appears to continue to infinity? The second question is very profound and the reason for this depth obvious. Its object isto find out where presentation Is sutured to some fixed point, 1 some atom of being that could no longer be decomposed This would sem tobe impossible i being-muliple isthe absolute form of presentation. The response this question wil be set out in two tages: by {he axiom ofthe voi, a litle further on, and then by the examination of the axiom of foundation in Meditation 18. ‘The frst question Is decided here by the axiom of union which sates ‘hat each sep ofthe diseminaton is counted as one. Tha is it states thatBEING AND EVENT he multiples from which the mallpls which make up a one-multipe are ‘omposed form ase themselves (remember thatthe word se whieh i ‘either defined not definable, designates what the axlomate presentation uthories to be counted as on). ‘Using the metaphor of elements —iself a perpetually risky substantial laation of the relation of belonging-—he axiom is phrased as such: for very se, there exits the set ofthe elements ofthe elements ofthat se ‘Tha fois prevented, a certain 8 is also presented to whleh all the belong which also belong 1 some y which belongs 1 a. In other words: f ye wand Se y, there then exists such that 3. The mile 8 zathers, Together the lst dissemination ofa tht obtained by decomposing into multiples the multiples which belong to shus by um counting WoN3AG€ AO Gyles a) Be VL Given a. the set @ whose existence is aimed here wail be wit Ue (union of). The choice of the Word ‘union’ refers tothe sea that this Glomatie proposition exbibis the very essence of what a multiple ‘unifes-—tnultiples—and tha this is exhibited by unifying’ the second multiples (in regard to the initia one) from which, in turn, the first, ‘ultiples—those from which the Ina one esults—are composed, ‘The fundamental homogeneity of being Is supposed henceforth on the tasithat Ua. which disseminates the inital one-muliple and dhen counts fa one what is thereby disseminated. no more or less a multiple sell than the initial set, Jus like the powerset. the union set does not i any vay remove us from the concept-less reign ofthe multiple, Netter lower down, nor higher up. whether one disperses or gathers together, the theory does nov encounter any thing’ which is heterogeneous to the pre multiple Ontology announces herein nether One, nor All, nor Atom: solely the uniform axiomatic count-a-one of multiples. «The axiom of separation, o of Zermelo ‘Studied in detall in Meditation 3. <4 The asiom-chema of placement (r of substitution) In its natural formolaton, the axiom of replacement says the following i you havea set and you replace is elements by other elements, you obtain Tn its metgontologcal formulation, the axiom of replacement says rather i 2 multiple of multiples is presented, another multiple i aso presented which i composed ftom the substitution, one by one. of new fmultiples for the multiples presented by the fist multiple. The new Ialtiples are supposed as having been presented themselves elsewhere ‘The idea—singular, profound—is the following: if the count-a-one operates by giving the consistency of being one-mulple to some ml ples iil also operate if these multiples are replaced, term by term, by fathers. This is equivalent to Saying tha he consistency of maple does nor eso upon the particular mails wha mulpe is. Change the multiples and the one-consstency—which {sa result—remains, a5 long as you operate, however, your substitution multiple by multiple. ‘what set theory affirms here, purlying again what It performs as presentation of the presentation multiple, % that the countas-one of multiples indifferent to wha these muipls are mops of provided. fof cours, that it be guaranteed that nothing other than multiples are at Stake. In short, the attbute“to-be-a-mukiple’ transcends the parcicalar multiples which are elements of a given mile. The making-up- ‘multiple (the ‘holding together’ as Cantor used to say, ultimate structured figure of presentation, maintains itself as such, even if everything from Which i s composed is replaced ‘One can see just how frst theory takes its vocation of presenting the pure multiple alone: othe point t which the count-as-one organized by its axiom system institutes its operational permanence on the theme of the bond-muliple in isell, devoid of any speciation of what it binds together ‘The muliple is genuinely presented as form-mulhipe, invariant in any substituton which affects its terms: 1 mean, invariant i that ii always Asposed in the one-bond ofthe multiple ‘More than any other axiom. the axiom of replacements suited even to the point of overindicating it—to the mathematical stuation being presentation ofthe pure presentative form in which being occurs 3 that whichis. ‘However, no more than the axioms of extenslonaity, separation, subsets for union does the axiom of replacement induce the existence of any multiple whatsoever. The axiom of extensonality fixes the regime of the same and the other The posterset anu the union-set regulate internal compositions (subsets) {and disseminations (union) such that they remain under the law ofthe 6s“ ING AND evENT count; thas, nothing ts encountered therein. neither lower down nor bhiuher up, which would prove an abstade to the uniformity of presenta sion as multiple “The axiom of separation subordinates the capacity oanguage to present suutipes tothe fac of there already being presentation "Te axion of veplacement posits that dhe multiple stunder the law ofthe count qua form- multiple, incorruptible idea ofthe bond in sum, these five axioms oF axiom-schemas fx she system of eas under whose law any presentation, 35 form of being, lets itself be presented: belonging (unique primitive idea, ultimate signifier of pre ‘ented: being), difference incusion, dissemination the languagelexstence ‘couple, and subssuton "We defintely have the entre material for an ontology bere. Save that ‘sone ofthese inaugural statements in which the la of Iasi ven has tet decided the question: there something rather than nothing? 3, THE VOID, SUBTRACTIVE SUTURE TO BEING [At this point the axiomatic decison s particulary risky. What privilege Could multiple poses such that tbe designated asthe muliple whose texstence sinaugutlly aimed? Moreover, fits dhe multiple from which Ailhe others resul. By compostions in conformity wit the Tdeas ofthe “lp eit notin truth that oe whose non-being has been the focus of ‘ue entite effort? I on the other hand, iti a muliple-counted-as-one, {hus a multiple of mulipes, ow could it be the absolutely frst mulipe, already being the result ofa composition? ‘his question Is none other than that of the suture-to-being of a theoryaxiomaticlly presented—of presentation, The existential index 0 be found fs that by which the lepslative sytem of ldeas—which ensures hat nothing alflets the purity of the multiple—proposes itself as the inserted deployment of being-qua-being ‘But to avoid lapsing ino # non-ontlogical situation, there isa pre requisite for this index: It cannot propose emthing in particular: conse~ ‘quently it can nether be a matter ofthe one, which isnot, nor ofthe Compose multiple, which i never anything bu a result of the count, an ‘elec of structure, “The solution tothe problem is quite striking: maintain the poston that thing is delivered by the law of the Ideas, but mate this nothing be THE MARK through the assumprlon of a proper name. In other words: verify He ecedetary choc of a proper name, the unpresonuble alone as eset: on tS basis the ideas wl subsequently cause ll admissible forms of presentation to proceed. the framework of et theory what is presented is muiple of multiples, the form of presentation itsel, For this reason, the unpresentable can only figure within language as what is ‘multiple of nokng. Lev’ also note this point: the diference between two multiples, as regulated by the axion of extensional, can only be marked by those ‘uluples that acualy belong to the two multiples tobe differentiated A ‘mulple-of-nothing thus has no conceivable differentiating mark. The “unpresentable i inextensible and therefore in-iflerent. The result is that the insrption ofthis indifferent will be necessarily negative because no possbilty—no mulhple—can indicate that ition is basis that existence i tifirmed. This requirement that the absolutely iia existence be thar ofa ‘negation shows that beng is definitely surured to the Ideas ofthe mule fn the subtractive mode. Here begins the expulsion of any presenti assumption of being But What Is it that this negation—in which the existence of the “unpresentable as indiference is insribed—Is able to negate? Since the primitive idea of the multiple fs belonging, and since iis a matter of ‘egting the multiple as muliple of mulkiples—without, however, res: rectng the one—it sera that ii belonging a5 sich which i negated ‘The unpresentabe is that to which nothing. no multiple, belongs: conse~ ‘quemly it cannot present itself in ts iference To negate belonging i to negate presentation and therefore existence ‘because existence is benin-prsentaion. The srucure ofthe statemet that inseribes the “is” existence is thus, im tuth the negation of any texstence according to belonging. This statement wil say something Uke: ‘there existe that fo which no existence can be said to belong’ of, '2 ‘multiple’ exits which is subtracted trom the primitive Idea of the multiple” This singular axiom, the sivth on ou Uist, ssh axon ofthe oie nits natural formulation thi time actually contradicting ss own laity says: There exist a et which has no clement point at whieh the subtractive of being causes the intuitive distinction between elements and sets to break doven mts metzontolgial formulation the axiom says: the unpresenable i resented, asa subtractive term of the presentation of presentation. Or: a o‘etna AND evENT multiple i which s aot under the Mea of dhe mule. Or: being lets sel the named, within the ontological stuation, as that from which existence does not exis Tn is technical formalation—the most suitable for conceptual expos fkion—the axiom ofthe voi-set wil besin with an existential quantifer (thereby declaring that being invests the Ideas), and continue with a negation of existence (hereby wn-presenting being), which wal bear on ‘longing (hereby unpresenting being as motile since the Wea ofthe ‘multiple is €). Hence the flowing (negation i written ~) (2) ‘This reads: there exists such that there does not exist any a which belongs ‘Now, in what sense was 1 able 10 say that this ® whose existence Is atfirmed hete. and which i thus no longer simple Idea or law but an ‘omolopcal suture—the existence of a inexstent—was in truth a proper rhame? A proper name requires iis teferent to be unigue. One must, Carefully distinguish between the ove and wnicy- 1 she one is solely the Implicit effect without being. ofthe count, thus of the axiomatic ideas, then there fs no reason why unity cannot bean attribute ofthe multiple. Te indicates solely that a mulple i dilerent from any other. I can be oniolled by use ofthe axiom of extensional. However the mullet Inextensibe naiflerent How can [even think its unicty when nothing belongs toi that would serve asa mark ofits ference? The mathem: ticans sayin general quite ight-handedly, thatthe void-set is unique ‘afer the axiom of extensional’. Yer this st proceed as If 490" voids can be identified like two ‘something's. which sto say two multiples of multiples, whist the law of difeence is conceptualy, if not formally, adequate 10 them. The truth i rather this the uncty ofthe vod-set i Jmmedlate because nothing diferentes i, not because its diference can be attested. An iremediable unicy based on in-diference i herein substtated for unity based on dillerence. ‘What ensures the uniqueness of the void-set that in wishing to thnk of it as a species or a common name, in supposing that there can be ‘several vols, expose mysell. within the framework of the ontological, theory ofthe multiple 0 the isk of overthrowing the regime ofthe same land the othet, and s0t0 having 10 fund difeene om something other than Ieonging, Yet any such procedure is equivalent to restoring the being of the fone. That fs, "these’ voids, elng inextensble, are indstinguishable as nulples, They would therefore have to be dillerentiated 38 ones, by ‘ean of an ently new principle. But the one isnot, and thus I cannot tssume that being- voi 3 propery. a species ora common name. There {are not several” voids there is only one void rather than signifying the presentation of the one, this signifies the unity ofthe unpresentable such {s marked within presentation, ‘We thus ative a the following remarkable conclusion: Bemus the cei ot ha he vod i erg ‘saying that the nall-sets unique is equivalent to saying that ts mark is aproper name, Being thos invests the leas ofthe presentation ofthe pure ‘ultpe inthe form of unicty signalled bya proper name. To wet i his name of being this subtractive pont of the mullple—of the general form in Which presentation presents isll and thus isthe mathematicians searched for sign far fom ll thei customary alphabets: nether a Greek, ‘nor Latin, nor a Gothic letter but an old Scandinavian letter, 2, emblem fof the void, zero affected by the barting of sense. AS if they were duly aware that in proclaiming thatthe void alone is—because it alone in-exiss {om the multiple, and Because the Ideas ofthe multiple only Ive on the ‘bss of what is subtracted from them—they were touching upon some sacred region, sel timinal to language; as if thus. rivaling the theologians {for whom supreme being has been the proper name since long ago, yet, ‘opposing 0 the laters promise ofthe One, and af Presence the ieevoce bility of un-presetation and the un-belng ofthe one, the mathematicians had to shelter theie own audaciy behind the character of a forgotten languageMEDITATION SIX Aristotle ———— “absurd fout of place) (to suppose) thatthe points void Physics, Book 1V For most three centuries it was possible to elev that the experiments tion of rational physics had rendered Aristotle’ eutation ofthe existence ‘ofthe void obsolete. Pascal's amous leaflet New Experiments concerning the Void the tle alone being inadmissible in Arsrle's system, had 10 fndow-sin 1647—forrcell's prior work with a. propagandisic force ‘amable of mobilizing the non-scientific public In his cca examination ofthe concept of the void (Pips, Book IV. section 8, Aristotle in three diferent places, exposes his argument to the posiiity ofthe experimental production ofa counterexample on the par. Dt positve slence Fis, he explicitly declares that itis the province ofthe [hist to theorize onthe void. Second, his own approach cites expe Incnts such as that of plunging a wooden cube into water and compering teeffecs to thos of the same cube supposed empty. Finaly his condusion {s entiely negative: the vold has no conceivable type of being, nether separable nor inseparable bir dxdpior ofre nexepapsor However, thanks to the light shed on tis mater by Hekdeggr and some ‘others, we ean no longer be satistied today with this manner of dealing rth the question. Upon a close examination, one has 10 accord that [Arittle leaves atleast ne possiblity open: thatthe void be another name for mater conceived as matter (j ty § zt afr), especially mater asthe ‘concept of the potential being ofthe light and the heavy. The void would thus name the material cause of transport, not—as with the atomits—as anistone ‘a universal miiew of local movement, but rather as an undetermined ‘ontological vitality immanent to natural movement shich carries the Tight upwards and the heavy downwards. The vod would be the latent mlifference of the natural diferentation of movements, suchas they are prescribed by the qualified being—Hght or heavy—of bodes. tn this sense ‘here would definitely be a being ofthe vod, but a pe-substantal beng therefore unthinkable a such. Besides, an experiment in Aristotle's sense bears no relation to the conceptuslarilats materialized in Toricel’s or Pascal's water and mer. uty tubes in which the mathematzable mediation of measure prevails, For Arsole, an experiment isa cortent example, 2 sensible image, which serves to decorate and support a demonstration whose key resides entirely {nthe production af a correct definition. eis quite doubiul that a common referent exists, even inthe shape ofan in-exlstent,shnkable as unique, for ‘what Paseal and Aristo cal the void. Ifone wantsto lear fom Arstote, ‘oreven to refute him, then one must pay attention othe space of thought within which his concepts and definitions function. For the Greek. the ‘old isnot an experimental diference but rather an ontological category, 2 supposition relative to what natural proliferates as figures of being. In {this logic, the arti! producon ofa void isnot an adequate response 10 the question of whether nature allows, according toi own opening forth “a place whete nothing Is’ to occur, Because such Is the Aritotelan definition ofthe void nevi rns & gah Zr) ‘This i because the “physidst" in Arstotles sense is in no way the ‘archaeological form of the modem physics, He only appears vo be such due tothe setzoactve iluson engendered by the Galilean revolution. For Aristrle, a physics studes nature; which so say that reson ofbeing (ve will ay that type of situation) in awhich the concepts of movement aad estate pertinent. Better sl that with which the theoretical thought of the physicist in acord that which causes movement and rest to be ‘mine aribates of that-whichis in a “physical” situation, Provoked ‘movements (Aristotle terms them ‘violent’ and thus, in a certain Sense, ‘everything which can be produced via the artifice of an experiment, via 3 technical apparatus, ate excluded from the physical domain in Aristotle's Sense. Nature isthe being-qua-being ofthat whose presentation implies ‘movement it not the aw of movement, ts movement. Physics attemprs to think the theres of movement a5 a figure ofthe natural coming-to-be of being: physics sts self he following question: why is there movement rather than absolute immobility? Nate isthe principle (dp. the cause nENG AND EVENT fea) of self moving and of beingatrest, whlch reside primordally in Teng: moved or beingeatrest and this in and for ise ka ard) and not by accident. Nothing herein ks capable of excluding Pascal or Toric’ ‘old-not being determined as estentally belonging to what-ispresented in its natural oiginaity—from being an in-exlstent with regard to nature, § physial non-being (in Anstole’ sense): tht isa forced or accidental Production Tris thus appropriate—in our ontlogial projec—to reconsider Aris toils question: our maxim cannot be that of Pascal, who, precisely wlth respect to the existence of the void, declared that if on the bass of a hhypothess “something follows which is contrary to one phenomenon alone, that is sulicient proof of falsity’ To this ruin of a conceptual System by the unicty of the fact—in which Pascal anticipates Fopper—we ‘us oppose the internal examination of Adstole's argumentation; we for {whom the void sin truth the name of being. and so can neither be cast, Into doubt nor established via the effets ofan experiment. The facity of Pinysical refuttion—in the moder sense—is bared to us, and conse: ‘quently we have to discover the ontological weak point ofthe apparatus inside which Aristotle causes the void t0 absolutely inex "Arstole himself dlsmises an ontological facility which is symmeticl, in a certain sense, tothe fadhty of experimentation. I the later prides ‘sell on producing an empty space, the frmer—imputed 10 Melisos and Parmentdes contents self with rejecting the void as pure non-being 76 ‘2 evn of nav draw, the void does not make up one of the number of ‘beings, itis foreclosed from presentation. This argument does not sult [ristile: for him—quiterightly—frst one must think the coreation of the void and ‘physica’ presentation, or te relation between the void and ‘movernent The voi i-isel fs terally unthinkable and ths irrefutable. Inasmuch as the question ofthe void belongs tothe theory of mature itis ‘on the bass ofits supposed disposition within sel-moving thatthe critique must commence. In my language: the void must be examined in ‘The Aristotelian concept of a natural situation i place. Place isl does rot exist itis what envelope any existent insofar asthe later is assigned to ‘natural ite, The vold in station’ would thus be a place in which there ‘vas nothing, The immediate coreelaton is not that of the vod and non- being its rather that ofthe vold and the noting via the mediation non: being, however natral—of place. But the naturalnes of place Is that of ‘being the site towards which the body (he being) whose pace tis, moves, aniston Every places that of body and what testifies to thisis that fone removes, 1 body from is place, it tends to return wo that place. The question ofthe ‘Eaistence ofthe void thus comes down o that os funcon In respect 10 sell-moving. the polarity of which is place. ‘The aim of Arsotle’ fist major demonstration isto establish thatthe void excludes movement, and that it thus excludes itself from being-qua ‘being grasped in ts natural presentation. The demonstration, which very sfletve, employs, one after the other, the concepts of ference, unlit ‘edness (r infinity), and incommensurably. There i great profundity in positing the vold In this manner: a in-dference, a5 in-finite, and as ‘Unemessured. This triple determination spectfles the ertancy ofthe vod isssutractive ontological function and ts inconststency with regard to any presented multiple 4 ference. Any movement grasped in its natural being requites the ferentiation of place: the place that situates the body which moves Yet the void as such possess no dilference (fip wen, ob ye Sapp) Difference, in fact, supposes that the diferenated muliples—termed "podle’ by Ariotle—aze counted as one according tothe naturalness of ‘het local destination. Yer the void, which names inconsistency is prior to the countasone. It cannot suppor diference (cf, Meditation $ on the ‘mathematics of this point), and consequently forbids movement. The dilemma isthe following: “Either there Is no natueal anspor (gop) anywhere, for any being of if there is such transport then the void snot, ‘But the exclusion of movement is absurd, for movement is presentation ‘itself s the natural coming forth of being. And it wold bead this i Arisole’s expression itseli—ridculous yeni) to demand proof of the ‘existence of presentation, since all existence assured on the basis of resentation, Furthermore: Is evident that, amongst beings, there isa plurality of beings arising from nature” Ifthe vold thus excludes ditler- fence, its ridiculous to ensure its being a8 natural being, 2 Init. For Aristotle there san itrinsi connection between the void ‘and infinity, and we shall see in Meditations 13 and 14 for example that, hes emttely correct on this point: the voids the pont of being of infinity. Aristotle makes this point according to the subtractive of being, by posing that inference is common tothe void and infinity as speces of Both the rothing and non-being: How could there be natural movement if, due to the void and infinity, no difference existed? For there is no diference fon the basis of the nothing feo yess). no more than on the ”BEING AND EVENT 1) Yet the void seems to bea non-being and bass of non bing * Tlowence has nity or moe exact the united? Fora Geek si egan of yesenton ise beste what presents sel afm tbs nese dposon of sien To ay thatthe wold itimetay lait eqralent to saying hat Wt sous stions Siptemable as such the voi i in excess of being 3 2 thinkable {unton: and epi as natural potion. sh a tree ma “ru, spposing that shee is movement, and thos natural present sn lnthe ld oracrding othe vid one woul then ave coveeve that dis ae necessary tansped to Innity HS seg den vet feyaince ro aifleenc would diate heir coming 1 4 hak. The Sif ante of ths remark i he moder sense) ian onl Eas pysest—impssbly fn te Avorn sense. I hate Stat tad ne nypomos of» natural ting ofthe void immediately ‘ket inherent ii of any elective presesaion Seon gen tat the ndference ofthe oi canot deere oy stunt etn for movement, hele would be explo whic 80 [Ey multe ranspore woul take place ‘everywhere’ dro eve again the void exceeds the alway ernfated character of nat {sposton ruin the opoloy of stations aly we suppose hats ays eral void which hens and ie ap i teeore, the vod ithe ase of movement woul {uve to ete tater goa the wo transporting isl oars so sett lace ohich one would suppose tobe for example, wad ‘Thorens a eduptation ofthe wo an exces of the vod oe That cre ematng sow moby towards el or what Asode (atk avid ofthe voi fo ses) Yt the indiference ofthe vid Sone hom ferent tell from Sself—which Is In fact an Thug Uhorem (ch Medaton S}—and consequent fom pre Stppotng sel asthe desnation of tral beng. “py nnd the ensemble o thse emark fs etely cere, is the cane psn parr sho this—that the wo ocean ‘Fava enced the tation acrding wt own ify ts ao he {ose ats event crrtence proceeds explosively’ or “everyhee ssa ly stat ta he ed pues ow car wajcoronce unbound rom the eraey in which Hs Tonfnd bythe se Evenly, we ist therfore conclude wih Astle shat the void is nor If by “being” we understand the limited order of presentation, and in particular what x natural of such order, Unmeasire. Every movement is measurable in relation 0 another according tis speed, Or, as Aristotle says, there is alays a proportion, a rato (ies) berween one movement and another. inasmuch a5 they are ‘wan time, and all vine i inte. The naural character of siwation i sos proportionate or numerable character in the broader sense of the term, Thisis actully what {will stabish by linking natural situations to the concept of ordinal multiplicity (Meditations 11 and 12). There is 3 reciprocity between nature (yes) and proportion, or reason (ys). One element which contributes t0 this veprodty asa power of obstruction and thus ofa limit—is the resistance of the mllew in which there is ‘movement. If one allows that hi resistance canbe zero, which Is the ose A the milew is void, movement wall lose all measure it will become Incomparable to any her movement, I wil tend towards infinite speed Aristo says: “The void bears no ratio to the fll, such that neither does ‘movement fin the voi} Here again the conceptual mediation is accom plished subvratvely, whieh so say by means of the nothing: "There s 00 ratio in which the void is exceeded by bodies, just as there is m0 ratio between the nothing fe yn) and number’ The void is in-numerable, ‘hence the movement whichis supposed therein doesnot have atinkable ature, possessing no reason on the basis of which its comparison to other ‘movements could be ensued Physics fin the modem sense) must not lead us astray here. What Axistile is inviting us to think ste following: every reference tothe void produces an excess over the count-asone, an iuption of inconsistency, hich propagates—meraphysically—within the situation at infinite speed ‘The voids thus incompatible withthe slow order in which every station resensures in their place, che muliples tha it presents, Wis this tiple negative determination (indilerence, n-finite, wn: ‘measured) which thus leads Aristole ro eefuse any natura! being or the ‘void. Could, however, have a non-natural being? Three formulas must be Imerrogated here: wherein resides the possible enigma of an unpreset abl, pre-substanal void whose being, unborn and non-arving, would however be the latent iumination of what i, isola a itis ‘The fist of these formulas—attbuted in truth by Arisone 0 those ‘partisans ofthe void” that he sets out to refute—declares that ‘the same being (Zan pertains toa void to fliness, and to place, but the same being | (Gan) does not belong t0 ther when they are considered fom the 1s