Furthermore the degree of dogmatism would not alone disestablish the epistemic rights grounding a given interpretation. Any lack of normative impetus for others may come about, instead, from the fact that novel unshared priors have entered the conceptual mix, for example, as in a bayesian calculus. This is what I mean by starting within the faith vs philosophy via natural theology vs a theology of nature. One way to discem whether an argument has introduced theologic vs philosophic priors, as far as the present conceptual consensus would indicate, is to ask whether it argues for more than a mere deism, for example, to establish specific divine attributes beyond any of the various vague causal notions (e.g. Aristotelian cosmological, ontological, teleological, etc). The practical upshot is that, if people don't share all of our bayesian-like abductive priors, they certainly aren't going to share the inferences that flow therefrom, no matter how much we may otherwise be within our epistemic rights in holding our additional priors. theology of nature, natural theology, philosophicaltheology, bayesian priors, dogmatic concepts, dogmatism, epistemic rights, normative impetus, deism, divine attributes