A.M. No.

90-474 October 4, 1991

CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR., complainant
vs.
JUDGE ADRIANO R. VILLAMOR, RTC, BRANCH 16, NAVAL, LEYTE, respondent.

PER CURIAM:p
In an Affidavit-Complaint, dated 7 March 1990, Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr., a practicing lawyer in Naval,
Biliran Subprovince, Leyte, charged respondent, Judge Adriano R. Villamor of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
16, Naval, Leyte, with falsification of his monthly Certificates of Service by making it appear that he had
resolved all cases submitted for decision within the ninety-day period required by the Judiciary Act of 1948,
Section 5, when actually he had fifteen (15) cases undecided from five (5) years back or from March, 1985.
On 7 August 1990, the Court directed Deputy Court Administrator Juanita A. Bernad to make an on-the-spot
audit of the cases pending in the sala of Respondent Judge. On 2 October 1990, Deputy Court Administrator
Bernad reported that there were, indeed, eighty seven (87) cases undecided beyond the ninety(90)-day
reglementary period as of 3 July 1990, consisting of six (6) criminal cases with prisoners, 36 criminal cases
without prisoners, and forty-five (45) civil cases. Worse the records of two (2) criminal cases and twelve (12)
civil cases were missing. While the records of six (6) criminal cases were not in the Court but acknowledged
by Respondent Judge to have beenin his possession.
Deputy Court Administrator Bernad also noted the dismal state of the Courthouse of the RTC, Branch 16,
which he described as "bereft of any dignity as a court of law" showing 'a lack of financial and moral support of
the local authorities," and observed that the Municipal Court was even better housed.
On 31 October 1990, Complainant further furnished the Court with an Affidavit of Judge Dulcisimo Pitao of the
Municipal Trial Court of Maripipi, Leyte, stating that Respondent had intervened for the accused in Criminal
Case No. 959 then pending with the said Municipal Court. We considered the foregoing as a supplemental
charge of undue interest in apending criminal case.
On 23 November 1990, Complainant again brought to the attention of the Court seven (7) additional cases
submitted for decision, at the earliest since April 1986, still unresolved by Respondent (p. 44, Rollo), even
though the transcripts were ready as early as 1984 in one (1) case.
In his Comment filed on 20 December 1990, Respondent claimed that the Complaint was more for
harassment and vengeance, otherwise, Complainant would not have filed a criminal case against him for
Falsification under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code before the Ombudsman, based on the same
facts alleged in his Complaint before this Court. Respondent further claimed that he had not violated the 90day rule since 1 February 1990 when the Court required the adoption of the continuous trial system. He did
not deny, however, that before said date, there were other cases not decided within the 90-day rule, including
those listed in the Complaint allegedly because the transcripts were incomplete. He added that he had no
hand in the preparation of his monthly reports of pending cases; that after he had ordered the person-incharge of preparing the Certificates of Service to explain why she had made it appear that said cases were
decided within ninety (90) days from its submission when actually they were not, she stated that he had
nothing to do with the preparation of the monthly report except to sign after she had prepared them.
On 18 April 1991, acting upon a second Report from Deputy Court Administrator Bernad, the Court resolved:
(1) to refer the supplemental charge regarding undue interest in a particular criminal case to Associate Justice
Fermin A. Martin, Jr., of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation; (2) to order
Respondent to decide with dispatch cases still unresolved beyond the 90-day-period; and (3) to inform the
Court immediately regarding steps he had taken to retrieve lost records and to personally put his records in
order. To date, Respondent has been unheard from on those directives.

On 12 July 1991, Complainant followed up with another letter complaint stating that the seven cases
mentioned in his letter of 23 November 1990 remained undecided, adding that five (5) cases handled by him
were unresolved since January 1987, not to speak of cases handled by other lawyers.
Judging from the Deputy Court Administrator's two Reports, there is validity to Complainant's charge that
Respondent had failed to decide cases within the 90-day reglementary period notwithstanding "Second Exparte Motions to Decide Case" flied by Complainant (Annexes A to L, Complaint), and that Respondent had
falsified his Certificates of Service for 2 September 1986,3 October 1987, 3 October 1988, 3 November 1989,
and 1 March 1990 (Annexes N to R, Complaint). Respondent's defense that incomplete transcripts of
stenographic notes dissuaded him from deciding those cases for fear of "rendering an injustice" is
controverted by his own stenographic reporter who stated that the transcripts in some of those cases were
ready as far back as 1984 (Comment, Annex "2").
Respondent, however, shifts the blame on his Clerk of Court, Atty. Rogelio Jocobo, who, he claims, was
inefficient in the management of Court records. Respondent forgets, however, that he sits not only to Judge
litigated cases with the least possible delay but that his responsibilities include being an effective manager of
the Court and its personnel. Canon 3, Rule 3.08, of the Code of Judicial Conduct, provides:
A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain
professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the
administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.
Also expected of a Judge under Rule 3.09 is that:
A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards
of public service and fidelity.
As we held in Secretary of Justice vs. Legaspi (A.M. No. 997-CFI, 10 September 1981, 107 SCRA 234):
Respondent, as the incumbent judge, ought to know the cases submitted to him for
decision, particularly those pending for more than ninety days. As a matter of fact, he is
supposed to keep his own record of cases submitted for decision so that he could act
on them promptly and without delay, mindful of the mandate in Section 5 of Republic
Act No. 296, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 ... It is expected that he should be
more diligent and more vigilant in attending to cases submitted for decision as well as
in the preparation of his monthly certificates of service by verifying every now and then
whether there are cases pending decision for more than ninety days; because he could
be held accountable for any error or falsification in his certificates. Thus, respondent
cannot now escape liability for falsification of his certificates of service with the lame
excuse that he has no knowledge of those cases pending decision for more than ninety
days at the time he submitted his certificates of service. Nor could he give the excuse
that his attention was not called to the cases pending decision ninety days because he
need not be reminded of his deadlines by a subordinate court employee like the clerk
of court. Court employees are not the guardians of a judge's responsibilities.
In Nidua vs. Lazaro (A.M. No. R-465 MTJ, 29 June 1989, 174SCRA 581), we maintained:
It is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his Court
so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition,
particularly those submitted for decision. A judge cannot take refuge behind the
inefficiency or mismanagement by Court personnel. Proper and efficient court
management is as much his responsibility. He is the one directly responsible for the
proper discharge of his official functions.

And in Cipriano vs. Judge Villamor (A.M. No. RTJ-88-207, 22 June 1989, en banc, Minute Resolution) we
ruled,
The Supreme Court cannot countenance such undue delay of a judge especially now
when there is an all-out effort to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the problems of
congestion and delay long plaguing our courts. Thus, judges are called upon to
exercise the utmost diligence and dedication in the performance of their duties. It is a
measure of a judge's competence as an administrator that he is capable of delegating
to his personnel those tasks which properly pertain to them, maintaining, likewise, their
trust and confidence in him.
A member of the bench can not pay mere lip service to the 90-day requirement, but should, in fact, persevere
in its implementation. The Certificate of Service is not merely a means to one's paycheck, but an instrument by
which the Courts can fulfill the Constitutional mandate of the people's right to a speedy disposition of cases.
The people's faith in the administration of justice, especially those who belong to the
low income group, would be greatly impaired if decisions are long in coming, more so
from trial courts which unlike collegiate tribunals where there is a need for extended
deliberation, could be expected to act with dispatch. (Magdamo vs. Pahimulin, Adm.
Mat. No. 662-MJ, 30 September 1976, 73 SCRA 110).
Additionally, we have to hold respondent inexcusably negligent for failure to account for the records of twelve
(12) civil and two (2) criminal cases.
"A judge is expected to ensure that the records of the cases assigned to his sala are intact. There is no
justification for missing records save fortuitous events. The loss of not one but eight records is indicative of
gross misconduct and inexcusable negligence unbecoming of a judge. For true professionalism in the bench
to exist, judges whose acts demoralize the ethical standards of a judicial office and whose acts demonstrate
unfitness and unworthiness of the prestige and prerequisite attached to said office must be weeded out"
(Longboan vs. Polig, Adm. Mat. No. 704-RTJ, 14 June 1990, 186 SCRA 557).

Take care because I learned Big Man Egane is taking much interest because accused
is competing with Ms fishing but only in a small scale. Okay? Thanks.
Sincerely,
Ading.
Sometime later, Judge Pitao sought respondent, as the Executive Judge, regarding his application for leave of
absence which had to be coursed through the latter. During their conversation, respondent mentioned the
case of "People vs. Lipango," asked Judge Pitao whether the latter had received the note, and again warned
the latter about a certain "Big Man Egane," who was backing the complainant therein and that he (Judge
Pitao) better acquit the accused (Tsn., 15 July 1991, pp. 13-14).
On 25 August 1988, after hearing the case, Judge Pitao rendered his decision convicting the accused,
Guillermo Lipango, of the crime of Theft (Exhibit "C") "because the evidence against the accused was very
strong" (ibid., p. 14).
On 16 November 1988, when Judge Pitao went to the boarding house of Respondent to invite the latter to a
birthday party, and while they were walking together, Judge Pitao confided to Respondent that he had
convicted Lipango "because he could not in conscience acquit him" (ibid., p. 17). Irked, Respondent directed
Judge Pitao to forward the records to the former's Court (ibid., p. 18).
On 23 November 1988, the records of Criminal Case No. 959 were elevated to the RTC, Leyte, Branch XVI,
over which Respondent presides, but the case was actually docketed thereat on 5 December 1988.
From 1 to 3 December 1988, Judge Pitao attended the National Convention of Lawyers in Cebu City. Upon his
return, he learned that Judge Meljohn de la Pena had been designated as Acting Judge of the 4th MCTC
Biliran-Cabucgayon, Leyte, and that his designation had been revoked effective 30 November 1988 (ibid., pp.
18-19).

We come now to the supplemental charge of undue interest in a pending criminal case, subject of the
Investigative Report submitted on 9 August 1991 by Justice Fermin A. Martin, who found the imputation
sufficiently substantiated, and has recommended the on of a fine of P10,000.00.

On 9 December 1988, Respondent promulgated his decision acquitting accused-appellant Guillermo Lipango
of the crime charged (Exhibit "F"). This, despite the fact that the records of the case disclosed that no notice
had been sent to the parties of the receipt of the entire record to enable them to submit their respective
memoranda.

From that Report, we gather that on 16 July 1987, Respondent, as; Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch XVI, Naval, Biliran Subprovince, Leyte, designated Judge Dulcisimo Pitao, of the Municipal Trial
Court of Maripipi, Leyte, as Acting Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Biliran-Cabucgayon, Leyte,
which was then vacant, with the directive to allocate two (2) session days a week in his additional sala.

For his part, Respondent opted to rely on his six (6)-page Comment, dated 19 December 1990 (Exh. H, pp.
78-83, Rollo), as his testimony-in-chief As correctly observed by the Investigating Justice, said Comment
contains nothing more than a denial of the charge of falsification and an attribution of ill motive to the
Complainant. He then determined that Respondent is deemed not to have denied:

On 19 August 1987, while Judge Pitao was at his residence at Naval, Biliran Subprovince, Leyte, he received
a note handcarried by a woman, whom he came to know later as the wife of Guillermo Lipango, the accused in
Criminal Case No. 959, which had long been pending trial in the 4th MCTC of Biliran-Cabucgayon, Leyte.
The note (Exhibit "A"), written on Respondent's letterhead, reads:

l) that he sent the handwritten note dated August 19, 1987 (Exhibit "A") to Judge
Dulcisimo Pitao through the wife of the accused Guillermo Lipango;
2) that when Judge Pitao brought his application for leave of absence to respondent as
Executive Judge, respondent took up the matter of the note he sent and the theft case
against accused Guillermo Lipango which was pending trial before Judge Pitao and
even hurried the remark "better acquit him;" and,

Aug. 19, 1987

Dear Tete,
The bearer is the wife of Guillermo Lipango who has a long pending theft case. If you
have jurisdiction hear and decide. If none,remand it to RTC.

3) that he decided the appealed criminal case and acquitted the appellant Guillermo
Lipango although the record of the case disclosed that no notice had been sent yet by
the branch clerk of court to the parties of the receipt of the entire record to enable the
parties to submit memoranda pursuant to Rule 21 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines.
Accordingly, the Investigating Justice came up with the following apt observations and findings:

In sending his handwritten note (Exhibit "A") to Judge Pitao, and through the wife of the
accused Guillermo Lipango, respondent failed to exercise due care. It is true that the
contents of the letter may not have directly exhorted the addressee to decide the case
in favor of one party but to have the wife of the very accused deliver the letter to the
municipal judge who will decide the case and over whom he i respondent) exercised
supervision and wielded a degree of moral ascendancy as Executive Judge was simply
a big letdown in the required circumspection and high ideals expected of a judge. It is a
truism that a judge's official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial
duties should be free from the appearance of impropriety (Aleza vs. Reyes, 131 SCRA
445, 453).
Moreover, respondent Judge, while cautioning Judge Pitao to watch out and exercise
care in handling the case supposedly on account of the interest of persons not parties
to the case, made a side remark for the acquittal of the accused. Such a statement,
winch was not denied, was highly improper and was apt to create the impression that
he was for the exoneration of the accused Guillermo Lipango- It tended to influence the
trial judge who was going to decide the case and thus did violence to the lofty principle
that "the office of a judge exists for one solemn end: to promote justice by
administering it fairly and impartially" (Gonzales-Austria vs. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634,
646).
Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
The Canons mince no words in mandating that a Judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the
outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another Court (Canon 2, Rule 2.04). Interference by members
of the bench in-pending suits with the end in view of influencing the course or the result of litigation does not
only subvert the independence of the judiciary but also undermines the people's faith in its integrity and
impartiality (Commentaries on the Code of Judicial Conduct). On this point, Impao vs. Makilala (A.M. No. MTJ88-184, 13 October 1989, 178 SCRA 541) expounds:

Upon the facts and the evidence, we can not but hold respondent guilty (1) of having made untruthful
statements in his Certificates of Service, of inexcusable negligence and gross inefficiency in connection with
missing records in his Sala, and of utter indifferences to the directives of this Court; and (2) of serious
misconduct for undue interest in a pending criminal case before a lower Court over which he exercised
supervision, all in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The dilapidated condition of the Courthouse of the
RTC, Branch 16, also betrays a lack of management capabilities desired of a Presiding Judge and an
insensitiveness to the needs of a Court of Justice worthy of its name. All told, we find him unfit to continue with
his membership in the Bench.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to DISMISS respondent Judge Adriano R. Villamor, Jr. of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Leyte, from the service, with forfeiture of all his accrued retirement benefits,
leave and other privileges, if any, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Let a copy of this Decision be spread in his personal record.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. RTJ-91-712. July 9, 1996]
BEN D. MARCES, SR., complainant, vs. JUDGE PAUL T. ARCANGEL, Presiding Judge, Branch 12,
Regional Trial Court Davao City, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

It is an important judicial norm that a judge's private as well as official conduct must at
all times be free from the appearance of impropriety [Lugue vs. Kayanan, G.R. No. L26826, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 165; ...]. As held by the Court in the case of De la
Paz vs. Inutan, Adm. Mat. No. 201 MJ, June 30, 1975, 64 SCRA 540: ... The judge is
the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. From him, the
people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. They see in him an intermediary
of justice between two conflicting interests, specially in the station of municipal judges,
like respondent Judge, who have that close and direct contact with the people before
nobody else in the judiciary. Thus, for the judge to return that regard, he must be the
first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow.

Respondent was, at the time material to this case, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 12, at Davao City.[1] He is charged with serious misconduct, grave abuse of authority, harassment, and
immorality.
The complaint alleges the following:
(1)
Complainant is a 61-year old retiree, married to Ruth Jovellar, by whom he has five children,
namely, Farley, Lydia, Ben Jr., Nikki and Allan. Complainant and the members of his family are residents of
the BRC Village, Catalunan Pequeo, Davao City.

The Investigating Justice gave one final and pointed observation on respondent's culpability, thus:
The clincher though came when respondent Judge decided the same case which was
appealed to his branch although he knew that no notice had been sent yet by the
branch clerk of court to the parties of the receipt of the entire record to enable the
precaution and the defense to submit memoranda pursuant to Rule 21 of the Interim
Rules and Guidelines. Respondent's excuse was that under the rules, it was (and still
is) the duty of the clerk of court to notify the parties of the fact that the original record of
the case, together with the transcripts and exhibits, had been received (Rule 21,
paragraph c, Interim Rules and Guidelines). Respondent overlooked, however, that the
same rule provides that the RTC judge shall decide the case on the basis of the entire
record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs,
as may have been filed (paragraph D, Rule 21, Ibid).
Whether or not the accused deserved the acquittal, in point of fact, is of no moment as Respondent's mere act
of interference in a criminal case seals his fate. In administrative proceedings such as this, mere
preponderance of evidence suffices to establish the charges (The Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, et al.,
A.M. No. R-97-RTJ, 28 May 1987, 150 SCRA 269).

In 1984 the spouses Wilfredo and Flordeliza Caas moved into complainants neighborhood. They
became the nearest neighbors of the complainant, their houses being only 45 meters apart. In that year, a
domestic helper of the Caases sought complainants help for alleged maltreatment she had received from her
employers. Complainant, who was the incumbent Purok leader, referred the matter to the barangay
authorities. The dispute was resolved, but the relation of the Marces and the Caas families became strained.
On September 27, 1990, Mrs. Flordeliza Caas had an exchange of words with Mrs. Ruth Marces and
the latters daughter, Lydia, during which they hurled invectives at each other. The incident was triggered by a
relatively minor matter involving a fight between the turkeys owned by the two families but which, because of
the bad blood between them, became a major issue.
The following day, September 28, Mrs. Caas, together with her sister and a neighbor, boarded a
passenger jeepney despite the fact that there were no more seats available because complainant was riding
on that vehicle. It turned out that Mrs. Caas had intended to cause the complainants arrest, because as the
jeepney neared the police station, Mrs. Caas asked the driver to stop the vehicle. Mrs. Caas then got off
and called a policeman and had the complainant Ben D. Marces arrested.

The arrest was made on the basis of alias warrants of arrest handed to the policeman by Mrs.
Caas. The warrants had been issued by MTCC Judge Edipolo Sarabia in three criminal cases against the
herein complainant for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Complainant was detained for one night without
the knowledge of his family, a fact of which Mrs. Caas allegedly boasted in the neighborhood.
The following day, complainant saw Judge Sarabia and explained that the criminal cases against him,
in connection with which the alias warrants were issued, had long been amicably settled. Judge Sarabia told
the complainant that he really did not know anything about the cases and that he had only been requested by
respondent Judge Paul Arcangel to issue the warrants.
(2)
As a result of the September 27, 1990 shouting incident, Mrs. Caas also filed a complaint
with the Barangay Captain against complainants wife and daughter, Lydia. Mediation conferences between
the two families were conducted on October 27, 1990 and on November 3, 1990. Although he had not been
asked to, respondent Judge Arcangel attended the conferences. It is alleged that respondent judge
disturbed the proceedings by walking in and out of the Barangay Hall where the conferences were being
held;
introduced himself as the Executive Judge of the RTC of Davao City in an obvious attempt to influence the
Barangay Officials; and
accompanied Mrs. Caas and acted as the baby-sitter of the latters daughter.
During the October 27, 1990 conference, respondent judge allegedly confronted the complainant,
accusing him of sending the judge a death threat by means of a letter which purported to have been sent by
the New Peoples Army.
The barangay officials failed to amicably settle the dispute. It is averred that Mrs. Caas showed
arrogance and callousness at all times as if to prove that she is protected by a hard rock and impregnable
when she is with the judge.
(3)
The feud between the Marces and Caas families worsened. On December 29, 1990, there
was a violent confrontation between members of the two families. Some of the parties were injured as a result
of hacking. Investigations were conducted by the police during which, according to complainant, he saw
respondent Judge Arcangel talking to the policemen.
(4)
On the night of January 2, 1991, armed men in uniform arrived in two military vehicles and
arrested members of the complainants family and took them to the Davao Metrodiscom Headquarters. The
arrests were made on orders of a certain Col. Nelson Estares. A summary inquest was conducted which
complainant laments to be irregular as the arrests were pre-arranged and the complaint sheet was
fabricated. Complainant avers that the illegal issuance and service of the warrant (i.e., so-called Arrest
Orders) by the Commander of the Davao Metrodiscom can only be done by a person with a strong
connection, power and influence, such as respondent judge, considering his high position in the government
and close relations with the Caas family.
(5)
In a resolution dated May 11, 1991 the investigating prosecutor, Albert Axalan, found
probable cause and filed charges of attempted murder against complainant Ben D. Marces, his wife and his
son, Farley. Complainants countercharges were dropped. Three days after, warrants of arrest were issued
by the RTC against complainant, his wife Ruth and son Farley respectively. Complainant alleges that
respondent Judge Arcangel, taking advantage of his position, influenced the conduct of the preliminary
investigation.
(6)
Subsequently, complainants son, Farley, was arrested. He was handcuffed and taken to the
Ma-a City Jail. It is alleged that respondents Toyota car, with plate number LBT 555, followed the car of the
arresting policemen as if to make sure that the evil plan allegedly authored by Judge Arcangel is well

followed and executed. To add insult to injury, it is alleged that while the applications for bail bond of
complainant, his wife and Farley were being processed at Branch 8 of RTC of Davao City, respondent Judge
Arcangel arrived and questioned the validity of the bond posted, telling the representative of the bonding
company, Hindi puwede ito, who gave you the authority to issue? He then removed the receipts and
arrogantly left with the receipts.
(8)
Because of these events, complainant started asking why a judge should have a special
interest in his familys feud with the Caas family. All he knew before was that the judges car was often
parked in front of the house of Mrs. Caas, especially when Mr. Caas was away working overtime.
In his Comment submitted in compliance with the resolution of this Court, respondent judge alleges (1)
that the charges against him are not only false and malicious but utterly baseless; (2) that the same were filed
merely to gratify complainants personal spite and animosity against him; and (3) that the complaint was filed
in anticipation of the cases which the respondent intends to file against the complainant for slander and
threats.
Respondent judge further avers:
Anent the charge of causing the issuance of warrants of arrest against the complainant and the
handing of the same to Mrs. Caas for enforcement, it was Mrs. Esperanza Deiparine and Mrs. Flordeliza
Caas who obtained the warrants. He only requested Judge Sarabia of the MTCC of Davao City to issue
them.[2] Respondent judge claims the warrants were valid, having been issued in connection with pending
cases and that there were other warrants against complainant which could not be served because of
complainants close connections with the officers of the warrant section. [3]
As to the allegation that he disturbed the barangay conciliation proceedings in the case between the
Marces and Caas families and allegedly acted as an escort of Mrs. Caas and baby-sitter of her daughter,
respondent judge denies he acted as escort and baby-sitter and claims that he could not have disturbed the
proceedings because none were held on November 3, 1990. He claims that he went to the barangay hall
because he filed his own complaint against Ruth Marces and her daughter Lydia. Apparently, respondent
judge is referring to the incident on September 27, 1990 during which Mrs. Marces and daughter Lydia
allegedly called Mrs. Caas kabit, kabit, kabit sa abogado (paramour, paramour, paramour of a lawyer).
[4]
The judge probably felt alluded to.
Respondent judge likewise denies that he pressured the police officers and the prosecutors to file
charges in court as a result of the December 29, 1990 hacking incident.
Respondent vehemently denies having illicit relations with Mrs. Caas and that he went to the house of
the Caas family whenever Mr. Wilfredo Caas was away. Respondent claims that he has known the Caas
family since 1983, when he was still a City Judge. According to him, in 1989 he used to go to the Caas
residence on request by Mrs. Caas to mediate in the latters family problem. After this was settled, he
continued going there because he and Mr. Caas had business interests in the manufacture of appliance
protectors.
Finally, it is alleged that complainant is actually a fugitive from justice, who has a string of criminal
cases[5] and is notorious in the community. Respondent further discusses the merits of the December 29,
1990 hacking incident pointing to complainant, his wife and son as the felons and the guilty parties.

On February 27, 1992, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation. A Reply was subsequently filed by the complainant, alleging
harassment by respondent judge, as follows: (a) respondent judge wrote the Administrator of the Social
Security System, pretending to be interested in purchasing an acquired asset consisting of a house and lot,
which happens to be the residence of the complainant; (b) the management of the Philippine Airlines was
asked by a fictitious person to revive the criminal cases against the complainant; (c) the respondent judge,
together with a certain Fiscal Dumlao, had been visiting witnesses to the December 29, 1990 hacking incident;
(d) the respondent judge filed an administrative case with the Professional Regulations Commission against
Nikki Marces, daughter of the complainant who had just passed the Nursing Board Examinations; and (e)
respondent still visited the house of Mr. and Mrs. Caas.
Complainant further avers that the criminal cases against him are all business-related, being cases for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and for estafa arising from the issuance of bouncing checks. He calls
attention to the fact that respondent judge discussed in his pleadings the merits of the December 29, 1990
hacking incident and contends that this is improper and unethical.
On May 26, 1992, the Court referred the case to Associate Justice Luis Javellana of the Court of
Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. Unfortunately, Associate Justice Javellana suddenly
died on August 25, 1993. The case was thereafter reassigned to Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima, but the
reception of the evidence was assigned to Executive Judge Romeo D. Marasigan of Branch XVI, RTC-Davao
City. On September 18, 1993, Judge Marasigan forwarded the records of the case, together with the evidence
adduced before him, to this Court. The records were later transmitted to Justice Purisima.
In his Report and Recommendation dated May 30, 1994, Associate Justice Purisima recommends
dismissal of the charges against respondent judge for insufficiency of evidence, except the charge that
respondent judge attended mediation conferences between the feuding families and tried to intervene. As to
this charge the Investigating Justice finds that the evidence establishes the same. Justice Purisima
recommends that respondent judge be admonished and sternly warned that repetition of the acts of
impropriety by respondent will be dealt with more severely. The pertinent portions of Justice Purisimas report
states:
The charge concerning the frequent visits by respondent Judge at the residence of Mrs. Flordeliza Caas in
Barangay Catalunan Pequeo, Davao City, and allusion that the former has illicit relation with the latter are
utterly devoid of sufficient substantiation. The mere suspicion on the part of the complainant and members of
his family that the respondent Judge has an affair with Mrs. Flordeliza Caas has been completely effaced and
reduced to nothing reprehensible or censurable by the unequivocal and straightforward testimonies of
Flordelizas husband and parents that the respondent Judge is just a family friend whose visits did not have
any immoral implication. According to these knowledgeable witnesses, the latter was their frequent visitor in
1990, when respondent Judge and Engr. Wilfredo B. Caas, were engaged in the manufacture of appliance
protectors.
Obviously, Engr. Wilfredo B. Caas, the lifetime partner of Mrs. Flordeliza Caas, day and night, should be in
the best position to observe her. Whether or not his wife is unfaithful to him is a matter within the sphere of the
husband to detect. Here, Engr. Wilfredo B. Caas having given his wife clean slate, We can do no less. A
different conclusion and ruling could ruin families, which society cherishes and protects (Article 215, New Civil
Code; Article 149, Family Code).
....
So also, respondent Judge cannot be held administratively liable for the handcapping [sic] of a son of
complainant, who was allegedly handcapped [sic] and brought to the Ma-a jail, while working at the Davao
Light and Power company. Absent any admissible evidence that the respondent Judge was the one who
caused such malfeasance to happen, he is not answerable therefore
....

But the charge that the respondent Judge was present during the mediation conference between the Marces
family and Caas family on October 27 and November 3, 1990, before the Lupon Tagapayapa of Catalunan
Pequeo, Davao City, and that during such conference, respondent Judge was in and out of the conference
room, trying to interfere with the proceedings, and to wield influence as Regional Trial Court Judge, is firmly
anchored on Complainants evidence, which has not been effectively traversed and negated by respondents
evidence.
From the evidence on hand, it is clear that on October 27, 1990, the respondent Judge arrived at the
Barangay Hall of Catalunan Pequeo, Davao City, in the company of Mrs. Flordeliza Caas, and the latters
small child. During the said mediation conference between the Marces family and Caas family, respondent
Judge entered the conference room and made it known to all and sundry that he is the Presiding Judge of
Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao. Such actuation was indiscreet and improper because the
disputes and controversies between the two warring families could develop into a litigation before any of the
courts of Davao.
All things studiedly considered, with due regard to the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced, pro
and con, before Honorable Executive Judge Romeo D. Marasigan of the Regional Trial Court, Davao City; the
ineluctable conclusion is that on October 27, and November 3, 1990, the respondent Judge intruded into the
conference room, and interfered with a mediation conference then being held between the family of the herein
complainant and the Caas family, before the Lupon Tagapayapa of Catalunan Pequeo, Davao City, and
while inside said room, tried to influence barangay officials thereat, by identifying himself as the Presiding
Judge of Branch 12 of the Davao Regional Trial Court; a misbehavior and an improper actuation under the
premises.
Equally anemic of evidentiary support is the charge that the respondent Judge influenced the prosecutors and
police authorities of Davao City to harass the family of complainant.
The Court finds the conclusions of the investigator that respondent judge is guilty of improper conduct
to be fully supported by the evidence in the record. It only needs to be added that the claim of respondent
judge that he was at the mediation conference held on October 27, 1990 because he had himself filed a
complaint against Ruth Marces and the latters daughter, Lydia, is belied by the fact that respondent judges
complaint was filed only on November 3, 1990.
The report of the Investigating Justice fails to consider other serious allegations in the complaint, of
which there is also sufficient evidence in the record, to wit:
(1) That respondent judge caused the issuance of alias warrants of arrest by requesting another
judge, before whom the case against the complainant was pending, to issue the warrants;
and
(2) That the arrest of the members of the Marces family on January 2, 1991 would not have
been made without the intervention of respondent judge.
These charges have not only been proven by substantial and convincing evidence, but have actually
been admitted by respondent judge. Thus, complainant alleges that he was informed by Judge Sarabia that
the warrants had been issued by him upon the request of respondent judge. This allegation is supported by a
handwritten note (Exh. E) of respondent judge, which reads:
Judge Edipolo Sarabia
Br. 3, City Trial Court
Davao City
Dear Ed:

If these cases (Cr. Case Nos. 9-C-M, 10-C-M & 11-C-M) are still pending, please issue another alias warrants
as the accused is now in town.
Thanks,

Nelson Estares, to whom I explained the entire incident and treatment I received from the police who was
investigating the case;
In addition, Wilfredo Caas testified in the investigation and affirmed that it was because of the help of
respondent judge that he was able to talk with Col. Estares, thus: [9]

(Sgd.) Paul Arcangel

[JUDGE ARCANGEL conducting examination:]
In addition, complainant presented a certification by the Clerk of Court [6] of the MTCC-Davao City, Branch 3,
stating the following:

Q:

In connection with the hacking of your wife and mother-in-law, what action did you take?

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

A:

I tried to follow up the complaint to the police station about the hacking incident. I even went to
the Tugbok police station.

THIS IS TO CERTIFY, that according to the records of this Court, the three (3) Estafa Cases against MR. BEN
MARCES under Criminal Cases Nos. 9-CM, 10-CM and 11-CM has been in archive since December 28, 1983
due to non-arrest of the accused and an alias warrant of arrest was issued against the accused.

Q:

What action was taken at the police station?

A:

The police station did not entertain my complaint and they tried to pass me around.

Q:

When no action was taken in your complaint by the police station, what did you do?

A:

Sensing that there is no hope (to go to the) police, I asked Judge Arcangel to accompany me to
Col. Estares.

Q:

When Judge Arcangel accompanied you to the Office of Col. Estares, what did you do?

A:

He introduced me to Col. Estares and I told Col. Estares that my wife and my mother-in-law were
attacked by the Marces family and they were hacked and I requested Col. Estares to help me
because the police did not take any action and I even sensed that somebody was supporting the
Marces family.

That its discovery and revival was made possible upon the request for verification of its status and information
by Judge Paul T. Arcangel that accused is back in town and that ultimately resulted to the dismissal of the
three (3) cases on March 11, 1991, without which verification the said cases would have remained pending to
date.
Instead of being delivered to the warrant officer, the warrants were actually given to Mrs. Caas. The
entry in the Daily Record of Events of the Ulas Police Substation [7] stated that [e]lements of this unit led by
P/Cpl. VA Secretaria arrested with alias warrant of arrest one BEN MARCES Y DOMANILLO. . . who was
charge[d] with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 with Criminal Case No[s]. 9-CM, 11CM, duly signed by
Judge Edipolo Sarabia this 28th of September 1990 at Davao City. The warrant was given by one
FLORDELIZA CAAS Y Pelegrino, 26 years old, married, housewife. . . .
To cap it all, respondent judge himself admitted in his Comment, dated December 27, 1991, that Mrs.
Esperanza Deiparine and Mrs. Flordeliza Caas requested him to have the warrants renewed, thus, he
requested Judge Sarabia for the issuance of the new warrants [8] against the complainant.
Respondent judge justifies his intervention on the ground that complainant Ben D. Marces had been
able to evade service of the warrants because of connections with the warrant officers of Davao City. Even if
this had been the case it would not excuse respondent judge in using his own influence.

With the above-cited charges having been duly proven, in addition to the factual findings of Justice
Purisima, it is clear that (1) respondent judge intervened in the feud between the complainants family and the
Caas family and (2) such interference was not limited to the barangay mediation proceedings but extended
as well to the various stages of the conflict. These acts of respondent judge must be viewed not as single,
isolated actuations but in their totality and in the context of the enmity between the two feuding families. Thus
viewed we find the actuations of respondent judge improper and censurable.

Indeed this is the same excuse given for respondent judges interceding with the Metrodiscom
authorities for the issuance of a so-called order of arrest as a result of which complainant Ben D. Marces, his
wife Ruth and his children Farley, Lydia, Nikki and Allan were arrested on January 2, 1991. Respondents own
witness, Wilfredo Caas, stated that he was accompanied by respondent to Col. Nelson Estares. It was Col.
Estares who ordered the arrest of complainant and members of his family. Thus, in his affidavit dated August
23, 1991, Wilfredo Caas stated:

Respondent is, as we have so often said, the visible representation of the law, [10] the intermediary
between conflicting interests,[11] and the embodiment of the peoples sense of justice. [12] Unless it was a case
filed with his court, it was improper for him to intervene in a dispute or controversy. The Code of Judicial
Conduct provides:

13. That when my wife and mother-in-law were attacked and hacked by Ben Marces and his family
within the premises of our house on December 29, 1990, I called Judge Arcangel for assistance because Ben
Marces was trying to manipulate the case by making it appear that they were the victims....
14. That when I followed up the case at the Talomo Police Station and at the Tugbok Police Station, I
was given a run around by the police authorities and I sensed that a ranking police officer was interceding in
behalf of Ben Marces and his family;
15. That when the police authorities could not come up with a report of the incident after more than
three days, I sought the assistance of Judge Arcangel, who accompanied me to Metrodiscom Chief Col.

The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor
convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. [13]
He should not suffer his conduct to create the impression that any person can unduly influence him or
enjoy his favor.[14]
Respondent judge allowed himself to be dragged into what was a purely private matter between feuding
families. In attending, at the request of Mrs. Caas, the barangay conciliation proceedings and introducing
himself there as the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in an obvious demonstration of support for
Mrs. Caas, respondent lent the prestige of his office to a party in a case.

Respondents request to the judge of a lower court to issue warrants of arrest against the complainant
is no less censurable. As the Court had occasion to state in Sabitsana, Jr. v. Villamor:[15]
Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety in all activities. The Canons mince no words in
mandating that a Judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute
pending before another Court (Canon 2, Rule 2.04). Interference by members of the bench in pending
suits with the end in view of influencing the course or the result of litigation does not only subvert the
independence of the judiciary but also undermines the peoples faith in its integrity and impartiality.
Respondent judge also acted improperly in accompanying Wilfredo Caas to Col. Nelson Estares who
ordered the arrest of complainant and members of the latters family. It would have been impossible for the
Caas family to procure the arrest of complainant and of members of his family by the Davao Metrodiscom
were it not for the intervention of respondent judge.
Wilfredo Caas claim that he had to seek the help of respondent judge because even after three days
the police still had not made a report on the incident on December 29, 1990 cannot justify respondents
intervention in the quarrel. The possibility that the incident could become the subject of litigation in his court
should have deterred him from getting involved in the feud.
Nothing can bring courts into disrepute more than the failure of the occupants thereof to be ever
scrupulous in their conduct. Canon 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics cautions judges in pending or
prospective litigation before him [to] be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to
waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in determining
his judicial course. It cannot be overemphasized that a judges official conduct should be free from
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of
official duties but also in everyday life, should be beyond reproach. [16]
For the foregoing reasons, we find respondent judge guilty of improper conduct. We do not agree with
complainant, however, that respondents misconduct justifies his dismissal from the service. While in some
cases involving similar acts the penalties imposed on the erring judges were dismissal, there were in those
cases other grounds warranting the imposition of such drastic disciplinary penalty. For example, in Ubarra v.
Mapalad,[17] respondent, aside from pressuring complainants to drop criminal charges against the accused,
likewise refused to inhibit herself when she knew it was improper to decide the case, and was guilty of delay in
deciding the case. On the other hand, in Sabitsana, Jr. v. Villamor [18] the respondent was found guilty of
attempting to influence another judge to acquit the accused in a criminal case and, in addition, of making
untruthful statements in the certificate of service.
In the case at bar, there is no other charge against respondent judge. This is his first administrative
case. On the other hand his record as City Judge of Davao City, from 1975 to 1983, and as Regional Trial
Court Judge in the same city since 1983 is otherwise exemplary. In the circumstances of this case, the
penalty of reprimand with warning that commission of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with
more severely, should suffice to accomplish the purpose of disciplining an erring member of the judiciary who
has not shown himself to be beyond correction. As the Book of Proverbs says, A single reprimand does more
for a man of intelligence than a hundred lashes for a fool. (17:10)
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED with WARNING that commission of similar acts
of impropriety on his part in the future will be dealt with more severely. All other charges are hereby
DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-40603 July 13, 1978
PALMARIN Q. HURTADO, petitioner,
vs.

ISABEL G. JUDALENA and HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG, in his capacity as Judge in the CFI of Ilocos
Norte, Batac branch, respondents.

CONCEPCION JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to annul the order of April 2,
1975, issued by the respondent Judge Arsenio M. Gonong in Civil Case No. 485-IV of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte, upon the ground that the said order was issued in violation of Section 1, Rule 137 of
the Revised Rules of Court, the respondent judge being the brother of the private respondent Isabel G.
Judalena.
The record shows that on March 14, 1975, the private respondent Isabel G. Judalena filed a complaint against
the petitioner Palmarin Q. Hurtado before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte which was docketed
therein as Civil Case No. 485-IV. The substance of the complaint is that Isabel G. Judalena had sold a portion,
containing an area of 75 square meters of her parcel of land to Palmarin Q. Hurtado, with the condition that
the latter shall cause a subdivision survey of the portion sold in order to segregate said portion from the bigger
portion, after which the said Palmarin Hurtado shall construct a concrete fence between the two lots, but that
the said Palmarin Hurtado contrary to their agreement, built a concrete fence much beyond the 75 square
meters portion and started construction of a house on the encroached portion. Isabel Judalena prayed for a
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain Hurtado from construction the house mentioned on the controverted
parcel of land. 1
On March 31, 1975, the petitioner Palmarin Q. Hurtado filed his answer thereto, denying the claim of Judalena
that he had encroached on the property, claiming that they are the owners of the property on which they are
constructing their house. 2
On April 2, 1975, the respondent Judge Arsenio Gonong, his close relationship with Isabel G. Judalena
notwithstanding, and despite the prohibition imposed by Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of
Court, 3issued an order, ex-parte. directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of a
bond in the amount of P1,000.00. On April 4, 1975, Isabel G. Judalena filed the required bond and a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued, ordering Palmarin Q. Hurtado, his father, and other persons acting on his
behalf to refrain and desist from constructing a house on the land in controversy and stop disturbing in any
other manner the possession of Isabel G. Judalena. 4
The next day, April 5, 1975, the respondent judge issued an order voluntarily disqualifying himself from hearing
the case in view of his close relationship with the plaintiff therein and directed the transmittal of the records of
the case to the incumbent Executive Judge for proper assignment to the other judges of the court. 5
On April 10, 1975, Palmarin Q. Hurtado filed a motion for the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction in
order to preserve the status quo until the designation of another judge to try the case, with a prayer that the
respondent judge hear the motion to give him an opportunity to rectify the mistake error he had committed in
taking cognizance of the case and in granting, ex-parte, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. 6
The respondent judge, however, denied the motion on April 21, 1975.

Hence, the instant petition. On May 12, 1975, this Court issued a temporary restraining order, to stop the
respondent judge from enforcing his orders on April 2, 1975 and April 21, 1975. 8
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court enumerates without ambiguity the cases in which any judge
or judicial officer is disqualified from acting as such. 9 The said section, in no uncertain terms, expressly
prohibits a judge or judicial officer from sitting in a case where he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguity or affinity. This is mandatory. 10 In the case at bar, it is not denied that the respondent
judge is the brother of the respondent Isabel G. Judalena and their close relationship notwithstanding, and

despite the prohibition mentioned above, the respondent judge took cognizance of the case and issued the
controversial order directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, after which he inhibited himself
from sitting on the case for the same reasons. Such action, to our mind, is reprehensible as it erodes the all
important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby granted and the order of April 2. 1975, issued in Civil Case No.
485-IV of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, is hereby annulled and set aside. The temporary
restraining order heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. With costs against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460

Upon Judge Floros personal request, an audit on his sala was conducted by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) from 2 to 3 March 1999. 2
After conducting the audit, the audit team, led by Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, reported its findings
to erstwhile Court Administrator, Alfredo L. Benipayo, who submitted his own report/memorandum 3 to then
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. dated 13 July 1999 recommending, among other things, that his report be
considered as an administrative complaint against Judge Floro and that Judge Floro be subjected to an
appropriate psychological or mental examination. Court Administrator Benipayo recommended as well that
Judge Floro be placed under preventive suspension for the duration of the investigation against him.

March 31, 2006

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent.

In a Resolution4 dated 20 July 1999, the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of the OCA, docketing
the complaint as A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, in view of the commission of the following acts or omissions as
reported by the audit team:
(a) The act of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements regarding qualifications
and for announcing in open court during court session his qualification in violation of Canon 2,
Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct;

x--------------x
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC

the way to Atty. Floros appointment as Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Branch 73, Malabon City, on 4
November 1998.

March 31, 2006

Re: RESOLUTION DATED 11 MAY 1999 OF JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR.

(b) For allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters;

(c) For rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of
Procedures;

x--------------x
(d) For his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he declares that he is pro-accused which is
contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct;

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988

March 31, 2006
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 99-812-RTJ)
LUZ ARRIEGO, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
"Equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives." Justice Brandeis, Loughran v.
Loughran 1
THE CASES

(e) For appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending before Regional Trial
Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Canons of Judicial Conduct
which prohibits a judge from engaging in the private practice of law;
(f) For appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme Court and without
filing the corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing;
(g) For proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on Recognizance filed by the
accused without the presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of
examination of the custodian of the accused;
(h) For using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal
Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by
persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the
presence of the trial prosecutor;

The First Case: A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A pre-requisite psychological
evaluation on him then by the Supreme Court Clinic Services (SC Clinic) revealed "(e)vidence of ego
disintegration" and "developing psychotic process." Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his application. In
June 1998, when he applied anew, the required psychological evaluation exposed problems with self-esteem,
mood swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations, suspiciousness, and perceptual
distortions. Both 1995 and 1998 reports concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit to be a judge.
Because of his impressive academic background, however, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) allowed Atty.
Floro to seek a second opinion from private practitioners. The second opinion appeared favorable thus paving

(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, ordering the mental and
physical examination of the accused based on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pickup";
(j) For issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he issued in open court in
Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide;
(k) For violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly criticized the
Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system;

(l) For the use of highly improper and intemperate language during court proceedings;
(m) For violation of Circular No. 135 dated 1 July 1987.
Per the same resolution of the Court, the matter was referred to Retired Court of Appeals Justice Pedro
Ramirez (consultant, OCA) for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt. Judge
Floro was directed to comment within ten days from receipt of the resolution and to subject himself to an
appropriate psychological or mental examination to be conducted "by the proper office of the Supreme Court
or any duly authorized medical and/or mental institution." In the same breath, the Court resolved to place
Judge Floro under preventive suspension "for the duration of the investigation of the administrative charges
against him." He was barely eight months into his position.
On 20 August 1999, Judge Floro submitted a Verified Comment where he set forth both affirmative and
negative defenses6 while he filed his "Answer/Compliance" on 26 August 1999.
On 3 March 2000, Judge Floro moved for the provisional/final dismissal of his case for failure to
prosecute.7However, on 21 March 2000, he presented himself as his first witness in the hearing conducted by
Justice Ramirez.8 Subsequently, on 7 July 2000, Judge Floro filed a "Petition for Inhibition/Disqualification"
against Justice Ramirez as investigator9 which was denied by Justice Ramirez in an Order dated 11 July
2000. 10 Judge Floros motion for reconsideration 11 suffered the same fate. 12 On 27 July 2000, Judge Floro
submitted the question of Justice Ramirezs inhibition/disqualification to this Court. 13 On 8 August 2000, the
Court ruled against the inhibition of Justice Ramirez. 13
On 11 September 2000, the OCA, after having been ordered by the Court to comment on Judge Floros
motion to dismiss, 15 recommended that the same should be denied.
Judge Floro presented his last witness on 6 March 2001. 16 The day after, Justice Ramirez came out with a
"Partial Report" recommending the dismissal of Judge Floro from office "by reason of insanity which renders
him incapable and unfit to perform the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73." 17
In the meantime, throughout the investigation of the 13 charges against him and even after Justice Ramirez
came out with his report and recommendation on 7 March 2001, Judge Floro had been indiscriminately filing
cases against those he perceived to have connived to boot him out of office.
A list of the cases Judge Floro filed in the wake of his 20 July 1999 preventive suspension follows:
1. OCA IPI No. 00-07-OCA against Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, Team Leader,
Judicial Audit Team, Office of the Court Administrator 18
2. OCA IPI No. 00-933-RTJ against Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr., Regional Trial Court, Branch 72,
Malabon City 19
3. AC No. 5286 against Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo and Judge Benjamin Aquino,
Jr.20
4. AC No. CBD-00-740 against Thelma C. Bahia, Court Management Office, Atty. Mary Jane
Dacarra-Buenaventura, Atty. II, Court Management Office, both of the Office of the Court
Administrator and Atty. Esmeralda G. Dizon, Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 73, Malabon 21
5. AC No. 6282 (CPL No. C-02-0278) against former Court Administrator Justice Alfredo L.
Benipayo and (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator 22
6. A.M. No. 03-8-03-0 against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez 23

7. A.C. No. 6050 against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez 24

On 1 February 2006, Judge Floro moved that the cases he filed, now totaling seven, be dismissed. 25 On 14
February 2006, the Court granted the motion to dismiss. 26
The Second Case: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988(Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
This charge is likewise the subject matter of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460: "(f)or using/taking advantage
of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated
homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the
accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor." The complainant Luz Arriego
is the mother of the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN.
On 28 June 2001, Arriego testified, while court stenographer Jocelyn Japitenga testified on 16 July 2001. On
31 July 2001, Arriego filed her Formal Offer of Evidence which was opposed by Judge Floro on 21 August
2001. On 5 September 2001, Judge Floro testified on his behalf while Atty. Galang testified against him on 4
October 2001. On 16 October 2001, Judge Floro filed a Memorandum in this case. 27
The Third Case: A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
As can be gathered from the title, this case concerns a resolution issued by Judge Floro on 11 May 1999 in
Special Proceeding Case No. 315-MN "In Re: Petition To Be Admitted A Citizen Of The Philippines, Mary Ng
Nei, Petitioner." The resolution disposed of the motions for voluntary inhibition of Judge Floro and the
reconsideration of the order denying the petition for naturalization filed by petitioner in that case, Mary Ng Nei.
This resolution found its way to the OCA through a letter written by Atty. David S. Narvasa, the petitioners
counsel.28 The OCA, through Court Administrator Benipayo, made the following evaluation:
In the subject resolution, Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition and declared it as null
and void. However, he ordered the raffling of the case anew (not re-raffle due to inhibition) so that
the petitioner, Mary Ng Nei, will have a chance to have the case be assigned to other judges
through an impartial raffle.
When Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition, he should have continued hearing and
taking cognizance of the case. It is improper for him to order the raffle of the case "anew" as this
violates Administrative Circular No. 1 (Implementation of Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the 1987
Constitution) dated January 28, 1988 which provides to wit:
"8. Raffle of Cases:
xxxx
8.3 Special raffles should not be permitted except on verified application of the interested party
who seeks issuance of a provisional remedy and only upon a finding by the Executive Judge that
unless the special raffle is conducted, irreparable damage shall be suffered by the applicant. The
special raffle shall be conducted by at least two judges in a multiple-sala station.
x x x x"
Based on the foregoing, a judge may not motu proprio order the special raffle of a case since such is only
allowed upon a verified application of the interested party seeking a provisional remedy and only upon the
Executive Judges finding that if a special raffle is not conducted, the applicant will suffer irreparable damage.
Therefore, Judge Floro, Jr.s order is contrary to the above-mentioned Administrative Circular.

Moreover, it is highly inappropriate for Judge Floro, Jr. to even mention in his resolution that Justice Regino C.
Hermosisima, Jr. is his benefactor in his nomination for judgeship. It is not unusual to hear a judge who speaks
highly of a "padrino" (who helped him get his position). Such remark even if made as an expression of deep
gratitude makes the judge guilty of creating a dubious impression about his integrity and independence. Such
flaunting and expression of feelings must be suppressed by the judges concerned. A judge shall not allow
family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment (Canon 2, Rule 2.03, Code of
Judicial Conduct).
The merits of the denial of the motion for inhibition and the ruling on the motion for reconsideration are judicial
matters which this Office has no authority to review. The remedy is judicial, not administrative. 29
The OCA thus recommended that Judge Floro comment on (a) his act of ordering the raffle of the case in
violation of Administrative Circular No. 1; and (b) his remark on page 5 of the subject resolution that "Justice
Hermosisima, Jr. x x x helped undersigned so much, in the JBC, regarding his nomination x x x."
In a Resolution dated 17 August 1999, the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of the OCA. 30 Judge
Floro, through his counsel, filed his Comment on 22 October 1999 31 which was noted by this Court on 7
December 1999. On 11 January 2000, Judge Floro filed a Formal Offer of Evidence which this Court, in a
resolution dated 25 January 2000, referred to Justice Ramirez for inclusion in his report and recommendation.
For the record, the OCA is yet to come up with its report and recommendation in this case as well as in the
second case (i.e., A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988). Thus, in a resolution dated 14 February 2006, the Court directed
Judge Floro as well as the other parties in these two cases to inform the Court whether or not they are willing
to submit A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for decision on the basis of the pleadings filed and
the evidence so far submitted by them or to have the decision in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of the
two. On 20 February 2006, the OCA, thru Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., manifested its
willingness to submit A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for resolution based on the pleadings and the evidence
submitted therein. Complainant Luz Arriego in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 likewise informed this Court, in a Letter
dated 28 February 2006, her willingness to submit her case for decision based on the pleadings already
submitted and on the evidence previously offered and marked. On the other hand, on 3 March 2006, Judge
Floro manifested his preference to have A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M.
No. 99-7-273-RTC.
In the interest of orderly administration of justice, considering that these are consolidated cases, we resolve to
render as well a consolidated decision.
But first, the ground rules: Much has been said across all fronts regarding Judge Floros alleged mental illness
and its effects on his duties as Judge of a Regional Trial Court. For our part, figuring out whether Judge Floro
is indeed psychologically impaired and/or disabled as concluded by the investigator appointed by this Court is
frankly beyond our sphere of competence, involving as it does a purely medical issue; hence, we will have to
depend on the findings of the mental health professionals who interviewed/analyzed Judge Floro. Our job is
simply to wade through the evidence, filter out the irrelevant and the irreverent in order to determine once and
for all if Judge Floro is indeed guilty of the charges against him. If the evidence makes out a case against
Judge Floro, the next issue is to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed.
Finally, we will have to determine whether Judge Floro acted with an evil mind or because of a psychological
or mental incapacity. Upon the resolution of this question hinges the applicability of equity.
As an aside, it bears pointing out that some of the charges ("c" and "g", "h" and "j", "e" and "f") will be jointly
discussed as they had likewise been jointly discussed by the OCA. These charges involve common facts and
to treat them separately will be superfluous.
DISCUSSION
As alleged and as proven, the 13 specified charges do not warrant the supreme penalty of dismissal against
Judge Floro

(a) Re: Charge of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements regarding qualifications AND
for announcing in open court during court session his qualifications in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons
of Judicial Conduct
As narrated by the audit team, Judge Floro was circulating calling cards bearing his name as the Presiding
Judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City, and indicating therein that he is a "bar exams topnotcher (87.55%)"
and with "full second honors" from the Ateneo de Manila University, A.B. and LL.B. 32 The audit team likewise
reported that: "(b)efore the start of court session, Judge Floro is introduced as a private law practitioner, a
graduate of Ateneo de Manila University with second honors, and a bar topnotcher during the 1983 Bar
Examinations with an average score of 87.55%. Afterwards, a reading of the Holy Bible, particularly the Book
of Revelation according to Saint John, was made. The people in the courtroom were given the opportunity to
ask Judge Floro questions on the matter read. No questions were asked; hence the session commenced." 33
Judge Floro argues that, per commentary of Justice Ruperto G. Martin, 34 "the use of professional cards
containing the name of the lawyer, his title, his office and residence is not improper" and that the word "title"
should be broad enough to include a Judges legal standing in the bar, his honors duly earned or even his Law
School. Moreover, other lawyers do include in their calling cards their former/present titles/positions like
President of the Jaycees, Rotary Club, etc., so where then does one draw the line? Finally, Judge Floro
argues that his cards were not being circulated but were given merely as tokens to close friends or by
reciprocity to other callers considering that common sense dictates that he is not allowed by law to seek other
professional employment.
As to the charge that he had been announcing in open court his qualifications, Judge Floro counters that it
was his branch clerk of court, Atty. Esmeralda Galang-Dizon, who suggested that during his initial court
session, she would briefly announce his appointment with an introduction of his school, honors, bar rating and
law practice. Naively, Judge Floro agreed as the introduction was done only during the first week of his
assumption into office.
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that "a judge should not seek
publicity for personal vainglory." A parallel proscription, this time for lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility: "a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or
legal services." This means that lawyers and judges alike, being limited by the exacting standards of their
profession, cannot debase the same by acting as if ordinary merchants hawking their wares. As succinctly put
by a leading authority in legal and judicial ethics, "(i)f lawyers are prohibited from x x x using or permitting the
use of any undignified or self-laudatory statement regarding their qualifications or legal services (Rule 3.01,
Code of Professional Responsibility), with more reasons should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity for
vanity or self-glorification. Judges are not actors or actresses or politicians, who thrive by publicity." 35
The question, therefore, is: By including self-laudatory details in his professional card, did Judge Floro violate
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct?
In Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., 36 we explained that the use of an ordinary and simple professional card by
lawyers is permitted and that the card "may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm
which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced." In herein case,
Judge Floros calling cards cannot be considered as simple and ordinary. By including therein the honors he
received from his law school with a claim of being a bar topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the norms of
simplicity and modesty required of judges.
Judge Floro insists, however, that he never circulated his cards as these were just given by him as tokens
and/or only to a few who requested the same. 37 The investigation by Justice Ramirez into the matter reveals
otherwise. An eye-witness from the OCA categorically stated that Judge Floro circulated these
cards. 38 Worse, Judge Floros very own witness, a researcher from an adjoining branch, testified that Judge
Floro gave her one of these cards. 39
As this charge involves a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, it should be measured against Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC being more favorable to respondent Judge Floro.
Rule 140, before its amendment, automatically classified violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct as serious
charges. As amended, a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct may amount to gross misconduct, which is a
serious charge, or it may amount to simple misconduct, which is a less serious charge or it may simply be a
case of vulgar and/or unbecoming conduct which is a light charge.

"Misconduct" is defined as wrong or improper conduct while "gross" connotes something "out of all measure;
beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful." 40 For serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act
complained of should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of wellknown legal rules. 41
With the foregoing as yardstick, we find the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling cards containing selflaudatory statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct as it appears that Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive but, from what we
can see from the evidence, a persistent and unquenchable thirst for recognition. Concededly, the need for
recognition is an all too human flaw and judges do not cease to be human upon donning the judicial robe.
Considering, however, the proscription against judges seeking publicity for personal vainglory, they are held to
a higher standard as they must act within the confines of the code they swore to observe.
As to the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk of court, had been announcing in open court his
qualifications, we find that this is likewise violative of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it
smacks of unnecessary publicity. Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for announcing their
qualifications especially to an audience of lawyers and litigants who very well might interpret such publicity as
a sign of insecurity. Verily, the public looks upon judges as the bastion of justice confident, competent and
true. And to discover that this is not so, as the judge appears so unsure of his capabilities that he has to court
the litigants and their lawyers approval, definitely erodes public confidence in the judiciary.
As it is not disputed, however, that these announcements went on for only a week, Judge Floro is guilty of
simple misconduct only.

c. It was reported by the staff of Branch 73 that regardless of the absence of the trial prosecutor, Judge Floro,
Jr. still proceeded with the hearing of the following matters:
(c-1) "Motion for Release on Recognizance" filed by the accused, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20384, 20371,
20246 and 20442 entitled "People vs. Luisito Beltran", "People vs. Emma Alvarez, et al.", "People vs. Rowena
Camino", and "People vs. John Richie Villaluz", respectively. In the hearing of these motions, Judge Floro, Jr.
propounded questions (in a form of direct examination) to the custodian of the accused without the accused
being sworn by the administering officer. (Note: initially, Judge Floro, Jr. ordered the Branch Clerk of Court
Dizon to place the accused under oath prior to the start of his questions. However, COC Dizon refused). The
hearing on the aforesaid motions is an offshoot of a previous hearing wherein the accused had pleaded guilty
to a lesser offense. After the reading of the sentence, Judge Floro, Jr. would automatically inform the accused
that they are qualified to apply for probation. In fact, Judge Floro, Jr. would even instruct his staff to draft the
application in behalf of the accused so that a motion for release on recognizance will immediately be heard
and be consequently granted. As appearing in the minutes of the hearing (attached herewith as Annexes "3" to
"6"), the custodians of the accused are either a barangay kagawad, barangay tanod or a member of the
lupong tagapamayapa. Likewise, no written order granting the motion for release on recognizance is being
issued by Judge Floro, Jr. since according to him neither rules nor circular mandates the issuance of a written
order. Instead, after granting the motion, Judge Floro, Jr. just requires the parties to sign the minutes of the
session. Photocopies of the minutes dated March 4, 1999 in Criminal Cases Nos. 20384-MN; 20373-MN; and
20371-MN are hereto attached as Annexes "3" to "5".
On March 11, 1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20426-MN and 20442-MN, Judge Floro, Jr. granted a similar
motion without issuing a written order. Copies of the minutes are hereto attached as annexes "6" to "7." 44

(b)Re: Charge of allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters

In his Verified Comment, Judge Floro argues that he never violated any rule of procedure with respect to the
cases mentioned by the Audit Team, asserting that

The audit team observed that "inside Judge Floros chamber[s], there is a folding bed with cushion located at
the right corner of the room. A man, who was later identified as Judge Floros driver, was sleeping. However,
upon seeing the audit team, the driver immediately went out of the room." 42

Contrary to the stance of the TEAM, Sec. 1 of Rule 36, Rules of Court refers only to final and not interlocutory
orders. Only final orders and judgments are promulgated, rendered and entered.

Judge Floro contends that this charge is without legal or factual basis. The man the audit team saw "sleeping"
on his folding bed, J. Torralba, was Judge Floros aide or "alalay" whom he allows to rest from time to time (in
between periods and especially during court sessions) for humanitarian reasons. J. Torralba was not sleeping
during that time that the audit team was in Branch 73 as he immediately left when he saw the members
thereof.
This charge must fail as there is nothing inherently improper or deplorable in Judge Floro having allowed
another person to use his folding bed for short periods of time during office hours and while there is no one
else in the room. The situation would have been different if there had been any allegation of misuse or abuse
of government funds and/or facilities such as in the case of Presado v. Genova 43 wherein Judge Genova was
found guilty of serious misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he and his
family used his chambers as residential quarters, with the provincial government paying for the electrical bills.
Be that as it may, it does not augur well for a new judge to allow such familiarity from his aide as this becomes
fodder for gossip as what had apparently happened in this case. Judge Floro should have been aware of and
attuned to the sensibilities of his staff who were understandably uncomfortable with the uncommon
arrangement of a judge allowing his aide easy access to his folding bed.
(c) Re: Charge of rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of
Procedure
(g) Re: Charge of proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on Recognizance filed by the
accused without the presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of examination of
the custodian of the accused
The memorandum report reads:

xxxx
Applying the foregoing well-settled doctrines of law to the case at bar, herein respondent faithfully complied
with the requirements of Sec. 7 of P.D. 968 as amended, regarding the applications for release on
recognizance, thus:
a. The application for release on recognizance, although captioned as MOTION FOR RELEASE
ON RECOGNIZANCE, is primarily governed by Sec. 7 of P.D. 968, a Special Law on Probation.
b. Any Application for Release on Recognizance, is given due course/taken cognizance of by
respondent, if on its face, the same bears the rubber stamp mark/receipt by the Office of the
City/Public Prosecutor.
c. The consistent practice both in RTC, METRO MANILA (all courts), especially in RTC,
MALABON, and in Malolos, Bulacan (where respondent practiced from 1985-1998 almost 14
years), [and especially the practice of former Judge A. V. Cabigao, Br. 73, RTC, Malabon, Metro
Manila], is to interview the custodian, in the chambers, regarding his being a responsible member
of the community where the accused reside/resides; the questions propounded are in the form of
direct and even cross examination questions.
d. The accused is not required to be placed on the witness stand, since there is no such
requirement. All that is required, is to inform the accused regarding some matters of probation
(optional) such as whether he was sentenced previously by a Court, whether or not he has had
previous cases, etc.
e. Even if RTC Judges in Malabon do not conduct Court hearings on application for release on
recognizance, respondent, for caution in most of the applications, included the interview/hearing

on the applications for release on recognizance, during criminal trial dates, where a fiscal/trial
prosecutor is available; at other times, the hearing is held in the chambers. 45
The explanation given by Judge Floro betrays his liability for ignorance of the rules on probation under
Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law), as amended. Contrary to his remonstrations, the release of an
accused on recognizance entails more than a cursory interview of the custodian and the applicant. Under the
Probation Law,46 and as we explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares, 47 it is incumbent upon the Judge hearing the
application to ascertain first that the applicant is not a "disqualified offender" as "(p)utting the discharge of the
accused on hold would have allowed [the judge] more time to pass upon the request for provisional liberty."
Moreover, from Judge Floros explanations, it would seem that he completely did away with the requirement
for an investigation report by the probation officer. Under the Probation Law, the accuseds temporary liberty is
warranted only during the period for awaiting the submission of the investigation report on the application for
probation and the resolution thereon.48 As we explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares49 :
It must be stressed that the statutory sequence of actions, i.e., order to conduct case study prior to action on
application for release on recognizance, was prescribed precisely to underscore the interim character of the
provisional liberty envisioned under the Probation Law. Stated differently, the temporary liberty of an applicant
for probation is effective no longer than the period for awaiting the submission of the investigation report and
the resolution of the petition, which the law mandates as no more than sixty (60) days to finish the case study
and report and a maximum of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the report for the trial judge to resolve the
application for probation. By allowing the temporary liberty of the accused even before the order to submit the
case study and report, respondent Judge unceremoniously extended the pro tem discharge of the accused to
the detriment of the prosecution and the private complainants. (Emphasis supplied)
As to the argument of Judge Floro that his Orders for the release of an accused on recognizance need not be
in writing as these are duly reflected in the transcript of stenographic notes, we refer to Echaus v. Court of
Appeals50 wherein we held that "no judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence
until and unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of
Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation." Obviously, then, Judge Floro was remiss in his
duties as judge when he did not reduce into writing his orders for the release on recognizance of the accused
in Criminal Cases No. 20384, 20371, 202426 and 20442 entitled, "People v. Luisito Beltran," "People v. Emma
Alvarez, et al.," "People v. Rowena Camino," and "People v. John Richie Villaluz." 51 From his explanation that
such written orders are not necessary, we can surmise that Judge Floros failure was not due to inadvertence
or negligence on his part but to ignorance of a procedural rule.
In fine, we perceive three fundamental errors in Judge Floros handling of probation cases. First, he ordered
the release on recognizance of the accused without the presence of the prosecutor thus depriving the latter of
any opportunity to oppose said release. Second, Judge Floro ordered the release without first requiring the
probation officer to render a case study and investigation report on the accused. Finally, the order granting the
release of the accused on recognizance was not reduced into writing.
It would seem from the foregoing that the release of the accused on recognizance, as well as his eventual
probation, was already a done deal even before the hearing on his application as Judge Floro took up the
cudgels for the accused by instructing his staff to draft the application for probation. This, Judge Floro did not
deny. Thus, we agree in the observation of the audit team that Judge Floro, as a matter of policy, had been
approving applications for release on recognizance hastily and without observing the requirements of the law
for said purpose. Verily, we having nothing against courts leaning backward in favor of the accused; in fact,
this is a salutary endeavor, but only when the situation so warrants. In herein case, however, we cannot
countenance what Judge Floro did as "the unsolicited fervor to release the accused significantly deprived the
prosecution and the private complainants of their right to due process." 52
Judge Floros insistence that orders made in open court need not be reduced in writing constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. Likewise, his failure to follow the basic rules on probation, constitutes gross ignorance of
the law. 53
Verily, one of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law fully and uphold it
conscientiously.54 When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and simply apply it for
anything less is constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. 55 True, not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance
of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanctions. 56 To hold otherwise
"would be nothing short of harassing judges to take the fantastic and impossible oath of rendering infallible

judgments." 57 This rule, however, admits of an exception as "good faith in situations of fallible discretion
inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple
and the applicable legal principle evident and as to be beyond permissible margins of error." 58 Thus, even if a
judge acted in good faith but his ignorance is so gross, he should be held administratively liable. 59
(d) RE: Charge of partiality in criminal cases where he declared that he is pro-accused which is contrary to
Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct
The audit team reported that Judge Floro relayed to the members thereof that in criminal cases, he is always
"pro-accused" particularly concerning detention prisoners and bonded accused who have to continually pay for
the premiums on their bonds during the pendency of their cases.
Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that what he did impart upon Atty. Buenaventura was the
need for the OCA to remedy his predicament of having 40 detention prisoners and other bonded accused
whose cases could not be tried due to the lack of a permanent prosecutor assigned to his sala. He narrated as
well to Atty. Buenaventura the sufferings of detention prisoners languishing in the Malabon/Navotas jail whose
cases had not been tried during the vacancy of his sala from February 1997 to 5 November 1998. At any rate,
Judge Floro submits that there is no single evidence or proof submitted by any litigant or private complainant
that he sided with the accused.
Atty. Dizon, Judge Floros Clerk of Court, on the other hand, categorically stated under oath that Judge Floro,
during a staff meeting, admitted to her and the staff of Branch 73 and in the presence of his Public Attorneys
Office (PAO) lawyer that he is pro-accused for the reason that he commiserated with them especially those
under detention as he, himself, had been accused by his brother and sister-in-law of so many unfounded
offenses. 60
Between the two versions, the testimony of Atty. Dizon is more credible especially since it is corroborated by
independent evidence, 61 e.g., Judge Floros unwarranted eagerness in approving application for release on
recognizance as previously discussed.
Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A judge should so behave at all times as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." This means that a judge whose duty is to
apply the law and dispense justice "should not only be impartial, independent and honest but should be
believed and perceived to be impartial, independent and honest" as well. 62 Like Caesars wife, a judge must
not only be pure but above suspicion. 63 Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and the PAO lawyer that he
is pro-accused, opened himself up to suspicion regarding his impartiality. Prudence and judicial restraint
dictate that a judge should reserve personal views and predilections to himself so as not to stir up suspicions
of bias and unfairness. Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the
judiciary. 64 "His language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions
be misconstrued." 65
On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is objectivity if an independent judiciary is to be
realized. And by professing his bias for the accused, Judge Floro is guilty of unbecoming conduct as his
capacity for objectivity is put in serious doubt, necessarily eroding the publics trust in his ability to render
justice. As we held in Castillo v. Juan 66 :
In every litigation, x x x, the manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the
offended party, no less than the accused. It is not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering
to the at-times human failing of yielding to first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or
prejudging matters. It would be deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather
than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and predilections. It must be obvious to the
parties as well as the public that he follows the traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he hear both
sides with patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum. It is not
necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to hold the balance
true. What is equally important is that he should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his impartiality. What
has been said is not merely a matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed with constitutional significance.
(h) Re: Charge of using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal
Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading

the private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial
prosecutor.
(j) Re: Charge of issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he issued in open court in
Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide.
The memorandum report states:
During the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 20385-MN entitled: "People vs. Nenita Salvador",
Judge Floro, Jr., in the absence of the public prosecutor and considering that the private complainant was not
being represented by a private prosecutor, used his moral ascendancy and influence to convince the private
complainant to settle and eventually cause the dismissal of the case in the guise of settling its civil aspect by
making the private complainants and the accused sign the settlement. (Copy of the signed stenographic notes
is hereto attached as Annex "8").

In herein case, what was involved was an interlocutory order made in open court ostensibly a judicial
approval of a compromise agreement which was amended or revised by removing the stamp of judicial
approval, the written order merely stating that Judge Floro was reserving its ruling regarding the
manifestations of the parties to enter into a compromise agreement after the public prosecutor shall have
submitted its comments thereto. 69
Considering then that it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to revise his oral order per the Echaus
ruling and factoring in his explanation for resorting to such an amendment, we find no basis for the charge of
dishonesty (under paragraph "j" of the complaint).

xxxx
In an Order dated March 8, 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide, Judge Floro, Jr. put
on record the "manifestations" of the private complainant and the accused relative to their willingness to settle
the civil aspect of the case. In the same order, Judge Floro, Jr. reserved his ruling on the said settlement until
after the public prosecutor has given his comment. However, per report of the court employees in Branch 73,
the aforesaid order was actually a revised one or a deviation from the original order given in open court.
Actually, the said criminal case was already settled even without the presence of the public prosecutor. The
settlement was in the nature of absolving not only the civil liability of the accused but the criminal liability as
well. It was further reported that the private complainants signed the compromise agreement due to the
insistence or persuasion of Judge Floro, Jr. The audit team was furnished a copy of the stenographic notes
(unsigned draft order) and the revised order (signed). Copies of the stenographic notes and the revised order
are hereto attached as Annexes "8", "13", and "14". (Note: the stenographic notes were signed by the parties
to the case).
In the meantime, the mother of the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, Luz Arriego, filed an
administrative case against Judge Floro docketed as A.M. OCA-I.P.I. No. 99-812-RTJ. In her Affidavit
Complaint67 dated 9 August 1999, she alleged that on 8 March 1999, Judge Floro forced them to settle her
daughters case against the accused therein despite the absence of the trial prosecutor. When the parties
could not agree on the amount to be paid by the accused for the medical expenses incurred by complaining
witness, they requested respondent that they be given time to study the matter and consult a lawyer to which
Judge Floro replied that the case be settled immediately, uttering, "ngayon na! ngayon na!" Moreover, Judge
Floro allegedly made them believe that the counter-charges filed by the accused against the complaining
witness would likewise be dismissed, so they agreed to settle the case. However, the written Order issued by
respondent Judge did not reflect the agreement entered into by the parties in open court.
Judge Floro takes exception to the foregoing OCA report and the complaint filed by Mrs. Arriego, maintaining
that the hearing on said case was not only in accordance with the Rules of Court but was also beneficial to the
litigants concerned as they openly manifested their willingness to patch up their differences in the spirit of
reconciliation. Then, considering that the parties suggested that they would file the necessary pleadings in due
course, Judge Floro waited for such pleadings before the TSN-dictated Order could be reduced to writing.
Meanwhile, in the course of a conversation between Judge Floro and Court Administrator Benipayo, the latter
opined that under Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, an offer of compromise in criminal cases is
tantamount to an admission of guilt except in some cases. With this in mind, the 8 March 1999 Order of the
hearing on even date was superseded by the revised written Order likewise dated 8 March 1999.
Judge Floro asserts that contrary to Atty. Buenaventuras stance that he has no power to revise an Order,
courts have plenary power to recall and amend or revise any orally dictated order in substance and in form
even motu proprio.
The rule on the matter finds expression in Echaus v. Court of Appeals

the parties and implementation, and that indeed, even after promulgation, it does not bind the parties until and
unless notice thereof is duly served on them by any of the modes prescribed by law. This is so even if the
order or judgment has in fact been orally pronounced in the presence of the parties, or a draft thereof drawn
up and signed and/or copy thereof somehow read or acquired by any party. In truth, even after promulgation
(i.e., filing with the clerk of court), and even after service on the parties of notice of an order or judgment, the
Court rendering it indisputably has plenary power to recall and amend or revise it in substance or form on
motion of any party or even motu proprio, provided that in the case of a final order or judgment, the same has
not attained finality. (Emphasis supplied)

68

wherein we declared:

x x x [N]o judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set
down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to

Anent the charge that Judge Floro used his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case
No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the
private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor,
the same must likewise fail for lack of basis. The controversial settlement never came to pass. It was not
judicially approved as reflected in the revised Order of 8 March 1999, thus, Mrs. Arriego actually had no cause
for complaint. She cannot, on one hand, complain that the written order did not reflect the agreement reached
during the hearing and, on the other hand, claim that this agreement was reached under duress at the
instance of Judge Floro.
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, ordering the mental and physical
examination of the accused based on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up"
The audit team reported that in an Order dated 8 February 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20347-MN, Judge Floro
"motu proprio ordered the physical and mental examination of the accused by any physician, over the strong
objection of the trial prosecutor, on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up." 70
In refutation, Judge Floro argues -In the case at bar, respondent/Court carefully observed the demeanor of the accused NESTOR ESCARLAN
and noted the manifestations of his counsel de oficio, Atty. E. Gallevo, PAO lawyer, and the
comment/objections of the trial prosecutor, Prosecutor J. Diaz, thus:
a. Atty. Gallevo manifested to the Court that the accused opted to enter a plea of not guilty;
b. But upon query of the Court, the accused approached the bench and he appeared trembling
and stammering;
c. Atty. Gallevo, upon questions by respondent, readily admitted that accused is "nauutal", has
difficulty of reasoning, of speaking, and very nervous;
d. Atty. Gallevo also manifested that the accused often changed his mind regarding the plea, from
not guilty to guilty and to not guilty, and so forth;
e. Considering the grave situation, Atty. Gallevo, upon citation by the Court/respondent of the
pertinent provisions of the Rules, namely Rule 28 (Mental Examination of Persons), Sec. 12 of
Rule 116, and Sec. 5(g) of Rule 135, Rules of Court (plenary powers to issue orders to conform to
justice), manifested orally that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up";

f. Hence, respondent exercised his sound discretion in issuing the ORDER OF MENTAL
EXAMINATION.

In support of the above charges, the memorandum report states:

The MENTAL examination ORDER finds legal support, since it is well-settled that "the court may order a
physical or MENTAL examination of a party where his physical or mental condition is material to the issues
involved." (27 C.J.S. p. 119, cf. MARTIN, p. 107, id.). 71

i.Judge Floro, Jr. informed the audit team that he has personal cases pending before the lower courts in
Bulacan. He admitted that Atty. Bordador, the counsel of record in some of these cases, is just signing the
pleadings for him while he (Judge Floro, Jr.) acts as collaborating counsel. When attending the hearing of the
cases, Judge Floro, Jr. admitted that he does not file an application for leave of absence.

PAO lawyer Erwin Joy B. Gallevo took the witness stand for Judge Floro. He testified that he moved for the
suspension of the arraignment of the accused Nestor Escarlan Escancilla in order to assess his mental fitness
for trial. 72 As reflected in the Order for suspension, however, and as admitted by Judge Floro himself in his
Comment, Atty. Gallevo merely manifested that accused is "mahina ang pick-up."

Based on the reports gathered by the audit team, Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending civil case in the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan and a criminal case in Municipal Trial Court, Meycauayan, Bulacan. It is
reported that in these cases, he is appearing and filing pleadings in his capacity as party and counsel for
himself and even indicating in the pleadings that he is the Presiding Judge of Branch 73, RTC, Malabon.

Be that as it may, we cannot fault Judge Floro for suspending the arraignment motu proprio and "over the
strong objection of the trial prosecutor." It must be remembered that the scheduled arraignment took place in
February 1999 when the applicable rule was still Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which reads:

Upon verification by the audit team, it was found out that Judge Floro, Jr. indeed has a pending case before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan docketed as Civil Case No. 46-M-98, entitled: "In Re: In
the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Robert V. Floro, Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr., Petitioner - versus
Jesie V. Floro and Benjamin V. Floro". In this case Judge Floro, Jr. filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of
Entry of Judgment with Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission" wherein he signed as the petitioner and at the
same time indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon, Metro Manila. Court
stenographer Marissa Garcia, RTC, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan confirmed this information. Judge Floro, Jr.
even attached a copy of his oath taking and his picture together with President Joseph Estrada to the
aforesaid pleading. Photocopy of the said Motion is hereto attached as Annex "9".

SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment. The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him
unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court
shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
The above-cited rule does not require that the suspension be made pursuant to a motion filed by the accused
unlike Section 11(a), Rule 116 of the present 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure which decrees that the
suspension be made "upon motion by the proper party." 73 Thus, it was well within the discretion of Judge
Floro to order the suspension of the arraignment motu proprio based on his own assessment of the situation.
In fact, jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the duty to suspend the proceedings if it is found that the
accused, even with the aid of counsel, cannot make a proper defense. 74 As we underscored in People v.
Alcalde 75 :
Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an accused is apparently in a present
condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the matter. If it be found that by reason
of such affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the
court to suspend the proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of detention until his faculties are
recovered. x x x.
xxxx
The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him under the Bill of
Rights carries with it the correlative obligation to effectively convey to the accused the information to enable
him to effectively prepare for his defense. At the bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of
the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency on the part of the accused is sufficient to justify suspension of the
proceedings, the trial court must be fully satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance
the law secures or gives. x x x.
Whether or not Judge Floro was indeed correct in his assessment of the accuseds mental fitness for trial is
already beside the point. If ever he erred, he erred in the side of caution which, under the circumstances of the
case, is not an actionable wrong.
(e)Re: Charge of appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending before Regional Trial
Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Code of Judicial Conduct which
prohibits a judge from engaging in the private practice of law
(f)Re: Charge of appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme Court and without filing
the corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing

Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending request with the Court Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, to
appear as counsel or collaborating counsel in several civil cases (except the above-mentioned case) pending
before lower courts. 76
Well ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law. Section 35,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court unequivocally states that: "No judge or other official or employee of the superior
courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as member of the bar or give
professional advice to client." Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, on the other hand, provides
that: "A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law."
Judge Floro vehemently denies the foregoing charge claiming that he hired lawyers to attend to his personal
cases. 77
A scrutiny of the voluminous records in this case does not reveal any concrete proof of Judge Floro having
appeared as counsel in his personal cases after he had already been appointed Judge except that he
prepared a pleading ("Ex Parte Motion For Issuance of Entry of Judgment With Manifestation and/or Judicial
Admission") jointly with his counsel of record in connection with a habeas corpus case he filed against his
brothers for the custody of their "mild, mentally-retarded" brother. He explained, however, that he prepared the
said pleading in the heat of anger as he could not accept the judgment of dismissal in that case. 78 He likewise
explained that the pleading was signed by him alone due to inadvertence and that he had rectified the same
by filing an Amended Manifestation with Affidavit of Merit. 79 Finally, during the hearing of this case, Judge
Floro argued that he filed the subject pleading as petitioner and not as counsel. 80
The proscription against the private practice of law by judges is based on sound public policy, thus:
[T]he rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with
the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a judge. It also aims to ensure that
judges give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors to
their own private interests and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions.
These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public interest. 81
Based on the above rationale, it becomes quite evident that what is envisioned by "private practice" is more
than an isolated court appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the
same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. 82 In herein case, save for
the "Motion for Entry of Judgment," it does not appear from the records that Judge Floro filed other pleadings
or appeared in any other court proceedings in connection with his personal cases. It is safe to conclude,
therefore, that Judge Floros act of filing the motion for entry of judgment is but an isolated case and does not

in any wise constitute private practice of law. Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that Judge Floro is obviously
not lawyering for any person in this case as he himself is the petitioner.
Be that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of unauthorized practice of law as defined, he is
guilty of unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading wherein he indicated that he is the presiding judge of
RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City and for appending to the pleading a copy of his oath with a picture of his oathtaking. The only logical explanation we can reach for such acts is that Judge Floro was obviously trying to
influence or put pressure on a fellow judge by emphasizing that he himself is a judge and is thus in the
right. 83 Verily, Canon 2, Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a "judge shall refrain from
influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative
agency." By doing what he did, Judge Floro, to say the least, put a fellow judge in a very awkward position.
As to charge (f), the OCA has failed to substantiate its claim that Judge Floro has been attending the hearing
of his personal cases without filing for leave of absence. As Judge Floro vehemently protests the charge as
untrue, it was incumbent upon the OCA to prove its case. Time and again we have held that although
administrative proceedings are not strictly bound by formal rules on evidence, the liberality of procedure in
administrative actions is still subject to limitations imposed by the fundamental requirement of due process. 84
(k) Re: Charge of openly criticizing the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system
(l) Re: Charge of use of highly improper and intemperate language during court proceedings
The memorandum report reads:
In the course of the judicial audit, the audit team was able to observe the way Judge Floro, Jr. conducts court
proceedings. With the assistance of the court staff, the team was able to obtain a tape-recorded proceeding
conducted by Judge Floro, Jr. Attached is the transcript of the proceedings (Annex "15"). The tape record of
the court proceedings is also submitted along with this report as Exhibit "A".
xxxx
The case for hearing that day was Civil Case No. 1256 MM. A certain Atty. Abelarde was appearing for the
plaintiff while Atty. Emmanuel Basa was appearing for the defendant. During the hearing, it seems that the
counsels for both parties were guiding Judge Floro, Jr. on how to proceed with the trial.
There was one instance when Judge Floro, Jr. criticized the Rules of Court, to wit:
"Judge Floro, Jr.: Kasi nga ang may plano nito ay ang Rules of Court, hindi nila maayos ang Rules of Court
natin, hindi realistic kinopya lang sa law of California on Civil Procedure; pagdating dito eh dahil sa kanila
maraming nagkakaproblema, masyadong maraming eh ako wala akong pinagkopyahan yan but ginawa
ko lang yon Sabi ko si Judge nagko-complain kasi, sabi ko nga pagka ang lawyer hindi alam yan talo na sa
akin except na hindi papayag kasi marami diyang "
In another proceeding conducted on a different day, Judge Floro, Jr., instead of holding trial, discussed, in
open court, the case involving his brother. He even condemned the Philippine justice system and manifested
his disgust on the unfairness of the system. Thus, he said:
"Sabi ko paano ko matatagpuan ang katarungan dito sa korteng eto bulok ang hustisya. Ang kapatid ko
napakayaman, ako walang pera."
He continued:
"Yung kapatid ko. Hindi ko makuha kundi makita ko lang. Bawal kasi; yung kapatid ko retarded, bawal. In
memory of my brother, Robert Floro. So, ngayon nag-file ako. Sabi ni Judge Agloro senermonan pa ako,
ganun ganun Sabi ko paano ko makikita ang katarungan. Tapos ngayon ang nangyari di Judge na ako,
hindi ko pa nakita ang kapatid ko. Di ngayon, ang ginawa ko na-dismiss na yung case, hindi ko inano kasi

wala akong nakikitang katarungan dahil ang kapatid ko ay napakaraming pera. Alam ko naman kung ang
isang court eh parehas o may kiling eh. Yung abogado niya malakas na malakas doon. Sana hindi nakarecord eto (laughs) baka ako ma-contempt dito." 85
Judge Floro denies the foregoing accusations, emphatically arguing that these are all hearsay fabrications
supplied by his Clerk of Court, Atty. Dizon, and by disgruntled RTC personnel due to ill or ulterior motives (i.e.,
to allegedly cover-up their consistent tardiness, habitual absenteeism and gross neglect of duties which were
all unearthed by Judge Floro).
As to the tape recording of an alleged court hearing wherein he criticized the Philippine judicial system, Judge
Floro contends that this recording was done clandestinely by his staff in violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law
(Republic Act No. 4200) and, to suit their plans, they twisted the facts by cutting portions thereof. They also
made it appear that the conversation took place in a court proceeding when, in fact, this was inside his
chambers.
During the investigation, it was established that the two tapes in question were submitted to the OCA sans the
"yellow notes" and the official transcribed copy thereof. 86 This means that the transcribed copy that was
submitted by the audit team as Annex "15" is but an unofficial copy and does not, by itself, prove that what
was being recorded was a court proceeding. This being the case, the two tapes, without concrete proof that
they were taken officially during a court proceeding, cannot be used against Judge Floro as the unauthorized
recording of a private conversation is inadmissible under Rep. Act No. 4200. 87
Without the tape and transcribed copies of the contents thereof, we are thus left with only Judge Floros word
against that of Atty. Dizon, his Clerk of Court who testified under oath as to Judge Floros alleged propensity to
criticize the judiciary and to use intemperate language. Resolving these particular charges would therefore
depend upon which party is more credible.
Atty. Dizon stated on the witness stand that:
Q: Is Judge Floro guilty of Violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly criticized
the Rules of Court and the Philippine Justice System?
A: Yes. Judge Floro has mentioned to each and everyone of us in branch 73 the alleged "kabulukan ng
hustisya". Time and again he said the Rules of Court is of no use. He said that since theory and the practice of
law are very different, the Rules of Court does not always apply to different cases. Not only the justice system
did he criticize but likewise Judges and Justices. He told us . . . and I quote "Dyan sa Malolos sangkatutak
ang corrupt na Judges . . . Sa Court of Appeals P25,000.00 ang pinakamababang lagayan diyan."
To our mind, how can a Judge like him openly criticize the very institution he is now serving? Where is his
respect to the court, to the bar and to the bench? How can he uphold courts as temples of justice if he himself
did not believe in the justice system?
xxxx
Q What can you say about charge letter "L" which reads for the use of highly improper and intemperate
language during court proceedings?
A Judge Floro, if in the presence of all his staff, during the presence of me, the Court Interpreter, the Legal
Researcher, maybe a Clerk, he always discuss matters regarding practitioners in our court. There is one time
one Atty. Feliciano a lady lawyer, he said, "Luka-luka, talaga yang babaing yan" and then he would call even
not during court session, but during office hours our Court Interpreter "malandi, luka-luka, may fruit of the sun".
So, it did not surprise us one time when during a pre-trial conference in a Civil Case, for Civil Case No. 25-86MN "Lopez v. Reyes and Mercado", he uttered offensive language against his fellow judge. Take the
transcription of this court proceeding is already adapted by the Court Administrator. It was the content of the
tape he sent the Court Administrator. Actually, for consultation and advise after hearing what Judge Floro
discussed in open Court, before all of us, the court staff present in the hearing and before the lawyer and the
defendants in the case, we were in quandary whether or not to attach in the record the stenographic notes or
even the actual transcription of the proceedings because it contained offensive languages against the justice

system, against a certain judge, against a certain Clerk of Court named Jude Assanda, against people he is
disgusted with. In fact, instead of discussing the merit of the case or the possibility of the amicable settlement
between the parties, he integrated this kind of discussion. So, as a Clerk of Court, I may not use my discretion
whether or not to advise the stenographer to indeed present the same or attach the same in the record
because it contained offensive languages highly improper and intemperate languages like for example,
"putang ina", words like "ako ang anghel ng kamatayan, etcetera, etcetera". 88
The denials of Judge Floro are insufficient to discredit the straightforward and candid declarations of Atty.
Dizon especially in the light of confirming proofs from Judge Floro himself.

But before we even go into that, we must determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed for the seven of the
13 charges discussed above. To recapitulate, we have found Judge Floro guilty, in one way or another, of
seven of the 13 charges against him. Thus:
1) Charge "a" - simple misconduct
2) Charges "c" and "g" gross ignorance of the law
3) Charge "d" unbecoming conduct

The Court finds the version of Atty. Dizon more credible because subject utterances are consistent with Judge
Floros claims of intellectual superiority for having graduated with several honors from the Ateneo School of
Law and having placed 13th in the bar examinations. Moreover, his utterances against the judicial system on
account of his perception of injustice in the disposition of his brothers case are not far removed from his
reactions to what he perceived were injustices committed against him by the OCA and by the persons who
were either in charge of the cases against him or had some sort of participation therein. Consequently,
although there is no direct proof that Judge Floro said what he is claimed to have said, nonetheless, evidence
that he sees himself as intellectually superior as well as evidence of his habit of crying foul when things do not
go his way, show that it is more likely that he actually criticized the Rules of Court and the judicial system and
is thus guilty of unbecoming conduct. Verily, in administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a
finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. 89 In this case, there is ample and competent proof of violation on Judge
Floros part.
(m) Re: Charge of violating Circular No. 13-87 dated 1 July 1987
The memorandum report stated that Judge Floro

4) Charge "e" unbecoming conduct

5) Charges "k" and "l" unbecoming conduct
Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge. Under Rule 140 as amended, a judge guilty of a
serious charge may be dismissed from the service, suspended from office without salary and other benefits for
more than three but not exceeding six months or fined in the amount of P 20,000.00 but not exceeding P
40,000.00 depending on the circumstances of the case. In herein case, considering that Judge Floro had
barely warmed his seat when he was slammed with these charges, his relative inexperience is to be taken in
his favor. And, considering further that there is no allegation or proof that he acted in bad faith or with corrupt
motives, we hold that a fine is the appropriate penalty. The fine is to be imposed in the maximum, i.e. P
40,000.00, as we will treat the findings of simple misconduct and unbecoming conduct as aggravating
circumstances. 91
Judge Floro must be relieved of his position as Judge of RTC Malabon Branch due to a medically disabling
condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his office

[D]eviat[ed] from the regular course of trial when he discusses matters involving his personal life and beliefs.
Canon 3, Rule 3.03 provides that "[a] judge shall maintain order and proper decorum in the court." A disorderly
judge generates disorderly work. An indecorous judge invites indecorous reactions. Hence, the need to
maintain order and proper decorum in court. When the judge respects himself, others will respect him too.
When he is orderly, others will follow suit. Proceedings in court must be conducted formally and solemnly. The
atmosphere must be characterized with honor and dignity befitting the seriousness and importance of a
judicial trial called to ascertain the truth. Anything which tends to detract from this atmosphere must be
avoided. And the judge is supposed to be in control and is therefore responsible for any detraction therefrom.

As we have explained, the common thread which binds the 13 seemingly unrelated accusations in A.M. No.
RTJ-99-1460 is the charge of mental illness against Judge Floro embodied in the requirement for him to
undergo an appropriate mental or psychological examination and which necessitated his suspension pending
investigation. This charge of mental illness, if true, renders him unfit to perform the functions of his office
notwithstanding the fact that, in disposing of the 13 charges, there had been no finding of dismissal from the
service against Judge Floro.

Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the Administration of Justice) dated July 1, 1987 provides that trial of cases
should be conducted efficiently and expeditiously. Judges should plan the course and direction of trials so that
waste of time is avoided.

The Supreme Court Clinic first had occasion to interview Judge Floro when the latter applied for judgeship
(which application he later voluntarily withdrew) way back in September 1995. The psychological report, as
prepared by Cecilia C. Villegas, M.D. (Director III, Chief SC Clinic Services) and Melinda C. Grio
(Psychologist), stated in part:

Moreover, a judge should avoid being queer in his behavior, appearance and movements. He must always
keep in mind that he is the visible representative of the law. Judge Floro, Jr.s claims that he is endowed with
psychic powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is the angel of death and that he has
unseen "little friends" are manifestations of his psychological instability and therefore casts doubt on his
capacity to carry out the functions and responsibilities of a judge. Hence, it is best to subject Judge Floro, Jr.
once again to psychiatric or mental examination to ascertain his fitness to remain in the judiciary. 90
Circular No. 13-87, by itself, does not define nor punish an offense but, as its title would suggest, it merely sets
the guidelines in the administration of justice following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
The arguments forwarded by the OCA, however, best exemplify the fact that the 13 charges are inextricably
linked to the charge of mental/psychological illness which allegedly renders Judge Floro unfit to continue
discharging the functions of his office. This being the case, we will consider the allegation that Judge Floro
proclaims himself to be endowed with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he
is the angel of death and that he has unseen "little friends" in determining the transcendental issue of his
mental/psychological fitness to remain in office.

PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION:
There are evidences of developing psychotic process at present.
REMARKS:
Atty. Floro was observed to be restless and very anxious during the interview. He was argumentative and over
solicitous of questions asked, giving the impressions of marked suspiciousness. He centered on his academic
excellence, an Ateneo de Manila graduate of the College of Law, rated top 13th place in the bar examination.
He emphasized his obsessive and compulsive method of studying, at least 15 hours per day regardless of
whether it was school days or vacation time. Vying for honors all the time and graduated Law as second
honor, he calls this self-discipline and self-organization. He expressed dissatisfaction of his achievements,
tend to be a perfectionist and cannot accept failures. To emphasize his ultra bright mind and analytical system,
he related that, for the past 3 to 5 years, he has been experiencing "Psychic vision" every morning and that
the biggest secret of the universe are the "unseen things." He can predict future events because of "power in
psychic phenomenon" as when his bar results was to be released, he saw lights in the sky "no. 13-1," and he
got the 13th place. He has been practicing "parapsychology" seeing plenty of "dwendes" around him.

He can talk on and on of bizarre ideas, that tends (sic) to be irrelevant.

Intellectually, he has high assets, however, evidence of ego disintegration are prominent findings, both in the
interview (conscious) and psychological test results. (unconscious level). 92
Approximately three years later, in June 1998, Judge Floro again presented himself to the Supreme Court
Clinic when he applied anew for judgeship, this time of RTC Malabon. Psychologist Beatriz O. Cruz and
Celeste P. Vista, M.D. (Psychiatrist and Medical Officer IV) did the interview and evaluation. Dr. Vista
observed:
Atty. Floro has an impressive academic achievements (sic), and he takes pride in this. During the interview, he
was quite reluctant to reveal information about his family background and would rather talk about his work and
academic achievements. However, he failed to integrate his knowledge into a cohesive unit which he can
utilize to cope with the various tasks that he undertakes. This renders him confused and ambivalent with a
tendency to vacillate with decision-making. He also has a low self-esteem and prone to mood swings with the
slightest provocation.
From the interview, there seems to have been no drastic change in his personality and level of functioning as a
lawyer in private practice. However, he showed a pervasive pattern of social and interpersonal deficits. He has
poor social skills and showed discomfort with close social contacts. Paranoid ideations, suspiciousness of
others motives as well as perceptual distortions were evident during the interview.
Atty. Floros current intelligence function is along the mild mental retardation (68) which is below the expected
cognitive efficiency of a judge. Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he has lapses
in judgment and may have problems with decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness and
seclusiveness and preoccupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his role
as a lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in dispensing justice.
Furthermore, he is at present not intellectually and emotionally equipped to hurdle the responsibilities of a
judge and he may decompensate when exposed to anxiety-provoking and stress-laden situation. 93
It would seem that the JBC disregarded the above-quoted report as it allowed Judge Floro to seek a second
opinion from private practitioners. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, however, resurrected the issue of his mental and
psychological capacity to preside over a regional trial court. Thus, the Resolution of 20 July 1999 specifically
ordered Judge Floro to submit to "appropriate psychological or mental examination."
On 1 February 2000, per recommendation of Justice Ramirez, 94 the Court clarified that the "appropriate
psychological or mental examination" being adverted to in the Resolution of 20 July 1999 is to be conducted
by the SC Clinic. The Court thereby directed Judge Floro to "submit himself to the SC Clinic for psychological
or mental examination, within ten (10) days from notice." 95 Judge Floro sought reconsideration which was
denied by the Court on 22 February 2000. 96
The order to submit to the appropriate psychological examination by the SC Clinic was reiterated by the Court
on 17 October 2000 with the admonition that Judge Floros failure to do so would result in appropriate
disciplinary sanctions. 97
On 24 October 2000, Judge Floro sought reconsideration of the 17 October 2000 Resolution with a
conjunctive special motion for him to undergo psychiatric examination by any duly authorized medical and/or
mental institution. 98 This was denied by the Court on 14 November 2000. 99
On 10 November 2000, Judge Floro moved, among other things, for the inhibition or disqualification of
Supreme Court Clinic doctors 100 and psychologist 101 with a manifestation that he filed cases against them for
revocation of licenses before the Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC), the Philippine Medical
Association (PMA) and the PAP 102 for alleged gross incompetence and dishonorable conduct under Sec. 24 of
Rep. Act No. 2382/1959 Medical Act/Code of Medical Ethics. 103
On 16 November 2000, Justice Ramirez, with the approval of Court Administrator Benipayo, moved that Judge
Floro be sanctioned for obvious contempt in refusing to comply with the 1 February 2000 and 17 October 2000
resolutions. According to Justice Ramirez, Judge Floros filing of administrative cases with the PRC against Dr.

Mendoza, et al., is an indication of the latters intention to disregard and disobey the legal orders of the
Court. 104The Court en banc agreed in the report of Justice Ramirez, thus Judge Floro was ordered to submit
to psychological and mental examination within 10 days from receipt, otherwise, he "shall be ordered arrested
and detained at the jail of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) x x x." 105
Judge Floro finally complied with the directive on 13 and 15 December 2000. 106 He likewise sought the
services of a private practitioner, Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, who came out with his own evaluation of Judge Floro
on 3 January 2001. 107
Thus, Judge Floro trooped to the Supreme Court Clinic for the third time in December 2000, this time in
connection with A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460. Francianina G. Sanchez, Clinical Psychologist and Chief Judicial Staff
Officer reported that "(o)ver all data strongly suggest a delusional disorder with movement in the paranoid
direction." Dr. Celeste Vista, for her part, stated that:
Based on the clinical data gathered, it appears that Judge Floro is basically a cautious, and suspicious
individual with a compulsion to analyze and observe motives in his milieu. Despite his status, cognitive assets
and impressive educational background, his current functioning is gauged along the LOW AVERAGE
intelligence.
He can function and apply his skills in everyday and routine situations. However, his test protocol is
characterized by disabling indicators. There is impairment in reality testing which is an indicator of a psychotic
process. He is unable to make an objective assessment and judgment of his milieu. Hence, he is apt to
misconstrue signals from his environment resulting to perceptual distortions, disturbed associations, and
lapses in judgment. Such that, cultural beliefs in dwarfs, psychic and paranormal phenomena and divine gifts
of healing have become incorporated in a delusional (false and unshakable beliefs) system, that it has
interfered and tainted his occupational and social functioning. Hence, he is found to be unfit in performing his
court duties as a judge. 108
Pursuant to the aforecited December 2000 interview of Judge Floro, Supreme Court Senior Chief Staff Officer
Rosa J. Mendoza, M.D., reported to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in March 2001 that
The findings of mental and psychological incapacity is thus substantially supported by evidence. Based on the
three[3] psychological tests and evaluation of the two[2] psychiatrists, the undersigned has no other recourse
but to recommend that Judge Florentino Floro be declared unfit to discharge his duties as a Judge, effective
immediately.
Not one to take this last recommendation sitting down, Judge Floro submitted earlier psychological evaluations
conducted by several mental health professionals which were all favorable to him. The first three evaluations
were in connection with his application as RTC Judge of Malabon City in 1998 brought about by him having
"failed" the examination given by the Supreme Court Clinic. The report dated 04 September 1998 by staff
psychologist, Rowena A. Reyes as noted by clinical Psychologist, Ma. Teresa Gustilo-Villasor of the
Metropolitan Psychological Corporation (MPC), states in part:
I. INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS
SUMMARY OF INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS
1. FFJ can draw from above average intellectual resources to cope with everyday
demands. He is able to handle both concrete and abstract requirements of tasks. Alert
to details, he has a logical approach in evaluating the relationship between things and
ideas.
2. He thrives in predictable and structured situations, where he can consider solid facts
to arrived (sic)at concrete, tangible outcomes. Task-oriented, he can organize
procedures and details so as to get things done correctly and on schedule. He uses
conventional standards to determine personal progress. Set in his views, he may not
readily accept others ideas and contributions especially if these oppose his own.

3. A serious and thorough approach to his commitments is expected of FFJ. Generally,

he prefers to control his emotions and does not let this get in the way of his judgment
and decisions.

xxxx
Q: And reality oriented and a reality oriented person is one who will not be pronouncing or making
pronouncement concerning his psychic powers. Is this not correct?

II. EMOTIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

xxxx
FFJ is motivated by the need to be recognized and respected for his undertakings. Achievementoriented, he sets high personal standards and tends to judge himself and others according to
these standards. When things do not develop along desired lines, he may become restless and
impatient. Nevertheless, he is careful of his social stature and can be expected to comply with
conventional social demands. 109
Testifying as one of Judge Floros witnesses, Rowena A. Reyes opined on cross-examination that
"psychologically speaking," Judge Floro was not fit to be a judge. Thus:

A: Yes sir.
Q: A reality oriented person is also one who will not claim that he is capable of having trances in the course of
his private activities and even in the course of the performance of his official duty as a Judge. Will you not
agree with that?
A: I agree with you, Sir.

JUDGE AQUINO:
Q: Now, that we are telling you that Judge Floro based on his testimony here and on every available records of
the proceedings, has been claiming that he [is] possessed with Psychic Powers and he did not tell you that in
the interview. Would you consider his failure to tell you about his Psychic Powers to be a fatal [flaw]?

Q: And if he will do so, he will not be actually a reality oriented person. Meaning tatagalugin ko na po
nakukuha naman "na ako ay psychic, na ako ay pwedeng ipower ng by location, na kaya kong mag trance.
Gumawa pa ng ibat iba pang bagay at the same time." Yan ay hindi compatible sa pagiging reality oriented?
A: Yes, Sir.

xxxx
Q: And a person who is not reality oriented is not fit to sit as a Judge.
A: Yes, Sir.
xxxx
Q: Very grave one, because it will affect the psychological outlook of the patient?
Q: I will add the phrase Psychologically speaking.
A: Yes, Sir.
xxxx
xxxx
A: Yes, Sir. 110
Q: I tell you now, Judge Floro has been claiming in [these] proceedings and you were here when we were
cross-examining Mr. Licaoco and you heard that we mentioned in the course of our cross-examination. Would
you consider his failure to tell you about his power of by location to be a fatal [flaw] and your assessment of his
psychological outlook?
xxxx
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Fatal [flaw]?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Did Judge Floro tell you also in the course of the interview that he is capable of being in a trance?
A: He did not.
Q: So, he did not tell you that while in a trance he could type letters?
A: He did not.

Another psychiatrist, Pacita Ramos-Salceda, M.D., Senior Consultant Psychiatrist of the Makati Medical
Center, stated in her report dated 3 September 1998 that at the time of the interview Judge Floro
[W]as enthusiastic and confident. He is well informed about current issues, able to discuss a wide variety of
topics intelligently without hesitation. His thinking is lucid, rational, logical and reality based. He is well
oriented, intelligent, emotionally stable, with very good judgment. There is no previous history of any
psychological disturbances. 111
This was followed by the evaluation of Eduardo L. Jurilla, M.D., dated September 1998, who stated in his
report that
Atty. Floro is an asthenic, medium height, fairly groomed, be-spectacled person with graying hair. When
interviewed he was somewhat anxious, elaborative and at times approximate in his answers. He was alert,
oriented, conscious, cooperative and articulate in Pilipino and English. He denied any perceptual disturbances.
Stream of thought was logical and goal-directed. There was pressure of speech with tendency to be
argumentative or defensive but there were no flight of ideas, thought blocking, looseness of associations or
neologisms. Delusions were not elicited. Affect was broad and appropriate but mood was anxious. There were
no abnormal involuntary movements or tics. Impulse control is good. Cognition is intact. Judgment, insight,
and other test for higher cortical functions did not reveal abnormal results.
Comments: The over-all results of this psychiatric evaluation of Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. do not contradict
his nomination and appointment to the post he is seeking. 112

On the witness stand, however, and testifying as Judge Floros witness, Dr. Jurilla clarified that the interview
had its limitations 113 and he might have missed out certain information left out by his patient. 114 The following
exchange is thus instructive:

Q: Especially so if you will now know that after that interview Judge Floro has been proclaiming himself as the
number five psychic in the country [where] no one has called him as a psychic at all?
xxxx

JUDGE AQUINO: x x x. Did Judge Floro tell you in the interview that he has little unseen, unheard friends
known as duwendes?
DR. JURILLA: He did not.
xxxx
Q: Did you interview Judge Floro or did he [volunteer] to you information about his claim to be the number five
psychic in the country?

Q: Would it be really more altered?

A: I would say so.
xxxx
Q: Returning to the confirming proofs, meaning after the interview, which are confirmations of what Judge
Floro did not tell you during the interview, would your finding of [J]udge Floro be drastically altered if he will tell
you that he is capable or possessed of the power of bilocation?

xxxx
xxxx
A: No, Your Honor.
A: I would probably try to for a diagnosis.
Q: He did not tell you also that he is gifted also with this so called, psychic phenomena?
Q: Which may make a drastic alteration of your evaluation of Judge Floros mental and psychological x x x?
A: He did not.
A: My diagnosis I will be seeking for an abnormal condition.
xxxx
Q: He did not tell you also that in [traveling] from one place to another, at least four (4) kilometers apart, he
used to ride on a big white or whatever it is, horse?

Q: When you said abnormal something would have made you suspect that there was abnormality in the
person of Judge Floro?
A: Given the data.

A: Not during our interview.

xxxx
A: It is possible like any other psychiatrist or mental health doctor you might have missed some information or
it is possible that our clients or patients might not [have] told us everything.
Q: And if your clients or patients did not tell you things such as those that Judge Floro did not admittedly tell
you in the course of the interview, your opinion of the patient would be altered a little?
xxxx
A: The answer has something to do whether my evaluation may be altered. Yes, Your Honor in the absence of
any corroborative contradiction.
Q: More so, if the presence of confirming events that transpired after the interview, would that be correct?

Q: We will give you the data or additional information. Would you also have your evaluation favorable to Judge
Floro drastically altered if I tell you that based on record Judge Floro has claimed that while in a trance he is
capable of typing a letter?
xxxx
A: If there is data toward that effect prior to September 1998, probably drastically altered.
Lastly, Judge Floro presented the psychiatric evaluation of Eduardo T. Maaba, M.D.,
the relevant portions of which state:

116

115

dated 3 January 2001,

Affect was adequate and no mood incongruity was observed. Content of thought did not reveal delusional
thought. He was proud of his achievements in line with his profession and expressed his frustration and
dissatisfaction with the way his colleagues are handling his pending administrative cases. He was observed to
be reality-oriented and was not suffering from hallucinations or abnormal perceptual distortions. Orientation,
with respect to time, place and person, was unimpaired. Judgment and decision-making capacity were
adequately functioning.

A: The interview has its limitations.

xxxx
Q: Let us say, what Judge Floro did [not] tell you during the interview are confirmed by events that transpired
after the interview, would you not say you have more reason to have your evaluation altered?
A: Yes.

An open-ended clinical interview was conducted at our clinic on December 26, 2000. He talked about his
family and academic achievements. He claimed to possess a divine gift for prophecy and a gift of healing. He
also talked about a "covenant" made during a dream between him and 3 dwarf friends named Luis, Armand
and Angel. He reported that the first part of his ministry is to cast illness and/or disease and the second part is
to heal and alleviate sufferings/pain from disease.

A series of psychological test was administered to Judge Floro on December 28, 2000. The battery of test
consisted of the following: (1) Otis-Lennon Mental Ability Test (2) SRA Language Test (3) Purdue NonLanguage Test (4) Sacks Sentence Completion Test and (5) Draw A Person Test. Test results and evaluation
showed an individual with an Above Average Intelligence. Projective data, showed an obsessive-compulsive
person who is meticulous to details and strive for perfection in tasks assigned to him. He is reality-oriented and
is deemed capable of making day-to-day decisions in his personal as well as professional decisions.
Confusion with regard to sexual identification, was further observed.

A. If these delusions or hallucinations are part and parcel of a major psychiatric disorder like schizophrenia or
an organic mental disorder, this individual suffering from hallucinations or delusions is unfit to sit as a judge,
however, there is, this symptom might also exi[s]t in a non-psychotic illness and the hallucinations and
delusions could be transient and short in duration.

Based on the clinical observation and the results of the psychological tests, respondent Judge Florentino V.
Floro, Jr., was found to be a highly intelligent person who is reality-oriented and is not suffering from any major
psychotic disorder. He is not deluded nor hallucinated and is capable of utilizing his superior intellect in making
sound decisions. His belief in supernatural abilities is culture-bound and needs further studies/work-ups.

A: Yes, doubtful capacity.

On cross-examination by Judge Aquino, however, Dr. Maaba also stated that Judge Floro was unfit to be a
judge.117 The relevant exchanges between Dr. Maaba and Judge Aquino are hereunder reproduced:
JUDGE AQUINO: And would you say that something is wrong with a judge who shall claim that he is
possessed with power of [bi-location]?
xxxx
DR. MAABA: A reality-oriented individual would not claim to be in two (2) places at one time.
Q: And that something must be wrong?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. Would you say that something is wrong also with a judge claiming in the course of his testimony and
in this very case that while [he] was so testifying there is another spirit, another person, another character
unseen who is with him at the same time or in tagalog "sumapi sa kanya".

Q: But of doubtful capacity to sit as a judge?

Q: Now, trance is something covered by the field of which you are practicing with psychiatry.
A: Yes.
Q: Would you consider a person claiming in the course of a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative
proceedings particularly in the course of his testimony that while he was doing so, he was under trance
normal.
xxxx
A: Let me explain the phenomenon of trance it is usually considered in the Philippines as part of a culture
bound syndrome and it could also be an indication Basically the phenomenon of trance are often seen in
cases of organic mental disorder. It is also common in culture bound syndrome and the effect of person is
usually loss of concentration in a particular settings or situations so that a person or a judge hearing a case in
court would [lose] concentration and would not be able to follow up testimony of witnesses as well as
arguments given by the counsel for the defense and also for the prosecution, so I would say that there is this
difficulty in manners of attention span and concentration if that person sitting as a judge experience trance as
in the case of Judge Floro, this trance is manifested by flashing of lights and he might not be able to rationalize
or to control expressions or as well as physical when he is in a trance.
Q: Have you heard of a judge claiming that in the course of a proceeding, he was in a trance?

xxxx

A: No, I have not encountered any.

A: The observation that Judge Floro had unseen companion "sumapi" to me is unbelievable.

Q: And if you hear one and will be shown records of one maybe such claim you will call that person not a
normal person.

Q: Unbelievable. And anyone claiming it might be suffering from some delusion?

A: Maybe weird.
xxxx
A: It could be and it could not be considered as perceptual distortion, your Honor.
Q: No, Delusion.
A: Delusions, no, but Hallucinations, maybe yes.
Q: Ah, Hallucination, and which maybe worse?
A: Both are on the same footing.
Q: Okay. Would you say that the person declaring in a proceeding as a witness about hallucinatory matters
would turn out to be fit to become a judge?
xxxx

Q: I will now show to you portions of the stenographic notes of the proceedings in these cases held on
October 10, 2000, afternoon session, page 30 we start with the question of Atty. Dizon. "Atty. Dizon: Mr.
witness, can you tell us? Are you in trance at this very precise moment? JUDGE FLORO, JR.: "Nakalakip sila".
I call it a trance, but I distinguished not the trance that you see the nag-sa-Sto., Nino, naninigas. Thats a
trance that is created by the so called Because Fr. Jaime Bulatao, multi awarded Jesuit priest, considered
that as mind projection. He is correct in a sense that those nagta-trance na yan, naninigas, the mind projection
or the hypnosis do come, and there is a change in the psychological aspect of the person. But in my case I
never was changed physically or mentally. Only the lights and heat will penetrate that person. ATTY. DIZON:
That will do. So at this very moment, Mr. witness, "meron kayong kalakip ngayon?"" "Ngayong oras na ito?"
JUDGE FLORO: Yes, they are here. Atty. DIZON: Where are they? Judge Floro, Jr.: They cannot be seen
but ATTY. DIZON: No, can you see them?" To point to us where are they in this room?", Now that you have
read and seen this portion wherein Judge Floro himself admitted that in the course of his testimony in these
cases he was in a trance, would you still consider him at least insofar as this claim of his to be a normal
person?
A: No.

Q: No, okay, so he is not normal. Now, Judge Floro in these proceedings also and I will show to you the
transcript of stenographic notes later have claimed that he had, always had and still had a socalled counter
part, his other side, other self, what can you say to that claim, would that be the claim of a normal, mental
sound person?
A: No.

entrusted the destinies of individuals and institutions. As it has been said, courts will only succeed in their
tasks if the judges presiding over them are truly honorable men, competent and independent. 123
There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an honorable man. And, in fact, in our disposition of the
13 charges against him, we have not found him guilty of gross misconduct or acts or corruption. However, the
findings of psychosis by the mental health professionals assigned to his case indicate gross deficiency in
competence and independence.

Q: And one who is not normal and mentally sound is of course not fit to sit as judge?
xxxx
A: Yes. 118
Based on the foregoing, the OCA, thru Justice Ramirez, reported that:
Upon the testimony of his own witnesses, Drs. Eduardo T. Maaba, Ma. Nieves Celeste and Eduardo L. Jurilla,
respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. is unfit because of insanity to remain in office as Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73.
It is weird for respondent Judge to state in one of his pleadings in this case that President Estrada would not
finish his term as President. It is unusual and queer of him to state in his calling card that he is a graduate of
Ateneo de Manila, second honors, bar topnotcher with a grade of 87.55% and include in his address the name
Colonel Reynaldo Cabauatan who was involved in a coup detat attempt. So is it strange of him to make use of
his alleged psychic powers in writing decisions in the cases assigned to his court. It is improper and grandiose
of him to express superiority over other judges in the course of hearings he is conducting and for him to say
that he is very successful over many other applicants for the position he has been appointed. It is abnormal for
a Judge to distribute self-serving propaganda. One who distributes such self-serving propaganda is odd,
queer, amusing, irresponsible and abnormal. A judge suffering from delusion or hallucination is unfit to be one.
So is he who gets into a trance while presiding at the hearing of a case in court. One need not be a doctor of
medicine, a psychiatrist and a psychologist to determine and conclude that a person in such circumstances is
mentally unfit or insane and should not be allowed to continue discharging the duties and functions of a judge.
The life, liberty and property of the litigants in the court presided by such judge are in his hands. Hence, it is
imperative that he is free from doubt as to his mental capacity and condition to continue discharging the
functions of his office.

Moreover, Judge Floro himself admitted that he believes in "psychic visions," of foreseeing the future because
of his power in "psychic phenomenon." He believes in "duwendes" and of a covenant with his "dwarf friends
Luis, Armand and Angel." He believes that he can write while on trance and that he had been seen by several
people to have been in two places at the same time. He has likened himself to the "angel of death" who can
inflict pains on people, especially upon those he perceived as corrupt officials of the RTCs of Malabon. He
took to wearing blue robes during court sessions, switching only to black on Fridays. His own witness testified
that Judge Floro explained that he wore black from head to foot on Fridays to recharge his psychic powers.
Finally, Judge Floro conducted healing sessions in his chambers during his break time. All these things
validate the findings of the Supreme Court Clinic about Judge Floros uncommon beliefs and that such beliefs
have spilled over to action.
Lest we be misconstrued, we do not denigrate such belief system. However, such beliefs, especially since
Judge Floro acted on them, are so at odds with the critical and impartial thinking required of a judge under our
judicial system.
Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary duty bound to apply only positive
law and, in its absence, equitable rules and principles in resolving controversies. Thus, Judge Floros
reference to psychic phenomena in the decision he rendered in the case of People v. Francisco, Jr. 124 sticks
out like a sore thumb. In said decision, Judge Floro discredited the testimony of the prosecutions principal
witness by concluding that the testimony was a "fairytale" or a "fantastic story." 125 He then went to state that
"psychic phenomena" was destined to cooperate with the stenographer who transcribed the testimony of the
witness. The pertinent portion of Judge Floros decision is quoted hereunder:
3. The testimony of the prosecutions PRINCIPAL witness (sole eyewitness of the incident) NORMANDY is
INCREDIBLE, is full of inconsistencies (major and not regarding minor points), ergo, the court concludes that
due to several indicia of fraud/perjury (flagrant/palpable deception of the Court), his testimony is not worthy of
belief, assuming ex-gratia argumenti, that the same may be admissible, and his Court narrative is hereby
declared a FAIRY TALE or a FANTASTIC STORY of a crime scene that is acceptable only for
SCREEN/cinematic viewing. The following details, are proof of the foregoing conclusion:

RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that by reason of insanity which renders him incapable and
unfit to perform the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73, respondent Florentino V. Floro, Jr. be REMOVED and DISMISSED from
such office. 119
We are in agreement with the OCA that Judge Floro cannot remain as RTC Judge because of the findings of
mental impairment that renders him unfit to perform the functions of his office. We hasten to add, however,
that neither the OCA nor this Court is qualified to conclude that Judge Floro is "insane" as, in fact, the
psychologists and psychiatrists on his case have never said so.
When Justice Ramirez recommended that Judge Floro be dismissed from the service due to "insanity," he was
apparently using the term in its loose sense. Insanity is a general laymans term, a catchall word referring to
various mental disorders. Psychosis is perhaps the appropriate medical term 120 as this is the one used by Drs.
Vista and Villegas of the Supreme Court Clinic. It is of note that the 1995, 1998 and 2000 psychological
evaluations all reported signs and symptoms of psychosis.
Courts exist to promote justice; thus aiding to secure the contentment and happiness of the people. 121 An
honorable, competent and independent judiciary exists to administer justice in order to promote the stability of
government, and the well-being of the people. 122 Carrying much of the weight in this daunting task of
administering justice are our front liners, the judges who preside over courts of law and in whose hands are

a.) NORMANDY swore that he, Ponciano Ineria and Raul Ineria were "sinalubong" by
Lando/accused on June 21, 1987 at 2:30 a.m. at alley Wesleyan/Tangos, Navotas, and that he
saw the "nagpambuno" between Raul and Ando, and that HE SAW P. INERIA dead, but HE WAS
NO LONGER THERE, but he still saw the "nagpambuno"; MORE IMPORTANTLY, he SWORE that
HE NOTICED the ACCUSED P. Francisco THE FOLLOWING DAY;
b.) The foregoing verily demonstrate his 11th HOUR CONCOCTION (Big Lie, having been asked
to submit false testimony); for how could have he witnessed the stabbing by accused when he
NOTICED him the following day? (TSN dated May 2, 1995, pp. 1-2); assuming arguendo that the
TSN was incorrect due to typographical error, or maybe the Court Stenographer III Eloisa B.
Domingo might have been SLEEPING during the testimony, so that the word DAY should have
been corrected to another word SUITABLE to Normandys FAIRY TALE, still, the Court had
synthesized the entire NARRATIVE of Normandy, but the Court found no reason that the seeming
error DAY should be corrected; the Courts sole/remaining conclusion is that EVEN the
STENOGRAPHIC NOTES cooperated by PSYCHIC PHENOMENA perhaps of FOR SURE, in
having BEEN DESTINED to be FATEFULLY INSCRIBED WITH THE WORDS FOLLOWING DAY
(line 3, p. 3 TSN, id.) 126 (Emphasis supplied)
In State Prosecutors v. Muro

127

we held that

What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not mean that judges can
resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There are both implicit and explicit limits on the way judges

perform their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values and the explicit limits are substantive and
procedural rules of law. 128

Equitable considerations entitle Judge Floro backwages and other economic benefits for a period of three (3)
years.

The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knighterrant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from
consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He
is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and
subordinate to the "primordial necessity of order in the social life." 129

In retrospect, we are forced to say that Judge Floro should not have joined the judiciary as RTC judge.
However, we have assiduously reviewed the history of this case and we cannot hold anyone legally
responsible for such major and unfortunate faux pas.

Judge Floro does not meet such requirement of objectivity and his competence for judicial tasks leaves much
to be desired. As reported by the Supreme Court Clinic:
Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he has lapses in judgment and may have
problems with decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness and
preoccupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his role as a lawyer, may
cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in dispensing justice. x x x 130
Judge Floros belief system, as well as his actuations in the eight months that he served as RTC judge,
indubitably shows his inability to function with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.

Judge Floro did not breach any rule of procedure relative to his application for judgeship. He went through the
entire gamut of tests and interviews and he was nominated by the JBC on the strength of his scholastic
achievements. As to having failed the psychological examinations given by the SC Clinic, it must be pointed
out that this was disregarded by the JBC upon Judge Floros submission of psychiatric evaluations conducted
by mental health professionals from the private sector and which were favorable to him. Nowhere is it alleged
that Judge Floro acted less than honorably in procuring these evaluations.
The JBC in 1999 had all the discretion to refer Judge Floro to a private clinic for a second opinion of his mental
and psychological fitness. In performing its functions, the JBC had been guided primarily by the Constitution
which prescribes that members of the Judiciary must be, in addition to other requirements, persons of proven
competence, integrity, probity and independence. 135 It was only on 18 October 2000 when it promulgated
JBC-009, the "Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council," that the JBC put down in writing guidelines or criteria it
had previously used in ascertaining "if one seeking such office meets the minimum constitutional qualifications
and possesses qualities of mind and heart expected of the Judiciary." 136 Rule 6 thereof states:

Verily, Judge Floro holds an exalted position in our system of government. Thus:
Long before a man dons the judicial robes, he has accepted and identified himself with large components of
the judges role. Especially if he has aspired to a judges status, he is likely to have conducted himself, more or
less unconsciously, in the fashion of one who is said to have "the judicial temperament." He is likely to have
displayed the kinds of behavior that the judges role demands. A large proportion of his experiences on the
bench develop and reinforce such conformity, moreover. The ritualistic elements of investiture and of court
procedure, the honorific forms of address, and even the imposing appearance of some court buildings serve to
emphasize the demands upon his behavior. Even the most unscrupulous former ambulance chaser who owes
his position to a thoroughly corrupt political organization must conform at least in part to the behaviors
expected of him as a judge.131
The expectations concerning judicial behavior are more than those expected of other public officials. Judges
are seen as guardians of the law and they must thus identify themselves with the law to an even greater
degree than legislators or executives. 132
As it has been said, "[j]udges administer justice judicially, i.e., not according to some abstract ideas of right
and justice, but according to the rules laid down by society in its Code of Laws to which it gives its sanctions.
The function of the judge is primarily adjudication. This is not a mechanical craft but the exercise of a creative
art, whether we call it legislative or not, which requires great ability and objectivity." 133 We, thus, quote Justice
Frankfurter, in speaking of the functions of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:
To practice the requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient objectivity no doubt demands of judges the habit
of self-discipline and self-criticism, incertitude that ones own views are incontestable and alert tolerance
toward views not shared. But these are precisely the presuppositions of our judicial process. They are
precisely the qualities society has a right to expect from those entrusted with judicial power.
xxxx

SECTION 1. Good health. Good physical health and sound mental/psychological and emotional condition of
the applicant play a critical role in his capacity and capability to perform the delicate task of administering
justice. x x x
SEC. 2. Psychological/psychiatric tests. The applicant shall submit to psychological/psychiatric tests to be
conducted by the Supreme Court Medical Clinic or by a psychologist and/or psychiatrist duly accredited by the
Council.
It would seem that as things stood then, the JBC could very well rely on the evaluation of a private
psychologist or psychiatrist not accredited by the JBC. Thus, the JBC cannot be faulted for accepting the
psychological evaluations of mental health professionals not affiliated with the Supreme Court Clinic.
It goes without saying that Judge Floros appointment as RTC judge is fait accompli. What awaits us now is
the seemingly overwhelming task of finding the PROPER, JUST AND EQUITABLE solution to Judge Floros
almost seven years of suspension in the light of the fact that the penalty imposed herein does not merit a
suspension of seven years.
Verily, the Supreme Court is vested with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts. 137 The Constitution limits this power through the admonition that such rules "shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights." 138
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed in administrative cases against judges.
Glaringly, Rule 140 does not detail the steps to be taken in cases when the judge is preventively suspended
pending investigation. This is the state of things even after its amendment by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which took
effect on 1 October 2001.

The judicial judgment must move within the limits of accepted notions of justice and is not to be based upon
the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment. 134

The Supreme Courts power to suspend a judge, however, is inherent in its power of administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. 139 This power -- consistent with the power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts -- is hemmed in only by the Constitution which
prescribes that an adjective law cannot, among other things, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

In fine, Judge Floro lacks the judicial temperament and the fundamental requirements of competence and
objectivity expected of all judges. He cannot thus be allowed to continue as judge for to do so might result in a
serious challenge to the existence of a critical and impartial judiciary.

The resolution of 20 July 1999 which put Judge Floro under preventive suspension resolved to:
(1) DIRECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. to answer the foregoing charges against him within ten (10) days
from notice; (2) REFER this case to Retired Justice Pedro Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court

Administrator for investigation, report and recommendation, within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records
thereof; (3) SUBJECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. for appropriate psychological or mental examination to be
conducted by the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical and/or mental institution.
Moreover, the Court RESOLVED to place Judge Florentino Floro, effective immediately under PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION for the duration of the investigation of the administrative charges against him. 140
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted resolution, Judge Floros suspension, albeit indefinite, was for the
duration of the investigation of the 13 charges against him which the Court pegged at 60 days from the time of
receipt by the investigator of the records of the case. Rule 140, as amended, now states that "(t)he
investigating Justice or Judge shall terminate the investigation within ninety (90) days from the date of its
commencement or within such extension as the Supreme Court may grant" 141 and, "(w)ithin thirty (30) days
from the termination of the investigation, the investigating Justice or Judge shall submit to the Supreme Court
a report containing findings of fact and recommendation." 142
From the foregoing, the rule now is that a Judge can be preventively suspended not only for the entire period
of his investigation which would be 90 days (unless extended by the Supreme Court) but also for the 30 days
that it would take the investigating judge or justice to come up with his report. Moreover, the Court may
preventively suspend a judge until such time that a final decision is reached in the administrative case against
him or her. 143This is because
[U]nlike ordinary civil service officials and employees, judges who are charged with a serious offense
warranting preventive suspension are not automatically reinstated upon expiration of the ninety (90)-day
period, as mandated above. The Court may preventively suspend a judge until a final decision is reached in
the administrative case especially where there is a strong likelihood of his guilt or complicity in the offense
charged. Indeed, the measure is intended to shield the public from any further damage or wrongdoing that
may be caused by the continued assumption of office by the erring judge. It is also intended to protect the
courts image as temples of justice where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice solemnly
dispensed.
This is a necessary consequence that a judge must bear for the privilege of occupying an exalted position.
Among civil servants, a judge is indeed in a class all its own. After all, in the vast government bureaucracy,
judges are beacon lights looked upon as the embodiment of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate
weapons against justice and oppression. 144
In the case of Judge Floro, he is under preventive suspension up to the present because of the serious charge
of mental unfitness aggravated by the fact that the actual investigation into his cases dragged on for a much
longer period than 90 days. And the reasons for the delay, for the most part, can be directly ascribed to Judge
Floro himself. From the records, it would seem that not only did Judge Floro move for several re-settings of the
hearings of his cases; he likewise dragged his feet with respect to the order to submit himself to the
appropriate psychological/mental examination. Worse, what started out as single case against him ballooned
into 10 cases which were consolidated into one due to common questions of fact and law. 145 All in all, Judge
Floro filed seven cases against those he perceived had connived to remove and/or suspend him from office,
the last of which he filed on 19 May 2003 against Justice Ramirez. 146
Be that as it may, EQUITY demands that we exercise utmost compassion in this case considering that the
rules on preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly included in the Rules of Court, are
amorphous at best. We have ruled similarly in the case of Judge Philbert Iturralde, thus:
Be that as it may, we cannot in conscience hold that a judge who was placed under preventive suspension
pending investigation is not entitled to the payment of back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits
for the entire duration of the preventive suspension. The inequity of the doctrine as applied to judges is clearly
apparent, given the peculiar circumstance in which a judge finds himself preventively suspended by the Court
"until further orders".
In this case, Judge Iturralde was preventively suspended for 13 months, during which period he was not paid
his salaries, allowances and other benefits. Except for a teaching job that the Court permitted him to undertake
pending resolution of the administrative case, Judge Iturralde had no other source of income. He thus incurred
several loans to provide for his familys basic needs.

It would thus be unjust to deprive Judge Iturralde of his back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits
for the entire period that he was preventively suspended. As we have said in Gloria v. Court of Appeals,
preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty but only a measure intended to enable the
disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered formal investigation. We held that ninety (90) days is ample
time to conclude the investigation of an administrative case. Beyond ninety (90) days, the preventive
suspension is no longer justified. Hence, for purposes of determining the extent of back salaries, allowances
and other benefits that a judge may receive during the period of his preventive suspension, we hold that the
ninety-day maximum period set in Gloria v. Court of Appeals, should likewise be applied.
Concededly, there may be instances when an investigation would extend beyond ninety (90) days and such
may not be entirely unjustified. Nevertheless, we believe that in such a situation, it would be unfair to withhold
his salaries and other economic benefits for the entire duration of the preventive suspension, moreso if the
delay in the resolution of the case was not due to his fault. Upon being found innocent of the administrative
charge, his preventive suspension exceeding the ninety-day (90) period actually becomes without basis and
would indeed be nothing short of punitive. It must be emphasized that his subsequent acquittal completely
removed the cause for his preventive suspension in the first place. Necessarily, therefore, we must rectify its
effects on just and equitable grounds. 147
Taking off from the case of Judge Iturralde, we hold that Judge Floro is likewise entitled to the payment of back
salaries, allowances and other economic benefits being at the receiving end of a rule peculiar to judges who
find themselves preventively suspended by the Court "until further orders" or, as this case, "for the duration of
the investigation." Judge Iturraldes suspension of 13 months even pales in comparison to Judge Floros
suspension of 81 months, more or less. During this entire excruciating period of waiting, Judge Floro could not
practice his profession, thus putting him solely at the mercy of his brothers largesse. And, though he was
given donations by those who came to him for healing, obviously, these could not compensate for his loss of
income as Judge.
Unlike the case of Judge Iturralde, however, wherein we held that the period of suspension exceeding 90 days
should be the basis for the payment of back salaries, we hold that, as a matter of equity, Judge Floro is
entitled to back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for a period corresponding to three of his
almost seven years suspension. We cannot apply the ruling in Gloria that any suspension served beyond 90
days must be compensated as we would be, in effect, rewarding Judge Floros propensity to delay the
resolution of his case through the indiscriminate filing of administrative cases against those he perceived
connived to oust him out of office. In Judge Iturraldes case, the investigation was not delayed through any
fault of his. More importantly, Judge Iturralde was ultimately held innocent, thus, using by analogy Gloria v.
Court of Appeals, his suspension in excess of 90 days was already in the nature of a penalty which cannot be
countenanced precisely because, being innocent, he cannot be penalized. Judge Floro, on the other hand,
and as already discussed, contributed to the delay in the investigation of his cases. Moreover, unlike Judge
Iturralde, Judge Floro has not been adjudged innocent of all the 13 charges against him.
These facts, however, as we have already discussed, do not put Judge Floro beyond the reach of equity. To
paraphrase Justice Brandeis, equity does not demand that its suitors are free of blame. As we are wont to say:
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts of law,
through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances
of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form,
the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts. 148
In fine, notwithstanding the fact that Judge Floro is much to blame for the delay in the resolution of his case,
equitable considerations constrain us to award him back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for
a period corresponding to three years. This is because Judge Floros separation from the service is not a
penalty as we ordinarily understand the word to mean. It is imposed instead upon Judge Floro out of necessity
due to a medically disabling condition of the mind which renders him unfit, at least at present, to continue
discharging the functions of his office.
The period of three years seems to us the most equitable under the circumstances. As discussed, if we were
to give him more than three years of back salaries, etc., then it would seem that we are rewarding him for his
role in delaying the resolution of these cases (as well as the seven cases he filed which were only dismissed
on 14 February 2006 at his own bidding). On the other hand, if we were to peg the period at less than three
years then the same would only be a pittance compared to the seven years suspension he had to live through

with Damocles sword hanging over his head and with his hands bound as he could not practice his
profession.
Judge Floros separation from the service moots the case against him docketed as A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC
(Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v.
Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.), on the other hand, is dismissed for lack of merit.

Finally, if Judge Floros mental impairment is secondary to genetics 154 and/or adverse environmental factors
(and, unfortunately, such essential information is not available), we cannot condemn people for their faulty
genes and/or adverse environment factors they have no control over.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC

1) FINE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. in the total amount of FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00)
PESOS for seven of the 13 charges against him in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460;

It cannot be gainsaid that Judge Floros separation from the service renders moot the complaint in A.M. No.
99-7-273-RTC. As it is, even the most favorable of resolutions in this case will not cause a ripple on the
Courts decision to separate Judge Floro from the service. Thus, this charge is dismissed for being moot and
academic.

2) RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his functions as Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 73, Malabon City and consider him SEPARATED from the service due to a medically
disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his office,
effective immediately;

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988

3) As a matter of equity, AWARD Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. back salaries, allowances and other
economic benefits corresponding to three (3) years;

Considering that this case is a replica of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 and considering that charge "h"
is without basis, this particular complaint filed by Luz Arriego must necessarily be dismissed for lack of merit.

4) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for
LACK OF MERIT; and

Judge Floros separation from the service does not carry with it forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits
nor disqualification from appointment to any other public office including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
As Judge Floros separation from the service cannot be considered a penalty, such separation does not carry
with it the forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor disqualification from appointment to any other
public office including government-owned or controlled corporations.
In fact, the psychological and psychiatric reports, considered as the bedrock of the finding of mental
impairment against Judge Floro, cannot be used to disqualify him from re-entering government service for
positions that do not require him to dispense justice. The reports contain statements/findings in Judge Floros
favor that the Court cannot overlook in all fairness as they deserve equal consideration. They mention Judge
Floros assets and strengths and capacity for functionality, with minor modification of work environment. Thus:

5) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge
Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for MOOTNESS.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
LUCILA TAN,
Complainant,

A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563

(Formerly A.M. OCA
IPI No. 02-1207-MTJ)
Present:

a. High intellectual assets as a result of "self-discipline and self- organization."

149

b. "(I)mpressive academic achievements" with "no drastic change in his personality and level of
functioning as a lawyer in private practice." 150
c. "(C)haracter traits of suspiciousness, seclusiveness, pre-occupation with paranormal and
psychic phenomena not detrimental to his role as a lawyer." 151
d. "Everyday situations can be comprehended and dealt with in moderate proficiency . His
concern for the details that make up a total field represents his attempts at being systematic and
cautious." 152
e. "(E)quipped with analytical power."

- versus -

Puno, J.,
Chairman,
*
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr.,
Tinga, and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
Promulgated:

Judge MAXWEL S. ROSETE,

Respondent.

September 8, 2004

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION

153

PUNO, J.:
Consequently, while Judge Floro may be dysfunctional as a judge because of the sensitive nature of said
position, he may still be successful in other areas of endeavor.
Putting all of the above in perspective, it could very well be that Judge Floros current administrative and
medical problems are not totally of his making. He was duly appointed to judgeship and his mental problems,
for now, appear to render him unfit with the delicate task of dispensing justice not because of any acts of
corruption and debasement on his part but clearly due to a medically disabling condition.

Lucila Tan filed the instant complaint against Judge Maxwel S. Rosete, former Acting Presiding Judge,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila, [1]for violation of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of
Court and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019).
The complaint alleged that Lucila Tan was the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 59440 and
Criminal Case No. 66120, both entitled People of the Philippines vs. Alfonso Pe Sy and pending before Branch
58, Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila, then presided by respondent judge. Before the cases

were decided, respondent judge allegedly sent a member of his staff to talk to complainant. They met at
Sangkalan Restaurant along Scout Albano, near Timog Avenue in Quezon City. The staff member told her that
respondent was asking for P150,000.00 in exchange for the non-dismissal of the cases. She was shown
copies of respondent judges Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120, both still unsigned,
dismissing the complaints against the accused. She was told that respondent judge would reverse the
disposition of the cases as soon as she remits the amount demanded. The staff member allowed complainant
to keep the copy of the draft decision in Criminal Case No. 59440. Complainant, however, did not accede to
respondents demand because she believed that she had a very strong case, well supported by
evidence. The criminal cases were eventually dismissed by respondent judge. [2]
Respondent judge, in his Comment, denied the allegations of complainant. He instead stated that it was
complainant who attempted to bribe him in exchange for a favorable decision. She even tried to delay and to
derail the promulgation of the decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120. Complainant also sought
the intervention of then San Juan Mayor, Jinggoy Estrada, to obtain judgment in her favor. Mayor Estrada
allegedly talked to him several times to ask him to help complainant. The former even called him over the
phone when he was in New Zealand, persuading him to hold in abeyance the promulgation of the Decisions in
said cases. But he politely declined, telling him that there was no sufficient evidence to convict the accused,
and moreover, he had already turned over the Decisions to Judge Quilatan for promulgation. Respondent
further stated that complainant kept bragging about her close relations with Mayor Estrada who was her
neighbor in Greenhills, San Juan, and even insinuated that she could help him get appointed to a higher
position provided he decides the suits in her favor. Respondent judge also claimed that complainant offered to
give cash for the downpayment of a car he was planning to buy. But he refused the offer. Finally, respondent
judge denied that a member of his staff gave complainant a copy of his draft decision in Criminal Case No.
59440. He said that he had entrusted to Judge Quilatan his Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and
66120 before he left for New Zealand on study leave. Thus, he asserted that it was impossible for him to
thereafter change the resolution of the cases and it was likewise impossible for any member of his staff to give
complainant copies of said Decisions.[3]
In a resolution dated December 2, 2002, the Court referred the complaint to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City for investigation, report and recommendation. [4]
First Vice Executive Judge Edwin A. Villasor conducted several hearings on the administrative
case. Only complainant Lucila Tan testified for her side. She presented as documentary evidence the copy of
the unsigned Decision in Criminal Case No. 59440 dated February 23, 2001 which was allegedly handed to
her by a member of respondent judges staff. [5] Respondent judge, on the other hand, presented four (4)
witnesses: Josefina Ramos, Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), Fernando B. Espuerta, and Joyce Trinidad Hernandez. His
documentary evidence consists of the affidavits of his witnesses, [6] copy of the Motion for Reconsideration in
Criminal Case No. 59440,[7] and various documents composed of the machine copy of the Order of Arrest in
Criminal Case No. 117219, machine copy of the letter dated December 29, 1997, machine copy of
Certification dated Nov 13, 2000, front and dorsal sides of Check No. QRH-0211804, Bank Statement dated
March 31, 1998, Stop Payment Order dated April 6, 1998, Current Account Inquiry, and Transaction Record,
which documents were allegedly given by complainant to respondents witness, Fernando B. Espuerta. [8]
The Investigating Judge summarized the testimonies of the witnesses as follows:
COMPLAINANTS VERSION:
1.

LUCILA TAN

Complainant Lucila Tan testified that she knew Respondent Judge because she
had a case in Branch 58, MeTC, San Juan, Metro Manila. She alleged that, in
September 1998, she filed two cases involving B.P. 22 and Other Deceits with the
Prosecutors Office in Pasig. After resolution, the cases were filed in the MeTC, San
Juan. One case went to Branch 57 and the other one went to Branch 58, where
Respondent Judge Rosete was the Presiding Judge. Judge Quilatan was the
Presiding Judge of Branch 57. Upon advise of a friend, she moved for consolidation
and the two cases were transferred to Judge Quilatan in Branch 57. Subsequently, in
view of the Motion for Inhibition filed by Complainants lawyer, Judge Quilatan inhibited
himself and the two cases were transferred to the sala of Respondent Judge
Rosete (TSN, pp. 9-16, Hearing of March 3, 2003). After several hearings, the Clerk
of Court, named Joyce, called up the Complainant and advised her to talk to San Juan
Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to seek for (sic) assistance. Joyce gave her the phone number
of the Office of the Mayor (TSN, pages 17-18, Hearing of March 3,
2003). Complainant then called up the Office of the Mayor but her call was intercepted
by Josie, the Mayors Secretary. When she told Josie why she called, the latter asked
her if she wanted to meet the Judge and when Complainant answered in the

affirmative, Josie made arrangements for Complainant to meet the Judge (TSN, pages
19-21, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant called up the Office of the Mayor
sometime in November or late October 2000 and she met the Judge on November
10. She, Josie and Respondent Judge met at the Cravings Restaurant in Wilson, San
Juan (TSN, page 22, Hearing of March 3, 2003). During the meeting, Complainant
told the Judge regarding this matter, how this happened and that he will convince the
Accused to pay me as soon as possible (TSN, page 23, Hearing of March 3,
2003). When she went to the restroom for a few minutes, Respondent Judge and
Josie were left alone. After she came back, they went home. On the way home, Josie
told her to give something to [the] Judge, Sabi niya magbigay tayo ng kaunti para
bumilis iyong kaso mo (TSN, page 24, Hearing of March 3, 2003). At first, Josie did
not mention any amount but when the Complainant asked her how much, the former
mentioned Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). Complainant asked for a lesser
amount, Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) (TSN, page 25, Hearing of March 3,
2003). When Josie agreed, she sent the amount of P20,000.00 to Josie through her
driver after two days (TSN, pages 26-27, Hearing of March 3, 2003). When Josie
received the money, the Clerk of Court, Joyce, also called her (Complainant) on that
date. The Clerk of Court asked her if she sent money. At first, Complainant denied it
but the Clerk of Court said that Josie went there and there was money in the
drawer (TSN, pages 28-29, Hearing of March 3, 2003). After that, several hearings
were on-going, and before the resolution, Joyce called up the Complainant again
around February 2001. Complainant was in Baguio when Joyce called saying that she
had an important thing to tell to (sic) the Complainant. After Complainant got back to
Manila, Joyce called her again and said that she will show Complainant
something. When they were in Complainants car in San Juan, Joyce showed
Complainant two unsigned Decisions of the case[s]. After reading the Decisions,
Complainant saw that the cases were dismissed and that it will be dismissed if she will
not accede to Joyces request (TSN, pages 30-33, Hearing of March 3,
2003). Complainant claimed that Joyce asked for Php 150,000.00 for each
case. Sabi niya it [was] for Judge daw, kailangan daw ni Judge because he is leaving
at that time (TSN, page 34, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant identified the
copy of the Decision in Criminal Case No. 59440 for Other Deceits, dated 23 February
2001, which was marked as Exhibit A for the Complainant (TSN, pages 35-38,
Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant further alleged Sabi niya, if I will accede to
that request of P150,000.00 for each case then they will (sic) going to reverse the
Decision and Si Judge daw will reverse the Decision. Complainant met with Joyce
around February 2001 (TSN, page 39, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant
further claimed that Joyce told her to go to Mayor because he is a friend of the
Judge. Complainant went again to the Office of the Mayor to seek the Mayors help
and she met the Mayor at his Office in San Juan. The Mayor called up the Judge but
he was not around so the Clerk of Court, Joyce, was called. Joyce went to the Office
of the Mayor and when she arrived, she said that the Judge was out of the
country (TSN, pages 40-41, Hearing of March 3, 2003). The Mayor asked for the
phone number of Respondent Judge Rosete, which Joyce gave. Mayor Estrada was
able to get in touch with the Judge. While the Mayor was talking in (sic) the phone with
the Judge, Complainant was in front of the Mayor (TSN, pages 42-43, Hearing of
March 3, 2003). Complainant heard the Mayor because his voice is very loud. He
said, Judge, Saan ka? Sabi niya New Zealand. When were you coming back? I do
not know what is the answer and then he said, you help my friend naswindler siya,
pabilisin mo ang kaso niya para matapos na kasi matagal na iyan (TSN, page 43,
Hearing of March 23, 2003). After that they left the Office of the Mayor and
Complainant was not able to approach Mayor Estrada again. Since the Complainant
was still carrying the Decision, and being afraid that it will be promulgated already, she
sought the advi[c]e of her friends. The Complainant showed the decision to the
Prosecutor in San Juan at that time (TSN, pages 44-45, Hearing of March 3,
2003). The Prosecutor told the Complainant that she is going to meet with the Judge
when he comes back from New Zealand. Complainant testified that, sometime in April,
in Sangkalan, Quezon City, a night life restaurant, she met Respondent Judge Rosete.
She was with two (2) Prosecutors. When she arrived at Sangkalan at about 8:30 in the
evening, Judge Rosete was already in the company of several men whom she got to
know as Fernan and Buboy (TSN, pages 46-48, Hearing of March 3, 2003). After
eating and drinking, the Complainant left at around 10:30 in the evening. While they
were inside, Complainant claimed that she did not say anything at all and it was the
Prosecutor who talked in her behalf. She was the one who paid all the bills which
amounted to Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00). When Complainant left, only they,
three (3) girls, left while the Judge and his company were still there drinking. While
Complainant was waiting for her car outside, a man came over from behind (TSN,

pages 49-50, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant did not know him but she
asked the Prosecutor later after the man left. The Complainant said that the man
asked if he could have an advance, which she understood as a payment, and she told
the Prosecutor. Complainant heard the Prosecutor say that she already talked to the
Judge. The man left and went back inside the restaurant (TSN, page 51, Hearing of
March 3, 2003). Complainant said that when she did not give the money she was still
scared because there will already be a promulgation and she did not know whether it
will be in her behalf (sic) or not. Complainant did not give anything aside from
the P20,000.00 because her case was very strong and she had all the papers and
evidence and that she promised them that she will give them after she was (sic) able
to collect all the debts. Complainant did not know the actual date of the promulgation
but somebody from the Office of Respondent Judge called her up in her house and told
her not to go to the promulgation. When Complainant asked why, Sabi niya baka
mapaiyak daw ako kasi alam na daw nila ang decision. Sabi niya ako na lang ang
magdedeliver ng case ng promulgation. She received the decision when she sent her
driver to pick it up. The caller said that the decision was unfavorable to her (TSN,
pages 52-55, Hearing of March 3, 2003).
RESPONDENTS VERSION:
1.

JOSEFINA RAMOS

She testified that she was the Private Secretary of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, the
former Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, since he was Vice Mayor of San Juan. In
2000 and 2001, she was already the Secretary of Mayor Jinggoy (TSN, page 7,
Hearing of September 9, 2003). She met Lucila Tan when the latter went to the
Mayors Office together with Tita Pat, the sister of President Estrada, but she could no
longer remember the year. Lucila Tan went to the Office, together with Tita Pat, and
they were seeking the help of Mayor Jinggoy because they have a case. She did not
know the case because they were talking to Mayor Jinggoy. She could no longer
remember how many times Lucila Tan went to the Office of Mayor Jinggoy
Estrada. She did not know what Lucila Tan wanted from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada or
how close Lucila Tan was to him (TSN, pages 8-11, Hearing of September 9,
2003). She denied that she met Lucila Tan at the Cravings Restaurant and that she
suggested to Lucila Tan to give Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to Judge Rosete to
speed up or facilitate her cases but that Lucila Tan agreed for only Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00). She claimed that she did not know what Lucila Tan was talking
about regarding the money. There was no occasion that she suggested or even
intimated to Lucila Tan the idea of giving money to Judge Rosete. She denied that she
met with Lucila Tan and Respondent Judge at Cravings Restaurant along Wilson Street
in San Juan, Metro Manila. She identified her Sworn Statement, subscribed on
February 5, 2003, which was marked as Exhibit 1 (TSN, pages 12-16, Hearing of
September 9, 2003). She denied that Lucila Tan gave anything to her (TSN, page 17,
Hearing of September 9, 2003).
2.

RODOLFO CEA

He testified that his acquaintances usually call him Buboy and for about two
years or more he had no occupation. Two years before, he was a Clerk III at
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan. He knows Lucila Tan because, when
he was still working as Clerk in San Juan, she approached me and asked if I can
introduce her to Judge Rosete and eventually asked for a favorable decision against
her case. He could not remember anymore when that was because it was a long
time ago (TSN, pages 6-7, Hearing of September 22, 2003). It was when he was
still with the MeTC, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila. He met Lucila Tan at the
corridor of the Metropolitan Trial Court when she approached him and asked if he can
introduce her to Judge Rosete. He agreed to introduce Lucila Tan to Judge Rosete but
he was not able to actually introduce Lucila Tan to Judge Rosete because aside from
the introduction, she wants me to ask Judge Rosete for a favorable decision against
(sic) her case and I told her that Judge Rosete dont ( sic) like his staff (to) indulge on
that kind of transaction (TSN, pages 8-9, Hearing of September 22, 2003). As far
as he knows, the meeting he had with Lucila Tan in the corridor of the Court in San
Juan was the first and the last time. When asked about the claim of Lucila Tan that
he approached her and demanded from her a sum of money to represent an advance
payment for a favorable decision in her cases then pending before Judge Rosete, he
answered I dont know about that, sir. (TSN, page 10, Hearing of September 22,
2003.) He identified the Sworn Statement, subscribed on February 6, 2003, and

confirmed and affirmed the truthfulness of the contents of the Affidavit, which was
marked as Exhibit 2 (TSN, pages 11-12, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He
denied that he met the Complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant around 8:30 in the
evening of an unspecified date(TSN, page 13, Hearing of September 22, 2003).
3.

FERNANDO B. ESPUERTA

He testified that he is a government employee employed at the Supreme Court

with the position Budget Officer III since November 9, 1981. His first job was Casual
and he became Budget Officer in 1997 (TSN, page 46, Hearing of September 22,
2003). He recalled having met Lucila Tan sometime just before Christmas in October
or November 2000. The first time he saw Lucila Tan was in a restaurant in Quezon
City where she was introduced to him by Fiscal Reyes. He went to the restaurant
alone. He was invited by Judge Rosete because they had not been together for a long
time and they were long time friends. They ate at the restaurant. When he arrived,
Judge Rosete and Buboy were already there. They stayed in the restaurant until 11:00
[eleven] oclock in the evening (TSN, pages 47-49, Hearing of September 22,
2003). He met Lucila Tan in that restaurant when Fiscal Reyes pointed him to Lucila
Tan as Fernan of the Supreme Court. When he arrived there, Buboy and Judge
Rosete were already there. Later, the three (3) girls arrived, namely: Fiscal Reyes,
Lucila Tan and the sister of the Fiscal (TSN, page 50, Hearing of September 22,
2003). They ordered and ate but they were in a separate table. He recalled that
Judge Rosete paid for their bill because he saw him get a credit card and sign
something. He did not know about Mrs. Tan but he saw Judge Rosete sign and give to
the waiter. The incident where he met Lucila Tan in the restaurant in Quezon City
came before the incident when she went to his Office (TSN, pages 51-52, Hearing of
September 22, 2003). He could not remember the month when Lucila Tan went to his
Office but he remembers that it was nearing Christmas in 2000. Pumunta siya sa akin
parang may ipinakiusap siya sa akin, katunayan nandito po dala ko. Lucila Tan asked
him to help her in her case with Alfonso Sy. Meron siyang inalok sa akin. Sabi
bibigyan niya ako ng three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) para iabot kay
Judge Rosete. Ang sagot ko nga sa kanya, hindi ganun ang aking kaibigan. Matagal
na kaming magkaibigan niyan noong nagpapractice pa yan. Iyon ang sagot ko sa
kanya. He told Judge Rosete about that and the latter got mad at him. In their
second meeting, Lucila Tan gave him papers. He presented a Motion for
Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 59440, which was marked as Exhibit 3 (TSN,
pages 53-56, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He presented the papers actually
given to him by Lucila Tan. He claimed that the xerox copy was the exact same
document given to him by Lucila Tan when she went to his Office. The other
documents that Lucila Tan gave to him when she went to his Office were marked as
Exhibit 4 and submarkings (TSN, pages 57-63, Hearing of September 22, 2003).
Lucila Tan told him the contents of the documents and how the case against Alfonso Sy
came about. When Lucila Tan asked him, he answered her that his friend (Respondent
Judge) was not like that and they had been together for a long time and it is not
possible. When he told Judge Rosete about that, the latter got mad at him. Lucila Tan
also mentioned to him that she knew the son of the Chief Justice (TSN, pages 64-66,
Hearing of September 22, 2003). Lucila Tan was insisting that he give Judge Rosete
so that her case will win but he answered that his friend was not like that (TSN, pages
67-68, Hearing of September 22, 2003).
4.

JOYCE TRINIDAD HERNANDEZ

She testified that she was a government employee connected with the Judiciary
at the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila. She knew
Complainant Lucila Tan because in the year 2000 she had a case in their court. She
first came to know Lucila Tan when the latter went to their Office with Ellen Sorio, the
Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 57, who introduced Lucila Tan to her. Ellen Sorio said,
may kaso ito sa inyo, pinapasabi ni Mayor kay Judge (TSN, pages 7-11, Hearing of
September 29, 2003). She did not say anything but Lucila Tan asked may tumawag
na ba sa Mayors Office? and she said yes, maam. After that there was a hearing
and the sister of former President Estrada went to their Office looking for Judge
Rosete. She told her that Judge Rosete was on a hearing and the former told her to
tell Judge Rosete about the case of Lucila na pinakikiusap ni Mayor (TSN, page 12,
Hearing of September 29, 2003). She told Judge Rosete about the things that the
sister of the former President told her and that Judge Rosete said nothing. She denied
the testimony of Complainant on March 3, 2003 that, sometime in November 2000, she
(Joyce Hernandez) called up Lucila Tan by telephone and said that she saw money

stuffed inside the drawer of the Respondent in his Office and that she asked the
Complainant whether the latter was the one who sent the money stuffed inside the
drawer. What she remembers is that Lucila Tan called her and asked if Josie went to
their Office and she told Lucila Tan that Josie never went to their Office. She also
denied that she called up Lucila Tan sometime in February 2001 and claimed that
Lucila Tan was the one who called her up and told her that she (Lucila Tan) was going
to show her something. Lucila Tan showed her a copy of the Decision and she was
surprised when the former showed her the copy. When she asked where Lucila Tan
got the copy, the latter did not answer and said that Mayor Jinggoy wanted to talk to
her (TSN, pages 13-16, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She immediately went to
the Office of the Mayor with Lucila Tan and Mayor Jinggoy talked to her. The Mayor
asked her where Judge Rosete was and she answered that he was in New Zealand on
study leave. When the Mayor asked if she knew the telephone number of the Judge,
she gave him the telephone number in New Zealand. She was present when the
Mayor called up Respondent Judge and talked to him (TSN, page 17, Hearing of
September 29, 2003). He said Pare ko, ano na itong kaso na pinakikiusap ko sa
iyo? I dont know what was your answer(ed) [sic] to him, you were talking and then he
said ganun ba? then Mayor Jinggoy said o sige, okay na and then we left the
Office. She denied that she gave two advance copies of the Decisions in
Complainants two cases inside the latters parked car in San Juan, Metro Manila and
claimed that Complainant was the one who showed her the copy in their Office. She
likewise denied the testimony of the Complainant that she allegedly demanded
Php150,000.00 for each of the two cases then pending before Branch 58, which were
decided by Respondent Judge, in return for a favorable decision (TSN, pages 18-21,
Hearing of September 29, 2003). She claimed that it was the Complainant who
offered to her. She identified her Sworn Statement, subscribed and sworn to on
February 5, 2003, which was marked as Exhibit 5, and confirmed and affirmed the
truthfulness of all the contents thereof (TSN, pages 22-25, Hearing of September 29,
2003).[9]
The Court is now faced with two opposing versions of the story. Complainant claims that respondent
judge, through his staff, required her to pay the amount ofP150,000.00 for him to render judgment in her favor
in the two criminal cases she filed against Alfonso Pe Sy. Respondent judge, on the other hand, asserts that it
was complainant who attempted to bribe him by offering to pay for the downpayment of the car he was
planning to buy, and she even sought the intervention of then San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to persuade
him to rule for the complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120.
The issue in this administrative case thus boils down to a determination of the credibility of the parties
evidence.
After a thorough evaluation of the testimonies of all the witnesses, as well as the documentary evidence
presented by both parties, we find the complainants version more trustworthy. Not only did she testify with
clarity and in full detail, but she also presented during the investigation the unsigned copy of the draft decision
of respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 59440 given to her by a member of his staff. Said documentary
evidence supports her allegation that a member of complainants staff met with her, showed her copies of
respondent judges draft decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120, and demanded, in behalf of
respondent judge, that she pays P150,000.00 for the reversal of the disposition of said cases. It would be
impossible for complainant to obtain a copy of a judges draft decision, it being highly confidential, if not
through the judge himself or from the people in his office. And an ordinary employee in the court cannot
promise a litigant the reversal of a cases disposition if not assured by the judge who drafted the decision.

The respondents evidence did not overcome the facts proved by complainant. We note that the
testimonies of two of respondents witnesses contradict each other. Fernando Espuerta confirmed
complainants claim that she met respondent judge and his two companions, Espuerta himself and Rodolfo
Cea (Buboy), at Sangkalan Restaurant in Quezon City. Rodolfo Cea, on the other hand, denied that he met
complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant and swore that he never went out with respondent judge in non-office
functions. The Investigating Judge observed:
Thus, there is an apparent inconsistency in the testimony of the
Respondent Judges two witnesses, Rodolfo Cea and Fernando B. Espuerta, regarding
the incident at Sangkalan Restaurant in Quezon City where Complainant claimed that
she met Respondent Judge, a certain Fernan, and Buboy, while she was with two
Prosecutors. Fernando B. Espuerta testified that he was at Sangkalan Restaurant with
Respondent Judge and Buboy (Rodolfo Cea), while the latter (Rodolfo Cea) denied
that he met the Complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant. [10] (citations omitted)
Hence, we are more inclined to believe complainants version that she met with respondent judge and his
companions at Sangkalan Restaurant sometime in April 2001.
We have also observed that respondent judge has not been very candid with the Court as regards the
dates when he went to New Zealand and when he came back to the Philippines. Respondent asserts that he
was already in New Zealand at the time when complainant claims that he met with her. However, the
evidence he presented only shows his New Zealand visa and the dates when he entered said country. [11] He
did not show to the investigating body the dates when he left and returned to the Philippines. Apparently, he
entered New Zealand on two dates: March 4, 2001 and May 1, 2001. We may therefore infer that complainant
was in the Philippines before May 1, 2001, which is consistent with complainants testimony, as well as that of
Fernando Espuerta, that she met with respondent judge and his companions, Fernando and Buboy in April
2001.
We have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. They
must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Like Caesars wife, a judge must not
only be pure but above suspicion. This is not without reason. The exacting standards of conduct demanded
from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because
the peoples confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and the
diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness
they are expected to possess. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of any law which he is sworn
to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount that a judges personal behavior
both in the performance of his duties and his daily life, be free from any appearance of impropriety as to be
beyond reproach.[12]
Respondents act of sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant and show copies of his draft
decisions, and his act of meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours violate the
standard of judicial conduct required to be observed by members of the Bench. They constitute gross
misconduct which is punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Respondent Judge Maxwel S. Rosete is SUSPENDED from office without salary
and other benefits for FOUR (4) MONTHS.
SO ORDERED.