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    artiuclo de Dancy

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    artiuclo de Dancy

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
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    14 views8 pages

    Dancy Practical Reality

    Uploaded by

    Daniela Celestino
    artiuclo de Dancy

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    of 8
    Practical Reality JONATHAN DANCY “ Reasons and Dees coal So the I capable of untoning bot a mative ant gd and Korner egret fa Taoagh convo te uh ot br conchon, dont inka he fas mage to sa at th Reasons and Beliefs 1. Moral Reasons and Blisfs In Chapter3Targued that ou normative reason are not grounded In our desire There i however, anther way in which ich Teaoes col be seasitv tothe coningeacis of our peychologel make up, and this would befor them Yo depend on, or stem fom, our belit bour the sluaton rather than fromthe wey that things i {ct are. Hing argued that our reasons ar, in ens, Idee dent of our desires, 1 now intend to argue that they are fa similr seas independent of our belifs What this wil arm out (o mean is tat though my beliving something canbe a reeson for me, of give me 8 reason that I would not otherwise have, ven in thi ease the thing that is eason for me ie not depen ent for its being 40 on may suppoding or recognizing that tf the ote, 1 sat wit moral reasons atthe eatet cate, The question is ‘what the relation is between two remark wh ee (OD) Since she was alone an in trouble should ave offered ely (SD) Since he believed that she was alone and in trouble, he should have offered hep, Both remarks, it seems, could be true. And, taken literally, that seems to mean that there ae wo sore of ground for dies Duties rounded inthe way things are are ofieaealed ‘objective those ‘Bounded in the wey the agent inks them tobe ae subjective ‘his chapter, thea, concerns the relation between objective ed subjective dties—cor, more general, between abjectve and sub: jective reasons T want o say that al our moral reasons ad 0 all ‘our datieg ae objective; indeed, I wil eventually argue tat al ott [ratcalrenons are objective fa this ens = Reasons and Belefs One's frst thought however is tia we should spy allow that {here are two ways in which an action ca gto be wha we ought ‘0 doth objective way and te subjesive way. According to OD, hat makes tthe cae that be ought to have biped is en ebjer: tive matter, hat se was alone and in trosble, Atording to SD, ‘what makes it the caso tht he shoud hee offered helps that he thought she was alone and in trouble. Suppose he was ule ‘wrong about tha this makes no diereacs, we might she should sill have offered help. There was 20 (objective) reasca to offer hep, but he ould have done eo al the sume. ‘bio tht this Wea ta there ae two quite dsnct potential grounds for a duty is inthe end untenable, Whatever tha eation ‘between eaurs of he situation and potent ection tat non. anaot also hold betweea the agen’ bells end potetl action, Sol we do have these two distin grounds for dis there must ‘be two dint grounding relation’ ope that takes duties out of features af the situation, and the oer that does toto (pamibly ‘ale bis Whatever it thatthe agent's tlic are eapabl of doing, i cannot be wit sats of afi can da Soi here 4 igh-ming relation that holds between sates of ae ad ‘scons can there bea second sch relation holding betreen bee ‘nd actions: a rgh-making relation indeed, but» dferet one? ‘The eviwardnes of this suggestion isa tong incentive to find some way todo witout i “We need to be sure that. we realy woud be dealing hee with {to dtintsight-making relations To do thi we should stingush between two ways of mdersanding subjective dues The fit of ‘ete grounds objective duties in what the peat belleves Tae Second grounds them in such states ofall tat the ago belies that There ia considerable difference betwen these, a last at fit sight. For the scond view grounds these due aims in something tal isthe eas, namely that the agent 90 telioves mil the ist view wil sometimes ground duties in things {at are not the ease, woere things are nota the aget belever ‘This el us immediatly thatthe Set vow realy docs req t tinct iting relation, since 1 supposes (Pronutay tat the ‘objective relation only obtains between tag theta the ‘ase, the lf, aod potent actions on the rght wile the ‘ub ‘ett’ one can make do with thing tha are ott case on the Jef Matters look effet with the second vem whieh require the Reasons and Belifs ey Ie ad sid fit jin’ clio cont hays of tgs thr are he can ecg ny abject ate fe Sth th the een een isnt tee ot such 8 ‘aria dfeene bemen the two rleaaing rion since fret the ech eo hinge tht rt cse Bat we ‘hou remember th ye wich ur tapped jot dee te genoa Tiny erty en at detest aga oul hve ta igs had Son be {ana supe. ‘ne jee iw dors rn tet ue oe tat the set won tae ad iiings bd teen fleet tac, bet abet tox Aad hs tet Geese rk esos ‘round ths ci tn we mon herfare be dang te och ig reloon ‘ot why coherent omppove tat the ae two dtc ‘ahi resie eprint ame wes? Neigh a tht we ae prety el ted odoin th tn ut cm ‘tinge ft we deal mou diel wih eopetng Tess fran agua ton spice pete ‘ton any wot thn ht? Ye tc Forte ordamy fesse {exand nxn segs para ca annte ane et elie tothe acto propose. ier vowing fer ao But ihe sgestion Tw opesig hte els th thee ‘othr timlerrstoplt wich tr the tents et tat Er eer fevouog he econo ao Tak theo rl ics too ny Suppose ta oe at lato te cea comers ve acting wie na condi dos at Fo ee neve el ese ie Re ood acto abt or erong? ont mens ots qe Fron he ott of iw he get cay pry was ag the agent on me thu thee a hse to velo sual belntmapate of dangiing etree thes npc nce taza digs in pce Sven how ee Word how i tates it tbe Toe pot rns how ve a to soppe tal the demands of thet two competing rion te 6 pa {opts iy own vow tt oct we Sete fn so ine lon of domaine swe ass tetece Tere aot be two oof dena, sete st ide mbjstve or ‘Bat trig we hae an ena hie to make tee ly oe sort fan whch anoles raj? s Reasons and Belg ‘There are considerable difcules with eltber answer For each snawer has o explain away the appetrances that sappot te other ‘Shower, nd thi i ery Bard todo Tr seems to me, however, bistanly obvious that mot of our ‘moral duis are grounded in fentres ofthe ataton, atin out belts about how things az. Ie because se rn trouble tat ‘ought lp her, not because Think bein ouble, What made it rong for arto behave inthis way was tht she had promised ‘not fat that she believed she had promised not a, What mede It wrong for Rin not co turn up was that made le mpsbe for het to get home that evening, The reason why Tsbuld go and see ny seri hat sho has been ill And x on, Nog the lt one may Say, wo do say things like SD. Believing that se hae been i, ‘Should go and we bee even if i fact am quite wrong about tt ‘Ase thre really no such dis at these? ‘Worted by this question we might try somehow to construct bjetve duties out of subject ones BUT i Tock Ie ery ‘thc garda Ater al we Ove obec dee wont being aware of the features that ground them, even though we ‘know perfecy well what we baie The igiorence san inorance ‘of malier of fact. Subjective duties ae ql nlke thi real ‘rant way. (Ibis plat requires qualicaion which wil thor receive) So um tenses ow one ih defend th de tha ‘ite tiacive roue sadly sone. Remember the derstanding of subjective duis that 1 gave eaters those dates that we would have to defensible belies ‘were tue. We could try to tea this a8 a definition of jective Gury so that our mabjective dies are deined in toms af objee- tive duty. A aubjecve duty, defined in his wa,» duty that one oes not have but would have aatgs wate ose bl {ob Dat sway of puting things reveals jus whats wiong wh ‘Ourmaneeure. The whole pint abou subeetive duties that they ot ones tht we don't have but would have iting Were at esa eb, Weare soppoed actly to have it dtes- ‘nom, eventhough they aze somehow grounded in our Fettps inte ‘elet Out overeat Sfaon fala ‘ccommodate ts point. ‘Wit this manuvre exposed as useless there seem tobe three ‘main options avalble tome as an objects here. The Bet i 19 Reasons and Beliefs s {ry to understand claims such a SD as evaluative rather than one All genine ‘should are objective, andthe thought thet, beioving that abe was in trouble, he shuld have offered help i realy not what i appears ts more lke a rreak to the eet that & better perton, believing tis, would have offered help. We ‘now that SD cannot be What it seems Because there wa sey, ‘no reaon for him to offer help. How then ean ibe the ease that hn should have dane so? Allwe can ty ithat he would bave done ‘well ta do something that there was ia fact no reason 10 da 80 the ‘ought hat be should have offered helps relly a ema whowe ‘ain purport les in evahution of how wel he acted rather than in speciation of a duty (how he should have acted) which has 20 ‘ound in rely. think that there i something inthis st opin, and that we ‘need to keep It on the tbl. am much less Keen on the second ‘option, which so apeal to some sppropiateverion ofthe dis: tetion between act and agent. Tis ets across the fet option, for we cond dstnguih between our deontic and our evaluative sessment ofthe at (ast ight, wast good?) and we ean die: tinguish between our deontc and our evaluative atesaments of the agent (was he right todo what he dd, wa it good of him to do ‘what he di?) This option requies fra fll treatment a compen

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