it to the seventh,’ depending on the facts and analyses involved in each study Thus, on the basis of this alleged closure, aspects of Islamic history were Fecon- structed and interpreted time afte time. ‘A-systematic and chronological study of the original legal sources reveals that these views on the history of ijtihad after the second eighth century are entirely baseless and inaccurate. In the following pages, I shall try to show that the gate of itihad was not closed in theory nor in practice. To do so, | shall first demon- strate that ijtihad was indispensable in legal theory because it constituted the ‘only means by which jurists were able to reach the judicial judgements decreed by God. In order to regulate the practice of ijtinad a set of conditions were required to be met by any jurist who wished to embark on such activity. An exposition of these conditions will prove that, unlike the often-held view. the demands of legal theory were relatively easy to meet and they facilitated rather than hindered the activity of itihad. Further, it will enhance our thesis to exam- ine the relationship between this theory, in which ijtihad was deemed a perennial duty, and the actual practice of Muslim jurists. Such an inquiry will disclose that ijtihad was not only exercised in reality, but that all groups and individuals who ‘opposed it were finally excluded from Sunnism, By chronologically analyzing the relevant literature on the subject from the fourth/tenth century onwards, it will become clear that (I) jurists who were capable of jtihad existed at nearly all times; 2) itihad was used in developing positive law after the formation of the schools; (3) up to ca. $00 An. there was no mention whatsoever of the phrase ‘insidad bab al-ijtihad’ or of any expression that may have alluded to the notion of the closure; (4) the controversy about the closure of the gate and the extinction of mujtahids prevented jurists from reaching ‘a consensus to that effect. Let us now turn to examine jtihad in legal theory and the conditions that this theory required for its practice NoTes ‘Author’ mote: | wish to thank Profestors Fathat Ziadeh and Nicholas Heer for their valuable ‘comments on the manusei. "FAI. ABS AIT al-Ami,a-Ihkam fF Usilol-Abkam, 3 vols. (Cato, 1968) Il 204: Taj al-Din Jam: al-Jowani, with the commentary of Tall 3: aba, 2volk. (Bombay |, 379-381; Muhammad b. “AI al-Shawkn, Ila! Fubit 1 Taha al- Haga min ‘Nr al-Usid (Cairo, 1909), pp. 232-233, On the meaning of Stihad’ see M.M. Bravman, The Spiritual ‘Background of Barly Iam (Leiden, 1972). p- 19. E1'Sehacht, Am Introduction o Islamic Law (Oxford, 1968), pp. 70-7. 3N.D. Anderson, Law Reform in the Muslim World (London, 1976, p. 7. Such statements on the closure of the gate canbe easily multiplied. See, eg, M. Khadduri, "From Religious to National Law."in J. H. Thompson and R. D. Reischaver, eds, Modernization of the Arab World (Toronto, 4: F, Rahman, Ilam (Chicago, 1966), pp. 37-78; H. A. R. Gibb, Mohammedanism (New 1962}, p. 108; A. S, Tritton, Material om Muslin Education in the Middle Ager (London, 1957), p. 163. N.J. Coulson, 4 History of Islamic. Law (Edinburgh, 1964). p. 81. See also the introduction of G, Lewis to Katib Cheleb’s The Balance of Truth (London, 1957), pp. 18-19. For ditional citations om this, se notes 6 and 7 below “HA. R. Gibb, Modern Trends n lam (Chicago, 1947). p13 idem. Mohammedanism, p. 98 ‘see W. M, Watt, “The Closing ofthe Door of Iatihad.” Oriematia Mispanica, 1 (Leiden, 1978), srs. NW. M, Watt, lam and the Imepration of Society (Evanston, 1961) pp. 206-207, 242-283 H. Liebesny, *Stabiliy and Change in Islamic Law." Middle East Journal, 21 (1967) 18, Coulson, Hissory . 80-81: Schacht, dntodution, p78: Raman, Islam, pp. 77-78. "CLC. L. Ostroog. The Angora Reform (Landon, 1927), p. 31: Anderson, Law Reform. p. 1: Pellat “Les Etapes de In decadence cultrelle dans les pays Arabes Orient.” in R. Brunsehvig and G. von Grunebaum, eds. Clasieime er deen eultarel dans Phstoire de Uatam (Pars, 1957), pss