PADERANGA vs COURT OF APPEALS

Posted on March 8, 2013 by legendphil

FACTS:
Miguel P. Paderanga was included in an amended information for the crime of
multiple murder as the mastermind.
Paderanga, through his counsel, filed a Motion for Admission of Bail before a
Warrant of Arrest could be issued by the lower court. Copies of the motion were
furnished to the State Prosecutor, the Regional Prosecutors office and the
Private Prosecutor.
The lower court proceeded to hear the application for bail, four of the
petitioners counsels appeared before the court but only Erlindo Abejo, the
Assistant Prosecutor of the Regional State Prosecutions Office appeared.
Paderanga was unable to appear for the hearing due to an ailment that needed
medical attention. His counsel manifested that they were submitting custody
over the person of their client to the local chapter president of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing, he considered
being in the custody of the law.
Prosecutor Abejo, in accordance to the stand of the Regional State prosecutor
informed the court that the prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the
application for bail, and that they were submitting the same to the sound
discretion of the court. He also waived the presentation of evidence in the
prosecutions behalf, leading to the grant of bail with P200,000.00 as bail bond.
Later, a motion for reconsideration was filed by Henrick Guingoyon, the State
Prosecutor, who alleged that he received his copy of the petition for admission
to bail on the day after the hearing but his motion was denied. With this, he
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through the special civil action of
certiorari.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that Paderanga was granted bail when was not in
the custody of the law, thus not eligible for the grant of the petition. Then, it

annulled the order granting Paderanga bail. The latter challenged the judgment
of the Appellate court, hence the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Paderangas petition for bail is admissible.
RULING:
YES. An arrest of the second kind exists, that is by submission to the custody of
the person making the arrest. It is enough that the person, although not
physically restrained, has surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Other procedures in this case are followed.
RATIONALE:
In the case, it may be conceded that Paderanga had indeed filed his motion for
admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He
may, however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be
considered as being constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the
likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of his bail application
with the trail court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to
have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and, necessarily,
to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In
fact, an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. The latter mode may
be exemplified by the so-called house arrest or, in case of military offenders,
by being confined to quarters or restricted to the military camp area.
It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made it
known to the prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he could not
personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General
Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance to leave the
hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of
the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly
served upon him. Certainly, it would have taken but the slightest effort to place petitioner in
the physical custody of the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under

medication in a hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement
or placing him under guard.
The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of the law.
Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never
attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to
physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the application for bail with the
trail court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; and, more
importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when
it came to his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, petitioner never
made any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his
whereabouts from the authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the
submission application for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof.
Habeas Corpus Right to Bail Rebellion
Salas aka NPAs Ka Bilog was arrested and was charged for rebellion. He was charged together
with the spouses Concepcion. Salas, together with his co-accused later filed a petition for the Writ of
Habeas Corpus. A conference was held thereafter to hear each partys side. It was later agreed upon
by both parties that Salas will withdraw his petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus and that he will
remain in custody for the continued investigation of the case and that he will face trial. The SC then,
basing on the stipulations of the parties, held to dismiss the habeas corpus case filed by Salas. But
later on, Salas filed to be admitted for bail and Judge Donato approved his application for bail. Judge
Donato did not bother hearing the side of the prosecution. The prosecution argued that Salas is
estopped from filing bail because he has waived his right to bail when he withdrew
his petition or habeas corpus as a sign of agreement that he will be held in custody.

ISSUE: Whether or not Salas can still validly file for bail.

HELD: The SC ruled that Salas did waive his right to bail when he withdrew his petition for the
issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus. The contention of the defense that Salas merely agreed to
be in custody and that the same does not constitute a waiver of his right to bail is not tenable. His
waiver to such right is justified by his act of withdrawing his petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

GELACIO vs FLORES

Posted on March 7, 2013

FACTS:
Juana Marzan-Gelacio filed two counts of rape against Emmanuel Artajos before
RTC, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, wherein the respondent Judge Alipio Flores is
the presider of the sala.
After going over the records of the case and the recommendation of the
1stAssistant Provincial Prosecutor Redentor Cardenas, the Judge concluded that
the evidence of guilt was weak but made a finding of probable cause.
Consequently he issued warrants of arrest with a recommendation of
P200,000.00 bail bond in both cases.
Gelacio through her private prosecutor filed an urgent motion to deny bail. On a
later date, the accuseds counsel filed a petition to reduce bail bond to
P100,000.00 for each case.
After a series of exchange motions by the counsels of Gelacio and Artajos, and
the Judges recalls of his previous orders, the Judge ordered the grant of the
Motion to reduce bail by the accused.
Gelacio through her counsel filed an Administrative Complaint against the Judge
for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Evident Partiality for granting the bail
without any hearing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Judge can grant an accuseds petition for bail without a
hearing.
HELD:
No. A judge cannot grant a petition for bail without a trial.
The procedural necessity of a hearing relative to the grant of bail cannot be
dispensed with especially in this case where the accused is charged with a
capital offense. Utmost diligence is required of trial judges in granting bail

especially in cases where bail is not a matter of right. Certain procedures must
be followed in order that the accused would be present during trial. As a
responsible judge, respondent must not be swayed by the mere representations
of the parties; instead, he should look into the real and hard facts of the case.
To do away with the requisite bail hearing especially in those cases where the
applicant is charged with a capital offense is to dispense with this time-tested
safeguard against arbitrariness. It must always be remembered that imperative
justice requires the proper observance of indispensable technicalities precisely
designed to ensure it proper dispensation. In this regard, it needs be stressed
that the grant or the denial of bail in capital offenses hinges on the issue of
whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong and the
determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion which remains with the judge.

US VS. TAN TENG [23 PHIL 145; G.R. NO. 7081; 7 SEP 1912]
Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old girl.

Tan Teng was gambling near the house of the victim and it was alleged that
he entered her home and threw the victim on the floor and place his private
parts

over

hers.

Several

days

later,

Pacomio

was suffering from a

disease called gonorrhea. Pacomio told her sister about what had happened
and

reported

it

to

the

police.

Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim identified
him. He was then stripped of his clothing and was examined by a policeman.
He was found to have the same symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took
a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and
turned it over to the Bureau of Science. The results showed that the
defendant

was suffering from

gonorrhea.

The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the victim
had acquired came from the defendant herein. Such disease was transferred
by the unlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter. The defendant alleged
that the said evidence should be inadmissible because it was taken in
violation

of

Issue:
violation

Held:

his

right

against

self-incrimination.

Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was a

of

the

defendants

rights

against

self-incrimination.

The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not

a violation of the said right. He was neither compelled to make any

admissions or to answer any questions. The substance was taken from his
body without his objection and was examined by competent medical
authority.
The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the
use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, and
not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. It would
be the same as if the offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen
by him may be used as evidence against him.