The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy In coupesation with M, BRAINARD, Munich = R. BRUZINA, Kentucky A. MICKUNAS, Ohio «'T. SEEBOHM, Bonn T. SHEEHAN, Stanford edited by BURT HOPKINS STEVEN CROWELL 5a T- 2001 N Norsis Pars, LT. SEATTLEContents I. Essays Janes Meson. Derrida-Husserl; ‘Towards a Phenomenology of Language Bur? ©. HOPKINS Jacob Klein and the Phenomenology of History, Part I Maxcus BRAINARD. As Bae Would [lave It: Husseil on tie Vouation of Philusophy Axars Mickunas Self Identity and its Disruptions THOMAS SHEEHAN Reading Heidegger’s “What Is Metaphysics?” (1929) R.O. Environ Hosserl and Heidegger: The Suructure of the World OLay K. WIEGAND: ‘The Phenomenological Semantics of Natural Language, Part 1 Appraisals of Eugen Fink's Phenomenology STEVEN GALT CROWELE Gnostic Phenomenology: Eugen Fink and the Critique ot Transcendental Reason Janes G. HART Parts of the Fink-Husserl Conversation, SEAN LEICHTLE Husserl and Fink: Tra Phenomenologics 67 1 161 181 203 241 237 279 301IT. Texts and Documents Fowunn Husserr Personal Notes ADELGUNDIS JAEGERSCHMID, O.S.B. Conversations with Edmund [Tusser], 1931-1938 OSKAR BECKER Husserl and Descartes Jacos Kitin (On the Platonic Meno in Particular and Platonic Dialogues in General III. Discussions RONALD BRuzINA Limitations: On Steinbock’s “Generative Phenomenology” Burt C. Hopkins The Transcendental Problematic of Generativity and the Problem of Historicism: Remarks on Steinbock’s [Tome and Beyond NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS vi 319 Hoa. 351 357 OY 377 ulThe Phenomenological Semantics of Natural Language, Part T Olay K. Wiegand University of Mainz § 1. Introduction The first conception of a mereology to be developed systematically, though not formally, was presented in 1901 by Edmund Husserl in his Third Logical Investigation.’ In 1916 the first formal mereology was elaborated by Stanislaw Lesniewski! Since then mereology has become a respectable disci- pline within which a wide range of problems is discussed,’ though still other applications remain to be explored. Fur example, an investigation into con- 1. Edmund Husserl, Logisehe Untersuchingen, Zrwolter Band, Ester Teil. Untersuebun gen zur Phanornenologie und Theorie der Erkenmanis, ed. Ursula Panzer, Husserliana XLS/1. (he Hague: Nijholl, 198); English translation: Logical lnvestigations, trans. J. N, Findlay (New York: Humanities Press, 1970); henceforth cited as L/ with German aud English page references, respectively. Cited translations have beca modified wherever it has been deemed necessary and without notice. 2. Sce Stanislaw Lesniewski, Colleeted Warks, ed § J Susma et al, ? vols (Noedreehe Kluwer, 1991), Loaniewski’s aystems are summarized and diseussed in Peter M. Simons, Parts: A Study in Ontology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), chap. 1.3. For the historical background see Boleslaw Sobocishi, “Studies in Lesniewski’s Mereology,” in J. T. J. Sr7 nickiand V.T. Rickey, ede., Lesniowshi’ Syston: Ontology arid Mereology (The Laguc: Ni holf, 1984), 217-28, On Husser!’s influence on Polish logic see in particular Jan Wolenski and Peter Simons, “De veritite: Austro-Polish Contributions to the Theory of Truth from Brentano to Tarski,” in Klemens Szaniawski, ed., The Viena Civele and the Leow. Warsaze School Doreiechts Kluwer, 1989), 391-44 3. See for example: George Boolos, “Nominalism Platonisin,” Philosophical Reviow 94 (1983), 327-4; Davill K. Lewis, “Maduesuadis is Meyetology,” in his Papers in Philewophical Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), T, chap. 18 Barry Smith, “On Draw. ing Lines on a Map,” in A. U, Brank, W. Kuhn, and D. M. Mark, eds. Spatial Information Theory: Proceedings of COSIT'95 (Berlin: Springer, 1995), 75-84; Frielerike Molimane, ind Roberts Represents IOS Press, Parts and Wholes in Soneanties (ew York: Oxlord University: Press, 199 Casati, Barry Smith, and Achille ©. Varzi, “Ontological Tools for Geograp! tiou,” in N, Guarino, ed., Formal Ontology in Information Systems (Amsterdam: 1998), 77-85, The New Yearbook Jur Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 1 (2001): 241-85 ISSN 1539-7472242 OU AV K WIFGAND nections between mereology and synergetics might prove fruitful.’ Among the many possibilities, one is of particular interest from a phenomenological per spective, namely the applicarion af merealogy to narural languiage, which Hus- serl already suggested in his Fourth Investigation.’ In the 1980s several authors revived this seminal idea and suggested chat a new semantics of natural lan guage be developed on the basis of Husserl’s mereology with a view to estab- lishing a fresh approach cue problan of ameaning, Bary Sunith, for example, has suggested that predication be reinterpreted as stating part-whole relations. His aim has been to overcome the intuitive obstacles posed by the high degree of abstraction characteristic of Tarskia-Davidsonian semantics and its deriv- atives.! Recent work, in particular by Smith and Broogart,’ presents some of the first fruits of this approach. “The task of the present paper is preliminary. It is motivated by the insight that a specifically phenomenological semantics nf natnral language presupposes 4, Herman Haken’s Adoenced Syergeves (Berlin: Springer, 1983) continues to be the standard reference work on synergetics, 5, Cl, the introduction wo che Fourth Logical Investigation, See also Appendix [of Ed- anund Husserl, Formate nau eransaendentale Logik. Versuch einey Kritik der logisesen Ver. afi el. Paul Janssen, Husserlana XVI (The [lagues Nijlolt, 1974); Enlist waustavious Formal and Transcendental Logic, rans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Nijholt, 1978), as well as his Vorlesungen riber Bedentungslebre. Sommersemester 1908, ed, Ursula Panzer, Husser- Tiatna XXVE (Dundicelat: Kluwer, 1987) and Logik sand allgenseine Wisenscbufistheas ie. Vure lesungen 191//18, ed. Ursula Panzer, Husserliana XXX (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996). |. N. Movhanry's Finan Huscor!s Thenry af Meaning (The Hague» Nijho, 1969) camraine a sys tomatic investigation that is still of great value. 6, See for example: Barry Smith and Kevin Mulligan, “Pieces of a Theory,” in Barry Smith, ed., Parts and Momems (Munich: Philesophia, 1982), 15-109; Kevin Mulligan, Peter M. Simons, and Barry Smith, “Truth Makers,” Philosophy ased Phononnenolagical Resaxseh 1 (1984), 267-321; and Peter M. Simons, “Moments as Truth-Makers,” in Werner Leinfellner, ed. Language and Ontology (Vieana: Hoelder Pichler-Tempsky, 1982), 159-61. Dissatisfac: tion with dhe Tarski Davidson program has alzo been the etatting point of a number of stulies; cL, eg, Hans G. Herzberger, “Nows on Naive Sennanies,” Jonrnal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1982), 61-102; Jon Barwise and John Perry, Sitwations and Attitudes (Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford Books/MIT Press, 1983); and Jon Barwise, “Logic and Information,” in his ‘The Sitwatiun ire Logie (Stanford: CSLI, 1986), 37-57. /, Barry Smith and Berit Broogart, "A Unified Theory of ‘ruth and Reference” {forthcoming in Logique ot Analyse, 2602; a version may be read at ltp://wings bulla. eclu/philosophy/faculty/smith/aiticles/eruthanslucfeicuve), but see also Bassy Sunith, "Ou Substances, Accidents and Universals: In Defence of a Constituent Ontology,” Philasophi- coal Papers 26 (1997), 105-77 8, Regarding the gencral concept of a phenomenological semanties, see ‘Thomas M. Seebohm’s “Phenomenology of Logie and the Problem of Modalizing,” formal of the British Society for Phenomenology 19 (1988), 235-51; “Kategoriale Anschating,” in E. W. Outh, ed., Logik, Anschaulichkote and Transparcns. Studion 2a Husserh Heidegger td der Jfranzisischen Phinomenologickritik, in Piinomenologische Forscbnmgen 23 (1990), 9-47, and “Possible *Worlds’: Remarks about a Controversy,” in F, M, Kirkland and D, P. Chatto- padhyaya, eds., Phenomenology ~East and Wert (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993), 129-43, as wellPHENOMENOLOGICAL SEMANTICS OF NATURAL LANGUAGE 243 a duoroughly developed fora phenomenological anereology. Kit Fine has of fered the most suphistivated study of tis hin so fat; in it he seeks w grasp dhe basic concepts and definitions of Husser!’s Third Investigation by combining phenomenological goals and mercological-topological techniques.’ It is ques« tionable, however, whether Husser!’s approach (and therewith Fine’s formal claboration of Husser!’s intentions) can be defended against a critique advanced by Aron Gurwitsch with reference to basic. tenets af Gestalt psychology. In fact, it remains unclear what kind of intuitions a formal system of phenome- nological mereology ought to capture. The aim of the present paper is to pro vide a clear, if preliminary, phenomenological motivation for the construction uf a specifically phenomenvlogiual aerevlogy, one that Gun yrouud a ford phenomenological semantics of natural language. § 2. Husserl’s Merevlogy and Gurwitsch’s Critique ‘Taking Carl Stumpl’s work’ as his starting point, Husserl deals chiefly with two concepts. whole and part. In addition, he treats two two-place rela- tions: the part-of-relation and the relation of foundation. Given the restricted scope of this paper, it is not necessary to introduce the various distinctions that Husserl unfolds in the Third Investigation, as well as in §§ 30-32 of Experience and Judgment.!' Regarding the concept of whole, it is sulficient lor our pur- poses here to focus on the concept of pregnant whole.” For example, in § 22 of the Third Investigation Husserl defines pregnant wholes as those “wholes, that break up into preces,” that is, into zdependent parts (LE, 273/468)."" ‘Lhe in- as my Interprotationen der Modallogih. Fin Beitrag zur phinomenologisehon Wissonschafs theorie (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998) and “Phenomenological Semantic Investigations into In- completeness,” in ©. K, Wiegand et al, eden Phevionenolony on Karts Geratan Idealisra, Hermeneutics and Logic (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000), 101 31. 9. CE. Kit Fine, “Part Whole,” in B. Smith and D. W. Smith, eds., The Cambridge ‘Companion to Fiusert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 463-85. 10, Husserl discusses Scumpi’s mercologieal analyses ia the Second Investigation, § 40, sued in the Third, §§ 4-5, La the Gest uote is § 2 of the Thisd Luvestigation, [Lusser] refers: 10 Garl Stumpf, Uber den psyehologuchen Ursprung der Raumevorstellang (Lespzig: Hirzel, 18/3; reprint: Zandvoort: Bonset, 1965). But Husserl also mentions Stump!'s psychology (of perception), e.g, in the Fifth Investigation, § 25, 11, Edmund Husserl, Erfihrung und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur Gencalogie dev Logik (1938), ed. Ludwig Landgrche (Hamburg, Glaasscn & Goverts, 1948), Tinglish translation. Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic, rans. James 8. Churchill and Kael Ameriks (Evanstoa, Ills Northwestern University Press, 1973). Henceforth cited as J with German and English page references, respectively, 12, A more detailed discussion of this concept may be found in Simons, Pat: A Stacy in Ontology, chap. 9.4. 15. As a special case of pregnant wholes Husserl names extended wholes (masses) “When a whole permits the sort of ‘piecing’ in which the pieces essentially belong to the sane lowest genus as is determined Ly the uuslivided whole, we speah of it as au eatemled whole, and of its pieces as extended parts" (III, § 1/, 2/5-/4/408). For a linguistic study of244 OLAV K.WIEGAND dependent parts that arise from breaking up such a whole also have parts of their own, Furthermore, in the Third Investigation, as well as in the important §30 of Experience and Judgment and in Carteswan Meditations," pregnant wholes ate defined as whivles Urat lave a figaeral moment (xyuouyuiously, a “Gestalt quality” in Ehrenfels’s sense") as an immediate “dependent” part." For Husserl this is a unifying moment, which makes a pregnant whole more than a mere (mercological) sum of parts: “It is not w mere sunt of parts, such as in an aggre- gate, the explicarion af which alto leads to independent determinations” (F, 1o2/ 141-42).”, Husserl distinguishes pieces from dependent parts (ic. moments) in various ways. In the present context a delinition advanced in the Third Investigation is important. There he defines the concept of piece (an, indireculy, of momem) by means of the alsenice of those functional dependencies to which dependent parts, along with other parts of a given perceived whole, are subject: The head af a hnrse can he presented ‘on its own’ or ‘cut olf,” Le. we ean hold it in our imagination, while we allow the other parts of the horse, and its whole intuited setting, to alter and vanish at will... . the content of such a ‘phenomenon’ does nat in the least involve anything entailing a self evident, necessary, furetional dependence of its changes on those of co existent phenomena. (Li, 234/439) Hiusseel’s definition of pieces with reference to the absence of finctional de- pendencies, as well as his definition of moments with reference to the concept of dependency (Ill, § 5), the latter definition having, been developed by extend- ing Stumpt’s work," was the starting point for Aron Gurwitsch’s hindamen- ual critique of Suampf and Husserl." Based on Gestalt theory, his critique ‘mass and count nouns inspired by phenomenology, sce Moltmann, Parts nnd Wholes in Semantics, 14, Edmund Hlussesl, Covtesianische Meditationen, ia Cartesianische Meditationen smd Pariser Vertniige, ed. S, Strasser, Husserliana I (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1950}; English transla- lion: Curtesien Mediation. An Inivaductton to Phenomenology, waus. Dorion Cairns (The Hepes Nabietl, 160). I deoceforth ented as C1 with German pagination, which is included inthe margins af the translation, tse eos Phrcslels: Ghee Gosnlenslcten,” vaahlvaschal Pitan schaftliche Philosophie 14 (189%), 242-92. 16. CEL, § 22, CM, § 20, and Fy, §§ 30-3? 17. On the distinetion between sct theory and meseology, see Peter M. Simons, “Mereology and Set Theory as Competing Methodological Tools within Philosophy of Language” in M. Daseal taeda, Spreclphilosphie Berne Walter de Gruyter, 1998), 1085 97, 18, Here Husserl was ceinly aio influenced by Franz Brentano (ee 1, § 1) 19 Gurwitsch formulated this critique of the Stump/-Hussesapproach as early as 1929 (coe Aron Curwitsch, “Phenomenology of Thematies and of the Pure Ego: Studies of the Relation bewweeu Gestalt Theory aud Phenomenology,” uans. B. Kersten, in Strclies in Phenomenology and Psychology | Evanston, IIL: Northwestern University Press, 1966, 175- 286, here Part IV, esp. §§ 17 Ls this essay is a modified version of “Phinomenologie derPHENOMENOLOGICAL SEMANTICS OF NATURALLANGUAGE 245 accuses both Stumpf and Husserl of holding positions close to associationist psychology.” The concept of the Gestalt was used in a technical sense for the first ime by Ehrenfels, then further developed in the various schools of Gestalt psychol- ogy," and finally given its definitive formulation in the work of Kurt Kofika, Wolfgang Kehler, Max Wertheimer, and Kurt Lewin. According to Wert- heimer, a Gestalt is “an ensemble of items which mutually support and deter- mine ane another. Thus they realize a tatal structure which governs them and assigns to each of them (as a part of the whole) a function or a ole to be per- formed as well as a determinate place in that whole.” Koffka stressed that a ‘Thematik und des reinen Ich,” Peychologische Forschung 12 [1929], 279. 381). Later work on this opie may be found in Aron Gurwitseh, The Fill of Consciousness (Piusburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1957; 4th ed., 1982), § 20, and implicitly in his “On the Intentionality of Consciousness.” (1940), in Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology, 124-40, 20, Asguciativaist psychology is upposed ww the Geslale approwch, Busivally, he for mer kind of psychology understands conscious acts merely as the results of the compost ton and modification of sensual contents. Ihe psychological laws m accordance with which those compositions and modifications work aze called ‘laws of association’. Asso- fionism can be traced back to British empiricism, but Joseph Priestley, James Mill, and Jehann P. Techarr are als eminent figuees in thar traditivm, Prem the viewpeint af Gir witschian phenomenology, the psychological atomism and the “psychophysies” of Gustav Theodor Fechner and Termana von Lelmboltz (ce n. 40 below) must also be regarded as a physicalistic branch of associationism. The main reason why Gurwitsch has severely aiticized «suciuiouisa peychology is that pliysival stimuli or psychological laws of asso rion—they need not he the Humean laws—assume the role of causes. In this sense causal explanation is the main methodological tool of associationist psychology, whereas Gestalt pochology_—tike phenom thaligicl method it dacripive in earire, Comat paychlogy does siut distinguish between che stinwuli aud dhe laws of assoviasion Usa cause a cet ut nity among am uvitself scattered and unstructured manifold of sense data, Gurwitsch for- amuilates the main tenet of a strictly deseriptive approach to ue psychologieal as follows “for intentional analysis the ulinaate fact aud datuun isthe sense or meaning itself asa strac. ured whole” (“Phenomenology of ‘Thematies aud of the Pure Ego,” 257). For a summary af Gurwitsch’s critique af astociationism (where he alser mentions Hobbes, Lacke, and Herhart) sec “The Place of Paychology in the Syatcm of Sciences,” in Studies in Phereonne- nology and Psychology, 56-68, See also Edward C, Carterette and Moston P. Friedman, Handbook of Pereepiton I: Historical and Philosophical Roots of Perception (New York: Aca. demic Press, 1974), cap. 94 FE. 21, A-historical overview is provided in Aron Gurwitsch, “Some Aspects and Developments of Gestalt Psychology” (1936), in Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology, 3-55 (see also Lester Embree, “Gestalt Psychology,” in L, Embree et al.,eds., Encyclopedia of Phenomenology Dordrecht: Kluwer, 19971, 276 Il). For an alternative treatunent of the history of Gestalt psychology, see Barry Smith, Foudations of Gestalt Theory (Munich: Philesnphia, 1988) 22, Max Wertheimer, “Untersuchungen zur Lehre Forschung (1922/23), 13 47-58 and 4: 301-50, quoted in Gurwitsch, “Some Aspects and De- vyelopments of Gestalt Psychology” (1936), 25. On this topic see also Gurwitsch, The eld of Conscionsness, section II. Sec also Gian-Carlo Rota, “Findicruieg as a Logical Concept,” ‘The Monist 72 (1989), 70-77. n der Gestalt,” Prychologische246 OLAV K WIFGAND Gestalt is marked by the fact that every part receives its properties and its place by being a part of the whole.” Already in his lirst mereological analyses, Gurwitsch avoided the term ‘Gestalt’ and insveud used dhe concept of structured whole, which is a gradual concept and thus avoids any unwanted connotations of shape and the like. I can therefore be used as a gencric concept, that is restricted, firstly, by the concept of the pregnant structured whole (as it were, the pregnant Gestalt); secondly, hy the enncept of a more mereological sum (an aggregate); and, thirdly, by chaos. It is characteristic of a structured whole that no part of ican be altered without influencing the entire whole, By contrast, an aggregate is a (minimally integrated) structured whole that is only minimally affected by the modification of one of its elements. Not even adding or removing a unit alters an aggregate in any qualitative sense, Also important here is that at least in the perceptual field neither the aggregate nor chaos is encountered in its pure form, whereas the pregnant structured whule cous frequently, particu- larly under experimental conditions. In keeping with basic tenets of Gestalt theory, Gurwitsch points out that a part qu part is u/tueys part of a structured whole, and in this scnsc a given con- tent is subject to functional dependencies since each part af a structured whole represents the whole, and the whole in turn assigns to each element its fune- tional significance (.c. its role) and meaning. On the basis of this insight Gur witsch criticizes Huscer!’s example of a morphologically given rectangle.” Flusserl holds that a particular side of a rectangle is “independent” if we ca freely vary the entire surroundings of this side—all that appears along with it— while the side itself is maintained in its identity. On his view the side in ques- ion is a piae of die reciaugle since there ae nu “Tunctional dependencies” that would prevent one from generating changes and variations, Yet seen {rom the perspective of a strictly descriptive phenomenology, as well as that of Gestalt thevry, aside ofa (morphologically given) rectangle that has been separated from the res ofthe configuration is nn Tanger “a se ofa teevangl.” Tr can now be called, say, a “Tine sepment.” But regardless of how it is referred to, it has never- theless undergone a far reaching modifications its physiognomy has changed, and ir has become phenomenally different. Neither conligurations nor ‘indi- vidual" objects are made of atomic paris that could be extracted from a given Gestalt nexus, contemplated on their own, and then inserted into a different 23. This is one of the main tenets, eg. of Kurt Kofta's Principles of Gestalt Pyyohology (London: Routledge, 19353 reprint: 2000), 24, See Edmund Husserl, “Psychologische Studien zur clementaren Logi,” in Aug- site und Rezensionen (1890-1910), ed. Beruhard Rang, Husserliana XXII (The Hague: Nij- hoff, 1979), 92-124, here 96-97; Euylish Ganslaion: “Psychological Studies in ue Elements of Logic,” sn Lardy Writings nn the Philosophy of Logic and sthematies trans, Dallas Willard (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), 139-70, heve 143.PHENOMENOLOGICAL SEMANTICS OF NATURALLANGUAGE 247 Gestaltatexus, while remaining identical chroughout those operations, No part of given structuied whole—aud this is the durust of Gur witselr’s critique can be given outside of functional dependencies such that it could have absolute qualities and attributes, independently of all combinations, variations, and con- texts in which this part could be given, When itis inserted into a new context, a part receives a new role to play within and for this new context. Under the heading “A New Distinction between Independent and Depen- dent Parts,” Gurwitsch considers concepts such as ‘dependent part’ and ‘mo- ment’ as abbreviations of more precise definitions, or as shorthand for “items not lending themselves to being singled out or made independent.”* On the ule Land, he regards che eoucept of pieve as an abbreviation for “ivems sus- ceptible of being made independent.” A part belonging to the lauer category can be singled out of a given context. But it will chen undergo a modification and become phenomenally different. From the standpoint of Gurwitsch’s critique, Husser!’s definitions suffer from a mistake in the phenomenological description on which they rest. The mistake proves to be a confusion of separability and separatedness, where the latter holds of a part that hus already been singled out (and thus thematized “in itself”). The reason thar Husserl and Gurwitsch reach different results, then, is that each describes a different experience:” Husserl considers the line as a theme in itself, which is wo say that even if iis apprehended in che context of a eon figuration, only the line itself is mean its separatedness is defined. By contrast, Gurwitsch does not consider the line as standing out against the background of the rest of the configuration; instead, at issue is the entire configuration in the How ofits givenness, The configuration is the theme and the line is a part of the theme. Phenomenalogically this part is a constituent susceptible of heing sin- gled out, though not singled out in actuality. Of course, a Gestalt can be rup- tured, such as when a single side is removed from a rectangle, but singling something out from a context, or separating a content from a given context, is an operation that will have grave impact on the convent singled out. § 3. The Ambiguity of the Goncept of Foundation in Husserl’s Third Investigation The concept of foundation is introduced variously in the Third Tnvesti- gation, However, the following definitions may be considered central among them, What is more, they have played an important role in the liter- ature On mereology that hearkens back to Husserl. They read: 25, Aron Gurwitsch, “Phenomenology of Thematics and of the Pure Ego,” 264. 26, Ibid, 264, 27, Ibid, 262,248 OLAV & WIFGAND (I) Definitions. UF an eidetic law means that an er cannot as such exist except in a comprehensive unity that associates it with a i, we say that an cas such re- ‘quires fouredation by ap or that an eras euch needs ta be supplemented hy «p Ii accordingly op, are determinate instanees of the pure kinds a oF j, ac- tuaized ina single whole and standing in the rations mentioned we say that a is founded upon yp... The indefinite expression ‘cg requires supple moniation by is fonrided upon, « creain momen? plainly means the same as the expression “ag is on independent.’ (LI, 267-68/463) But we should note that in addition to these definitions there is also another of the pregnant whole in terms of the concept of foundation: @) Byalpregnanc] whole we understand a range of contents that are all covered by a single foundation without the help of further contents, The contents of such a range we call its pars, Talk of the singleness of ve foundation means that every conient is toundationally connected, whether directly ar indirectly, ‘with every content. (LI, 282/475) ‘The employment of the expression ‘foundation’ in (1) and (2) can be justi- fied to some extent if we extricate the term from the context of the Third In vestigation, ‘This would enable us to adopt Gurwitsch’s preferred understand- ing of foundation’ as functional dependency’, wliete die fawer vena is suet w capture some basic intuitions derived {rom Gestalt theory. But leaving this un- derstanding aside fora moment, it can be seen that Husset!’s use of ‘foundation’ Ieads to grave systematic problems for the argument of the Third Investigation: (0) Given the definition of the concept of pregnant whole as in 2), and given the definition of a dependent part as fosmded part in accordance with (1)— and as distinet from pieces then a preguant whole in the sense of (@) pos sesses moments exclusively as its parts (umd diese moments are pairwise biditectionally tounded). Now @3) confronts us with a number of possible conclusions, two of which are most important here. The first possibility is: (8) We take (2) as our starting point, while not wishing ta give up the notion of pregnant whole. But this forces us to give up Tusser!’s distinetion be- tween pieces and moments. We may conclude that parts are moments (thar is, depondonr parts), and therefore thar the eoncepts af part and af moment are synonymous. Yet this conclusion is odd and stands in obvious contradiction to important definitions HTusserl gives elsewhere. If we stick to what has been said about the pregnant whole in § 2 above, we are obliged to retain the aforementioned distinction between independent and dependent parts (ic. between pieces and moment). Its also noteworthy that this distinction is mentioned in the first sentence of the Introduction 10 the Third Investigation and plays an eminent role in almost every paragraph of it that follows; indeed, without it we would have to discard the whole of the Third Investigation, It therefore seems rea sonable first to pursue a second possibility, an alternative to (4):PLENOMENOLOGICAL SEMANTICS OF NATURAL LANGUAGE 249 (8) We look for another definition of the fundamental concept of foundation, and thus discard (1). (Our primary interest here is not one of exegesis. Nevertheless, the solu- tiom that suggests itself might best be elaborated by way of a reexamination of the Third Investigation, Besides definition (2), the Third Investigation contains an important passage in which Husserl males a brief comment on the process af singling ont: “Strictly speaking, the phenomenal thing ar its piere, that is, he sensuous phenomenon as such, the spatial shape filled with sensuous qualities, never stays just the same in descriptive content” (L/, 234/430). Obviously, Hiusserl was well aware of the changes singling oust effects with regard to the de- scriptive content of what is singled out. However, he eventually dismissed a purely descriptive treatment of part, whole, and foundation, and extended the scope of his definitions vo the onvological reali, aa extension iat Gurwitsel cousidered plenviuenulogically legitimate.” If oe regards phenmeuvlogy as strictly descriptive in method, then the solution to the aforementioned dilem- ma is indeed to discard (1) and understand ‘foundation’ as ‘functional depend- ency’, as was suggested in § 2 above, A meteological system motivated by a purely descriptive phenomenology—and this seems to he characteristic of a specilically phenomenological merealogy—would have to adopt Gurwitsch’s more exact definitions of ‘piece’ and ‘moment’. If we do not extend mereolog- ical reasoning to the ontological sphere, it becomes clear that definition (2) comes close 1 Gurwitsch’s understanding of the structured whole, that is, the concept of whole as a Gestult nexus in which each pare bears a foundational re: lation to (i. it functionally depends upon) every other coordinated part of the same whole. Let us outline a way in which these results could be exploited for a phenomenclogical semantics of natural language. § 1. Phenomenological Mcreology and the Notion of “Individual” Object To prepare the way tw a future phenomenological semanties of natural language, it seems sullicient for now to show the consequences that the rea- soning of the previous sections has for our conception of individual objects (of perception) and their qualities in grammatical terms: for subjects and their predicates, Like Husserl Gurwitsch takes the perspectival character of all perception as the starting point of his phenomenological analyses.” An object in the visual 28. Cf. Gurwitsch, “Phenomenology of Thematics and of the Pure Ego,” 263: “The distinction we aie going Ww prupuse ca however, vt be applied so widely as Hussesl claimed for his theory. It is Linited wo the pheaomenological sphere and does n0t allow of heing extended to the ontological realm.” 29, See Aron Gurwitsel, “Contribution wo the Phexwmenological Theory of Per ception,” trans. Frederick Kersten, Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology, 383-49, and250 OLAV K. WIEGAND field, for example, always appears from a certain perspective; generally speak- ing, itis always perceived in a cervain How of is givenmess (put pheuouseus- logically: objects of perception are given nvematically), However, itis not only the tectonic aspect that counts as part of the noematic sense. Material and prac- tical determinations, suclras “desk seen {rom above” or “house perceived from the front,” etc., are also contained in the noema I perceive. Such noemata enr- relate with temporally extended, psychological acts (in phenomenological terms: they correspond to a noesis) of the subject (the perceiver). "Takeing perception as our starting point, the problem now is how it is that the manifold sides of a perceptual object are connected to one another such that they constitute a nocmatic syseem. Noctically speaking, this is vo ask how it is possible rhar a conrse of perception results in a unified and interconnected psy- chological actin which an identical object is given and shows itself frou various perspectives. With regard to the individual objects of perception that are doubt- less to be considered as structured wholes in the sense of the previous sections, this is a problem of organization. Lu the terminology of present-day brai ences, this problem is often referred to as the ‘binding-problem’. Fram the view- point of Gurwitschian phenomenology, however, the adoption of causal explanation (which is still the prevalent methodological basis in cognitive sci ence) is nat possible. A stritly descriprive theory af the organizational problem in question is the phenomenological theory of intentionality. (For Gurwitsch ‘intentionality’ means ‘the objectivating function of consciousness”) This theo- ry provides structural laws—acquired through purely descriptive analyses—that guide the linking of the various aspeus uf an individual object of perception. “Taking Husser!"s phenomenological analyses as starting point, Gurwitsch explains this linkage with reference to the analysis of primary, that is, prein gutic expectation and memory, as well as with reference to the theory of the Iypicality of perception. Each perceived thing is encenntered hy virrne af a cer- “Husserl’s Theory of the Intentionality of Consciousness,” in HL L. Dreyfus, ed., Huser Intenticmality, and Cognitive Science (Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press, 1982), 59-71. 30. Ir is, however, important to bear in mind that Gurwitsch’s definition of ‘inven- tionality” as ‘noetic-noematic correlation’ signilicanily differs frou Musseal’s dheoty of the intentionality ol consciousness: whereas Husser! had added an “ego” to the correla- tion of the cogito cogivatum (which Huser] often uses instead of the expression ‘noetic- noematic’), which vhus becomes an “ego-vogito-cugitatua” («here the ego is 10 be understood as a transcendental ego in the sense of Ci, §§ 8-9), Gurwitsch refused 10 rec- ognize the “ego” in this definition primarily for two reasons: (3) the transeendental ego is not descriptively accessible «ud (L) the intsoxluction of a transcendental ego brings in a factor that that, within the framework of a theory of consciousness, functions as a catisal explanans. In this sense tmwendental phenomenalagy comes methodologically close to assuciationisns (for this critique sce, in particular, Aron Gurwitach, “A Non cgological Cnoeption of Consciousness,” in Soules ie Pharomenology and Psychology, 297-300, 4. See, e.g., Gurwitsch, “Contribution to the Phenomenological Theory of Per- ception,” esp. 336 ff.PHENOMENOOGICAT SFMANTICS OF NATIRAT LANGUAGE 251 taint typicalitys it presents itsell us « thing ol a certain kind or type. For exan- ple, when | perceive the front of a house that presents itself as a residential building, its interior architectural arrangement and organization remain more cor less indeterminate to ane. Nevertheless, dhe perception of the {rout of tis house is accompanied by a variety of anticipations that may find fulfillment, just as the indeterminacies of these auvicipatious inay find determination, No object of a possible perception is completely undetermined, even if I were never ta have seen anything like it hefore (e g, an asyet unknown machine), At Teast at the structural level, I know based on past experience that the object must have, for example, a certain weight, some color o other, and so forth—and this holds also of its back side, which is yet out af view. The untamiliarity of an object exhibits isell not by the complete absence of ancicipations hav are induced by the type to which it belongs, but rather by the degree to which the typical latitude (piefrasm) of anticipations is determined. Hence, the famailiar things of everyday life are exuctly hose chinys, perceived by virtue of theis typicality, ditt possess saniuimal anount of indewenuinacy ia dieir nora characteristics, Such familiar objects give rise to w veitain “intinnacy” andl Sauto- matism” in our dealings with them, However, the phenomenologist views and analyzes these phenomena as a highly complicated structure of explicit and inexplicie expectations and memories, A crucial point here, however, is that the anticipated perceptions, to which the present one points, are subject to two conditions: they must he in agreement and conformity both with one another and with the present per- ception: “However indeterminate the yieldings of anticipated further percep- tions may be, the condition imposed on them is their fitting invo the generic pattern and framework which define the ty pivality in whose light te thing ap- pears through the present perception.”” The individual object is thus an orgun- ized totality, the members of which are subject vo muvual fiavetional dependencies ‘These dependencies can now be further clarified as having two aspects: (a) each individual noema has a functional significance for the whale (ane ceuld say that it makes demands on the whole in order to fit inte the whole) and (H) at the same time the complete noematic system determines the functional signif- cance of each of its parts, Both of these aspects make up what Gurwitsch calls the ‘principle of sense conformity’. Expressed noematically, the principle states that the complete noematic system must be constituted in such a way that it can adopt cach perceptual noema as a part or element of itself.” The relationship . Aron Gurwitsch, “Perceptual Coherence as the Foundation of the Judgment of Predication,” in Phenomenology and the Theory of Science (Evanston, I: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 241-67. 33. Cl. Gurwitsch, “Contribution to the Phenomenological Theory ofPereeption,” 54%: “the total noematic system must be of such a kind as to be capable of recervang the pres- ent perceptual noema as a part or member of itsel.”252 OLAV K.WIEGAND between complete the noematic system and individual noemara ot perception is analogous to that between a Gestalt and its parts. Gurwitsch notes that Wettlieimer’s law of “good continuity” can be treated as a special case of the principle of sense conformity. Two influential theories in the hustory of phi- losophy may be contrasted with this theory of objects of perception. "The first of these philosophical theories, which seeks to explain the nature ofthe cohesion of the properties and attributes of “objects,” has a tradition that runs from Aristotle 10 Husserl hiuusel! (uud is the impetus, incidentally, for many of the definitions Husserl advances in the Third Investigation) Musser] expresses this theory concisely in Jdeas I, where he speaks of the “central point of unity” a a “point of connection or ‘hearer’ of the predicates” (279). This con necting point or bearer must “necessarily he distingnished {rom [the predicates), although it cannot be placed alongside or separated from chet; just as, cou versely, they arc its predicates: unthinkable without [the central point of unity}, yet distinguishahle from it.”° Tn his later writings, especially in § 29 of Expert- ence and Judgment, Husserl no longer speaks of the cena point of unity, but rather of substrates." But regardless of the term used, important here is that an entity is introduced—whether a substance or a substrate—that exists alongside and in addition 10 at whic must be organized and unified. If we turn to the qualities of the object—Husserl says that “they” are “to he eeparated and placed alongside the substrate”—we find that in the philosophical tradition they are ueated merely as a “manifold of sense data,” to use Kant’s expression, By con trast, Gestalt theory—and this is one of irs mast imporiant leatures—mo longer regards these sense data as disparate and unstructured “manifolds.” The other theory in the philosophical adition was given precise formu- lation in the early phase of twentieth century empiricism, specifically by Rus- sell.” He formulates the problem of the organization uf seuse data a « variation on Occam's razor, and in fact by applying the following rule: “Whenever pas- sible, replace inferences to unknown eatities with constructions of known en- (Cube vou noetnitc systerit aust be of such a kind that itis eapable of absorbing che present pperceptwal noema wathun itself”). M,C. Edmund Husser, loon ru einer reinen Phinomenolagie und phinomenologischen Philosophie. Estes Buch: Algemicine Einfhvang ie die reine Plsinamonologie (1913), ed. Kas] Schuhmann, Husserliana TH/1 (The Hague: Nijhoif, 1976), 270; Ideas peraininy ww a Pure Phonomonnlogy and 10 a Phenomenological Philosophy. Fist Book: General introduction t0 a Pare Phenomenology, tans. F. Kersten (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1983), 270, Henceforth cited as ‘eds f with original pagination, which is included in the auargius of both the Gessnas ail the English editions. 35. Idaas 1, 270-71. 36, See, eg. Ef § 244. 37, Although Quine differs in many important respects from the ontology pro- posed by Whitehead and Russell, there are nevertheless strong, similarities (ee, eg. W. V. Quine, Wore «ul Object [New York. The Technology Press of MIT, 1960], $6 1 2),PHENOMENOLOGICAL SEMANTICS OF NATURALLANGUAGE 253 tities." As is well known, Russell acknowledged only *hard data,” namely the “particular facts of sense, and the general truths of logic.”” He completely re jected Aristotelian substances or Husseilian “central points of unity” as being entities beyond all experience. “Soft data” of this kind were to be reduced to “hard data.” In order to solve the problem of substance, Russell then developed a highly sophisticated theory that in some respects continued the nineteenth cenvury physiological uadition with its bias towards the hard sciences.” As a re- sul, Uhe substance was ultimately identified with che clus of its appearances (perspectives). For Russell, then, substance was a “mere logical construction.” Within a Russellian framework, those things that were designated above as the various aspects of an object must instead be treated as “hard data.” According to Russell, the object is nothing but a class of appearances. The similarity of the various perspectives is what gives them their cohesion. If one approaches some- thing such as a penny, then for Russell one would be confronted with "a grad- uated series of circular aspects of varying sizes." "hese various, continuously changing perceptions of “circular aspects” are the retinal pictures that are con- tinuously changing in accordance with the laws of geometrical optic There are some prima facie resemblances between Russells del the object and Gurwitsch’s treatment of the matter, described earlier. [low ever, a phenomenologist will observe immediately that Russell is proposing a “theory from above,” that is, experience is reinterpreted from the point of view of physics and in accordance with theories of physics. Yet this kind of rein- terpretation is far removed from a realistic description of perception in which an object is not experienced as a “miere logical construction,” Furthermore, Russell’s physicalism can by no means explain why the various perspectives that show themselves are in fact perspectives of one identical object. What is meant here can be illustrated by way of a psychological experiment in which a series of green impressions have an identical saturation and warmth but dil- fer in brightness. According to Russell, this would have to be conceived of as a series of similar perceptions, yet it can by no means be said that we perceive an identical object, * 38, Bertzand Russell, Logie nd Knozwledge: Fsseys 1901-1930, ed. R. C, Marah (London: Allen & Unwin, 1956), 326, 39, Bertrand Russell, Our Knowlodge of the External World (London: Allen & Unwin, 5th ed., 1969), 76 tt, 40. The main figures of this tradition were Fechner and Helmholtz, (the works of the lanier have recently been reprinted in Hermann von Helmholtz, Sehvifien zur Exkenntats theoric (Vienna: Springer, 1998). Sce n. 20 above. 41. Aron Gurwitsch, *Substantiality and Perceptual Coherence. Remarks on H. B. Veach: "Two Logica,” Reewarch it Phenoimenvlogy 2 (1972), 29-46, here 45.254 OLAV K.WIEGAND The express aim af one of the most important publications in the field of semantics today, namely Jon Barwise’s The Simation in Logic,” is to establish a mathematical theory of (natural-language) meaning. The book’s motto reads: “The time has come to enrich formal logic by adding to it some other lunda- mental notions. Besides situation semantics, other aemps have been mide over the past wo decades that also have made strides towards an “enrichment of formal logic” in order to achieve an intuitively satisfying theory of (natural- Tanguage) meaning, The aim of the present essay has been to follow up on an attempt by Barry Smith and others ta develop a new semanties of navural lan- guage on the basis of Husser!’s mereology."" However, the question posed here was whether Husserl's mereology does indeed provide consisteme and intuitive Jy satisfying prounds lor such a lar-reaching enterprise. A closer examination of Husser!'s Third Investigation revealed incompaible definitions. (However, such should not lead one to discard this Investigation, but rather to appreciate the systematic problem that surfaces on account of these inconsistencies.) Al- hough his acute auualyses of ute plienomenological psyculogy of perception were not pursued in depth, Aron Gurwitsch’s critique of Husserl’s merealogy was shown here to be much closer to a strictly descriptively oriented phenome- nology than the largely ontologically biased Third Investigation. This essay has employed Gurwitsch's analyses of individual objects (re- garded as structured wholes) and their qualities (as parts of those structured wholes) to show how « genuinely phenomenological mereological foundation of the judgment of predication can be established. In this sense a phenomenological semanuis of the navural-language predicative judgment will interpret de vo- hesion of predicate and subject through the part-of-relation, the latter taken in Gurvitch’s sense, Husserl himself already suggested that mereological tools could be applied in order we gain a deeper understanding of dhe watural-hanguage predicative judgment, In his "Third Investigation we read: “Every non-relative ‘real’ predicate therefore points to a part of the object that is the predicate’s subject: ‘red? and ‘round’, for example, do so, but not ‘existent’ or ‘some- thing? (77,231/497), However, whar sharply distinguishes the understanding, af the predicative judgment as uafolded in the present essay from Husserl's own—and, for that matter, from any other approach that follows Hussee’s ontologically oriented mereology—is that it employs a phenomenologically psychological understanding of the relaion beoween “part” aud “object” in the predicative judgment. 42, Jon Barwise, The Sitwation in Logie (Stantord: CSL, 1989), 43. This motto is a remark made by Stan Ulam in a conversation with Gian-Carlo Rou. This couversation is suuuuuized ia GiaueCarlo Ro, “The Baier of Meany,” Letters in Mathematical Phystes 10 (1985), 97105, See also. Barwise’s epilogue to his Srtua tian in Logie, entitled “Toard a Mathematical Theary of Meaning” 44. See n. b above.PHENOMENOLOGIGAL SEMANTICS OF NATURALLANGUAGE 255, The heart of Gurwitsch's critique of Husser!’s mereology is that the lat- ter neglected the functional dependencies to which coordinate parts of the same whole are subject. Th ane enncedes this point of the critique, however, cone will arrive at an informal analysis of hasie merealogical concepts thar crt cially deviates from the analyses carried out in the Third Investigation. The next step would then be to advance a formal phenomenological mereology that is motivated by the concept of Gestalt (or ‘suuaured whole’, ws use Gut- witsch’s preferred expression). The development of such a system would not only respond to Husser!’s claim that a phenomenological mereology can only be considered complete when it becomes a formal theory." Ie seems plausible that it would also provide grounds for a formally elaborated phenomenologi- cal semantics of natural language that has—as many of Husserl’s critics have pointed out—thus far been neglected by Husserlian phenomenalogy 45, The idea of fouunally analyzing the concept of Gestalt is not new. See Nicholas Rescher and Paul Oppenheim, “Logical Analysis of Gestalt Concepts,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 6 (1954), 89106, ard Nicholas Resvher, “Awians for the Part Ree lation,” Philosophical Studies 6 (1958), 8-11. Unfortunately, this line of research has not been continued. 4G, See both the introduction to and Chap. 2 of the Third Investigation, as well as Fino, “Part Whole,” 164.