G.R. NO.

129242

January 16, 2001

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and ISABELITA MANALO ,petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME, MILAGROS M.
TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and
IMELDA MANALO, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda De Manalo, et. Al., seeking to annul the Resolution 1 of the
Court of Appeals 2 affirming the Orders 3 of the Regional Trial Court and the Resolution 4which denied petitioner' motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts 5 are as follows:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his
wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano,
Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who are all
of legal age.1wphi1.nt
At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of
Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon
City and at NO. 45 General Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita,
Milagros, Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition 6 with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila 7 of
the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as
administrator thereof.
On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on February 11, 1993 and directing the
publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing
service by registered mail of the said order upon the heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned therein.
On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order 'declaring the whole world in default,
except the government," and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, the trial court
upon motion of set this order of general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio,
Isabelita and Orlando who were granted then (10) days within which to file their opposition to the petition.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion 8 on
July 23, 1993 seeking; (1) to seat aside and reconsider the Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the motion for
additional extension of time file opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the
case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the immediate
inhibition of the presiding judge.
On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order9 which resolved, thus:
A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July 20, 1993, only for the purpose of considering
the merits thereof;
B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their affirmative defenses as ground for the dismissal of
this proceeding, said affirmative defenses being irrelevant and immaterial to the purpose and issue of the present
proceeding;
C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors;
D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge;
E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in the intestate estate of the deceased
Troadio Manalo for hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP.
No. 39851, after the trial court in its Order 10 dated September 15, 1993. In their petition for improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 9263626; (2) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was included in the
intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same family; and (5) no
certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.
Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its Resolution 11promulgated on
September 30, 1996. On May 6, 1997 the motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was likewise dismissed. 12
The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in
upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for
judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving
members of the same family have been made prior to the filling of the petition but that the same have failed.
Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the same
family. They point out that it contains certain averments, which, according to them, are indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:
X

Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his father, TROADIO MANALO, had not made any
settlement, judicial or extra-judicial of the properties of the deceased father TROADIO MANALO.
Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties aforementioned, without proper
accounting, to his own benefit and advantage xxx.
X

Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO to his own
advantage and to the damage and prejudice of the herein petitioners and their co-heirs xxx.
X

Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were compelled to bring this suit and were forced to
litigate and incur expenses and will continue to incur expenses of not less than, P250,000.00 and engaged the services of
herein counsel committing to pay P200,000.00 as and attorney's fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court
xxx.13
Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court
which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground that a condition precedent for filling the claim has not
been complied with, that is, that the petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made involving members of the same family prior to the filling of the petition pursuant to Article
222 14 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The instant petition is not impressed with merit.
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments 15 and the character of the
relief sought 16 in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of
Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that the
same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fat of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his
residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within he country
are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest. 17The petition is SP.PROC No.
92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased
which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for
doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their
deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to wit;
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court:

a. That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner ROMEO MANALO for the administration of the
estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO upon the giving of a bond in such reasonable sum that this Honorable Court may
fix.
b. That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO have been inventoried and expenses and just debts, if any,
have been paid and the legal heirs of the deceased fully determined, that the said estate of TROADIO MANALO be settled
and distributed among the legal heirs all in accordance with law.
c. That the litigation expenses of these proceedings in the amount of P250,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of
P300,000.00 plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court in the hearing and trial of this case and costs of suit be
taxed solely against ANTONIO MANALO.18
Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which may be typical of an ordinary civil action.
Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of the said defect in the petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto
which, as observed by the trial court, is actually an Answer containing admissions and denials, special and affirmative defenses and
compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and costs 19 in an apparent effort to make
out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--vis, Article
222 of civil of the Civil Code.
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of
the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized
that the trial court, siting as a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction 20 and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters
and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that
the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by
the defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its
proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem. 21 So it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.
Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be considered as a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--visArticle 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue of ule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court
which provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceedings.' Petitioners contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad
that it must necessarily include special proceedings.
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of
Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the
estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. To wit:
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward
a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035(underscoring supplied).22
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an
action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law
affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. 23 A civil action is thus an action filed
in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. 24 Besides,
an excerpt form the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal
provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus:
It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is
necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in
the family. It is know that lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than stranger. 25
It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action
as in fact no defendant was imploded therein. The Petition for issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of
Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish
a status, a right, or a particular fact. 26 the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fat of death of
their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their
right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction
of the probate court.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit, Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133000

October 2, 2001

PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO
MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and
EDUARDO DEL ROSARIO, respondent..
BUENA, J.:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance annulment of title with damages,
adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of
property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?
Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the decision1 of public respondent Court of Appeals, the
decretal portion of which declares:
"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside and another one
entered annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario in favor of defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and
ordering the Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and reinstate TCT No. 107443 without prejudice to the filing of a
special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario in a proper court. No costs.
"So ordered."
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of 9,322 square meters
located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with
his six children, namely: Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's
estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under the
agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14 share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No.
11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and the Six children.1wphi1.nt

Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with
Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano
then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving
only 447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name, as covered by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT
No. 35988 was further subdivided into two separate lots where the first lot with a land area of 80.90 square meter was registered
under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a land area of 396.70 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually,
Graciano sold the first lot2 to a third person but retained ownership over the second lot.3
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by TCT
No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 186059 4 was issued in the latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano
died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, herein private respondents alleged
that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No.
107443, by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 1987 6 in favor herein petitioner resulting in the
cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private
respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married to Graciano in 20 March 1980
and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Graciano's
lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents may not anymore
claim against Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's property.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26 January 1996 holding: 8
"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a
complete nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that
there has been decreed a judicial separation of property between them, the spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a
contract of sale;
"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally prohibited by law under Article 133 of
the New Civil Code;
"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be regarded as an extension of
advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision ratiocinating, inter alia:
"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. The court a quo,
trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts
proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person. XXX
"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance inheritance. What the court should have
done was merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on advancement to be resolved in a separate
proceeding instituted for that purpose. XXX"
Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and
assails the appellate court's decision "for being contrary to law and the facts of the case."
We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this wise:
"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong.
"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to
specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
"XXX

"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact."
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a
formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying
legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding
to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless
the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion." 9
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:
"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted
according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings
include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to some special
mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are
characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent
proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon
notice."10
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating
to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a
special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the
probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the
deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final
order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same provision 11contemplates a probate
court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings".
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an
adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case
No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question.
Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to
validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:
"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it must first settle the estate in a special
proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a quo determined the respective legitimes of the
plaintiffs-appellants and assigned the subject property owned by the estate of the deceased to defendant-appellee without
observing the proper proceedings provided (for) by the Rules of Court. From the aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial
courts trying an ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding because it is subject to
specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as an advance inheritance." 12
In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo13 andMendoza vs. Teh14 that
whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it is procedural
question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived". 15
Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as the six children of the decedent
even assailed the authority of the trail court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by
the decedent to petitioner.
Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing principle that although generally, a
probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership. 16
Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:

"In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking appointment as estate
administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have invited the exercise of the
limited jurisdiction of a probate court. 17 (emphasis supplied)
Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that
certain steps be taken first.18 The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges
from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be
added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only
thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. 19
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case, reveals that the trial court failed to
observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent
reason to sanction the non-observance of these well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing circumstances, a
probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as
well as other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del Rosario's estate.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168799

June 27, 2008

EUHILDA C. TABUADA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. J. CEDRICK O. RUIZ, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Iloilo City, ERLINDA CALALIMANLEDESMA and YOLANDA CALALIMAN-TAGRIZA, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the March 2, 2005 Order 1 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 39 in Special Proceedings (Sp. Proc.) No. 5198 and the May 20, 2005 Resolution 2 of the trial
court denying the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged order.
The very simple issue raised for our resolution in this case surfaced when the parties in Sp. Proc. No. 5198 (the proceedings for the
settlement of the intestate estate of the late Jose and Paciencia Calaliman) manifested to the RTC their desire to amicably settle the
case. In light of the said manifestation, the trial court issued the following Order 3 on December 6, 2004:
In view of the strong manifestation of the parties herein and their respective counsel that they will be able to raise (sic) an
amicable settlement, finally, on or before 25 December 2004, the Court will no longer be setting the pending incidents for
hearing as the parties and their counsel have assured this Court that they are going to submit a "Motion for Judgment Based
On An Amicable Settlement" on or before 25 December 2004.
Atty. Honorato Sayno Jr., Atty. Gregorio Rubias and Atty. Raul Retiro are notified in open court.
Serve a copy of this Order to Atty. Rean Sy.
SO ORDERED.4
The RTC, however, on March 2, 2005, invoking Section 3,5 Rule 17, of the Rules of Court, terminated the proceedings on account of
the parties' failure to submit the amicable settlement and to comply with the afore-quoted December 6, 2004 Order. The trial court, in
the challenged order of even date, likewise denied all the motions filed by the parties. 6
Petitioner, the administratrix of the estate, and private respondents separately moved for the reconsideration of the March 2, 2005
Order arguing, among others, that the termination of the case was premature, there being yet no payment of the debts and
distribution of the estate, and that they had already prepared all the necessary papers for the amicable settlement. 7 Despite the said
pleas for reconsideration, the trial court remained firm in its position to terminate the proceedings; hence, in the assailed May 20,
2005 Resolution,8 it affirmed its earlier order. Dissatisfied, petitioner scuttles to this Court via Rule 45. 9
The petition is granted.
While a compromise agreement or an amicable settlement is very strongly encouraged, the failure to consummate one does not
warrant any procedural sanction, much less provide an authority for the court to jettison the case. 10 Sp. Proc. No. 5198 should not
have been terminated or dismissed by the trial court on account of the mere failure of the parties to submit the promised amicable
settlement and/or the Motion for Judgment Based On An Amicable Settlement. Given the non-contentious nature of special
proceedings11 (which do not depend on the will of an actor, but on a state or condition of things or persons not entirely within the
control of the parties interested), its dismissal should be ordered only in the extreme case where the termination of the proceeding is
the sole remedy consistent with equity and justice, but not as a penalty for neglect of the parties therein. 12
The third clause of Section 3, Rule 17, which authorizes the motu propio dismissal of a case if the plaintiff fails to comply with the
rules or any order of the court,13 cannot even be used to justify the convenient, though erroneous, termination of the proceedings
herein. An examination of the December 6, 2004 Order14 readily reveals that the trial court neither required the submission of the
amicable settlement or the aforesaid Motion for Judgment, nor warned the parties that should they fail to submit the compromise
within the given period, their case would be dismissed. 15 Hence, it cannot be categorized as an order requiring compliance to the
extent that its defiance becomes an affront to the court and the rules. And even if it were worded in coercive language, the parties
cannot be forced to comply, for, as aforesaid, they are only strongly encouraged, but are not obligated, to consummate a
compromise. An order requiring submission of an amicable settlement does not find support in our jurisprudence and is premised on
an erroneous interpretation and application of the law and rules.
Lastly, the Court notes that inconsiderate dismissals neither constitute a panacea nor a solution to the congestion of court dockets.
While they lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to records of individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between

the parties. In the absence of clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance, trial on the
merits, and final disposition of the cases before the court. 16
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The March 2, 2005 Order and the May 20,
2005 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 39 in Sp. Proc. No. 5198 areREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164108

May 8, 2009

ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS HOLDING CORPORATION,Petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent
Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino. 1 At the time of his death,
there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The
second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation
and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.2
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21,
presided by respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be P5 Million,
"net of liabilities."3 On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of
her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor. 4 In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory
of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband. 5 In the List of Liabilities
attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then being
litigated before the Bacolod City courts.6 Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two cases
as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.7 Thereafter, the Manila RTC required
private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate. 8
On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, 9praying that they be
furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the
manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before
the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for
the submission by private respondent of the required inventory of the decedents estate. 10 Petitioners also filed other pleadings or
motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the
inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.
On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not
interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings. 11 After the Manila RTC had
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in
general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in
the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision 12 dismissing the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a
motion to intervene, according to the appellate court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the
fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in
separate proceedings before other courts.
Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in denying them the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their argument is
not the rule on intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings. 13

To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo. First, they prayed that they be henceforth
furnished "copies of all processes and orders issued" by the intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto
with the said court.14 Second, they prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to
submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same. 15 Third, petitioners moved that the intestate
court set a deadline for the submission by the administrator of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the
date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation,
preservation and disposition of the estate.16
The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule on intervention. We can readily agree
with the Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x" While the language of Section 1,
Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the
legal interest required of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and
expectant."17
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in
special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of
Court,18 not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings."
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to
creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not
accommodate contingent claims.
Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto
Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before the RTC, and also now before us, do not square with their recognition as
intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not
necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those
reliefs.
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn our focus to the Rules on Special
Proceedings.
In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any interested persons" or "any persons interested in the estate" to
participate in varying capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1)
Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right of "any person interested" to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and to file a
petition for administration;" (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition for letters of
administration to the known heirs, creditors, and "to any other persons believed to have interest in the estate;" (3) Section 1, Rule 76,
which allows a "person interested in the estate" to petition for the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an
individual interested in the estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of
any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedents title or interest therein;" (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice
of the time and place of the examination and allowance of the Administrators account "to persons interested;" (6) Section 7(b) of
Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested" before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the
disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the
estate" to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied
or provided for.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or implied, then they should have filed their
claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of
administration and published by the administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice. 19 However, it appears that the
claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal
Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under
Rule 86.20These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its
administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case 21 was already pending review before
this Court at the time of Benedictos death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases where they were raised, and not in
the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the
judgment against the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?

Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia, 22 and it does provide us with guidance on how to proceed. A
brief narration of the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance and damages against respondents, and
during a hearing of the case, learned that the same trial court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan
had sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to implead Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her
late husband. He likewise filed a verified claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that a coadministrator be appointed, the bond of the administrator be increased, and that the intestate proceedings not be closed until the
civil case had been terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took cognizance of the pending civil case,
the administrator moved to close the intestate proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial
partition of the estate. The trial court refused to close the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the civil case, and the
Court affirmed such action.
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to their desire to protect their interests
it appearing that the property in litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only property of the estate left subject of
administration and distribution; and the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the unavoidable fact that
whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the determination and
distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case
but merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as
having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending determination of
the separate civil action for the reason that there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings until
after the separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the
Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or
administrator." What practical value would this provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its
termination simply because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil
case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of
the estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the court in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be
closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x x 23 (Emphasis supplied) [Citations omitted]
It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-in-intervention under the Rules of Civil
Procedure, but we can partake of the spirit behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated:
"[t]he rulings of this court have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so to protect the same, but not for a decision
on their action."24
Petitioners interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful
that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also "any person interested" or "persons interested in the estate"
various specified capacities to protect their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending
action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the
estate of the decedent would have already been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be
enforced against it.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right
to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such persons
may accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners,
they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the
prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which
such interests can be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in connection with the intestate proceedings,
as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility of such relief for the
petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the assets of the
estate. Such a running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies should their interests be compromised, such as
the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently
conveyed.
At the same time, the fact that petitioners interests remain inchoate and contingent counterbalances their ability to participate in the
intestate proceedings. We are mindful of respondents submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all
processes and pleadings of the intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent or otherwise, would have
the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that would
mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims, would

unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly
disposition of cases.
Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by this Court, with respect to the petitioners herein,
that addresses the core concern of petitioners to be apprised of developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge
Reyes,25 the Court heard a petition for mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the RTC judge, praying that they be
allowed access to the records of the intestate proceedings, which the respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2 of Rule 135
came to fore, the provision stating that "the records of every court of justice shall be public records and shall be available for the
inspection of any interested person x x x." The Court ruled that petitioners were "interested persons" entitled to access the court
records in the intestate proceedings. We said:
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records tomonitor prompt compliance with the Rules governing the preservation
and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the
Administratrix of an annual accountingappears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against Roberto
Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested persons" under
Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x26
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent
than mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that
the assets are being preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access
the records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim,
will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means by
which the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved.1awphi1
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all "interested parties" the petitioners
as "interested parties" will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in:
(1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2)
Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or
otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the
estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases
filed by the petitioners.
We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to
submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue be required to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the intestate court set a
deadline for the submission by the administratrix of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her
examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and
disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.
Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate
of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account
of his administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that there are
reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is
not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the context of dissipating
the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent
claims against the estate.
Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the
administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of
the administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After all, the
interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general
competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners should
not be deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of
Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of
Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-8409

December 28, 1956

In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. EUGENIO EUSEBIO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
AMANDA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE EUSEBIO, and CARLOS EUSEBIO,oppositors-appellants.
Francisco M. Ramos and Valeriano Silva for appellee.
Filemon Cajator for appellants.

CONCEPCION, J.:
This case instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for his
appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, who died on November 28, 1952, residing, according to said
petition, in the City of Quezon. On December 4, 1953, Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio,
objected to said petition, stating that they are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been improperly filed. By an order,
dated March 10, 1954, said court overruled this objection and granted said petition. Hence, the case is before us on appeal taken,
from said order, by Amanda Eusebio, and her aforementioned sister and brothers.
The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on November 28, 1952, for Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court,
provides:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizens or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate, in the Court of
First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so
far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was, and had always been, domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga, where he had his home, as well as some other properties. Inasmuch as his heart was in bad condition and his son, Dr.
Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City, on October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a house
and lot at 889-A Espaa Extention, in said City (Exhibit 2). While transferring his belongings to this house, soon thereafter, the
decedent suffered a stroke (probably heart failure), for which reason Dr. Eusebio took him to his (Dr. Eusebio's) aforementioned
residence, where the decedent remained until he was brought to the UST Hospital, in the City of Manila, sometimes before November
26, 1952. On this date, he contracted marriage in articulo mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion Villanueva, in said hospital.
Two (2) days later, he died therein of "acute left ventricular failure secondary to hypertensive heart disease", at the age of seventyfour (74) years (Exhibit A). Consequently, he never stayed or even slept in said house at Espaa Extention.
It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for
over seventy (70) years, the presumption is that he retained such domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory
proof to the contrary, for it is well-settled that "a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained" (Minor, Conflict of
Laws, p.70; Restatement of the Law on Conflict of Laws, p. 47; In re Estate of Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78). Under the circumstances
surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another domicile, it must have been one of choice, for which the following
conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3)
intention to stay therein permanently (Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110; Googrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 169; Velilla vs. Posadas, 62
Phil., 624; Zuellig vs. Republic of the Philippines, 46 Off. Gaz. Suppl. No. 11, p. 220). Admittedly, the decedent was juridically capable
of choosing a domicile and had been in Quezon City several days prior to his demise. Thus, the issue narrows down to whether he
intended to stay in that place permanently.
There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent appears to have manifested his wish to live indefinitely in said
city. His son, petitioner-appellee, who took the witness stand, did not testify thereon, despite the allegation, in his answer to the
aforemention, opposition of the appellants herein, that "the deceased (had) decided to reside . . . for the rest of his life, in Quezon
City". Moreover, said appellee did not introduce the testimony of his legitimate full brother and son of the decedent, Dr. Jesus
Eusebio, upon whose advice, presumably, the house and lot at No. 889-A Espaa Extention was purchased, and who, therefore, might
have cast some light on his (decedent's) purpose in buying said property. This notwithstanding, the lower court held that the
decedent's intent to stay permanently in Quezon City is "manifest" from the acquisition of said property and the transfer of his
belonging thereto. This conclusion is untenable.lawphil.net

The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent because he had been adviced to do so "due to his illness", in the
very words of herein appellee. It is not improbable in fact, its is very likely that said advice was given and followed in order that
the patient could be near his doctor and have a more effective treatment. It is well settled that "domicile is not commonly changed by
presence in a place merely for one's own health", even if coupled with "knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of
illness, to return home." (The Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, pp. 172-173; see, also, Shenton vs. Abbott, Md., 15., A. 2d. 906;
U.S. vs. Knight, D. C. Mont., 291 Fed. 129).
Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Moreover, some of his children, who used to
live with him in San Fernando, Pampanga, remained in that municipality. Then, again, in the deed Exhibit 2, by virtue of which said
property at No. 889-A Espaa Extention, Quezon City, was conveyed to him, on October 29, 1952, or less than a month before his
death, the decedent gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. Similarly, the "A" and "B" residence certificates used by the
decedent in aknowledging said Exhibit 2, before a notary public, was issued in San Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly, the marriage
contract Exhibit 1, signed by the deceased when he was married, in articulo mortis, to Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST Hospital, on
November 26, 1952, or two (2) days prior to his demise, stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga. It is worthy of notice
that Alfonso Eusebio, one of the legitimate full brothers of the herein appellee, was a witness to said wedding, thus indicating that the
children of the deceased by his first marriage, including said appellee, were represented on that occasion and would have objected to
said statement about his residence, if it were false. Consequently, apart from appellee's failure to prove satisfactory that the
decedent had decided to establish his home in Quezon City, the acts of the latter, shortly and immediately before his death, prove
the contrary. At any rate, the presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile 1 which is particularly strong when the
domicile is one of the origin 2as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said decedent has not been offset by the
evidence of record.
The lower court, however, rejected said Exhibits 1 and 2, upon being offered in evidence, and refused to entertain the same in the
order appealed from. The reason therefor are deducible from its resolution in rejecting said documents during the hearing of the
incident at bar. The court then held:
Exihibits "1" and "2" are rejecting but the same may be attached to the records for whatever action oppositors may want to
take later on because until now the personality of the oppositors has not been established whether or not they have a right
to intervene in this case, and the Court cannot pass upon this question as the oppositors refuse to submit to the jurisdiction
of this Court and they maintain that these proceedings should be dismissed. (P. 10, t. s. n.)
In short, the lower court believed that said documents should not be admitted in evidence before appellants had established their
"personality" to intervene in the case, referring seemingly to their filiation. When appellants, however, sought, during said hearing, to
establish their relation with the deceased, as his alleged illegitimate children, His Honor, the trial Judge sustained appellee's objection
thereto stating:
Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of this Court, and it seems that you are now trying to prove the status of
your client; you are leading so that. The main point here is your contention that the deceased was never a resident of
Quezon City and that is why I allowed you to cross-examine. If you are trying to establish the status of the oppositors, I will
sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court. This is not yet the time to declare who are
persons who should inherit. (p. 1, t. s. n.)
Thus, the lower court refused to consider appellant's evidence on the domicile of the decedent, because of their alleged lack of
"personality", but, when tried to establish such "personality", they were barred from doing so on account of the question of venue
raised by him. We find ourselves unable to sanction either the foregoing procedure adopted by the lower court or the inference it
drew from the circumstances surrounding the case.
To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent positions. While, on the one hand, he declared that appellants could
not be permitted to introduce evidence on the residence of the decedent, for they contestedthe jurisdiction of court, on the other
hand, he held, in the order appealed from, that, by cross-examining the appellee, said appellants had submitted themselves to the
authority of the court.
What is more, this conclusion is refuted by the record. At the beginning of the hearing, in the lower court, appellants' counsel
announced that he would take part therein "only to question the jurisdiction, for the purpose of dismissing this proceeding," (p. 2,
t.s.n.). During the cross-examination of petitioner herein, said counsel tried to elicit the relation between the decedent and the
appellants. As, the appellee objected thereto, the court said, addressing appellants' counsel: "Your stand until now is to question the
jurisdiction of the court. . . . It you are trying to establish the status of the oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless you want to
submit to the jurisdiction of the court" (p. 7, t.s.n.). Thereupon, appellants' counsel refused to do so, stating: "I will insist on my
stand." Then, too, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court rejected Exhibits 1 and 2, for the reason that appellants "refuse to
submit to the jurisdiction of this court and they maintain that these proceedings should bedismissed." Thus, appellants specially
made of record that they were not submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only of assailing the
same, and the court felt that appellants were not giving up their stand, which was, and is, a fact.

At any rate, appellants were entitled to establish facts tending to prove, not only their right to object to appellee's petition, but, also,
that venue had been laid improperly. Such facts were: (a) their alleged relationship with the decedent, 3 which, if true, entitle them to
proceed him under the Civil Code of the Philippines; and (b) his alleged residence is Pampanga. In other words, the lower court should
have admitted Exhibits 1 and 2 in evidence and given thereto the proper effect, in connection with the issue under consideration.
Appellee, however, asks: "What will happen if this case be dismissed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction or improper venue?" In this connection, it appears that on November 14, 1953, the Clerk of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga received a petition of appellants herein, dated November 4, 1953, for the settlement of the "Intestate Estate of
the late Don Andres Eusebio". Attached to said petition was petition for the docketing thereof free charge, pursuant to Rule 3, section
22, of the Rules of Court. The latter petition was granted by an order dated November 16, 1953, which was received by the cashier of
said court on November 17, 1953, on which date the case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 957. On December 14, 1953,
Jesus, Eugenio, Amando and Alfonso, all surnamed Eusebio (the children of the decedent by first marriage, including petitioner
herein), moved for the dismissal of said proceedings, owing to the pendency of the present case, before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, since November 16, 1953. This motion was granted in an order dated December 21, 1953, relying upon the above Rule 75,
section 1, of the Rules of Court, pursuant to which "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case at bar. Said order did not pass upon the question of domicile
or residence of the decedent. Moreover, in granting the court first taking cognizance of the case exclusive jurisdiction over the same,
said provision of the Rules of Court evidently refers to cases triable before two or more courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not
possibly have intended to deprive a competent court of the authority vested therein by law, merely because a similar case had been
previously filed before a court to which jurisdiction is denied by law, for the same would then be defeated by the will of one of the
parties. More specially, said provision refers mainly to non-resident decedents who have properties in several provinces in the
Philippines, for the settlement of their respective estates may undertaken before the court of first instance of either one of said
provinces, not only because said courts then have concurrent jurisdiction and, hence, the one first taking cognizance of the case
shall exclude the other courts but, also, because the statement to this effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of the Court
immediately follows the last part of the next preceding sentence, which deals with non-resident decedents, whose estate may settled
the court of first instance of any province in which they have properties.lawphil.net
In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:
. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of
his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted in two or more courts, and the question of venue
is raised before the same, the court in which the first case was filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so
held in the case of Taciana Vda. De Borja vs. Tan, L-7792 (July 27, 1955). Should it be decided, in the proceedings before the said
court, that venue had been improperly laid, the case pending therein should be dismissed and the corresponding proceedings may,
thereafter, be initiated in the proper court.
In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the Court of First
Instance of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid
improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have sustained appellants' opposition and dismissed appellee's petition.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and appellee's petition is dismissed, with costs against the appellee. It is so
ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna,
Branch Vl, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and
PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents.
Francisco Carreon for petitioners.
Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents.

MARTIN, J.:
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court,
referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a
special administrator is sought to be reviewed.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar,
a petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a
property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba,
Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as
special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served
upon all persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a
regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special
administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be
appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing.
While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to
remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of
May 8, 1973 that her appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia
G. Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the
court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in theBayanihan, a weekly publication of general
circulation in Southern Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia
G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified the original petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the
deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last place of residence
was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia;
(3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G.
Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and
(4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission of this supplemental petition was opposed by
Preciosa B. Garcia for the reason, among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of
which the court was not possessed at the beginning because the original petition was deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental petitions for letters of administration, raising
the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G
Fule as special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for authority to take possession of properties of the
decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the
power of the special administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal and real properties making up the state of the
deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the
motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and
admitting the supplementation petition of May 18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in
interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is
not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix,
reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an
illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the special administratrix from taking
possession of properties in the hands of third persons which have not been determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to

remove the special administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the interest of the estate; and still another, filed in
behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by
Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the special administratrix are those
provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1 subject only to the previous qualification made by the court that the
administration of the properties subject of the marketing agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association should remain with the latter; and that the special administratrix had already been authorized in a previous order of
August 20, 1973 to take custody and possession of all papers and certificates of title and personal effects of the decedent with the
Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any qualifying
words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue of
jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment
of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of
administration in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B.
Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special and
regular administratrix of the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar,
in view of previous court order limiting the authority of the special administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia
also asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina
B. Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and
remove the special administratrix, and the second, holding that the power allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct
and submit an inventory of the assets of the estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19,
1973, insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b)
venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special
administratrix of checks and papers and effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January
7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba
Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the statement of
accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the estate; another, directing
Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the estate; and another, directing Ramon
Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the
word "single" or "married to Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death
certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia
presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before his death his residence was in Quezon
City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and
preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge
Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that
court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss the
criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing
the delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc.
27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by
certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on
February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as
Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved
for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B.
Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the office.

For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge
Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30,
1975. She manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling
the proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it being the subject of a
motion for reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court
of the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11,
1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated
in the previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the parties had already filed their respective briefs; and
that the case is still pending before the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent
Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud
of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul
the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Pao from further acting in the case. A restraining order
was issued on February 9, 1976.
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons and considerations
hereinafter stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court
of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court
of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to letters
of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the
existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last
residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of the
person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last
residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and
that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is
conferred on the court to grant letters of administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates:
"Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the
subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is
one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and
was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply
directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not
exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to
exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may
thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to
sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with
the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the
place of residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court,
however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased
in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over
the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the
province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 6

2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the
decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should
be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes
and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.
It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 11
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at
the time of his death. In her original petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna,
Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the
City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of
venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property
owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B.
Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other
papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her
amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna."
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel
Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the
time of his death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and
also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside
from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power
of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in certain
parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show
in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that
the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba,
Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised
Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case before Us the
Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not
necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of
a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule
fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B.
Garcia claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting
letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may
appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are
decided and executors or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only proper when the
allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such
appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot
agree among themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate court. 15That,
however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule,
his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the
same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into account in the
appointment of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order of preference in the appointment of a
regular administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all others in this respect is
the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession
over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would
have as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad
administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a property. 18
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force,
Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate
sister of the latter, incapable of any successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the
appointment of special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and
subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share in the

estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of
distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of
distribution. 21 The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased
Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In
his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the First District of Laguna filed on
September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,
Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. 24
5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority
over all inferior courts may properly decree that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City
and that it is in the interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special administratrix over the latter's estate be
approved and authorized and the Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be
required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.
6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975, granting the "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate
Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang
Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate obligations is hereby
upheld.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby
denied, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973

ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO
MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34104-R, promulgated 21 November 1964,
and its subsequent Resolution promulgated 8 July 1964 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:
On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his widow, the
herein petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y
Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco,
Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal
age and residing in Cebu.
On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator) 1 respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R), alleging among other things, that the late senator

died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and
personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 10
April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the heirs and interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof at
LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Cebu.
The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and modified one released on 13 March 1964, in view of
the fact that the petition was to be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu court. On the same date, a third order was
further issued stating that respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the appointment of a special administrator dated 4 March 1964
was not yet ready for the consideration of the said court, giving as reasons the following:
It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this
proceeding, the requisite publication of the notice of hearing not yet having been complied with. Moreover, copies
of the petition have not been served on all of the heirs specified in the basic petition for the issuance of letters of
administration. 2
In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the Cebu petition) herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano
Cuenco filed a petition with the court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased's last will and
testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and
testament. The said proceeding was docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-7898.
Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu court an Opposition
and Motion to Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8
April 1964. On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until
after the Court of First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probate of that document purporting to be the last
will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco." 3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to the probateproceedings in
the Quezon City court was neither excepted to nor sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu court nor did
they challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts.
Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 10 April 1964,opposing probate of the
will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as
executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No.
2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue.
In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal reason the "precedence of
probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding." 4 The said court further found in said order that theresidence of the late senator at
the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent portion of said order follows:
On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the opposition and motion to dismiss reads as follows:
"that since the decedent Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a resident of the City of Cebu at the time of his death, the
aforesaid petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March 1964 was not filed with the proper Court (wrong
venue) in view of the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73 of the New Rules of Court ...". From the aforequoted
allegation, the Court is made to understand that the oppositors do not mean to say that the decedent being a
resident of Cebu City when he died, the intestate proceedings in Cebu City should prevail over the probate
proceedings in Quezon City, because as stated above the probate of the will should take precedence, but that the
probate proceedings should be filed in the Cebu City Court of First Instance. If the last proposition is the desire of
the oppositors as understood by this Court, that could not also be entertained as proper because paragraph 1 of the
petition for the probate of the will indicates that Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his death was a resident
of Quezon City at 69 Pi y Margal. Annex A (Last Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the petition for
probate of the will shows that the decedent at the time when he executed his Last Will clearly stated that he is a
resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and also of the City of Cebu. He made the former as his
first choice and the latter as his second choice of residence." If a party has two residences, the one will be deemed
or presumed to his domicile which he himself selects or considers to be his home or which appears to be the center
of his affairs. The petitioner, in thus filing the instant petition before this Court, follows the first choice of residence
of the decedent and once this court acquires jurisdiction of the probate proceeding it is to the exclusion of all
others. 5
Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City court's said order of 11 April 1964 asserting its exclusive
jurisdiction over the probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court was denied on 27 April 1964 and a second motion for
reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was likewise denied.
On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for probate of the last will of the decedent was called three
times at half-hour intervals, but notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors appeared and the Quezon City court
proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the hearing in their absence.

As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City court noted that respondents-oppositors had opposed
probate under their opposition and motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary or some
other persons for his benefit;
(c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the testator acted by mistake and did not intend
that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time he affixed his signature thereto. 6
The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of the hearing had been duly complied with and that
all the heirs had been duly notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of the three instrumental witnesses to the
decedent's last will, namely Atty. Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the notary public, Atty. Braulio
A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last will, and the documentary evidence (such as the decedent's residence certificates, income tax
return, diplomatic passport, deed of donation) all indicating that the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon City, as
also affirmed by him in his last will, the Quezon City court in its said order of 15 May 1964 admitted to probate the late senator's last
will and testament as having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all formalities of the law" and appointed
petitioner-widow as executrix of his estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as probated.
Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix
thereof, respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent Court of
Appeals (docketed as case CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with case No. Q-7898.
On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondents (petitioners therein) and against the herein
petitioner, holding that:
Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person,
covers both testate and intestate proceedings. Sp. Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that
court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. It is that court which can properly and
exclusively pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether the decedent left or did not leave a valid will, and (2)
whether or not the decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death.
Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI (Special Proceeding 2433-R), it follows
that the said court must exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for probate was
filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-7898). The said respondent should assert her
rights within the framework of the proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another court.
The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964, Judge Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI,
acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R, stated that the petition for appointment of special administrator was "not yet ready for
the consideration of the Court today. It would be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly
acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding ... . " It is sufficient to state in this connection that the said judge was
certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the
moment a petition is filed, but only to theexercise of jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all
events, jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and does not depend on the pronouncements of a trial
judge.
The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and directing the respondent Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, and the respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain perpetually from proceeding
and taking any action in Special Proceeding Q-7898 pending before the said respondent court. All orders heretofore
issued and actions heretofore taken by said respondent court and respondent Judge, therein and connected
therewith, are hereby annulled. The writ of injunction heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein
petition for review on certiorari.
The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition
against the Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with the testateproceedings and annulling and setting
aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the decedent's last will and testament and appointing
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond in compliance with the testator's express wish in his testament. This issue is tied

up with the issue submitted to the appellate court, to wit, whether the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings filed with it, in pursuance
of the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings
that it (the Quezon City court) should first act "on the petition for probate of the document purporting to be the last will and
testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco" - which order of the Cebu court respondents never questioned nor challenged
by prohibition or certiorari proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon City court to proceed without any impediment or obstruction,
once it denied respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion to dismiss the probate proceeding for alleged lack of jurisdiction or improper
venue, toproceed with the hearing of the petition and to admit the will to probate upon having been satisfied as to its due execution
and authenticity.
The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon
City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its
admission to probate of the deceased's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond
pursuant to the deceased testator's express wish, for the following considerations:
1. The Judiciary Act 7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over "all matter of probate, both of
testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue, as the very
caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict among the different courts which otherwise may properly assume
jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The cited Rule provides:
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time
of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the Province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of the province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence, of the decedent, or
of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73) 8
It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject
matter but merely of venue. This was lucidly stated by the late Chief Justice Moran inSy Oa vs. Co Ho 9 as follows:
We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate cases the place of residence of the deceased
is regarded as a question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter. But we decline to follow this view because of its
mischievous consequences. For instance, a probate case has been submitted in good faith to the Court of First
Instance of a province where the deceased had not resided. All the parties, however, including all the creditors,
have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the case is therein completely finished except for a
claim of a creditor who also voluntarily filed it with said court but on appeal from an adverse decision raises for the
first time in this Court the question of jurisdiction of the trial court for lack of residence of the deceased in the
province. If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court over the
subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents
which have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same case will have to be commenced
anew before another court of the same rank in another province. That this is ofmischievous effect in the prompt
administration of justice is too obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206,
December 31, 1942) Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, 10 providing that the estate of a deceased person
shall be settled in the province where he had last resided, could not have been intended as defining the jurisdiction
of the probate court over the subject-matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure
dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure is one thing and
jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney-General vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The
law of jurisdiction Act No. 136, 11 Section 56, No. 5 confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all
probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are many courts of
First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where
each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where
the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue".
It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or intestate petition is first
filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.
The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estateof a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."

A fair reading of the Rule since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction indicates that
the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise
jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in another court
where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the
allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take
cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the
petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.
2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued
its order holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the
petition for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the
Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to
be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by
its act of deference, the Cebu court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the question between the parties whether the
decedent's residence at the time of his death was in Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as
claimed by respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it and
instead defer to the Quezon City court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as to the probate petition and the residence
of the decedent within its territory and venue.
3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in
declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court.
Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on
the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and
must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule
only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the
consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court their opposition to probate of the will, but
failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the appellate court did, to
have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in
accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition.
4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
authority against respondent appellate court's questioned decision.

12

with facts analogous to the present case

13

is

In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over intestate proceedings in this wise:
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person,
whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a
proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled
jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take
precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course
of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will,
proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that state an
administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate
in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This however, is understood to be without prejudice that
should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already
adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings. 14
The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this case, the Quezon City court) although opining that
certain considerations therein "would seem to support the view that [therein respondent] should have submitted said will for probate
to the Negros Court, [in this case, the Cebu court] either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose
filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344," 15 thus:

But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the
petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had no
jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect, and, in the light of the
circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right
to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that
petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio
Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was
served with notice of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the
petition for its probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for
the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed
with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the
dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only
to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five months
earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the
probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396
would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul
proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result
would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like
the present where the objection against said proceedings is raised too late. 16
5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of the will
duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the firstchoice of residence of the decedent, who
had his conjugal home and domicile therein with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court could not be contested
except by appeal from said court in the original case. The last paragraph of said Rule expressly provides:
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)
The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record" could probably be properly invoked, had
such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise shown
that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.
6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the late senator, the appellate court while recognizing that
"the issue is a legitimate one" held in reliance on Borja vs. Tan 17 that.
... The issue of residence comes within the competence of whichever court is considered to prevail in the exercise
jurisdiction - in this case, the Court of First Instance of Cebu as held by this Court. Parenthetically, we note that the
question of the residence of the deceased is a serious one, requiring both factual and legal resolution on the basis
of ample evidence to be submitted in the ordinary course of procedure in the first instance, particularly in view of
the fact that the deceased was better known as the Senator from Cebu and the will purporting to be his also gives
Cebu, besides Quezon City, as his residence. We reiterate that this matter requires airing in the proper court, as so
indicated in the leading and controlling case of Borja vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al., G.R. L-7792, July 27, 1955.
In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to
the testate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to determine the residence of the
decedent and whether he did leave a last will and testament upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate proceedings,
Cebu or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus determined in effect for both courts at the behest and with the deference
and consent of the Cebu court thatQuezon City was the actual residence of the decedent who died testate and therefore
the proper venue, the Borja ruling would seem to have no applicability. It would not serve the practical ends of justice to still require
the Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to be held applicable and as indicated in the decision under review, to determine for itself the
actual residence of the decedent (when the Quezon City court had already so determined Quezon City as the actual residence at the
Cebu court's behest and respondents have not seriously questioned this factual finding based on documentary evidence) and if the
Cebu court should likewise determine Quezon City as the actual residence, or its contrary finding reversed on appeal, only then to
allow petitioner-widow after years of waiting and inaction to institute the corresponding proceedings in Quezon City.
7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is taken into consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires
that the petition for allowance of a will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as
held by the Court in Fernando vs. Crisostomo 18 " are the death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province
where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such province."

This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that "(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by
publication as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the
judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State.The probate of a will by a court having jurisdiction thereof is
conclusive as to its due execution and validity." 19 The Quezon City court acted regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were to be
conceded that Quezon City was not the proper venue notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to it,) in admitting
the decedent's last will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's action
should not be set aside by a writ of prohibition for supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate court's appealed decision, and
should instead be sustained in line with Uriarte, supra, where the Court, in dismissing the certiorari petition challenging the Manila
court's action admitting the decedent's will to probate and distributing the estate in accordance therewith in the second proceeding,
held that "it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter
was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar
jurisdiction." As stressed by Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect in the administration of justice" of
considering the question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start
all over again the same proceedings before another court of the same rank in another province "is too obvious to require comment."
8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of the decedent's relatives gets first to file a petition for
settlement of the decedent's estate, then the established jurisprudence of the Court that Rule 73, section 1 provides only a rule
of venue in order to preclude different courts which may properly assumejurisdiction from doing so and creating conflicts between
them to the detriment of the administration of justice, and that venue is waivable, would be set at naught. As between relatives who
unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it would be converted into a race as to who can file the petition faster in the court of his/her
choice regardless of whether the decedent is still in cuerpo presente and in disregard of the decedent's actual last domicile, the fact
that he left a last will and testament and the right of his surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such dire consequences were
certainly not intended by the Rule nor would they be in consonance with public policy and the orderly administration of justice.
9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under all the applicable rules of venue, and despite the fact
that the Cebu court (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate petition in the Cebu court earlier by a week's time on 5
March 1964) deferred to the Quezon City court where petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12, 1964) after the decedent's
death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the decedent's last will and petitioned for letters testamentary and is admittedly entitled
to preference in the administration of her husband's estate, 20 would be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all the
way to Cebu and submit anew the decedent's will there for probate either in a new proceeding or by asking that the intestate
proceedings be converted into a testate proceeding when under the Rules, the proper venue for the testate proceedings, as per the
facts of record and as already affirmed by the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-widow had their
conjugal domicile.
It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle
his estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to
spend much more time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of
the estate to take up with the probate court.
It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule 73, section 2, 21 since petitioner's marriage has been
dissolved with the death of her husband, their community property and conjugal estate have to beadministered and liquidated in the
estate proceedings of the deceased spouse. Under the appealed decision, notwithstanding that petitioner resides in Quezon City, and
the proper venue of the testate proceeding was in Quezon City and the Quezon City court properly took cognizance and exercised
exclusive jurisdiction with the deference in comity and consent of the Cebu court, such proper exercise of jurisdiction would be
nullified and petitioner would have to continually leave her residence in Quezon City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate
even her own community property and conjugal estate with the decedent.
10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of
discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and instead deferring to thetestate proceedings filed just a week
later by petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of the decedent's last will, since the record before it (the petitioner's
opposition and motion to dismiss) showed the falsityof the allegation in the intestate petition that the decedent had died without a
will. It is noteworthy that respondents never challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of 10 April
1964 deferring to the probate proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's
order of deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit the decedent's will to probate.
For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of
discretion in admitting the decedent's will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance with its testamentary
disposition, in the light of the settled doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of venue, not of
jurisdiction.
Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of May 15, 1964 admitting the will to probate and
appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction to issue said order, the said order of probate has
long since become final and can not be overturned in a special civic action of prohibition.

11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority over all inferior courts, 22 it may
properly determine, as it has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by and transferredto the Quezon City
court and that it is the interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over
the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference and consent of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will
and testament and appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and
all its orders and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved and authorized rather than to annul all such
proceedings regularly had and to repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once more to the
Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the strength
of incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the decedent.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104R) is ordered dismissed. No costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Fernando and Castro, JJ., took no part.

G.R. No. 133743

February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029

February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the
Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17,
1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15,
1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14,
1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer,
Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but
lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On
December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP.
Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico
Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six
children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive,
valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal
partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on
the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration
should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He further
claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at
the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10 of the petition. On
February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted
documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to
their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of
absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee

had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2,
26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14

13

Article

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying
their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to
validate respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the
Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge
Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of
the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for
disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S.
Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for
reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it
was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order
presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

21

granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134

On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and
legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence
set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June
14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce
dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It
also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of
Felicisimos legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration

26

and for the disqualification

27

of Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied.

28

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated
February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated
February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence
or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his
functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was
properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo
and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent.
Thus
With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van
Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, there is no justiciable reason to sustain the
individual view sweeping statement of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic
policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should
do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on

December 14, 1992,32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage
between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration

34

which were denied by the Court of Appeals.

On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari.
motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36

35

Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our
rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any
given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed during the
subsistence of the latters marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it
would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of
Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in
the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of
Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence as contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides,"
like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or
rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed
as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention
to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election
cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing
the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court,
the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that
a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also
maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of
Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the
address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the
deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48from 1988 to 1990 sent by the
deceaseds children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100
San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of
his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has
territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was
still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction
over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was
validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the
issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that
Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In
resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that
there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently
dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien
spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized
the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the
divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed.
794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing
status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one
party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in
the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the
bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married to the alien
spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should
not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad.
In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court
stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling
in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil
Code provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The
ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to
remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr.
Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III,
Family Code were discussed, to wit:

62

the historical background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code,"
which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law,
amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge
Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. TheVan Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse.
With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established
through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no
possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment
between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital
bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against
the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are
concerned. However, in light of this Courts rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated
against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that,
in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent.
An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we
must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them
just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice
may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal
command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish
continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an

essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming
that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed
Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as
well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific
guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done
in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry
Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal
personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards
the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the
decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person
and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of
their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may
be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who
live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions
belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148
of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples
living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described
the property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other,
but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their
respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry.
Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the
parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case,
asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the
partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise
from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family
Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of
the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners
motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 144915

February 23, 2004

CAROLINA CAMAYA, FERDINAND CAMAYA, EDGARDO CAMAYA and ANSELMO MANGULABNAN,petitioners

vs.
BERNARDO PATULANDONG, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Court of Appeals Decision dated June 19, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 53757, "In re: Petition for the Probate of the Codicil (Will) of Rufina
Reyes; Bernardo Patulandong v. Anselmo Mangulabnan v. Carolina G. Camaya, Ferdinand Camaya and Edgardo Camaya."
On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a notarized will wherein she devised, among others, Lot No. 288-A to her
grandson Anselmo Mangulabnan (Mangulabnan). The pertinent portion of her will reads:
IKALIMA. - Aking inihahayag at ginagawa na tagapagmana, sa aking kusang loob, ang pinalaki kong APO na si ANSELMO P.
MANGULABNAN, may sapat na gulang, kasal kay Flora Umagap, at naninirahan sa San Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, at anak ng aking
anak na si SIMPLICIA, at sa aking APO na si ANSELMO ay aking ipinagkakaloob at ipinamamana, sa aking pagkamatay,
ang mga sumusunod kong pagaari:
LOT NO.

TITLE NO.

KINALALAGYAN NABANGGIT SA

288-A

NT-47089

Sta. Cruz (1) p. 2

3348-A

100629

Poblacion (2) p. 2

3349-B

100630

Poblacion (3) p. 2

xxx1 (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)

The testatrixs son Bernardo Patulandong (Patulandong), respondent herein, was in the will appointed as the executor.
During her lifetime, the testatrix herself filed a petition for the probate of her will before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Nueva Ecija where it was docketed as Sp. Pro. No. 128.
By Order2 of January 11, 1973, the CFI admitted the will to probate.
On June 27, 1973, the testatrix executed a codicil modifying above-quoted paragraph five of her will in this wise:
UNA. - Ang Lote No. 288-A na nakalagay sa barrio ng Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, magsukat 36,384 metro cuadrados, at
nagtataglay ng TCT No. NT-47089, na aking ipinamana sa aking apong si ANSELMO P.MANGULABNAN, sangayon sa Pangkat IKALIMA, pp. 5-6, ng aking HULING HABILIN (Testamento), ay ipinasiya kong ipagkaloob at ipamana sa aking mga anak na sina
BERNARDO, SIMPLICIA, GUILLERMA at JUAN nagaapellidong PATULANDONG, at sa aking apong si ANSELMO P. MANGULABNAN, sa
magkakaparehong bahagi na tig-ikalimang bahagi bawat isa sa kanila.
IKALAWA. - Na maliban sa pagbabagong ito, ang lahat ng mga tadhana ng aking HULING HABILIN ay aking pinagtitibay na muli.
x x x3 (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied) On May 14, 1988, the testatrix died.
Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to him by executor Patulandong of the title to Lot 288-A. Patulandong refused to heed the
request, however, in view of the codicil which modified the testators will.
Mangulabnan thus filed an "action for partition" against Patulandong with the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, docketed as
Civil Case No. 552 (the partition case).

On June 8, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision in the partition case, 4 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the court orders the partitioning of the properties and the defendant to deliver the copy of the Transfer Certificate of
Title No. NT-47089.
However, in view of the case cited by the plaintiff himself, the court holds that the partition is without prejudice
[to]... the probate of the codicil in accordance with the Rules of Court, [P]alacios vs. Catimbang Palacios cited by the plaintiff:
"After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the
same before his death. Should he make a new will, it would also be allowable of his petition and if he should die before he had a
chance to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceedings after the testators death would be in order."
The Court also orders that the right of the tenants of the agricultural land in question should be protected meaning to say that the
tenants should not be ejected. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On July 17, 1989 Patulandong filed before the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija a petition 5 for probate of the codicil of the testatrix,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 218.
On December 28, 1989, the probate court issued an Order 6 setting the petition for hearing and ordering the publication of said order.
On February 7, 1991, by virtue of the decision in the partition case, Mangulabnan caused the cancellation of the title of the testatrix
over Lot No. 288-A and TCT No. NT-2157507 was issued in his name.
Mangulabnan later sold to herein petitioners Camayas Lot No. 288-A by a Deed of Sale dated February 19, 1991. 8 TCT No. NT-215750
was thus cancelled and TCT No. NT-2164469 was issued in the name of the Camayas.
On January 16, 1996, the trial rendered a decision 10 in Sp. Proc. No. 218 admitting the codicil to probate and disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in the following manner:
1. Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-215750 issued by the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija in the name of
Anselmo Mangulabnan dated February 7, 1991 and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by him in favor of the intervenors
Carolina, Ferdinand and Edgardo, all surnamed Camaya on February 19, 1991 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-216446
under date March 18, 1991 issued in the names of the above-named intervenors as NULL and VOID and of no force and
effect; and,
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel Transfer of Certificate of Title Nos. NT-215750 and NT-216446 and
reissue the corresponding Certificate of Titles to Bernardo R. Patulandong, Filipino, married to Gorgonia Mariano residing at
San Vicente, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Juan R. Patulandong, Filipino, widower and residing at San Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija;
Guillerma R. Patulandong Linsangan of legal age, Filipino, widow and residing at San Vicente, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Simplicia
R. Patulandong Mangulabnan, of legal age, widow, and residing at San Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija and her grandson,
Anselmo Mangulabnan with full personal circumstances stated herein to the extent of one fifth (1/5) each pursuant to the
approved codicil (will) of Rufina Reyes dated June 27, 1973. 11
The Camayas who had been allowed to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. 218, and Mangulabnan, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
above-said decision but it was denied by Order 12 of February 28,1996.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Camayas and Mangulabnan (hereinafter referred to as petitioners) raised the following errors:
1. THERE WERE SERIOUS SUBSTANTIAL DEPARTURES FROM THE FORMALITIES REQUIRED BY THE RULES, THE LAW, AND THE
AUTHORITY OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SETTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
2. THE OPPOSITOR DID NOT ONLY ACQUIRE LOT NO. 288-A BY WILL BUT HE ALSO ACQUIRED THE SAME BY PARTITION IN A
CIVIL CASE WHERE THE DECISION HAS ALREADY REACHED ITS FINALITY AND THEREFORE CAN NO LONGER BE NEGATED BY A
QUESTIONABLE CODICIL.
3. THAT THE SUBJECT LOT 288-A IS NO LONGER WITHIN THE REACHED (sic) OF THE PETITIONER CONSIDERING THAT THE
OPPOSITOR VENDOR HAD A CLEAN TITLE AND THAT THE INTERVENORS-VENDEED HAD ACQUIRED THE SAME BY WAY OF
SALE AS INNOCENT PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE.13
By Decision14 of June 19, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed that of the trial court.
Hence, the present petition for Review on Certiorari proffering the following issues:
1. Whether the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared null and void and ordered the cancellation of the
TCTs of petitioners and the deed of sale; and

2. Whether the final judgment in Civil Case No. 552 bars the allowance of the codicil.
As to the first issue, petitioners contend that the under the law, the probate court has no power, authority, and jurisdiction to declare
null and void the sale and titles of petitioners;15 and that the probate court can only resolve the following issues:
1. Whether or not the instrument which is offered for probate is the last will and testament of the decedent; in other words,
the question is one of identity[;]
2. Whether or not the will has been executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; in other words, the
question is one of due execution[; and]
3. Whether the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will; in other words, the question is
one of capacity.16
In Cuizon v. Ramolete,

17

this Court elucidated on the limited jurisdiction of a probate court, to wit:

It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine
title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that said court
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties
to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and
the opposing partieshave to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate
court cannot do so.
xxx
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of third parties and more important, covered by
a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the
respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority
to deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the property. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following Cuizon, the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further declared the deed of sale and the titles of petitioners null
and void, it having had the effect of depriving them possession and ownership of the property.
Moreover, following Section 48 of the Property Registry Decree which reads:
SECTION 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be
altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law,
petitioners titles cannot, under probate proceedings, be declared null and void.
As to the second issue, petitioners argue that by allowing the codicil to probate, it in effect amended the final judgment in the
partition case which is not allowed by law; 18 and that petitioner Camayas are innocent purchasers for value and enjoy the legal
presumption that the transfer was lawful.19
Petitioners first argument does not persuade.
Though the judgment in the partition case had become final and executory as it was not appealed, it specifically provided in its
dispositive portion that the decision was "without prejudice [to] ... the probate of the codicil."The rights of the prevailing
parties in said case were thus subject to the outcome of the probate of the codicil.
The probate court being bereft of authority to rule upon the validity of petitioners titles, there is no longer any necessity to dwell on
the merits of petitioners Camayas claim that they are innocent purchasers for value and enjoy the legal presumption that the
transfer was lawful.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 19, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 53757 affirming the January 16, 1996 Decision of Regional
Trial Court, Branch 35, of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
The decision allowing the codicil is AFFIRMED, but the 1) declaration as null and void of Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-215750
issued on February 7, 1991 by the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija in the name of Anselmo Mangulabnan, the February 19, 1991
Deed of Absolute Sale executed by him in favor of the intervenors - herein petitioners Carolina, Ferdinand and Edgardo Camaya, and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-216446 issued on March 18, 1991 in favor of the petitioners Camayas, and 2) the order for the
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel Transfer of Certificate of Title Nos. NT-215750 and NT-216446 and reissue the
corresponding Certificate of Titles to Bernardo R. Patulandong, Juan R. Patulandong, Guillerma R. Patulandong Linsangan, Simplicia R.
Patulandong Mangulabnan, and Anselmo Mangulabnan to the extent of one-fifth (1/5) each pursuant to the approved codicil are SET
ASIDE, without prejudice to respondent and his co-heirs ventilation of their right in an appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005

EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR AND HEIR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUELITA
CHING-PACIOLES, Petitioners,
vs.
MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING, Respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the people he leaves behind. For in death, a persons estate
remains, providing a fertile ground for discords that break the familial bonds. Before us is another case that illustrates such reality.
Here, a husband and a mother of the deceased are locked in an acrimonious dispute over the estate of their loved one.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr., herein petitioner, against Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein
respondent, assailing the Court of Appeals Decision 1 dated September 25, 1996 and Resolution2 dated January 27, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 41571.3 The Appellate Court affirmed the Order dated January 17, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, Quezon
City denying petitioners motion for partition and distribution of the estate of his wife, Miguelita Ching-Pacioles; and his motion for
reconsideration.
The facts are undisputed.
On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value of P10.5 million, stock investments
worth P518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to P6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her husband,
petitioner herein, and their two minor children.
Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition 4 for the settlement of Miguelitas estate. He prayed
that (a) letters of administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate be divided among the compulsory
heirs.
Miguelitas mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an opposition, specifically to petitioners prayer for the issuance
of letters of administration on the grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an administrator;
and (b) the bulk of Miguelitas estate is composed of "paraphernalproperties." Respondent prayed that the letters of
administration be issued to her instead.5 Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her appointment as special administratrix. 6
Petitioner moved to strike out respondents opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and material interest in the estate, she
not being a compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be appointed as administrator
under the law.7
Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave half of her inherited properties to
Miguelita on condition that both of them "would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of
business partners."8
In her omnibus motion9 dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to act as special administrator.

On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the
estate.10 Both were issued letters of administration after taking their oath and posting the requisite bond.
Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila Standard on September 12, 19, and 26, 1994. However,
no claims were filed against the estate within the period set by the Revised Rules of Court.
Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelitas estate. 11 Emmanuel did not submit an
inventory.
On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita. 12
On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion 13 praying, among others, that an Order be issued
directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs;
and 3) payment of attorneys fees.
Respondent opposed petitioners motion on the ground that the partition and distribution of the estate is "premature and
precipitate," considering that there is yet no determination "whether the properties specified in the inventory are conjugal,
paraphernal or owned in a joint venture." 14 Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelitas estate as an "heir and
co-owner." Thus, she prayed that a hearing be scheduled.
On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and attorneys fees but denied petitioners
prayer for partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed "premature." The intestate court ratiocinated as follows:
"On the partition and distribution of the deceaseds properties, among the declared heirs, the Court finds the prayer of petitioner in
this regard to be premature. Thus, a hearing on oppositors claim as indicated in her opposition to the instant petition is necessary to
determine whether the properties listed in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or the
paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a co-ownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in their
partnership venture."
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution dated May 7, 1996.
Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the intestate courts Order
dated January 17, 1996 and Resolution dated May 7, 1996 which denied petitioners prayer for partition and distribution of the estate
for being premature, indicating that it (intestate court) will first resolve respondents claim of ownership.
The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in issuing the challenged Order and Resolution, the intestate
court did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
The Appellate Court ruled:
"Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in entertaining private respondents
unsupported claim of ownership against the estate. In fact, there is no indication that the probate court has already made a finding of
title or ownership. It is inevitable that in probate proceedings, questions of collation or of advancement are involved for these are
matters which can be passed upon in the course of the proceedings. The probate court in exercising its prerogative to schedule a
hearing, to inquire into the propriety of private respondents claim, is being extremely cautious in determining the composition of the
estate. This act is not tainted with an iota of grave abuse of discretion."
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorarianchored on the
following assignments of error:
"I
RESPONDENT COURTS DECISION WHICH AFFIRMS THE INTESTATE COURTS ORDER IS A GRAVE ERROR FOR BEING CONTRARY TO THE
SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY OF THE LAW THAT ESTATE PROCEEDINGS MUST BE SETTLED EXPEDITIOUSLY.
II
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE INTESTATE COURTS ORDER TO CONDUCT HEARING ON THE
ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE, AS SAID FUNCTION IS OUTSIDE AND BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE
INTESTATE COURT.

III
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE INTESTATE COURTS ORDER AND RESOLUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
RESPONDENT CHINGS OWNERSHIP CLAIMS ARE CONFLICTING, FRIVOLOUS AND BASELESS."
The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership
involving properties claimed to be part of the decedents estate?
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to matters having to do
with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.15 The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises
special and limited jurisdiction.16
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of
ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. In such situations the
adjudication is merely incidental and provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,17 we held:
"x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for
the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate
properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive,
and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title."
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on
respondents claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose of the intestate
or probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property should
be included in the inventory. The facts of this case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.
First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and Opposition 18 dated September 18, 1995, respondent expressly
adopted the inventory prepared by petitioner, thus:
"6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his Amended Compliance dated October 6, 1994, and filed
only on November 4, 1994 not October 5, 1995 as erroneously asserted in Par. 12 of the Omnibus Motion. Oppositor, however, takes
exception to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties and reserves her right to submit a more accurate and realistic
pricing on each."
Respondent could have opposed petitioners inventory and sought the exclusion of the specific properties which she believed
or considered to be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory, taking exception only to the low valuation
placed on the real estate properties.
And second, Emmanuel, respondents son and representative in the settlement of Miguelitas estate, did not submit his own
inventory. His mandate, as co-administrator, is "to submit within three (3) months after his appointment a true inventory and
appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased which have come into his possession or knowledge." 19 He could have
submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those properties which respondent considered to be hers. The fact that
he did not endeavor to submit one shows that he acquiesced with petitioners inventory.
Obviously, respondents purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what properties should or should not be
included in the inventory. She wanted something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate court a final determination of her
claim of ownership over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelitas estate. The intestate court went along with
respondent on this point as evident in its Resolution20 dated May 7, 1996, thus:
"On petitioners motion for partition and distribution of the estate of the late Miguelita Ching Pacioles, it is believed that since
oppositor had interposed a claim against the subject estate, the distribution thereof in favor of the heirs could not possibly be
implemented as there is still a need for appropriate proceedings to determine the propriety of oppositors claim. It must be mentioned
that if it is true that oppositor owns the bulk of the properties, which she allegedly placed/registered in the name of the deceased for
convenience, Oppositor, therefore, has a material and direct interest in the estate and hence, should be given her day in Court."
It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set by the intestate court was actually to "determine
the propriety of oppositors (respondents) claim." According to the intestate court, "if it is true that the oppositor
(respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelitas) properties," then it means that she has a"material and direct interest in the
estate" and, hence, "she should be given her day in court." The intended "day in court" or hearing is geared towards resolving
the propriety of respondents contention that she is the true owner of the bulk of Miguelitas estate.

Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondents ingenious attempt to secure a proceeding for the purpose of resolving her blanket
claim against Miguelitas estate. Although, she made it appear that her only intent was to determine the accuracy of petitioners
inventory, however, a close review of the facts and the pleadings reveals her real intention.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a
hands-off stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a
question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other
person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and
his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate
court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.21 Jurisprudence teaches us that:
"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties
to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so."22
Hence, respondents recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate
forum for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate.
Now, even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make a provisional or prima facie determination of the issue of
ownership, still respondents claim cannot prosper. It bears stressing that the bulk of Miguelitas estate, as stated in petitioners
inventory, comprises real estates covered by the Torrens System which are registered either in the name of Miguelita alone or with
petitioner. As such, they are considered the owners of the properties until their title is nullified or modified in an
appropriate ordinary action. We find this Courts pronouncement in Bolisay vs. Alcid23 relevant, thus:
"It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand,
petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in
the manner indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in
special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. x x x
x x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the
presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the
contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified
or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself
is in the persons named in the title. x x x"
Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The Property Registration Decree," proscribes collateral attack against Torrens Title,
hence:
"Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law."
Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to present convincing evidence to bolster her bare assertion of
ownership. We quote her testimony, thus:
"Q: I now direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on page 1 of this sworn statement of yours which I quote:" In accordance
with the Chinese tradition and culture in the distribution of properties to the legal heirs, we decided to give only a token to our
daughter Miguelita and leave the rest to our only son Emmanuel, with the undertaking that being the son he will take full
responsibility of the rest of the family despite his marriage. Madame witness, do you recall having stated that in your sworn
statement?
A: Yes sir, but it was not carried out.
Q What was actually given to your daughter Miguelita is only a token, is that right?
A: Not a token, sir, but one half of the share of the estate was given to Lita and the other half was given to Emmanuel.

Q: What went to Emmanuel was also , is that right?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What makes up the one half share of Lita, if you recall?
A: What was given to her were all checks, sir, but I cannot remember any more the amount.
xxxxxx
Q: Summing up your testimony, Madame, you cannot itemize the one half share of the estate of Miguelita, is that
right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was there any document covering this partition of the estate among you, Emmanuel and Miguelita with respect to
the estate of your late husband?
A: If I only knew that this will happen
Q: Samakatuwid po ay walang dokumento?
A: Wala po."24
She further testified as follows:
"Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of land, stocks, investments, bank accounts and deposits both
here and abroad, interests and participation in IFS Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies, Inc. and various motor
vehicles, per your pleasure, Madam Witness, how should these properties be partitioned or what should be done with
these properties? According to you earlier, you are agreeable for the partition of the said properties with Emil on a 5050 basis, is that right?
A: Kung ano po ang sa akin, iyon ang dapat na bumalik sa akin, sir.
Q Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels of land located in Pag-Asa, in Silangan, in San Lazaro, in
Sta. Cruz, in San Francisco del Monte and shares of stock. Alinsunod sa inyo, paano po ang dapat na partihan o hatian
ninyo ni Emil?
A: Kung ano ang sa akin
xxxxxx
Q Ang tanong ko po sa inyo ay ganito, ito po ba ang inyong iminungkahi kay Emil? Ito po ba ang inyong paghahatian or
hindi?
A: Iyo akin talaga na hindi nila pinaghirapan, sir." 25
Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the properties listed in petitioners inventory belong to her. Neither could
she present any document to prove her claim of ownership. The consistently changing basis of her claim did nothing to improve her
posture. Initially, she insisted that the bulk of Miguelitas estate is composed of paraphernal properties. 26 Sensing that such assertion
could not strengthen her claim of ownership, she opted to change her submission and declare that she and Miguelita were "business
partners" and that she gave to the latter most of her properties to be used in a joint business venture. 27 Respondent must have
realized early on that if the properties listed in petitioners inventory are paraphernal, then Miguelita had the absolute title and
ownership over them and upon her death, such properties would be vested to her compulsory heirs, petitioner herein and their two
minor children.28
At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish or deprive respondent of whatever rights or properties
she believes or considers to be rightfully hers. We reiterate that the question of ownership of properties alleged to be part of the
estate must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. 29

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571
are hereby REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167405

February 16, 2006

ANA JOYCE S. REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. CESAR M. SOTERO, Presiding Judge, RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, ATTY. PAULINO SAGUYOD, the Clerk of
Court of Branch 67 of the RTC at Paniqui, Tarlac in his capacity as Special Administrator, CORAZON CHICHIOCO,
ANGELITO LISING, ERLINDA ESPACIO, GONZALO ZALZOS and ERNESTO LISING, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review seeks to modify the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74047 as well as
the Resolution dated May 14, 2005 denying the motion for reconsideration. In the assailed judgment, the Court of Appeals annulled
and set aside the September 18, 2002 and November 12, 2002 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch
67 in Spec. Proc. No. 204 but refrained from dismissing the petition for letters of administration and settlement of estate on the
ground that petitioner must first prove that she was legally adopted by the decedent, Elena Lising.
On September 15, 1998, respondent Corazon L. Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and settlement
of estate of the late Elena Lising before the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, where it was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 204 and raffled to Branch
67. Chichioco claimed that she was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate on July 31, 1998. Named as co-heirs of Chichioco
were Rosario L. Zalzos, Florante Zalzos, Erlinda Lising, Manuel Lising, Evelyn Lising, Josephine Lising, Alfredo Lising and respondents
Ernesto Lising and Erlinda Espacio.
According to Chichioco, the deceased left real properties located in the municipalities of Ramos and Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as
assorted pieces of jewelry and money which were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the
deceased. Chichioco prayed that she be appointed administrator of the estate, upon payment of a bond, pending settlement and
distribution of Lisings properties to the legal heirs. 1
On November 6, 1998, petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition 2 to the petition, claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the
latters husband, Serafin Delos Santos, who died on November 30, 1970. She asserted that the petition should be dismissed and that
the appointment of an administrator was unnecessary, since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any
debts. She further asserted that Chichioco is unfit to serve as administrator of Lisings estate because of her "antagonistic interests"
against the decedent. Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs have questioned the decedents title to a piece of real property which forms
a large part of the estate.
On November 11, 1998, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition 3 attaching thereto the Certification4issued by the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac stating that on page 76, Book No. 01 of the Register of Court Decrees, Reyes was adopted by Elena
Lising and Serafin Delos Santos pursuant to a decision rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410 by Judge Julian Lustre of the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, Branch 3, promulgated on December 21, 1968 and duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar on
January 29, 1969.
Petitioner also submitted a Certification5 issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC-Tarlac City, stating that a judgment was rendered in
Spec. Proc. No. 1410 on December 21, 1968 decreeing petitioners adoption by Elena Lising and Serafin Delos Santos. She also
presented a copy of Judicial Form No. 436 indicating that the adoption decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac City,
wherein the dispositive portion of the adoption decree was recorded as follows:
In view of the foregoing, the court finds this petition a proper case for adoption and therefore grants the same. Consequently, the
Court declares that henceforth, the child Ana Joyce C. Zalzos is freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with
respect to her natural parents Orlando Zalzos and May C. Castro, and is to all legal intents and purposes the child of the petitioners
Serafin delos Santos and Elena Lising.7

Petitioner likewise submitted a Decree of Final Distribution 8 issued by the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) showing that, upon
the death of Serafin Delos Santos, death benefits were paid to his widow, Elena Lising, and his "daughter", Ana Joyce Delos Santos, in
accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
On April 5, 1999, the RTC ordered respondents to submit documentary evidence to prove the jurisdictional facts of the case and to
comment on petitioners opposition.9 Only Rosario L. Zalsos appears to have filed a Comment/Reply to Oppositors Opposition, 10 after
which the RTC ordered the parties to submit memoranda thereon. 11 On July 22, 1999, the case was deemed submitted for resolution. 12
Meanwhile, on June 30, 1999, Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the
adoption decree docketed as SP No. 53457.13 They claimed that no proceedings for the adoption of petitioner took place in 1968 since
the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had no records of the adoption case. Petitioners
natural mother supposedly connived with the court personnel to make it appear that petitioner was adopted by the Delos Santos
spouses and that the CFIs order for initial hearing was published in a weekly newspaper which was not authorized to publish court
orders in special proceedings.
Upon motion of Chichioco, the RTC ordered on October 4, 1999, the suspension of hearings in Spec. Proc. No. 204 pending the
outcome of SP No. 53457.14 Subsequently, however, the Court of Appeals dismissed 15 SP No. 53457 for failure to comply with the third
paragraph of Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. 16 The said dismissal became final and executory on March 8, 2000. 17
Thereafter, on August 22, 2000, petitioner filed a motion before the RTC praying that the opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204 be finally
resolved and that the petition be dismissed. 18 This was followed by an Urgent Ex Parte Motion19 filed by petitioner on October 17,
2000 praying for the immediate resolution of her opposition.
On November 16, 2000, respondents filed a Comment20 to the opposition stating that reasonable doubts have been cast on
petitioners claim that she was legally adopted due allegedly to certain "badges of fraud." Respondents also informed the RTC that
they have filed a criminal complaint against petitioner before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Tarlac City, for alleged
falsification of the adoption decree and Judicial Form No. 43, docketed as I.S. No. 00-1016.
Subsequently, the RTC issued a Resolution21 dated December 12, 2000 deferring resolution of petitioners opposition to Spec. Proc.
No. 204, pending the outcome of the criminal case filed against the latter. In the meantime, the parties were enjoined from
dissipating or disposing any or all of the properties included in the estate of Elena Lising without order from this Court.
On December 13, 2000, Chichioco filed an Urgent Motion to Appoint Special Administrator 22 before the RTC on the ground that there
was yet no true determination and appraisal of the decedents universal estate. It was prayed therein that the Branch Clerk of Court,
Atty. Paulino Saguyod, be appointed special administrator as he was "an experienced and able person in the management of
properties" and is "honest, impartial, competent and acceptable to the majority of the interested parties."
In the meantime, the Provincial Prosecutor found probable cause to charge petitioner with falsification of public documents per
resolution dated January 5, 2001.23 Petitioner thus appealed the said finding to the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor.
On August 8, 2001, the RTC granted respondents motion for the appointment of a special administrator and appointed its branch
clerk of court, Atty. Saguyod.24 Petitioner moved for reconsideration on the grounds that the branch clerk of court was disqualified
from taking on the task of special administrator, and that Atty. Saguyod was appointed without being required to file a bond.
Petitioner also reiterated that the petition should be dismissed because she is the sole heir of the decedent. 25 However, the RTC
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on November 5, 2001. 26
On January 14, 2002, the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor reversed the findings of the Provincial Prosecutor and dismissed the
criminal complaint against petitioner.27 Undaunted, Chichioco filed a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Simultaneously, Chichioco and the other alleged co-heirs filed a motion before the RTC to enjoin petitioner from conducting business
in a property belonging to the estate. Respondent Chichioco alleged that petitioner converted the basement of Lisings residence into
a billiard hall without authority of the special administrator.28
Acting on said motion, the RTC issued a resolution on September 18, 2002, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Oppositor Ana Joyce Reyes is hereby enjoined from conducting business activity in any of the properties left by the
decedent. The Special Administrator is also empowered to take control and possession of the listed personal and real properties of the
decedent and those that may be found to be owned or registered in the name of the same.
SO ORDERED.29

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution which was denied by the RTC on November 12, 2002. On even
date, the DOJ also issued a resolution dismissing respondent Chichiocos petition for review in the criminal case. 30
Subsequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
74047,31 assailing the September 18, 2002 and November 12, 2002 resolutions of the RTC. Petitioner alleged that said resolutions
were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction since as sole heir, she had the right to
possess and use the decedents property, title over which automatically passed on to her upon the latters death. Moreover, the
special administrator, Atty. Saguyod, had yet to file a bond and submit an inventory of the decedents estate.
Additionally, petitioner insisted that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed since the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of SP No.
53457 constituted res judicata as to the former. There was likewise no valid challenge to her adoption and she consequently remains
to be the sole heir of the decedent. Thus, she stressed that there was no need for the appointment of an administrator or for the
settlement proceedings.
In due course, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment32 nullifying the resolutions of the trial court. It held that the presiding judge,
Judge Cesar M. Sotero, gravely abused his discretion in appointing his branch clerk of court as special administrator. Citing Balanay, Jr.
v. Martinez,33 the appellate court reasoned that such act could engender a suspicion that Judge Sotero and his clerk are in cahoots in
milking the decedents estate. Moreover, Atty. Saguyod failed to comply with the requirements of a bond and inventory and could not
therefore take control and possession of any of the decedents properties.
However, the appellate court refused to dismiss Spec. Proc. No. 204 since the dismissal of SP No. 53457 was not a judgment on the
merits and did not operate as res judicata to the former. It was also incumbent upon petitioner to prove before the trial court that she
was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouses since, according to the appellate court, "imputations of irregularities permeating
the adoption decree render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt."
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied on March 15, 2005, 34 hence this petition on the following assigned errors:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD TO PROVE THE VALIDITY OF HER ADOPTION DUE TO
IMPUTATIONS OF IRREGULARITIES IN VIEW OF SECTION 47 OF RULE 39. 35
B. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DISMISSAL IN SP NO. 53457 WAS NOT A DISMISSAL ON THE
MERITS.36
The petition is meritorious.
On the first assigned error, we agree with petitioner that she need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than those
which she had already presented before the trial court. To recall, petitioner submitted a certification from the local civil registrars
office that the adoption decree was registered therein and also a copy of Judicial Form No. 43 and a certification issued by the clerk of
court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac City. Both certifications were issued under the seal of the
issuing offices and were signed by the proper officers. These are thus presumed to have been regularly issued as part of the official
duties that said public officers perform.37
It should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public document 38 required by law to be entered into the public records, the
official repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrars
office as well as the court which rendered the judgment.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated.39 As such, the certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of
petitioners adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts
contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioners adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until
contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere "imputations of irregularities" will not cast a "cloud of doubt" on the adoption
decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.
In this regard, it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be presented only in a separate action brought principally for the
purpose of nullifying the adoption decree. The latter cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedents
estate, as categorically held in Santos v. Aranzanso. 40 Accordingly, respondents cannot assail in these proceedings the validity of the
adoption decree in order to defeat petitioners claim that she is the sole heir of the decedent. Absent a categorical pronouncement in
an appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption is void, the certifications regarding the matter, as well as the facts stated
therein, should be deemed legitimate, genuine and real. Petitioners status as an adopted child of the decedent remains unrebutted
and no serious challenge has been brought against her standing as such. Therefore, for as long as petitioners adoption is considered
valid, respondents cannot claim any interest in the decedents estate. For this reason, we agree with petitioner that Spec. Proc. No.
204 should be dismissed.

As succinctly held in Santos v. Aranzanso:41

From all the foregoing it follows that respondents - x x x and those who, like them x x x, claim an interest in the estate x x x as
alleged first cousins, cannot intervene, as such, in the settlement proceedings, in view of the fact that in the order of intestate
succession adopted children exclude first cousins (Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil Code). The same holds true as long as the
adoption must be - as in the instant case - considered valid. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner, whose adoption is presumed to be valid, would necessarily exclude respondents from inheriting from the decedent since
they are mere collateral relatives of the latter. To allow the proceedings below to continue would serve no salutary purpose but to
delay the resolution of the instant case. After all, the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 is the logical consequence of our
pronouncement relative to the presumed validity of petitioners adoption.
Moreover, it must be stressed that all the evidence pertinent to the resolution of the petitioners opposition, which is actually a
motion to dismiss the petition for letters of administration and settlement of the estate, is a matter of record in the instant case. The
same has in fact been submitted for resolution before the RTC more than six years ago and is so far the only pending incident before
the RTC. The parties have likewise amply ventilated their positions on the matter through their respective pleadings filed before the
lower courts. No useful purpose will thus be served if we let the RTC resolve the matter, only for its ruling to be elevated again to the
Court of Appeals and subsequently to this Court. The remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not
necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the evidence before it. 42 This is in keeping with the avowed
purpose of the rules of procedure which is to secure for the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding.43 Hence, since the grounds for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 are extant in the records and there is no cogent
reason to remand the case to the RTC, Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed.
Based on the foregoing, the Court sees no need to discuss petitioners second assigned error.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Special Proceedings No. 204 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City,
Branch 67 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-27082 January 31, 1978

Intestate Estate of the Spouses Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. FILOMENO COCA, Administrator, PRIMA
PANGILINAN, and HEIRS OF CONCEPCION PANGILINAN-YAMUTA, namely, MARIA P. YAMUTA DE ATAY, EUSEBIO P.
YAMUTA, and APOLINAR P. YAMUTA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN, HEIRS OF FRANCISCO PANGILINAN, namely, FRANCIS, ALGERIAN,
BENJAMIN, PERLA and FRANCISCO, JR., all surnamed PANGILINAN, and CRISPIN BORROMEO, oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-29545 January 31, 1978

FILOMENO COCA, administrator-appellant,

vs.
CRISPIN BORROMEO and GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN and her Children, claimants-appellees.
Casiano U. Laput and Lorenzo D. de Guzman for appellants.
Paulino A. Conol and Felicidario M. Batoy for appellees.

AQUINO, J.:
These two cases involve the question of whether the ownership of a parcel of land, whether belonging to the deceased spouses or to
their heirs, should be decided in the intestate proceeding or in a separate action. Also in issue in these two cases is the liability of the
decedents' estate for the litigation expenses allegedly incurred in a case regarding that same land.
Being related cases, their adjudication in a single decision was allowed in this Court's resolution of August 13, 1969.
The spouses Juan Pan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate in 1943 and 1948, respectively. They possession a homestead, consisting of
two parcels of land, located at Barrio Bunawan or Mauswagon, Calamba, Misamis Occidental.
One parcel is Identified as Lot No. 1927. It has an area of 3.9791 hectares. It was covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 10
of the registry of deeds of Oriental Misamis in the name of Juan Pangilinan issued in 1927. It is now covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 86 (T-10) of the registry of deeds of Misamis Occidental (p. 7, Appellees' brief in L-27082).
The other parcel is Identified as Lot No. 1112. It has an area of 18.0291 hectares. It is covered by OCT No. P-8419 issued on
November 21, 1961 in the name of the Heirs of Juan Pan , represented by Concepcion Pan de Yamuta (p. 73, Record on Appeal in
L-27082).
According to Guadalupe Pizarras and her children, a third parcel, Lot No. 1920, with an area of eight hectares which was surveyed in
the name of Concepcion Pan and which adjoins Lots Nos. 1927 and 1112, also forms part of the estate of the deceased Pangilinan
spouses (pp. 61-64, Record on Appeal).
The Pangilinan spouses were survived by the following heirs: (1) Prima Pangilinan, (2) Maria, Eusebio and Apolinar all surnamed
Yamuta, the children of Concepcion Pangilinan Yamuta who died in 1961, and (3) Francis, A Benjamin Perla and Francisco, Jr., all
surnamed Pan the children of Francisco Pan who died in 1948 and who was also survived by his widow, Guadalupe Pizarras. (It is not
clear whether Roseller, Demosthenes and Eliza, all surnamed Japay, were the children of the deceased Helen Pangilinan, presumably
a daughter of Francisco Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. See pages 81-82, Record on Appeal).
Special Proceeding No. 508 of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental was instituted on September 5, 1963 for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses, Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba.
On September 25, 1965 the administrator presented a project of partition wherein the combined areas of Lots Nos. 1112 and 1927, or
22.0082 hectares, were partitioned as follows:
(a) To Crispin Borromeo as payment of his attorney's fees in Civil Case No. 560 or CA-G.R. No. 6721-R, February 27,
1952, Crispin Labaria vs. Juan C. Pangilinan, in accordance with the lower court's decision dated July 19, 1965 in
Civil Case No. 2440. Borromeo vs. Coca (p. 11, Appellees' brief in L-27082), three hectares which should be taken
from Lot No. 1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-A;
(b) To the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Mrs. Pizarras and children), 5.3361 hectares taken from Lot No. 1112 and
designated as Lot No. 1112-B;
(c) To Prima Pangilinan, 6.3361 hectares, taken from Lot No. 1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-C, and
presumably a daughter of Francisco Pan 81-82, Record on Appeal).
(d) To the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan, 7.3360 hectares, consisting of Lot No. 1927 and the remainder of Lot No.
1112, which remainder is designated as Lot No. 1112-D.

It was also provided in the project of partition that the sum of P5,088.50, as the alleged debt of the estate to Concepcion Pan should
be divided equally among the three sets of heirs, or P1,696.16 for each set of heirs, and that Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of
Francisco Pangilinan should pay that amount to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan.
The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Guadalupe Pizarras, et al.) opposed that project of partition. They contended that the proposed
partition contravened the lower court's order of December 6, 1963 which recognized the right of the heirs of Francisco Pan to a
twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112; that Prima Pangilinan, who sold her share to Francisco Pan should be excluded from the
partition; that the total share of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan in Lot No. 1112 is 12.6720 hectares, while that of the heirs of
Concepcion Pangilinan is 6.3360 hectares, and that the claim of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan for 115,088.50 had not been
properly allowed.
The lower court in its order of October 2, 1965 directed the administrator to pay the debt of the estate to the heirs of Concepcion
Pangilinan. It deferred action on the project of partition until the ownership of the twelve hectares, which were claimed by the heirs of
Francisco Pan and the six hectares, which were claimed by Crispen Borromeo (eighteen hectares in all which were excluded from the
inventory in the court's order of December 6, 1963) is determined in an ordinary action.
On may 14,1966 the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan filed a supplemental opposition wherein they asked that Lot No. 1920, with an area
of eight hectares, which lot was surveyed at should be included in the project of partition.
On August 31, 1966 the lower court, apparently acting on its own volition, tackled once more the project of partition. After noting that
no separate action had been filed to determine the ownership of the twelve hectares, it issued an order approving the project of
partition but excluding the twelve hectares claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan.
That order on its face appears to be incomplete because, after excluding the twelve hectares, the lower court did not bother to decide
how the remainder should be partitioned and whether Prima Pangilinan had a share in that remainder.
That is the order under appeal in L-27082 by Filomeno Coca as administrator, Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion
Pangilinan. However, the said appellants in their brief also assail the lower court's order of December 6, 1963, excluding eighteen
hectares from the inventory, which order was sustained by the Court of Appeals in its decision in Atay vs. Catolico, CA-G.R. Nos.
33165-R, and 3426-R, May 14,1964, 5 CAR 1200. This Court refused to review that decision in its resolution of July 29, 1964, in
L-23088-89, Atay vs. Court of Appeals.
The other incident involves the lower court's order of May 11, 1968 which directed that the claim of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan
for reimbursement of litigation expenses (apart from the sum of P1,459.49, as the value of the produce of the twelve hectares already
mentioned, which was appropriated by the special administrator), be referred to the clerk of court for reception of the evidence.
In another order, also dated May 11, 1968, the lower court reiterated its order of October 2, 1965 that the administrator should pay
the heirs of Concepcion Pan the. amount to be reimbursed to her estate. The court further directed the administrator to account for
the income of the estate, to recover any amount due from the special administrator, and to pay the claim of Crispin Borromeo and the
amount due to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan as directed in its order of August 31, 1966 and in its approval of the accounting of
the special administrator.
The administrator, Filomeno Coca, Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion Pan also appealed from those two orders dated May
11, 1968 (L-29545).
The appellant contend that the lower court, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the twelve-hectare
portion of Lot No. 1112. On the other hand, the appellees" or the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan counter that the lower court did not
decide the ownership of the twelve hectares when it ordered their exclusion from the project of partition. So, the problem is how the
title to the twelve hectares should be decided, whether in a separate action or in the intestate. proceeding.
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a procedural question
involving a mode of practice "which may be waived" (Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227, 232. Cf. Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484 re
jurisdiction over the issue).
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the estate or intestate proceeding. That question
should be ventilated in a separate action. (Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266). That general rule has
qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion
from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action Lachenal vs. Salas, supra).

Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the
rights of 'third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership (Pascual vs. Pascual
73 Phil. 561; Alvarez vs. Espiritu, L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892; Cunanan vs. Amparo, supra; 3 Morans Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 4731).
We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the general rule that questions of title should be ventilated in a
separate action.
Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion during the hearing of the
motion for its exclusion from title inventory The only interested parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate
proceeding.
As pointed out by the appellees, they belong to the poor stratum of society. They should not be forced to incur additional expenses
(such as filing fees) by bringing a separate action to determine the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion.
The just, expeditious and inexpensive solution is to require the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan to the in the intestate, proceeding,
Special Proceeding No. 568, a motion in the form of a complaint wherein they should set forth their claim for the twelve hectares in
question, stating the ultimate facts in support of their claim, such as the partition made by Juan C. Pangilinan, their acquisition of the
share of Prima Pangilinan and the usufructuary rights of their parents, their long possession of the said portion, their claim for the
produce of the land, the expenses incurred by them in Civil Case No. 560, Labaria vs. Pangilinan, and their contention that Lot No.
1920 forms part of the estate of the Pangilinan spouses.
Copies of that motion should be serves upon the administrator and upon Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan
(who are all represented by the same lawyers). They should answer the motion within fifteen days from service. In their answer the
appellants should set forth the ultimate facts and the defenses (such as the violation of section 118 of the Public Land Law) to
support their theory that Lot No. 1112 still forms part of the estate of the spouses Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba and that the
heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should bear one-third of the expenses incurred by Concepcion Pan in Civil Case No. 560.
After the issues have been joined and in case no amicable settlement has been reached, the probate court should receive evidence
or, as indicated by the Court of Appeals in Atay vs. Catolico, supra a full-dress hearing should be held.
Crispin Borromeo may set forth also his claim for the three hectares but only for the purpose of deciding what portion of the estate
should be given to him in satisfaction of his share. His claim for the sum of P416 had already been adjudicated by the lower court in
its order of August 31, 1966 (pp. 26- 27, Record on Appeal in L-29545). No appeal was interposed from that adjudication.
After trial the lower court's decision on the issues as to what constitutes the estate of the Pangilinan spouses should include the
partition thereof and should indicate what portion of the estate should be allocated to Crispen Borromeo. If necessary, the validity of
the donation or partition of Lot No. 1112, made by Juan C. Pangilinan during his lifetime, should be passed upon.
Considering that the respective claims of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan . and the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan for reimbursement
of the litigation expenses allegedly incurred in Civil Case No. 560 will be included in the trial, the two orders of the trial court dated
May 11, 1968 regarding those matters (L-29545) should not be enforced. They should be set aside.
WHEREFORE, (1) the lower court's amended order of August 31, 1966, excluding twelve hectares from the partition of the estate of
the deceased Pan spouses (L-27082) and (2) the two orders dated May 11, 1968, regarding the claim of Guadalupe Pizarras and her
children and the debt of the estate to Concepcion Pangilinan (L-29545) are reversed and set aside.
A new trial should be held on those matters after the filing of the proper pleadings and in case no amicable settlement is reached.
The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should file their motion within thirty days from notice of the entry of judgment in this case.
The case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with the guidelines already set forth. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005]

ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., petitioners, vs. LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail the September 24, 2002 [1] Decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 124 [2] which dismissed, after trial, their complaint
for annulment of title for failure to state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following material allegations claims of the parties which they sought to prove
by testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial of the case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo. [3]
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta. [4]
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein copetitioner.[5]
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,[6] later baptized as Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein respondent. [7]
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights [8] over the
estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on November 2, 1964. [9] In the deed, Portugals siblings waived their
rights, interests, and participation over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan in his favor. [10]
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292 covering the
Caloocan parcel of land in the name of Jose Q. Portugal,married to Paz C. Lazo.[11]
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased
Person[12] adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-172[13] in Portugals name was subsequently cancelled
and in its stead TCT No. 159813 [14] was issued by the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name of
respondent, Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988 transfer by respondent of the title to the Caloocan
property in her name, petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a complaint [15] against respondent for
annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by her and the transfer certificate of title issued in her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to
inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself when she made false representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and the TCT in her name be declared void and that the
Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in respondents name and to issue in its stead a new one in their
(petitioners) name, and that actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees and litigation expenses be awarded to them.

Following respondents filing of her answer, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order chronicling, among other things, the issues as
follows:
a.

Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is valid?

b.

Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?

c.

Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs.

d.

Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the complaint. [16] (Underscoring supplied)

After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001, [17] after giving an account of the testimonies of the parties and their
witnesses and of their documentary evidence, without resolving the issues defined during pre-trial, dismissed the case for lack of
cause of action on the ground that petitioners status and right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate ( sic)
court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario. [18]
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court held:
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at bar.
xxx
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate of Live Birth, pictures (sic) and testimonial evidence to
establish their right as heirs of the decedent. Thus, the preliminary act of having a status and right to the estate of the decedent,
was sought to be determined herein. However, the establishment of a status, a right, or a particular fact is remedied
through a special proceeding(Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court), not an ordinary civil action whereby a party sues another for
the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong (ibid, a). The operative term in the former is to
establish, while in the latter, it is to enforce, a right. Their status and right as putative heirs of the decedent not having been
established, as yet, the Complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs cause to establish their status and right
herein. Plaintiffs do not have the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2, supra).[19] (Italics in the
original; emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial courts ratio decedendi in dismissing the case as
diametrically opposed to this Courts following ruling inCario v. Cario,[20] viz:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to
be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579
[1993]) However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the
death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it
is essential to the determination of the case. (Nial, et al. v. Bayadog, GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In such cases, evidence
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. (Domingo v.
Court of Appeals, supra) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cario was promulgated (in 2001) subsequent to that of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (in
1999), the appellate court found Cario to be inapplicable, however, to the case in this wise:
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cario case was the validity of the two marriages contracted by the
deceased SPO4 Santiago Cario, whose death benefits was the bone of contention between the two women both named Susan (viz.,
Susan Nicdao Cario and Susan Yee Cario) both of whom he married. It is not disputed in said case that SPO4 S. Cario contracted
two marriages with said two women during his lifetime, and the only question was: which of these two marriages was validly
celebrated? The award of the death benefits of the deceased Cario was thus, merely an incident to the question of which of the
two marriages was valid. Upon the other hand, the case at bench is of a different milieu. The main issue here is
the annulment of title to property. The only undisputed fact in this case is that the deceased Jose Portugal, during his lifetime,
owned a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34292. However, here come two contending parties,
herein plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee, both now insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The status and

rights of the parties herein have not, therefore, been definitively established, as yet. x x x. Necessarily and naturally, such questions
as to such status or right must be properly ventilated in an appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary civil action, whereunder
a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong. The institution of an
ordinary civil suit for that purpose in the present case is thus impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law prohibits or forbids
directly, it cannot permit or allow indirectly. To permit, or allow, a declaration of heirship, or the establishment of the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child to be determined in an ordinary civil action, not in an appropriate special proceeding brought for that purpose,
is thus to impinge upon this axiom. x x x[21] (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied).
The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002, [22] thus affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the case.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,[23] faulting the appellate court to have erred when
I.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it failed to state a cause of action.
II.
. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel] Yaptingchay despite the existence of a later and contrary ruling in Cario,
and (ii) when the Honorable CA and the lower court failed to render judgment based on the evidence presented relative to
the issues raised during pre-trial, . . .[24] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that the questioned CA decision be reversed, and a new one
entered in accordance with the prayers set forth in the instant complaint based on the above disquisition and evidence adduced by
petitioners in the court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that the pronouncements in Cario apply, a decision be
entered remanding to the court a quo the determination of the issues of which of the two marriages is valid, and the determination of
heirship and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and Leonila preparatory to the determination of the annulment of title issued in the name of
Leonila.
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for. [25] (Underscoring supplied).
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay and in effect encouraged
multiplicity of suits which is discouraged by this Court as a reading of Cario shows; that Cario allows courts to pass on the
determination of heirship and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child so long as it is necessary to the determination of the case; and
that contrary to the appellate courts ruling, they had established their status as compulsory heirs.
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determine their
status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her
name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,[26] the therein petitioners executed on March 17, 1994 an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, owners-claimants of the two lots mentioned
therein. They later discovered on August 26, 1994 that a portion, if not all, of the two lots had been titled in the name of the therein
respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation which in turn sold portions thereof to the therein individual
respondents. The therein petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment of titles. The therein respondents moved to dismiss
the case for failure of the therein petitioners to, inter alia, state a cause of action and prove their status as heirs. The trial court
granted the motion to dismiss in this wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a
semblance of itexcept the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchaysthat they have been
declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must
be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take
precedence over the action for reconveyance . . . [27] (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied).
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the petition was an improper recourse, found that the trial court
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. Citing Litam et al. v. Rivera[28] and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,[29] this
Court held that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking
the establishment of a status or right.

In the above-cited case of Litam,[30] Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special proceeding for issuance of letters of administration
before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition that he is the son of Rafael Litam who died in Manila on
January 10, 1951 and is survived by him and his therein named seven (7) siblings who are children of the decedent by his marriage to
Sia Khin celebrated in China in 1911; that the decedent contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera;
and that the decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the issuance of letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera,
the surviving spouse of the decedent. The CFI granted the petition and issued letters of administration to, on Marcosas request, her
nephew Arminio Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported siblings filed a civil case before the same court, against
the estate of Rafael Litam administrator Arminio Rivera and Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed guardian of Marcosa. In their
complaint, Dy Tam and his purported siblings substantially reproduced the allegations made in his petition in the special proceeding,
with the addition of a list of properties allegedly acquired during the marriage of the decedent and Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some unresolved incidents in the special proceeding, both were jointly
heard by the trial court, following which it rendered a decision in the civil case dismissing it, declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy
Tam et al. are not the children of the decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised for determination was whether they are the legitimate
children of Rafael Litam.
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were married in 1911, and whether Rafael Litam
is the father of appellants Dy Tam et al., found substantially correct the trial courts findings of fact and its conclusion that, among
other things, the birth certificates of Dy Tam et al. do not establish the identity of the deceased Rafael Litam and the persons named
therein as father [and] it does not appear in the said certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner intervened in the
preparation and filing thereof; and that [t]he other documentary evidence presented by [them] [is] entirely immaterial and highly
insufficient to prove the alleged marriage between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged status . . . as children
of said decedent.
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that the lower court should not have declared, in the decision appealed from,
that Marcosa is the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in the [civil case], it being within the exclusive
competence of the court in [the] [s]pecial [p]roceeding.
In Solivio,[31] also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased, who was a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special proceeding, Branch 23 of said court declared as sole heir
Celedonia Solivio, the decedents maternal aunt-half sister of his mother. Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, the decedents paternal
aunt-sister of his father, moved to reconsider the courts order declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the decedent, she claiming
that she too was an heir. The court denied the motion on the ground of tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial of her motion,
Concordia filed a civil case against Celedonia before the same RTC, for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages.
The civil case was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, which rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the
appellate court affirmed the said judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who posed, among other issues, whether Branch 26 of the RTC of
Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain [the civil action] for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanuevas share of the estate of [the
deceased] while the [estate] proceedings . . . were still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same court, this Court held that [i]n the
interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedents estate, a court should
not interfere with [estate] proceedingspending in a co-equal court, citing Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga.[32]
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon [c]onsidering that the estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless [therein
private respondent-Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, opted to proceed
to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice, and declared her an heir of the decedent.
In Guilas[33] cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted daughter, the therein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas
(Juanita), and her adoptive father was approved in theproceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of the decedent-adoptive
mother, following which the probate court directed that the records of the case be archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to annul the project of partition on the ground of lesion,
preterition and fraud, and prayed that her adoptive father immediately deliver to her the two lots allocated to her in the project of
partition. She subsequently filed a motion in the testate estate proceedings for her adoptive father to deliver to her, among other
things, the same two lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the parties agreement to suspend action or resolution on
Juanitas motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the two lots alloted to her until after her complaint in the
civil case had been decided, set said case for trial.

Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order setting it for trial on the ground that in the amended complaint
she, in the meantime, filed, she acknowledged the partial legality and validity of the project of partition insofar as she was allotted
the two lots, the delivery of which she was seeking. She thus posited in her motion to set aside the April 27, 1966 order setting the
civil case for hearing that there was no longer a prejudicial question to her motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to
her of the actual possession of the two lots. The trial court, by order of April 27, 1966, denied the motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court.
The probate courts approval of the project of partition and directive that the records of the case be sent to the archives
notwithstanding, this Court held that the testate estate proceedings had not been legally terminated as Juanitas share under the
project of partition had not been delivered to her. Explained this Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed
and terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir
from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapse (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil.,
137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion
in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had
already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may
thus reverse a decision or order of the probate o[r] intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties
long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107,
April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461). [34] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied).
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court setting the civil case for hearing, but allowed the civil case
to continue because it involves no longer the two lotsadjudicated to Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or
parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special
proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues,
heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally
closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir
and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about
the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugals estate, executed on February
15, 1988[35] the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.
[36]
Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and
the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no
will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein. [37]
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to
declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of
land,[38] to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious,
just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses
of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case subject of the present
case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the
issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate to
administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners,
[39]
the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon
upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit:
1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal
(Sr.);
3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs;
4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint. [40]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 24, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, for it to
evaluate the evidence presented by the parties and render a decision on the above-enumerated issues defined during the pre-trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-18148

February 28, 1963

DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, executor of the testate estate of the deceased EUSEBIO CAPILI; and the instituted heirs,
namely: ARMANDO CAPILI and ARTURO BERNARDO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMOGENA REYES, namely: FRANCISCO REYES, ET AL., and
JOSE ISIDORO, ET AL., respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla Law Offices for petitioners.
Romerico F. Flores for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is a petition by certiorari for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan holding that the probate court in Special Proceeding 1101 had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the deed of donation in
question and to pass upon the question of title or ownership of the properties mentioned therein.
The facts are briefly stated in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died on July 27, 1958 and a testate proceeding for the
settlement of his estate was instituted in the Court of the Fist Instance of Bulacan. His will was admitted to probate on
October 9, 1958, disposing of his properties in favor of his widow; his cousins Armando, Ursula, and Buenaventura, all
surnamed Capili; and Arturo, Deogracias and Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo. Hermogena Reyes herself died on April 24,
1959. Upon petition of Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of the deceased Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by
her collateral relatives and intestate heirs, namely, Marcos, Vicente, Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and Jose,
Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro.
On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project of partition in the testate proceeding in accordance with the terms of the will,
adjudicating the estate of Eusebio Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of Hermogena Reyes, whose
share was alloted to her collateral relatives aforementioned. On June 16, 1959 these relatives filed an opposition to the
executor's project of partition and submitted a counter-project of partition of their own, claiming 1/2 of the properties
mentioned in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that they belonged not to the latter alone but to the
conjugal partnership of the spouses.
The probate court, in two orders dated June 24, 1959 and February 10, 1960, respectively, set the two projects of partition
for hearing, at which evidence was presented by the parties, followed by the submission of memoranda discussing certain
legal issues. In the memorandum for the executor and the instituted heirs it was contended: (1) that the properties disposed
of in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili belonged to him exclusively and not to the conjugal partnership, because
Hermogena Reyes had donated to him her half share of such partnership; (2) that the collateral heirs of Hermogena Reyes
had no lawful standing or grounds to question the validity of the donation; and (3) that even assuming that they could
question the validity of the donation, the same must be litigated not in the testate proceeding but in a separate civil action.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable
Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1wph1.t
The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on their part, argued that the deed of donation itself was determinative of the
original conjugal character to the properties, aside from the legal presumption laid down in Article 160 of the Civil Code, and
that since the donation was null and void the deceased Eusebio Capili did not become owner of the share of his wife and
therefore could not validly dispose of it in his will.
On September 14, 1960, the probate court, the Honorable M. Mejia presiding, issued an order declaring the donation void
without making any specific finding as to its juridical nature, that is, whether it was inter vivos or mortis causa, for the
reason that, considered under the first category, it falls under Article 133 of the Civil Code, which prohibits donations
between spouses during the marriage; and considered under the second category, it does not comply with the formalities of
a will as required by Article 728 in relation to Article 805 of the same Code, there being no attestation clause. In the same
order the court disapproved both projects of partition and directed the executor to file another," dividing the property
mentioned in the last will and testament of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the properties mentioned in the deed of
donation, Exhibit B, between the instituted heirs of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the legal heirs of the deceased
Hermogena Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties were conjugal properties of the deceased spouses." On
September 27, 1960, the executor filed a motion for new trial, reiterating and emphasizing the contention previously raised
in their memorandum that the probate court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of the legal heirs of
Hermogena Reyes involving title to the properties mentioned in the will of Eusebio Capili and taking exception to the court's
declaration of the nullity of the donation "without stating facts or provision of law on which it was based." The motion for
new trial was denied in an order dated October 3, 1960.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed from being affirmed, petitioners filed this present petition for review
by certiorari.
The petitioners-appellants contend that the appellate court erred in not declaring that the probate court, having limited and special
jurisdiction, had generally no power to adjudicate title and erred in applying the exception to the rule.
In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on
testate or intestate proceedings,"1 except where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of
the property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in
a separate action.2 However, we have also held that when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to
submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass
judgment thereon (Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Manalac v. Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661); and that with the consent of the parties,
matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate
proceeding, provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232).
In the light of this doctrine, may it be said correctly that the trial court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the power of
the probate court in this case to adjudicate in the testate proceedings, the question as to whether the properties herein involved
belong to the conjugal partnership of Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes, or to the deceased husband exclusively?
At the outset, let it be clarified that the matter at issue is not a question of jurisdiction, in the sense advanced by appellants that the
trial court had completely no authority to pass upon the title to the lands in dispute, and that its decision on the subject is null and
void and does not bind even those who had invoked its authority and submitted to its decision because, it is contended, jurisdiction is
a creature of law and parties to an action can not vest, extend or broaden it. If appellants' contention is correct, then there can be no
exception to the no-jurisdiction theory. But as has been stated in the case of Cunanan v. Amparo (supra) the Supreme Court speaking
through Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason: "Determination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The
responding Soriano's objection (that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession of the lots to the
estate) relates exclusively to the procedure, which is distinct from jurisdiction. It affects only personal rights to a mode of practice
(the filing of an independent ordinary action) which may be waived". Strictly speaking, it is more a question of jurisdiction over the
person, not over the subject matter, for the jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a deceased person regarding the
ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate, has been recognized to be vested in probate courts. This is so because the
purpose of an administration proceeding is the liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees.
Liquidation means determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses. 3 Thereafter, distribution is
made of the decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled to succeed him. The proceeding is in the nature of an action of
partition, in which each party is required to bring into the mass whatever community property he has in his possession. To this end,
and as a necessary corollary, the interested parties may introduce proofs relative to the ownership of the properties in dispute. All the
heirs who take part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are before the court, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all
matters and incidents necessary to the complete settlement of such estate, so long as no interests of third parties are affected. 4
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties involved whether they
belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court

which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed
among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now represented because of her death, by her
heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties
whose rights may be affected. It is true that the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but the widow is,
in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is this right that is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes.
Therefore, the claim that is being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it complies with the
requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the petitioners and the widow, represented by dents) are all heirs claiming
title under the testator.
Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court, for the purpose of
the determination of the question of ownership of the disputed properties. This is not borne by the admitted facts. On the contrary, it
is undisputed that they were the ones who presented the project of partition claiming the questioned properties as part of the
testator's asset. The respondents, as representatives or substitutes of the deceased widow opposed the project of partition and
submitted another. As the Court of Appeals said, "In doing so all of them must be deemed to have submitted the issue for resolution
in the same proceeding. Certainly, the petitioners can not be heard to insist, as they do, on the approval of their project of partition
and, thus, have the court take it for granted that their theory as to the character of the properties is correct, entirely without regard to
the opposition of the respondents". In other words, by presenting their project of partition including therein the disputed lands (upon
the claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband), petitioners themselves put in issue the question of ownership of the
properties which is well within the competence of the probate court and just because of an opposition thereto, they can not
thereafter withdraw either their appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction of the court. Certainly, there is here a waiver where the
parties who raise the objection are the ones who set the court in motion. 5 They can not be permitted to complain if the court, after
due hearing, adjudges question against them.6
Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the question of ownership of the properties involved because
the widow herself, during her lifetime, not only did not object to the inclusion of these properties in the inventory of the assets of her
deceased husband, but also signed an extra-judicial partition of those inventoried properties. But the very authorities cited by
appellants require that to constitute estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of the facts and be appraised of his rights at the time
he performs the act constituting estoppel, because silence without knowledge works no estoppel. 7 In the present case, the deceased
widow acted as she did because of the deed of donation she executed in favor of her husband not knowing that such deed was illegal,
if inter-vivos, and ineffectual if mortis-causa, as it has not been executed with the required formalities similar to a will.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals being in accordance with law, the same is hereby affirmed with costs against
appellants. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-44602

November 28, 1938

MARIA CALMA, as administratrix of the testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ESPERANZA TAEDO, assisted by her husband Felipe Mamaual, and BARTOLOME QUIZON, Deputy Sheriff of
Tarlac, defendants-appellees.
AVANCENA, C.J.:
The spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were the owners of the property described in the complaint, being their conjugal
property. They were also indebted to Esperanza Taedo, chargeable against the conjugal property, in the sums of P948.34 and P247,
with interest thereon at 10 per cent per annum. On October 10, 1933, Fausta Macasaquit died leaving a will wherein she appointed
her daughter, Maria Calma, as administratrix of her properties. Upon the commencement of the corresponding probate proceedings in

the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, the said daughter, Maria Calma, was appointed judicial administratrix of the properties of the
deceased.
While these probate proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit were pending, Esperanza Tanedo, on January 27, 1934, filed a
complaint against Eulalio Calma for the recovery of the sums of P948.34 and P247. The Court of First Instance of Tarlac rendered
judgment for the payment of this sum. In the execution of this judgment, despite the third party claim filed by Fausta Macasaquit, the
property described in the complaint was sold by the sheriff.
Maria Calma, as administratrix of the estate of Fausta Macasaquit, now brings this action and asks that the sale made by the sheriff of
the property described in the complaint be annulled and that the estate of Fausta Macasaquit be declared the sole and absolute
owner thereof. lawphi1.net
The court absolved the defendants from this complaint.
The probate proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit were instituted in accordance with Act No. 3176 reading:
SEC. 685. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried,
administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof shall be paid, in the testamentary or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse, in accordance with the provisions of this Code relative to the administration and liquidation and partition
proceeding, unless the parties, being all of age and legally capacitated, avail themselves of the right granted to them by this
Code of proceeding to an extrajudicial partition and liquidation of said property.
In case it is necessary to sell any portion of said community property in order to pay the outstanding debts and obligations of
the same, such sale shall be made in the manner and with the formalities established by this Code for the sale of the
property of deceased persons. Any sale, transfer, alienation or disposition of said property effected without said formalities
shall be null and void, except as regards the portion that belonged to the vendor at the time the liquidation and partition was
made.
Prior to this Act, the liquidation of conjugal property was made under section 685 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Interpreting the
scope of Act No. 3176, this court, in the case of Caragay vs. Urquiza (53 Phil., 72), said that the amendment introduced by this Act
consists in authorizing the institution of testate or intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased spouse or of
an ordinary action for the liquidation and partition of the property of a conjugal partnership. It should be understood that these
remedies are alternative, and not cumulative, in he sense that they cannot be availed of at he same time, inasmuch as an anomalous
and chaotic situation would result if conjugal property were administered, liquidated and distributed at the same time in a
testamentary proceeding and in an ordinary action for liquidation and partition of property. Consequently, the testamentary
proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit having been instituted, the liquidation and partition of the conjugal property by reason of her
marriage to Eulalio Calma should be made in these proceedings, to the exclusion of any other proceeding for the same purpose.
Interpreting this same Act No. 3176 in another decision, this court, in the case of Cruz vs. De Jesus (52 Phil., 870) said that when the
marriage is dissolved by the death of the wife, the legal power of management of the husband ceases, passing to the administrator
appointed by the court in the testate or intestate proceedings instituted to that end if there be any debts to be paid. This doctrine has
been confirmed in the other case of Ona vs. De Gala(58 Phil., 881).
From the foregoing it follows that when Esperanza Tanedo brought suit against Eulalio Calma for the payment of the sums of P948.34
and P247, which wee debts chargeable against the conjugal property, the power of Eulalio Calma. legal administrator of the conjugal
property while Fausta Macasaquit was living, had ceased and passed to the administratrix Maria Calma appointed in the testamentary
proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit. Hence, this being an indebtedness chargeable against conjugal property, no complaint for its
payment can be brought against Eulalio Calma, who had already ceased as administrator of the conjugal property; the claim for this
amount had to be filed in the testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit.
Having to be filed according to Act No. 3176 under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relative to the administration and
liquidation of properties of deceased persons, it should be filed before the committee on claims in said testamentary proceedings
and, at all events, thereafter, by appeal to the corresponding Court of First Instance, in an ordinary action against the judicial
administratrix.
On the other hand, he property described in the complaint is included among the inventoried properties subject to the testamentary
proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit because, belonging as it does to the conjugal property, it should, under Act No. 3176, be included
among the properties of the testamentary proceedings.
We conclude that, Eulalio Calma having ceased as legal administrator of the conjugal property had with his wife Fausta Macasaquit,
no complaint can be brought against him for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property, and that the
action should be instituted in the testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit in the manner provided by law, by
filing it first with the committee on claims.

Wherefore, we hold that the sale of the property described in the complaint, made by the sheriff in execution of the judgment
rendered against Eulalio Calma for the collection of the indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal property, is void and said
property should be deemed subject to the testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit for all the purposes of that
case.
The appealed judgment is reversed, without special pronouncement as to the costs. So ordered.
Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-2263

May 30, 1951

PAZ Y. OCAMPO, JOSEFA Y. OCAMPO, ISIDRO Y. OCAMPO, GIL Y. OCAMPO, MAURO Y. OCAMPO, and VICENTE Y.
OCAMPO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
CONRADO POTENCIANO, VICTOR POTENCIANO and LOURDES POTENCIANO, defendants.
VICTOR POTENCIANO and LOURDES POTENCIANO, defendants-appellants.
Salvador P. de Tangle for appellants.
Amado A. Yatco and Rosendo J. Tansinsin for appellees.
REYES, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari form a decision of the Court of Appeals.
From the findings of fact of said court, which are conclusive for the purposes of this appeal, it appears that on February 3, 1930,
Edilberto Ocampo, married to Paz Yatco, executed a deed purporting to convey to his relative, Conrado Potenciano, and the latter's
wife, Rufina Reyes, by way of sale with pacto de retro for the sum of P2,5000, a town a lot with a house as strong materials standing
thereon. On that same day, Ocampo signed another document, making it appear that, for an annual rental of P300, which, as may be
noted, is equivalent to 12 per cent of the purchase price, the vendees were leasing to him the house and lot for the duration of the
redemption period.
The property involved in the above transaction is located at the center of the poblacion of Bian, Laguna, and in the opinion of the
Court of Appeals, worth between 20 and 25 pesos. Though registered in the name of Ocampo alone, it in reality belonged to him and
his wife as conjugal property.
The period originally fixed for the repurchase was one year, "extendible to another year," but several extensions were granted, with
the vendor paying part of the principal in addition to interests. The last extension granted was for year from February 3, 1937, and
the period having elapsed without the repurchase having been made, Potenciano, on January 24, 1939, filed with the register of
deeds of Laguna an affidavit for the consolidation of title, on the strength which the register of deeds issued transfer certificate of title
no. 18056 in the name of Potenciano and his wife. This, however, did not close the avenue for settlement, for on February 28, 1939,
with Edilberto Ocampo and Rufina Reyes already dead, Potenciano gave Paz Yatco an option to repurchase the property for P2,500
within 5 years, and a lease thereon for the same period of time at annual rental of P300 which, as may again be noted, is equivalent
to 12 per cent of the purchase price. On or about February 7, 1944, Paz Yatco sought to exercise the option by tendering to
Potenciano at his clinic in Manila the sum of P4,000 an amount sufficient to cover both principal and interest, and upon the tender
being rejected, deposited the money in court and brought an action in her own name and as judicial administratrix of the estate of
her deceased husband to compel Potenciano to accept it and to have the title to the property reinstated in her name and that of her
husband.
Intervening in the case, Potenciano's children, Victor and Lourdes, filed a cross-complaint, alleging that the option to purchase
granted by their father to plaintiff on February 28, 1939, was null and void as to the share of their deceased mother Rufina Reyes in
the property in litigation, which share passed to them by right of inheritance, and that as to their father's share in the same property
they, the intervenors, were exercising the right of redemption accorded by law to co-owners of property held in common, for which
purpose they had already tendered him the sum of P1,250 on the fifth day after they learned of said option through plaintiff's
complaint. To meet these allegations, plaintiff amended her complaint by including the intervenors as defendants and alleging, in
effect, that the pacto de retro sale in question was in reality a mortgage to secure a pre-existing debt, with the rental contract thrown
in to cover the stipulated interest of 12 per cent; that the option agreement for the repurchase of the property within five years from
February 28, 1939, and for the payment of rental for that period in an amount equal to an annual interest of 12 per cent on the loan,
was also meant to be in reality an extension of the life of the mortgage; and that the tender of payment was valid, the same having
been made within the extended period. The Court of First Instance, after trial, upheld these allegations and gave judgment in favor of
the children of Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco, who had substituted the latter after her death.
When the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, that court took a somewhat different view and rendered judgment declaring:
(a) That contract Exhibit A entered into between Edilberto Ocampo and Conrado Potenciano was one of mortgage, with
interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum;
(b) That the "option to purchase" and the "contract of lease" (Exhibit E and E-1) were validly executed by defendant Conrado
Potenciano and binding upon the property in litigation;

(c) That appellants were not co-owners of said property, by inheritance of one-half of the same from their deceased mother
Rufina Reyes;
(d) That appellants were not entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption (retracto legal) of the other half of the property
belonging to their father Conrado Potenciano;
(e) That the late Paz Yatco exercised her option to purchase the property in litigation within the time she had to do so;
(f) That the consignation of the P4,000 in Japanese military notes, made with the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna in payment of the property in question, was in accordance with the law and relieved the heirs of the spouses
Ocampo-Yatco from paying anew said purchase price;
(g) Ordering defendant Conrado Potenciano to execute the corresponding deed of conveyance, sufficient in law to transfer
the title of the property in litigation to the heirs of the deceased spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco; and
(h) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Laguna to cancel transfer certificate of title No. 18056 (Exhibit 1) and issue in lieu
thereof a new transfer certificate of title for said property in favor of the heirs of the spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz
Yatco, upon payment by appellees of the corresponding fees and the registration in his office of the deed of conveyance
mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.
This judgment that is now before us for review.
First thing to be noted is that the Court of Appeals found and it is not disputed that the pacto de retro sale made by Edilberto Ocampo
in favor of Conrado Potenciano and his wife was in reality a loan with security or an equitable mortgage, with simulated rental for
interest. Such being the case, the lenders had no right, through the unilateral declaration of one or both them, to consolidate title in
themselves over the property given as security. The consolidation of title effected by Potenciano in this case was, therefore, null and
void.
The Court of Appeals, however, held that the mortgage contract was superseded, through novation, by the option agreement for the
repurchase of the property mortgaged, and the appellants now contend that this war error because Potenciano had no authority to
enter into that agreement after the death of his wife. To this contention we have to agree. The Court of Appeals erred in supposing
that the surviving spouse had such authority as de facto administrator of the conjugal estate. As pointed out by appellants, the
decisions relied on by that court in support of its view are now obsolete. Those decisions laid down the rule that, upon the dissolution
of the marriage by the death of the wife, the husband must liquidate the partnership affairs. But the procedure has been changed by
Act No. 3176 (approved on November 24, 1924), now section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, which provides that when the marriage
is dissolved by the death of either husband or wife, the partnership affairs must be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings
of the deceased spouse (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 3rd ed., Vol. II, p. 324).
Furthermore, there is ground to believe that, as alleged by the appellees, the option agreement in question was nothing more than
mere extension of time for the payment of the mortgagee debt, since in the mind of the parties the real transaction had between
them was that of loan with security, or equitable mortgage, though as is usual in these cases, it was given the form of sale with right
to repurchase.
It follows from the foregoing that at the time Paz Yatco made the tender of payment and consigned the necessary amount in court,
the said contract of loan with security was still in effect, and as the tender was made in legal currency (Haw Pia vs. China Banking
Corporation,* 45 O.G. [Supp. 9] 229), the tender and consignation must be held to produce their legal effect, which is that of relieving
the debtor from liability. (Art. 1176, Civil Code; Limkakovs. Teodoro, 74 Phil., 313.)
Under this view of the case, it is not necessary to consider the claim of the appellants Victor Potenciano and Lourdes Potenciano and
that the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring them owners of the property in question, they having inherited one-half of it from
their mother and acquired the other half from their father in the exercise of their right of legal redemption as co-owners. As ownership
in the property never passed to their parents, these appellants acquired nothing.
Wherefore, with the modifications of the judgment below, let judgment be entered, declaring the obligation evidenced by Exhibit "A",
which is hereby held to be mere contract of loan with security or equitable mortgage, already discharged, and ordering the Register
of Deeds of Laguna to cancel transfer certificate of title No. 18056 and to issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title for said
property in favor of the heirs of the spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco upon payment of the corresponding fees. With costs
against the appellants.
Paras, Bengzon, C.J., Montemayor, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
Tuason, J., concurs in the result.