Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Jurisdiction Cases
Jurisdiction Cases
Respondent relied solely on estoppel to oppose petitioners claim of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the labor arbiter. He
adduced no other legal ground in support of his contention that the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case - "The operation
of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had
jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the
parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same 'must exist as a matter of law, and may not be
conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel' (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case
was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to
adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent positionthat the lower court had jurisdiction.
Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the
parties, has no bearing thereon - the NLRCs correct observation that jurisdiction over grievance issues, such as the propriety of
the reassignment of a union member falls under the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator.
The decision of the NLRC in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction REINSTATED
ATWEL vs CPA, INC (GR. 169370)
FACTS: Emiliano Melgazo founded and organized Concepcion Progressive Association (CPA) in Hilongos, Leyte .as CPA president,
Melgazo bought a parcel of land in behalf of the association. The property was later on converted into a wet market where
agricultural, livestock and other farm products were sold. It also housed a cockpit and an area for various forms of amusement.
The income generated from the property, mostly rentals from the wet market, was paid to CPA. When Emiliano Melgazo died, his
son, petitioner Manuel Melgazo, succeeded him as CPA president and administrator of the property. On the other hand,
petitioners Atwel and Pilpil were elected as CPA vice-president and treasurer, respectively.
Other elected officers and members formed their own group and registered themselves in the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) as officers and members of respondent CPAI. But petitioners not listed as members. CPAI alleged that it was
the owner of the property and petitioners, without authority, were collecting rentals from the wet market vendors. filed a case in
the SEC for mandatory injunction which was transferred to Tacloban City RTC (RA 8799), a special commercial court.
Petitioners contend that since the property was purchased using the money of petitioner Manuel Melgazo's father (the late
Emiliano Melgazo), it belonged to the latter and it was preposterous and impossible for the CPAI to have acquired ownership over
the property in 1968 when it was only in 1997 that it was incorporated and registered with the SEC special commercial court
ruled that CPA to be one and the same as CPAI, CPA as the owner of poperty and not Melgazo- Court ruled in favour of CPAI
Petitioners went to the CA and contested the jurisdiction of the special commercial court over the case. According to them, they
were not CPAI members, hence the case did not involve an intra-corporate dispute between and among members so as to
warrant the special commercial court's jurisdiction over it. CPAI, on the other hand, argued that petitioners were already in
estoppel as they had participated actively in the court proceedings. - nonetheless held that petitioners were already barred from
questioning the court's jurisdiction based on the doctrine of estoppel The court agreed [CPAI] that petitioners, after actively
participating in the trial of the case, can no longer be allowed to impugn the jurisdiction of the court... CA affirmed decision.
Peitioners appealed to SC.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners are estopped from questioning jurisdiction after participating in the proceeding. NO
RATIO: The SC agreed with the petitioners that estoppel cannot apply because a court's jurisdiction is conferred exclusively by
the Constitution or by law, not by the parties' agreement or by estoppel.
RA 8799 in 2000-the jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate controversies and other cases enumerated in Section 5 of PD
902-A was transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction
To determine whether a case involves an intra-corporate controversy to be heard and decided by the RTC, two elements
must concur:
(1)
the status or relationship of the parties (intra-corporate or partnership relations) and
(2)
the nature of the question that is subject of their controversy (intrinsically connected with the regulation of the
corporation).
In the case at bar, these elements are not present. The records reveal that petitioners were never officers nor members of
CPAI. CPAI itself admitted this in its pleadings. In fact, petitioners were the only remaining members of CPA which, obviously,
was not the CPAI that was registered in the SEC. The issue in this case does not concern the regulation of CPAI (or even CPA).
The determination as to who is the true owner of the disputed property entitled to the income generated therefrom is civil in
nature and should be threshed out in a regular court - conflict among the parties here was outside the jurisdiction of the special
commercial court
The rule remains that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that has none over the cause of action or subject matter
of the case. Unfortunately for CPAI, no exceptional circumstance appears in this case to warrant divergence from the rule.
Jurisdiction by estoppel is not available here.
Consequently, CPAI cannot be permitted to wrest from petitioners (as the remaining CPA officers) the administration of the
disputed property until after the parties' rights are clearly adjudicated in the proper courts. It is neither fair nor legal to bind a
party to the result of a suit or proceeding in a court with no jurisdiction. The decision of a tribunal not vested with the
appropriate jurisdiction is null and void.
The petition is GRANTED. Case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
FIGUEROA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (GR 147406)
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The RTC found him guilty. In his
appeal before the CA, the petitioner, for the first time, questioned RTCs jurisdiction on the case.
The CA in affirming the decision of the RTC, ruled that the principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitioner
from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTCthe trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and
without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity.
The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time
even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON petitioners failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case, constitute laches in relation to the
doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in petitioners appeal
to the CA
HELD: No.
RATIO: Citing the ruling in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, the Court held that as a general rule, the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to
that of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.
Laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised
so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.
In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had
already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches.
In the case at bar, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of
the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said
courts jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate courts directive to
show cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be considered
as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the
natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply.
The petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof
in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition for review on certiorari is granted. Criminal case is dismissed.