Mayor Bayani Alonte vs Judge

Maximo Savellano, NBI &

People of the Philippines
Due Process in Criminal Proceedings Waiver of Right to Due Process

Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had
later lured her into Alonetes house who was then the mayor of Bian, Laguna. The case was brought before RTC Bian. The counsel and the prosecutor
later moved for a change of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of desistance. The
prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of venue was done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila RTC
under J Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie
and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case
was then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due
process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her
desistance.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.

HELD: The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case due to animosity between him and the parties. There is no
showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a
waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano has not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting
on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.

PEOPLE VS. DRAMAYO [42 SCRA 60; G.R. L-21325; 29 OCT 1971]
Thursday, February 12, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not testify in the robbery case where he is an

accused. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who wasreturning from Sapao. The others were to station
themselves

Issue:

Held:

nearby.

Whether

Only

or

Dramayo

not

and

the

Ecubin

were

convicted

accuseds criminal

in

the

RTC

liability proved

for

murder.

beyond

Hence

the

reasonable

appeal

doubt.

Yes. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the Presumption of innocence. So it must be, according to the

Constitution. That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with
guilt. It is incumbent on theprosecution demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer

evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence.
Their guilt be shown beyond reasonable doubt. What is required then is moral certainty. "By reasonable doubt is meant that which
of possibility may arise, but it is doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation,
to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certain of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any carnal
charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof regular to constitute the
offense."

The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the two appellants, as from the evidence
deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not
come to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by theprosecution. The principal
contention raised is thus clearly untenable. It must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the first time, there had
been cases where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise
being allegedly present, did hold the party or parties, responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainty
having arisen as to their capability.

MARQUEZ vs. COMELEC Case Digest

MARQUEZ vs. COMELEC
243 SCRA 538

Facts: It is averred that at the time respondent Rodriguez filed his certificate of
candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten counts of insurance fraud or grand
theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los
Angeles, USA. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to
be served on private respondent on account of his alleged flight from that
country.

Before the May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation of respondents certificate
of candidacy on the ground of the candidates disqualification was filed by
petitioner, but COMELEC dismissed the petition.

Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon. Petitioner instituted

quo warranto proceedings against private respondent before the COMELEC but the
latter dismissed the petition.

Issue: Whether private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading
a warrant of arrest comes within the term fugitive from justice.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations
implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:

Article 73. Disqualifications The following persons shall be disqualified from

running for any elective local position:

(a) xxxx

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive
from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment.

It is clear from this provision that fugitives from justice refer only to persons who
has been convicted by final judgment. However, COMELEC did not make any
definite finding on whether or not private respondent is a fugitive from justice when
it outrightly denied the petition for quo warranto. The Court opted to remand the
case to COMELEC to resolve and proceed with the case.

Corpuz v People 194 SCRA 73 (1991)

Facts: Petitioner seeks reversal of the lower courts decision finding him guilty
formalversation of public funds. The accused was the acting supervising cashier at the
Provincial Treasurers office. He denied having misused the whole amount of P72,823.08 which
was discovered to be a shortage from the government funds contending that the P50,000.00
was the unliquidated withdrawal made by their paymaster Pineda thru the 4 checks he issued
while the petitioner was on leave and that he was forced by their Provincial Treasurer Aluning
to post said amount in his cash book despite not actually receiving the amount.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in observing the presumption of innocence of the
accused of the charge against him
Held: It is held that presumption of innocence of the accused should yield to the positive
findings that he malversed the government funds considering all the evidences presented that
point out to his guilt on the charge imputed against him. Records shows that the checks issued
for the paymaster were duly liquidated to the accused and there were inconsistent entries on
his cash books and that he was not really on leave on the day the said checks were disbursed
by the paymaster.

Feeder International Line vs. CA

Facts: The M/T "ULU WAI" foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and
operated byFeeder International Shipping Lines of Singapore, was carrying 1,100
metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil consigned to Far East Synergy
Corporation of Zamboanga. The vessel anchored in Iloilo without notifying the
customs authorities,who upon knowing this, discovered that it did not have the
required ship and shippingdocuments. The vessel and its cargo were held and a
Warrant of Seizure andDetention over the same was issued after
due investigation. The vessel was thenfound guilty of violating the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines. This decisionwas affirmed both by the Court of Tax
Appeals and the Court of appeals.
Issue:WON petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law in that its
rightto be presumed innocent was not recognized and the decision was not
supported byproof beyond reasonable doubt
Held:Proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in
naturesince they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in the
imposition uponhim of a penalty, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in
order to justify theforfeiture of the goods. In this case, the degree of proof required
is merely substantialevidence which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept asadequate to support a conclusion.In the case at bar, it was
held that the Government has sufficiently established thatan illegal importation, or
at least an attempt thereof, has been committed with theuse of the vessel M/T "ULU
WAI," thus warranting the forfeiture of said vessel and itscargo pursuant to the
provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code.Moreover, the petitioner, which is a
corporate entity, has no personality to invoke theright to be presumed innocent
which right is available only to an individual who is anaccused in a criminal case

PEOPLE VS. HOLGADO [85 PHIL 752; G.R.L-2809; 22 MAR 1950]

Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because

according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and withoutjustifiable motive, kidnap and detain one
Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal
liberty. He pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was presented
to

indict

Issue:

Held:

Whether

or

Not

there

was

the

any

irregularity

in

the

latter.

proceedings

in

the

trial

court.

Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it

is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney
de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney. This was violated. Moreso the guarantees of our
Constitution that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the
opportunity

to

be

heard

by

counsel.

The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The record does not show whether the
supposed instructionsof Mr. Ocampo was real and whether it had reference to the commissionof the offense or to the making of the
plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of
determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the
court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do
with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to
overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel
especially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.

People v Agbayani 284 SCRA 315 (1998)

Posted by Evelyn

Facts: The appellant was charged for raping his 14-year old daughter and was found guilty of
the crime of rape. A motion for a new trial was filed before the court by the new counsel of
the accused assailing the irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused
invoking the failure of the court to inform the accused of his right to choose his own counsel
and the violation of the appellants right for a 2 day preparation for trial.

Issue: Whether or not the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge
advised the accused of the right to have counsel is sufficient ground to reverse the judgment
of conviction and to send the case back for a new trial.
Held: It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge
advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The
reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure
prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a presumption can only be
overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has been held that unless the
contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively proved that the trial court failed to
inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was informed
by the court of such right.
Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides that after a plea of not guilty, the
accused is entitled to two (2) days to prepare for trial unless the court for good cause grants
him further time. It must be pointed out that the right must be expressly demanded. Only
when so demanded does denial thereof constitute reversible error and a ground for new
trial. Further, such right may be waived, expressly or impliedly. In the instant case, appellant
did not ask for time to prepare for trial, hence, he effectively waived such right. It is
untenable to believe that the counsel who represented the appellant was not prepared during
the trial as records showed he was able to cross-examine the complainant and there was no
ground to claim he is incompetent to represent the appellant in court. The SC thereby
affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Amion v Chiongson 301 SCRA 614 (January 22, 1999)

Posted by Evelyn

Facts: This is an administrative matter filed before the court charging the respondent judge
for ignorance of the law and oppression for vehemently insisting of appointing the accusedappellant counsel de officio despite the appellants opposition because he has his own counsel
of choice in the person of Atty. Depasucat. However, many instances that Atty. Depasucat did
not appear in court which prompted respondent judge to assign Atty. Lao Ong from the PAO to
represent the accused stating on record that his representation is without prejudice to the
appearance of the accused own counsel. This was done in order to avoid delay of the trial

since the complainant already expressed frustration on the so many postponement of the
hearing.
Issue: Whether or not there is merit of invoking the right to counsel of his own choice as
asserted by the accused in the case at bar.
Held: The court finds the administrative complaint against respondent judge devoid
of merit.An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to
counsel, will show that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and
specifically to a person under investigation rather than one who is the accused in a
criminal prosecution. Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of his substantive
and constitutional rightto due process as he was duly accorded all the opportunities to be
heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense but he forfeited this right, for not
appearing in court together with his counsel at the scheduled hearings. It was the strategic
machination of delaying the proceeding by the accused that gave rise to the need of
appointing him counsel de officio by the court as delaying further the hearing is prejudicial to
speedy disposition of a case and causes delay in the administration of justice.

PEOPLE VS. QUITLONG

VITUG ; July 10, 1998
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the RTC
FACTS
- Calpito was a student from Baguio city. One time,he wanted some fishballs so he
and Gosil boughtsome fishballs worth P15. When Calpito counted hischange, he
found out that he only received P35 forhis P100. Confronted by Calpito and Gosil,
thefishball vendor would not admit that he had short-changed Calpito. The 3 men
kept arguing. Momentslater, Soriano saw eight men rushing towards Gosiland
Calpito. Calpito got stabbed and fell to theground.- The RTC found Ronnie Quitlong,
Salvador Quitlongand Emilio Senoto guilty of murder for the killing of Jonathan
Calpito. Accused-appellants, shortly afterthe filing of the information, submitted a
motion forreinvestigation alleging that it was a certain
JesusMendoza
who stabbed the victim. The trial courtacted favorably on the motion. The City
Prosecutorfiled a motion to admit an amended information onthe basis of
affidavits. The information, as amended,included Jesus Mendoza among the named
accused.But unlike accused-appellants who were immediatelyarrested after the
commission of the crime, JesusMendoza remained at large. At their arraignment,the
detained accused pleaded not guilty to the crimecharged.- On 21 April 1995,

the trial court,

following hisevaluation of the respective submissions of theprosecution and the
defense, including their rebuttaland sur-rebuttal evidence, rendered its now
assaileddecision.
ISSUES
1.
WON the RTC abused its discretion and/oracted in excess of or without jurisdiction
infinding that there was conspiracy betweenand among the accused-appellants
2.
WON the RTC gravely abused its
discretionand/or acted in excess of or without jurisdiction in finding the accusedappellantsguilty of the crime of Murder instead of Homicide
HELD
1
.
YES, Quitlong is guilty of murder while the other 2are only accomplices.2. NO, the
crime was qualified The crime
committedwas qualified by abuse of superiority. Whilesuperiority in number would n
ot per se meansuperiority in strength, enough proof was adduced,however, to show
that the attackers had cooperatedin such a way as
to secure advantage of theirsuperiority in strength certainly out of proportion
tothe means of defense available to the personattacked.- Article III, Section 14, of
the 1987 Constitution, inparticular, mandates that no person shall be
heldanswerable for a criminal offense without dueprocess of law and that in all
criminal prosecutionsthe accused shall first be informed of the nature andcause of
the accusation against him. The right to beinformed of any such indictment is
likewise explicit inprocedural rules.- object of informing an accused in writing of
thecharges against him: First. To furnish the accusedwith such a description of the
charge against him aswill enable him to make his defense; and second,
toavail himself of his conviction or acquittal forprotection against a further
prosecution for the samecause; and third, to inform the court of the
factsalleged, so that it may decide whether they aresufficient in law to support a
conviction, if one shouldbe had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S., 542).In order
that this requirement may be satisfied, factsmust be stated, not conclusions of law.
Every crimeis made up of certain acts and intent; these must
beset forth in the complaint with reasonableparticularity of time, place,
names (plaintiff anddefendant), and circumstances. In short, thecomplaint must

contain a specific allegation of everyfact and circumstance necessary to constitute

thecrime charged
DISPOSITION
appellant Ronnie Quitlong is foundguilty of the crime of murder for the killing
of Jonathan Calpito. Appellants Salvador Quitlong andEmilio Senoto, Jr., are found
guilty as accomplices inthe commission of the crime

Pecho v People 262 SCRA 518 (1996)

Posted by Evelyn

Facts: The decision of the Supreme Court for convicting the accused for the complex crime of
attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document was assailed with the
contention of the defense that the accused may not be convicted of the crime for double
jeopardy. The charge against the accused was on violation of RA 3019 of which he was
acquitted because it only penalizes consummated crime. In the absence of evidence that
shows that the crime was consummated the accused was acquitted but the court held
judgment of prosecuting his conviction for attempted estafa thru falsification of official and
commercial document which is necessarily included in the crime charged. Accused invokes the
defense of double jeopardy since his acquittal from the charge involving RA 3019 is a bar
forprosecution on the crime of attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial
document and that the accused was not informed of this charge against him in the filing of
the information.
Issue: Whether or not the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the crime to
which he is convicted
Held: The court presented the objectives of the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the crime he is charged with as follows:
1.

2.

3.

To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable
him to make his defense;
To avail himself of his conviction
furtherprosecution for the same cause;

or

acquittal

for

protection

against

To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.

In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must be stated: not conclusions of
law.The complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance

necessary to constitute the crime. What determines the real nature and cause of accusation
against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not
the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision
of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. It follows then that an
accused may be convicted of a crime which although not the one charged, is necessarily
included in the latter. It has been shown that the information filed in court is considered as
charging for two offenses which the counsel of the accused failed to object therefore he can
be convicted for both or either of the charges.
However by reviewing the case at bar the SC finds lack of sufficient evidence that would
establish the guilt of the accused as conspirator to the crime of estafa beyond reasonable
doubt, the prior decision of the SC was deemed to be based merely on circumstantial
evidence, thus the accused was acquitted.

SORIANO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [131 SCRA 184; G.R. NO.L-65952; 31 JUL 1984]
Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Tan was accused of qualified theft. The petitioner, who was an Asst. Fiscal, was assigned to investigate. In the course of

the investigation, petitioner demanded Php.4000 from Tan as price for dismissing the case. Tan reported it to the NBI which set up
an entrapment. Tan was given a Php.2000, marked bill, and he had supplied the other half. The entrapment succeeded and an
information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty as a
principal in violating the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.3019). A motionfor reconsideration was denied by the
Sandiganbayan,

Issue:
purview

Held:

hence

this

instant

petition.

Whether or Not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as contract or transaction within the
of

.RA.3019.

R.A. 3019 Sec.3. Corrupt practices of public officers - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized

byexisting laws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx b.
Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share percentage or benefit, for himself or for other person, in
connection with any contract or transaction between the Govt. and any other party wherein the public officer in his official capacity

has

to

intervene

under the

law.

The petitioner stated that the facts make out a case of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC and not a violation of R.A. 3019
sec.3 (b). The offense of direct bribery is not the offense charged and is not included in the offense charged which is violation of
R.A.3019

sec.3

(b).

The respondent claimed that, transaction as used hereof, is not limited to commercial or business transaction, but includes all kinds
of transaction whether commercial, civil, or administrative in nature.

The court agrees with the petitioner. It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was neither a contract nor
transaction. A transaction like a contract is one which involves some consideration as in credit transactions. And this element is
absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner.

Judgment modified. Petitioner is guilty of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC.

BORJA VS. MENDOZA [77 SCRA 422; G.R. NO.L-45667; 20 JUN 1977]
Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu. However, he was not arraigned. That not withstanding,

respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime
charged. The case was appealed to the Court o First Instance in Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. It was alleged that
the failure to arraign him is a violation of his constitutional rights. It was also alleged that without any notice to petitioner and
without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered The Solicitor General commented
that

the

Issue:

Whether

Held:

decision

or

should

Not

be

annulled

petitioners constitutional

because

right was

violated

there

when

was

he

no

was

arraignment.

not

arraigned.

Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was indicted

and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full
opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. It is also not just due process that requires an arraignment. It is required in the

Rules that an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative
that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him.
At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. Being arraigned
is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. Also, respondent Judge Senining convicted petitioner
notwithstanding the absence of an arraignment. With the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel
being thus manifest, it is correct that the Solicitor General agreed with petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should be set
aside for being null. The absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of therequirements of due process to ensure
a

fair

and

impartial

trial.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining dated December 28, 1973,
finding the accused guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries, is nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of respondent
Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated November 16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is nullified and set aside.
The case is remanded tothe City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries, with due respect
and observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with the arraignment of petitioner.

People v Tee GR No. 140546-47 (January 20, 2003)

Posted by Evelyn

"rights of

the

accused

to

speedy

trial"

Facts
The case involves an automatic review of judgment made against Tee who was convicted for
illegal possession of marijuana and sentenced to death. The defense assailed the decision of
the court for taking admissible as evidence the marijuana seized from the accused by virtue
of allegedly general search warrant. They further contend that the accused was deprived of
his right to speedy trial by failure of the prosecution to produce their witness who failed to
appear during the 20 hearing dates thereby slowing down the trial procedure.

Issue
Whether or not the substantive right of the accused for a speedy trial prejudiced during the
hearing of the case.
Held
The court ruled that the substantive right of the accused for a fair and speedy trial was not violated. It held that the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 provides that the trial
period for the criminal cases should be in general 180 days. However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1) the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or (2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or (3) when without
cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
It was shown by the records that the prosecution exerted efforts in obtaining a warrant to compel the witness to testify. The concept of speedy trial is necessarily
relative where several factors are weighed such as the length of time of delay, the reason of such delay, and conduct of prosecution and the accused and the
prejudice and damaged caused to the accused of such delay. The court did not find the 20 days of delayed hearing unreasonable length of time as to constitute
deprivation of the constitutional rights of the accused for a speedy trial in addition to the fact that court trial may be always subjected to postponement for
reasonable cause of delay. In the absence of showing that the reason for delay was capricious or oppressive, the State must not be deprived of reasonable
opportunity in prosecuting the accused.

Flores Vs. People (December 10, 1974)

Flores vs. People
GR L-25769 | December 10, 1974

FACTS:

Petitioners, Francisco Flores and Francisco Angel, were accused for robbery. Information was filed in
December 1951. They were found guilty of the crime charged in November 1955. Notice of appeal was file
in December 1955. It was until February 1958 that action was taken by CAa resolution remanding the
records of the case to the lower court for a rehearing of the testimony of a certain witness deemed material
for the disposition of the case. Such resolution was amended dated August 1959 which granted the
petitioners to set aside the decision so that evidence for the defense on new facts may be received and a
new decision in lieu of the old one may be rendered. The case was returned to the lower court but nothing
was done for about a year because the offended party failed to appear despite the 6/7 dates set for such
hearing. Furthermore, when the offended party took the witness stand, his testimony was characterized as a
mere fiasco as he could no longer remember the details of the alleged crime and even failed to identify the 2
accused.

The trial court instead of rendering a decision sent back the records to the appellate tribunal. 5 more years
elapsed without anything being done, petitioners sought dismissal of the case against them due to inordinate
delay in the disposition (from December 1955- May 1965). CA was unresponsive notwithstanding the
vigorous plea of the petitioners, its last order being a denial of a second MR dated January 1966. CAs
defense is that the case was not properly captioned as People of the Philippines and without Court of
Appeals being made a party to the petition.

ISSUE: WON constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.

HELD: YES. Petition for certiorari was granted. Orders denying Motion to dismiss as Motion to
Reconsideration are set aside and nullified. Criminal Case against petitioners was dismissed.

Constitutional right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. An
accused is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. He cannot be oppressed by delaying the
commencement of the trial for an unreasonable length of time. The Constitution does not say that such right
may be availed only where the prosecution of a crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It does
not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private individuals. Where a person is prosecuted
criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it
is authorized to be commenced.

Technicalities should give way to the realities of the situation. There should not be too much significance
attached to the procedural defect (refer to CAs defense). CA failed to accord respect to this particular
constitutional right amounting at the very least to a grave abuse of discretion.

CONDE VS. RIVERA [45 PHIL 650; G.R. NO. 21741; 25 JAN
1924]
Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Aurelia Conde,

been

forced

to

formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has

respond

to

no

less the five

information

for

various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel
at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to seethe cause
postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection,
and now, after the passage of more than one year from the time when the first
information was filed, seems as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles
as

she

Issue: Whether

was

when

originally

charged.

or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy and

impartial

trial.

Held: Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde,
like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent
she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. We lay
down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause,
secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a
reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is
entitled

to

relief

by

proceeding

in

mandamus

to

compel

dismissal

of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain

his freedom.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8493

AN ACT TO ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL
CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURT, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURT, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Speedy Trial Act of
1998."
Sec. 2. Mandatory pre-trial in criminal cases. In all cases cognizable by
the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan, the justice or
judge shall, after arraignment, order a pre-trial conference to consider the
following:
(a)
Plea
bargaining;
(b)
Stipulation
of
Facts;
(c)
Marking
for
identification
of
evidence
of
parties;
(d)
Waiver
of
objections
to
admissibility
of
evidence;
and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial.
Sec. 3. Pre-trial agreement. All agreements or admissions made or
entered into during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced to writing
and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise the same shall not be
used in evidence against the accused. The agreements in relation to
matters referred to in Sec. 2 hereof is subject to the approval of the
court: Provided, That the agreement on the plea of the accused to a lesser
offense may only be revised, modified, or annulled by the court when the
same is contrary to law, public morals, or public policy.
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Sec. 4. Non-appearance at pre-trial conference. Where counsel for the

accused or the prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial conference and
does not offer an acceptable excuse for his/her lack of cooperation, the
pre-trial justice or judge may impose proper sanctions or penalties.
Sec. 5. Pre-trial order. After the pre-trial conference, the court shall
issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and
evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to
matters not disposed of and control the course of action during the trial,
unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.
Sec. 6. Time limit for trial. In criminal cases involving persons charged
of a crime, except those subject to the Rules on Summary Procedure, or
where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6) months

imprisonment, or a fine of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both,

irrespective of other imposable penalties, the justice or judge shall, after
consultation with the public prosecutor and the counsel for the accused,
set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial
calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no
case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days
from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of
Court.
Sec. 7. Time limit between filing of information and arraignment and
between arraignment and trial. The arraignment of an accused shall be
held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from the
date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which
the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a
plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15)
days to prepare for trial. Trial shall commence within thirty (30) days
from
arraignment
as
fixed
by
the
court.
If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state
whether he/she interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative
defense shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may modify the
order of trial and require the accused to prove such defense by clear and
convincing
evidence.
Sec. 8. Time limit following an order for new trial. If the accused is to
be tried again following an order of a court for a new trial, the trial shall
commence within thirty (30) days from the date the order for a new trial
becomes final, except that the court retrying the case may extend such
period but in any case shall not exceed one hundred eighty (180) days
from the date the order for a new trial becomes final if unavailability of
witnesses or other factors resulting from passage of time shall make trial
within
thirty
(30)
days
impractical.
Sec. 9. Extended time limit. Notwithstanding the provisions of Sec. 7 of

this Act, for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its

effectivity, the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to
trial imposed by Sec. 7 of this Act shall be one hundred eighty (180) days.
For the second twelve-month period the time limit shall be one hundred
twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period the time limit
with respect to the period from arraignment to trial shall be eighty (80)
days.
Sec. 10. Exclusions. The following periods of delay shall be excluded in
computing the time within which trial must commence:
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the
accused,
including
but
not
limited
to
the
following:
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(1) delay resulting from an examination of the accused, and hearing on

his/her
mental
competency,
or
physical
incapacity;
(2) delay resulting from trials with respect to charges against the accused;
(3)

delay

resulting

from

interlocutory

appeals;

(4) delay resulting from hearings on pre-trial motions: Provided, That the
delay
does
not
exceed
thirty
(30)
days;
(5) delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to
change of venue of cases or transfer from other courts;
(6) delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a valid prejudicial
question;
and
(7) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30)
days, during which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually
under
advisement.
(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the
accused
or
an
essential
witness.
For purposes of this subparagraph, an accused or an essential witness

shall be considered absent when his/her whereabouts are unknown and, in

addition, he/she is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution or
his/her whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. An accused
or an essential witness shall be considered unavailable whenever his/her
whereabouts are known but his/her presence for trial cannot be obtained
by due diligence or he/she resists appearing at or being returned for trial.
(c) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the accused is
mentally
incompetent
or
physically
unable
to
stand
trial.
(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and
thereafter a charge is filed against the accused for the same offense, or
any offense required to be joined with that offense, any period of delay
from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation
would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no
previous
charge.
(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a
co-accused over whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or as to
whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been
granted.
(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any justice
or judge motu propio or on motion of the accused or his/her counsel or at
the request of the public prosecutor, if the justice or judge granted such
continuance on the basis of his/her findings that the ends of justice
served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and
the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of delay resulting from a
continuance granted by the court in accordance with this subparagraph
shall be excludable under this Sec. unless the court sets forth, in the
record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that
the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh
the best interests of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.
Sec. 11. Factors for granting continuance. The factors, among others,
which a justice or judge shall consider in determining whether to grant a
continuance under subparagraph (f) of Sec. 10 of this Act are as follows:
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(a) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding

would be likely to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or
result
in
a
miscarriage
of
justice.
(b) Whether the case taken as a whole is so novel, so unusual and so
complex, due to the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution
or otherwise, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation
within the periods of time established by this Act.
No continuance under subparagraph (f) of Sec. 10 shall be granted because
of general congestion of the court's calendar, or lack of diligent
preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the
public
prosecutor.
Sec. 12. Public attorney's duties where accused is imprisoned. If the
public attorney knows that a person charged of a crime is preventively
detained, either because he/she is charged of a bailable crime and has no
means to post bail, or is charged of a non-bailable crime, or is serving a
term of imprisonment in any penal institution, the public attorney shall
promptly:
(a) Undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial, or cause a
notice to be served on the person having custody of the prisoner
mandating such person to so advise the prisoner of his/her right to
demand
trial.
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(b) Upon receipt of a notice, the person having custody of the prisoner
shall promptly advise the prisoner of the charge and of his/her right to
demand trial. If at any time thereafter the prisoner informs the person
having custody that he/she demands trial, such person shall cause notice
to that effect to be sent promptly to the public attorney.
(c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to
obtain
the
presence
of
the
prisoner
for
trial.
(d) When the person having custody of the prisoner receives from the
public attorney a properly supported request for temporary custody of the
prisoner for trial, the prisoner shall be made available to that public
attorney.

Sec. 13. Remedy where accused is not brought to trial within the time
limit. If an accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required
by Sec. 7 of this Act as extended by Sec. 9, the information shall be
dismissed on motion of the accused. The accused shall have the burden of
proof of supporting such motion but the prosecution shall have the
burden of going forward with the evidence in connection with the
exclusion
of
time
under
Sec.
10
of
this
Act.
In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the
court shall consider, among other factors, the seriousness of the offense,
the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal, and
the impact of a reprosecution on the implementation of this Act and on
the administration of justice. Failure of the accused to move for dismissal
prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty shall constitute a waiver of the
right
to
dismissal
under
this
Sec..
Sec. 14. Sanctions. In any case in which counsel for the accused, the
public prosecution or public attorney:
(a) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing the fact
that
a
necessary
witness
would
be
unavailable
for
trial;
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(b) files a motion solely for the purpose of delay which he/she knows is
totally
frivolous
and
without
merit;
(c) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which
he/she knows to be false and which is material to the granting of a
continuance;
or
(d) otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification
consistent with the provisions of this Act, the court may, without
prejudice to any appropriate criminal and/or administrative charges to be
instituted by the proper party against the erring counsel if and when
warranted, punish any such counsel or attorney, as follows:
(1) in the case of a counsel privately retained in connection with the
defense of an accused, by imposing a fine not exceeding; fifty percent

(50%) of the compensation to which he/she is entitled in connection with

his/her
defense
of
the
accused;
(2) by imposing on any appointed counsel de officio or public prosecutor a
fine
not
exceeding
Ten
thousand
pesos
(10,000.00);
and
(3) by denying any defense counsel or public prosecutor the right to
practice before the court considering the case for a period not exceeding
thirty (30) days.
The authority to punish provided for by this Sec. shall be in addition to
any other authority or power available to the court. The court shall follow
the procedures established in the Rules of Court in punishing any counsel
or
public
prosecutor
pursuant
to
this
Sec..
Sec. 15. Rules and regulations. The Supreme Court shall
promulgate rules, regulations, administrative orders and circulars which
shall seek to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases. The rules,
regulations, administrative orders and circulars formulated shall provide
sanctions against justices and judges who willfully fail to proceed to trial
without justification consistent with the provisions of this Act.
Sec. 16. Funding. For the effective implementation of the rules,
regulations, administrative orders and circulars promulgated under this
Act, the amount of Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) annually shall
be appropriated from the allocation of the Supreme Court under the
General Appropriations Act. Thereafter, such additional amounts as may
be necessary for its continued implementation shall be included in the
annual
General
Appropriations
Act.
Sec. 17. Act not a bar to speedy trial claim under the Constitution. No
provision of this Act shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of
speedy trial as required by Article III, Sec. 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.
Sec. 18. Repealing clause. All laws, presidential decrees, executive
orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Sec. 19. Separability clause. In case any provision of this Act is

declared unconstitutional, the other provisions shall remain in effect.
Sec. 20. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of
general circulation: Provided, That Sec. 7 of this Act shall become
effective after the expiration of the aforementioned third-calendar-month
period provided in Sec. 9 of this Act.

Garcia v Domingo 52 SCRA 143 (1973)

Facts: For the convenience of the parties the trial was held in the air conditioned chamber of the respondent judge Garcia. The complaint was under the premise
that such act is in violation of the right to hold a public trial.
Issue: Whether or not such proceeding of holding trial in the chamber of the judge in violation to the principle of right to a public trial.

Held: It is not in violation of the right to a public trial since the trial was still open to public and there is no showing that the public was
deprived to witness the trial proceeding.

Re: Request For Live Tv Of Trial Of Joseph Estrada

Re: Request For Live Tv Of Trial Of Joseph Estrada
360 SCRA 248
A.M. No 01-4-03-Sc
June 29, 2001

Facts: The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting the Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other
criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an
unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo.

Issue: Whether or Not live media coverage of the trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada should be permitted by the
court.

Held: The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information,
on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. When these rights race against one another,
jurisprudence tells us that the right of the accused must be preferred to win.

Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted about its individual settings nor made an object of publics
attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only be evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and
calm ambiance is demanded.

An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to
ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous
with publicized trial, it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the
trial process.

The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most
accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public. Nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of
the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions.

Re: Petition for radio and television coverage of the multiple murder cases
againstMaguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, et al., A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC/A.M. No.
10-11-6-SC/A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC. June 14, 2011. Right to fair trial v. freedom of the
press.Right to fair trial v. freedom of the press. Prejudicial publicity insofar as it
undermines the rightto a fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances test that
the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that
pervasive publicity is not
per se
prejudicial to theright of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation
and proof of the impairedcapacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision.
FACTS: On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media
practitionerswere killed on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. This tragic
incident came to beknown as Maguindanao massacre spawned charges for 57
counts of murder and additionalcharges of rebellion against 197 accused. Almost a
year later on November 19 2010, the NationalUnion of Journalists of the Philippines
(NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network Inc., relatives of the
victims, individual journalists from various media entities andmembers of the
academe filed a petition before this court praying that live television and
radiocoverage of the trial in this criminal cases be allowed, recording devises be
permitted inside thecourt room to assist the working journalists, and reasonable
guidelines be formulated to governthe broadcast coverage and the use of devices.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for radio and television coverage of the
MaguindanaoMassacre should be allowed.
HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. The Court partially grants pro hac vice petitioners prayer for a
live broadcast of the trial court proceedings, subject to certain guidelines as
enumerated. The present petition which asserts the exercise of the freedom of the
press, right to information, right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and to
petition the government for redress of grievances, rightof free access to courts, and
freedom of association, subject to regulations to be issued by theCourt.Respecting
the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court

judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it

undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances test,
applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. andEstrada v. Desierto, that the right of an
accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press,that pervasive publicity is
not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and thatthere must be
allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a biasfreedecision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual
prejudice resulting inthe deprivation of the right to a fair trial
In this day and age, it is about time to craft a win-win situation that shall not
compromise rightsin the criminal administration of justice, sacrifice press freedom
and allied rights, and interferewith the integrity, dignity and solemnity of judicial
proceedings. Indeed, the Court cannot glossover what advances technology has to
offer in distilling the abstract discussion of keyconstitutional precept into the
workable context. Technology per se has always been neutral. It isthe use and
regulation thereof that need fine-tuning. Law and technology can work to
theadvantage and furtherance of the various rights involved, within the guidelines.

Talino vs Sandiganbayan
FACTSThe petitioner, along with several others, were charged in four separate
informations with estafa through falsification of publicdocuments for having
allegedly conspired to defraud the governmentin the total amount of P26,523.00,
representing the cost of repairsclaimed to have been undertaken, but actually not
needed and never made, on four government vehicles, through falsification of
thesupporting papers to authorize the illegal payments.

The cases weretried jointly for all the accused until after the prosecution had
rested,when Genaro Basilio, Alejandro Macadangdang and petitioner Talino asked
for separate trials, which were allowed. They thenpresented their evidence at such
trials, while the other accusedcontinued defending themselves in the original
proceedings, atwhich one of them, Pio Ulat gave damaging testimony against
thepetitioner, relating in detail his participation in the questionedtransactions. In
due time, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decisionin all the four cases finding
Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang Ulat andRenato Valdez guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimescharged while absolving the other defendants for
insufficientevidence. This decision is now challenged by the petitioner on theground
that it violates his right of confrontation as guaranteed by

theConstitution.ISSUEWON the right of confrontation was violatedHELDThe right of

confrontation is one of the fundamental rightsguaranteed by the Constitution to the
person facing criminalprosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers
are andmust be given a chance to cross-examine them on their charges.
Noaccusation is permitted to be made against his back or in hisabsence nor is any
derogatory information accepted if it is madeanonymously, as in poison pen letters
sent by persons who cannotstand by their libels and must shroud their spite in
secrecy. That isalso the reason why
ex parte
affidavits are not permitted unless theaffiant is presented in court

and hearsay is barred save only in thecases allowed by the Rules of Court, like the
dying declaration.The Court finds that the respondent court did not consider
thetestimony given by Ulat in convicting the petitioner. The part of thatdecision
finding Talino guilty made no mention of Ulat at all but

confined itself to the petitioner's own acts in approving thequestioned vouchers as

proof of his complicity in the plot to swindlethe government.The petitioner makes
much of the statement in the Comment that thepetitioner's guilt could be deduced
"from the evidence for theprosecution and from the testimony of Pio Ulat,"

but that was not therespondent court speaking. That was the Solicitor
General'sanalysis. As far as the Sandiganbayan was concerned, the saidtestimony
was inadmissible against the petitioner because he "didnot cross examine Ulat and
was not even required to be presentwhen the latter was testifying. In fact, the
respondent court evenexpressed the wish that Ulat had been presented as rebuttal
witnessin the separate trial of the petitioner as there would then have been"no
impediment to the use of his testimony against the other accused. " As it was not
done, the trial court could not and did notconsider Ulat's testimony in determining
the petitioner's part in theoffenses