OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF ILLINOIS Lisa Madigan ATTORNEY GENERAL July 13, 2015 Via electronic mail Mr. Robert Skolnik Riverside Brookfield Landmark 141 South Oak Park Avenue Oak Park, Illinois 60302 bobskolnik@aol.com Via electronic mail Mr. Brian P. Crowley Franczek Radelet 300 South Wacker Drive, Suite 3400 Chicago, Illinois 60606 bpe@franczek.com RE: OMA Request for Review ~ 2015 PAC 34844 Dear Mr. Skolnik and Mr. Crowley: ‘This determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3,5(e) of the Open Meetings Act (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(e) (West 2014)). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that Riverside School District 96 Board of Education (Board) violated OMA when a majority of quorum of Board members held a meeting on April 1, 2015, without providing advance notice, posting an agenda, or otherwise abiding by the requirements of OMA. On April 21, 2015, Mr. Robert Skolnik, on behalf of the Riverside Brookfield Landmark submitted a Request for Review to the Public Access Bureau alleging that the Board violated OMA when three of its members held a meeting on April 1, 2015, to discuss strategy for contract negotiations without providing advance notice to the public. On April 28, 2015, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the District and asked it to respond to Mr. Skolnik’s allegations. On May 14, 2015, the District 500 South Second Sr, Spring nis 2706 + (217) 782-1090 + TTY: (217) 785-277 » Fax (17) 782-7046, 100 West Randolph See, Cieago, Minos, 60601 + 12) 8143000 + TTY: G12) 814.3374 + Fox (312) 814-3806 1001 East Main, Carbondale, Ilinois 62901» (618) 529.6400» TTY: (618) 529-6403 «Fax: (618) 529-6416Mr. Robert Skolnik Mr. Brian P. Crowley July 13, 2015 Page 2 responded that the April 1, 2015, meeting was part of collective bargaining negotiations and was, therefore, exempt from the requirements of OMA under section 18 of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (IELRA) (115 ILCS 5/18 (West 2014)). The District explained that the District's negotiating team took part in a bargaining session on March 31, 2015, from 4:00 p.m. until approximately 8:00 p.m. The District further explained that the next day the negotiating team, which included three members of the Board, gathered at the office of the Districts attorney to debrief and prepare for the next session. ‘The District's response emphasized that the negotiating team’s April 1, 2015, discussion was limited to the March 31, 2015, bargaining session, preparation for the next session, and overall negotiating strategy. On May 14, 2014, this office forwarded the District's response to Mr. Skolnik; he did not reply. DETERMINATION The intent of OMA is to "ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.” $ ILCS 120/1 (West 2014). To that end, section 2(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2(a) (West 2014)) provides: "{a]l! meetings of public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed in accordance with Section 2a." OMA defines a "meeting" as "any gathering, * * *, of a majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for the purpose of discussing public business or, for a 5-member public body, a quorum of the members of a public body held for the purpose of discussing public business." Additionally, section 2,02(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2.02(a) (West 2014)) provides: “[plublic notice of any special meeting except a meeting held in the event of a bona fide emergency, or of any rescheduled regular meeting, or of any reconvened meeting, shall be given at least 48 hours before such meeting, which notice shall also include the agenda." It is undisputed that three members of the seven-member Board, which constitutes a majority of a quorum, participated in the negotiating team's April 1, 2015, discussion of public business. Accordingly, this meeting was subject to the advance n ns and other requirements of OMA unless exempted by section 18 of IELRA, which provides: “The provisions of the Open Meetings Act shail not apply to collective bargaining negotiations and grievance arbitrations conducted pursuant to this Act.” Mr. Skolnik’s Request for Review alleged that preparations for negotiations are not covered by the exemption in section 18 of IELRA and, therefore, the meeting was held in violation of OMA because no advance notice was provided to the public. In its response to this office, the District claimed that because collective bargaining negotiations require confidential preparation, debriefing, and caucusing, section 18 of TELRA exempts such discussions from the requirements of OMA. The District contended that by enacting section 18 of IELRA, "the General Assembly has recognized that the requirementsMr. Robert Skolnik Mr. Brian P. Crowley July 13, 2015 Page 3 and the constraints of the OMA would impede collective bargaining and would serve no public interest.” In construing statutory provisions such as section 18 of IELRA, the primary goal is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the General Assembly. See Southern Illinoisan v. Minois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill, 2d 390, 415, 844 N.E.2d 1, 14 (2006). The best indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. See, e.g., Bettis v. Marsaglia, 2014 ¥L 117050, §13, 23 N.E.3d 351, 356 2014), When a statutory provision is ambiguous, a reviewing body turns "to aids of statutory construction, including legislative history and established rules of construction.” BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP y. Mitchell, 2014 IL 116311, 938, 6N.E.3d 162, 170 (2014). "Under the doctrine of in pari material, two legislative acts that address the same subject are considered ‘with reference to one another, so that they may be given harmonious effect.” See, e.g., Citizens Opposing Pollution v, ExxonMobil Coal U.S.A., 2012 IL 111286, §24, 962 N.E.2d 956, 964 (2012). Itis also a well-established principle of statutory construction that "each word, clause and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable construction, if possible, and should not be rendered superfluous." See, e,g. Home Star Bank and Financial Services v. Emergency Care and Health Organization, Lid, 2014 IL 115526, §24, N.E.3d 128, 135 (2014), Under the plain language of section 18 of the IELRA, "collective bargaining negotiations” are not subject to OMA. Negotiations are commonly understood to involve parties with differing interests each advocating for their own interests; Black's Law Dictionary defines negotiations as "[dJealings conducted between two or more parties for the purpose of reaching an understanding.” Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), available at Westlaw BLACKS. Section 18 of IELRA does not refer to discussions concerning collective bargaining negotiations, but to the collective bargaining negotiations themselves. Accordingly, the plain language of section 18 of IELRA does not evince the intent to remove a public body's internal discussions conceming collective bargaining negotiations from the purview of OMA. This interpretation is further supported by the fact that OMA contains its own provision excepting a public body's internal discussions of collective bargaining negotiations from open meetings. Specifically, section 2(¢)(2) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2(c)(2) (West 2014)) allows a public body to hold a closed session discussion of "[clollective negotiating matters between the public body and its employees or their representatives[.J" If, as the District contends, section 18 of IELRA renders OMA inapplicable to discussions related to collective bargaining matters, as opposed to applying only to negotiations or grievance arbitrations conducted under IELRA where both educational employees and employers are present, then "Letter from Brian P. Crowley, Franczek Radelet, o Lindsey C. Johnson, Assistant Attomey General, Public Access Bureau (May 14, 2015), at 2.Mr. Robert Skolnik Mr. Brian P. Crowley July 13, 2015 Page 4 section 2(c)(2) of OMA is superfluous. The exception permitting a public body to discuss collective negotiation matters in closed session would be pointless if OMA does not apply to a public body's discussion of collective bargaining negotiations. On the other hand, section 18 of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act and section 2(¢)(2) of OMA can be construed in a manner that gives effect to both provisions: section 18 of the IELRA applies when a public body meets with the opposing party in a collective bargaining dispute to negotiate, whereas a public body's internal discussions about collective bargaining matters are subject to OMA. For those reasons, the Public Access Bureau has previously determined that “it comports with and effectuates both section 18 of the IELRA and section 2(c)(2) of OMA to conclude that OMA. applies when a negotiating team holds a meeting for the members to discuss collective negotiating matters among themselves.” Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Reg, Rev. Ltr. 32578, issued February 27, 2015, at 4. Accordingly, the Board violated OMA on April 1, 2015, when a majority of a quorum of its members participated in the negotiating team's discussion of collective bargaining without providing advance notice, posting an agenda, or otherwise abiding by OMA. We note that the conclusion that OMA applies to unilateral meetings to discuss collective bargaining does not mean that those discussions cannot be confidential; it simply means that if'a negotiating team wishes to discuss collective negotiating matters confidentially, it must make a motion and vote to center a closed session during a properly-noticed open meeting to discuss those matters. We caution the Board to comply with all the requirements of OMA in the future. The Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does not require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, you may contact me at (312) 793-0865 or at the Chicago address on the bottom of the first page of this letter. This letter shall serve to close this matter. Mery ey yours, SY 4 han con nese JOHNSON Assistant Attorney General Public Access Bureau 34844 0 202 notice improper sd