Σημειώσεις Παραδόσεων Θεωρία Παιγνίων Για Πολιτικούς Επιστήμονες

:
2008

.

.
-
,

.

.

, ,
,
.

.
70%

30%.

,

.
, . (2004), :

, : [1990] ()
.
Dixit and Skeath (1999), Games of Strategy, US:

Norton (DandS)
Dixit and Nalebuff (2001),
-
,
, : [1991] (DandN)
Shepsle and Bonchek (1997), Analyzing Politics,
NY: Norton (S)
()
() (2002),
John Nash: , :
()
, (2000), ,
: [1984] (A)
Morrow (1994), Game theory for political
scientists, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press (M)

2008
27/02
:

( )
(DandN) .1, (DandS) .1,2, () .:21-61
05/03
.
(, )
() . 2,3 (DandN) .1, (DandS) .1,2
12/03
:
(sequential moves):
(backwards induction)
(DandN) .2 (DandS) .3

2008
19/03
(simultaneous move
games with pure strategies):
(dominant and dominated strategies),
(dominant strategy equilibrium),
Nash.
() .3, (DandN) .3, (DandS) .4
26/03
(simultaneous move
games with mixed strategies):
(mixed strategy equilibrium)
() .3, (DandN) .7, (DandS) .5
02/04
.
- (sub-games)
(sub-game perfect
quilibrium)
(DandN) .7, (DandS) . 6, () . 3

2008
09/04
16/04
:
.
,

() . 3, (DandN) .4, (DandS) .8, () .1,2
07/05
: , ,
.
,
(DandN) .5, 6, (DandS) .9, () . 5

2008
14/05
:
() . 4, (DandS) .11, (S) . 8, 11
21/05

(uncertainty, incomplete and asymmetric information) (moral hazard
and adverse selection):

(signaling and screening)
(DandN) .12, (DandS) .12, SandN, . 11
28/05
- (incentives and
enforceable contracts, principal-agent control models).
(S) .: 358-404 , () . 5,7

. 60
: Theory of Games and Economic Behavior John
von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (Princeton UP:
1943) .
50-60.
John Nash
Thomas Schelling.
..()
:

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-
200

,
, , , .

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( Vs )

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- (output)
- (payoff):

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(expected payoff):

()
:
0 75%

25%
100
0.75*0 +0.25*100=25
( )
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(game tree).

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:
(initial node)
(decision nodes)
(terminal node)
(branches)

: ()
(Gray) (Green)
:

.
(Green) ,

( )
:

.
(Green) ,

( )
GRAY, GREEN
1, 1
GREEN
b
Ads
3, 3
GRAY
a
2, 4
No Ads
GREEN
c
4, 2
FIGURE 3.1 Tree for Senate Race Game
Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company
;
1:
(pure strategies) .
;
,
. O

.

(contingent pure strategies).
;
Gray
ads no ads
.
Green ,
.

Gray.

(IN) (OUT ).
;

Green :
1) Gray Ads , IN,
No Ads IN
2) Gray Ads, OUT,
No Ads IN
3) Gray Ads, IN,
No Ads OUT
;
4) Gray Ads, OUT
No Ads OUT

Green, .
Green b, c
:
1) , 2) OUT, IN 3) IN, OUT 4) OUT, OUT
;
2:
.
;

( ).
;

rollback ( ).
;

.
;
Green 2) Gray
Ads, OUT, No
Ads IN.
Gray
Green Ads.
- : (Ads; Out,
In)
(a) Pruning at terminal nodes

GRAY, GREEN
1, 1
GREEN
b
Ads
3, 3
GRAY
a
2, 4
No Ads
GREEN
c
4, 2
FIGURE 3.2 A Using Rollback
(b) Fully pruned tree

GRAY, GREEN
1, 1
GREEN
b
Ads
3, 3
GRAY
a
2, 4
No Ads
GREEN
c
4, 2
FIGURE 3.2 B Using Rollback
$50,000/yr
FUTURE
SELF
family practice
medical
school
$150,000/yr
$500,000/yr
$50,000/yr
CURRENT
SELF
law
school
politics
$35,000 $200,000/yr
$600,000/yr
business
school
$100,000/yr
management
$250,000/yr on average
$ 0 $5m/yr
FIGURE 3.3 One-Player Game
GREEN, GRAY
1, 1
GRAY
In
4, 2
Out
3, 3
GREEN
GRAY
2, 4
FIGURE 3.4 Change of Move Order in the Senate Race Game
PAYOFFS
BIG
GIANT
TITAN
1, 5, 5
5, 5, 2
TITAN
5, 2, 5
3, 4, 4
TITAN
2, 5, 5
4, 3, 4
TITAN
4, 4, 3
4, 4, 4
b
U
e
FRIEDAS
a
R
BIG
GIANT
c
g
FIGURE 3.5 Three-Player Game Tree
X wins X wins
bottom
bottom
left
right
X wins
Player X
top
right
X wins
X wins
bottom
right
X wins
bottom
left
top
right
Player O
bottom
Player X
left
bottom
right
Player X
bottom X wins
right
top
left
top
left
top
right
bottom
right
Player O
bottom X wins
right
Player X
top
right
X wins
bottom
left
X wins
FIGURE 3.6 A More Complex Tree
top
right
Player X
top
bottom
left
left
X wins X wins
top
left
bottom
right
Player O
top
left
X wins
bottom
Player X
left
bottom
right
top
left
top
right
bottom
right
bottom
left X wins
top
left
top
left
Player X
X wins
Player X
Player O
top
left
Player X
X wins
X wins X wins
top
bottom
right
left
Player X
top
right
Player X
X wins X wins
top
bottom
right
right
bottom
left
X wins
Player X
Player X
top
left
X wins
bottom X wins
left
top
right
X wins
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
0, 0
Take
Dime
10, 0
Take
Dimes
Take
Dimes
0, 20
30, 0
Take
Dimes
0, 40
Take
Dimes
0, 100
Payoffs all shown as A, B
FIGURE 3.7 The Centipede Game
(a) All payoffs shown
(b) Zero-sum shorthand

PLAYER 2
PLAYER
1
PLAYER 2
T, T
L, W
W, L
W, L
T, T
L, W
L, W
W, L
T, T
FIGURE 4.1 Rock-Paper-Scissors Game
PLAYER
1
:

.

----

..
:

. .

:
Nash
Nash

.
Nash

:
--

.

(--)

1/3
9

A,B,C a,b,c C
:
P(C,a) P(A,a) P(C,a) P(B,a) P(C,b) P(A,b).
:

Times, News
..

.

.. Bismark

.
minmax,maxmin
(cell by cell inspection)
WIFE
Confess
(Defect)
Deny
(Cooperate)
Confess
(Defect)
10 yr, 10 yr
1 yr, 25 yr
Deny
(Cooperate)
25 yr, 1 yr
3 yr, 3 yr
HUSBAND
FIGURE 4.2 Prisoners Dilemma
JAPANESE NAVY
U.S.
AIR FORCES
North
South
North
South
FIGURE 4.3 Battle of the Bismarck Sea
PIERCES PIZZA PIES
DONNAS
DEEP DISH
High
Medium
Low
High
60, 60
36, 70
36, 35
Medium
70, 36
50, 50
30, 35
Low
35, 36
35, 30
25, 25
FIGURE 4.4 Successive Elimination of Dominated Strategies ($'000)
DEFENSE
Run
Pass
Blitz
Run
13
Short Pass
5.6
10.5
Medium Pass
4.5
min = 1
Long Pass
10
min = 2
max = 10
max = 5.6
max = 13
min = 2
min = 5.6
OFFENSE
FIGURE 4.5 The Minimax Method
PIERCES PIZZA PIES
DONNAS
DEEP DISH
High
Medium
Low
High
60, 60
36, 70
36, 35
Medium
70, 36
50, 50
30, 35
Low
35, 36
35, 30
25, 25
FIGURE 4.6 Cell-by-Cell Inspection
Pierces
Price,
PPierce
Donnas
best response
Joint profit
maximized
13.5
10
Pierces
best response
Nash
equilibrium
7.5
7.5
10
FIGURE 4.7 Best-Response Curves and Equilibrium in the

Pizza Pricing Game
13.5
Donnas Price, P Donna
(assurance game):

(Chicken game):

(The battle of the Sexes):

(preemptive
moves)
x ante (focal
points)

U.S.S.R.
Refrain
Build
Refrain
4, 4
1, 3
Build
3, 1
2, 2
U.S.
FIGURE 4.10 The Arms Race as an Assurance Game
DEAN
Swerve
(Chicken)
Straight
(Tough)
Swerve
(Chicken)
0, 0
1, 1
Straight
(Tough)
1, 1
2, 2
JAMES
FIGURE 4.11 Chicken
HUMANITIES FACULTY
SCIENCE
FACULTY
Lab
Theater
Lab
2, 1
0, 0
Theater
0, 0
1, 2
FIGURE 4.12 Battle of the Two Cultures
FIGURE 4.13 Lottery
0, 0
0, 5
0, 0
5, 0
0, 0
5, 0
0, 0
0, 5
5, 5
HINGIS
DL
CC
DL
50
80
CC
90
20
SELES
FIGURE 4.14 No Equilibrium in Pure Strategies
(a)
COLUMN
Left
Right
Up
Down
ROW
EXERCISE 4.1 a
(b)
COLUMN
Left
Right
Up
Down
ROW
EXERCISE 4.1 b
(c)
COLUMN
ROW
EXERCISE 4.1 c
Left
Middle
Right
Up
Straight
Down
(d)
COLUMN
ROW
EXERCISE 4.1 d
Left
Middle
Right
Up
Straight
Down
(a)
COLUMN
Left
Right
Up
2, 4
1, 0
Down
6, 5
4, 2
ROW
EXERCISE 4.2 a
(b)
COLUMN
Left
Right
Up
1, 1
0, 1
Down
1, 0
1, 1
ROW
EXERCISE 4.2 b
(c)
COLUMN
ROW
EXERCISE 4.2 c
Left
Middle
Right
Up
0, 1
9, 0
2, 3
Straight
5, 9
7, 3
1, 7
Down
7, 5
10, 10
3, 5
COLUMN
ROW
EXERCISE 4.4
Left
Center
Right
Up
1, 2
2, 1
1, 0
Level
0, 5
1, 2
7, 4
Down
1, 1
3, 0
5, 2
COLUMN
Left
Middle
Right
Up
4, 3
2, 7
0, 4
Down
5, 5
5, 1
4, 2
ROW
EXERCISE 4.5
COLUMN
Left
Middle
Right
Top
3, 1
2, 3
10, 2
High
4, 5
3, 0
6, 4
Low
2, 2
5, 4
12, 3
Bottom
5, 6
4, 5
9, 7
ROW
EXERCISE 4.7
COLUMN
A
1, 1
0, 0
0, 0
1, 1
ROW
EXERCISE 4.8
EXERCISE 4.9
10, 10
0, 0
0, 0
0, 0
15, 15
0, 0
0, 0
0, 0
15, 15

:
(
;)
,

(leadership)
WIFE
Confess
Deny
Confess
10 yr, 10 yr
1 yr, 25 yr
Deny
25 yr, 1 yr
3 yr, 3 yr
HUSBAND
FIGURE 8.1 Payoffs for the Standard Prisoners Dilemma
PIERCE'S PIZZA PIES
DONNA'S
DEEP DISH
High
Medium
High
60, 60
36, 70
Medium
70, 36
50, 50
FIGURE 8.2 Pizza Stores in a Prisoners Dilemma ($000)
COLUMN
Defect
Cooperate
Defect
D, D
H, L
Cooperate
L, H
C, C
ROW
FIGURE 8.3 General Version of the Prisoners Dilemma
WIFE
Confess
Deny
Confess
10 yr, 10 yr
21 yr, 25 yr
Deny
25 yr, 21 yr
3 yr, 3 yr
HUSBAND
FIGURE 8.4 Prisoners Dilemma with Penalty for the Lone Cheater
WIFE
Confess
Deny
Confess
30 yr, 30 yr
21 yr, 25 yr
Deny
25 yr, 21 yr
3 yr, 3 yr
HUSBAND
FIGURE 8.5 Prisoners Dilemma with Penalty for Any Cheating
PIERCE'S PIZZA PIES
DONNA'S
DEEP DISH
High
Medium
High
156, 60
132, 70
Medium
150, 36
130, 50
FIGURE 8.6 Donnas as Leader in the Pizza-Store Prisoners Dilemma
(credibility)
(commitment)

(threats, promises)
DEAN
Uncommitted
Swerve
Straight
Swerve
0, 0
1, 1
Straight
1, 1
2, 2
JAMES
JAMES
DEAN
Committed
JAMES
Straight
FIGURE 9.1 Chicken: Commitment by Restricting Freedom to Act
Swerve
Straight
1, 1
2, 2
DEAN
Uncommitted
Swerve
Straight
Swerve
0, 0
1, 1
Straight
1, 1
2, 2
JAMES
JAMES
DEAN
Committed
Swerve
Straight
Swerve
3, 0
4, 1
Straight
1, 1
2, 2
JAMES
FIGURE 9.2 Chicken: Commitment by Changing Payoffs
STUDENT
Punctual
Late
Weak
4, 3
2, 4
Tough
3, 2
1, 1
TEACHER
FIGURE 9.3 Payoff Table for Class Deadline Game
JAPAN
UNITED
STATES
Open
Closed
Open
4, 3
3, 4
Closed
2, 1
1, 2
FIGURE 9.4 Payoff Table for the United States-Japan Trade Game
JAPAN
UNITED
STATES
Open
Closed
Open
4, 3
3, 4
Closed
2, 1
1, 2
No Threat
UNITED
STATES
(U.S., J)
Threat
Closed (1, 2)
JAPAN
Open
FIGURE 9.5 Tree for the United States-Japan Trade Game with Threat
(4, 3)
PIERCE'S PIZZA PIES
DONNA'S
DEEP DISH
High
Medium
High
60, 60
36, 70
Medium
70, 36
50, 50
FIGURE 9.6 Payoff Table for the Pizza Sellers Prisoners Dilemma
UNITED STATES
Yes
No
Yes
3, 3
2, 4
No
4, 1
1, 2
EUROPE
FIGURE 9.7 Payoff table for the Military Intervention Problem

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:

Dixit and Skeath (1999), Games of Strategy, US:

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

(a) Pruning at terminal nodes

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

(b) Fully pruned tree

FIGURE 3.2 B Using Rollback

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

FIGURE 3.3 One-Player Game

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

FIGURE 3.4 Change of Move Order in the Senate Race Game

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

FIGURE 3.6 A More Complex Tree

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

Payoffs all shown as A, B

FIGURE 3.7 The Centipede Game

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

(a) All payoffs shown

(b) Zero-sum shorthand

FIGURE 4.1 Rock-Paper-Scissors Game

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

FIGURE 4.2 Prisoners Dilemma

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

FIGURE 4.3 Battle of the Bismarck Sea

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

PIERCES PIZZA PIES

FIGURE 4.4 Successive Elimination of Dominated Strategies ($'000)

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

FIGURE 4.5 The Minimax Method

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

PIERCES PIZZA PIES

FIGURE 4.6 Cell-by-Cell Inspection

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

FIGURE 4.7 Best-Response Curves and Equilibrium in the

Donnas Price, P Donna

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

FIGURE 4.10 The Arms Race as an Assurance Game

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

FIGURE 4.11 Chicken

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

FIGURE 4.12 Battle of the Two Cultures

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

FIGURE 4.13 Lottery

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

FIGURE 4.14 No Equilibrium in Pure Strategies

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

FIGURE 8.1 Payoffs for the Standard Prisoners Dilemma

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company

PIERCE'S PIZZA PIES

FIGURE 8.2 Pizza Stores in a Prisoners Dilemma ($000)

Copyright 2000 by W.W. Norton & Company