Marsh e Furlong - A Skin Not A Sweater

Contents
List of Figures, Tables and Boxes
Preface to the Second Edition
xi
Notes on Contributors
xiii
Introduction
Gerry Stoker and David Marsh
The discipline of political science: a celebration of diversity

What is politics? What is it that political scientists study?
What is a scientific approach to politics?
Connecting to the world of politics
Is there a standard method for undertaking political science?
Conclusion
1 A Skin not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in
Political Science
David Marsh and Paul Furlong
Ontology and epistemology
Different approaches to ontology and epistemology
Ontology and epistemology in political science: two cases
Conclusion
Further reading
PART I
3
8
11
12
15
16
17
18
22
32
40
41
APPROACHES
2 Behavouralism
David Sanders
45
The rise of the behavioural movement and its core

characteristics
Criticisms of the behavioural approach
The strengths of the behavioural approach: an example
Conclusion: the behavioural legacy in the twenty-first century
Further reading
v
46
51
55
62
63
vi Contents
3 Rational Choice
Hugh Ward
The development of rational choice theory
The key commitments and assumptions of the
mainstream variant
Criticisms of rational choice theory
Developments: where is rational choice going?
Conclusions
Further reading
4 Institutionalism
Vivien Lowndes
Introduction
The `traditional' institutional approach
The rise of the `new institutionalism'
What's new about new institutionalism? The core features
of the approach
New institutionalist dilemmas
Conclusion
Further reading
5 Feminism
Vicky Randall
Debates within feminism
Feminism and political science
Critical responses to feminist political science
Conclusion: the way forward
Further reading
6 Interpretive Theory
Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes
The importance of interpretation
Varieties of interpretation
An anti-foundational approach to interpretation
Criticisms of interpretive theory
Conclusion
Further reading
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101
107
108
109
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127
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149
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Contents
7 Marxism
David Marsh
The development of Marxism
What has Marxism to offer?
Conclusion
Further reading
8 Normative Theory
Steve Buckler
Logical positivism and the death of political philosophy
Interpretive theory
Critical theory and dialectics
Deontological theory and value pluralism
Conclusion
Further reading
PART II
vii
153
153
163
170
171
172
172
176
181
185
192
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METHODS
9 Qualitative Methods
Fiona Devine
The role of qualitative methods in political science
The epistemological underpinnings of qualitative methods
Criticisms of qualitative research
Illustration of qualitative research
Conclusion
Further reading
10 Quantitative Methods
Peter John
The collection and management of data
The power of description
Tables and inferential statistics
Multivariate analysis
Beyond ordinary least squares
Conclusion
Further reading
11 Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods
Melvyn Read and David Marsh
Quantitative and qualitative methods: a false dichotomy?
Combining research methods
Problems of combination
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200
204
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215
215
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222
225
225
229
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231
231
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240
viii Contents
Two case studies
Conclusion
Further reading
242
247
248
12 Comparative Methods
Jonathan Hopkin
249
Introduction
Theory and the comparative method
Basic forms of comparative explanation
Large Ns: quantitative comparative strategies
Limitations of the quantitative comparative approach
Small Ns: qualitative comparative strategies
Quantity or quality? Quantitative versus qualitative
comparative research
Conclusion: challenges to the comparative method
Further reading
PART III
249
249
252
255
258
260
261
265
267
ISSUES
13 Structure and Agency

Stuart McAnulla
Introduction: structure and agency a problem for all?
Structure and agency: what's really in it for us?
The postmodern onslaught
The morphogenetic approach
Conclusion
Further reading
14 Institutions and Ideas
Mark Blyth
Introduction
Don't worry about the philosophy . . .
Why institutions? Producing a `conventional' wisdom in
political science
Changing the conventional wisdom: reinventing institutions
Historical and rational institutionalism
Explaining change and stability: the turn to ideas
Rationalism and ideas
Historical institutionalism and ideas
Conclusion: rival ontologies and progress in political science
Further reading
271
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285
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298
300
301
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305
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310
Contents ix
Conclusion
David Marsh and Gerry Stoker
311
The importance of ontological and epistemological issues

The growth of diversity in the formal study of politics
Beware gatekeeping
A plea for dialogue
311
313
315
316
Bibliography
318
Author Index
350
Subject Index
355
Chapter 1
A Skin, not a Sweater: Ontology

and Epistemology in Political
Science
DAVID MARSH AND PAUL FURLONG
This chapter introduces the reader to the key issues that underpin what we
do as social or political scientists. Each social scientist's orientation to their
subject is shaped by their ontological and epistemological position. Most
often those positions are implicit rather than explicit, but, regardless of
whether they are acknowledged, they shape the approach to theory and the
methods which the social scientist utilises. At first these issues seem
difficult but our major point is that they are not issues that can be avoided
(for a similar view see Blyth, Chapter 14). They are like a skin not a
sweater: they cannot be put on and taken off whenever the researcher sees
fit. In our view, all students of political science should recognise and
acknowledge their own ontological and epistemological positions and be
able to defend these positions against critiques from other positions. This
means they need to understand the alternative positions on these
fundamental questions. As such, this chapter has two key aims. First, we
will introduce these ontological and epistemological questions in as
accessible a way as possible in order to allow the reader who is new to
these issues to reflect on their own position. Second, this introduction is
crucial to the readers of this book because the authors of the subsequent
chapters address these issues and they inform the subject matter of their
chapters. As such, this basic introduction is also essential for readers who
want fully to appreciate the substantive content of this book.
The chapter is divided into three major sections. The first section
describes what we mean by these two terms òntology' and èpistemology'
and considers briefly why these questions are important. The second
section then outlines the different positions on ontology and epistemology
and the arguments which have been put forward for and against these
positions. Finally, we shall illustrate how these different positions shape
the approaches that researchers take to their research by focusing on
research in two broad areas: globalisation and multilevel governance.
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18 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science
Ontology and epistemology

Ontological and epistemological positions are related, but need to be
separated. To put it crudely, one's ontological position affects, but far
from determines, one's epistemological position.
Ontology
Ontological questions are prior because they deal with the very nature of
`being'; literally, an ontology is a theory of `being' (the word derives from
the Greek for èxistence'). This sounds difficult, but really it is not. The
key question is whether there is a `real' world òut there' that is
independent of our knowledge of it. For example, are there essential
differences between genders, classes or races that exist in all contexts and
at all times?
A simple illustration easily makes the point. Over the last ten years John
Gray's book Men are from Mars and Women are from Venus (1992) has
sold seven million copies in the USA and millions more in forty countries
worldwide. He argues that men and women are very different and that
men and women can only understand and deal with one another better if
they recognise this fact of life. This book takes a clear ontological position;
there are fundamental differences between men and women that are
features of their very existence. These differences persist over time and
are common across cultures. This is an essentialist or a foundationalist
ontological position. So, its proponents argue that there are essential
differences of `being' that provide the foundations upon which social life
is built.
Of course, this is a contentious position; one which is strongly attacked
by many, if not most, feminists. They believe that the differences between
men and women are socially constructed. As such, they are not essential
differences but are particular to a given culture and time. They are the
product of patriarchy, in which male dominance shapes the culture and
values of society, affects patterns of socialisation and perpetuates gender
inequality. This argument reflects a different ontological position that is
anti-foundationalist and emphasises the social construction of social
phenomena.
Epistemology
If an ontological position reflects the researcher's view about the nature of
the world, their epistemological position reflects their view of what we can
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know about the world and how we can know it; literally an epistemology
is a theory of knowledge. Again, this sounds difficult, but the basic
concerns are not too difficult. There are two key questions. Can an
observer identify `real' or òbjective' relations between social phenomena?
If so, how? The first question itself subsumes two issues. Initially, it takes
us back to ontology; if one is an anti-foundationalist, then one argues that
there is not a `real' world, which exists independently of the meaning
which actors attach to their action, to discover. At the same time, such an
anti-foundationalist would also suggest that no observer can be òbjective'
because they live in the social world and are affected by the social
constructions of `reality'. This is sometimes called the double hermeneutic;
the world is interpreted by the actors (one hermeneutic level) and their
interpretation is interpreted by the observer (a second hermeneutic level).
The second question raises another important, and clearly related, issue.
To the extent that we can establish `real' relationships between social
phenomena, can we do this simply through direct observation, or are there
some relationships which èxist' but are not directly observable? The
answers one gives to these questions shapes one's epistemological position.
Of course, there are different ways of classifying epistemological
positions and there is no agreement as to the best way. Probably the most
common classification distinguishes between scientific (sometimes positivist) and hermeneutic (or interpretist) positions. We shall begin with a
brief review of that distinction, before proposing an alternative, which
distinguishes between positivist, realist and interpretist positions.
Scientific versus hermeneutic approaches
Social science was influenced by the ideas of science as the nomenclature
clearly indicates. In particular, the empiricist tradition played a crucial role
in the development of social science. David Hume argued that knowledge
starts from our senses. On the basis of such direct experience we could
develop generalisations about the relationships between physical phenomena. The aim was to develop causal statements which specified that, under
a given set of conditions, there would be regular and predictable outcomes
(on this see Hollis and Smith 1990: ch. 3). The adherents of the scientific
tradition saw social science as analogous to science. In ontological terms
they were foundationalists; they thought there was a real world òut there'
which was external to agents. Their focus was upon identifying the causes
of social behaviour. The emphasis was upon explanation and many felt
that the use of rigorous `scientific' methods would allow social scientists to
develop laws, similar in status to scientific laws, which would hold across
time and space.

In methodological terms, the scientific tradition was greatly influenced
by logical positivism that posited a very straightforward characterisation
of the form of scientific investigation. As Hollis and Smith put it (1990: 50):
To detect the regularities in nature, propose a generalisation, deduce
what it implies for the next case and observe whether the prediction
succeeds. If it does, no consequent action is needed; if it does not, then
either discard the generalisation or amend it and [test the] fresh
[predictions].
In contrast, there is an alternative hermeneutic (the word derives from
the Greek for `to interpret') or interpretist tradition. The adherents of this
position are anti-foundationalists, believing that the world is socially
constructed. They focus upon the meaning of behaviour. The emphasis
is upon understanding, rather than explanation. As such, in the interpretist
tradition it is not possible to establish causal relationships between
phenomena that hold across time and space.
Positivist, realist and interpretist positions
We prefer this classification because the scientific tradition identified by
Hollis and Smith conflates two distinct positions, positivism and realism.
Positivists adhere to a foundationalist ontology and are concerned to
establish causal relationships between social phenomema, thus developing
explanatory, and indeed predictive, models. The realist is also foundationalist in ontological terms. However, realists, unlike positivists, do not
privilege direct observation. The realist believes that there are deep
structural relationships between social phenomena which cannot be
directly observed, but which are crucial for any explanation of behaviour.
So, as an example, a realist might argue that patriarchy as a structure
cannot be directly observed, although we can see many of the
consequences of it; we return to this example later.
The distinction between positivist, realist and interpretist approaches is
examined in much more depth in the next section. However, the key point
here is that any classification that we adopt would annoy some social
scientists. We use this particular distinction because we are realists and, as
such, do not like the conflation between positivism and realism involved in
the first distinction. However, many other authors would question our
distinction. In particular, many, like Bevir and Rhodes (see below) would
want to make further distinctions within the tradition of interpretive
theory. The point is that any way of classifying epistemological positions
can be contested; we choose one, but are aware of the criticism of it. In
addition, we shall deal with many of those criticisms when we look at the
variants within the three positions we identify.
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Why are such distinctions important?

In our view, ontological and epistemological concerns cannot, and should
not, be ignored or downgraded. Three points are important here:
1. First, these concerns should not be put in what the Australians, with
typical directness, call the `too hard basket'. Certainly, the issues
involved are not easy, but neither are they difficult, if they are
explained simply and with appropriate examples.
2. Second, ontological and epistemological positions should not be
treated like a sweater that can be `put on' when we are addressing
such philosophical issues and `taken off' when we are doing research.
In our view, the dominance of a fairly crude positivist epistemology
throughout much of the postwar period encouraged many social
scientists to dismiss ontological questions and regard epistemological
issues as more or less resolved, with only the details left to be decided
by those interested in such matters. Such social scientists have tended
to acknowledge the importance of epistemology without considering it
necessary to deal with it in detail; positivism has been regarded as a
comforting sweater that can be put on where necessary. In contrast, we
would argue that epistemology, to say nothing of ontology, is far from
being a closed debate.
3. Third, researchers cannot adopt one position at one time for one
project and another on another occasion for a different project. These
positions are not interchangeable because they reflect fundamental
different approaches to what social science is and how we do it. This is
the key point. As we pointed out in the introduction, a researcher's
epistemological position is reflected in what is studied, how it is
studied and the status the researcher gives to their findings. So, a
positivist looks for causal relationships, tends to prefer quantitative
analysis (for a more detailed discussion of the relationship between
ontology, epistemology and methodology, see Chapter 11) and wants
to produce òbjective' and generalisable findings. A researcher from
within the interpretist tradition is concerned with understanding, not
explanation, focuses on the meaning that actions have for agents, tends
to use qualitative evidence and offers their results as one interpretation
of the relationship between the social phenomena studied. Realism is
less easy to classify in this way. The realists are looking for causal
relationships, but think that many important relationships between
social phenomena cannot be observed. This means they may use
quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative data will only be
appropriate for those relationships that are directly observable. In
contrast, the unobservable relationships can only be established

indirectly; we can observe other relationships which, our theory tells
us, are the result of those unobservable prelationships. We return to
these issues in the next section.
Different approaches to ontology and epistemology

Here we outline the positivist, the interpretist and the realist positions in
more detail. We shall focus on: the major criticisms of the positions; the
variations within these positions; and the way the positions have changed
over time. At the outset, however, it is important to emphasise that the
distinctions between the positions, and more specifically that between
interpretism and realism, are not clear-cut.
Positivism
The core of positivism is fairly straightforward, although of course there
are variants within it:
. Positivism is based upon a foundationalist ontology. So, to the
positivist, like the realist, but unlike those from the interpretist position,
the world exists independently of our knowledge of it.
. To the positivist, natural science and social science are broadly
analogous. We can establish regular relationships between social
phenomena, using theory to generate hypotheses which can be tested
by direct observation. In this view, and in clear contrast to the realist,
there are no deep structures that cannot be observed. Traditionally,
positivism contended that there is no appearance/reality dichotomy and
that the world is real and not socially constructed. So, direct
observation can serve as an independent test of the validity of a theory.
Crucially, an observer can be objective in the way they undertake such
observations. Researchers from the interpretist tradition rarely accept
any notion of objectivity. Realists accept that all observation is
mediated by theory (to the realist, theory plays the crucial role in
allowing the researcher to distinguish between those social phenomena
which are directly observable and those which are not).
. To positivists the aim of social science is to make causal statements; in
their view it is possible to, and we should attempt to, establish causal
relationships between social phenomena. They share this aim with
realists, while interpretists deny the possibility of such statements.
. Positivists also argue that it is possible to separate empirical questions
that is, questions about what is from normative questions that is,
questions about what should be. Traditionally, positivists thought that
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the goal of social science was to pursue empirical questions, while

philosophy, metaphysics or religion pursued the normative questions.
Because we can separate empirical and normative questions, it is
possible for social science to be objective and value-free. Realists and,
especially, those from within the interpretist tradition would reject that
proposition.
Many social scientists are positivists, although much of the positivism is
implicit rather than explicit. The behavioural revolution in the social
sciences in the 1960s, dealt with by David Sanders in Chapter 2, was an
attempt to introduce scientific method into the study of society. It was an
explicit reaction to political theory, which it saw as concerned with
normative questions, and institutionalism, which it saw as lacking theoretical and methodological rigour. In contrast, it was based upon a
foundationalist ontology and, most often, a quantitative methodology
(but see below and Chapter 10). The view was that a social `science'
was possible if we followed the scientific method; deriving hypotheses
from theory and then testing them in an attempt to falsify them. We
needed òbjective' measures of our social phenomena, our variables; as
such, we would focus upon `hard' data from government statistics,
election results and so on rather than soft data from interviews or
participant observation. So, for example, if a positivist was studying
political participation, they would be interested in measuring the level of
voting, party or pressure group membership, direct action or whatever,
and relating it to demographic variables such as class, gender, race and
education. The aim would be to establish the precise nature of the
relationship between these variables and participation in order to produce
causal models. We shall return to this example later. The key point here is
that, as always, the ontological and epistemological position adopted had
clear methodological implications.
The criticism of positivism takes two broad forms. The first line of
criticism broadly argues that, in following the methods of science,
positivists misinterpret how science really proceeds. Two lines of argument
have been particularly important here. First, there is the pragmatist
position of Quine (1961) who develops two crucial critiques of positivism
(for a fuller exposition see Hollis and Smith 1990: 557; they deal with a
third, less important, criticism):
(i) Quine argues that any knowledge we derive from the five senses is
mediated by the concepts we use to analyse it, so there is no way of
classifying, or even describing, experience without interpreting it.
(ii) This means that theory and experiment are not simply separable,
rather theory affects both the facts we focus on and how we interpret
them. This, in turn, may affect the conclusions we draw if the facts

appear to falsify the theory. As such, if we observe `facts' which are
inconsistent with the theory, we might decide that the facts are wrong
rather than that the theory is wrong. Of course, this undermines the
notion that observation alone can serve to falsify a theory.
Second, there is Kuhn's view (1970) that, at any given time, science tends
to be dominated by a particular paradigm that is unquestioned and which
affects the questions scientists ask and how they interpret what they
observe (for a fuller discussion, see Hollis and Smith 1990: 5761).
Consequently, scientific investigation is not òpen', as positivism implies,
rather certain conclusions are almost unthinkable. There is a `paradigm
shift' when a lot of empirical observation leads certain, brave, scientists to
question the dominant paradigm, but until that time, and for the most
part, scientists discard observations which do not fit (obviously this fits
well with the second of Quine's criticisms above) and embrace the results
which confirm the paradigm.
The second main line of criticism of positivism is more particular to
social science. It argues that there are obvious differences between social
and physical or natural phenomena that make social `science' impossible.
Three differences are particularly important. First, social structures, unlike
natural structures, do not exist independently of the activities they shape.
So, for example, marriage is a social institution or structure, but it is also a
lived experience, particularly, although not exclusively, for those who are
married. This lived experience affects agents' understanding of the
institution and also helps change it. Second, and related, social structures,
unlike natural structures, do not exist independently of agents' views of
what they are doing in the activity. People are reflexive; they reflect on
what they are doing and often change their actions in the light of that
reflection. This leads us to the third difference. Social structures, unlike
natural structures, change as a result of the actions of agents; in most
senses the social world varies across time and space. Some positivist social
scientists minimise these differences, but, to the extent they are accepted,
they point towards a more interpretist epistemological position.
Many positivists avoid these critiques which are put in the `too hard
basket'. However, the more sophisticated positivists are aware of these
criticisms and the position has changed significantly as a result. Fortunately, this volume boasts two sophisticated behaviouralists who are
positivists, Sanders and John. It is particularly worth examining David
Sanders' view in a little more detail because it represents an excellent
example of the modern, more sophisticated, positivist position. Sanders
(Chapter 2) accepts he has been strongly influenced by the positivist
position, but acknowledges the `ferocious philosophical criticism' to which
it was subjected. He argues that `post-behaviouralists', who might also be
25
called `post-positivists': acknowledge the interdependence of theory and

observation; recognise that normative questions are important and not
always easy to separate from empirical questions; and accept that other
traditions have a key role to play in political and social analysis. As such,
this post-positivism has moved a significant way from more traditional
positivism, largely as a result of the type of criticisms outlined here.
However, the ontological and epistemological problems have not gone
away, rather they have been elided. Two quotes from Sanders illustrate the
point. First, he argues (see Chapter 2: 51):
Modern behaviouralists `post-behaviouralists' simply prefer to
subject their own theoretical claims to empirical tests. They also suspect
that scholars working in non-empirical traditions are never able to
provide a satisfactory answer to the crucial question: `How would you
know if you were wrong?'
Later he continues (Chapter 2: 54):
For modern behaviouralists, the ultimate test of a good theory is still
whether or not it is consistent with observation with the available
empirical evidence. Modern behaviouralists are perfectly prepared to
accept that different theoretical positions are likely to produce different
observations. They insist however, that, whatever òbservations' are
implied by a particular theoretical perspective, those observations must
be used in order to conduct a systematic empirical test of the theory that
is being posited.
This is a sophisticated statement of a positivist epistemological position,
but it is still essentially positivist. The aim is to use observation (of
whatever type) to test hypothesised relationships between the social
phenomena studied. Research from within other traditions must still be
judged against the positivists' criteria: òbservation must be used in order
to conduct a systematic empirical test of the theory that is being posited'.
Yet, that is not a standard most researchers from within an interpretist
tradition could accept (even Bevir and Rhodes 1999 could only do so with
major qualifications), because they do not believe that direct observation
can be objective and used as a test of `reality'. Most realists would also
have a problem with Sanders' position because they would see many of the
key relationships as unobservable.
One other aspect of Sanders' position is important here. He accepts that
interpretation and meaning are important, which might suggest that the
differences between positivist and interpretist traditions are beginning to
dissolve. So, Sanders argues (Chapter 2: 53), in criticising prior studies of
voting behaviour: `There are other areas relating to the way in which
individuals reflect, to a greater or lesser degree, upon themselves where

behavioural research has simply not dared to tread.' He recognises that
such factors might, or might not, be important, but emphasises that they
would be difficult to study empirically. However, the crucial point is that
Sanders wants to treat interpretation and meaning as intervening variables.
In this view, how a voter understands the parties and their own position
may affect their voting behaviour. At best, this acknowledges only one
aspect of the double hermeneutic; the interpretist tradition would argue
that we also need to acknowledge the subjectivity of the observer.
So, positivism has changed in response to criticism. Post-positivism is
much less assertive that there is only one way of doing social science.
However, it still emphasises explanation, rather than understanding, and
the primacy of direct observation. In our terms, it is still foundationalist
and firmly located in the scientific tradition.
The interpretist position

The interpretist tradition is the obvious òther' of positivism. However, it
is a much broader church than positivism and much of this subsection will
deal with its variants. Nevertheless, it is useful to begin with an outline of
the core of the position.
. In the interpretist tradition researchers reject the notion that the world
exists independently of our knowledge of it. Rather, they contend that
the world is socially or discursively constructed. This view is
diametrically opposed to positivism, but shares certain features with
some modern variants of realism. In ontological terms, then, this
position is anti-foundationalist.
. This means that for researchers working within this tradition social
phenomena do not exist independently of our interpretation of them;
rather it is this interpretation/understanding of social phenomena which
affects outcomes. As such, it is the interpretations/meanings of social
phenomena that are crucial; interpretations/meanings which can only be
established and understood within discourses or traditions. Consequently, we should focus on identifying those discourses or traditions
and establishing the interpretations and meanings they attach to social
phenomena.
. However, we must also acknowledge that òbjective' analysis is
impossible. Social `scientists' (of course interpretists would not use this
term) are not privileged, but themselves operate within discourses or
traditions. Consequently, knowledge is theoretically or discursively
laden. As such, this position acknowledges the double hermeneutic.
This position has clear methodological implications. It argues that there
is no objective truth, that the world is socially constructed and that the role
27
of social `scientists' [sic] is to study those social constructions. Quantitative

methods can be blunt instruments and may produce misleading data. In
contrast, we need to utilise qualitative methods interviews, focus groups,
vignettes and so on to help us establish how people understand their
world. So, for example, someone operating from within this tradition
studying political participation would start by trying to establish how
people understand `the political' and `political' participation
The major criticism of the interpretist tradition comes, unsurprisingly,
from positivists, though some realists would agree with elements of that
critique. To positivists, the interpretist tradition merely offers opinions or
subjective judgements about the world. As such, there is no basis on which
to judge the validity of their knowledge claims. One person's view of the
world, and of the relationship between social phenomena within it, is as
good as another's view. To many positivists, this means that such research
is akin to history, or even fiction, whereas they aspire to a science of
society. It is difficult for someone in the interpretist tradition to answer
this accusation, because it is based on a totally different ontological view
and reflects a different epistemology and, thus, a different view of what
social science is about. However, as we shall see, most researchers do
believe that it is possible to generalise, if only in a limited sense. Perhaps
more interestingly, Bevir and Rhodes (forthcoming) attempt to defend
their approach against this positivist critique by establishing a basis on
which they can make knowledge claims; on which they can claim that one
interpretation, or narrative, is superior to another. We shall return to their
argument below.
Bevir and Rhodes (forthcoming: ch. 2) distinguish between the hermeneutic and postmodern, or post-structuralist, strands in the interpretist
position. In essence, the hermeneutic tradition is idealist; it argues that we
need to understand the meanings people attach to social behaviour. So,
hermeneutics is concerned with the interpretation of texts and actions.
This involves the use of ethnographic techniques (participant observation,
transcribing texts, keeping diaries and so on) to produce what Geertz
(1973) calls `thick description'. As Bevir and Rhodes put it, quoting Geertz,
the aim is to establish òur own constructions of other people's constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to'. However, ethnographers do generalise. They develop a narrative about the past based upon
the meanings which the actions had for social actors. Then, on the basis of
this `thick description', they offer an interpretation of what this tells us
about the society. The point is that these interpretations are always partial,
in both senses of the world, and provisional; they are not `true'.
More recently, as Bevir and Rhodes (forthcoming) emphasise, poststructuralism and postmodernism have provided a powerful challenge to
foundationalism in both philosophy and social science. Yet, as Bevir and

Rhodes also point out, this variant of the interpretist tradition is itself so
diverse that it is difficult, if not impossible, to characterise. They overcome
this problem by focusing on the work of Michel Foucault, who is perhaps
the best-known writer in this broad tradition. He, like most poststructuralists and postmodernists, is a strong opponent of foundationalism
and the modernisation project associated with the Enlightenment. This
project argues that: the basis of human knowledge is direct experience; as
such, it is possible to develop an òbjective' view of the `real' world (thus, it
denies both elements of the double hermeneutic); language is transparent
or neutral; and that human history is inevitably progressive, with present
knowledge building on past knowledge to improve our information about
the world and our ability to control it.
In contrast, Foucault argues that experience is acquired within a prior
discourse. As such, language is crucial because institutions and actions
only acquire a meaning through language. Thus, as Bevir and Rhodes
(forthcoming) argue, for Foucault: `to understand an object or action,
political scientists have to interpret it in the wider discourse of which it is
part'. This means that, as Bevir and Rhodes stress, it is the social discourse,
rather than the beliefs of individuals, which are crucial to Foucault's
version of the interpretist position. The identification of that discourse,
and the role it plays in structuring meanings, is thus the key concern of
those adopting this approach (for an example of this broad approach in
use see Howarth (1995).
Bevir and Rhodes (forthcoming) develop their own take on the interpretist tradition. It is particularly interesting because it directly addresses
the key issue raised in the positivist critique of this tradition. They argue
that social science is about the development of narratives, not theories. As
such, they stress the importance of understanding and the impossibility of
absolute knowledge claims, but they want to explain and they defend a
limited notion of objectivity.
Broadly, Bevir and Rhodes are within the hermeneutic, rather than the
postmodern, or post-structuralist, stream of the interpretist tradition. As
such, they follow Geertz and others in arguing that it is possible to produce
explanations within the interpretist tradition. However, their understanding of explanation is very different from that of a positivist. In their view,
the researcher can produce an explanation of an event or of the relationships between social phenomena. But, this explanation is built upon their
interpretation of the meanings the actors involved gave to their actions.
What is produced is a narrative which is particular, to that time and space,
and partial, being based on a subjective interpretation of the views of, most
likely, only some of the actors involved. Consequently, any such narrative
must be provisional; there are no absolute truth claims.
29
However, Bevir and Rhodes do wish to make some, more limited,

knowledge claims. They argue (forthcoming): Àlthough we do not have
access to pure facts that we can use to declare particular interpretations to
be true or false, we can still hang on to the idea of objectivity.' They
suggest that a field of study ìs a co-operative intellectual practice, with a
tradition of historically produced norms, rules, conventions and standards
of excellence that remain subject to critical debate, and with a narrative
content that gives meaning to it' (original emphasis).
They continue:
[Practice, tradition and narrative provide] for a negotiated and dynamic
set of standards through which rational debate and argumentation
between proponents of rival perspectives or approaches is possible
[where] these standards are historically embedded within social
practices, traditions and narratives which provide èmbedded reasons'
. . . for judging an argument true or false or an action right or wrong.
Such criteria are not universal or objective; rather, they are `shared criteria
for assessing . . . knowledge claims'. To Bevir and Rhodes, postmodernism
errs in failing to acknowledge `significant, grounded rationality' that is to
be found in these practices and traditions.
In Bevir and Rhodes' view, such knowledge claims are not selfreferential because they can be `reconfirmed' at three distinct points:
The first is when we translate our concepts for fieldwork: that is, are
they meaningful to practitioners and users and if not, why not? The
second is when we reconstruct narratives from the conversations: that is,
is the story logical and consistent with the data? And the third is when
we redefine and translate our concepts because of the academic
community's judgement on the narratives: that is, does the story meet
the agreed knowledge criteria?
Overall, they argue:
To overcome this difficulty, we should conceive of objective knowledge,
less as what our community happens to agree on, and more as a
normative standard embedded in a practice of criticising and comparing
rival accounts of àgreed facts'. The anti-foundational nature of this
practice lies in its appeal, not to given facts, but to those agreed in a
particular community or conversation. In addition, and of key
importance, the normative, critical bite of our approach lies in
conducting the comparison by the rules of intellectual honesty. These
rules originate in anti-foundationalism and not in a straightforward
acceptance of the norms of the relevant community or conversation.

As we can see then, there are a number of variants within the interpretist
tradition. However, they are all anti-foundationalist and critical of
positivism. These approaches have become much more common in
political science since the 1970s for a number of reasons. First, increasingly
philosophical critiques have led to the questioning of positivism. Second,
the postmodern turn in social science has had an affect on political science,
although much less so than in sociology. Third, normative political theory
has changed fundamentally. Historically, it was foundationalist; the aim
was to establish some absolute notion of the good or of justice. As Buckler
argues in Chapter 8, that is no longer the case. Some normative political
theorists have been influenced by postmodernism, again variously defined,
and more by the work of Quine and others. Now, most political theorists
are anti-foundationalists or, at the very least, have a very limited
conception of any universal foundations. Fourth, as Randall shows in
Chapter 5, much, but by no means all, feminist thought has been strongly
influenced by postmodernism; it is anti-foundationalist and operates
within the interpretist tradition. As such, we can see the influence of this
interpretist tradition very broadly across political science.
Realism
Realism shares an ontological position with positivism, but, in epistemological terms, modern realism has more in common with relativism. The
core views of classical realism are again fairly clear and owe much to
Marx's work:
. To realists, the world exists independently of our knowledge of it. In
ontological terms they, like positivists, are foundationalists.
. Again like positivists, realists contend that social phenomena/structures
do have causal powers, so we can make causal statements.
. However, unlike positivists, realists contend that not all social
phenomena, and the relationships between them, are directly
observable. There are deep structures that cannot be observed and
what can be observed may offer a false picture of those phenomena/
structures and their effects (for an excellent exposition of this position
see Smith, in Hollis and Smith 1990: 2058). But, as Smith puts it,
although we cannot observe those structures, `positing their existence
gives us the best explanation of social action. To use a phrase familiar
to the philosophy of science, we are involved in `ìnference to the best
explanation'' (Hollis and Smith 1990: 207). As such, to a realist there is
often a dichotomy between reality and appearance. This is a very
important issue because it has clear methodological implications. It
means that realists do not accept that what appears to be so, or, perhaps
31
more significantly, what actors say is so, is necessarily so. As an

example, classical Marxism, and Marxism is the archetypal classical
realism, argued that there was a difference between `real' interests,
which reflect material reality, and perceived interests, which might be
manipulated by the powerful forces in society. Given this view, we
cannot just ask people what their interests are, because we would
merely be identifying their manipulated interests, not their `real'
interests.
The criticisms of classical realism were of two sorts, which reflect
different epistemological positions. The positivists denied the existence of
unobservable structures. More importantly, they argued that positing them
makes the knowledge claims of realism untestable and, thus, unfalsifiable.
As such, realist claims that rely on the effect of unobservable structures
have the same status to positivists as the claims of scholars from within the
interpretist tradition. In contrast, authors from the interpretist tradition
criticise the foundational claims of realism. In their view, there are no
structures that are independent of social action and no òbjective' basis on
which to observe the actions or infer the deep structures. So, the realist
claim that structures cause social action are rejected on ontological and
epistemological grounds.
In our view, contemporary realism has been significantly influenced by
the interpretist critique. In particular, this modern critical realism acknowledges two points. First, while social phenomena exist independently
of our interpretation of them, our interpretation/understanding of them
affects outcomes. So, structures do not determine; rather they constrain
and facilitate. Social science involves the study of reflexive agents who
interpret and change structures. Second, our knowledge of the world is
fallible; it is theory-laden. We need to identify and understand both the
external `reality' and the social construction of that `reality' if we are to
explain the relationships between social phenomena.
Realism also has clear methodological implications. It suggests that
there is a real world òut there', but emphasises that outcomes are shaped
by the way in which that world is socially constructed. As such, it would
acknowledge the utility of both quantitative and qualitative data. So, for
example, realists might use quantitative methods to identify the extent to
which financial markets are `globalised'. However, they would also want
to analyse qualitatively how globalisation is perceived, or discursively
constructed, by governments, because the realist argument would be that
both the `reality' and the discursive construction affect what government
does in response to global pressures. We shall return to this example later.
Modern realism then attempts to acknowledge much of the interpretist
critique, while retaining a commitment to causal explanation. The key

problem here of course is that it is not easy, indeed many would see it as
impossible, to combine scientific and interpretist positions because they
have such fundamentally different ontological and epistemological underpinnings, one focusing on explanation and the other on understanding (on
this point, see Hollis and Smith 1990: 212).
One of the main criticisms of realists has been that they often treat
concepts as if they related to some fixed, or at least more or less given,
èssences' or cores. It should be noted first that this is not a necessary tenet
for realists; it reflects rather the philosophical traditions from which they
derive. Nevertheless, the question of what a concept is for is an important
one, and it affects ontology directly. If a concept cannot be tied firmly to
an underlying reality, as traditional philosophy seems to imply, the concept
of `being' itself may be detached from the real world of experience. This is
one of the reasons why modern philosophy has considerable difficulty even
recognising that there may be a subject of ontology. It should also be noted
that this is one of those issues on which positivists and interpretists can
find themselves temporarily in agreement, even though, as we have seen,
they have fundamentally different views about knowledge and being. Any
apparent agreement between them, however, has limited scope, as they
have different origins and are heading for different destinations. Having
considered how these categories relate to some important issues in the
social sciences, we can now move on to apply the arguments to particular
cases so as to illustrate their use and their limits.
Ontology and epistemology in political science:

two cases
The aim in this section is to examine how a researcher's ontological and
epistemological position affects the way they approach empirical questions
in political science. We shall focus on two areas: globalisation and
multilevel governance. These areas have been chosen because they reflect a
broad spread of the concerns, but, in our view, similar arguments could be
made in relation to other substantive areas.
Case 1: Globalisation
The literature on globalisation mushroomed in the 1990s. It has been
common to distinguish between processes or aspects of globalisation: so
many authors have distinguished between economic, political and cultural
processes, while acknowledging that they are interrelated. In this vein,
many have argued that economic globalisation has grown apace and that
this process has significantly restricted the autonomy of the nation state.
33
Indeed, Ohmae (1990) goes as far as to argue that only two economic
forces, global financial markets and transnational corporations, will play
any role in the politics of the future. In his view, the future role of states
will be analogous to the current role of local councils. At the same time,
other authors have focused on cultural globalisation, suggesting that world
culture is becoming increasingly homogeneous: in the view of most,
reflecting a growing US hegemony. Certainly, there is little doubt that the
issue of globalisation in a crucial one for those interested in questions of
contemporary political economy and governance.
Political scientists have probably been most concerned with economic
globalisation and the way in which it restricts the autonomy of the state,
and have utilised a foundationalist ontology and a positivist epistemology,
although, as we shall see below, some more recent work is realist. In
contrast, sociologists, particularly those who focus on cultural studies,
concentrate upon cultural globalisation, operating from an anti-foundationalist and interpretist position.
The main debate about economic globalisation has concerned the extent
to which it has increased. There are two main positions. Some authors, like
Ohmae (1990), who are christened hyperglobalists by Held et al. (1999)
and seen as first-wave theorists by Hay and Marsh (2000), argue that there
has been a massive increase in various indicators of economic globalisation: direct foreign investment; international bank lending; transnational
production; international trade and so on. In contrast, authors such as
Hirst and Thompson (1999), christened sceptics by Held et al. (1999) and
seen by Hay and Marsh (2000) as second-wave theorists, argue that the
process is more limited. More specifically, they suggest that: globalisation
is not a new phenomenon; regionalisation, rather than globalisation, is a
better description of the changes that have occurred; and the only area in
which there has been significant globalisation is in relation to financial
markets. We are not concerned here with the detail of this argument. Our
point is that both sets of authors agree about what constitutes evidence of
globalisation and how we can go about studying that evidence. Globalisation is an economic process that can be measured quantitatively, indeed
there is large agreement as to the appropriate measures, and which, to the
extent that it exists, has an effect on patterns of governance.
More recently, other authors have been, in most cases implicitly rather
than explicitly, critical of this ontological and epistemological approach.
The point is easily made if we return to two ways of classifying the
literature on globalisation to which we have already referred. Held et al.
(1999) contrast hyperglobalist and sceptical approaches to globalisation
with a third approach to which they adhere: the transformationalist thesis.
In contrast, Hay and Marsh (2000) identify a third wave of the globalisation literature that builds upon a critique of the first two waves. These two

`third ways' share something in common, but do differ significantly in a
manner that reflects ontological and epistemological debates.
The transformationalists differ significantly from the sceptics in that
they share:
a conviction that, at the dawn of a new millennium, globalisation is a
central driving force behind the rapid social, political and economic
changes that are reshaping modern societies and world order . . . In this
respect, globalisation is conceived as a powerful transformative force
which is responsible for a massive shake out of societies, economies,
institutions of governance and world order. (Held et al. 1999: 7)
Held et al. also emphasise the major way in which the transformationalist
account parts company with both the other two positions (1999: 7):
The transformationalists make no claims about the future trajectory of
globalisation . . . Rather [they] emphasise globalisation as a long-term
historical process which is inscribed with contradictions and which is
significantly shaped by conjunctural factors.
So, they argue that: there are `real' social, political and economic changes
occurring in the world; globalisation is a cause of these changes, a
transformative force; but there is no inevitable process of globalisation
which, as social scientists, we can identify. This last point is especially
important here. The putative development of globalisation is dependent on
the actions of agents, whether individuals, companies, institutions or
states; as such it is a socially constructed process. It seems clear then that
the transformative position is a realist one.
This position has methodological consequences. It points strongly to
comparative analysis, because the emphasis is upon how different countries, and indeed different companies and markets, are affected by, and
respond to, this process of globalisation in different ways. If globalisation
is not an inevitable or universal process, then we need to focus on how it is
differently experienced in different contexts.
This point is even clearer if we turn to what Hay and Marsh call the
third-wave literature on globalisation. Hay and Marsh (2000: 6) follow
Held et al. in arguing that we: `shouldn't make essentialising and reifying
assumptions about the effects, consequences, or even the very existence, of
globalisation'. Rather, globalisation is a series of contradictory and
contingent processes. More specifically, they suggest that, for many
authors, especially the hyperglobalists, globalisation is a process without
a subject. In contrast, they argue that it is agents who construct globalisation and, as such, the researcher should identify the actors involved and
how they perceive and discursively construct globalising tendencies.
35
However, Hay and Marsh go further to contend that these discursive

constructions have significant effects on outcomes. So, they suggest that it
is the discursive construction of globalisation that affects government
economic policies, rather than the `real' processes of globalisation. As
such, and taking the UK as an example, their argument would run along
the following lines:
. While there has been a significant increase in regionalism in patterns of
trading and a globalisation of financial markets, there is limited
evidence that Britain is locked into a globalised political economy which
determines the economic policy which the British Government can
adopt.
. However, British governments, and especially the Blair Government,
have argued that it is constrained in that way. It suggests that the extent
of globalisation is such that the pursuit of neo-liberal policies is
inevitable: there is no alternative.
. As such, it is not the `reality' of globalisation that is shaping British
economic policy, but the dominant discursive construction of that
reality.
We are not concerned here about the validity or otherwise of this
argument. The crucial point for us is that this view clearly marks a break
with the positivism that underpins most work on globalisation. To Hay
and Marsh, there may be `real' processes at work, but the way they affect
outcomes is mediated by the discursive construction(s) of these processes.
This argument has both realist and interpretist elements. There is an
appeal to a real world, but the emphasis is on the discursive construction
of that world. This position illustrates how realist and interpretist
positions interface. In our view, this position is a realist one if it recognises
that there is an interactive or dialectical relationship between the `real'
world and the discourses. A realist would acknowledge not only that
discourses have real effects, in this case that the dominant discourse of
globalisation shapes economic policy, but also that the `real' processes of
globalisation constrain the resonance of different discourses. So, if the
dominant discourse is at odds with the `reality', alternative discourses can
appeal to that `reality deficit'. However, if it is merely the discourses that
have the causal power, then, in our view, it is an interpretist position.
There are other approaches to globalisation which are clearly located in
an interpretist tradition. As we emphasised above, most of these approaches stress cultural globalisation. Of course, as Held et al. point out
(1999: 328), the concept of culture has a long and complex history but
`normally refers to the social construction, articulation and reception of
meaning'. This definition immediately suggests an anti-foundationalist
ontology and, most often, an interpretist epistemology.

It is possible to approach the issue of cultural globalisation utilising a
positivist epistemology. So, one could focus empirically on the extent to
which certain cultural icons, such as Coca-Cola, McDonald's or Madonna,
have become universal, or whether colonialism was associated with a
similar global culture. However, the focus of a cultural studies approach to
globalisation is much more likely to be on difference. Two points are
important here. First, the argument would be that there are various
discourses about globalisation, none of which is `true', although at any
time one discourse may be dominant. Second, while one discourse may
dominate, it can be, and will always be, resisted: different agents citizens
and researchers will offer different narrations of globalisation and its
effects. In this way, this alternative `cultural studies' approach reflects an
anti-foundationalist and an interpretist position.
Case 2: Multilevel governance

Multilevel governance and intergovernmentalism: realism
versus positivism
The term `multilevel governance' covers a variety of familiar phenomena
that are normally located in the areas of regional policy and European
integration. Though `multilevel governance' (MLG) is rapidly acquiring
the status of a fashionable mainstream concept, it is not as established as
`globalisation' in the vocabulary of politicians and commentators. Here
again, the contemporary debates in large part reflect different ontological
and epistemological positions. In this case study, we concentrate not on the
different uses of the term, although these can be significant, but rather on
the contrast between MLG and its main opponent, which is liberal
intergovernmentalism.
A useful definition of MLG is provided by Hunt (1999): `[According to
multilevel governance theories] the policy process involves the interaction
between a constellation of public and private actors located at the supranational, national and sub-national level.' This interaction is usually
understood as non-hierarchical and as lacking a central, predominant
authority, and similar usages can be found in Marks et al. (1996) and
Armstrong and Bulmer (1998). These theorists argue against the view of
the EU as an international organisation whose decision-making is based
predominantly on national interests determined by member states, a view
known as intergovernmentalism.
The intergovernmentalist perspective is closely associated with international lawyers, but an influential political analysis is provided by Andrew
Moravscik (1993), who argues that the European policy process can be
37
understood as a nested game played out both in the domestic politics of

member states and in the international arena of the EU's institutions.
While the MLG theorists derive their frameworks from institutionalist
perspectives (see Chapter 4), arguing that ìnstitutions matter' in shaping
interaction, analysts such as Moravscik generally utilise rational choice
perspectives (see Chapter 3 below). Both approaches would claim to be
empirically grounded, but the nature of the empirical grounding differs.
Most MLG theorists are realists in epistemological terms, emphasising
how the continuity of rules, norms and operating procedures, and sometimes of `deep, non-observable structures', can, and does, determine the
outcomes of decision-making in the long term. As such, their logic is
inductive rather than deductive. Overall, MLG is not so much concerned
with the debate between neo-federalists and intergovernmentalists as with
the consequences of different possible forms of integration for normative
issues such as democratic participation, effective government and distributive justice.
In contrast, liberal intergovernmentalists seek to identify the preferences
and the parameters of the individual actors (usually member states) and
show how, after the event, the outcomes can be understood as the result of
rational calculated behaviour. Their logic is therefore deductive: they
argue from the general to the particular. Liberal intergovernmentalism is
foundationalist in ontological terms and operates with a positivist epistemology. In its treatment of European integration it is clearly unsympathetic to neo-federalism and to supranationalism.
The normative underpinnings of multilevel governance and
intergovermentalism
MLG theorists argue that, rather than conceptualising regional policy as a
national issue in which the lead role is taken by the national state
institutions, it should be identified as an arena in which the European
Union plays an integral role in policy-making, together with the separate
regional authorities and the central national institutions. In this sense,
theories of multilevel governance make a distinction between `government'
and `governance'. `Government', it is argued, is too narrowly concerned
with the formal structures of state authority, and with the associated
processes and issues, whereas `governance' is concerned with much wider
notions of politics, encompassing the production, accumulation and
regulation of collective goods at all levels including the international.
Power relations in multilevel governance are structured by reciprocal
interdependence on each other's resources, rather than on conflict over
either scarcity or fundamental values. Typically, these theories argue that
relations of decision-making between the various levels should be seen as

loosely interconnected rather than as tightly nested; that is, characterised
by multilateral links, and non-hierarchical in form, rather than by a
hierarchical chain of bilateral links in which the national state authority
has a predominant role, as is the case with intergovernmental approaches.
There is thus a strong normative element in multilevel governance. From
describing the increased evidence of the multiplicity of decision-making
forms and levels in European integration, proponents move to arguments
about the value of multilevel governance in enhancing democratic legitimacy and effective decision-making under conditions of globalised political economy. In comparison with state-centred accounts, multilevel
governance is said to be `closer to the people', and therefore more
acceptable, and more flexible and adaptable, so better able to respond
to the rapidly changing economic climate (Marks et al. 1996).
The arguments against multilevel governance, if it is regarded as a policy
prescription as well as empirical analysis, concentrate on two main issues
(Moravscik 1993; Scharpf 1988). The first is what is known as the `joint
decision trap'. This focuses upon the danger of deadlock in decisionmaking where there are many participants, interdependent arenas and a
variety of possible combinations of policy-making processes. Though
multilevel governance may offer the prospect of policy-making close to
the people and greater legitimacy, it risks sacrificing efficiency in decisionmaking if there is no authoritative procedure for resolving disagreements
among equal participants. A second criticism denies even that multilevel
governance provides greater legitimacy and argues that, when the smaller
units and more local levels of decision-making are included, the greater
complexity of procedures results in opacity of decision-making and,
therefore, in less accountability. In practice, multilevel governance can
mean obscure elite-led agreements and public incomprehension. Neoliberal arguments try to resolve these problems by emphasising how the
member states in the EU remain both the focus of popular legitimacy,
albeit with some rebalancing towards regional authorities, and the main
guarantors of effective governmental decision-making.
In response to this, Marks et al. (1996) have three main criticisms of the
intergovernmental approach. Underlying these disagreements is a fundamental dispute about the nature of social reality. First, positivist explanations of societal phenomena neglect the structural constraints within which
individuals operate. These are varied in kind, but the most important are
generally the impact of differential allocation of resources, the culturallygiven nature of the value framework within which individuals choose and
the unpredictability of external factors, such as the international economic
and security climate.
Second, the realist perspective emphasises how the institutional frameworks have a primary effect in shaping decision-making through their
39
formal rules, their informal procedures, their value structures and their
effect on office-holding and internal role-oriented behaviour. In one sense,
the institutions are no more than the sum of countless individual choices,
but merely to state this does not get us very far. Realists seek to find ways
of characterising different institutional frameworks so as to move beyond
this and to introduce other levels of analysis and explanation which
recognise the weight of the long-term structural and institutional context.
Third, it is argued that intergovernmentalists are insufficiently critical
about what time-frames are relevant and why. The term `path dependency'
used in this context (Pierson 1996) does not just refer to the given nature of
resource allocations at `point zero' which the researcher takes as the start.
It also directs our attention to the impact of decisions prior to point zero,
and of the ways in which the institutional frameworks lock actors into
particular sets of choices. This implicitly asks positivists to justify why they
adopt diachronic modes of explanation, which imply social understanding
as a set of discrete operations in fixed points in time, as opposed to
synchronic explanations, which emphasise a more continuous and contextled understanding of the social nature of time.
Despite these epistemological and methodological differences, writers
such as Moravscik and Scharpf (Scharpf 1988, 1997) appear to be able to
integrate some of the concerns of multilevel governance into their own
perspective, so that, despite the methodological differences between the
positivists and realists, we can identify these as distinct strands in the study
of the European policy process, marked by an attentiveness to similar
policy problems and with some of the same language.
The constructivist approach
This is not true of the social constructivist approach (see, for example,
Jrgensen 1998; Weldes 1996; Wendt 1994). This rejects the language of
causality, with which positivists and realists are content in their different
ways, and in contrast, is based upon an interpretist epistemological
position. Constructivists argue that, if there is a problem of increasing
complexity of decision-making associated with the decline of the nation
state, this complexity must be understood as an intentional social construct
on the part of decision-makers, part of a set of political projects associated
with responses to perceptions of external and internal constraints. The
questions which arise are concerned with political decision-making as a
series of attempts to resolve conflicts over meaning and identity,
understood in the broadest sense. Constructivists take issue with the
positivist understanding of the nature of political choice. They argue
against the acceptance of individual preference as a given and instead
interrogate specifically why and how preferences come to be formed and

how these preferences and choices relate to the strategic aims of powerful
interests in society. Multilevel governance then would not be seen as a set
of objectively perceived phenomena, but as a normative framework which
is itself part of the political conflict between the interests associated with
neo-liberal economic restructuring and those seeking a more social
democratic accommodation with technological change.
This locates the arguments about multilevel governance within the
discussion about the nature of globalisation, which we dealt with above,
and in which one of the main disputes is about the underlying realities of
technological economic and social change and their relationship with the
discursively constructed political uses made of them within specific
political projects.
Conclusion
The point here is not to attempt to resolve these disputes. Rather, what we
have sought to do is to show how the different approaches in different
issues relate to epistemological and methodological assumptions, and to
one another. The terms introduced here can be used as signposts,
suggesting how we can come to terms with the deeper implications of the
theories and groups of concerns which are the focus of the individual
chapters which follow. One of the temptations in so doing is to attempt to
find a synthesis of all the available positions, in the hope that, at some level
of analysis, agreement is possible over fundamental issues. Unfortunately,
experience and logic combine to warn against this temptation. These
debates have been part of the intellectual and moral climate of Western
thought for centuries and continue because they reflect disagreements not
just about logic or technicalities but also about the proper scope of human
action in society. In other words, they are questions which relate to deeprooted moral positions that may be internally coherent, but are
incompatible with one another, except in so far as they all include some
appeal to intellectual and ethical tolerance of diversity. In the face of these
difficulties, another strategy, alluring at least to risk-averse researchers, is
to avoid the issue. Far from being safe, this position is actually rather
unsafe, since it does not enable one to distinguish between good and bad
research and between good and bad arguments. The least one can say
about these issues is that they are of sufficient importance to warrant a
genuine commitment to coming to terms with them. Coming to terms with
the issues requires one to think through the different arguments separately,
to compare them and to evaluate them. As we argued at the beginning of
this chapter, this means identifying, as far as possible, what are the
epistemological and ontological underpinnings and what these imply in
41
terms of argumentation, practical research method, explanatory logic and

research construction. The purpose of this chapter has been to encourage
this and to attempt to provide an introduction to some of the main ideas
and methods involved.
Further reading
. The best introductions to the philosophy of science and social science
are Chalmers (1985, 1990) and Winch (1958).
. For an accessible overview of ontology and epistemology, see Hay
(2002).
. On the positivist approach, see Kuhn (1970), Hempel (1965, 1966) or
Halfpenny (1982).
. On the interpretive approach, see Bevir and Rhodes (1999).
. On realism, see Sayer (1992).
Author Index
Acker, J. 125, 318

Adorno, T. 55, 318
Allen, J. 123, 318
Allison. G.T. 45, 74, 318
Almond, G. 3, 4, 318
Almond, G.A. and Coleman, J.S. 297,
318
Althusser, L. 275
Archer, M.S. 279, 28590, 291, 318
Aristotle 172
Armstrong, K. and Bulmer, S. 36, 318
Arrow, K. 66, 318
Ashe, G. et al. 193, 318
Austen-Smith, D. 85, 318
Avineri, S. and de Shalit, A. 194, 318
Ayer, A.J. 46, 64, 1745, 319
Budge, I. and Laver, M. 45, 321

Butler, D. and Stokes, D. 214, 321
Butler, J. 112, 321
Baldwin, D. 45, 319

Barnes, S. 266, 319
Barnes, S. and Kaase, M. 45, 319
Barrett, M. 110, 319
Barry, B. 71, 89, 319
Bates, R., Greif, A., Levi, M., Rosenthal,
J. and Weingast, B. 263, 319
Bauman, Z. 152, 319
Beasley, C. 109, 319
Bellamy, R. and Hollis, M. 194, 319
Bentham, J. 135, 151
Berger, P. and Luckman, T. 1356, 152,
319
Berlin, I. 1856, 193, 319
Berman, S. 3057, 310, 319
Bernstein, R. 152, 320
Bevir, M. xiii, 3, 152, 320
Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R.A.W. 20, 25,
279, 41, 152, 320
Blalock, H.M. 64, 320
Blyth, M. xiii, 17, 266, 277, 284, 310,
320
Boix, C. 260, 320
Bromley, S. 158, 321
Bryman, A. 232, 321
Bryson, V. 130, 321
Buckler, S. xiii, 8, 13, 30, 313, 314
Budge, I. and Fairlie, D. 45, 321
Carnap, R. 64, 322

Carr, E.H. 53, 322
Castles, F. 2578, 322
Chalmers, A. 63, 322
Chalmers, A.F. 41, 322
Champney, L. 230, 248, 322
Charlesworth, S.J. 203, 322
Clegg, S. 101, 322
Coleridge, S.T. 135, 151
Collard, D. 79, 322
Collingwood, R.G. 1356, 152, 322
Comte, A. 46, 322
Connell, R. 1234, 130, 323
Connolly, W. 194, 323
Coole, D. 111, 323
Corrin, C. 109, 323
Cowling, M. 151, 323
Cox, R. 72, 258, 323
Creswell, J. 23941, 323
Crewe, I. and King, A. 200, 209, 323
Crewe, I. and Thomson, K. 209, 323
Cutright, P. 257, 323
Daly, G. 159, 323
Daniels, N. 194, 323
Denzin, N. 203, 236, 237, 323
Derrida, J. 137, 324
Dessler, D. 291, 324
Devine, F. xiii, 1516, 203, 197, 324
Devine, F. and Heath, S. 215, 241, 247,
248, 324
Dews, P. 193, 324
Di Palma, G. 251, 324
Diamond, I. and Hartsock, N. 117, 324
Diamond, L. 257, 259, 261, 324
Dobbin, F. 310, 324
Dogan, M. 260, 324
Dowding, K. 236
Downs, A. 656, 67, 73, 74, 79, 85,
324
Dreyfus, H. and Rabinow, P. 152, 324
350
Author Index 351

Dunleavy, P. 89, 2457, 3245
Dunleavy, P. et al. 45, 325
Durkheim, E. 75
Dworkin, R. 194, 325
Eckstein, H. 92, 325
Eliasoph, N. 198, 215, 325
Elster, J. 75, 325
Eribon, D. 152, 325
Esping-Anderson, G. 124, 325
Evans, G. and Norris, P. 224, 325
Finer, H. 92, 93, 326
Finkel, S.E. and Muller, E.N. 84, 326
Finnemore, M. 310, 326
Fischer, E. 171, 326
Foucault, M. 28, 119, 123, 1379, 141,
152, 326
Fox, C. and Miller, H. 97, 98, 326
Franzosi, R. 222, 326
Frazer, E. 194, 326
Freud, S. 82
Furlong, P. xiii
Gamble, A. 107, 327
Gamble, A., Marsh, D. and
Tant, T. 171, 327
Gamson, W.A. 199, 327
Garrett, G. 220, 2589, 327
Garrett, G. and Weingast, B.R. 3034,
306, 327
Gauthier, D. 76, 327
Geertz, C. 27, 28, 1356, 152, 327
Giddens, A. 98, 105, 273, 27880, 284,
285, 291, 327
Gilbert, N. 215, 327
Gilligan, C. 121, 327
Gilmour, I. 143, 327
Gintis, H. 80, 327
Goldstein, G. and Keohane, R. 3034,
310, 328
Goodin, R. 100, 105, 108, 328
Goodin, R. and Klingemann, H. 2, 3, 5,
10, 11, 90, 91, 101, 107, 108, 328
Goodin, R. and Pettit, P. 193, 328
Grafstein, R. 82, 328
Gramsci, A. 156, 1589, 171, 328
Grant, W. and Marsh, D. 45, 328
Gray, J. 18, 328
Green, D.P. and Shapiro, I. 71, 79,
823, 84, 328
Greenleaf, W.H. 136, 151, 328
Gutmann, A. 194, 328
Habermas, J. 55, 1825, 193, 328

Hague, R. et al. 267, 329
Halford, S. 125, 329
Halfpenny, P. 41, 64, 329
Hall, P. and Taylor, R. 95, 96, 1067,
108, 329
Hall, P.A. 102, 103, 263, 300, 310, 329
Hammersley, M. 152, 232, 236, 240, 329
Hanson, R. 64, 329
Hargreaves-Heap, S., Hollis, M., Lyons,
B., Sugden, R. and Weale, A. 71,
329
Harrop, M. and Miller, W.L. 74, 329
Hartsock, N. 11516, 329
Hay, C. 89, 41, 156, 272, 276, 2801,
284, 285, 291, 330
Hay, C. and Marsh, D. 33, 345, 330
Hay, C. and Wincott, D. 106, 330
Hayek, F.A. von 70
Hayward, J. 3, 330
Heath, A. 53, 330
Heath, A., Jowell, R. and Curtice, J. 45,
53, 330
Helco, H. and Wildavsky, A. 200, 330
Held, D. 193, 330
Held, D. et al. 334, 35, 330
Hempel, C. 41, 46, 52, 54, 64, 330
Hicks, A. 2645, 330
Hindess, B. 89, 330
Hirst, P. and Thompson, G. 33, 330
Hix, S. 86, 330
Hobbes, T. 67
Hollis, M. and Lukes, S. 193, 331
Hollis, M. and Nell, E. 72, 331
Hollis, M. and Smith, S. 1920, 23, 24,
30, 32, 331
Honig, B. 194, 331
Hopkin, J. xiii, 16, 312
Horkheimer, M. and Adorno, T. 182,
331
Howarth, D. 28, 2823, 331
Huff, D. 230, 331
Hume, D. 19, 1734, 331
Hunt, J. 36, 331
Huntington, S.P. 99, 2978, 331
Husserl, E. 136, 331
Immergut, E.
102, 331
Jackson, J. 248, 332

Jackson, S. 1567, 159, 230, 332
Janda, K. 256, 332
Janis, I.L. and Mann, L. 80, 332
352 Author Index

Jay, M. 193, 332
Jenkins, K. 152, 332
Jessop, B. 55, 107, 157, 162, 171, 2801,
283, 284, 285, 291, 332
John, P. xiv, 1516, 24, 92, 103, 232,
316
Johnson, N. 92, 93, 332
Johnston, J. and Dolowitz, D. 156, 158,
332
Jones, K. and Jonasdottir, A. 130, 332
Jordan, G. and Maloney, W. 84, 332
Kaletsky, A. 165, 332
Kathlene, L. 1257, 333
Katz, R. 260, 333
Kautsky, K.J. 155
Kavanagh, D. 1456, 333
Kenney, S. 128, 333
Kenny, M. 158, 333
Keohane, R. 45, 87, 315, 333
King, A. 45, 285, 333
King, G. 64, 227, 228, 333
King, G., Keohane, R. and Verba, S. 64,
217, 333
King, G., Tomz, M. and Lee, J. 220,
333
Kingdon, J. 310, 333
Kiser, L. and Ostrom, E. 101, 334
Klein, N. 1667, 171, 334
Kolakowski, L. 193, 334
Kuhn, T. 24, 41, 64, 334
Kukathas, C. and Pettit, P. 194, 334
Kymlicka, W. 193, 334
Lacan, J. 137, 334
Lacey, A. 64, 334
Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. 153, 162,
283, 334
Lakatos, I. 50, 69, 334
Lane, J.-E. and Ersson, S. 261, 334
Lane, R. 113, 334
Laslett, P. 172, 334
Laver, M. 89, 335
Laver, M. and Shepsle, K.A. 83, 335
Layder, D. 27980, 291, 335
Leftwich, A. 9, 335
Lenin, V. 158, 171, 335
Levi, M. 263, 335
Levi-Strauss, C. 275
Lewin, L. 72, 79, 335
Lewis, D.K. 76, 335
Lichbach, M.L. 266, 335
Lijphart, A. 258, 260, 335

Lipset, S.M. 2501, 2567, 259, 335
Locke, J. 67
Lovenduski, J. 124, 335
Lowndes, V. xiv, 5, 99, 108, 114, 296,
299, 313, 314, 3356
Luce, R.D. and Raiffa, H. 89, 336
Lukacs, G.S. von 155
Lupia, A. and McCubbins, M.D. 86,
336
Lyotard, J.-F. 137, 194, 336
McAdam, D. 198, 336
McAnulla, S. xiv
McCarthy, T. 193, 336
Machiavelli, N. 156
MacIntyre, A. 180, 336
MacKay, F. 122, 130, 336
Mackie, T. and Marsh, D. 267, 336
Maclean, I. 89, 336
McLellan, D. 171, 336
McNamara, K.R. 310, 336
McNay, L. 152, 336
Mainwaring, S. and Scully, T. 256,
336
Mansbridge, J.J. 72, 79, 80, 89, 3367
March, J. 72, 337
March, J. and Olsen, J. 74, 94, 96, 99,
103, 105, 108, 337
Margolis, H. 7980, 337
Marks, G., Hooghe, E. and
Blank, K. 36, 38, 337
Marquand, D. 1467, 337
Marsh, D. xii, xiv, 8, 233, 337
Marsh, D. and Furlong, P. 11, 12, 159,
232, 2401, 250, 285, 295, 311
Marsh, D. and Read, M. 2435, 337
Marsh, D. and Rhodes, R.A.W. 94, 96,
97, 102
Marsh, D., Richards, D. and
Smith, M. 2467, 337
Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. xi, xii, 272
Marx, K. 30, 53, 1535, 162, 171, 182,
305, 337
Mason, J. 202, 215, 248, 337
May, E. 244
Meehan, J. 193, 338
Meyer, J. and Rowan, B. 96, 338
Miles, M. and Huberman, A. 236, 338
Miliband, R. 158, 171, 338
Mill, J.S. 135, 2525, 265, 338
Miller, W.L. 230, 248, 338
Moe, T.M. 72, 338
Author Index 353

Moller Okin, S. 120, 338
Monroe, K.R. 72, 89, 338
Moore, B. 251, 2613, 338
Moore, M. 257, 338
Moravscik, A. 367, 39, 338
Morgenthau, H. 53, 339
Morrow, J. 89, 339
Mouffe, C. 194, 339
Mueller, D.C. 89, 339
Mulhall, S. and Swift, A. 194, 339
North, D.C. 103, 310, 339
Nozick, R. 194, 339
O'Donnell, G. et al. 251, 340
Oakeshott, M. 1356, 143, 340
Offe, C. 100, 340
Ohmae, K. 33, 340
Okin, S. 194, 340
Olson, M. 66, 79, 299, 340
Ordeshook, P.C. 77, 89, 340
Ostrom, E. 73, 84, 87, 102, 340
Ostrom, E., Gardner, R. and
Walker, J. 73, 340
Outhwaite, W. 193, 340
Padgett, D. 23940, 340
Panebianco, A. 252, 340
Pareto, V. 53, 340
Parry, G., Moyser, G. and Day, N. 45,
340
Pateman, C. 121, 194, 3401
Pattie, C. and Johnston, R. 243, 341
Pennings, P., Keman, H, and
Kleinnijenuis, J. 230, 248, 267, 341
Peters, G. 92, 95, 96, 100, 102, 103, 104,
105, 108, 252, 253, 341
Phillips, A. 120, 129, 130, 194, 341
Pierre, J. 100, 341
Plant, R. 193, 341
Plato 2, 172, 174
Polsby, N. 93, 341
Popkin, S. 85, 341
Popper, K. 48, 50, 52, 161, 341
Poulantzas, N. 156, 1612, 171, 341
Powell, R. 69, 341
Pridham, G. 251, 342
Pridham, G. and Lewis, P. 251, 342
Pringle, R. and Watson, S. 117, 342
Przeworski, A. 74, 342
Przeworski, A. and Teune, H. 254, 257,
258, 265, 342
Putnam, H. 2956, 342
Quattrone, G.A. and Tversky, A. 82,

342
Quine, W. 234, 30, 342
Ragin, C. 252, 264, 342
Randall, V. xiv, 5, 9, 10, 14, 30, 31213,
314, 342
Randall, V. and Waylen, G. 130
Rasmusen, E. 89, 342
Rawls, J. 67, 1869, 194, 342
Raz, J. 194, 342
Read, M. xiv
Read, M. and Marsh, D. 16, 314
Rhodes, R.A.W. xiv, 91, 92, 93, 94, 108,
152, 3423
Rhodes, R.A.W. and Bevir, M. 1112,
233, 236, 281, 312
Rhodes, R.A.W. and Dunleavy, P. 94,
343
Rich, A. 111, 343
Riker, W. 778, 343
Riker, W. and Ordeshook, P.C. 89, 343
Risse-Kappen, T. 310, 343
Rittberger, V. 96, 102, 343
Robinson, N. 163, 343
Robson, W. 92, 93, 343
Rokkan, S. 262, 343
Rorty, R. 137, 194, 343
Rosenau, J. 45, 343
Rosenau, P.M. 152, 343
Rosenberg, S. 80, 343
Roseneil, S. 198, 215, 343
Rothstein, B. 93, 100, 102, 103, 344
Rubin, G. 111, 344
Ruddick, S. 111, 344
Rudner, R. 63, 344
Rueschemeyer, D. et al. 2612, 344
Sahlins, M. 79, 344
Sandel, M. 189, 194, 344
Sanders, D. xv, 14, 23, 246, 45, 201,
219, 235, 31112, 313, 316, 344
Sapiro, V. 11617, 344
Sarlvik, B. and Crewe, I. 53, 344
Sartori, G. 254, 344
Saussure, F. de 2745
Savage, M. and Witz, A. 125, 130, 344
Sayer, A. 41, 291, 344
Scharpf, W. 39, 3445
Schlick, M. 64, 345
Sears, D.O. and Funk, C.L. 79, 345
Self, P. 72, 345
354 Author Index

Sened, I. 878, 345
Shepsle, K. and Bonchek, M.S. 87, 89,
345
Sikkink, K. 266, 345
Silverman, D. 152, 215, 248, 345
Simon, H.A. 72, 80, 171, 345
Skinner, C. 230, 345
Skocpol, T. 75, 346
Smelser, N. 261, 346
Smith, A. 67, 144
Smith, M.J. 278, 314, 346
Smith, S. 30, 315, 346
Soros, G. 1656, 346
Spencer, H. 151
Squires, J. 127, 129, 130, 346
Steinmo, S. 102, 263, 346
Stoker, G. xv, 346
Stone, D. 310, 346
Strange, S. 171
Tanenbaum, E. and Scarbrough, E. 228,
230, 346
Tant, T. 159
Taylor, C. 193, 194, 346
Taylor, M. 75, 347
Thomas, D. 63, 347
Thompson, J. and Held, D. 193, 347
Tronto, J. 1212, 347
Tsebelis, G. 263, 347
Tsebelis, G. and Garrett, G. 86, 347
Tufte, E. 230, 248, 347
Ullmann-Margalit, E. 76, 347
Vanhanen, T. 251, 257, 260, 347

Verba, S., Schlozman, K. and
Brady, H. 222, 347
Walby, S. 121, 348
Walt, S.M. 83, 348
Walzer, M. 194, 348
Ward, H. xv, 5, 235, 277, 302, 313, 314
Waylen, G. 130, 348
Weale, A. 260, 348
Weaver, R. and Rockman, B. 102, 348
Weber, M. 53, 149, 155
Weingast, A. 86, 348
Weldon, T.D. 175, 177, 179, 348
White, H. 137, 348
White, S. 193, 348
Whiteley, P. and Seyd, P. 46, 5662, 349
Whiteley, P., Seyd, P. and
Richardson, J. 84, 349
Willetts, D. 144, 349
Williams, M. and May, T. 202, 203, 349
Wilson, G. 45, 349
Wilson, W. 93, 349
Winch, P. 41, 63, 77, 17780, 193, 349
Wittgenstein, L. 1768, 349
Wittman, D. 80, 349
Wonnacott, T. and Wonnacott, R. 230,
349
Young, I.
194, 349
Zey, M. 72, 349

Ziegler, J. 310, 349
Subject Index
abortion 120, 242, 244, 288

aesthetics 46, 51
Africa 292, 297
agencies 246
agents 298, 300, 301, 305, 306, 309
Agreement on Investment 167
altruism 73, 7980, 83, 84
disguised forms of self-interest 80
reciprocal 80
American Political Science Review 249
Analytical Narratives (Bates et al.
1998) 263, 319
anthropology 135, 136, 139, 142, 197,
275
anti-foundationalism 5, 7, 8, 9, 1112,
15, 1819, 20, 26, 2930, 33, 35, 36,
13948, 155, 193, 232, 233, 236, 314
appearance and reality 154
Ashdown, J.J.D. (Lord Ashdown) 210,
211
assertion 294
attitudes 45, 207
Australia 124, 168
authority 175, 179, 184
black economy 259

Blair, A.C.L. 35, 198, 209, 211
Boolean algebra 2645
bounded rationality 723, 82, 84
brand names 36, 166
Brazil 164
Britain see United Kingdom
British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC) 147
British Election Surveys (BES) 2078,
214, 224
budgets 98, 100, 299
Bush, George W. 271
banking 33, 158, 164, 238, 300

behaviouralism 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12,
1314, 15, 23, 24, 256, 4564, 65,
901, 94, 107, 132, 137, 176, 235,
236, 263, 313
philosophical origins 64
theoretical concepts and empirical
indicators 60
see also post-behaviouralism
beliefs 95, 131, 1323, 1345, 139, 140,
141, 14950, 154, 179, 180, 188, 200,
306
tripartite distinction 303
Berlin Wall 273
bias 117, 201, 204, 2056, 219, 307
selection bias 265
binary opposition 282
biological
determinism 111, 127
reductionism 111
cabinet 100, 145

capital 90, 160, 162, 166
financial 166
industrial and banking 161
capital punishment 244
capitalism 789, 110, 115, 1223, 142,
147, 153, 154, 157, 161, 166, 167,
181, 182, 256, 298, 3056
advanced 55
Asian 164
casino 165, 171
contemporary 163
contradictions 155, 171
exploitative 171
global 8
internationalisation 157
US-style 164
case studies 3240, 75, 81, 106, 130,
20715, 2427, 263
cathexis 124
causality 212, 23, 30, 31, 47, 63, 78,
107, 154, 160, 1789, 182, 184, 223,
2245, 232, 253, 257, 258, 263, 264,
273, 274, 2767, 305, 306, 312
see also explanation
central conflation 279
central government 99, 200, 246
change 293, 3013, 3049
chief officers (local government) 125
children 111, 115, 117, 120, 130, 168,
212
355
356 Subject Index

China 262
church 121, 134, 139
citizens 36, 76, 85
civic groups 198, 215
civil association 143
civil servants 238, 299
civil service/bureaucracy 67, 86, 93, 94,
1245, 133, 145, 147, 218, 2457,
262, 277, 298, 299
civil society 101, 119
class 7, 11, 74, 78, 102, 112, 116, 117,
118, 123, 124, 133, 138, 150, 154,
155, 1567, 161, 167, 178, 181, 184,
20910, 213, 219, 251, 284, 294
climate change 286
Cold War 296
aftermath 164
collective action 66, 73, 76, 78, 79, 80,
82, 84, 87, 96, 1045, 299, 3023,
304, 3089
collective benefits 57, 58, 59, 60
collective values 163
collectivism 136, 144
Colne Valley 213
Colombia 260
common sense 90, 92, 136, 2212, 273,
274
`common-pool resource' (CPR)
problems 301
communism 95, 150, 153, 163, 262,
298
Communist Manifesto (Marx and
Engels 1848) 171, 337
Communist Party of Italy (PCI) 158
communitarianism 18890, 192, 194
comparative methods/analysis 16, 34,
401, 101, 102, 104, 108, 142, 151,
24967, 297, 312
case studies 75
`method of agreement' 253, 255
`method of concomitant
variables' 2534
`method of difference' 2523
`most similar' and `most
different' 2545
qualitative comparative
strategies 2601
quantitative comparative
strategies 25560
quantitative versus qualitative 2615
`conceptions of the good' 188, 190, 191
`conceptions of the right' 188, 190
conceptualisation 25960
consensus 97, 99, 143, 145, 185, 186,

189, 1912
end of 1458
Conservative Party 589, 60, 61, 77,
143, 144, 200, 20814, 244, 28990
consistency 141, 142
constitutions 4, 5, 901, 93, 102, 183,
296, 308
constraints 233, 235, 238, 243, 2756,
279, 280, 291, 300, 301
constructivism 3940, 310
content analysis 218, 219, 235, 237, 238
context 218, 221
contract 134, 186
conventional wisdom 2969, 310
conventions 789
`core executive' studies 94
critical realism 7, 285
critical theory 180, 1815, 192, 193
Cuban Missile Crisis 74
cultural
conditioning 288, 289
elaboration 288, 289
reproduction 288, 289
culture 18, 103, 111, 115, 116, 121, 125,
147, 160, 166, 180, 190, 192, 1978,
256, 266, 282, 28790, 291, 312
currency/foreign exchange 165, 259,
264
customs 103, 104
data
29, 52, 58, 81, 84, 88, 149, 202, 204,

205, 207, 217, 221, 2245, 230, 232,
2345, 23940, 241, 242, 245, 2589,
260
binary 2645
collection 1516, 21820
field notes 198
quantitative and qualitative 212, 31
`soft' 247
decision-making 801, 82, 96, 98, 100,
103, 116, 273
deconstruction 150, 203
deductive approach 37, 62, 95, 232, 234
democracy 13, 37, 45, 66, 76, 85, 87, 92,
95, 118, 123, 146, 179, 183, 256, 262
Democracy and Participation
programme 215
democratisation 2501, 2568, 25960,
262
Denmark 1312
deontological theory 1845, 193
and value pluralism 18592
Subject Index 357

description: power of 2202
Designing Social Inquiry (King, Keohane
and Verba 1994) 217, 333
determinism 106, 121, 123, 154, 1556,
157, 159, 161, 162, 167, 170, 263,
267, 2723
development 292, 2978
developmental state 1478
devolution 945
Devon West and Torridge 212
dialectics 155, 1815, 27881, 285, 288,
290, 291
strategicrelational approach 2801
structuration theory
(Giddens) 27880
dialogue 31617
dictatorship 250, 256, 257, 262, 297
difference 1901
disability 168
discourses 26, 28, 35, 36, 51, 77, 131,
1389, 140, 141, 159, 161, 164, 165,
170, 233, 235, 2825, 312
discursive
conditions 192
construction 159, 1601
selectivity 284
division of labour 124
domestic 125
sexual 115
division of powers 102
divorce 242
dogmatism 294, 295
domestic violence 120
dominant ideology thesis 288
double hermeneutic 19, 26, 28
economic
crisis 155
depression/recession 273, 3012,
3056
development 2501, 256, 25960,
262, 263
liberalisation 279
structure 251
economics 65, 299, 314, 317
economism 154, 1556, 157, 159, 161,
162, 170, 171
economy 209, 211, 213, 218, 229, 238,
256, 271, 272, 305
education 167, 168, 169, 210, 211, 212,
213, 223, 224, 237, 238, 255, 257,
260, 286, 298
fee-paying 168
elections 216, 224

electoral systems 100, 216, 258
electorates 93
eleventh of September (2001) 165, 290
elites/elitism 45, 77, 110, 112, 169, 183,
197
emancipatory knowledge
(Habermas) 1834
empirical
institutionalists 967
questions 25
theory 47
empiricism 6, 11, 13, 20, 223, 25, 457,
49, 50, 51, 524, 56, 58, 616, 71, 79,
81, 834, 86, 88, 95, 109, 157, 173,
1756, 1779, 184, 185, 197, 202,
203, 205, 232, 234, 250, 2525, 257,
259, 262, 265, 272, 291, 293, 295, 310
employment 191, 279, 281, 286
white-collar 158
enabling 233, 279, 301
enterprise association 143
environment 66, 87, 271, 272
epiphenomena 276, 288
epistemes (Foucault) 138, 140
epistemology xi, 1, 4, 11, 12, 1741,
48, 71, 108, 109, 131, 154, 1723,
197, 2004, 215, 231, 232, 233, 234,
235, 237, 239, 2401, 242, 245, 247,
265, 2823, 292, 293, 2945, 300,
307, 308
approaches 2232
case studies 3240
conclusion 31117
definition 1819
feminist critique 11418
importance 212
Marx 15960
scientific versus hermeneutic
approaches 1920
à skin, not a sweater' 17, 21, 311
equality 98, 186, 190, 191
essentialism 18, 111, 112, 115, 127, 140,
148, 154
strategic 130
ethic of care 1212, 130
ethic of justice 121
ethical principles 184
ethical solidarity 188
ethics 46
ethnocentricity 312
ethnography 27, 117, 137, 152, 197, 206
four main characteristics 136
358 Subject Index

ethnology 1357, 150
Europe 158, 256, 265, 300, 313, 314
East and Central 95
Eastern 163
European Commission 86
European Community 3034
European Court of Justice 279
Cassis de Dijon ruling (1979) 304
European Parliament 86
European Single Market 3034
European Union (EU) 367, 378, 45,
867, 164, 211, 213, 258, 279
evolution 73, 80
expected utility 81, 84
experience 111, 115, 121, 1389, 140,
198, 199, 200, 201, 203, 207, 2834
explanation 47, 50, 545, 556, 75, 84,
87, 88, 120, 1312, 136, 148, 149,
151, 180, 201, 232, 234, 252, 2545,
264, 272, 282, 284, 290, 296, 304
see also causality
fairness 1867, 191
false consciousness 77, 180
falsifiability 6, 4850, 63, 71, 83, 103,
150, 161, 174, 204, 217, 265, 295,
312, 316
see also testing
family 79, 119, 120, 154, 213, 288
fascism 150, 262, 305
feminism 1, 5, 7, 9, 1011, 12, 15, 18,
30, 10930, 1567, 158, 185, 191,
194, 273, 278, 314
general: gendering the state 1227;
internal debates 109, 11013;
methodology and
epistemology 11418; `not bold
enough' 1289; race 112;
reconceptualising
politics 11822
types: black 112, 115; cultural 117,
121; liberal 110, 112, 116, 117,
118, 120, 123, 312;
Marxist 11012, 114, 115,
11819, 1223, 1567, 312;
materialist 159;
postmodern 116, 124;
post-structuralist 117, 130;
Radical 11012, 115, 11723,
312; second-wave 111, 11415,
120; socialist 110, 118, 123, 157;
standpoint 114, 115, 116, 117,
313
femocrats 124
`file drawer problem' 227, 228
financial crisis (global 1997) 164
financial markets 31, 33, 35, 300
financial sector 158
Financial Times 167
focal points 304, 306
focus groups 15, 27, 197, 1989
foundationalism 11, 18, 20, 23, 28,
301, 33, 37, 137, 154, 187, 188,
18990, 202, 232, 236, 315
see also positivism
France 93, 102, 168, 262, 263, 265, 313
free markets 144, 146, 1478, 164, 165,
254
market forces 163
free trade 2534
free will 2723
freedom/liberty 143, 175, 186, 187, 190
Freedom House 257
Freedom Summer project 198
functional analysis 76
functional responses 87
functionalism 92, 161, 300, 3089
funding 226, 234, 2356, 242, 265
game theory 66, 71, 74, 80, 83, 85, 88,
89, 263, 299
evolutionary 73
strategy equilibrium 689, 70, 85
games 1767, 178
gatekeeping 31516
Gates, B. 166
`gender' 111
gender 18, 74, 111, 112, 116, 117, 123,
1245, 155, 1567, 158, 161, 167,
168, 16970, 178, 191, 233, 314
`gender regime' (Connell) 1234
general trends (academic Holy
Grail) 249
generalisability 207, 241, 248, 255, 263,
312, 317
generalisation 263
geographic location 74
Germany 93, 1312, 168, 181, 262, 265,
313
Social Democratic Party
(SPD) 3056, 307
glass ceiling 275, 283
globalisation 31, 326, 40, 1578, 160,
235, 238, 258, 271, 286
cultural 33, 356
economic 323
Subject Index 359

first-wave theorists 33
markets 165
political economy 38
protesters 1667
sceptics 334
second-wave theorists 33
third-wave theorists 334
governance 334, 37, 92, 100, 170
Governing the Economy (Hall
1986) 263, 329
government 37, 92, 136, 144
advisers 238
coalitions 83
structures 90
governments 9, 10, 31, 35, 243, 299,
300
marginal seats 224
Great Depression 296, 308
Green Party 208
Greenham 198, 215
gross domestic product (GDP) 257, 259,
261
groups 272, 276, 278, 2867, 288
guillotine (House of Commons) 243
habit 1034
Hansard 243
health 102, 168, 210, 211, 213, 238
hedge funds 165
Hegelianism 139
hermeneutics 1920, 27, 28, 51, 132,
1357, 139, 150, 152, 293
heuristics 69, 72, 73, 81, 235
Himmler, H. 131
historical institutionalism 92, 94, 96,
101, 104, 105, 106, 261, 263, 265,
293, 299, 3001, 3023, 304, 309,
310, 313
ideas 3057
historical materialism 294
historicism 92
history 86, 116, 121, 124, 129, 132, 135,
138, 145, 151, 181, 273, 313, 317
end of 164
historical stories 148
Marxist theory 155
History of the Human Sciences
(journal) 193
Hitler, A. 131, 305, 306
holism 261
holistic approach 199, 202
homosexuality 113, 242, 244, 28990
House of Commons 169, 2425

filibustering 2434
Second Reading debates 243, 244
Third Reading debates 244
House of Lords 243, 290
households 220
housework 259
human agency 77, 105, 1067, 138,
13940, 141, 1545, 160, 1612, 170,
187
Mrs Thatcher 146
see also structure and agency
human condition 182, 188, 189, 192,
291
Human Development Index
(UNDP) 257
human/civil rights 1334, 198, 257, 303,
313
Hungary 158
hyperglobalists 33, 34
hypothesis 22
ideal speech situation (Habermas) 183
ideal types 149
idealism 27, 135, 145, 155
ideas 2, 9, 131, 135, 151, 155, 162, 234,
266, 2834, 285, 28790, 291,
292310
explaining stability and change 3013
historical institutionalism 3057
rationalism 3034
role in explaining political
phenomena xi
see also institutions and ideas
Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs,
Institutions and Political Change
(Goldstein and Keohane
1993) 3034, 310, 328
identity 56, 61, 77, 78, 83, 95, 100, 112,
124, 127, 18990, 192, 194, 281
ideology 56, 578, 60, 61, 768, 85, 120,
122, 123, 133, 136, 143, 150, 161,
165, 180, 181, 182, 262, 275, 288,
299, 306
end of 164
idiographic studies 249, 252, 263
incentives 95, 100
income 168, 169
independent definition 489
India 137, 262
indicators 5961
individual benefits 57, 58, 60, 61
individual costs 57, 58, 60, 61
360 Subject Index

individualism 144, 163, 3089
methodological 75
possessive 147
reductionist 147
individuals 10, 66, 70, 76, 78, 80, 84, 90,
91, 94, 95, 96, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105,
106, 188, 189, 191, 255, 256, 258,
272, 274, 2768, 281, 283, 2867,
288, 294, 302, 306, 307, 309
Indonesia 164
inductive reasoning 37, 83, 232, 234
inductivism 52, 54
industrialisation 257, 262, 300
inequality 157, 161, 162, 163
inflation 67, 133, 146, 149, 238, 252,
281
information 845, 856, 95, 299, 301
false disclosure 85
private 85
instinct 2778
Institute for Social Research (Frankfurt
1923) 181, 193
institutional theory 314
institutionalism 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14,
23, 37, 90108, 2967, 313
descriptiveinductive method 95, 102
examples 93
historicalcomparative method 923
old 296, 308, 317
see also new institutionalism
institutions 2, 8, 9, 16, 389, 84, 868,
989, 1001, 1012, 1036, 108, 110,
129, 132, 145, 14950, 154, 170, 258,
263, 272, 276, 286
formal and informal
conceptions 989
genesis and transformation 1046
holistic and disaggregated
conceptions 1001
and ideas 292310
international 271
not independent, but embedded 101
static and dynamic conceptions 99
see also institutionalism; new
institutionalism
instrumentalism 123
intellectual imperialism 293
intellectuals 156
intentionalism 106, 2768, 279, 285,
2878, 2901
ìnter-coder reliability scores' 219
interaction: institutions and
individuals 102
interest groups 10, 45, 86, 244, 273

pressure groups 102, 289
interest rates 1323
interests 31, 534, 94, 95, 100, 117, 121,
188, 281, 286
intergovernmental relationships 100
intergovernmentalism 369, 86
international institutionalism 96
International Monetary Fund
(IMF) 165
international relations (IR) 53, 66, 81,
85, 87, 96, 102, 291, 303, 310, 314
gatekeeping 315
International Studies Association
(USA) 315
internet 167, 227
interpretation 256
see also hermeneutics
interpretive theory 1, 5, 1112, 1920,
20, 215, 2630, 313, 356, 39, 41,
71, 114, 13152, 160, 17680, 193,
201, 241, 2956, 31217
intersubjectivity 701
interviews 15, 23, 27, 197200, 201,
2056, 207, 20815, 233, 234, 235,
237, 2389, 240, 243, 246, 247, 275,
281, 283
irrationalism 141
IR see international relations
Islam 68
Italian Socialist Party (PSI) 256
Japan 164, 168, 255, 258, 262
Jews 1312
joint decision trap 38
journals 84, 217, 220, 2268, 230
judiciary 93
justice 13
juvenile delinquency 113
Kennedy, J.F. 74
Keynesianism 102, 147
kin altruism 80
Kinnock, N. 209
kinship 275
knowledge 167, 170, 296
see also epistemology
labour 90, 161, 166, 181, 184, 300
Labour Government (1977) 243
Labour Party 589, 60, 61, 132, 169,
200, 20814, 244, 254
Subject Index 361

language 28, 138, 1769, 183, 184, 256,
265, 275, 282
games 177, 178, 179
gendered 234, 235
racially inspired 235
terminology 64
Language, Truth and Logic (Ayer
1936/1971) 174
Latin America 114, 164, 2567, 297
law/legislation 87, 92, 102, 132, 154,
236, 296, 308, 313, 317
law-courts 94, 169
laws (scientific) 6, 12, 232, 2512
lawyers 36, 92, 94
leadership 45, 209, 211, 213, 275
legal systems 90
legislative coalitions 66
legislatures/parliaments 93, 94, 145,
147, 169, 224, 246, 305
lesbianism 111
Liberal Democrat Party 208, 21014
liberal democratic reformism 93
liberal universalism 150
liberalcommunitarian debate 194
liberalism 67, 77, 1445, 153, 186,
1912, 194
libertarianism 189, 194
life expectancy 257
life histories 235
life-chances 9
life-saving 2778
lifestyle 286
linguistics 275
literacy 257
Liverpool 210
local government 125, 147, 200
Local Government Act (1988),
Section 28 28990
logical empiricism see logical
positivism
logical positivism 46, 1726, 177, 179,
185, 192, 193, 314
lone parents 168
Long-Term Capital Management Fund
(LTCMF) 165
Madeira 255
Major, J. 209, 213
majority, size of 233
manufacturing 158, 259
March of Dimes (USA) 302
marriage 24, 134, 138
Marxism xi, 1, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 31, 66,

139, 15371, 181, 184, 273, 275,
2945, 305, 307
classical 1536
contemporary 15963
economic, social and political
change 1579
`flexibility' 163
importance 16370
ìrresolvable dualism' 155
surviving collapse of communism 163
theoretical critiques 1567
utility 167
see also feminism; neo-liberalism
masculinity 130
material reality 14950
materialism 1545, 1556, 157, 159,
1612, 170
mathematics 173
mean values 221
meaning 62, 77, 116, 131, 1345, 136,
138, 151, 170, 175, 176, 177, 180,
184, 199, 207, 232, 316
see also understanding
media 14, 86
newspapers 222, 292, 293
media information 199
median (middle observation) 221
Members of Parliament 218, 2425, 289
Men are from Mars and Women are from
Venus (Gray 1992) 18, 328
mentalities 141
meta-narrative (world-view) 155
meta-theoretical concepts 287
metaphysics 23, 46, 1746, 179, 181,
184, 193
methodological individualism 88
methodology 1516, 301, 34, 83, 90,
92, 235, 2401, 247, 293, 2945
conclusion 311, 312, 314
economics 65
see also comparative methods;
qualitative methods; quantitative
methods
micro-practices (Foucault) 119, 139, 141
microeconomics 67
Microsoft 166
middle class/bourgeoisie 133, 210, 214,
262
miners 210
ministers 238, 243
misogyny 11314
362 Subject Index

Mississippi 198
mode (most frequent value) 221
models 11, 12, 6970, 73, 75, 78, 7980,
82, 83, 84, 85, 102, 105, 178, 217,
299
bootstrapping 229
bureau-shaping (Dunleavy) 2456
general incentives 567
linear additive 58
logocentric 185, 191
male breadwinner 124
masculine behavioural 118
non-parametric 217
regression 225, 228
socialeconomic status (SES) 222,
224
spatial 83
Westminster 147
modernisation 262, 298
modernism 202
monetarism 102, 146
money 167, 170
monists 295
Monte Carlo simulation 229
moral arguments 51
moral nihilism 192
morphogenesis 28590
morphostasis 287
multiculturalism 1912, 194
multilevel governance (MLG) 369,
3940
multinational corporations 33, 45,
1667, 171
multiple regression 223
multivariate analysis 216, 224, 2258
Murdoch, R. 165
Mussolini, B. 158
narratives 28, 29, 134, 142, 1438, 199,
312
Nash equilibria 73
nation states 323, 368, 39, 45, 55, 96,
266, 3034
nationalisation 210
natural law 179, 188
natural liberty (Adam Smith) 144
natural selection 73
natural structures 24
Nazis/Nazism 1312, 305
neo-functionalism 86
neo-institutionalism 74
neo-liberalism 35, 38, 40, 67, 70, 1647,
235, 315
neo-Marxism 901, 288

neo-realism 315
nested games 37
Netherlands 168, 313
network institutionalism 96, 97, 99
New Conservatism 144
new information 81
new institutionalism 86, 90108, 299,
308, 313
approach 947
contribution to `multi-theoretic
research' 108
core features 97101
dilemmas 1017
èpistemic gain' 108
òrganising perspective' rather than a
`theory' 107
points of departure 97
varieties 95, 96, 102
see also institutionalism
New Labour government (1997) 118
new public management 934
New Right 70, 146, 163
New York: Waldorf Hotel 280
New Zealand 168
News International Group 165
Next Steps agencies 99, 246
nihilistic irrationalism 139
nobility 262
nomothetic studies 249, 263
non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) 1667
non-positivism 232, 233, 235, 239,
2401, 242, 245, 31617
normative institutionalism 956, 98, 99,
100, 101, 103, 105
compatibility with rational choice
approach 1067
normative theory/approach 1, 67, 8,
1315, 223, 25, 30, 379, 40, 51, 67,
723, 79, 80, 82, 83, 92, 95, 121, 123,
132, 17294, 313, 314
norms 10, 756, 95, 96, 103, 105, 182,
183, 184, 190, 192, 266
conventional forms of behaviour 75
non-instrumental 193
Northampton North 21011, 212
Northern Ireland 292
Norway 168
objectivity 22, 26, 28, 29, 116, 139, 142,
149, 159, 174, 175, 184, 185, 201,
2056, 236
Subject Index 363

observation 22, 234, 256, 30, 45,
467, 52, 534, 545, 59, 197, 200,
237
occupation 178
One Nation Toryism 143, 144
ontology xi, 1, 4, 89, 11, 1741, 70, 71,
103, 107, 111, 154, 197, 232, 234,
2401, 247, 265, 266, 287, 2926,
300, 301, 302, 304, 306
approaches 2232
case studies 3240
conclusion 31117
definition 18
facilitates adjudication between
competing theories 307
importance 212
positivist, realist and interpretist
positions 20
progress in political science 30710
scientific versus hermeneutic
approaches 1920
à skin, not a sweater' 17, 21, 311
social 106
open government 200
operationalisation 59, 61, 62, 201
opinion 856, 135, 199
opinion polls 198, 199, 213, 238
oppression 111, 116, 189, 190, 191
ordinary least squares (OLS) 217, 2258
disadvantages 2289
multivariate regression analysis 244
r-squares 225, 228
Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) 167,
261
organisations 978, 101, 117
outcomes 35, 37, 57, 68, 69, 74, 87, 111,
160, 162, 167, 170, 203, 257, 262,
263, 266, 272, 286, 293, 298, 304
Oxbridge 168
Oxford West and Abingdon 211
parliamentary procedures 296
parliamentary systems 102
participant observation 23, 27, 1978,
201, 206, 235, 237, 239
path dependency 39
patriarchy 18, 20, 110, 115, 118, 1201,
1223, 273, 275, 283
male domination 115
male power (entrenched) 112
pauperisation 294
peasant communities 75, 262
pension systems 299

personal economic expectations 238
phenomenology 132, 135
philosophy 23, 30, 32, 82, 132, 151,
1748, 272, 282, 314, 317
permanent task 186
philosophy of history 152
philosophy of science 41, 63
pluralism 66, 153, 162, 167, 190, 194,
277, 278, 293, 31415, 316
policy-making 14, 100, 102, 128, 160,
2456
path-dependent 101
policy networks 94, 99
polio 302
`political', the 109, 118, 130, 296
political
activism 46, 5662
business cycle 67
context 56, 58, 60, 61
correctness 204
`dispossessed' 203
efficacy 57
participation 23, 237, 316
parties see political parties
philosophy see political philosophy
science see political science
Political Man (Lipset 1959) 2501,
2567, 259, 335
political parties 45, 53, 73, 77, 83, 85,
93, 156, 205, 20815, 218, 219, 220,
233, 254, 256, 2578, 300, 301, 305
discipline 2423
emotional attachment 57
governing 238
manifestos 216
membership 200
officials 200
voting behaviour in House of
Commons 2445
political philosophy 67, 1315, 179,
180, 186, 188, 193
`death' 1726
political science xi, 116, 197, 251
approaches 1, 67
basic questions 3
boundaries of discipline 119, 122,
125, 128, 129
conclusion 31117
dialogue 4, 12, 14, 31617
diversity (broad church) 38, 311,
31315
internationalisation 2
364 Subject Index

political science (cont.)
mainstream critique of rational choice
theory 824
meta-theoretical challenges 2, 9
methods 2, 1516
scientific approach 1112
subject matter 811
theory and practice 1215
see also politics
Political Science Association
(USA 1903) 2
Political Studies Association
(UK 1950) 2
politics 215
avoidance 198, 215
connecting to the world of 1215
feminist perspective 11822
practice of 67
see also political science
positivism 1113, 1920, 20, 21, 226,
28, 303, 367, 38, 39, 41, 468, 51,
52, 64, 114, 11618, 1357, 15960,
161, 173, 182, 2002, 216, 2325,
23942, 245, 247, 248, 250, 265, 266,
295
conclusion 31117
criticism of interpretist position 27
criticisms 234
reformulation in light of interpretist
critiques 245
post-behaviouralism 245, 51, 54,
623
post-positivism 246
post-structuralism 278, 117, 132, 135,
1379, 13941, 150, 151
feminist 112, 115, 116
postmodernism 278, 29, 30, 116, 124,
132, 135, 1379, 13941, 150, 151,
152, 153, 155, 18992, 194, 2024,
236, 2901, 314
`structureagency' debate 2815
poverty 164, 168, 169
power 9, 10, 37, 91, 95, 97, 1001, 102,
104, 106, 110, 113, 119, 1234, 129,
130, 145, 146, 147, 157, 167, 170,
200, 203, 234, 278, 288
systemic 90
prediction 201
Preface to the Critique of Political
Economy (Marx 1859) 154
preferences 1345, 234, 306
presidential systems 102
privacy 120
private property 878, 154

private sector (economy) 120, 164
privatisation 945, 146, 209
probability 2256, 228
production 33, 157, 184
means/mode of 138, 154, 155
professions 118, 125
prospect theory 81
protectionism 2523
protest movements 167, 273
riots 45
psychology 65, 7982, 121, 228, 271
public
administration 90, 93
choice theory 667, 277
corporations 93
opinion 10
policy 257, 258, 299, 310
private partnerships 210
private spheres (of life) 5, 7, 110,
118, 11920, 121, 122, 128, 129,
157, 191: `personal is political' 9,
1011, 119
sector 120, 146, 158, 164
spending 218, 238, 245, 247
qualitative methods xi, 2, 15, 212, 27,
31, 48, 589, 64, 197215, 21617,
218, 2212, 223, 227, 229, 251, 263,
2645, 267, 294, 314
case study 20715
comparative strategies 2601
criticisms 2047, 21415
generalisability 207
interpretation 2067
objectivity and bias 2056
representativeness and reliability 205
quantitative methods xi, 2, 15, 212, 23,
27, 31, 48, 64, 116, 128, 173, 2001,
202, 204, 205, 207, 215, 21630, 251,
263, 2645, 267, 312, 314
comparative strategies 25560
quantitative and qualitative methods
(combined) 23148
false dichotomy? 2315
modes 23940
move towards methodological
pluralism 2356
triangulation 237, 2389
why and how 23740
questionnaires 198, 201, 220, 233, 234,
238, 317
Subject Index 365

race 112, 117, 124, 133, 155, 161, 167,
1689, 16970, 190
ethnic categories 256
racism 221, 282
randomness 225, 229
rational choice institutionalism 956,
97, 99, 100, 101, 103, 1045, 3001
compatibility with normative
approach 1067
rational choice theory 1, 45, 6, 9, 10,
12, 14, 15, 37, 567, 61, 6589, 901,
94, 95, 132, 137, 224, 234, 235, 263,
266, 277, 293, 294, 2989, 3001,
3023, 304, 306, 307, 3089, 31314,
317
cooptation of ideas 310
information 846
institutional 868
psychologists' critique 7982
Rawls 1868
sociological critique 749, 88
rational institutionalism 3001
rationalism 136, 263, 301, 3034
rationality 139, 1401, 185
Reaganomics 67
real world 5, 11, 18, 19, 28, 35, 62, 63,
149, 154, 156, 15960, 163, 177, 203,
236, 283, 297, 299, 305, 308
realism 1112, 20, 223, 25, 26, 302,
33, 34, 35, 367, 389, 41, 154,
15960, 233, 247, 292, 313, 314,
31617
critical 160
criticism of interpretist position 27
modern critical realism 31
reductionism 701, 88, 93, 94, 103, 185,
285, 2878
economic 149, 150
Referendum Party 212
reflexivity 24, 31, 105, 160, 170, 206,
232, 2801
regime theory 91
regional policy 36
regionalisation 33
regionalism 35
regression analysis 235
relations of production 275
relativism 30, 54, 1412, 160, 180, 185,
193, 204, 233, 241, 248, 265, 282, 296
epistemological 62
religion 23, 74, 177, 190, 244, 252, 284,
292
replicability/replication 56, 2278, 230,

248, 250, 251, 265, 266, 317
research
`good' and `bad' 2034, 2478
see also qualitative methods;
quantitative methods
research design 311, 312
researchers 17, 1819, 21, 36, 40, 56
crisis of legitimation 2034
crisis of representation 2023
resources 9, 38, 39, 2789
retroduction 62
revolution 133, 181, 264, 298, 305
rights 121, 183, 184
risk 68, 81, 141
Robertson, P. 290
Rotherham 203
Rowntree Inquiry into Income and
Wealth 168
rules 10, 75, 789, 86, 88, 92, 95, 96,
978, 100, 121, 146, 178, 275, 2789,
280, 297
informal conventions 98, 99, 103,
104
standard operating procedures 1034
ruling class 154, 155, 181, 288
rural areas 262
Russia 164, 255, 260
sampling 205, 207, 215, 21920, 233,
239, 242, 246, 258, 317
Scandinavia 252, 313
Scargill, A. 210
sceptics 103
science 11, 22, 24, 41, 132, 134, 159,
173, 176, 177, 178, 200, 201, 224,
2323, 250, 265, 312
scientific
approaches 1920
claims 67
realism 295
Scotland 122, 290
Seattle 167
Second International 155, 156
Second World War 296
aftermath 300
Selections from the Prison Notebooks
(Gramsci 1971) 1589, 171, 328
selectivity
strategic (Jessop) 162
structural (Poulantzas) 1612
self-esteem 141
366 Subject Index

self-interest 68, 77, 78, 7980, 83, 87,
90, 102, 116, 143, 188, 189, 191, 277,
299, 3001, 3023, 304, 305, 307
senior managers (local government) 125
sense experience 173, 174, 177
service sector 259
sex 112, 126
sex categories 124
sexgender system (Rubin) 110, 111
sexual conduct 138
sexuality 11112, 121, 190
signalling 85
significance tests 2256, 227, 228
Single European Act (1986) 279
slavery 296
small business 300
snowball sampling 205
social
aggregates 45
atoms 701, 78
capital 101, 114, 222
change 158
choice theory 66, 79, 86, 87
consciousness 154
construction 18, 20, 22, 267, 31, 34,
35, 39, 124, 127, 266, 314
constructionism 111, 112
constructivism 233
context 189
contract 175, 179
contract theory 88
democracy 40, 258, 305
forces 162
and human sciences 2, 5, 20, 223,
24, 41, 137, 193, 197, 201, 202,
2323, 236, 240, 247, 248, 249,
271, 274, 277, 278, 282, 295, 312,
314, 317
interaction 286, 287
justice 1858, 191
life 178, 179, 182
mobility 168
movements 84
obligations 189
reality 183, 274, 275, 283
revolution 75
status 288
stratification 262
structure 24, 301, 38, 745, 83, 88,
140, 158, 180, 184, 25960, 284:
see also structure and agency
theory 180
welfare 76
Social Democratic Moment (Berman

1998) 3057, 310, 320
Social Democratic Party (SDP, UK) 200,
211
Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy (Moore 1966) 251,
2612, 338
socialisation 18, 11617, 213, 308
socialism 155, 213
Socialist tradition 1468
society 163, 178
Society for the Protection of the Unborn
Child (SPUC) 244
socio-cultural interaction 288, 289
sociological institutionalism 95, 96,
107
sociology 30, 33, 65, 70, 86, 88, 116,
117, 129, 135, 153, 197, 198, 200,
215, 263, 291, 313, 314, 317
àrbitrary boundary' with political
science 119, 122
critique of rational choice
theory 749
sociology of knowledge 152
sociology of organisations 125
soft science 136
software 166, 217, 220, 222, 223, 226,
230, 234, 235
AMOS 224
LISREL 224
SPSS 228
STATA 223, 229
South Africa 95
South Korea 164
Soviet Union 158, 163
Spain 259
stability 293, 3013, 304, 306, 3089
Stalin, J. 158
state xi, 94, 111, 113, 120, 121, 130, 139,
141, 142, 143, 147, 154, 164, 175,
179, 280, 305
British 276
power 251
redistributive 187
`relative autonomy' 157, 161, 162
theory 1567, 2989, 300, 308:
Marxist 1612
State and Capitalist Society (Miliband
1969) 158
State and Revolution (Lenin 1917) 158,
171, 335
statistical techniques 15, 48, 52, 61, 204
Subject Index 367

statistics 23, 134, 201, 208, 217, 218,
219, 2212, 227, 229, 230, 232, 234,
235, 236, 238, 23940, 242, 2445,
256, 258, 260, 264, 265
inferential 2225
structural equation models (SEM) 224
strategic relational approach 2801, 291
structural
conditioning 286, 287
elaboration 286, 287
forces 53
functionalism 2978
reproduction 286
structuralism 91, 92, 107, 132, 154,
1556, 157, 159, 161, 162, 170, 266,
2746, 285, 2878, 2901
as a `movement' 2745
as tendency 276
structuration 88, 27880, 291
structure and agency 27191
structured inequality 157, 16771, 233
UK 1679
USA 16970
structures 93, 95, 1067, 160, 170, 273
corporatist 161
subjectivity 27, 13940, 201, 204, 232,
236
superstructure (Marxist) 154, 155
surveys 201, 220, 235, 237, 240, 258
Sweden 102, 1312, 260, 263, 265
Swedish Social Democrats (SAP) 305,
307
Switzerland 102
tautology 49, 50, 51, 83, 103, 104
tax and benefit systems 100
tax burden 102
taxation 88, 21112, 213, 218
Taxation and Democracy (Steinmo
1993) 263, 346
technical rationality 182
testing 478, 58, 62, 63, 102, 174, 217,
222, 223, 249, 2502, 263
see also falsifiability
Thailand 164, 255
Thatcher, M. 168, 209, 210, 252, 301
Thatcherism 67, 77, 132, 1428, 312
theology 46, 188
theory 22, 234, 25, 31, 478, 50, 52,
545, 56, 59, 60, 61, 623, 92, 134,
136, 160, 201, 226, 232, 249, 2502,
262, 265, 266, 272, 306, 307, 31112,
315
thick description (Geertz) 27, 1367

Third World/developing countries 130,
250
time 18, 87, 138
time and space 20, 24, 28, 101, 155
Times, The 165
Toryism 143, 144
trade 33, 160, 303
trade unions 125, 210, 211, 252, 299, 306
tradition 103, 136, 1401, 1438
Liberal 1445
Socialist 1468
Tory 143
Whig 1456
transformationalism 334
transitivity 68, 82
transparency 227, 230, 301
Treaty of Rome 304
triangulation 237, 2389
uncertainty 73, 81, 82, 84, 85, 102, 105
underclass 168
understanding 312, 31617
see also meaning
unemployment 149, 150, 229, 238, 256,
259, 274, 281
United Kingdom (UK) 3, 35, 5662, 87,
934, 99, 102, 111, 118, 125, 129,
136, 1428, 160, 163, 200, 219, 254,
255, 262, 263, 265, 289, 300, 313, 314
civil service (changing
structure) 2457
economic decline 276
economy 1578, 300, 301
Ministry of Defence 98
Parliamentary Select Committees 104
political participation 234
prime ministership 145, 233
private members' bills 2425
structured inequality 1679, 170
United States of America (US/USA) 65,
67, 83, 89, 93, 102, 111, 129, 164,
168, 217, 242, 254, 258, 260, 262,
263, 265, 290, 302, 313, 314
Congress 71, 867, 169, 233, 289
hegemony 33
international relations 315
Presidency 233, 271
ReaganBush Snr
administrations 277
state legislative committees 1257
structured inequality 16970
Supreme Court 170
368 Subject Index

universal claims 313
universal moral vision 184, 187, 188,
189, 193
universalism 127
universities xi, 147, 168, 281
urban areas 262
urbanisation 257
utilitarianism 67
utility maximisation 95, 96, 98, 99
value judgement 173, 174, 175, 185
value pluralism 18592
values 67, 10, 12, 1314, 18, 23, 37,
389, 45, 54, 91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 97,
99100, 102, 104, 105, 116, 122, 198,
200, 207, 216, 266, 288
variables 61, 2378, 244, 250, 251,
2534, 2557, 260, 261, 264, 267
independent and dependent 2223
Verstehen 149
veto points 102
Vienna Circle (1920s) 46
vignettes 27, 235, 239
Vocabulary of Politics (Weldon
1953) 175, 348
voluntary activity 102, 2224, 225
voting 45, 4950, 53, 589, 60, 65, 66,
74, 76, 79, 82, 83, 86, 116, 1323,
1789, 197, 198, 199, 205, 20715,
218, 219, 223, 229, 235, 255, 256
general election (1992) 59, 21014
general election (1997) 20815
general elections 61
sample (1997) 208
tactical 21213
see also electoral systems
war 264, 3012

wealth 167, 257, 259, 280
UK 1678
USA 169
and voluntary activity 2224, 225
wealth inequality 294
wealth redistribution 189
web sites 167
Weberianism 156, 162, 170
welfare 210, 21112, 259
welfare state 93, 119, 121, 124, 161, 168,
169, 252, 2645
public patriarchy 124
well-being 9, 67, 79, 132, 238
Whig tradition 1456, 147
Wirral West 209
`woman' 111, 112, 130
women 5, 18, 158 1689, 191, 275,
2834
`stereotypical and sexist
understandings' 14
see also feminism
women's culture 121
women's experience 111, 115, 121, 122,
126
women's initiatives 125
workers' councils 156
workforce 168
working class/proletariat 133, 1689,
181, 210, 213, 214, 254
World Bank 165
World Trade Organisation (WTO) 167
world-views 180, 181, 182, 191, 201,
297, 303
youth
209, 213, 214, 234, 238

Marsh e Furlong - A Skin Not A Sweater

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Contents

List of Figures, Tables and Boxes

Preface to the Second Edition

The discipline of political science: a celebration of diversity

The rise of the behavioural movement and its core

13 Structure and Agency

The importance of ontological and epistemological issues

A Skin, not a Sweater: Ontology

18 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

Ontology and epistemology

David Marsh and Paul Furlong

20 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

David Marsh and Paul Furlong

Why are such distinctions important?

22 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

Different approaches to ontology and epistemology

David Marsh and Paul Furlong

the goal of social science was to pursue empirical questions, while

24 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

David Marsh and Paul Furlong

called `post-positivists': acknowledge the interdependence of theory and

26 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

The interpretist position

David Marsh and Paul Furlong

of social `scientists' [sic] is to study those social constructions. Quantitative

28 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

David Marsh and Paul Furlong

However, Bevir and Rhodes do wish to make some, more limited,

30 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

David Marsh and Paul Furlong

more significantly, what actors say is so, is necessarily so. As an

32 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

Ontology and epistemology in political science:

David Marsh and Paul Furlong

34 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

David Marsh and Paul Furlong

However, Hay and Marsh go further to contend that these discursive

36 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

Case 2: Multilevel governance

David Marsh and Paul Furlong

understood as a nested game played out both in the domestic politics of

38 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

David Marsh and Paul Furlong

40 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

David Marsh and Paul Furlong

terms of argumentation, practical research method, explanatory logic and

Acker, J. 125, 318

Budge, I. and Laver, M. 45, 321

Baldwin, D. 45, 319

Carnap, R. 64, 322

Author Index 351

Habermas, J. 55, 1825, 193, 328

Jackson, J. 248, 332

352 Author Index

Lijphart, A. 258, 260, 335

Author Index 353

Quattrone, G.A. and Tversky, A. 82,

354 Author Index

Vanhanen, T. 251, 257, 260, 347

Zey, M. 72, 349

abortion 120, 242, 244, 288

black economy 259

banking 33, 158, 164, 238, 300