A DISSERTATION Presented to the Youlty of ?rincetan University in Candidscy for the Degree of Doctor af Philosophy ‘Recomended for Acceptance by the stays 1960Abstract: ‘This paper introduces the concopt of a non-cooperative gaxo and develops methods for the mathenatical analysis of such games. the ganee considered are nmporson gumes represented by means of pure stra= togies and payoff functions defined for the combinations of jure stratesiess ‘The distinction between cooperative and non-cooperative canes is unrelated to the uathematical doseriztion by means of pure strategies and peyeoff functions of a game. Rather, it depends on the possibility or impossibility of coalitions, commnication, ani cide-paymontss ‘The concepta of an equilitriim point, a solution, a strong solution, fa sub-solution, and valuas ere introduced by natheuntical definitions. and in later sections the interpretation af those concepts in non-cooper= ative gamee is discussed. The min mathematical result is the proof of the existence in any kane of at least one equilibrium poimte Other results concern the geo~ 4 mrtrioat structure of the set of equilthriun pointe of « guns with « son f lution, the geometry of sub-solutions, and the existence of « symetrical equilibrim point in a symmetrical game As on illustration of the possibilities for application «, treatasnt : of « sinple three-man poker model 1s includede S + 26 50 ~ Bocterel Dees otaTablo of Contents Sectton Le Introduction. s+ eee ee rere teens Qe Formal reftnitions and Torninology ++ eee eres Se Extatonce of Equilibrium Yointa +++ eee eres es de Symotricn of Cams se se ee tere ere tee Ge colutions sree eee rece cere eee eres Ge Ceonetrical Zorn of Solutions +++ seers eees Te Dominance and Contradiction vethoda + +ee sess Qe A Throceiian voker Gamo se eee eee cress Os Motivation and Interpretations + ++seseeree We Applications. +s eeeerer eer eer reese UL. Bibliography ee eee ee eee ere rete tees 12. Acknowlodgemnts se see ereesercrcreee SERBEEBRowone ffIntroduction Von Neusann and Norgenstern have develoced a very fruitful theory of twoeverson sero-eum games in their book Theory of Ganes and Zconomte Bokoviors This bock also conteins a thecry of nenerson canoe of a type which wo would call ccoverativos This theory is based on an analysis of the interrelaticnshins of the various coalitions which can be formed by the players of the gape. our theory, in contradistinction, is based on the absence of coalt~ tions in that it is ascuned that cach varticipant acts indenendent! without collaboration or communi ybion with any of the others. ‘The notion of an equilibrium point is the baste incrediont in our theory. This notion yielda a soneralization af the concost of the solu= tion of @ two-neraon sero-cum cane. It turns out that the set of equili- brium points of a two-person zero-sum cone is cinply the sat of all pairs of opposing “good strategie In the innediately following sections we shall define equilibrium points and prove that a finite non-cooperative came always has at least one equilibriua point. we shall also introduce the notions af solvability and strong solvability of a non-cooperative came and prove a theares on the geoustrical structure of the set of equilibrium points of a solvable game. Aa an axomple of the application of our theory we include a solution of a simplified three person poker came. ‘The motivation and interpretation of the aathenatical concepts em ployed in the theary are reserved for discussion in a special section of this papersPornal Definitions and Tersinology In this section we define the besic concerts of this paner and set uy standard toraizology and notation. inportazt definitions will ve preceoded by a cubetitle inéicating the concept defined. The ron-cocy= erative izea will be implicit, rather than explicit, below. Finite Gene: For us an menerson sane will be a set of n nlayers, or rositions, each with an associated finite set of gure stratogtoas and corresponding to each player, | , a payoff function, P, s which maps tho sot of alt netuples of sure strategies into the real musbera. when we uso the tora netuple wo shall clways nean a sot of x ‘tons, with oach itex associated with a different players ced Stratesy, Sj + A mixed strategy of playor {will be a collection of non-negative mmbers which have unit sum and are in one to one correspondence with his pure strategic : He write Si EH Tia wm Zews! ant Cie2o to represent such a nixed atrategy, where the “T[ia.’S are the pure strategies of player | + We regard the © Si’s_ ax points ine sim plex whose vortices are the © TTict’S «This simplex say be regarded es a convex subset of a real vector space, civing us « natural process of Linear combination for the nixed atrategies+ We shall use the suffixes i,j,k for players and XB, 0 Indicate various pure strategios af a players The symbole Sj ott and Yj , ato. will indicate mixed stratecioss [I jod —w#11 indi~ae cate the {th player's Odth pure strategy, oto. eayecry function, P, t Tho sayeéPo function, P; » used tx the doe emo chore, hes & unicue extonaton to the a-tuoles of tized stratesios which 4c Linear in the mixed stratey of each playor Lrelinoar]s this extonston we shall also denote by P- » writing PUS,Su--+ Sn)« tro 2 or AZ to denote an neturle of mixed stratecios te shall ang tg -<2= CS+,--+ $9) then iC) shalt sean P; (S, -Sn) Such an neturle, 2 , will also ve regarded a8 a point in a vector ennce, Si aeuld be chteired ty ultinlyine tocather the vector snaces the mixed atratosiess And the st of all such net containiny; oles forms, of courae, a convex polytope, the product of the eiaplicos rem ting ‘the alzed stratertess For convenience we introduce the substitution notation (45 ti) to etm tor Gy Se 0-2 Sitgti Sie, o--Sa) wnere = (51/505 stone (C452) 5 ty) wo indicate by (astz5 t5) a: Se) «the effect of successive substitun Equilibriua Points An netusle 2 fa an equilibrium point if and only if for every i @ Pa) = ma Pes +] : ‘Thus en oquilibrium point is an o-tuple 4 such that each player's nixed stratery maxinizes his pay-off if the atratestes of the others are held fixede Thus cach player's strategy is optimal against those of the others. Ye shall cocastonally abbreviate equiiiurium point by oqe ptea te y Siz Tce Ta ant Cig >O 6 EE -ae(S.5,- and Sz usos TTiot wo also cay that 4 wes it 6 ea mixed atratosy Sj uses a pure strate y Tig if + Sn) rea the Ltneartty of PGS, s--Sn) tn Sie @) met (plas sta] = marl pets a. me defize Pl) = Prl4a Tria) + Toa ve obtain the following trivial necessary and sufStetent condition for AL tore fan equilibriun point: (3) PG) = 2% Pa Ge) . (5,,Se,-c2 5m) and 7 Zia Tk shor aca) = Ecia Pakd) — 5 conmoquentty for (3) to hold we mut tee Cit =O stoner Pry Ct) < ean ro which 1s to aay that <2 doos not use TTio{ unless St ip an optinal pure stratery for player i. Sowe wite (4) Tg fe used in 2 then Prac 2) = man P. (4) as ancther necessary end sufficient condition for an equilibrium pointe Since a criterion Q) for an eqs pte can be expressed as the equating of two continuous functions on the space af n-tuples —< the fogs pte obviously fora a closed subset of thin spaces Actually, this number subset 1s formed fron a tee of pieces af albegraic varieties, cut out by other algebraic varieties.Uxistence of Zquilibriun 7oists 1 have previously published J Proc 36 (1950) 49-69 7 & proof of tho result Lolox basod on Lekutanis generslised fixed point theorene ‘The proof given here uses the Srouvar theorems the nethod is to set us a sequence cf continuous mmpp Lagss 2 0'(4s1) 5d 2/C4,1)5 2° whose fixed pointe have an equilibrium point ae limit point. A lintt mapping exists, but Le discont: aed not have any fixed pointes ‘THbO. 1s very finite come has an equilibrium pointe Proofs Using our standard notation, let 2 be an ntuple of mixed strategies, ant Pie (¢) the payoff to ployer / if be wes his pure strategy TTig and the others use their respective mixed atrate~ gies in -d . For each integor 2 ¥e define the following continuous functions of 2 + 9:4) = "2" Prald) , Pial-2) = bd) - 1) +, ana Piken= wax (0, Fiala] . Yow 5 ptr» = mex Bice =Yn>O 50 that in ; . ad a an rot ta contour Tef'ine Si(a,rn= EMax Ge Cer) end A2E4,r) = (Si, 8% ++ 84) + Shace all the operations pave preserved continuity, the napping <> - 2, Wiad to nctuedin £* , which contradicts our assumptions nonce —2* 4s indeed an equilibria pointsSymmetries of Gawa of An automorphism, or symmetry, of a caso ¥ill bo a permtati: ite pure strategies which satisfies cartain condi‘ ons, given belows If two strategies belong toa eincle player they oust co into tyo strutesios belonging to a single players Thun is QB ts tho persuta- tion of the pure atratogtes 1% induces a yermutatton PY of the players. Bach tuple of pure stratogios ts therafaro permuted into ancthor metuple of pure strategies wie nay call X the induced zarmitation of these mtuplese Let § denote an ntuple of pure strategies and PR) ‘the payoff to player | when the ntuple 5 is a ployede we require that if jai? om P(E)= RE) which completes the definition of a symmetrys The permtation Q hase unique linear extension to the mixed stratecies. if Se ZCa Woe we define 6% & Galttia) 9 ‘The extension of g ‘to the mixed strategies clearly generates an extension of X. to the mtuples of mixed stratectes. te shall also denote this ty 7. We define a symmetric n-tuple -< of « gam by 2X24 toe X's At being understood that "X neana a permtation derived from a symmetry gp.<8 THEO. 44 Any finite gana has a symmetric ecuilibriun vointe Prool: rst we note that Sie= Ema hag the property (Sie)% Sj shore ihe ae mtuple —Jo= C5ye,See, +++ Sno) to fied under any 2X. 4 henoo any game hac at longt ons symmetric m tuples uw 2=(s, -++Sn) and 5 (t,,--- tn) are oy aotrie then pe = (sath, Sexts) is 20 toc because -d%o gg &> s3=(s)4 where j= hence Supt = GUEGIA (sn) # ame (SEE) = ‘This shows that the set af symetric n-tuples is a convex subset cf the space of n-tuples since it is obviously closede How cbsorve that for each \ the mapping -<<->-<‘(¢s) used in the proof of existence theorem ws intrinsically defined. Therefore, we a= eC, n) ot a we wit havo -2,% = 2°(4%,r) . It —4, Se symm wis -O%2_¢, amtttentore di = -e’(4,r) =. Consequently this mpping impe the set of symmetric mtuples into itself. Since this ect is a cell there mst be s symetric fixed point <7. ‘And, as in the proof of the existence thooren we could obtain a linit point 4 véstch would have to be symstricesolutions te define here colutiens, strong solutions, ant sub-ecluttons. 4 nonecooperative gane does not always have a solution, but when it doos the sol: ton 1a uniques Strong aolutions are soluticns with uvecial sroperties. Sub-solutions alwa;s exist and have aany of the prove: of solutions, but lnck uniquenasse Si wi conote a set of nized ctrategics of player 7 wat of a set of tuples of mixed stratesiess colvabilitys A jam {n solvable if ite act, of , of equilibrium pointe sation ‘fies the condition qQ (ted wt 2ef> canjeL for nis. ‘Thin 1e called the interchangeability conditiene The solution of « solvable gone is ite sat » of equilitriua pointse Strong colvability: A game ia strongly solvable if it hes @ caution, of » such that forall i% ek ot ples) pla) > Cesmed oe 4s called a strong solutions Equilibrium Strategies: ina solvable came let S; be the set of all nixed strategios S;alo auch that for sxe A the mtuple (45 S:) 46 an equilibria eT point. £ Sj is the 7 th component of seme equilitr! mo call Sy the set of oquiliortim stratertes af player 1 + subsolutiodss im ae 1s a aubset of the sot af eguilibriun points of a jane and satisfies coodibion (1); and 1 of Se mstna] relative to this aro perty then we call af a gibesalutions Zor any suirsolution of, we daftne the Ten gector sets Si» os the sot of all Si/s auch that SL. containe (45 $i) tor coo a. Note that a sub-solution, when unique, is a solutions end its factor scts are the sete of equilibrium strategioss ‘THOO. 23 i gubeactution, of » As the aot of all netuples GuSa,- 775m) much that each sie Si where Sj te the 7 th factor set of as Geely, ia the product of its factor sstae proofs Consider such an ntuple (5:,--- Sn) i ee ee vaing the condition (1) mel tines we obtain successively Cegsssleky +++ 5 GE555555s5 --- 354) ef and the last Sa aimly (Gu Su,e++ Sn) eh « witch wo neoded to shame mide s1 the factor sote SiSa, 26° Sn of a absolution are closed and convex as subsets of the mixed strategy spaces. profs Tt euftines to show tan thinges (a) if Sz ant Si 6S:oue men SKE (Sasily « S; soya SAR as @ linit point of S: then site S . bet 6 XK « Then we have 543) tor any Cj, by using the criterion or (I) » Pg-3 for an one RGtsss) SRG sixy) me Pe 435i) APCs S pte Adding these inequalities, using the linearity of P(s, a eeSn) in Si, ana atvictng ty 2 m0 cot BGs SP) > Passes since SEM = (S145; + From this we inow that Gee ee ait such og ptae CCS Si) to accea to of the auguented sot clearly satisfies condition (1), and since a7 was to be maximal it forlows that SES; To attack (b) note that the tuple (23 Si #) avhere tel wD be a Lintt point of the set of aetuples of the fora (65 si) Beer) Se St, te Site ane point of Sz . aut this set is a set of eq. pts. and hence ny point in its closure te an eqs pt. is closed [see py47 + There- tore (ots Si#) te aneas pte and home = Sit# @ Si trom the sane argument aa for S;* + since the set of all eq. pti Valuess Let ws be the set of equilibrium points of a care, 4 define vite mathe] , vis ene]. Brg Nits VT wewite Vic viteviev wo vF os ‘the upper value to player i of the game; Vi the lower values and“2 Vii the value, if it axistae jalues will obviously have to exist if there is but one equilibriua pointe one can define associated ymluss Zor a sub-solution by restrioting — to the oqe ptse in tho aub-coluticn and then using the eane defining equations as above. 4 two-person zero~cum cane is always volvable in the sense defined above. The sete of oquilibrium atratectoes S, ami Si are simply ood!" strategies. Such a gane 1s not jonerally strongly solvable; strong solutions axiat only when there is a “saddle point” in pure atratecieCeomtrical Form of solutions th the two-person zero-sum onge it haa been shown that the sot of 0a" strategies of a player is a convax polykedral aubset of lite strategy spaces ‘le shall cbtain the sano result for a player's sot of equiltbriun strategies in eny solvable cance mimo. 5: tho asta Si, Se,--+ Sy of equilibrium strato- cles in a colvable gum aro polyhedral convex cubscta of tho respective nized strategy spacegs Proof: an ntuple J for every | @ Rl2z)= "2% Rate) which is condition (5) on page Y + An equivalent condition is for every i ond Q) Pie) -Pakt) =O - Let us now consider the form of the set D5 of equilibrium strate gies, Sy of player j + Let be any equilibriun point,then (e535) w122 be on equilibrium point if and only if 53 € Sj. frau Theos + Yo now apply conditions (2) to (433) » obtaining (3) 555 Spt tye SSY- PreltsSI)z0 + since Pie neLinsar and AE 4s constant these are a set of linear inequalities of the corn Fig(S;)2O — + Bach auoh inequality is either satisfied for all Sj or for those lying on and to one side of some hyperplane passing through the stratezy sinplexe Therefore, theSimple Smnplea se uro intended to llustrate the concents defined £ and display special ghenanena which cccur in there ynmese tho romn letter str gow and the payeof: to 3 5 k solu Bar Ja+i9 eel oS oak solution: (Frat Z b axel ) = be 5 Ve 5 Vase 3 bp met lad i zelution: (bs 6) -0 af 10 esp Wba-l0 Visas cl <1b6 <1 BS 14d 2 unsolyables equilibriua (ax) (6A) 10 @ B -10 amd ut Bie gh + ema eateunse 10 D% -10 tecies in the last case have maxiemin and bea 1 aini-nax properties. Exe 4 laxil Strong Colution: all rairs of aixed strate- a tovete) v, 1v x o vtevats) 5 Wave = obo . : ] me 5 1A 2 unsolmbley oge pts (2™) > (26) amt 1UB 4 ee ee ac + are) © However, “4 8% a eqpirical testé show a tendency toward (aX). 2 mes pag age pter (pd amt (68) » with oa ° Oba 0 b an example of instability. oa (bB)4 completo set [which is finite 7 of conditions will all be sat fhed simultaneously on som convex polyhedral subset of player j% stre egy cisplexe Intersection of belr-cpacese 7 As a corollary we may conclude that Sk Sa the convex closure of a finite set af mixed strategics / vertices 7»Dominance and Contradiation Yethods ve eny tet S;° dantnton Si 2 P,(455;)>R(A3 Si) tor every t+ This anouxte to saying that Sf cives player 7 a higher pay off than Si 50 matter what the atrateics of the other players ares To see whether a stratecy ‘5! dominates Si it suffices to cousi= der only pure stratecios for the other players because of the nelinear sty or Py x6 4a obvious from the definitions that no equilibriua point can involv 9 dontrated stratesy Si + The domination of one mixed strategy by ancthor will always oxtail other dentnations. For suppose Si donimtes Si and +; usos ll of the pure strategie which have a highr coafvictent in S; than in Sf Thon or a aml enough — P>o tis tit (sisi) te a mized stratecys ani ti’ daxinates ti by Linearity one can prove a few properties of the sst of undoninated stratactese Xt ie slaply comected end in formed by the union of acne collection of faces of the strategy sinplexe The information obtained by discovering doninances for one player my be of relevance to the others, insofar as the elimination of classes of nixed atratecion as possible components of an equilibrium point ta cooserned. vor the 7's whose componente are sll undominated are ell that neod be considered and this eliminating sano of the stratectes of one player my raln possible the alimination of a now class of stratecies for another players1 dnother rocodure which may be used in locating equilibriu points is the contradictlonstype enalysiee Here oho cecumes that on oguilibrtua having camponent atratosios lying within certain regions of spaces and procecds to deduce furtier condi‘stons which aust ed 12 tho hypathacta ts tras. vite sart of ressoning aay bo cesricd through several stages to eventually obtain a contradiction ine dloating that there is no equilibrium poixt satiafying the initial hyo~ ‘thesis.(A Threowion Poker Gano exarple of the application af o: 0 a nore or toss roalictic case wa include the sinplivied poker gase jiven below. The rules aro as Sollowa: {1) The deck ts larze, wi acual yy igh and low cards, and a hand consiats af one carde (2) two chive are used to ante, open, oF calle (3) The >layors play in rotation and the gano ends after oll have passod or after ane player haa opaned and the others have had @ chance to calle (4) If no one tets the antes are retrioveds (5) Otharwive the pot is divided equally among the highest iands which have vate ind ib nore oxtisfactory to treat the game in terms of quantie ties we cali "behavior parsnoters" than in the normal farm of "Theory of Germs and Zconcaic Jehavior.” In the normal form representation two nixed strategies of a player may be equivalent in the sense that each mekes the individual choose each availble course of action in each pare tlowlar attuntion requiring action on his yart with the same frequency. ‘That 1e, they represent the seme behavior pattern on the part of the in dtviduale Bekavior paranstera give the probsbilitios of taking each af the various possible actions in each of the various possible situations which may arises Thus they describe behavior patterns. In torms of behavior paransters the strategies of tha players may be represented as follows, assuiing that since there 1s ro point in passing with a high cord et one's last opportunity to bet that this will not beole done. Tho creck letters are the probabilities of the various acts. First Loves | CX. open on high X< Call 352 on low 3| open on Low | low { Call I on Jow open on Righ pen on low Zand = on low | | | | | Player III never ceta a second qemis | om | Coll 12 on low We locate all possible equilibrium points ty first chowing that most of the creck parementers must venishe Dy dominance mainly with a little contradiotion-type analyeis 6 ts eliminated and with it go YS, and © ty dontnances Than contradictions eliminate #08, (,A,k, ent V in that order. This leaves us with X55 € am ys Contradiction analysia shows that nore of these can be sero or one and thus we obtein a system of simltansous algebraic equationts The equations happen to have but one solution with the variables in the range (0,1) + Te get a-.Bai 7 = as As se att 52 Sas. + and = bat €= HASt . These yield x=.308, 42.635, 82-826 » and €= -oHp,<1 Sinee there 1 only cho equilibrium point the came has valuos; these are Vz les EB) 9 vn a OIG = = 74. ( 1% Vs = -Ut3 2 2( ora) * LBs, and ‘Investigation af the coalition powers yields the following "ood strategies” and values for tho vartcus conlitionn. ?arananters not mon= tionec are zerce Loa verns mr ! k= 3p Lae 5 0f96% $= €=] waive to TT: «= -03te= Yr TL ond TL versus oe $=1,¢=0 x= % y= Ws miue to L: —1667 =-“% S=% ,€= we oI: -IG= ~ 74 The coalition aenbera have the power te agreo upan a pattern of play before the gam ia played. This advantage becanes significant only tn the case of coalition [JI] wtere JIL any open atter tro passes when [had planned to pass on both hizh end low but will not open ifTL tec plamod to bet if ba got highs the values given are, of course, iat che single player esuures biwel’ with his “seo” atrese ss a wwro detailed croatwnt of this ceca 2s veing orepared for pub= ett welutive clues a) unto LMoation oleguiures Jais will cous. and 3et—Motivation and Interpretation ‘In this section ve shall try to oxplain the significance of the concepts introdused in this paper. That is, we shall try to show how equilibrium points and solutions can be connected with observable phenonenss The basic requirements for a non-cooperative game is that there should be no pre-play communication among the players / unless it has po bearing on the gane7. Thus, by implication, there are no coalitions ‘end no aide=paynents. Decause there is no extraegane utility /pay-off_7 transfer, the pay-offs of different players are effectively incomparable; Af we transform the pay-off functions linearlys P:< @:P;+ b: * where 2; >0 the gane will be essentially the sames Tote that equilibrium points are preserved under such transfarmationss Me shall now take up the "mass-action” interpretation of equilibriun points. In this interpretation solutions have no grent significance. It 4s unnecessary to assume that the participants have full knowledge of the total structure of the game, or the ebility and inclination to go through any complex reasoning processes. But the participants are supposed to ac= cumulate enpirioal information on the relative advantages of the various pure stratezios at their disposals To be more detailed, we assume that there is » population [in the sense of statistion7 of participants for each position of the game Let us also assume that the “average playing" of the gane involves n partic!= pants selected at raniom from the n populations, and that there is a sta~ die average frequency with which ech pure strategy is euployed by the "average maubor" of the appropriate population. Since there is to be no collaboration between individuals playing in2 aigrerent positions of the game, the probability that « particular D- tuple of pure stratecios will be exployed ine playing of the game should be ths product af the probabilities indicating ‘the chance of each of the n pure strategies to be exployed in a random pleyings let the probability that TTiq will be euployed in a random playing of the game be Cit, and let Siz Bia Wie . 42(5, 5x, +++ Sm) «Then the expected pay-off to an indim {dual playing in the jth position of the game and employing the pure strategy Win ta (43 Mix) = PraCe) . Tow let us consider what effects the experience of the participants will produce. To assune, ax we did, that they accumlated expirical evidence on the pure strategies at their disposal is to assume that those playing in position f leam the mmbers Pw &) : Sut if they lnow these they will employ only optinal pure stratecies, ieee, those pure strategies TT iol such that Pia)= ™S* Proce) . consequently since Sj expresses their behavior © S; attaches posi= ‘tive coefficients only to optimal yure stratecias, so that Tate'wed ta 5; => Pa d)= ™EXPC2) - But this te simply a condition for _@ to be an equilibrium pointe Levalees7 ‘Thus the sssumptions we made in this "mass-action” interpretion lead to the conclusion that the mixed strategies representing the average behavior in each of the populations farm an equilibrium points ‘The populations need not be larce if the asmmptions stilt raohold. ‘There are situations in econonics or international politics in which, effectively, @ group of interests are involved in a noncooperative cane without being amare of ity the non-emarensss helping to make the situation truly non-ocperatives Actually, of course, we can only expect some sort of approxinate eugilitrtim, since tho information, Sts utilisation, and the atability of the average frequensies will bo inparfects We now sketch another interpretation, one in which solutions play a major role, and which is applicable to « came played but onces We proceed by Anvestigating the questions what would be a “rational prediction of the bebavior to be expected af rational playing the cane in question? By using the principles that a rational prediction should be unique, that the players should be able to deduce ani make use of it, ant that auch knowledge on the part of each player of what to expect the others to do should not lead hin to act out af conformity with the prom Glotion, one 12 led to the concept of a solution defined befcres rt Si,Sa,--+ Sn were the sats of equilibriim stratesies of a solvable cane, the "rational" predibtion should bes “rhe averege behavior of rational men playing in position { would define a mized strategy S; in S; if an experinmt were carried oute" In this interpretation we need to ussune the players know the full atructure of the gane in order to be sble to deduce the prediction for thoselvess Tt is quite strongly a rationlistic and idealising inter pretatione In an unsolvable game it sometines happens that good beuristio reascas can be found for narrowing dom the set of equilibrium points to _those in a aingle aub-solution, which then plays the role of « solutionstee In goneral a sub-solution may be looked at as a set of mutually forming a coherent wholes The sub- compatible equilibrium points, he vision offset of equilibrium solutions appear to give « natural subd! points of s-gamesApplications the study of neperscn ganos for which the accepted ethics of fair play Suply non-cooperative playing is, of courses an obvious direction this theory. And poker is the most obvious targets ‘The analysis of a more Tr alistic poker game than our very simple model should be quite an interesting affaire ‘Toe complexity of tho nathenstical work neoded for a complete in- vestigation increeses rather rapidly, however, with incrensing conple=~ ty af the canes 20 that it seams that analysis of a cane such nore oor plex than the example given here would only be feasible using approxi mate computational methodse ‘A less obvious type af application is to the study af cooperative gamese By © cooperative game wo pean @ situation involving a set af players, pure strateciet, snd payoffs as usual; but with the sssumption that the players can and will collabarate as they do in the von Heumann and Morgenstern theorye This means the players my comunioate ent fora coalitions which will be enforoed by an dapires Tt is umesssartly restrictive, however, to assum any transferability, or even couparabiie ity of the payoffs Zwhich should be in utility unite 7 to different playerse Any desired transferability can be pot into the game Steele in- atead of essuning it posaible in the extraecame collaborations the writer has developed a “dynamical” approach to the stuly of oom operative gases based wpon reduction to non-cooperative farms One pro costs by constructing a model of the preplay negotiation so that the atape of negotiation beets maves in a larger non-cooperative game / which will have on infinity of pure stratestos 7 describing the total situations This larger game is then treated in terns of the theory of this paper0 [extended to infinite ganeq/ and if values are obtained they are taken as the values of the cooperative canes ‘Thus the problen anslysing a cooperative gane becomes the problem of obtaining a suitable, and con~ vinoing, non-cooperative model for the negotiations ‘the writer has, by uch a treatuont, obtained values for all finite to person cooperative ganes, and soze special mperson ganeseBibliography (1) von eumann, Yorgenstern, “Theory of Genes and Economic Behavior", Princeton University Prees, 144. (2) Je Pe Hash, dre, "Equilibrium Points in Ye?erson Games", 2roce Te ‘Ae Se 56 (1950) 40-626 AsknowLedgenante Bras Tucker, Gale, and Zuhn gave valuable critician ani ougzeations for improving the exposition of the neterial in this papers David Gale suggested the investigation of symetric gamese The solution of the Poker model was a joint project undertaken by Lloyd S. Shapley and the authors Pinally, the author was sustained financially by the Atomic Roergy Comis- sion in the period 1949-80 during which this work was donee