MMDA vs Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.

,
Facts:
MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air is a
non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners of Bel-Air Villagee in Makati City.
Bel-Air is the registered owner of the Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
December 30, 1995 Bel-Air received a notice from MMDA requesting Bel-Air to open Neptune St. to
public vehicular traffic. On the same day, MMDA apprised that the perimeter wall separating the
subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
January 2, 1996, MMDA instituted a case for injunction against Bel-Air; and prayed for a TRO and
preliminary injunction enjoining Neptune St. and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. Court
issued a TRO the next day.
After due hearing, RTC denied the issuance of a preliminary injunction. MMDA question the denial and
appealed to the CA. CA conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune St. then issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the MMDA proposed action.
On January 27, 1997, appellate court rendered a decision finding MMDA no authority to order the
opening of Neptune St. It held that the authority is in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.
The motion for reconsideration is denied hence this recourse.
Issues: (1) MMDA has the authority to mandate the opening of Neptune St. to public traffic pursuant to
its regulatory and police powers? (2) Is passage of an ordinance a condition precedent before the MMDA
may order the opening of subdividion roads to public traffic? (3) Is Bel-Air estopped from denying the
authority of MMDA? (4)Was Bel-Air denied of due process despite the several meetings held between
MMDA and Bel-Air? (5) Has Bel-Air come to court with unclean hands?
MMDA: it has the authority to open Neptune St. because it is an agent of the Government endowed with
police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. From the premise of police powers, it
follow then that it need not for an ordinance to be enacted first.
**Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. Police power is lodged primarily in the National
Legislature, which the latter can delegate to the President and administrative boards, LGU or other
lawmaking bodies.
**LGU is a political subdivision for local affairs. Which has a legislative body empowered to enact
ordinances, approved resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
province/city/municipality.
**Metro Manila is declared as a special development and administrative region in 1995. And the
administration of metro-wide basic services is under the MMDA.Which includes, transport and traffice
management. It should be noted that MMDA are limited to the acts: formulation, coordination,
regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies and installation of
a system and administration. MMDA was not granted with legislative power.
Ruling:
(1) The basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December 22,
1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any
ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal
basis for the proposed opening of Neptune St.
(2) The MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner of
the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows
that the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.
(3) Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily responsible for the
governance of their respective political subdivisions. The MMA's jurisdiction was limited to addressing

common problems involving basic services that transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative
power.
Petition Denied.
GANZON v CA

Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of
misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension
orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was
facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the
suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the
President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987
Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present
Constitution was mere supervisory power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego, can suspend
and or remove local officials.
HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere
supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control,
which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally,
supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over
local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our
government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different
things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. In administration law supervision means
overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If
the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter. But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the
power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of
investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is
exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.

Basco vs PAGCOR GR 91649 (May 14, 1991)

FACTS:
Petitioners seek to annul the PAGCOR charter PD 1869 for being allegedly contrary to morals, public
policy and order, monopolistic & tends toward crony economy, waiving the Manila City governments
right to impose taxes & license fees, and violating the equal protection clause, local autonomy and
other state policies in the Constitution.
ISSUES:
Whether PD 1869 is valid.
HELD:
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must
be shown that there is a clear & unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The grounds for nullity must be
clear and beyond reasonable doubt. The question of wether PD 1869 is a wise legislation is up for
Congress to determine.
The power of LGUs to regulate gambling through the grant of franchises, licenses or permits was
withdrawn by PD 771, and is now vested exclusively on the National Government.
Necessarily, the power to demand/collect license fees is no longer vested in the City of Manila.
LGUs have no power to tax Government instrumentalities. PAGCOR, being a GOCC, is therefore
exempt from local taxes. The National Government is supreme over local governments. As
such, mere creatures of the State cannot defeat national policies using the power to tax as a tool for
regulation. The power to tax cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality of the very
entity which has the inherent power to wield it. The power of LGUs to impose taxes & fees is
always subject to limitation provided by Congress.
The principle of local autonomy does not make LGUs sovereign within a state, it simply
means decentralization.
A law doesnt have to operate in equal force on all persons/things. The equal protection clause doesnt
preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as
the classification is not unreasonable/arbitrary. The mere fact that some gambling activities are
legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws
unconstitutional.
ISMAEL MATHAY JR v CA
117 SCAD 352 Law on Public Officers Appointment in the Local Government Appointing Power
Cannot be Usurped by CSC
In November 1972, Presidential Decree No. 51 was signed into law. PD 51 created a Civil Service Unit
(CSU) office in cities. Pursuant to said law, then Quezon City mayor Brigido Simon appointed officers in
the QC-CSU. Meanwhile, an ordinance in QC was passed providing, among others, that the personnel of
the CSU shall be automatically absorbed into the QC Department of Public Order and Safety (QC-DPOS).
During the term of the next mayor, Ismael Mathay, Jr., it was determined that PD 51 never became a
law because it was never published. Mathay then did not renew the contracts of the QC-CSU personnel,
at the same time, they were not reappointed to the QC-DPOS. Mathay was then sued by the QC-CSU

personnel before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Eventually, the CSC Commissioner ruled that
based on the QC ordinance, Mathay should reinstate the CSU-personnel to QC-DPOS.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the CSC Commissioner is correct.
HELD: No. The ordinance is invalid for when it provided for automatic absorption of the QC-CSU
personnel to the QC-DPOS, it divested the mayor the power to choose as to who should fill said office.
Just like in the national government, the local sanggunian can only create an office, it cannot choose the
personnel who should fill such office that is a power vested in the local chief executive (mayor). This is
also clearly provided for in the Local Government Code. The power to appoint is vested in the local chief
executive. The

power

of

the

city

council

or sanggunian,

on

the

other

hand,

is

limited

to creating,consolidating and reorganizing city officers and positions supported by local funds. The city
council has no power to appoint. Had Congress intended to grant the power to appoint to both the city
council and the local chief executive, it would have said so in no uncertain terms.
On the other hand, the CSC Commissioner cannot order the mayor to reinstate the QC-CSU personnel to
the QC-DPOS. Such would be an encroachment of the mayors right to choose as to who should be
appointed. Further, the CSU never came into existence for it has no legal basis to speak of. It created no
right hence the QC-CSU cannot invoke any. It is axiomatic that the right to hold public office is not a
natural right. The right exists only by virtue of a law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it.