ZIMBABWEAN NATIONALISM AND THE RISE OF

ROBERT MUGABE

Mark Francis Riley

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California

THESIS
Zimbabwean Nationalism and the
Rise o: E Robert Mug< abe

by

Mark Francis Riley

June 19 8 2
The sis Advisor:

M.

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Clou gh

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7.

Master's Thesis
June 1982

Zimbabwean Nationalism and the Rise of

Robert Mugabe
AUTHOR,

Mark Francis Riley

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Southern Rhodesia, Rhodesia, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Zimbabwe, Robert

Mugabe, Abel Muzorewa, Joshua Nkomo, Zimbabwe African National
Union (ZANU)
Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU)
United
African Nation Council (UANC)
Black Nationalism, Zimbabwean
Nationalism
,

20.

ABSTRACT

(Continue on tovoroo udo

H noeoooorr on*

i+\;iir *y olock mmtmor)

This thesis discusses the black nationalist movement in

Zimbabwe.
The first part is a history of the Zimbabwean nationalist movement, including the emergence and evolution of the nationalist organizations and leaders, the guerrilla war, and the diplomatic
negotiations that occurred up to the Lancaster House Settlement of
The second portion explains why and how Robert Mugabe and
19 79.
the Zimbabwe African National Union won the 19 80 elections.
The
I

DO

jam

73

1473

EDITION OF
MOV
S/M
102-014- 660
I

IS

OBSOLETE

UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLAMIFlCATlON OF THIS PAOE (Whon Doio

tntotod)

UNCLASSIFIED
author compares Mugabe with his two principle opponents, Joshua
Nkomo and Bishoo Abel Muzorewa.
T^e "or SC n a harkrr^nTi^e
t-Oj-xticai careers, leaaersnip abilities, and bases of support of
the three candidates are examined and analyzed.
The author concludes that Mugabe's personal reputation arid credibility enabled
him to win the loyalty of the majority of the guerrillas who in
turn mobilized a large popular base of support for him.
i

DD

1^3

U73

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Approved for public release: distribution unlimited

Zimbabwean Nationalism and the Rise of Robert Mugabe
by

Mark ?rancis Rilsy

Captain, Suited Statss Army

B.A., University of California,

Santa Barbara, 1975

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 1982

ABSTRACT
black nationalist movement in

This thesis discusses the

Zimbabwe.

The

first part is

history of

the Zimbabwean

including the emergence and evolution

nationalist movement,
the guerrilla
of xhe nationalist organizations and leaders,
war,

and the diplomatic negotiations that occurred up to the

House Settlement

Lancaster

explains why and how Robert

of

The second

1979.

Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African

The author compares

National Union won the 1983 elections.

Mugabe with his

two principle opponents,

Bishop Abel Muzorewa.

careers,

three

The

Joshua

Nkomo and

personal backgrounds,

political

leadership abilities,

candidates are

enabled him to win the loyalty

who

in turn

support for him.

and bases of support of the

examined and

concludes that Mugabe^s personal

rillas

portion

mobililzed

analyzed.

The

author

reputation and credibility

of the
a

majority of the guer-

large popular

base

of

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

INTRODUCTION

II.

HISTORICAL SETTING

10

III.

THE RISE OF ZIMBABWEAN NATIONALISM

12

A.

THE EARLY NATIONALIST MOVEMENT:

B.

THE ODI QUESTION:

C.

POST-ODI NEGOTIATIONS AND THE GUERRILLA WAR:

1966 -

IV.

1964

1965

26
A

SETTLEMENT

53

RHODESIAN FRONT GOVERNMENT-NATIONALIS

NEGOTIATIONS AND NATIONALIST SPLITS:

1972 -

1978
B.

53

THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THE FINAL AGREEMENT:

1978 -

V.

1980

87

THE NATIONALIST CANDIDATES IN 1980

A.

3.

12

21

1972

FROM CONFLICT TO
A.

1964

1934

98

JOSHUA NKOMO

98

1.

Biographical Background

98

2.

Early Political Career

99

3.

Dedicated Nationalist or Political

Opportunist?

101

4.

Guerrilla Base

111

5.

Ethnic Base

114

6.

External Supporters

117

BISHOP ABEL MUZ3REWA

122

1.

Biographical Background

2.

Early Political Career

124

3.

Smith-Muzorewa Negotiations

126

4.

The Interim Government and the 1979

Elections
5.

Prime Minister Muzorewa and the 1980

6.

Election Campaign
External Supporters

122

130

133
135

7.

C.

Guerrilla iud Ethnic:

Sas-w

.... ...

ROBERT MUGABE

.33

141

1.

Biographical Background

2.

The Ascetic Militant

3.

Early Political Career

4.

Guerrilla Base

146

5.

External Supporters

151

141

.....

142

145

Political Mobilization of the Electorate

LIST OF REFERENCES

154

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

168

6.

159

I.

As

mid-February

of

NTRODOCriDN

980,

most

those

of

who

were

following the birth of the nation of Zimbabwe were very

hesitant to attempt to predict the outcome of the nation's
Although

would predict

first national

elections.

which, if any,

party was going to win the most votes,

no one

most

observers agreed that the election would be very close.

It

was expected to win a

was thought that since no single party

clear-cut majority in the slection. Lord Soames, the British

governor

would

in Salisbury,

flexibility in selecting

(ZAPO)

of forty-one African seats

Onion

political

ZANO

new

majority of Africans-

were

ZAPO

and

was no guarantee,

the

that

formed,

The problem with

in parliaaent.

that

was

however,

separately and there

not

Peoples

together would win at least the requisite majority

parties,
this,

African National

nationalist

based

of

government.

Zimbabwe African

two externally

the

premier to form

and and the

(ZANO)

amount

certain

felt that the Ziababwe

Most observers
Onion

have

if

coalition was

government wculd

Joshua Nkomo (ZAPO)

running

represent

was not committed

coalition government with his rival,

Robert
(ZANO).
Mugabe
Muzorewa's Onited African
Bishop
Abel
National Council (OANC) needed only thirty-one seats between

to forming

his own

and another African party

alliance
With

Hhodesian

with the

Mugabe's

decision,

assasination attempts upon

public rallies,

most

the loyal opposition

Soames

and

the

his

to form a

government in

twenty white

Front's
after

three

ansuccessful

life,

not to

appear at any

analysts believed that ZANO

in any government.

British

seats.

Government

had

Ref .

would be

1]

expressed

As Lord

their

and fear

dislike

occasions,

Nkomo to form

that Shames

moderate Muzorawa

government.

commissioned by
to run
Observer,

number

of

would be

able to

the less

radical

marketing research

company"

The
Natio nal
pro-Muzorewa newspaper,
predicted that the
public opinion poll,

number of seats.

win the largest

OANC would

or

on

[Ref. 2]

unnamed "international

An

Mugabe

Marxist

was probable

it

either the

select

the

of

[Ref.

In

commenting on Nkomo's apparent move

moderation vis a vis Mugabe's Marxist radicalism
The Times,

Salisbury,

towards

wrote that:
Nkomo. ..has. made a big
comeback. .- Mr.
Mr.
already soliciting an alliance with the
Mugabe,
white group in parliament, appears to foresee that
emerge as the largest
Darty.-.The
he
may not
he personally
believes
Marxist: society
in which
has no electoral appeal [Ref. 4].
.

Martyn Gregory conducted

with an unnamed

an interview on 10

employee of the Rholesian

April 1980

Ministry of Home

Affairs who acknowledged that that agency, which managed the

election,

predicted after

privately

finished

Mugabe 26, and Nkomo 20

Thus, the common belief held,
up -o the day the

that Muzorewa would win

[Ref.

polling had

5 ]

3'4

seats,

votes were tallied, was that ZANU would probably not win the

election and that even if it did,

power by

it

would be excluded from

RF-UANC-ZAPU coalition.

Thus, it came as quite

the election

emerged as
eighty black

surprise to most observers when

officials announced that

landslide victors,
seats

(seventy-one

victory was
forty

years

Zimbabwean

to form
the final

earlier

percent)

with

of

the

out of

fifty- seven

or

The next day Soames

Mugabe's overwhelming

government.
act

ZANU had

winning fifty-seven

percent of all the seats in parliament.

asked Mugabe

Mugabe and

play
rise

that had
of

the

begun over

organized

nationalist movement and had climaxed with an

eight-year guerrilla struggle of international importance.

This study has two primary purposes.

is

to present

history of

The first, purpose

nationalist movement

the

in

to include the emergence of nationalist organiza-

Zimbabwe,

tions and leaders,

the guerrilla war,

the diplomatic

occurred during the period.

negotiations that

this paper

purpose of

and

to determine

is

The second
why Robert

how and

prime minister of an indepen-

Mugabe became the first black

dent Zimbabwe.

three basic sections.

This thesis is divided into

which begins after

first section,

brief historical intro-

duction to Rhodesia, covers the years

with

deals

creation

the

evolution

organizations,

nationalist

Zimbabwean

from 193U to 1972.

early

and

The

It

the

of

early

the

Anglo-Rhodesian negotiations, and the beginning of the guerthis

period has
For organizational purposes,
rilla war.
section,

second

which includes historical phases IV and V,

covers

the period from

historical

three

This section deals with the

1972 to 198 0.

struggles within and between

the

phases.

The

divided into

been

the nationalist organizations,

expansion and intensification of the guerrilla war,

the series

nated

of diplomatic

in a

final

December 1979.

negotiations that

settlement of

The thiri

sectioQ

Robert Mugabe and ZANO were

February 1980 elections.

is that

the

and

finally culmi-

Rhodesian crisis

in

of this thesis shows why

the overwhelming victors in the

The position taken in this section

the outcome of the

election was determined

by the

relative credibility of the three primary nationalist candidates with the electorate.

comparison of

the candidates

Thus, this section focuses on

1

personal

backgrounds,

poli-

tical careers, leadership qualities, and sources of support.

HISTORICAL SETTING

II-

From 1890

Africa Company under

the British South

ruled by

1923

the territory became a colony under direct British

rule.

charter

When the royal charter expired

from the British government.

in

settled and

Rhodesia was

Southern

1923,

to

the British

In 1952,

Rhodesia and

government joined

Southern

Nyasaland to

form the

Northern Rhodesia with

The purpose of this federation

Central African Federation.
use
Southern
Rhodesia's
economic--to
was
primarily

managerial and financial resources

and coal and Nyasaland*s

labor force to develop Northern Rhodesia

mineral wealth in

order to support both Northern and Southern Rhodesia.

The organized black nationalist
the anti-colonial

occurred at

wars which

century,

began

National

Congress

in

with the

934

(ANC)

movement,

the turn

founding of

The history

exclusive of
of the

the African

Zimbabwean

of the

nationalist movement and of Rhodesia-Zimbabwe between 1934

and 1980 can be divided into five phases.
The first phase,
lasting from 1934 to 1964,

was characterized by the rise and

evolution of a number of black nationalist organizations and

the
increasing repression
thesa
of
organizations by the

Rhodesian government.
lasted from 1964

foci of the second period,

The

through 1965,

were the

which

struggles between

the British and Rhodesian governments over what would be the

political character

of Rhodesia and

the Unilateral Declaration

historical phase,

of Independence

beginning

intense

Rhodesian

(DDI)

in early 1966 and

the report of the Pearce Commission in

question of

the whole

1972,

The third

ending with

was typified by

negotiations between the British and

governments over
the
issues of
Rhodesian

diplomatic

10

rule

majority

concurrently,

and

independence

and

formation of

black nationalist guerrilla

the

organizations and

the beginning and intensification of guerrilla warfare.

The

determining factors in the fourth period, 1973 through 1978,

were the inter and intra party rivalries and splits in the
movement

nationalist

prospect

the

and

of

"internal

an

settlement" between the Smi th-Rhodasian Front government and

movement.
Phase five,
which
a faction of the nationalist

assumption

1978
until
the
from
lasted
prime-ministership by Robert Mugabe
by

internal

interim

the

surrounding

the

in

1980,

was dominated

settlement,

the

controversies

government,

Muzorewa

the

of

the

and

final

settlement formulated at the Lancaster House Conference.

during

each

one

occurred

at

three

Action

generally

consisted of

actions by
The

diplomatic

scene,

actors

primary

government,

the
and

include
Rhodasian
b

nationalist

organizations.

This level

United Nations,

the Frontline States,

At

consisted of

war and

These

the guerrilla

three levels

parallel

to

of action

each other,

actions on

between
the

leaders

but

interrelated.

11

the

and
of the

and South Africa in

the third level,

in

the

British

also included the roles

influencing the situation.

level

nationalist

the black

negotiations
government,

lack

phases

first

The

consisted of

to

the

historical

levals.

and within

second level

movement.

these

of

the action

the counterinsurgency.

Rhodesia frequently

ran

than

not

were

more often

THE RISE DP ZIMBABWEAN. NATIONALISM

III.

A.

THE EARLT NATIONALIST MOVEMENT: 1934

1964

The first African National Congress in Southern Rhodesia

was

The first

Aaron Jacha in 1934.

founded by

ANC was an

political party whose membership was limited to

upper and upper-middle class urban residents who had the

elitist

potential

to vote.

goals of

The

the

ANC

acquire, gain, or control political power,

to

but to influence

through dialogue and cooperation

the decision- making process

with the Rhodesian

were not

The first ANC

government.

was neither

revolutionary and by the beginning of the

exist as a functioning
War it had oeased to

nationalist nor
Second World
organization.

E.

Nemapare resurrected

restricted

Samkange and the Reverend

the Reverend Thomas

In 1948,
to

the ANC.

westernized

Membership was

Zimbabwean

elites.

The

again-

ANC

attempted to

influence the Rhodesian government to insure

Zimbabwean civil rights by giving Zimbabweans the right to
participate in

the colonial parliament.

The

most revolu-

tionary action taken by this organization was its support of

the general strike of

Generally,

1948,

that petitions, delegations,

and representations by respon-

sible black citizens were better methods

government

than

mass

the ANC believed

strikes

ani

of influencing the

protests.

The

ANC

achieved little success and had all but disappeared by 1953.

The formation of the Central

created

African Federation in 1952

rift among the Southern Rhodesian African leaders.

number of African leaders,

including Joshua Nkomo,
Mike
Hove,
Jasper Savanhu, and Charles flzengeli,
supported the
A

formation of the Federation because they hoped that it would

12

These leaders
racialism and discrimination.
achisving
white political parties with the hope of

joined

end

the white

nership with
and

opposed

Paul Mushonga,

In August 1955,

the City

Youth League (CYL)

was the

in Southern

Its membership was open to all classes of blacks

living in Rhodesia,

not

just the educated urban elite.

social,

feeling of pride

and dignity in then.

targetted

were

inculcate

economic position and to

and

The

make Africans aware of their poli-

goals of the CYL were to

CYL

The CYL

Harare.

in

nationalist political organization

Rhodesia.

tical,

multira-

these mors radical leaders formed

cialism.

first truly

of

Henry Hamadziripi,

Federation and

the

part-

Another group

ruling regine.
George Nyandoro,

led by

black leaders,

efforts of the

The

district

against the

native

commis-

sioners, who were considered the epitome of white domination

in Rhodesia.

larity.

3y 1956, the

CYL had gained considerable popu-

In that year, dus to its mass appeal,

the CYL was

able to win the Harare Advisory Board elections.

ficance

of the

evolution

for the

CYL

nationalist movement was two-fold.

supra-ethnic African

The signi-

Zimbabwean

of the

First, it was the first

nationalist party to draw

its member-

ship from the prof ess ional- elite, urban-working,

peasant

classes.

although the

Second,

radical philosophy towards change

alist organization,

and ruralhad

CYL

more

than any previous nation-

it still believed in working

within the

colonial political system to bring about change.

In September 1957,
form

the

(SRAMC).

Southern

the

Rhodes ian

African

National

Congress

By combining the organizationally and increasingly

politically
ANC,

Samkange's ASC and the 3YL merged to

strong Harare

CYL with

black leaders were

the widely

able to create

recognized

nationalist

organization with the potential for great growth and a truly

nation-wide appeal.
After much debate and disagreement, the

13

president,

Joshua Sfccao

Congress alectai

Chikereaa

Jazias

and Paul
vice-president, George Nyandoro general secretary,
was a
relatively moderate
The SRANC
Hushonga treasurer-

organization.
were national

Its goals
philosophy was non-racial.
unity and an equal partnership between all

Its

inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia, regardless of race, color,

that Rhodesia would prosper only
The SRANC felt
or creed.
if a completely integrated

its allegiance

Like the CYL,

the

of Native

masses

the

settler power

to

colonial administration.

continued to denounce,
criticize,
native district commissioners of the

Department
in

The SRANC

and hoped

Crown

the British

alterna-

the SRANC

embarrass

and

to

within the British

obtain reforms

racialism, and discrimination.

tive to tribalism,
swore

society was created as

front

Affairs in

hopes of

that invincible

was not

Africans

these

convincing

Zimbabwean

of the

when faced

that

with an

organized African opposition.

The SRANC
urban

rapidly gained

and rural

blacks

following among

large mass

all aconomic

from

sectors.

As

the SRANC belisvad in working peacefully

mentioned earlier,

and lawfully through the

3ritish colonial government.

Its

goal was not a new black government through revolution,

an

equal

partnership

mutual cooperation.

collapse of the

blacts

bat ween

It should

whites

and

be noted

Todd and

through

that before

Central African Fedaration in

Ministers Garfield

1963,

Whitehead had

Sir Hdgar

but

the

Prime
made

attempts to ease racial discrimination in Southern Rhodesia.

The Public Service Amendment Act No.

civil service on

non-racial basis.

eased by the Pass Law

(Repeal)

Apportionment (Amendment)
tions affecting

towards reform

42

urban blacks.

54

50

opened up the

pass system was

(1960)

(1960)

Nevertheless,

never satisfied the

14

The

Act No.

Act No.

(1962)

SRANC nor

The Land

aased regulathis

trend

convinced

it

that the

government to
act was

repeal the

designed

1951

to

to

made repeated

The SRANC

discrimination.
The

sincerely wanted

white government

Native

prevent

the

racial

end

appeals to

the

Land Husbandry

Act.

soil erosion

being

It
traditional African tribal farming methods.
was viewed as discriminatory by the SRANC because its implementation involved cattle destocking and the introduction of
were contrary
both of which
to
individual land tenure,

caused by

African traditions.

required

not

creating the

At the same

by the

destock their

to

act

appearance of

white farmers were

time,

an

attempt

herds,

by whites

thus

to mono-

polize the cattle industry.

In late

civil

early 1959,

1958 and

disturbances

These violent

Rhodesia and

in

Northern

there were a series of

Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

protests coincided with protests

in Southern

the Southern Rhcdesian government

accused the

SRANC of complicity in the rioting.

against the SRANC were never

Although these charges

provsn,

in late February 1959

the Southern Rhodesian government declared

gency and, claiming it was

the SRANC.

state of emer-

subversive organization, banned

Over 500 members of the SRANC were arrested, of

which 300 were detained without

went into

voluntary exile,

Joshua Nkoaio,

trial.

was the

only SRANC

who

leader to

escape arrest and detention.

The white settlers in Southern
black

nationalist

these

laws were

Rhodesia feared that the

organizations were nothing more than

covers for a world-wide communist conspiracy.
Consequently,
the Rhodesian government
enacted a number of laws aimed at
stemming the spread of communism and severely limiting the
effectiveness of the Zimbabwean nationalist movement.
Among
the

Preventive Detention
Act,

Unlawful
Act of 1959

the Vagrancy Act, and

Organizations Act
and the

and

the

Emergency Powers

the Law and Order Maintenance kct

15

of

These acts were

1960-

the beginning of

repressive,

anti-nationalist trend that was to continue until independence was achieved in 1980.
The void left by the banning of the SRANC was filled on
was
January 1960 when the National Democratic Party (NDP)
formed.
The formation of the NDP wi s a significant turning
1

point for

The

SRANC.

and

had sought

achieved through
felt that

those of

achieve reform

to

the

upon

SRANC believed that change

The

peaceful means.

by

government bureauc-

pressure

applying internal

by

minority regime.
hand,

SRANC

the Souths rn Rhodesian

working through
racy

differed dramatically from

of the NDP

mate goals
the

First, the tactics and ulti-

number of reasons.

The

NDP,

white

could be
the other

on

achieved if external

change could only be

pressure was exerted, upon the Southern Rhodesian government.

Believing
powers

Great

that

Southern

over

sought to

Nations.

placed

greater

Rhodesia,

NDP

the

through the Shodesian government itself.

than working

In addition,

mobilize international support for

other independent black

by lobbying

reserve

retain

lobbying the British government

emphasis upon
NDP

its

Britain should

Events in

improving status

states and

the 3elgian Zongo and

of the

the

its cause

the United

Nigeria and the

nationalist movements

in Northern

Rhodesia and Nyasaiand gave the NDP the hope that the internationalization

of an

internal problem

situation in Southern Rhodesia.

between the SRANC and NDP was
to resort to

violence as

violence.
a

might improve

the

Another tactical difference

the willingness of the latter

SJhile the

means of achieving

an

never approved of

3RANC

the NDP did.

end,

In

1960, the NDP organized a large number of riots in Salisbury

and

Bulawayo for

Rhodesian

the purpose of pressuring

governments

to

call

conference.

16

for

the British and

constitutional

ultimate

The

The NDP

differed.

was

looked

the SRANC

While

the SRANC

of

goals

and

more

radical and

or a

non-racial

the

NDP

also

revolutionary.
society and an

minority within the frame-

equal partnership with the white

work of the current governaental system, the NDP wanted "one

dence,

complete indepen-

an end to colonialism,

one vote,"

man,

with other black governments

and closer cooperation

and black nationalist

movements in Africa.

The NDP was also significant in that it demonstrated the

splits

Zimbabwean

within the

nationalist movement.

The

first division among Zimbabwean nationalists involved class.

While

could claim

the SRANC

groups and had

wide popular

membership

class

from all

the NDP was an elitist

base,

organization whose membership, like that of the old ANC, was

drawn primarily from the urban intalLengencia.

NDP were often centered

activities of the
needs

desires

and

neglected the
peasant population.

rural

the NDP's ef fectiveness as

Consequently,

base or

national organi-

by its failure to develop

zation was limited

popular

the

of

around the urban

the HDP often

schools,

industrial areas and

Because the

either

organization in

grass- root

wide

the

rural

areas.

The other split within the nationalist movement revolved

around Joshua
1960,

When the

Nkomo.

NDP was formed

in January

Michael Mawema was appointed its interim president as

Nkomo was

divided

self-exile in

in

between those

those who
The critics

who

Great Britain.

felt that he was

coward for

of Nkomo within the

the Zimbabwe National

Party

Pan-African Socialist Onion

Nkomo again became

Constitutional

Nkomo

wanted

president

and

leaving Rhodesia.
and formed

which later

became the

(PASD)

controversial
1961.

17

as

party was

NDP broke away

(ZNP)

Conference of

The

figure at the London

While

Nkomo was

in

e^l 1c5

s*i

-x.

a
- -i

* 1-

'

I
!'D
Ji>

% -a ^
.>_*

jc

)-)& s-n
.,.

a
TXT
. _ _
1

:
e ;t
H ~

-- ^
.

"'

^T"' " J f fi
___-_.>-.

~ K 2
_ ... _

P^fc'cs^si
_-.__.

~ !
a
.._

...

*.

It was
constitutional conference.
hoped by the NDP that a constitution would be framed that
nationalist aspirations a non-racial
would fulfill its

governments to

hold

the end of colonialism,

society,

Nkomo

and independence.

returned from exile in October 1960 and became the president

to the
the NDP delegation
of the
NDP and subsequently led

Constitutinal Conference

London

who was politically

convention, Nkomo,
tive,

Chitepo,

and Sithole,

Rhodesia,

of sixty-five

the

moderate conserva-

agreed

to

African seats

in

Nkoao returned

hen

seats.

At

195 1.

and Silundika,

provided for fifteen

constitution that
parliament

early

in

to

realization that the constitution

he came to the

Michael
acceptable to the majority of the NDP.
of the NDP executive,
Mawema and Leopold Takawira , nembers
was not

had already publically criticized hia and others had accused

him of selling out the black masses to colonialism and white

Consequently,

racism.

Nkono felt obliged to repudiate the

Unfortunately,
the NDP could not
reject a
constitution that it had already agreed to.
The greatest
constitution.

irony of the entire episode, however,

NDP*s

boycott of

the 1962

of the

constitution

ability

Fields conservative Rhodes

power almost unopposed.

was the fact that the

election due
to

unaccept-

to the

Africans enabled

ian Front

(RF)

Winston

Party to come to

Thus, because of its internal disa-

greements, the NDP had shot itself in the foot.

On

executive

December 1961,
members were

ironic exception.
detention because he

the NDP

arrested

Joshua

Nkomo

was banned.

and

All

detained,

again escaped

was out of the country at

of the

with

one

arrest and
the time of

the crackdown.

The Zimbabwe African Peoples anion

17

December 1961.

Although,

18

for

(ZAPO)

was

founded on

obvious reasons,

its

not acknowledge it

leadership did

publicly,

ZAPU

was the

direct descendent of the NDP. It was, in fact, the NDP with

Headed by Joshua Nkomo, ZAPO had the same
a different name.

organization

and

anti-colonialist
socialist

and

banned

as the

anti-imperialist,

communist.

nor

nationalist

leaders

organization

It was
to

Pan-Africanism to the liberation

was

ZAPO

the

apply

Although

NDP.

first

the

movement.

neither

Zimbabwean

concept
of
Its objectives

were as follows:
A..

Aims and Objectives:

To establish the policy of the one-man-oneI.
vote as the basis of government in this country.

democracv and
To maintain the spirit of
love of liberty among the people of Zimbabwe.

II.

To unite the African oeode so that they

liberate themselves from all
forms of imperialism and colonialism.
III.

To fight relentlessly
IV.
of ail forms of opression.

for the elimination

conditions for the economic

To create tha
Erosoerity of the people under a government
ased on the principle of ona-man-one-vote.

V.

the development of the best

To foster
values in African culture and traditions,
so as
to establish a desirable ordar.
VI.

B.

Pan- Africanism:
I.

ZAPO shall instill and maintain the spirit

of Pan- Africanism in Zimbabwe.

It shall work co-operatively wi^h any. other

movement in Africa or elsewhere which fosters
the spirit of Pan-Africanism.
II.

C.

International:
ZAPO shall observe,
respect and oromote
human
rights contained in the Declaration
of
Human Rights of tha Onited Nations Charter.

I-

It shall maintain peaceful and friendly

II.
relations with such nations as are peaceful and
friendly towards the African people of Zimbabwe.
It shall co-operate with any such international forces as are genuinely engaged
in the
struggle for the total and immediate liquidation
of colonialism and imperialism.
[ Ref .
5]
III.

19

During

more and more came to

the ZAPU leadership

1962,

believe that change would only occur through violent revoluAs Rhodesian security forces continued to arrest and
tion.
the ZAPU leadership came to

detain nationalist subversives,

the decision

same year,

that during this period

independence

leadership that

ZAND

the

philosophy of

the

a new

Nathan Shamuyarira notes

created.

would go

it

organization [Ref. 7].

the Zimbabwe Liberation Army was

than form

underground rather
During that

to be banned,

that if ZAPU were

could be achieved peacefully began to change:

Nk<

no
ar<
ec<

BrL.

present nature of
following.
[Ref. 8

ZAPU was banned

-in

politics that

been

have

we

September 1952.

Ironioally,

was again on a trip away from Southern Rhodesia.

at the time ZAPU was banned,

tation,

he was

conveniently out

at the time

of the crack-down by the

many of the

other nationalists,

very best,

Nkomo was a coward

saving

his own

Thus, three organi-

Nkomo was the head had been

all three occasions

skin and

it

and because

of

Ndabaningi

Sithole,

appeared

worst

at the

Presidents

Nyerere of

Rhodesia,

the country

that,

To

at the

interested in
traitor who was

Amid these accusa-

applied by

National

the

Reverend

treasurer,

and

Tangankyika and Kaunda of Northern

Nkomo was persuaded to fly back to Salisbury for

three months restriction.

At this

movement and
split.

ZAPU

of

who was only

pressures
the

banned and on

security forces.

collaborating with the secirity forces.

tions

In Lusaka

Nkomo, after several days hesi-

fled into hiding in Tanganyika.

zations of which

Nkomo

time

ZAPU.

First,

split

[Ref. 9]

occurred

There were

two

within the

nationalist

basic reasons

for the

for the reasons mentioned previously,

20

many

Zimbabwean nationalists lost confidence

Nkomo'

in

personal

Secondly, ZAPU had failed tD organize

leadership ability.

revolutionary liberation movement with a mass

as
Instead,
ZAPU had placed its amphasis,
popular base.
upon
demonstrated by Nkomo' s constant foreign travel,
domestic

rallying international support for the Zimbabwean liberation

within

strategy had failed.

This

movement.

manifested

ZAPU

itself in

the split

In 1963

formation

the

The organization that supported Nkomo was

splinter groups.

the Peoples Care-taker Council

(PCC)

The anti-Nkomo organ-

ization was the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)

Nkomo had

After
196 2,

called the

he

two

of

served his

in Rhodesia

detention

ZAPU executive

council,

in

include

to

together for

Ndabaningi Sithole and Robert ttugabe,

confer-

ence in Dar-es-Salaam,

Tanzania.

Mkomo

government in exile in

Tanzania.

President Julius Nyerere

opposed this plan

ment

would

Southern

on the

only

be

Rhodesia.

He

if

felt that

operated

ZAPU

within

Nkomo's leadership

needed in Southern Rhodesia, not Tanzania.

Ths

was also disappointed

decisiveness as

confidence

Nkomo

expressed to

in

was

ZAPU execu-

tive council also disagreed with Nkomo in this matter.

excutive council

the liberation move-

grounds that

successful

desired to form

in Nkomo' s

The

lack of

leader and was concerned about the lack of

that

them [Ref.

many

Pan-African
Unwilling to

13].

criticism or to compromise on

leaders

had

tolerate this
Nkomo left his

these issues,

executive council financially strandad in Dar-es-Salaam and

returned to Rhodesia.
Seven of
the executive
council
members denounced and deposed Nkomo and appointed Ndabaningi

Sithole as their
Cold Comfort Farm

leader.

Nkomo scheduled

near Salisbury for 10

purpose of the conference was to

mine

the leadership

of the

conference at

August

1963.

solve the split and deter-

nationalist movemant.

21

The

Nkomo

including the
pecpi- to z'ae conference,
invited over 5,00
Having returned to
dissident executive council membersthe executive council declined the invi-

Southern Rhodesia,

tation to Cold Comfort Farm and on

National Onion
Zimbabwe African

Ndabaningi Sithole as

August 1953 formed the

(ZAND)

and

elected

At

the Cold

interim president.

the

Skomo was confirmed as the primary

Comfort Farm Conference,

Zimbabwean nationalist leaier (presiient

of ZAPO and leader

of the PCC)

the same

At

Ndabaningi

time,

Robert

Sithole,

Mugabe,

Washington Salianga and Leopold Takawira were suspended from

the nationalist movement.

Between August and September

1953,

Although officially the

reconcile the PCC and ZAND failed.

PC3

was not

political party,

Rhodesian government
ZAPO".

pan-Africanism,
between the

and thus less susceptable to

repression,

the PCC

Both

socialism.

two organizations

they wanted to bring about

reality it

in

was still

professed anti-colonialism,

and ZAND*

and

several attempts to

The

difference

biggest
the manner

in which

Zimbabwe's liberation.

The PCC

was in

still emphasized the use of international arenas and consti-

affect raform.

tutionalism to
believed in

self-reliance and

other hand,

on the

confrontation of
ZAPO for
failing to

the direct

Although ZANO criticized

the enemy.

develop

ZANO,

revolutionary program of national liDeration,

at
this point in time it did
not itself have such
a program.
a

Both the

PCC and ZANO were

hundreds of ZANU

this time,

Nkomo,

banned on 26 August

Sithole,

and PCC members,

Mugabe,

and

1964.

began more than

At

among them
a

decade of

detention.

Inspite of
movement

in

these apparent set-backs to

Zimbabwe,

Nyasaland from 1960

to

events in
195 3 gave

22

the nationalist

Northern

Southern

Rhodesia

and

Rhodesians cause

opposition,

intensified

After

corner.

the

even independence might

that change and

to hope

be around

riots,

and

territories, Great Britain set

strikes in the two northern
commissions to investigate the political situation
up two
a

these commissions. Great Britain held

As a result of

there-

The right of Northern

constitutional conference in 1963.

Rhodesia and
Federation

Nyasaland to secede from the Central African

recognized.
When
the two territories
was

their

declared

dissolve the federation on

December 1963.

31

with

dence

respectively.

Zimbabwean

majority

rule was

The granting of indepen-

great

nationalist aspirations.

would soon

nationalists

be

came

Rhodesian Front

shattered
to

when the

realization

the

encouragement

Surely Great

would do the same for Southern Rhodesia.

hope

independence

the black governed nations of

from Great Britain and became

Zambia and Malawi,

to

At that time.

were granted

and Nyasaland

Northern Rhodesia

agreed

Britain

to secede,

intention

Britain

Nevertheless, this

Zimbabwean

black

the

white

that

also determined

government was

to

to achieve

independence from Great Britain, but without majority ruleOn

the whole,

the levels

of

violence and

activity were extremely limited during Phase

of Great 3ritain,

with the help

independence could be brought

change and

about largely through peaceful,

of the

Zimbabwean

I.

nationalist leaders still held the hope that,

guerrilla

constitutional aeans.

to confrontations

violence was limited

Most

between the

nationalists themselves, such as those that occurred between

the PCC and ZAND in 1964.
Guerrilla activities were limited
largely to organizing forces,
acts of

sabotage.

training cadre,

In February

divide Southern Rhodesia into

1954,

the PCC

command regions,

and planning

decided to
or fighting

zones.

At around the same time, ZANO" also planned

of acts

of sabotage aimed

at

23

impressing black

number

opinion and

lowering white morale.

.lost

before

intelligence

by Rhodesian

thwarted

of thsse sabotage

they could

be

however,

by

One successful attack was made,

implemented.

plans were

the infamous "Crocodile Commando" group which killed a white

farmer, Petrus Oberhultzer,

on

[8ef. 11] This

July 1964.

event was notable because it was the first attack on

white

settler since 1897 and because it signified the beginning of

the guerrilla war.

B.

THE ODI QUESTION:

The period

nated

1964

from early

the question

by

government

1964

would unilaterally

dominated

movement,

the action

or not

Rhodesian
s

indepen-

the action during Phase

While

movement and,

Phase II

in parti-

dominated by

was

nationalist

within the

in- fighting
in

was domi-

the

declare Rhodesia*

by the nationalist

the political

cular,

November 1965

to

whether

of

dence from Great Britain.

was

1965

the

struggle between Great Britain and Rhodesia and the struggle

within the Rhodesian government over who would determine the
future political disposition of
the Unilateral Declaration

Rhodesia.

of Independence

The question of
(UDI)

was brought

to a head by the events and trends of Phase I.

A

number of issues

Rhodesian Front Party

to the UDI

lei
(RFP)

Zambia and Malawi

Rhodesian settlers

Smith and his

First of all, the dissolution

of the Central African Federation

pendence to

by Ian

and the granting of inde-

by Great Britain

extremely nervous.

The

made white

white settlers

felt that the British government had sold cut their counter-

parts

in

Northern

Rhodesia and

Nyasaland

to

the

black

nationalists and were fearful that Britain would do the same

to white Rhodesians if gi/en the opportunity.
This fear was
reinforced by several other circumstances.
The rise of
African nationalism

within the

24

Central African

Federation

had

demonstrated to

Rhodesians that there

whit?

have to deal.

powerful force with which they would

that

feared

also

1964 elections

from Great

Britain for

by

the internationalization

in

majority rule

in

nawly

by the

black

independent

black

the Organization of African Unity

nations of Africa,

(CAO)

there was an historical

Pinally,

and the United Nations.

the

would result

problem

of the
the

organizations,

nationalist

It was

majority rule was intensified

This pressure for

Rhodesia.

new,

over

victory

in the

Conservative Party
greater pressure

Party

Labor

the

was

imperative among whita Rhodesians to improve

own positions vis a vis Africans and to
and solidify their

and cultural

strengthen their power over the African through institution-

alized racism.
White Rhodesians
would be able

had good reason

to hold off

at the time of

Federation

African

that they

if not

eliminate,

indef inits ly,

Ths distribution of mili-

the black nationalist onslaught.

tary forces

to believe

the dissolution of

provided Rhodesia

had

whelming regional military superiority

were confident that any threat,

could be successfully met.

quite

been

had

the Central

with

over-

an

and white Rhodesians

either internal or external,

repressive measures
crippling the nationalist

In addition,

successful in

movement.

After the
Great

break-up of

Britain and

concerning

Rhodesia

Rhodesia's

the Central

African Federation,

began preliminary

independence.

The

discussions

policy

of

the

British government was that no independence would be granted

to

Rhodesia

without

the

gradual

termination

of

racial

discrimination and progress towards majority rule.

This
prerequisite for independence was totally unacceptable to
the Rhodesian Front government.
UDI

was

the only solution

When,

the RFP suggested that

to the problem.

25

Prime Minister

lie Shodesian

the suggestion.

objected to

Winston Field

cabinet replaced him with Ian

Smith.

Prime Minister Smith unilaterally

On

11

November 1965,

declared Rhodesia's inde-

pendence from Great Britain.

During this phase, the nationalist parties and organiza-

Guerrilla

tion.

went

members

to

North Korea.

and Pyongyang,

already

had

in

ozher

1965,

forty

training.

and October 1965,

fifty-two

for

took guerrilla training in

ZAPU recruits

guerrillas

trained

guerrilla

Ghana

between March 196 4

Meanwhile,

being

were

September 1954 and March

Between

countries.
ZANU

forces

important excep-

with one

relatively inactive,

tions were

12] By the time of UDI,

[Ref.

started

Nanking,

Moscow,

infiltrating

back

into

Rhodesia.
C.

POST-DDI NEGOTIATIONS AND THE GUERRILLA WAR:

which began immediately

Phase III,

1966

after the

1972

UDI and

lasted until the announcement of the Pearce Commission findings in May 1972,

was dominated by two major sets of devel-

First there

opments.

the

efforts of

the

British

first Labour and later Conservative administra-

government,

tions, to negotiate
Front

ware

government to

peaceful settlsment with the Rhodesian

end the

crisis.

The

second set

of

developments concerned the dramatic change in tactics by the

nationalist organizations.
Specifically, the Zimbabwean
nationalists came
through

legal,

efforts

but
As

the realization

that the

ultimate majority rule would

the crisis and

warfare.

to

solution to

not come about

non-violent constit ational or diplomatic

would
be
achisved through guerrilla
only
will be shown, the irony of this phase is that

the British

commitment to a peaceful negotiated settlement

in
many ways forced the
black nationalists to resort
to
guerrilla warfare.
The British refusal to even consider the

26

the

in Rhodesia had

force to solve the problem

use of military

of bouying the RF

unwanted effects

government's confi-

dence in its ability to ride our the crisis and driving the
when they
Zimbabwean nationalists to desperate measures

realized that the

the

British government was unwilling

to take

necessary steps to solve the Rhodesian problem.

Harold Wilson's
1965,
Just prior to UDI in November

newly elected Labour government warned the Rhodesians of the

considered by Great
An UDI would be
consequences of GDI.
and as such would have no
Britain to be an act of defiance,
No Commonwealth
constitutional effect on Rhodesia's status.

The 3ritish

government would be able to recognize the UDI.

with Rhodesia and initiate

government would sever relations

Financial and trade relaBritain and Rhodesia would be jeopardtions between Great
In short,
Further financial aid would be terminated.
ized.
economic sanctions against her.

Britain would make

every effort to isolate

Rhodesia diplo-

her economically.

Despite making

matically and to cripple

these

diplomatic

threats

and economic

against

Rhodesia,

Wilson refused to threaten the use of force against Rhodesia

should she unlilaterally declare he independence [Ref- 13 ],

British overtures towards Smith's RF government began
immediately after

In

August 1966, the British govern-

ment announced the start of

exploratory talks between offi-

cials of

U DI.

the two governments and

first British delegation

Rhodesian officials.

diplomats returned to
efforts.

In

on

19

September

arrived in Salisbury to
On

Septeaber 1966,

28

London with little to

October 1965,

the British

threatened the Rhodesian government

1966 the

meet with
the British

show for their

government again

with economic sanctions

unless it agreed to renounce its UDI.

The first

round of

serious negotiations

Britain and Rhodesia began on

27

between Great

December 1966 aboard the HAS

Tiger .

The

discussions aboard the

HMS Tiger

Wilson and Smith governments resulted

that was to be the basis for

between the

in a wording document

constitutional agreement. The

basic provisions of this document were as follows:

A.

Unimpeded progress to majority rule:

The creation of a legislative assembly with
1.
and of 17
33 "A" roll seats, 17 "3" roll seats,
seats and
senate
of
a
reserved European
8 Africans,
and 6
consisting of 12 Europeans,
chiefs to be elected by the chiefs council.
the
of
franchise to all
The extention
2.
Africans over 30 who could fulfill citizenship
and residence requirements.

Guarantees against retrogressive

B.
the constitution:

amendments to

1.
any amendments to specifiA provision that
cally entrenched provisions of the constitution
would require a veto of three-quarters
of the
total membership of both the assembly and the
be
senate voting together
and
subject to an
to- a
constitutional commission
appeal
in
Rhodesia consisting of the chief justice and
other justices with further appeal to the judicial committee of the privy council.

Immediate improvement in the political status of

Africans.

C.
D.

Progress towards ending racial discrimination:

1.
The
establishment of
racial discrimination.

royal

commission on

E. The British government would have to be

satisfied
that any proposed basis
for independence would have
to be acceptable to the peode of Rhodesia as
a
w ho 1 e.

That there would be no oppression of majority by

minority or of minority by majority:

F.

1.
The creation of a
government headed b y la n

broadly-based

interim

5m"iT!YT~

2. Responsibility for the maintenance of law and

order and
protection of human rights to be in
the hands or
the 3ritish governor who
would be
advised by a securitv council consisting of the
responsible ministers, the heads of the defense
forces,
the chief of police,
and a representative of the British government.

Free elections which

campaigning and other

3.

[Ref.

14]

28

would include peaceful

political activities.

The Wilson government accepted

this working

refused to accept those

the Smith government

its entirety,

African rule.

to majority

provisions leading

document in
the

Thus,

requirements for African participation in government led to

rejection of the proposed settlement and the
a Rhodesian
collapse of the Tiaer talks.
failed

Having

its

first

the Rhodssians,

with

settlement

in

Smith* s Rhodesian Front govern-

hardened its stance against

First

ment.

of all,

attempt to negotiate a
the British
government
adopted the

British government

the

policy of no independence before majority rule (NIBNAR)

far

Britain

as Great

the

concernsd,

was

mere

As

progress

towards majority rule would no longer be an acceptable prerBritain

Secondly,

independence.

equisite for

pressure the Rhodesian government

following through with

by

under the provisions

The British government,

its threats.

decided to

of Articles 39 and 41 of the United Nations Charter,

duced a

resolution to the

on Rhodesia's

mandatory sanctions
On

16 December

Rhodesia constituted

calling for

most important

determining

1966,

Security Council

UN Security Council

intro-

exports.

the situation

that

threat to international peace, the 3N

voted to impose selective

tions against Rhodesia that

mandatory sanc-

would include certain specified

Rhodesian exports and the supply to Rhodesia of arms,

vehicles and

tary equipment,

in

aircraft,

and

mili-

oil and

oil

products.

Throughout

continued

1967

keep

to

Rhodesia open.

by

the

Lord
British

government

Wilson

the

communication with
government sent a number of

channels

of

Salisbury to discuss

Ian Smith.

respectively
Thomason,

the

1968,

The British

representatives to
ment with

and

Thase

possible settle-

diploaatic missions

Alport

(June

Commonwealth

29

1967),

ar.

Secretary

were led

George
(November

*OC"T\
30 )
,

-j-1.3
cLDQ

C
i-.^.
-

agree

to

tions.

In

iSs

"-.

<5

imposition

the

in

serious negotia-

Britain called upon

reat

discuss

to

Great

against Rhodesia

government into

March 1968,

Council

Security

> -

Again

settlement.

the pressure

to increase

force the Smith

order to

none of the British emissaries was able to

Smith to

Britain had

^0^3)
ijOC|

* n *, v
[i.Sfli.Uai.]f

-u

happened before,
convince

fa

11 av nAnnl
a s.Unqte
.*w
s
Jwll^iia^Sa

the ON

further

of

1968 a
economic sanctions against Rhodesia and on 29 May
resolution was passed which imposed comprehensive mandatory

sanctions upon
member

states to

join

resolution required

The

Rhodesia.

emoargo

in an

all trade

of

Rhodesia (with minor

exceptions such as medical

tional supplies),

all air and

Rhodesia,

from

and

passports,

Rhodesia.

from

and educa-

investment of

funds

in

meaber countries were to prevent the

cf

persons

travelling

persons

believed

to

be

The

resolution

UN

aiding

on

the

operating to

and aircraft from airlines

Rhodesian regime,

with

sea shipments of goods to

the

on

territory

their

into

Rhodesian
and

and

In addition,

Rhodesia.
entry

on

all UN

required

member

nations to discourage emigration to Rhodesia.

On 20 September

Secretary

at the

1968,

British

Mr.

James Bottomly,

Foreign

Office,

discussions with Ian Smith in Salisbury.

led

to

negotiations

aboard the HMS

between Great

Fearless from

9-13

all of the

proposals made during the

were drawn

from the Tiger

In addition to the original

began

the Under

further

These discussions

Britain

and

October 1968.

Rhodesia
Almost

Fearless negotiations

proposals of two
Tiger proposals,

years earlier.
the following

were added:

Action was to be taken to provide more educa(1)

tional
facilities for
African Rhodesians.
The
British government would provide 5 million pounds a
year for ten years,
waich would be matched bv equal
sums from the Rhodesian government,
in
pursuit of
this goal.
The British gp/eriment would act as the trustee
12)
for African Rhodesians and because of this the fifth

30

acceptability to the people of Rhodesia

was transcendent and would over-ride all
other principles.
proposed for the
Despite the additional safeguards
principle,

as a whole,

the Fearless talks,

African majority in

the

real signifi-

negotiations lies in the fact that they

demonstrated the willingness of the British to compromise on
"principle" and grant concessions in order to reach a
The fact
settlement with the Rhodes ian Front government.

cance

of these

British revived the

that the

Fearles s talks shows

they had abandoned

that

the terms

administration,

ensured that the Rhodesian

British governor, would retain control

proposals were

Rhodesia as

conditions,

attained until 1999-

majority
[Ref.

Smith's

Rhodesian

to the

not have

government.

Front

to the

judicial committee

extent

to

Consequently,

been

the proposals were unacceptable

of the

The

of the

voting

would

the appeal

privy council,
and the
count during
elections.

talks broke down on

the Fearless

Rhodesian

proposed agreement

dealing with the composition of the legislature,

which

people of

even under the most

rule would

the aspects

government rejected

rather than the

15]

As was the case before,

to

agreement

Calculations indicated that, should the

whole.

Fea r les s proposals have been accepted,

favorable

In

if the constitutional

be unacceptable

found to

the principle

proposed Fearless

the

of

at the

for Rhodesian independence.

of NIBMAR as a prerequisite

addition,

basic Tiger proposals

13

October

196 8.

The final break between Great

in

June

1969 with

government,

endorsed by

European electorate,
new constitution.

introduced

decision

the

Britain and Rhcd^ia came

by the

Rhodesian

Front

referendum of the overwhelmingly

to declare Rhodesia a republic under a

The ODI

to replace

the

or

Republican, Constitution was

1965

Constitutution which

Rhodesian government considered to be

31

the

oaoole of Bhodesia
to the
longer acceptable
because it contains a number* of objectionable
features, the principle one beiag that it provides
inevitably.
the
and,
for eventual majority rule
domination of one raca by another and that it does
the
government will
be
that
not guarantee
retained- [Hef. 16]
no

upon the premise of separate

The new constitution was based

and envisaged the attain-

racial development in all spheres

of racial

ment

parliament

only in

distant

the vary

whites in

blaoks and

parity between

provisions of the Republican Constitution,

effect on 2 March 1970, were as follows:
The Rhodesian legislative
composed of:
A.

The

future.

the

major

which went into

assembly was

to be

Fifty European members alectad on the roils

voters for
fifty European constituencies.
1.

of European

toral colleges comprised of the chiefs, headmen,

and elected
councilors of the African councils
of the Tribal Trust Lands.
The number of African members in the legislative
assembly would be increased, but the ratio
of the
African to European membership in the house assembly
was directly related to the
proportion of the total
income tax revenueeach community' paid.
B.

Shc-uld the African ever reach parity representation with the Europeans (i.e.,
seats apiece),
50
there would be no rurther increase in their* representation.

C.

The senate was to oonsist of 10 European members

elected by European members of the lower house,
10
African members electa! by all \frican chiefs,
and
three members appointed by the president.
D.

The effect of the Republican Constitution was that after

the elections

250,000 Europeans

the assembly and U, 000, 000

tives,
who

for

all practical

government employees.
tion,

Africans

half of whom were chiefs,

were

representatives in

had only

headmen,

purposes

15

representa-

and councillors

nothing

mere

than

by means of the new constitu-

Thus,

the Smith regime was not

tical parity indefinitely,

had 50

only able to postpone poli-

but also was able

to foreclose

altogether any future possibility of majority African rule.

32

The implementation

of

the Republican Constitution

on

effectively isolated Rhodesia from the internaThe British residual mission in Salisbury
tional community.
The British
and Rhodesia House in London were both closedMarch 1970

governor. Sir Humphrey Gibbs, who had been nothing more than
a

figure-head

since UDI in

adopted

the UN Security Council

1970,

missions.

and Portuguese

South African

only the

leaving

with Rhodesia.

missions in Rhodesia were

Eleven of the thirteen diplomatic

withdrawn,

18 March

On

resolution calling

all relations

immediate rupture of

for the

resigned.

1965,

The Rhodes ian Republic was denied official recog-

nition by all the members of the United Nations.

No sooner
tions with

government broken

had the British

decided to re-open

Rhodesia when it

with the Rhodesian

going again.

fact that the Conservatives,

dialogue

hope of getting

Front government in the

the negotiating process

off rela-

due to the

This was

by Edward Heath,

led

came to

power in June 1970 when Wilson's Labour government was voted

out

of

The Conservative

office-

Party's anti-Rhodesia

wing and

position to make concessions

to

Party lacked

thus was

the Rhodesian regime during

In addition,

tional climate was

-co

the

more favorable

Nixon administration

disposed towards
1971

the U.S. Senate would

to permit the
the Heath

compromise solution

to

which

on

October

vote to defy the UN sanctions and

importation of chrome from

ability in Africa,

favorably

be more

Republic and

government felt that,

President Kwame

the interna-

There were indications that

was going

the Rhodesian

much better

in a

the formulation of a settlement.

to the Anglo-Rhodesian crisis.

the Labour

Rhodesia.

due to the

was typified by

Also,

general inst-

the overthrow of

international organizations such as the OAU,

the Commonwealth,
the UN were
and
unlikely to actively oppose a compromise Anglo-Rhodesian
Nkrumah in Ghana,

33

?&+*

a & ti+

Vi

a t- a

jfg **

ch

"n 17

2.

C3

*"

h. S.

SUCh

5L

!"!

CI IT

9e

K!

would improve the stability of the rsgion.

Shortly after it came to power ia June 1970, the British

Conservative government announced that it was initiating new

re-open negotiations with the Rhodesian Front

were through private,
contacts
The initial

attempts to
government.

channels.

unofficial

On

16

February

Smith

Ian

1971,

confirmed that contact had been made between the British and
Lord
1971,
In April
Rhodesian governments in Salisbury.
five missions to
first of
Goodman led what would be the
for the Anglo-Rhodesian Summit

Salisbury to prepare the way

During October,

Conference.

achieve

Goodman

Lori

was able

to

basis for negotiations with the Rhodesians.

On 15 November 1971,
the foreign

minister,

British dslegation of 27,

Alex Douglas-Home,

Sir

led by

arrived in

Anglo-Rhodesian Summit Conference.

Anglo-Rhoiesian Accord was signed
the

begin the

Salisbury to

On 24 November 1971,
in Salisbury.

The Anglo-Rhodesian Accord represents

compromise by

the British

in that

major

government

the British

accepted, almost completely in tact, the Rhodesian constitution of 1969, removed the principle of NIBKAR as

and of the original

site for independence,

agreed upon
away on

in the Tiger

all of

allowed the

and Fearless

them except

prerequi-

six principles

negotiations,

principle number

British government to

five,

satisfy itself

gave
which

that the

proposed settlement was acceptable to the peopla of Rhodesia

as

whole.

Constitution,

In

the

addition

to

the

1969

Anglo-Rhodesian igreement

Republican
also included

the following important proposals:

A commission was to be formed to inquire into
1.
and make recommendations concerning discriainatory
legislation and a
justiciable declaration of
rights.
However,
attempts to remove racial
discrimination
vetoed
may be
if the
government
considers that there
are "overriding
considerations"
and the declaration of rights (which
is
qualified by numerous exceptions and provisos)
could be rendered largely ineffectual bv
the

34

the declaration

suspension of rights after

state of emergency.

of a

eventual political parity

The prospect of
followed by a black parliamentary majority in the
subsequent election.
2.

3.

sections

to entrenched

.Amendments

the

of

of the
white
the majority
affirmative votes of
representatives and a majority of black represenThese procetatives in the house of assembly.
possible future
while guarding against
dures,
retrogressive measures, could also be used to
[Ref. 17]
block progressive legislation-

Both the British and

Rhodesian governments expected the

black and white,

to accept
the
Rhodesians,
On 25 November 1971, the 3ritish
Anglo-Rhodesian Agreement.

majority of

government appointed

commission, headed by Lord Pearce,

to canvass the views of

former Lord of Appeal in Ordinary,

all

sections of Rhodesian

opinion,

the proposals

to Rhodesians

Commission visited Southern

opposed to

as a

whole.

Rhodesia from

11

Muzorewa,

who had emerged as

On

December

16

Muzorewa had formed the African National Council (ANC)

the express purpose of organizing
opposition to the

Anglo-Rhodesian
Commission

Accord.

presented to

which concluded
the

to 12

number of

the leading African politician in Rhodesia.

for

January

demonstrations organized by Africans

the settlement.
Much of this opposition was due
a

to the efforts of Bishop Abel

197 1,

Pearce

The

During that period there was considerable civil

March 1972.

unrest and

including Rhodesians in

to determine the acceptability

detention and living abroad,

of

that,

On

the

12

British

the proposals

people of Rhodesia as

lay

1972,

the

Parliament

were not

Pearce
report

acceptable to

whole:

We are satisfied
on our evidence that the proposals are acceptable
to the great
majority of
Europeans.
we
are
equally satisfied,
after
considering all our evidence,
including that on
intimidation,
that
the
majority of Africans
rejected the proposals. In our opinion the oeople
of Rhodesia as a whole do not regard the orobosals
as
acceptable
as
a
basis
for
independence.
[Ref. 181

35

for the
main reasons
believed that the
rejection of the proposals by the black majority were a deep
the
failure of the British and
distrust of the government,
Rhodesian governments to consult African nationalist leaders

The Commission

negotiations,

of the

any stage

during

Britain's ability to continue

belief in

and

persistent

influencing events

in Rhodesia,

The political wings of ZAPO/PCC and ZAND* were relatively

The miliand 1972.
inactive and ineffective between 1966
on the other hand,

ZIPRA and ZANLA,

tary wings,

although still very

active militarily,

were very

ineffective.

The

most straightforward method of discussing the problems faced

military wings of the nationalist

For many
organizations is by dealing with each separately.
by

the political

and

faced by ZAPOYPCC and ZAND

of the difficulties-

effort was not coordinated with

the fact that the political

the

were due to

military effort.

political

wings of

nationalist organizations

the

1966 and 1972

vas due to

in Rhodesia.

First

never recovered

ZAPO/PCC and

ineffectiveness of

and resulting

low profile

The

number

from the

movement had

had occurred

split that

Consequently,

ZANO in 1963.

between

of conditions prevailing

the nationalist

of all,

the

ZAPU

between
and ZAND

expended more effort denouncing each other than dealing with

the problems of GDI and majority rills.

eration prevented
front

to

This lack of co-op-

the nationalists from providing

negotiate

with

the

British

and

united

Rhodesian

governments.
Secondly,

by 1966,

been imprisoned in

most of the nationalist leaders had

Rhodesia.

Those who were

not in prison

were in exile abroad.

This situation had a number of nega-

tive

nationalist

effects

on

the

Communications between

the

movement

imprisoned

36

in

Rhodesia.

nationalist leaders,

exiled

was

very difficult,

coordinated effort

making any kind of

the leaders

majority of

With the

nearly impossible.

guerrilla leaders

and the

nationalist leaders,

the

in

the leadership of the nationalist moveprison or in exile,

young and inexperiwas often left to
ment inside ahodesia

enced members of the nationalist organizations.

Finally,

leaders
the

in

the credibility and coirage of the nationalist

was always very muoh

exile

Zimbabwean

the Frontline

and

abroad worked

nationalist leaders
States and

While
to court

the Commonwealth Nations,

the OAO,

the support of the ON,

in question.

set up

to

government

in

they received increasing pressure from the Frontline

exile,

particularly Tanzania and

guerrilla movement in aozambigue,

States,

Zambia and
to say

guerrillas and imprisoned nationalists

the FRELISO

nothing of

within Rhodesia,

the
to

return to Rhodesia so that they could better lead the masses

in the fight for independence and majority rule.

result of these problems was

The final

lack of leadership, organiza-

tion, and coordinated effort within the nationalist movement

inside Rhodesia between 1966 and 1972.

This struggle

continuing rivalry

within the struggle

between ZAPO and

ZANO called for

1966.

united

was typified

ZANO in late

by the

1965 and

front with ZAPO as long as

nification did not result in the subordination of

ZANO under
Nkomo's PCCZANO
wanted unity only in the

such a u

military aspects of the liberation struggle.

demanded nothing less

However, ZAPO

than the compLate disbanding

and the subordination of its

of ZANO

membership under Nkomo's lead-

Consequently, neither organization would give in to

the other's demands and the united front was not formed.
By

ership.

Liberation Couiittee of the 0A0 had recognized

ZAPO as the largest and most authentic Zimbabwean natinalist
party and had stopped financial support of ZANO.
The
1966,

the

37

funds to ZANJ

from going

to individual countries and

for support.

As

to

claiming

more

be

other organizations
and ZANU were

while both ZAPU

result,

prevent ZANU

OAU did not

dv the

cut-off of

than

revolutionary

other

the

and

spending much of their time trying to gather support from

and various Afro-Asian
Commonwealth of Nations,
the UN,

organizations, neither of them was carrying on

inside of Rhodesia.
of their

Because

lack

organization,

of

zations participated in any

occurred between

blame for

this cannot be placed

nationalist

1966 and

solely at the

abhorrent to the Rhodesian

sions abcut power-sharing.

talcing

felt that the

of

Front govern-

government could not invite

in

discus-

The British governaent,

on the

paternalistic view of

the situation,
to speak for

nationalists were not yet ready

themselves and that thereforethe British

out

never

The idea

had banned to participate

organizations that it
other hand,

were

they

of Rhodesia.

Certainly the Rhode sian

ment.

doorstep of

negotiations to determine the

black majority

majority rule was

Nevertheless,

1972.

Ironically,

leaders.

invited to participate in the

of the

and

the Anglo-Rhodesian negctia-

of

tias that

future

unity,

neither of the two major nationalist organi-

pur posef ulness,

the

revolution

would have to look

for their interests for them.

Not surprisingly, both

ZAPO and ZANU rejected all of the

agreements that had been negotiated

between the British and

Rhodesian governments

between 1966 and

feeling of

nationalist organizations

the black

talks were irrelevant

pendence.

States

In

Conference

It

to the Zimbabwean struggle

memorandum
on

1972.

to the

January

was the

that these

for inde-

Commonwealth Heads
1969

on

the

Fearl ess

Proposals, ZAPU stated that:

Any solution to the Rhodesian problem will have to
fulfill,
simultaneously,
all
of the
following
conditions:

38

of

and in cond
immediate
1.
freedom fighters condemned
imprisonment
in
fighters
detention and restriction;
and release of any freedom

itional Release of all

to
death;
all freedom
under
and
all those
dropping of all charges
fighters under arrest;

Joshua
free and unfettered conditions for Mr.
2.
African people of Zimbabwe,
leader of the
Nkomo,
to take full charge and conduct of all the affairs
people in ordar to bring about
of the African
immediate and unqualified majority rule;
3.

dissolution of the minority regime and all of

its institutions;

U.
drawing of an. unqualified najority rule independence constitution with no elements whatsoever
or
tribal
distinctions or
racial,
of class,
differentiations

and radical reconstruction

immediate, total,
police.
and administration so that
these correspond with the principles and purposes
of majority rule;
5.

of the army,

all racist and reactionary laws must cease to

immediately and be expunged from the
have effect
statutes.

6.

Major ^j
itya* aprule
7T*r _

irsrrr- s

j~

m ust
^

^r va^e

fec t
take
int. immediate
ef aw
-r

mm

i-

*g

-^

wi*h
*
mr m^mr

no

1 am mm

and'TustT "T5^ If T
The position of ZANO on the Anglo-Rhodesian negotiations
was exemplified in the following:

Britain and Ian Smith have no right to talk about

African independence
without African consent and
participation.
Both of them are imperialists and
nave no interest in
liberating the Africans.
Their talks about settlement have virtually no
effect on the Africans and can never
be regarded
as serious.
[Ref- 20]
As mentioned earlier,

African National

Council

Bishop
(

ANC)

Abel Muzorewa founded the

in December

purpose of opposing the Anglo-Rhodesian Accord.

ment to the

Pearce Commission made on

1971 for

In a state-

January 1972,

ANC concluded that:

that the proposals as they now stand

provide a satisfactory arrangement acceptable to the vast majority of the people in tne
country.
On behalf of these people, the ANC calls
for the Pearce Commission to rsport the rejection
of these terms, which, if accepted, can only serve
to perpetuate the existing divisions and injustice
in Rhodesia.
[Ref. 21 ]
It is clear

do not

39

the

the

In

letter

Douglas-Home concerning

Alec

to Sir

the

the
the Anglo-ahodesian Accord,
Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, the imprisoned leader of ZANO",
wrote from Salisbury Prison in January 1972 that:
The fundamental point you should bear in mind
Sir Alex, is that the problem facing this country
But your kith ana
is basically a political one.
kin, with your support, hope to solve it bv police
The
Anglo-Rhoaesian
action.
and
military
without military
Proposals cannot be implemented
because they
many years,
and* police actions over
and that is majority
lack one fundamental thing,
rule now.

Commission

Pearce

and

will giye this

sincerely hope that yoa
I
matter a further rethink so that a realistic solution to the present problem may be hammered out
and white,
and
for
the good of black
for good,
interested parties
if all
this can only be done
meet together, at a conference table on a basis of
give-and-take.
[Ref. 22]
Two key events occurred during Phase III that would have

the future leadership of

'an important effect* in determining

wings

political

the

Zimbabwe.

First of

National Council in 1971 had

beyond

far

the

formation

the

all,

immediate

movements

nationalist

the

of

of the

an importance that would reach

issue

of

the

Anglo-Rhodesian

of the heretofore relatively obscure 3ishop Abel

nationalist leader to

involved

African

The creation of the ANC signified the emergence

Proposals.

in

the Reverend

be

reckoned with.

Huzorewa as

The second event

Ndabaningi Sithole,

the leader

of

ZANU.

In 1969,
for

allegedly

Sithole

sentenced to six

plotting to assasinate

his cabinet members.

for

was

what reasons,

other

nationalist

already been done.

become

Ian Smith and

two of

During his trial, it is still unclear

Sithole denouncad

Although Sithole would later disavow

the armed struggle,

years in prison

the damage

political

the armed

his own repudiation of

to his credibility with the

and

leaders

guerrilla

Although Sithole would at

dominant actor in

the nationalist

40

struggle.

had

times again

movement,

the

his sincerity and dedication

questions about

completely recovering

from ever

him

This beginning

leader.

reputation as

his

Sithole's

of

'*ould prevent
a

gradual demise

is

important because it marked the beginning of Robert Mugabe's

Mugabe and Suzorewa, along
emergence as the leader of ZAND".
with Joshua

Nkomo,

will be seen,

as

become the

were to

triumvirate of Zimbabwean nationalist leaders.

The black nationalist guerrilla effort went

through

The realization
number of transitions between UDI and 1972.
political and military strength of
by the guerrillas of the

guerrilla armies to change both

the Smith regime forced the

Strategically,

1972.

very early in the phase,

rillas came to realize that they

a

British military

about

in

only

military and

the

in ZIPRA and

they

and majority rule would

intervention,

political

defeat

Rhodesian Front regime by the nationalist forces.

to the tactics,

bringing

Conseguently ,

about through British military

through

guer-

the

Rhodesia by

and order.

accepted the fact that independence

not come

1966 and

would not be able to force

intervention

breakdown of law

tactics between

strategy and their

their overall

ZANLA there was

of

but

the

In regard

change from

quasi-conventional warfare to classical guerrilla warfare.

knew by 19 69 that they could not hope to
The guerrillas
defeat the might
sive military

of the Rhodesian security

forces in deci-

Consequently,

the guerrillas

engagements.

began to avoid conventional battle

and starred
An important

to use

sorely

classec hit-and-run

part of these

politicization of

with the security forces

guerrilla tactics.

guerrilla tactics would

the indigenous population which

neglected during

the earlier

stages

be the

had been

of the

armed

struggle.

Although the nationalist organizations had adopted guerrilla warfare as a means to independence and majority rule

41

in the early 1960 's,

of British military intervention

Shortly after UDI,

the

nationalists had viewed guerrilla activity as a means of

provoking British intervention because the British had said
that only a breakdown of law and order would cause them to
not being

used to

into concluding

Consequently,

settlement
number

favorable to the nationalists.

small guerrilla bands,

of

trained abroad,
country, under the auspices of
were

Smith regime.
a

group.

win national

but as a means of intimidating Smith and Wilson

liberation,

which

struggle to

armed

wage an

guerrillas were

1966 f

before

Thus,

intervene militarily.

most of

infiltrated

were

into

the

and ZAPU, to harrass the

ZANtJ

The Crocodile Commando was an example of such

when it became apparent

Nevertheless,

Rhodesian Front government

would not give an

the British government *ould

that the

inch and that

not intervene militarily,

the

nationalists decided that they would have to use their guerwhite regime to achieve inde-

rilla forces to overthrow the

pendence and majority rule.

Immediately after

infiltration of

the

GDI,

bands into Rhodesia intensified.

On

guerrilla

April 1966,

group

of thirteen or fourteen ZAtfLA guerrillas crossed the Zambezi

River by canoe and entered Rhodesia.

three groups.

Two of the groups

This force broke into

ent to Umtali

and Fort

Victoria, respectively, with arms, explosives aad pamphlets.

Both groups were captured within

two weeks by the Rhodesian

security forces, although not without

struggle.

The third

group was captured during an attempted attack on the town of

Sinoia on the night of 27

28

April 1966.

[Ref.

23] In May,

ZIPRA also infiltrated guerrillas into Rhodesia and operated

in the Binga area

ZIPRA

guerrillas

sabotage,

but

west of Lake Kariba and in Bulawayo.

participated

like their

in

number

ZANLA counterparts,

i*2

of

acts

The
of

inevitably

contact

short end

of the

with the

Rhodesian

security forces.

both

1966,

stick

the

up on

ended

ZANLA and ZIPS

made

Throughout

infiltrate small

continued to

when they

Rhodesia.
The
guerrillas
guerrillas into
participated in a number of relatively small and usually
Host of the
unsuccessful raids and acts of sabotage.
bands

of

killed or captured by

guerrillas were either

the Rhodesian

security forces.
In 1967

Rhodesian security

and 1968,

forces and

the

nationalist guerrillas fought a series of conventional

battles that not only caused the nationalists to modify

intensification of the
The Wankie
divisions both within and between ZAND and ZAPO.
repreBattles, which occurred from July to September 1967,

their tactics but also resulted

sented

the

first

in

confrontation

large-scale

National Congress

the African

cooperative military

action against the

forces.

As a result of these meetings,

ance was

formed.

guerrilla

west of

about eighty

Victoria

Africa

of

of

Rhodesian

clashes
Army

In

a
a

ZAPU-SAANC allijoint ZAPU-SAANC

crossed the

late

their entry

July and

between
As

Oliver

Zambezi

Rhodesia's

into

the guerrillas was

occurred

patrols.

Rhodesian security

and moved

Palls

security forces.

number

men

Shortly after

Reserve.

the presence

country,

July 1957,

In late

force of

Sankie Game
the

of South

met with representatives of ZAPU to discuss and plan

(SAANC)

River

the

In mid-1967, represen-

security forces and the guerrillas.

tatives of

between

the

into the

discovered by
early August

guerrillas

Tambo,

the

and

Deputy

President-General of the SAANC,

Chikerema,
the
and James
acting president of ZAPU, had issued a joint statement on 19
August
1967
confirming the ZAPU-SAANC
alliance,
the
Rhodesian Front government

felt compelled to ask

the South

African government for assistance in fighting the guerrillas

43

lest Rhodesian security forces be stretched too thin.

South

contingent of para-military
police and a number of helicopters to Rhodesia to back up
series of clashes between the
In a
forces.
the security
security forces and the guerrillas from mid-August to late
September,
nearly all of the guerrillas were either killed
Africa responded

by sending

or captured.

The

reasons.
not

tion

ware significant

Wankie Battles

number

of

First, they demonstrated that the guerrillas could

hope to succeed in
with

security

for

one-to-one conventional confronta-

security

the

forces

were

forces,

backed up

particularly when
by
Rhodesian close

support and South African police and helicopters.

the guerrillas fought

well and inflicted light

the security

casualties on

command structure nor the

forces,

they

the
air

Although
to

moderate

had neither

the

sophisticated weaponry with which

to defeat the security forces in

Second, the

set battle.

alliance between ZAPO and the SAANC widened the rift between
ZANU felt that the SAANC should have stayed

ZAPO and ZANU.

in South

Africa to fight the

white regime in

instead of provoking the South

into Rhodesia to kill

against the

that country

Africans into sending forces

Zimbabwean nationalists.

ZAPU/SAANC alliance,

ZANO made

In arguing

the following

statement:
In guerrilla warfare we must
strive to soread the
enemy forces so that we can wipe them out one by
one.
The greatest help we can get from ANC is for
ANC to
wage intensive guerrilla warfare in South
Africa.
If ANC can pin
down
South
the whole
African
force
within
South
Africa,
then
Zimbabweans shall be left with Smith alone without
South African aid ...As it is now,
the ANC and
PCC-ZAPO alliance has
made it easy for Smith and
Vorster to unite and concentrate their forces to
slaughter Zimbabweans.
[Ref. 29]

In

South Africa,

Congress (PAC)

the SAANC's

rival,

the

Pan-Africanist

also criticized the joint ZAPtJ-SAANC alliance

when it declared that:

44

up a regular army,
all
You cannot hope to gobble
as
our
once in a conventional" style war,
brothers tried to do, and still claim to be waging
It is wholly unacceptable noth
guerrilla warfare.
[ Sef .
25]
in theory and practice.
at

According to Anthony

the debate between

Wilkinson,

A.

ZANU and ZAPO" which was sparked by the Hankie failure points
out one

practical differences

theoretical and

of the main

between the two rival nationalist organizations.

one

the

Africa

could

only

ZAPQ,

obtained

be

on the other

in geographic stages--first

the end South Africa."

The

to

be achieved

then Angola,

to prepare the way

and in

for the guerrilla

The native population

had not

Trustworthy collaborators had

not been

Rhodesia.

been politicized.

project

emphasized to the guerrilla

the support of the indigenous
win
the guerrilla struggle.

also

hoped to

ZAPU/ZIPRA had failed

struggle inside

Mozambique,

leaders the need of obtaining

if they

the

[Baf. 26]

Hankie failure

population

of southern

felt that the liberation

hand,

approached as

struggle should "be

identified nor informers cultivated.

ammunition caches were not in place.

Food,

weapons,

which was the

and

Consequently, when the

guerrillas were being pressured by the security forces,

local population,

on

simultaneous
under white minority

through

in all the countrias

revolt by blacks
rule.

the liberation

believed that

hand,

ZANU,

the

very object of the libera-

tion struggle, was of little or no assistance.

In fact,

the

hindrance to the guerrillas as

cultivated
many informers among

local population was often a

security forces

the

had

them.

The second

security

forces

group of

and

battles to
the

be fought

guerrillas

were

between the
the

Zambezi

Escarpement Battles which lasted from December 1967 to April

1968.
Having learned from their mistakes in the
Hankie
Battles,

the ZAPU-SAANC high command had dispatched several

45

elements to

reconnaissance

the

vicinity

Chigwasa

of the

River to establish base camps for ths main body which was to
approxi1958,
During December 1967 and January
follow.

guerrillas

150 ZAPO-SAANC

mately

infiltrated from Zambia

Again the presence of the

across the Zambezi into Rhodesia.

guerrillas was discovered by the security forces.

Between

which had broken up into

January and April, the guerrillas,
were constantly pursued
by the
bands,
of small
a number
security forces and again most of them were either killed or
But the fact that this time it took the security

captured.

forces four months instead two months to eliminate the guerrillas indicates that there were

two

factors working in the

guerrillas had evidentally

gained the support and loyalty of some of the local populaguerrillas

favor.

Second,

tion.

First,

ZANU,

the

probably desiring to take advantage of

the confusion caused by the ZAPO-SAANC guerrillas in eastern

began activities

Rhodesia,

the security forces

This caused

thinner than before.

The Kariba Battles
mostly SAANC

guerrillas.

and made

their way

Within

month,

captured all of

July

and

On 12 and

to an

Rhodesian

area the

The guerrillas

Rhodesia.
7

themselves much
involved

13 July,

total of

were

across the

other side

During that

engaged

of

Zambezi
Kariba.

had killed

security forces

the guerrillas.

the country.

August 1968

attempted to infiltrate fourteen

ZAND also

forces on

of

to spread

revolutionaries infiltrated

ninety-one
a

in other areas of

or

same period,

guerrillas into
by the

security

August as they were crossing Lake Kariba and all

of them were killed or captured during the next ten days.

There was very little guerrilla activity in 1969.

This
was
probably due to the severe defeats suffered by the

nationalist guerrillas in 1967 and

1970,

1963.

In early January

approximately 100 Z&PO guerrillas infiltrated into the

46

Victoria

region

Falls

several

units and

one

Nevertheless, by early February, most of the

installation.

tracked

had been

guerrillas

security force

South African

Rhodesian and

attacks on

moderarely successful

launched several

guerrillas

Thess

Rhodesia.

of

and eliminated

down

the

by

security forces.
ZAPU was not reported as being involved in any guerrilla

activity in

The ZANU

1971.

relatively inactive from

underground,

had been
to take

began

1968 through 1970,

Rhodesian security

Throughout 1971,

more action in 1971.

which

ZANLA guerrillas attempting to smuggle

In addition, a number of
arms, ammunition, and explosives.
forces intercepted

caches

ammunition

of

convicted of
students out

uncovered

were

ZAND also made

concerted

guerrilla training

for

in

in

teachers were arrested and

indoctrinating their students in the nationof school

number

ideology

alist

Zimbabweans

to recruit

Zambia.

explosives

During this period,

Salisbury.

effort

and

and

of

country over

of the

guerrilla training.

[Ref.

of

their

periods for

the level of ZANU guer-

1963 to 1971 never did

of activity by ZAPQ.

some

the holiday

In any event,

rilla activity from

take

planning to

reach the level

27]

ZANU's guerrilla movement was torn during this period by

a

number

of internal divisions

rilla action difficult.

problems

within

the

mentioned earlier,
1969.

The

successful guer-

One of the earliest

ZANtf

guerrilla

the denunciation

ment by the ZANO president,

in

that made

signs of the

movement

was,

as

of the guerrilla move-

Ndabaningi Sithole, at his trial

ZANLA guerrillas

particularly objected

Sithole^ reference to them as terrorists when

he said:

want to disassociate my name in thought.

word,
deed,
from any subvarsive activities,
trom any
terrorist activities and from any form of violence
[Ref. 28].
I

47

to

another major

also suffered

ZANO

ZANO

problem.

had

most militant and revolutionary of

always claimed to be the

the nationalist organizations.

from 1966 to 1971, the

Yet,

level of guerrilla activity by

was much lower than that

ZAND"

Richard Gibson has written that:

with great emphasis placed on
In
ZANO's case,
inevitable that some
was
also
it
militancy,
feel
file members should
leaders and rank and
after a relatively short while that the struggle
towards victory at a rapid
was
not proceeding
Complaints were raised about alleged
enough Dace.
[ Ref .
"bourgeoise leaders" in Lusaka.
29]

of ZAPO*.

and ZANO students living abroad

number of ZANU guerrillas

the ZANO

that

felt

military training and

out

in

party leaders

should undergo

return to Zimbabwe to

lead the guer-

felt that the

They

Zambia.

was hiding

leadership

party

rilla freedom fighters.

The

final strav

uing negotiations

with ZAPO

because it

leadership

Committee,

led

continued

in

which

by

Nathan

Shamuyarira'

of those who believed that

to

reorganization of the

members

the

Shamuyarira,

negotiations with

conference.

was impossible

that had so many divisions.

(ZAPU)

This announcement was accoa panied by

ZANO

in

announced that it was discontin-

ZANO"

talk to an organization

back came

Delegate Conference which was held

October 1971 at the ZANO

near Lusaka, Zambia.

the camel's

broke

that

ZAPO,

were

of

the
who

Central

supported

ousted from

the

bloc of dissidents included many

the ZANO leadership was not mili-

tant enough.

As was alluded to earlier,

a

number

of internal

defeats suffered

ZAPO was also suffering from

Largely because of the

and 1968,
there was a lack of

conflicts.

in 1967

confidence by the rank and file ZIPRA guerrillas in the ZAPO

leadership.

nications
Nkomo.

Also, ZAPO suffered from low morale and commu-

problems because

of the

imprisonment of

Joshua

Nkomo and his two main lieutenants were kept in two

48

As

the remainder of the

result,

were make

Accusations

very tight

unable to communicate between

they ware

security measures,
themselves or with
Lusaka.

Because of

inside Rhodesia.

separate prisons

that the

were

rumors

1969,

by

leadership in

ZAPO*

flying.

guerrilla commanders were

fraternizing with women and

time in Lusaka
In
using guerrilla labor to build homes for themselves.
there were disagreements along ethnic lines.
addition,
spending their

Disputes arose

with Chikerema,

the acting

president,

and

Nyandoro, the secretary-general, who were both Shona, on one

side, and Moyo,

the treasurer, Silundika,

the assistant

and Ndlovu,

icity,

offended part of

Chikerema

to a television film crew to

Moyo

the ZAPU

Zambian government when he

embarrassed the
the Zambia

secretary,

issued "Observations

criticized Chikerema*

interview

on Our

In January

leadership and
gave permission

guerrilla group on

February 1970,
Struggle," in which he

Zambezi River.

side of the

who were all

on the other side.

Sindebele-speaking Kalanga,
1970,

in charge of publ-

leadership.

In

this article,

In

Moyo

expressed concern at the poor state of ZAPU'z command structure, discipline, organization,

training,

recruitment,

and

intelligence [ Ref 30].

Several days later,
Chikerema
rebutted Moyo's accusations with "Reply to Observations on
Our Struggle."

He asserted that Joshua Nkomo had vested the

power of the ZAPU presidency in him during Nkomo'

took control of

ment and

all party functions,

imprisonto include

Chikerema also accused Moyo and his associates of

finance.

planning

coup against him.

In April,

Moyo

[Ref.

31]

group conceded

Chikerema'

authority

Chikerema could only act with the

approval of the ZAPU Executive Committee.
Throughout 1970,
tensions continued between the Chikerema and Moyo factions.
Finally,
President Kaunda called the five ZAPO leaders
with the

proviso

that

49

Zambia.

of being deported from

face the prospect

together or

start to work

demanded that they

together and

At this

time, the ZAPO leaders raada an effort to cooperate.

The truce

between the two

ZAPO factions was

broken in

June 1970 when Chikerema began talks with Nathan Shamuyarira

These
of ZANO to discuss the unification of ZANU and ZAPO.

December 1970 when

talks accelerated in
step down

parties

from

presidencies of

the

Robert

permit

to

Secretary-General of

ZANO,

opposed these

feud within

ZAPO manifested itself

Chikerema*

Rhodesia

to maintain

number

of

of

new

opponents

unification discussions.

confrontations and kidnappings.

order

detained

the

become president

to

within ZAPO

in

respective

their

Mugabe,

party that would unite ZANO and ZAPO.

Kaunda

had agreed

imprisoned Sithole and Nkomo

Salisbury that the

to

report came from

President

early 1971,

civil

deported

order,

members

ZAPO

of violent

in a number

In

were

who

This

to

promptly

arrested, tried, and convicted by the Rhodesian government.

Thus,

both ZANO and ZAPO were divided in

by late 1971,

to two factions,

one wanting to

maintain the status

by

cjuo

keeping ZANO and ZAPO separate and the other wanting to more

aggressively prosecute
and ZAPO.
and

the

guerrilla

the Chikerema

faction of

ZAPO broke

and merged to

Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI).

Shelton Ziwela,

pated in

uniting ZANO

In October 1971, the Shanuyarira faction of ZANO

parent organizations
was

war by

an ex-ZIPRA

two missions

Godfrey Savanhu,

Nathan Shamuyarira,
FROLIZI council.

for the

The Chairman of FROLIZI

guerrilla who had partici-

former ZANO member.

As would

formation of FROLIZI.

form the Front

into Rhodesia.
and Seorge

their

away from

The Secretary

James Chikerema,

Nyandoro were

be expected,

was

all on

the

Zambia welcomed the

Both ZANO and ZAPO denounced FROLIZI

while the OAO was hesitant

third nationalist/guerrilla

to give official recognition to

organization.
50

comparison of the strategies and goals of ZAND,

ZAPU r

By 1971, ZANU
FROLIZI as of 1971 is very enlightening.
direct confrontation with the
had abandoned the strategy of
Instead, greater emphasis was to be placed
Bhodesian Army.
and

the workers and peasents in

upon the political education of

change in emphasis were to

The purposes of this

Zimbabwe,

and to recruit

more people

The strategic aim of

ZANU was to

support of the masses

gain the

for guerrilla training.

cripple the Rhodesian

demoralize white Rhodesia ns and
economy by forcing the Rhodesian government to draw civilian
agriculture,

manpower away from industry,

fill the ranks of the army

and business to

which would be tied down fighting

small guerrilla bands in many parts of the countryZAPU believed that

similar strategy.
well-equipped
the white settler power was based in a large,
and communications
army,
a
good transportation network,
ZAPO advanced

facilities.

ZAPO,

like ZANU,

these things with industry

regime was financing

instead

Consequently,

of trying to

concentrated

forces,

ZAPtJ

against

industrial,

also realized that the white

and trade.

the security

tie down

of sabotage

its efforts on acts

transportation,

and

communications

facilities, the use of land mines, and limited, well-planned

armed attacks.

Although it was the philosophy of both ZAND

engagements,

ZAPU's tactics were

FROLIZI advocated tactics that were

similar to those of

and ZAPU to avoid decisive

much more risk-free.

both ZAND and ZAPO.

lutionary strategy.

However, FROLIZI espoused

To FROLIZI,

true,

revolution was the ultimate

transfer of power would not suffice.
democratic

In late
do with

the

more revo-

national,
goal.

and

simple

FROLIZI^

1971,

unite ZANU and ZAPO.

to

immediate goal was still to

Ironically, it was to have very little

unification.

51

At

meeting

of the

OAU

ZANU and ZAPU made

Liberation Committee in January 1972,

FROLIZI was to

joint declaration of their intent to unite.

that it would

The OAU declared

united front later.

be asked to join this

give money only to this united

front.

In a

February 1972 meeting of the OAU Liberation Committee,

and ZAPU agreed to form a Joint Military Command

(JMC)

ZANU
.

The

conducting all
Ultimately,
FROLIZI
aspects of the "revolution ary" war.
never was allowed to join the united front, but the OAU gave
to be responsible

JMC was

for planning and

money to both the JMC and FROLIZI.

conference in August 1972 at which James

elected Chairman and Stephen Pazrienyatwa was

FROLIZI held

Chikerema was
elected

never was

FROLIZI

Secretary.

able

viable guerrilla or political organization.

by ethnic rivalries",

limited.

collapsed.

executive
ZANU.
In

Three

by Juna

1973

members of FROLIZI*

and another

Torn internally

nineteen

it

rejected FROLIZI

the

had

ordinary members
G. G.

Liberation Committee

OAU

application for membership.

52

virtually

seven-man national

Among them were Nathan Shamuyarira and

November 1973,

its guerrilla activities were extremely

result,

As a

to become

rejoined
Parirewa.

finally

FROH CONFLICT TO

IV.

A.

SETTLEMENT

RHODESIAN FRONT GOVERNMENT-NATIONALIST NEGOriATIONS AND

NATIONALIST SPLITS: 1972

1978

Phase IV of the Rhodesian crisis, which lasted from June

1972 through March

1978,

important period in

was the most

Beginning with

nationalist struggle.

the Zimbabwean

the

emergence of Bishop Abel Mazorewa's ANC as the most influennationalist

tial

organization

internal "settlement"
Muzorewa,

between the

Smith regime

and treads that would

an

and Bishop

period was the virtual withdrawal

negotiating

process after

relationship

1972.

of

the

The British

process as active parti-

would not re-enter the negotiating

cipants until late 1976.

failure

the
of

in this

government

of the British

Anglo-Rhodesian Accord in the Spring

negotiating

determine the final

The first significant event

outcome in Rhodesia.
the

with

this period was significant because of the devel-

opment of events

from

culminating

and

This change in the Anglo-Rhodesian

was

nany

in

ways

crucial

the

turning point in the nationalist struggle.

Because of

the successful campaign mounted

against the

Anglo-Rhodesian Accord by Muzorewa's ANC and because of the

British withdrawal from the
negotiating process,
Ian Smith
to the realization

finally came
have

Smith

to include

the

settlement would
nationalist leaders.
Consequently,

negotiations

began

Nevertheless,

with

that any

Muzorewa

Smith*s willingness

to

in

early

negotiate with

1973.

the

nationalists was not motivated so much by altruism as it was

by pragmatism.

ance

For although Smith

of negotiating

reality he

gave the outward appearseriously with the nationalists,

in

was not doing this.

53

In

fact,

Smith

used the

negotiations with
and 1977

1973

nationalist leaders

the various
means

as a

of

playing

upon the

between

divisions

within and between the nationalist organizations.

At various

Smith negotiated

this phase.

times during

But never did he negoand Nkomo.

the
tiate with the nationalist leader wh3 had, at the time,
backing of the majority of the nationalist organizations,
most importantly,
the power and the
or,
popular support,
with Muzorewa, Sithole,

Through this

black majority.
authority to speak for the
Smith hoped,
strategy of divide and conquer.

at the very

settlement that would insure a privileged

position for the white minority and, hopefully, maintain the
least,

to get

sta tus quo indefinitely.

Indirectly, Smith's actions would determine who would be

The divide and conquer stra-

the future leader of Zimbabwe.

tegy had the effect of making Muzorewa,

change their positions on

of them appeared to be an incon-

at different times each one

sistent opportunist whose basic

sincerity

much

only Robert

period,
wind"

were very

strict adherence to
would insure

bickering

credibility,

motives,

Throughout

question.

in

Mugabe would refuse "to

would

and it

Consequently,

number of issues.

a.

be his
a

and Sithole

Nkomo,

unyielding

blow with the

consistency and

and distrust,

ZANU

would

would carry on an

war during

this internal

Out of

emerge as

powerful Zimbabwean nationalist organization,

guerrilla

this

basio set of principles and goals that

his ultimate victory.

be ZANLA that

and

final

the

the

most

and it would

intensified and successful

years of the nationalist

struggle.

Finally,
and

the

significance of the 197U

subsequent transfer

FRSLIMO government

existence of

of power

in 1975

government,

Portuguese coup

in Mozambique

cannot be

new

underestimated.

The

who had itself been

54

to

nationalist

guerrilla organization only a few months earlier,

had
to and sympathetic to the nationalist cause,
influence on the negotiating

process,

adjacent
dramatic

the struggles within

the nationalist movement, and the guerrilla war.

In late 1972 and early

began

preliminary

Although

the

ANC

negotiations wilth the Smith regime.

was opposed to guerrilla warfare and
it was nevertheless unyielding

violent revolution,

demands

Bishop Abel Muzorewa's ANC

1973,

for immediate

majority

in its

Initially,

rule.

Smith

attempted to circumvent tha ANC by dealing only with his own

hand-picked group of African leaders and organizations.
as

influence

the ANC's

support increased.

Smith gave up

dealing with Muzorewa.

nationalist
because
operate

party

officially

overtly and

these tactics

popular
and began

because the ANC was the only

Thus,

was the only

it

organize

ability to

and

But

recognized by

the

R?G

and

nationalist organization that could

legally

Muzorewa's

within Rhodesia,

power and influence increased dramatically.

that the

fact that

would serve

the ANC

as his ace in

was based

Muzorewa hoped
-inside of Rhodesia

the hole during

the negotiating

efforts.

Although the nationalist guerrilla organizations outside

of

Zimbabwe

ZAPU,

(ZANO,

and

FROLIZI)

had

supported

Muzorewa's campaign against the Anglo-Rhodesian Proposals of

1972,

they

were

Rhodesian Front

organizations

denouncing

government.
did not

his

negotiations

The more

agree

with

with

the

radical nationalist

Muzorewa'a strategy

of

achieving democratic rule through non-violent aeans.

They
still felt that violent revolution was the only
means of
getting independence and majority rula in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe.
In addition,

ZANO",

ZAPO,

and FROLIZI were

still wasting

precious effort on verbal attacks on one another,

each one
claiming
to
be
more
radical
than the
two
other

organizations.
55

was further complicated by the weak link-

The situation

between

ages

political

guerrilla and

the

wings

of

the

The JHC had never gotten off the

nationalist organizations.
sincere effort to
ZANU and Z APU did not aaks any
ground.

3y 1973, ZANU

coordinate military planning and operations.

very

was

advanced

far

setting up

Rhodesia and

in
a

infiltrating guerrillas into

political infrastructure in the

ZANU leaders felt that joint mili-

Rhodesian country-side.

tary operations with ZAPU would only serve to slow their own

progress.

In March

ZANU to form a joint

persuaded ZAPU and

tical council.

OAU concilliation

an

1973,

council

military and poli-

As might have been axpected, this organiza-

tion was no more effective than the JMC,

and both ZANLA and

thair own independent,

ZIPRA continued to go

uncoordinated

ways.

betwesn ZANU and ZAPO",

In addition to this split

split between the ZANU

an additional

was

and the ZANLA guerrilla

Nhongo and

Rex

commanders.

Josiah Toagogara,

their guerrilla army

there

political leaders

The military leaders.

refused to

to the ZANU political

subordinate

leaders and did

legitimate leader of ZANU.

They felt that, since they had the military power, that they
also had de facto political power.
Muzorewa and Smith began unofficial discussions during
not acknowledge

Sithole as the

the first several months of

occuring until

not

sions,

17

July

1973,

1973.

which lasted into 1974,

ciple of immediate majority rule

the first official talks

Throughout these discusMuzorewa stuck to the prinwhile Smith was unyielding

in his demand that the nationalists would have to accept the

Anglo-Rhodesian Proposals.
Smith totally rejected all
ANC demands
to end
racial discrimination in land tenure,
197

education,

franchise,

political detainees on

and the civil service and to free

197 1 proposals
the grounds that the

56

Partly as

negotiable.

were not

pressure from the guerrillas and

to accept the 1971

reaction to increasing
partly to pressure the ANC
a

Smith introduced

proposals,

number of

repressive laws in 1973 and 1974.

In a 20 March 1974 letter from six imprisoned members of
ZANU's

including

Sithole and

Mugabe,

condemned for conducting negotiations

with an

central committee,

Muzorewa was

The ANC gave Muzorewa

the Smith government.

peded progress towards majority rule.

Smith's offers

1974,

Smith

1971 proposals.

The

By March

to budge from the

was still refusing

20 June

and on

constitutional talks.

suspended the

mandate to
provide for unim-

with Smith that would

reach an agreement

ANC rejected

discussions with

asked to terminate all

illegal regime and

1974 Muzorewa

At this

Smith

time,

leaked information that was intended to undermine Muzorewa's

credibility

with

the nationalists.

Muzorewa had agreed to the

the accusations saying

proposals as

Smith produced

that he had only agreed

negotiation."

"basis for
a

document signed

stated -hat "Bishop Muzorewa,

in

of the African National Council,

he accepted the

1971

proposals for

by

"as

signed on

17

basis for negotiation

from Smith*

version of the

in the Rhodesia Herald on

is probably

2 7

best elucidated

In September

Bishop

1974,

Muzorewa which

ga/e an understanding that

a.

settlement and that he

on

to implement the proposals."

ment had been

to the 1971

his capacity as President

would urge the British government,

people,

that

Muzorewa denied

proposals.

1971

claimed

Smith

behalf of th African
[Ref. 32] This agree-

August 1973 and

the key phrase,

(or discussion) ,"

agreement,

which was reprinted

September 1974.
by Martin

was missing

This incident

and Johnson

in The

Str ug gle for Zimb abwe:

/

October,
in
circular distributed to ANC
offices,
the SishoD
claimed that he had been
cheated into signing' the documsnt.
He said that
he had
initiated the talks,
to which
Smith had
come with a prepared
statement apoarently
under
On

15

a.

57

their
the
had changed
ANC
the assumption that
settlement proposals and were
minds over the 1971
then.
This was not the
now willing to accept
Smith produced the prepared
"when Mr.
case.
but I said that
statement for signing, we signed,
the 1971 settlement proposals could only form the
Smith to amend
I asked Mr.
basis for discussion.
document and I believed he had
of the
his coDy
presence of the two witnesses."
done so in the
an uncle of
Chad Chipunza,
One of the witnesses,
politician from
conservative
Muzorewa and
a
Federal days, who favoured a settlement based upon
issued a statement saying he
the 1971 proposals,
claim that he had Been
was amazed at the bishop's
cheated and suggested Muzorewa should aracefully
Even
retire from politics and shepherd his flock.
taking into account Muzorewa' s political ineptiit is incredible that he should have signed
tude,
totally against the
agreement which went
an
exoressed
to
the
Pearce
opinion
African
Even more incredible,
or
perhaps
Commission.
merely naive, is the fact--even if he really meant
to include the phrase that the proposals ware only
for discussion"--he signed the document,
a "basis
been inserted.
that it had
before ensuring
[Ref. 33]

events in Portugal had had

Meanwhile,
on

the situation

Rhodesia.

in

forces conducted

Portuguese armed

On
a

against the government of Dr. CaetanD

the Portuguese

Bissau,

three

The coup

coup d'etat

The primary reasons

war weariness of

affected the situation in

First

be broken

withdrawing from

up.

It was

in Guinea

involvement in Mozambique,

Rhodesia in

Portuguese-South

nationalist guerrillas was

obvious that Portugal was

South Africa,

Africa.

develop

the

all,

of

Africa-Rhodesia alliance against

having to

successful

the

and Mozambique and the rampant inflation in

ways.

about to

1974,

Army over the counterinsurgencies

Angola,

Portugal.

dramatic effect

April

25

were the disillusionment and

for the coup

who

was faced with the

had economic

prospect of

(probably FRELIMO)

relationship with a new

Mozambique.
The Vorster

government

had

recognition

Portuguese

government.

good

working

governient in
given immediate
In

addition,

to

the South

the

new

African

forces were starting to take heavier casualties in Rhodesia.

Consequently,
of view,

that

it was very possible,

from Ian Smith's point

South African support for

gency would wane.

58

his counterinsur-

of hostile governments on two

power

supply,

in

the MPLA came

guerrillas

Zimbabwean

the

of sanctuary,

increased sources

assistance.

and

involvement and failure in Angola would ultimately

Finally,

cause both
Ian

giving

Angola,

in

Indeed,

of its borders.

in Mozambique and

to power

1975 FRELIMO came

to

faced with the prospect

the Smith regime was

Secondly,

the United States

and South Africa

Smith to seriously negotiate

to pressure

solution to the Rhodesian

dilemma.

Minister Vorster

Prime

mid-1974.

3y

of South

Africa

Africa's best interests to

realized that it was in South
Vorster felt that the
defuse the situation in Rhodesia.
Portuguese

and the likelihood of

into power in Mozambique made

coup d'etat

government coming
regime*

military defeat inevitable

solution could

be worked

situation

changed
Rhodesia.

South

seaports,

labor,

Vorster

attitudes

government in Mozambique.

hoped that

problem and

policies

and

upon

factor

towards

Mozambique's

Vorster felt that he had to

defuse the popular appeal of radical black

do something to

leaders such

primary

hydroelectric power would require

working relationship with the new

and

to develop

the

dependence

Africa's

the Smith

unless a constitutional
Rhodesia.
Indeed,
the

Mozambique was

in

Vorster's

influencing

out in

FRELIMO

Also,

as FRELIMO's

Samora Machel.

by assisting
aiding,

in
rather

Thus,

Vorster

settlement of

the Rhodesian

than hindering,

Mozambique's

transition to an independent government, he might be able to

obtain the respect of the moderate black states and possibly

revive

his dream

of

South African

dominated

southern

African economic community.

If Vorster

was going

to have

pressuring Smith to work for

would need an ally among one

any hope

of success

in

constitutional settlement, he

of the African states to apply

59

the

same

type of pressure

upon

nationalist guerrillas

trie

between Smith and the nation-

and to act as an intermediary

Countries such as Malawi, Senegal, and Ivory Coast

were out of consideration because thsir close relations with
South Africa and the former colonial powers gave them little

alists.

Julius Nyerere of Tanzania

credibility with the guerrillas.
since 1971 he had consistently opposed all
was out because

nationalists and

between

negotiations

because he

regime and

was

still

guerrillas

also unlikely

guerrilla movement

radical Marxist

Tete Province into Rhodesia.

and

guerrillas through

of ZANLA

the infiltration

assisting in

It was

Smith

any help from Hachsl's FR2LIM0,

that Vorster could hope for

which was

providing the

still

training facilities.

with rear base

illegal

the

only alternative left to

The

Vorster was Zambia, who, although still allowing ZIPRA guer-

rillas to
tory,

had

infiltrate from
the most no

Tanzania through

gain economically

Zambian terriand politically,

from a Rhodesian settlement.

Representatives of
with representatives of
early October 1974.
be willing

to help

Vorster*

government

secretly

net

Kaunda's government in New

York in

Zambia asked South Africa if she would

get rid of the
Smith regime and help

bring about majority rule and independence in Rhodesia.

The

Zambian government also asked if the South Africans would be

willing to allow the UN to assume responsibility for guiding

Namibia towards

independence.

The South

Africans replied

that they would be willing to assist in

negotiated settle-

ment in Rhodesia

guaranteed transi-

as long as there was

tion period in Rhodesia and

was independent,

rilla attacks

it

guarantee that,

would net be used as a

on South

Africa.

On

Zambian government in Lusaka drafted

be come known as the

1974,

the

document that was to

"Detente Scenario."

60

base for guer-

October

3
a

once Zimbabwe

Entitled "Towards

Summit:

the

An

of this document were

provisions

Afria," the aost important

Southern

Change in

Peaceful

Approach to

as follows:
i.
peaceful solution
Zambia agreed to work for
Rhodesia, along with the governments of Tanzania,
m
Botswana,
and Mozambique as long as such a solution
a

justice for all

would provide for freedom and
or ethnic
people, regardless of race, color, creed,
group.

Zambia and the o^her Frontline States would not

war effort
if peaceful
support an increase in the
conditions are possible.
2.

Tanzanian,
Botswanan,
and
The Zambian,
Mozambiquen governments would agree to a summit with
the Vorster government only if its objectives were
clearly defined.
3.

South Africa was to promise to recognize de

4.
and promise "Jo"
jure the new FRELIM3 government
and finansupport it politically, economically,
cially.

South Africa was to prevent

Mozambique by mercenaries based in
South Africa.
5.

attacks upon
Rhodesia and

South Africa was to initiate action to renego6.

and port charges,
tiate terms on harbors, railways,
the supply of hydroelectric power from Cabora Bassa,
migrant* labor, and any other South African interests
in Mozambique.

Mozambique would reaffirm its policy of non-aggression against South Africa and would not allow
its territory to be used as a base for mercenaries
or insurgents attacking into South Africa.

7.

Mozambique would nor interfere in the internal

affairs of other indaoendent countries, including
South Africa.

8.

South Africa would advise the Smith regime that

political solution to the Rhodesian problem is
"most negotiable and urgent."

9.
a

South Africa would not interfere in Rhodesia's

10.
internal affairs and would withdraw all security
personnel and equipment for Rhodesia.
11.
South Africa would declare that a negotiated
settlement was in Rhodesia's best interests and that
it was against any further escalation of the war.

The above conditions

of the "Detente Scenario"

be met by the end of November.

so.

that

In addition,

the

the South

Rhodesian

were to

Vorster had no trouble doing

African government was to ensure

government

61

moved

rapidly

towards

constitutional conference by implementing

the following six

points:
1.
Releasing all. political da^ainees and orisoners
since their voice is both credible and final in any
In this connection, Mr. Joshua Nkomo,
negotiations.
their lieutenants
and
Ndabaningi Sithole
Rev.
command tremendous influence and will for a long
time remain the voice of reason;

2.
Lifting the ban on ZAPU and ZAND and the
movements on leaders so that they
restrictions of
participate fully and constructively in the search
alternative to
for a just political solution as an
the current armed struggles;

Suspend political trials and

sentences for political offenders;
3.
4

tion;

revoke

death

Suspend all politically discriminatory legisla-

(South African Government)

Gearina the SAG
administration to help defuse racial tension ana
create a political climate for the acceptance of the
proposal of the constitutional conference reprethe Rhodesian Front,
and
senting ZAPO and ZAND*,
parties in Rhodesia under British
other oolitical
chairmanship.
In these circumstances the current
armed struggle will be replaced by a new sDirit of
cooperation and racial harmony *hich is the foundatherefore justiftion for political stability and
South
African security
ying withdrawal of the
forces
5-

SAG to make it clear that they will support any

legally constituted government irrespective of it's
racial composition in Rhodesia[Ref. 34]

6.

Zambia
Mozambigue)
by the

her "friends"

and

in turn promised to

South African and

and

work

Botswana,

towards

and

publicly welcome these moves

Rhodesian governments and

their influence to ensure that

struggle

(Tanzania,

ZAND"

to use

and ZAPU cease the armed

political

solution

to

the

problem.
In regard to Namibia, South Africa was asked to reaffirm
its policy of self-determination in accordance with the will
of the majority,

tion in Namibia,

to recognize SWAPO as a political organizato cease

physical abuse of prisoners,

to encourage ex-patriot

and

Namibians to return to the country

to participate in the political process.
It should be noted
that
the "Detente Scenario" did not ask South Africa to

62

release Namibian political prisoners,

carry

out the

process

or to allow the UN to

Namibia,

Bay as an intergral part of

to acknowledge Walvis

Namibia's decolonization.

of

StfAPO to cease

her "friends" would ask

return,

Zambia and

violent

activity and

itself

to register

as

legitamate

provided South

opposed to violent change,

political party

In

Africa allowed it to do so.

the "Detente Scenario" were

All of these commitments in

to

be met

by mid-December

1974 whan

and Kaunda

would be held between Vorster

other Frontline leaders)

cancelled when

summit

conference

(and hopefully the

Unfortunately, the conference was

Vorster was unable to

keep his part

of the

his plans to withdraw South

He had to postpone

agreement.

African military personnel from Rhodasia.

Nevertheless,

convince Smith

able to

Vorster was

release the detained nationalist leaders

ence with the

in Lusaka in

the pressure

from Vorster

It wasn't

caused Smith to

just

release the

In 1974 in Rhodesia security

heavier casualties.

of guerrillas

ratio

Iha

war and

in

whites twenty to one.

country

where blacks

transition

Mozambique

was over

free the
they would

borders.

outnumbered

in

June

In addition,

preceding

period

1975,

the

an

Thus,

it

caasefire

independent
Front

government on

was to Smith's advantage to

leaders in
that would

military threat to the Smith regima.

63

when the

Rhoiesian

facing a hostile PHELIHO

imprisoned nationalist
agree to

ZANLA's change in strategy was taking

nine-month

one of its

to security

which was unacceptable in

its toll against the security forces.

government would be

nationalist leaders.

forces had started taking much

forces killed was five to one,

guerrilla

to go to a confer-

leaders of the Frontline States

November 1974.
that had

to

the hope

that

eliminate the

On

November

while in

N&abaningi Sithoie was,

19 74,

prison, suspended as the president of ZANU by the imprisoned

Sithoie'

The central

suspension.

reasons for

There ware several

Committee.

ZANG Executive

committee

still

was

enraged at Sithoie' s denunciation of the armed struggle at

Sithoie refused to appear before
In 1974,
his 1969 trial.
to answer
questions about his
central committee
the ZANU

"quisling."

special

officers.

branch

he was suspected by the other ZAND*

Consequently,
being

Rhodesian

with

discussions

Sithoie had had several

Also in 1974,

1969 denunciation.

Finally,

the

straw

leaders of

that broke

that "one-man,
camel's back was Sithoie' s statement
vote" was not an immediate goal bat merely a slogan
used in mobilization

and negotiations.

vote on Sithole's suspension,

Tekere,

In the

the

oneto be

November

and Nyagumbo

Nkala,

voted for the suspension while Mugabe abstained from voting.

as chairman,

Malianga,

suspension
without

the

on

on 8 November

ZAND"

vote but opposed Sithole's

grounds that

central

Ref . 35]

government officials arrived

up Sithoie

1974 to pick

they were

unconstitutional

was

it

meeting of the ZANU Congress.

When Zambian
ence,

did not

instead

committee

had

fox the Lasaka confer-

Mugabe

et by

in Salisbury

decided

and Malianga.

The

Mugabe,

the

that

General-Secretary, and Malianga, the Secretary for Youth and

replace Sithoie

Culture,

should

Lusaka,

Mugabe and

Malianga,

in

Lusaka.

who

Arriving in

were unknown

to

the

Frontline State leaders, were confronted by Kaunda, Nyerere,

and Machel.
Accused of instigating a coup in prison and of
acting against
from

the ZANU constitution,

contacting their

under house

arrest over

ZANU colleagues
night,

and

they

were prevented

in Lusaka,

unceremoniously flown

back to detention in Rhodesia the next morning.

64

placed

On

either as
Lusaka,

November

to Lusaka,

In
private individual or as the ZAND president.
Kaunda told Sithole that while the Frontline State
a

ZANU ran

Sithole's leadership

to impose

not want

leaders did
ZAND",

Kaunda called Sithole

1974,

losing

risk of

the

the

support of

Sithole met with five members of the ZANLA war council,

with Sithole,
been

(DAHE)

Mudzi,

Zambia,

in

the

Tongogara, the Chief of Defense,

National Chairman who had

Administrative Secretary,
and Matuare,

stated that

Tongogara

Coamisar.

Sithole had endangered

six leaders

betrayed

by

the

should return to
their minds.

to suspend

training facilities in Tanzania

ZANJJ

that Kaunda might use the

excuse to throw ZAND out

the oonclusion

came to

the Politcal

the decision

and Chitepo expressed the opinion

suspension as an

the

who had been in prison

Nyangumbo,

the ZAND

Chitepo,

the

not resolve its internal crisis.

Frontline States if it did

Dare re Chimurenga

upon

of Zambia.

that Sithole

executive committee

and

that

Que Que Prison to convince

The

had been

Nyangumbo

them to change

Meanwhile, Sithole and his associates flew to

Tanzania where they were assured by Nyerere of his continued

support of ZAND.
them that he

Dpon arriving in Mozambique,

would arrest

every guerrilla

the ZAND executive committee did

Sithole's suspension.
adopt

Sithole's suspension
congress.
(Ref. 36]
Sithole

Frontline

not change its decision on

After much

of

With

in lozambique if

criticism by

Nkaia and

Nyagumbo was able to convince the execu-

Tekere at Que Que,

tive committee to

Machel told

resolution suspending

pending

reinstated

state leaders

as

were free

final

ZAND'S
to

the effect

decision by

the

president,

the

concentrate on

larger and more critical problems of uniting the ANC,

ZAPO,

and

Rhodesia.

FHOLIZI

Betweeen

and initiating
3

and

peace

December 1974,

65

summit

the
ZAND,

with

meetings were

held in Lusaka

Machel of

leaders

(Samora

Botswana,

Julius

between the Frontline State

Secetse

Mozambique,

Khama of

Nyerere of Tanzania, and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia)

leaders of the ANC (Muzorewa), ZAND" (Sithole), ZAPO
and FROLIZI
on

(Chikerema)

December

1974

As a

dissolve their individual

(Nkomo)

result of these discussions,

nationalist

the

and the

leaders

agreed

to

rgan izations and to form a united

front under the name African National Council

(ANC).

Muzorewa was appointed

new ANC.

the president of the

Bishop
The

organization and functions of this new ANC were explained in

the "Zimbabwe Declaration of Unity" of

ZANU, ZAPO,
in the ANC.

FROLIZI,

December 1974:

and ANC hereby agree to unite

The parties recognize the ANC as the unifying

force of the people of Zimbabwe.
(a)
They agree to consolidate the leadership of
bythe inclusion into it of the presithe ANC
dents of ZANO t
ZAPO,
and
FROLIZI under the
chairmanship ct the president of the ANC.
(b)
and FROLIZI shall each appoint
ZAPO, ZANO,
the enlarged
three other persons to join
ANC
executive.

2.

shall have the

The enlarged ANC executive
following functions:
for
the
(a)
To prepare
any conference for
transfer of power to the majority that might be

4.

called.
(b)
To
prepare for the holding of a congress
within four months at which
revised ANC constitution shall be
(i)
A
adopted.
(ii)
The leadership of the united people of
Zimbabwe shall be elected;
(iii)
A statement of policy for the new ANC
will be considered.
(c)
To organize the people for such conference
and congress.

The leadership of the ZAPO.

ZANO,
and FROLIZI
call upon their supporters and all Zimbabweans to
rally behind the ANC under its enlarged executive.
5.

ZAPO, ZANO, and FROLIZI will take steps to merge

their respective organs and structures into the ANC
before the congress to be held within four months.

6.

The leaders recognize the

inevitability of
continued armed struggle until the total liberation
of Zimbabwe.
7.

Signed:
Signed:
Signed:
Signed:

Abel Tendekayi Muzorewa

President of ANC
Joshua Mquabuko Nkomo President of ZAPO
Ndabaningi Sithole President of ZANO
James Robert Chikerema President of FROLIZI

66

State House, Lusaka

[Ref. 37]
The "Salisbury Declaration

"

of 11

December 1974 furthei

elaborated on the basic position and goals of the new ANC:

Recognizing the paramount need for unity in the
Zimbabwe liberation struggle, the executive commitZANU.
FROLIZI.
and AMC have met in
tees of ZAPU,
Lusaka to discuss the aims, objectives, and methods
on the
Full agreement was reached
to be pursued.
following points:
We have agreed to unite under one organiza1,
We have
agreed
tion with immediate effect.
further,
that this organization shall be the
African National Council.
We shall be working for the indeoendence of
2.
We assume that on this demand for
our country.
is
no
difference among
independence there
But there nas until
Rhodesians of all races.
now been a difference on the kind of independence which Zimbabwe must have.
The Rhodesian
Front has,
sought independence on
in the past,
We
reject that.
the basis
rule.
of minority
The indeoendence we still seek,
is independence
on the basis of majority rule.

For the purposes of achieving that Dbject^ve

have alwavs been ready to enter into negotiaNow that some of
tions with others concerned.
us have been released from detention, we believe
the time
us to repeat
this offer.
is ripe for
sides
Without pre-conditions
on both
we
are
3-

we

ready to enter into immediate and meaningful

negotiations with* leaders
of
the Rhodesian
Front,
British government in
and with
the
Britain.
on the steps to be taken to achieve
independence on the basis of majority rule.
As
sincerity,
a demonstration of our
all
freedom fighters will be instructed,
as soon as
been fixed,
a
date
for negotiation has
to
suspend fighting.
4.

We are not racialists.

We accept the right
white Rhodesians to
li?e
in Rhodesia
and
share the same rights and obligations of citizthe
enship as
their
fellow Hhodesians
of
majority community,
without any discrimination
on the grounds of race, colour, or creed.
5.

of

We call
udoq all Rhodesians,
and
all who
reside in Rhodesia, to remain calm,
maintain
peace and to go about
their normal business,
while these
matters are being considered,
and
while any negotiations are proceeding.

6.

call upon all Zimbabweans, wherever they

to remain
united behind
the demand
for
independence on the basis of majority rule.
and
to
give full support to tae African National
Council.

7.

We

are,

67

ror our
continue zheir support
abroau to
or. the
struggle until independence is achieved
basis of majority rule.

President of AHC
Abel Tendekayi Muzorewa
Signed:
Former President of
Joshua Mgabuko Nkomo
Signed:
ZAPU
Ndabaningi Sithole Former President of ZANU
Signed:
Dambadza Chikerema
Former
James Robert
Signed:
President of FROLOZI [fief- 38]
It was

that

Lusaka and

clear from the

ANC was

the new

willing to

Salisbury agreements

negotiate directly

with

Smith's Rhodesian Front government ia order to bring about

peace settlement and majority rule.

statements and

This differed from the

previous nationalist

policies of

the Smith government as

tions who viewed

organiza-

an illegal regime

that could not be

negotiated with.

sions between the

Smith government and the new

Ne vertheless,

discus-

ANC were in

trouble from the very start

Smith accused the nationalists
of not enforcing the ceasefire which had been agreed upon as
.

precondition for any

refused to attend

future talks.

Additionally,

talks outside of Rhodesia

grant immunity from arrest to

and refused to

exiled nationalist: leaders to

allow them to attend talks within Rhodesia.

nary talks

between the

in Salisbury

conference was

finally held

Inspite of the personal efforts

broke down soon

After prelimi-

the AHC,

RFG and

between the

railway car on the Victoria Falls

the talks

Smith

two parties

Bridge on

August:

26

in a

1975.

of both Kaunda and Vorster,

after they began.

The primary

reason for the deadlock was Smith's refusal to even consider

any transfer of power from

minority to majority rule.

Realizing the futility of peaceful negotiations, the ANC

already begun to make preparations to renew and accelerate the guerrilla war. On 8 July 1975 , ANC leaders had met
had

in

Dar

Council

es
(ZLC)

Salaam to

establish

and to send

the

Muzorewa,

Zimbabwe
Nkomo,

Chikerema to visit guerrilla camps in Tanzania.

68

Liberation

Sithole,

and

The ZLC was

and squipping the guerrillas

zc be responsible for training

carrying out the guerrilla

planning and

and

peace talks break down.

war should the

might have been expected the ZLC

is

failed in its attempts to to coordinate the guerrilla effort

within the nationalist

due to the rivalries and factionalism

would go

Ian Smith

movement.

to great

efforts to

take

advantage of this internal factionalism in the ANC and its

sub-organizations in order to negotiate an internal settlement with

what he felt were

and respon-

the more moderate

sible and reasonable members of the nationalist movement.

between Bishop Muzorewa and

exploit was that

the breakdown

Shortly after

able to

that Smith was

split within the ANC

The first

Joshua Nkomo.

7ictoria Palls

of the

disagreements between Muzorewa and Nkomo came to

talks,

head.

On

who had aspiraSeptember 1975, Muzorewa expelled Nkomo,

challenging Muzorewa' s authority and heading the
tions of
11

ANC himself,

from the ANC for initiating independent discus-

sions with and collaborating with the Smith government.

late September 1975,
was attended

two-thirds

by six

of the

September 1975,

Nkomo held his own ANC congress,

thousand delegates,
old

ANC

shortly thereafter he began

to discuss the possibility

which

including nearly

executive committee.

Nkomo was elected

In

On

28

president of the ANC and

preliminary meetings with Smith

of reopening formal negotiations.

December 1975,
Smith
and Nkomo announced their intent
to negotiate a constitutional settlement.
This declaration
On

to negotiate was immediately denounced

Sithole.

Sithole declared that ZANLA guerrillas would begin

anew the guerrilla

shortly,

war in Zimbabwe.

Sithole*s threat

had control over the ZANLA

Formal

by both Muzorewa and

will be discussed

was meaningless as he

no longer

forces.

negotiations between

during the first

As

Smith

half of March 1975.

and Nkomo

occurred

During this period,

and United States governments

both the British

urged Smith

Nkomo proposed
to Smith the creation of a 144-seat Legislature with between
Smith,
on the other
36 and 58 seats to be held by whitas.
wanted a three-tier assembly with one-third of the
hand,
and oneone-third for blacks,
seats reserved for whites,
to moderate his stand against majority rule.

third selected by electors on a common role with high qualiThe Rhodesian Front government felt that this
fications.
the majority

control of

insure whita

system would

Nkomo and

assembly seats for at least ten to fifteen years.

to reach

Smith failed

them collapsed on

March

leaders

of ZANO"

brought to

was taking place between the

head on 13

long time,

the split within ZANO"

national chairman.

the ZANU

militant nationalist,

rivalry within

March 1975 with the assasination

Herbert Chitapo,

in Zambia of

Chitepo,

being torn

ANC was also

Although this

and ZANLA..

had been brewing for

ZAND"

the

power struggle that

apart by

talks between

1975.

same period,

During this

was

and the

agreement

an

of the

had opposed the consolida-

tion of all the nationalist organizations under the new ANC.

He had

opposed the planned ceasefire

also

with the

Hhodesian governaent.

By early

primary concerns were reinforcing

into direct conflict

the ANC,

of a

constitutional settlement,
cut back

In pursuance

three organizations

were accused of being responsible

including the Rhodesian government, ZAPU, and

wing

violence and

these

wing of

assistance they had been giving to

ZANLA guerrillas.
hen Chitepo was murd-

number of groups

for his death,

Sithole' s

with the Sithole

on the

Chitepo and his

ered,

Chitepo's

Consequently, this

and the government of Zambia.

ZANO",

had

1975,

and resupplying the ZANLA

guerrillas fighting inside of Rhodesia.

brought him

and negotiations

of

ZANU.

In

ordar

to prevent ZANLA from

70

to

prevent

using Zambia as

further
a

base

from which to intensify the guarrilla war,

the

Zambian

arrested most

government
were residing

leaders who

of

in Zambia.

23

or.

ZANO/ZANLA

the

Kaunda was

not to

The ultimate

October 1976.

release these leaders until 17

March 1975

effect of the Chitepo assasination and the subsequent crackto further factiondown on ZANLA guerrillas in Zambia was
alize both ZANO and the ANZ
in accordance with the Lusaka

Sithole,

On 10 May 1975,

ordered ZANO to dissolve and

Unity Accord of December 1974,

to integrate

refused

into the

and the

peace

in Zambia

ZANU DA32

The

ANC.

Sirhole's orders

to obey

Sithole,

new

denounced the ANC,

On 8 July
1975,

and

egotiatioas.
lost

control over the ZANLA

guerrilla forces by creating the ZLC,

which was an alliance

Sithole attempted to regain his

between ZANU

more militant

The

and ZAPU.

ZANU guerrilla

leaders in Zambia opposed this Sithole-ANC effort and initiated what would turn out to be a complete break with Sithole
and the ANC.

In mid-1975,
in Zambia,

four DAS2 members detained at Mpima Prison

Tongogara, Sudzi

Kangai,

Sithole would have to be removed

four ZANLA

Zambia to

result

of

The

strengthened when Sithole failed

the ZANLA guerrillas after

been fired upon and killed

dent in a

as the head of ZANU.

commanders began to lobby guerrillas based in

gain support foe
their plan to replace Sithole.

Their position was further

to back up

and Gumbo, decided that

the

DAEE

11

members

September
efforts

Declaration" of late September 1975.

ZANLA officers at the Mgagao

number

of them had

Zambian troops during an inci-

by

guerrilla camp on

The final

1975.

was

the

"Mgagao

Signed by forty-three

guerriLla camp in Zambia,

main points of the document are summarized below:

1.
The ZANLA guerrillas thanked the OAU Liberation
Committee, the Tanzanian government, and FRELIMO for
their support of the armed struggle.

71

the

The guerrillas reaffirmed their conupitipent to an

2.
armed struggle as the only means of achieving libernegotiations with tae Smith
ation and denounced all
government.

Although the guerrillas believed in, nationalist

3.
Declaration of
"Lusaka
unity and affirmed the
come at
that unity could not
Unity," they asserted
the expense of the armed struggle.
The guerrillas condemned Nkomo for holding his. own
Nkomo ANC faction.
an
ANC congress and creating
the guerrillas accised Nkomo of collaFurthermore,
borating with the Salisbury and Pretoria governments.

The guerrillas denounced the ZLC and condemned

incompetent
for appointing
Sithole and Muzorewa
politicians rather than guerrilla commanders to head
the ZLC.
5.

Sithole,
and
The guerrillas accused Muzorewa,
6.
Chikerema of being incompetent leaders and declared
them incapable of leading the AN3.
The guerrillas condemned Sithole and the Zambian
government for their poor treatment of ZANLA detaiZambia was declared an enemy of the
nees in Zambia.
guerrillas.
7.

appealed to
the OAU and the
8.
The guerrillas
Tanzanian and Mozambiquen governments for support
the
guerrilla straggle*
for the continuation of
[Ref. 39]
A

important

critically

Declaration

"

aspect

of

also the first

the popularly accepted

leader of ZANU.

party secretary-general,

tical

hierachy and

approval by

the

At

Mugabe as

the meeting in

comnanders ana the detained

committee members

committee members told

(and thus ZANU)

acknowledgement of Robert

September between the four DARE

ZANU executive

"Mgagao

was that it foreclosed any chance Sithole evor

had of reasserting his authority over ZANLA

It was

the

at

Mpima,

the executive

commanders that Mugsbe,

as the

was the next man in the ZANU poli-

should take

party congress.

over

as leader,

pending

In the "Mgagao Declaration,"

the guerrilla

commanders did not go so far as to declare

Mugabe the leader of ZANU, but did state that:
An executive
member who has been
outstanding is
Robert Mugabe.
He
has
demonstrated this bv
defying the rigours of guerrilla life in the
junales of Mozambiaue.
Since we respect him most,
in all our dealings with the ANC leadership, he is
the only person who can act as a middle man.
We
72

will not accent any direct discissions with any of

the ANC we
aa7e
the leading three members of
We can only talk through Robert
described above.
[Ref. 40]
Mugabe to them.
By January 1976, the DARE had officially removed Sithole

had replaced him

ZANU presidency and

from the

with Robert

Mugabe did not become the president of ZANU at this

Mugabe.

time because of the legal and procedaral ramifications.

He

secretary-general and
September
On 1
picked up the additional title of leader.
1976, Sithole denounced the ANC and reclaimed the leadership
to maintain

continued

his title

the leader of an organization

thus claiming to be

of ZAND,

Sithole's attempt to regain

that he himself had disbanded.

leadership failed

the party

entrenced as ZANU's
nent,

of

as Mugabe

was already

Sithole's career as

leader.

firmly
a

promi-

influential nationalist leader was over.

With the breakdown

of

the Victoria Falls

change in ZANO's leadership,

for the formation of the

the resumption

"Mgagao Declaration,"

the stage was set in late 1975

Zimbabwe Peoples' Army

guerrilla war.

of the

talks and the

(ZIPA)

Shortly after

discussions were begun

and
the

between ZANU,

ZAPU, and the Frontline States that would lead to the forma-

There were several reasons for the formation

tion of ZIPA.

First, two of the Frontline State leaders,

of ZIPA.

had concluded as early

and Machel,

Smith-ANC

negotiations

unyielding stubborness,

were

the divisions

their generally low opinisns

and Chikerema,

in July

ZANO,

that the

Smith's

within the ANC,

Nkotno,

and

Sithole,

two leaders that negotiations

that they ought to

prepare to revitalize

The Frontline leaders had decided in Lusaka

1975 that, should the Victoria Falls talks fail, the

ZAPU,

and FROLIZI guerrillas

should be

moved from

Tanzania to camps in Sozambique in preparation

the resumption
of the
war.
This time around,
the

Zambia and
for

nowhere.

of Muzorewa,

convinced the

were hopeless and

the war effort.

going

as July 1975

Nyerere

73

Frontline State leaders

fought by one

wanted the war to be

army, not two.

ANC-formed ZLC had failed

the

Second,

miserably.

No

ZIPRA commanders had been appointed commanwhich was the

Zimbabwe Liberation Army (ZLA) ,

major ZANLA or
ders in the

Muzorewa had instead appointed

military wing of the ZLC.

leaders to leadership positions

number of political

In addition, he had appointed

ZLA.

rilla leaders

in the

number of junior guer-

senior comman-

of their more

over the heads

Sithole had appointed guerrilla leaders who had been

ders.

the DARE

suspended from

of authority

to positions

in the

In addition, the fact that Muzorewa had expelled Nkomo

ZLA.

from the ANC

ZAPOVZIPRA participation in

all but ruled out

Consequently,

the ZLC/ZLA.

the ZLC/ZLA had no leaders who

had the respect or following of the guerrillas.

Third,

they

the detained ZiNU leaders in Zambia felt that if

were going

Frontline States

to get
for the

assistance

from the

they would

war effort,

create some sort of military alliance.

the necessity

saw

of forming

Their professed militancy

would get

Finally,

there was

unified

desire among

ZAPO to short-stop competing FROLIZI

ence in Rhodesia

coramani

The best way to

with

they
ZAPU.

military effort.

leaders of both

ZAND"

and

efforts to gain influ-

and valuable support from the

Frontline States.

have to

armed struggle

and belief in the

them nowhere without

the

Consequently,

joint

OAU and

OAU and the

do this was to

form

joint military command that excluded FROLIZI.

During

September and

October 1975,

Rex Nhongo,

senior ZAND guerrilla commander at liberty,

the

external

ZAPO

Secretary-General in

discuss the possibility of bringing

unified command.
nated

by the

the

and Jason Moyo,

Zambia,

met

to

ZANLA and ZIPRA under

Neither ZANLA nor ZIPRA wanted to be domi-

other.

ZANLA

7H

had aore

guerrillas,

more

experience, and more current operations in Rhodesia.

On the

with the
ZANO's political leaders,
were
exception of Mugabe and Tekere who ware in Mozambique,
By contrast, Nkoao
in prison in either Rhodesia or Zambia.
most of

other hand,

were still free.

in Rhodesia and Moyo in Zambia

The ZANLA

guerrillas felt that they would be at an unfair disadvantage

the ZAPU political

had to deal with

if they

leaders while
Nyerere and

were unavailable.

their own political leaders

Agreement was finally

Machel supported the ZANLA position.

reached and ZIPA was established

on

12

November

ZIPA military committee had eighteen members,

half of which

were from

ZANLA and

Nhongo of

ZANLA was the army

organization
[Ref.

and

half of which
ZIPRA.

were from

the director coming from

with

The

Rex

commander while John Dube of

Each functional area on the staff had

ZIPRA was his deputy.

two officers,

1975.

coming

deputy

his

one guerrilla
the

from

other.

41]

The ZIPA military command consisted of the most militant

members

of ZANLA

and ZIPS

ZANLA commanders

The

A.

anti-ANC, anti-Sithole, pro-DARE, and pro-Mugabe.

Conference in December 1976 due

fall apart after the Geneva

several

violent

conflicts

initially the command was

January 1976.

Rhodesian

between

in

adopted hit

estimated that

and run tactics

aimed at

Reads, railways,

targets.

75

guer-

The guerrillas

crippling Rhodesia's

farms,

On 18 April

rillas blew up the Beit Bridge

over 900

thousands moce were being

Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia.

were the primary

ZIPA resumed

During the first four months of 1976, the

Front government

economic sector.

guerrillas,

Rhodesian Front government on

rillas had entered Rhodesia while

trained

the

fairly successful.

the guerrilla war against the

17

The ZIPRA

Although ZIPA began to

members were anti-ANC and pro-Nkomo.

to

were

and plantations

1976,

ZANLA guer-

rail link with South Africa.

illusion

shattering the

killed,

whits South African tourists wars

three

Daring this attack,

security

that Rhodesian

forces were in complete control of the situation.

Originally created as an apolitical military organization whose sole function was to provide military support to
it is
ironic that
wings of ZANO and ZAPO",
the political
ZIPA's downfall came when it became involved in politicsFrom ZIPA* s very inception,

their allegiance

pledged

Robert

to

with

Joshua

Mkomo for

Patriotic Front

ZANU-ZAPO

could present

December.

front at
1976,

Tongogara,
leaders.

and

Conference in

President

Kaunda finally

including

the charis-

Josiah Tongogara.

Op to

acknowledged Mugabe,

detained ZANU

the other

of

the Geneva

coamanders had

the ZANLA

this time,

Mugabe began

formation

the

ZANO

organizations

detained ZAN3 leaders,

matic ZANLA guerrilla commander,

the

the two

that

so

17 October

On

released the

united

Mugabe and

In October 1976,

leaders detained in Zambia.

negotiations

young ZANLA commanders had

its

leaders as

their

They had worked for the release of the leaders and

the revitalization of

Upon the release

ZANO.

of the ZANO

detainees, the ZANLA commanders in ZIPA reversed their posi-

They claimed the right to choose among the detainees

tion.

They refused to accept

for their leaders.

guerrilla leader.

In addition,

tical leadership when

settlement.
the

they rejected Mugabe's poli-

he began negotiating for

political

They claimed the right to have more input into

political processes.

The ZIPA

because they had the military

issue.

Tongogara as

However,

ZIPA

forces,

commanders felt

they could force the

had overestimated

influence the situation.

take into account Tongogara

that

its ability

to

The ZIPA commanders had failed to

leadership abilities and popularity with the rank and file guerrillas.
They had underestimated Mugabe in the same way.
In addition,
ZIPA was
f

75

totally dependent upon Machel

Machel had

support.

government in Mozambique for

much

spent too

effort getting

the

ail by
Zimbabwean nationalist movement unified to risk it
Also,
both
supporting the rebellious military commanders.

and Machel

Nyerere

to the authority

ZIPA's challenge

Consequently,

on coups.

death

were

of Mugabe

and Tongogara

coupled with the internal

This failure,
fighting among the ZIPA guerrillas in the Mozambique camps,
spelled the end of ZIPA as an affective or influential
was

failure.

organization by the end of 1976.

Returning to the diplomatic arena

three

settlement

in Rhodesia.

the collapse

days after

1976,

March 1976,

On 22

the Smith-Hkomo

of

British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan delivered

which declared Britain*s willingness
a

constitutional

government on

the British

principle of majority rule,

to

The preconditions imposed

the RF

government were

occur after majority rule,

thwart

independence.

that indepen-

that negotia-

and that no attempt should be

the progress

towards

majority

proposals placed the

onus to act

Ian Smith's lap.

Smith rejected the British

being

as

rule

and

extreme

those of

the

ANC.

right in

proposals as
The

American

Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger,

American proposals on 27
1.

the

[Ref. 42]

The British
as

speech

that elections for majority rule

tions must not be protracted,

made

Smith government

must be held in eighteen months to two years,

dence would only

talks,

to assist in convening

conference providing the

agreed to certain preconditions.

by

the

governments again became involved

British and United States

in seeking

in early

outlined the following

April 1976 while in Zambia:

American support for the Callaghan proposals of

22 March 1976;

A declaration of America's "unrelenting opposi2,

tion" to the Salisbury regime
until a negotiated
settlement was reached;

77

A commitment to repeal tha Byrd Amendment which

3.
allowed American firms to import strategic materials
from Rhodesia in violation of the UN sanctions;

rapid
Support
4.
for a
leading to majority rule;"

settlement

negotiated

discourage American citizens from

A promise to
5.
travelling to Rhodesia;
and 7.
A promise to give $12.5 million in assistance to Mozambique and other states on Rhodesia's
borders who suffered as a result of enforcing U.N.
sanctions;
6

assistance for Rhodesim refugees;

U.S.

8.

economic,
technical,
and educaA promise of
9.
tional assistance ones an agreement had been reaced;

Support for protection of minority rights after

10.
independence.
[Ref. 43]
Kissinger's speech in Zambia became the basis for intensive negotiations
1976.

and September

which occurred between Hay

The negotiations involved Kissinger, Smith, the South

African Prime Minister, Vorster, Great Britain,

and the Frontline State leaders.

alist leaders,

with Vorster twice

himself met
cials

several trips

made

African leaders.
to Africa

to

Africa

to meet

of finalizing an

settlement package

"Kissinger Proposals"

and

Kissinger

American offi-

while other

On 24 September 1976,

with the hope

result was

the nation-

with

other

Kissinger returned
agreement.

*hich became known

which included the

The
as the

following six

points:
1.

Majority rule in two years;

An immediate conference with African leaders to

organize an interim government;
2.

The interim
government was to consist of a
council of state, half of
whose members would be
black and half white,
with a white chairman without
a special vote.
This
council would be responsible
for drafting a new constitution.
There would also
be a council of ministers with
executive authority
during the interim period.
The two
Ministries of
Defense and Law and order on this council were to be
held by whites;
3.

4.
Great Britain would enact enabling legislation
once an agreement had been reached;

Once the interim government was

5.
ceasefire would begin;
78

established

community would groyide

The international
"substantial economic support" to assure Rhodesia's
[Ref. 44]
economic future,
6-

entirety,

"packaged

as a

nationalist leaders
not totally accept

eal,

"

it

presidents did
them as

the proposals but only viewed

Consequently,

was doomed

nationalists believed

because the

very beginning

Geneva

the

October 1976,

which convene! on 28

Conference,

in their

should be noted that the

and the Frontline State

further discussion.

basis for
from the

Kissinger Proposals

accepted the

While Smith

the Kissinger Proposals were negotiable while Saith demanded

that they accept all or nothing.

Robert Mugabe

October 1975,

In early

and Jason

Moyo

began negotiations in Mozambique to form an alliance between

ZAND and ZAPU at the Geneva Conference.

the

conference,

which formed the

finalized an

and Nkomo

Mugabe

Patriotic Front

Immediately before

(PP)

agreement
Mugabe and

Thus,

conference as a joint delegation.

The
conference was also attended by Bishop Muzorewa,
the leader
Nkomo attended the

of the UANC-ZLC,

and the 3ritish

The Frontline. States and the United States sent

government.

observers

the Rhoiesian government,

the

to

conference.

The

Reverend

Ndabaningi

Sithole, claiming to be the legitamate leader of ZANO,

attended the conference.

attending the

represent
Sithole

Mugabe

long as

he did

not claim

PF successfully

and the

attempts to be recognized as ZANO*s leader.

Sithole offered to form

UANC,

Mugabe did not object to Sithole's

conference as

ZANU.

Muzorewa had

to

blocked
When

patriotic alliance with Muzorewa's

the bishop, who airaady had

him down.

also

large following,

turned

should be noted that

on 14
September 1976
changed the name of his organization to the

It

UANC in order to differentiate it from the Sithole organization which

also often used

the name

popular support.

79

ANC in order

to gain

While the smith government viewed the primary purpose of

Conference as being the implementation of the
ths Geneva
the nationalists had other proposals
Kissinger Proposals,
The UANC demands, which were also

they wanted implemented.

by the

supported

participants,

other Zimbabwean

were

as

follows:
of
without condition?,
1.
The immediate release,
ail political prisoners detainees and restrictees
including people in the concentration villages.

The revocation of all death sentences on poli2,

war aad their
prisoners of
tical prisoners and
immediate release.

those
a:
The granting of general aanesty to ail
3.
i ca
_o1 i
crime,
have
committed
political
considered to
including those outside the country^
t_

The creation of conditions conducive to free

political activities and freedoa of expression in
the country.
4.

5.

The halting of all political trials.

The lifting of the state of emergency together

regulations at present in
with all restrictive
force.
6.

7.
In short, we demand the immediate suspension of
and oppressive constitution.
the present racist
[Ref. 45]

The Rhodesiar delegates ignored the nationalist demands,

whereupon
Rhodesian

organizations

nationalist

the

representatives

British

and

informed

that

they

the

would

continue the guerrilla war if the conference did not come up

with an acceptable solution leading to majority rule.

October 1976,

Robert Mugabe

issued the following statement

which represented the position of the Patriotic Front:

In conclusion, let me say, Mr,
Chairman* that our
presence at this conference is indicative or our
preparedness to pursue the method of peaceful
negotiations.
It' is indicative
of the
fact 1_that
J-L_
l__J

J
_
1_

On 29

-sly pi-

will therefore fail to produce a settlement of the

nature we desire,
we shall
have no option but to
continue to resort to war in ocder to achieve our
freedom and independence.
We have
always loved
Deace,
but when peace was lost we resorted to war
in
order to achieve
the
lost peace.
Let us
achieve peace in Geneva for failure to do so will
necessarily mean the
continuation
of war
in
pursuit of peace. [Ref. 46]
80

as the Geneva Conference continued,

The

African nationalists

themselves over

could not

the major

most of

reach agreement

including

issues,

among
the

the transitional

and duration of

composition,

structure,

so did the problems.

The
Smith government felt
government before independence.
if the nationalthat there was no need for the conference

the Kissinger package.

ists were not going to accept

1976,

internal

settlement

negotiate

threatened to

Smith

November

one

with

of

other

the

separate

nationalist

package if the

to implement the Kissinger

parties in order

On

The main issue that signalled

Geneva Conference broke down.

the death knell of the Geneva Conference was the question of

who

would control the security and defense forces during the

interim

government.

authority over

ultimate

majority rule.
alists.

security

the

insisted that the

and defense
forces

transitional period before

This was an acceptable to the African nation-

with it

should lie

white regime

The

during the

The Smith regime argued

that unless it maintained

defease and police,

discipline in the security forces would coLlapse and anarchy would

control over the ministries of

result
leaders,

during the
on

transitional

the other

hand,

police and defense ministries in

Smith government too much
period.

Shen the

period.

believed

The

nationalist

leave the
white hands would give the
that to

influence during the transitional

3ritish government offered to

appoint

governor-general
in
Salisbury to
control the
security forces. Smith rejected the offer.
Ail negotiations
deadlocked,
the Geneva
Conference was adjourned on
14
British

December 1976 with

17

the hope that it would

be reconvened on

January 1977.
The stalemate between the nationalists and the Rhodesian

Front government continued

reconvened in

January.

and the Geneva Convention was not

3

21

81

January 1977,

the British

chairman of the Geneva Conference,

Ivor Richard, offered Ian Smith a new set of proposals which
deadlock.
The main provisions of
he hoped would break the
ambassador to the UN and

Richards' proposals were as follows:

transitional go yernment
1.
A
British interim commissioner.

headed by

to be

Goyernment to be led by a council of ministers

2.
comprising equal representation by each of the delegations represented at Geneva plus representatives
of the European community appointed by the commiswould have a substantial
(Such
a council
sioner.
African majority.)
The commissioner to be gaided by an advisory
council consisting of the heads of the delegations
at Geneva.
3.

Geneva delegations along with

The heads of the
4.
the heads of the army and the police force to serve
on a national security council headed by the commissioner.

Foreign affairs, defence, and internal security

5.
to come under the commissioner.
[Ref. 47]
Richards

The

Kissinger

scrapped

Plan

would

Proposal that

chairmanship of

the council

provisions

the
have

of state

the

of

guaranteed the

white

and Rhodesian

Front

control of the Ministries of Defence and Law and Order.

Smith rejected the new

January 1977,

24

and

insisted

that he would

the Kissinger Proposals.

On

British proposals

not accept anything

other than

Smith announced that he was begin-

ning necrotiations with Bishop Muzorewa to obtain a separate,

internal settlement.
Smith had

number of reasons to believe

be able to reach an

agreement with Muzorewa.

that he would

Throughout the

Geneva Conference, Smith felt that Muzorewa had demonstrated

a

more

moderate position than had

issues of majority

rule and control of

during the interim government.

ment believed that,

nationalist
loyalty of

lugabe and Nkomo

armies,

more Africans

had no control over the

Muzorewa

inside of

82

the security forces

The Rhodesian Front govern-

even though he

guerrilla

on the

did

command

Rhodesia than

did"

the

the

Consequently,

Patriotic Front.

it

would be to Huzorewa's

rather than

advantage to negotiate a settlement with Smith

his position as the dominant
to risk losing

nationalist

Smith's straleader in Rhodesia to either Mugabe or Nkomo.

after a
tegy was given a big assist on 9 January 1977 when,
two-day meeting in Lusaka,
States

presidents of the Frontline

the

(Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique,

Botswana,

and Angela)

announced that they were going to throw all of their support

behind the Patriotic

which thsy considered

representative

legitamate,

sole,

Front

to be the

nationalist

Zimbabwean

In a statement read by President Nyerere,

organization.

the

decided to give their "full

five leaders said that they had

material, and diplomatic support to the Patriotic

political,

Front to enable them to achieve tha Dbjectives of their just

struggle"

Ref . 48].

The

decision of the

Frontline State

leaders was backed-up by the Liberation Committee of the OAU

in Lusaka

Front

February 1977

on 8

mandate

to-

gave the

when it

escalate

the

Rhodesia's white minority government.

guerrilla

Patriotic

war

against

Thus, Muzorewa found

himself isolated from the aainstream support for the nationalist cause and was faced with

the choice of either negoti-

ating with Smith or being left out in the cold.

The escalation of
was also

The increased guerrilla

early 1977

ZANLA and ZIPRA

economic pressures

bringing domestic: and

upon Smith.
and

the guerrilla war by

had convinced

many

to bear

activity in late 1976

white Rhodesians

that

their privileged position in society was not worth dying for

and

that

numbered.
cally.

the

days

of

the

white

regime

were

Consequently, white emigration increased dramatiThe emigration

aeant

currency cut of the country.

drain of

skilled labor and

By January 1977,

were active in
1,842 -

majority

guerrillas

virtually all of Rhodesia and of Rhodesia's

mile border,
only the South Africa portion could be

83

the Rhodesian Front announced on

their maximum capabilities,

27

January

stretched to

the security forces

With

considered secure.

1977 that it would

able-bodied men

call up all

the ages of thirty-seven and fifty for military

The opposition
service and tighten up on draft exemptions.
between

community

the business

from

men under thirty-eight

deferments for

the Minister of Defense,

13

national budget,

being devoted

was

United States reimposed UN economic

the escalating guer3y June 1977,

1977 when the-

sanctions on Rhodesia.

costing the Smith government

$300,000

day.

the RF government announced that all white

That same month,

males under thirty-eight

serve 190 days

to

The situation was made more difficult

fiscal year 1972-73.

rilla war was

1976-77

of the

four times the outlay of

This was about

national defense.

all

age caused

years of

percent

million,

or $186

of

to resign in disgust on

Sr. Cowper,

Twenty-three

February 1977.

in June

the cancellation

to

be required to

years of age would

per year in the security

thirty-eight to fifty would serve

forces while those

minimum of seventy days.

The wider call-up accelerated white emigration which in tarn

had the duel effects of
and

decreasing the

service.

lowering the gross domestic product

number of whites available

By October

the war was costing twenty-seven

1977,

percent of the national budget,

per day.

The

or over one million dollars

pressure was on Smith to

with black leaders of his own

ceasefire.

reach an agreement

choosing and to bring about

Ref . 49]

From January through Ai gust 1977,

internal settlement
1977,

for military

Smith moved towards an

with Bishop Muzorewa.

British Foreign

On

Secretary David Owen and

States Ambassador to the UN

Andrew Young,

September
the United

presented Smith

with the Anglo-American Peace Proposals on Zimbabwe.

September 1977,

Smith temporarily shelved

84

On 13

his plans for an

internal

settlement

that

order

in

Anglo-American

the

The basic provisions

Proposals might be further discussed.

of the proposals were as follows:

the oresent regime and

-Surrender of power by
1.
return to legality.

peaceful transition to indepenAn orderly and

dence in the course of 1978.

2.

Peaceful and impartial elections on the basis of

3.
universal adult suffrage.
The establishment, by the British government, of
transitional administration with the task of
conducting elections for an independent government
represent Britain
(Field Marshal Lord Zarver would
during the transition
commissioner
as resident
U.
a

period)

A United Nations presence, including

during the transition" period.

5.

UN

force,

constitution providing for a

An independent
democratically elected government,
-he abolition of
discrimination, the protection of individual riahts,
and the independence of the judiciary.
6.

A development fund to revive the economy of the

view as predicountry which Britain and the U.S.
cated upon the in pieman tation of the settlement as a
whole.
[Ref. 50]

7.

Anglo-American Proposals were really

The new
rent from

earlier British

Ehodesian Front government giving

security forces,

to include

rule.

They

proposals.
up

no diffe-

envisaged the

its power immediately,

immediate majority

and nearly

Obviously, Smith could not be expected to accept such

terms.

On

23

October

Smilth

1977,

Anglo-American Proposals and pushed

rejected

the

ahead with his internal

settlement plans.

Since January,

Smith

had take several actions

the way for his internal

settlement.

announced

racial

country.

plans to

end

In February,

to pave
he had

discrimination within

the

In April he had expelled twelve extreme right-wing

radicals from

the Rhodesia n

Front Party.

On

18

July he

dissolved parliament and

called for new elections in which

he would seek white support for an internal settlement.
The

icing on the

cake came whan Smith announced

85

on

24

November

accepted the principle of najority rule and would

and two tradibegin official talks with Muzorewa, Sithole,
9
on
Chief Zhirau and Chief Ndiweni,
tional leaders.
that he

December.

seeing that Smith was

Frontline State leaders,
had
Patriotic Front,
from the
stealing the initiative
attempted to get negotiations going in December 1977 and
On 13 December
January 1978 that would involve all parties.
The

1977,

the Frontline State

leaders reaffirmed their support

Samora Machel began to

Anglo-American Proposals.
with Smith and on 13
pressure the PF to reopen n egotiatioas
January 1978 he even admitted that PF demands for control of
the security forces during the transition period were unreafor the

sonable [Ref. 51]-

were made for the

Anglo-American representatives

meet with

effect

PF leaders to

at Malta

in late

Although the Malta talks were held, they had

January 1978.
no

Plans

on the

Smith-3 uzorewa-Sithole

negotiations

Salisbury which were near oompletition by that time.

nearly three

months of

internal

leaders

internal

settlement on

negotiations.

finally
3

reached

without

After

and the

agreement
Signed by

four

for

The settlement,

transitional government,

Smith,

had

which

the following

provisions:
new constitution would be
1.
A
drafted providing
majority rule based on adult suffrage;

legislative assembly of one-hundred members

A
with seventy-two seats reserved for black and twenty-eight seats reserved for
whites
(enough
to
provide whites a veto over constitutional changes)
2.

The reserved seats for whites would be retained

for at least ten years and would be reviewed at the
end of that
period,
at
which time a commission
headed by the judge of the high court would be
appointed to undertake the review.
If the commission were to recommend that the reserved seats for
whites should be changed, an amendment to the constitution to effect such change by a bill which would
require the affirmative votes of not less than
3.

firty-one members of the legislative assembly;

86

an

this settlement was obtained

consulting PF-ZANO-ZAPU.

provided for

an

1978.

March

Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau,

Smith

in

The independence and the qualifications of the

4.
judiciary would be entrenched and the judges would
have security of tenure
;

and the defense

The civil service, the police.
forces would be free from political interference;
5.

The above provisions would be set cut in the new

as specifically
constitution ana would be regarded
;g<
entrencnea provisions wnicn couia not oe amenaea
except by a bill that required the affirmative votes
of at least seventy-eight members of the legislative
assembly.
[Hef. 52]

6.

In addition,

eight percent of the legislature.

the continued

effect,

would

white domination
Smith had secured

security forces.

would control twenty-

population,

only four percent of the

for

which made up

the agreement insured that whites,

Thus,

insure the privleged

of

it provided

the judiciary

and

an agreement that,

position of

in

the white

minority for at least another ten yaars.

B.

1978 -

THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THE FINAL AGREEMENT:

1980

the

The action in Phase

V,

interim agreement

on

election victory on

different themes.

which lasted from the signing of

March

March 1978
1980,

The first concerns

to consolidate

eliminate

Front

Patriotic

ZANO-P?

was dominated by several

Smith-Muzorewa government
the

until the
the efforts

of the

its position

opposition

in

and

order

to

confront the external nationalist leaders and guerrillas and

community with a de facto "solution" to

problem.
Ihe second theme deals with the

the international
the Rhodesian

refusal of

Great Britain,

the

United States,

the United

Nations, and most of the rest of the international community

to

recognize the

Smith-Muzorewa agreement

and efforts

to

diplomatically pressure the Smith-Muzorewa bloc to agree to

a settlement
involving all concerned parties and providing
uninterrupted movement

towards majority

87

rule.

The

third

theme is concerned primarily with the intensification of the

order to force meanguerrilla war by ZANLA and ZIPRA in

the failure of the

ingful change and

Smith-Muzorewa coali-

tion to bring an end to the guerrilla war.

immediately after the internal agreement was

the Smith-Muzorewa led multi-racial Salisbury group

Almost
signed,

embarked upon policies designed to solidify their own posileaders and to exclude the Patriotic
as Rhodesia's
tion
the constitutional

Front from
1978,

the signatories of

that they

tional

in an

March

12

all-parties constitu-

intended

that they

the constitutional

from

ZANU-ZAPO-PF

On

the internal settlement announced

were not interested

conference and

negotiations.

to exclude

conference.

the

Smith

wanted to deal only with what he considered to be "moderate"

black

willing to go along with him on

to the UN to seek support for the

on 10 March 1978

world countries

were

the

than

Muzorewa travelled

internal settlement.

coalition of African,
in

more

this to preserve their new-

During that same week,

found prestige.

third

Sithole

Muzorewa and

and

leaders

But

socialist,

Security Council

and

prevented

Sithole from addressing tha General Assembly and on 14 March

the Security

Council voted to

condemn all attempts

by the

illegal regime in Rhodesia to retain power or to prevent the

achievement of independence.

It also

declared the internal

agreement illegal and unacceptable.

Evidently,

Smith believed that Muzorewa and Sithole had

greater influence with the guerrillas

What he failed to realize was

guerrillas were controlled

1978 r

than they really did.

that the vast majority of the

by Mugabe and Nkomo.

government announced that

be granted
to all
guerrillas who

the Rhodesian

amnesty would
their arms and

Muzorewa and

turned themselves in.

Sithole could

Smith

"swing enough

88

On
a

May

general
laid down

believed that

weight with

the

[Ref. 53]

to

guerrillas

Rationalist

he

1978

May

On 16

about

bring

Sithole supposedly had

Huzorewa and

it would

announced that

following

be

Rhodesia where

the situation in eastern

possible to defuse

ceasefire,"

among the

guerrillas [Ref. 54].

Smith's attempts to

All of

achieve

ceasefire failed

Throughout June 1978, the Patriotic Front accelNot only were

erated the guerrilla effort within Rhodesia.
settlers and
the security
forces
attacks
on white
miserably.

Sithole*s own

followers were killed by the guerrillas.

The guerrillas had

only by the obvious weakness

been buoyed not

The UN

The United States and

Sreat Britain

regime for an all-party

Mozambique was giving

On

guerrillas.

April

24

announced that

they intended to

rilla forces.

By 15 June

for the

external assis-

condemned the

were pressuring the

constitution.

of the coali-

Security Council had already

internal settlement.

ZAHU

the prospect of

but also by

tion regime,

tance.

some of Muzorewa s and

but even

increasing,

1978,

increasing aid to the

the

1978,

USSR and

increase aid to

Cuba

the guer-

Smith was forced to admit

time that military af forts to

first

settlement and

stop the guer-

rillas were not succeeding.

the Salisbury regime launched

In July 1978,
air strikes

against guerrilla

action

defended by

was

other

number of

Mozambique.

than Sithole

government was attempting to

grounds that the

democracy.

none

bases in

This
on

the

move towards

[Ref. 55]

On the home front, the increasing guerrilla pressure had

forced the government

support for the
masses.
had

On

internal settlement from among

August 1978,

ordered the

although

to enact policies designed

separate

to obtain

the African

the new regime announced that it

discrimination in public places,

educational and health
systems and

end to

89

be maintained.

segregated neighborhoods would still

On 16

with Sithole as its

September 1973, the interim government,
blacks would
spokesman, announced that, for the first time,

into the

be drafted

explained that

Sithola

army.

since

blacks would benefit from majority rale, they were obligated

to

fight

the grounds

this policy on

vehemently opposed

Muzorewa

settlement.

internal

defend the

to

that unless

there was majority rule there should be no military call-up.

[Ref.

56]
and Sithole had little

Probably realizing that Muzorewa

the nationalist

over

control

arrange

President Kaunda of Zambia to

and Joshua

Nkomo.

guerrillas,
a

Smith

allowed

meeting between him

Smith probably viewed Nkomo as the oldest

leaders and hoped that

with
the
guerrillas.

and most respected of the nationalist

this was

Additionally,

another opportunity

Patriotic Front

weaken the

between

influence

greater

carried

he

ZAND"

and ZAPO.

by playing

Smith

for Smith

upon the

still believed

to

divisions
that Nkomo,

inspite of the fact that he was receiving Soviet assistance,

was

more moderate that Sugabe.

was the case in

as

1975 when he broke away from Muzorewa's ANC,

could be convinced

tiate

Smith hoped that Nkomo,

to desert the Patriotic

Front and nego-

separate agreement with the Salisbury regime.

and Nkomo

met secretly in Zambia

prospects

for

September

1978

announced

that ZAPO

Smith-Nkomo

on

deal

14

August

were

Smith

1978.

shattered

All

on

guerrillas shot down an Air-Rhodesia

airliner and killed all forty-eight passengers.
When Nkomo
when

responsible for this

action,
the public outcry from white Rhodesians prevented
Smith form even considering a settlement with
Nkomo.
An
important aspect of the Smith-Nkomo Liaison is that it again
guerrillas were

placed Nkomos credibility in the

nationalist movement in

questionable

light.

Was

Nkomo

90

dedicated

nationalist

searching for

workable solution or

On 14 September 1978,

citing

ZANLA and

ZIPRA,

war by

from Rhodesia

the ZANO-ZAPO-PF

banned

the Salisbury government,

the guerrilla

escalation of

question would

This

1980 elections.

cone back to haunt Nkomo in the

the

political opportunist

position?

enhance his own

trying to

prevented

and thus

scheduled elections.
On 29
apparently without consulting either
Smith,
October 1973,
postponed the elections from 31
Muzorewa or Sithole,
December 1978 to April 1979, supposedly because of adminisThe real
trative problems in setting up the elections.

them frcm participating in the

reason

the

for

postponeaent

election

Despite the

security situation

in Rhodesia.

increasingly large

numbers of guerrillas

into Rhodesia
1978,

large sectors

placed under martial

of

country.

in urban areas.

was being

that increasingly large

[

On

that

fifty and fifty-nine would

to attack
11

December

in Salisbury was blown up.

strained because
January

12

October

Rhodesia were

1979,

white males

fact

of the

numbers of whites were

Ref . 57] On

government announced

31

Guerrillas had begun

law.

large oil storage depot

Military manpower

On

southern and western

previously immune targets

1978,

airstrikes,

were infiltrating

Mozambique.

from Zambia and

unstable

the

was

leaving the
Rhodesian

the

between the

ages of

called up for emergency mili-

be

tary service.

Throughout this period since

the Rhodesian

government was

international

community through

aid-April 1978, David Owen,

also being

the participants agreed on

settlement,

pressured by

diplomatic channels.

Cyrus Vance,

Prontline State leaders and the

in Dar-es-Salaam to discuss

the March 1973

Andrew Young,

Rhodesian problem.
the necessity of having
but no

set a timetable for the conference.

91

In

the

Patriotic Front leaders met

the

party constitutional conference,

the

All of
an all-

one was willing to

On 26 July 1978, tha

Ssr.ata

U. S.

Assistance Act

the International Security

Amendmentment to

for the removal

The Amendment provided

of 1978.

adopted the Case-Javits

sanctions against Rhodesia aftsr

31

of U.S.

December 1978

provided that the President determines that

p)
its
has demonstrated
of Rhodesia
the Government
faith at an allwillingness to negotiate in good
international
under
conference held
parties
and (2)
a government has
auspices, on all issue s;
chosen bv free elections in which
been installed,
groups have been
all political and population
allowed to participate freely, with observation by
internationally recognized observers
impartial,
[Ref. 58].
On 15 August

the House of Representatives also agreed

1978,

to accept the amendment.

government

and

Throughout October 1978, Rhcdesian

representatives

business

United States for acceptance of

On 21 December

embers of Congress.

condemn and reject the internal

The

the

the internal settlement and

the DN Seaeral

1978,

in

They were able to rally some

the lifting of the sanctions.

support from conservative

lobbied

Assembly voted to

settlement of

March 1978.

UN denounced all maneuvers of the Rhodesian regime aimed

at retaining

power for

the white

ninority,

internal settlement null and void,

internal

settlement

under

the

declared

the

and declared illegal any

auspices

of

the

illegal

regime, and called upon all states not to recognize any such

settlement.
On

[Ref.

59]

January 1979, the Rhodesian government unveiled its

new "Majority Rule

all-white referendum
constitution.

The

Constitution."
of Rhodesian

main provisions

Dn 30 January

whites approved
of the

1979,

the new

"Majority Rule

Constitution" were as follows:

1.

The country was to be renamed Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

Parliament was to
consist of two houses
House of the Assembly and the Senate.
2.

the

3.
The Senate would consist of thirty members, ten
of whom would be elected by the
seventy-two black
members of the House of Assembly:
be
ten would
whites elected by the
twenty-eight white members of
the House of Assembly
tea would
and
be
African
chiefs elected by the Council of Chiefs.
92

an

There would be two voting rolls, a common voters

4.
roll on which both black and whites could vote and a
(Thus whites could vote
separate white voters roll.
twice.

four commissions Judicial

The creation of
Service, Public servioa , Police Service, and Defense
The qj alif ication for membership in
Forces Service.
that they virtuallv
so high
the commissions were
ruled out black members.
5-

On 8 March
to

United Nations Security Council voted

the

1979,

new constitution

condemn the

the scheduled

and

April

elections.

constitution were held from

The elections under tha new

17

on

When the results were revealed

April to 20 April 1979.

24 April

having

victory,

Muzorawa's

1979,

party had

taken fifty-one

of

the

or sixty-sevei

parliamentary seats,
Sithole's

party

had

Rhodesian

Front

Party

only

won

had taken

landslide

won a

seveaty-two black

percent of

twelve

the vote.
Smith's

seats.

twenty-eight

all

white

seats.

elections was questioned immedi-

The credibility of the

ately after

were announced.

the results

that the elections had been

of inquiry.

session of

On

May

parliament and

Sithole boycotted

the first

The

because all

prior to the elections,

commission

acid

on 28 May

fill its two cabinet seats.

also questionable

rigged

19 79,

Sithole charged

demanded
his party

refused to

value of the election was

of the

parties had

agreed,

that cabinet posts would be distri-

buted on the basis of the number of parliamentary seats each

party won.

whites would

Thus,

least one-quarter of

position to restrain
The

be assured of retaining at

the cabinet seats and thereby

a

black prime minister.

announcement of

the election

expected reaction from the PF leaders.

for three days in

meeting,

be in a

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

they announced that

93

results brought

the

Mugabe and Nkomo met

At the

end of the

joint military command would

formed to coordinate the actions of ZANLA and ZIPSA.

guerrilla war was again escalated.
b

The

The elections also received generally negative reactions

One positive reaction
international coamunity.
from the
came from the

Congress when on

U.S.

15

1979 it called

Hay

for President Carter to lift the sanations against Rhodesia.

On 29

the OAU

1979,

May

and warned

regime

3ri-:ain

recognize Muzorewa's

refused to
and the

States not

United

In a statement issued through

recognize the regime either-

Kenyan foreign ministry, the 0A0 expressed concern

ments

in London

to

and Washington

to

remove the

at move-

sanctions.

President Nyerere stated that if the United

Britain recognized the Suzorewa government and

That same day,

States and

lifted the sanctions

on

ZANLA and

as declaring war

Mozambique who

Zambia and

were

Nyerere said that sich action by the United

States

or Great

insure

the

Britain could

only lengthen

destruction of

complete

any

the war

whites

left

and
in

Finally, on 30 May 1979, the Nigerian government

Rhodesiasent signals

recognize

and

ZIPRA,

assisting them.

would be

it would be the same

and Washington

to London

subject to

aa

the Muzorewa

oil embargo

implying that

should they

government or

lift the

they

decide to

sanctions.

(Ref. 60]

On

June 1979,

United States

President Carter

would continue to

announced that

act in compliance

economic sanctions against Rhodesia.

with UN

Carter denounced the

elections as neither fair nor free because:

The elections were held under a constitution
1that was drafted by and
submitted only to the white
minority and that the black citizens who constituted
ninety-six percent of the population of Zimbabwe
never had a chance to consider nor to vote
for or
against the constitution under which elections were
held.

The constitution gave the white minority vastly

2j
disproportionate numbers of votes in parliament,
continued control over the army, police,
judiciary,
and civil service and a veto over
any significant
constitutional reform.

9H

the-

parties
The representatives of the opposing
wera banned from the elections.

3.

and ZAPU)
(ZANU
fRef- 61]

newly elected

from the

some support

to get

government had hopsd

The Muzorewa

government at

British Conservative

which convened in Lusaka, Zambia

the Commonwealth Conference

August 1979, Prime Minister

Thatcher told the heads of state

that Great Britain was for

on

However,

August 1979.

for

working

on

participants

The conference

parties.

settlement

comprehensive

draft a settlement

constitutional

including

constitution
about

bring

conference in

heads of delegation present.

order to

safeguards for

ceasefire

to

approved on

an all-party

Britain to convene

called for Great

all

then proceeded

plan that was unanimously

August 1979 by all thirty-nine

The plan

involving

and

and an

adopt

democratic

minorities
to

and

to

sanctions.

the

[Ref. 62]

Initially,
tional

the

conference

Commonwealth proposals for

met

with negative

Both Smith

involved parties.
conference.

let they

solution as

they could

wer*e

unable to offer

achieve international recognition foe

from

the

denounced the
an

alternative

the guerrilla

war nor

the Salisbury govern-

Nkomo rejected the 3ritish supervised elections as he

ment.

blamed
place.
ZAND"

responses

and Muzorewa

neither end

constitu-

the British

for causing

the problem

in

the

first

An equally uncompromising position was presented by

on 7 August

1979 when

it declared that:

.The Smith- Muzore wa illegal

regime and
}..
iniquitous constitution must be liquadated.

its

2.
The constitution
must contain no racist
or
otherwise abridgement on the of the people acting
either directly or through their representatives in
parliament to freely alter it or abolish it.

Before reaching
3.
any
agreement the racist
Rhodesian army and police forces must be disarmed,
barracked.
and demobilized to give wav to our
forces.
[Ref. 63 ]

95

let

negotiate

Zambia to

Mozambique and

supporters in

pressured by

were being

and Nkomo

both Mugabe

settlement, even if compromise was nacessary.

their

peace

Thus,

by 20

sides had accepted invitations to attend

the London Constitutional Conference on 10 September 1979.
all

August 1979,

House

Lancaster

The

agenda that called

in order,

for,

constitution and

independence

(2)

and

"pre-independence
(a)

and order

an

agree-

elections under the

the ceasefire and military agreements

(b)

and maintenance of law

administrative arrangements

(c)

around

discussion of the

(1)

ments divided into three sectors:

new constitution,

organized

talks were

during the transition."

The constitu-

Ref . 64]

tion proposed by the British was based upon the independence

British colonies

of former

constitutions

and the

current

Rhodesian constitution.

stalemates throughout

Meeting frequent

the conference,

Lord Carrington conducted the negotiations by dealing bi-la-

terally, first with one side and than with the other.

On 21

September 1979, the Salisbury delegation voted to accept the

British constitutional proposals.

After the Patriotic Front

was presented with the British proposals,

proposals

which differed

from

it tabled

its own

constitutional

the British

proposals in the following respects:

1.

There was no special representation for whites.

2.
Provision for an executive president with wide
ranging oowers including powers to appoint members
of public service, defense, and police commissions.

3.

Lack of protection of private property rights.

No guarantees
servants.

4.
5.

for the

pension rights

Stringent citizenship requirements.

Since the Salisbury government

of civil

[Ref. 65]

had already accepted the

British proposals, the Patriotic Froat was under pressure to

accept them
deal

also.

them out

Fearing that their

of the

talks,

96

intransigence would

the guerrillas

reluctantly

accepted the principle of reserved

October

Carrington

1979,

gave

make up their minds,

after

the constitution

with or

without the

British proposals

transition period, followed

on

in the

PF

October 1979.

similar pattern.

The

The frequent

broken by 3riti=h pressure

17

in the form

The Lancaster

bullying.

December 1979.

period

transition

month

finally

prior to

elections rather than with Nkomo and PF-ZAPU.

three nationalist blocs competing

on election day

Muzorewa

('JANC)

Nkomo

the

destined to be

the first prime minister of

of Zimbabwe.

When the results

Each

Thus,

for power

(PF-ZAPU),

party leader believed that

Mugabe (ZANU-PF)

March 1980,

10

Robert Mugabe and ZAND decided to run separately

there would be

won

five days to

the

PF,

House Agreement was finally signed on

elections,

more

dealing with the ceasefire and

of Carrington 1 s intimidations and

the two

Carrington threatened to implement

remainder of the conference,

During

On

partial compromise was reached on

October 1979 and,

stalemates would be

PF delegates

the

the British proposals and

detailed version of

accepted the

seats for whites.

and

he was

the new country

were finally tallied

Mugabe had emerged as the victor.

on

ZANU-PF had

seventy-one percent of the African seats and fifty-seven

percent of

all the

percent of

all Patriotic

seats

parliament and

in

Front seats.

PF-ZAPU had won twenty seats,

The reasons

Joshua Nkomo

and

whils Muzorewa and the UANC,

the overwhelming winners just a

three seats.

seventy-seven

year earlier,

for Mugabe's

will be the topic of the ns xt section.

97

had only won

landslide victory

7.

THE NATIONALIST CANDIDATES IN

J[98

First, it

This section of this study has two purposes.

personal

the

examine

will

and bases

leadership qualities,

principal candidates

in the

support

of

of the

Robert

three

Joshua Nkomo,

1980 elections,

and

Abel Muzorewa,

Bishop

backgrounds,

political

and

Second,

Mugabe.

by

comparing and contrasting the three candidates, it will show

why Robert Mugabe won the

the

chapter,

position

basic

determining factor

of

will

that

be

of the election

candidates.

the

only Hugabe

rolled around,

election day

taken

in the outcome

credibility

personal

Throughout this

elections.

1980

was the

the

By

the

had any

time

kind of

meaningful credibility with the majority of the electorate.

A.

JOSHUA NKOMO
1

Biographical Backgr ound

A

member of the Xalanga tribe of the Ndebele nation,

Joshua Mqabuko Hyongolo

Nkomo was born in June

1917 on the

Semokwe Reserve, Matabelela nd.

his parents worked

Southern Rhodesia.
3oth of
for the London Missionary Society,
his

father first

driver and

mother as

as

cook.

Young

tion at the Tjolotjo School

as a

driver,

later as

teacher

and his

Nkomo received his primary educa-

after which he worked variously

bakery delivery boy,

and carpenter.

By

1941

Nkomo had saved enough money to enroll for one year at Adams

College in Durban, South Africa.

Mrs.

to

Hoskins,

continue

clerk at the school,

took an interest in Nkomo and encouraged him

his

employing him after

studies

and enabLed

him

school and paying his

98

to

fees.

do

so

by

In 194U,

assistance of

financial

the

with

Hoskins,

Srs.

Nkomo

enrolled in a three-year course of study at the Jan Hofmeyr

While in South
School of Social Sciences in Johannesburg.

Nkomo

Africa,

South African African National

two leaders of the

Lembede,

showed little

Although he

Congress (SAANC)

Zuma and

influence of Drs.

came under the

interest in

th2 se initial political associations

politics at the time,

would influence Nkomo's future.

In

1947,

Joshua Nk omo returned to Rhodesia where he

Railway as

by the Rhodes ian

was

employed

the

first black

to hold such

During the next

position.

social worker,

Nkomo complete! his studies at the University of

two years,

South Africa and graduated with a bachelor of arts degree in

Economics and Sociology.

Ea rly

2-

Political Career

equipped

If God ever

being for the world of

human

politics, Joshua Nkomo is that man.

six feet

(well over

tall and 250

pounds)

impressive physical appeara'nce that is

to a politician.

dynamic,

arouse any

ability to

handshaking,

exciting speaker,

he has the

Always

always

smiling,

Nkomo has the same gregarious,

baby-kissing style that

was totally in character

always

has the

great asset

Nkomo loves his role as

ians have.

Nkomo

audience.

and always outgoing,

joking,

large, heavy-set man

many American politia

celebrity.

for this charismatic,

Thus,

it

father-like

figure to throw his hat into the political arena.

Nkomo^ initiation
in

1951 when

Workers 1

he

to the world of politics occurred

was appointed

Association,

African Workers anion

union

was reorganized

1952,

Nkomo was

secretary of the Railway

which later became the Rhodesian
Onder Nkomo's leadership, the

(RAWtJ).

and its

membership increased.

elected president of the

99

In

African National

Nkomo attempted to unite all the African organi-

Congress.

zations, including those in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland,

Convention.

All-Africa Peoples'

in the

attempt was

This

unsuccessful and the convention was abandoned in 1954.

Party (DFP)
Nkomo joined the United Federal
1952,

In

and

the Prime
accepted an invitation from Sir Godfrey Huggins,
to represent African opinion
Minister of Southern Rhodesia,

Conference on the proposed

the
in
Rhodesias
and Nyasaland

federation of the

at the London

two

In January

plans to create it.

first Federal Flection

the

the

Congress (SRANC)

became

for the

defeated by

same year,

Nkomo

an auctioneer

and

During this period, he remained active in

the Southern

Rhodesia African

in September 1957 he

and

The Youth

League,

merged with the SRANC in

of the ANC,

but was heavily

railroad and

leadership of

president.

an independent candidate

That

insurance agent.

Nkomo ran in the

19 54,

OF? candidate.

from the

resigned

as

Matabelela nd,

African seat of
Hove,

government went ahead with

but the British

the Federation,

Mike

African

At the conference Nkomo opposed the creation of

Federation.
its

Central

19 59

National

was elected its

which was founded

to form the ANC.

in 1957 f

As president

Nkomo was very active in campaigning against the

Land Husbandry Act.

In addition,

he was successful in his

efforts to get the Court of Appeals to set aside the convictions of

1959,

number of black defendents.

Nkomo

Rhodesians..

was

This,

somewhat

coupled

first widely known and

nationalist,

of a

popular

Consequently,
hero

with the fact that

tc

by

black

he was the

well-publicized black politician and

placed Nkomo in

position where he was viewed

as "the father of Zimbabwean nationalism."

100

Dedicated Nationalist or Political Opportunist?

3.

be

credibility as

was his lack of

1980 Zimbabwean elections

questions would

From the late 1950's onward,

nationalist.

the February

in Nkomos defeat in

The major factor

continually raised about Nkomo's integrity, courage,

and

he truly

the

to the

dedication

nationalist cause.

or simply an opportunistic

father of Zimbabwean nationalism

president of every
he inevitably

was

always have to

did he

Why

politician?

out

the country

of

to?

Why

government

during

Did he attempt

to nego-

British and

settlements with the

internal

tiate separate,

leader or

be the

organization he ever belonged

organizations?

crackdowns on his

Was

Shodesian governments in order to get the best deal possible

for

Rhodesians or to insure

black

position in Rhodesian politics?

why

the guerrilla struggle,

the security of

During the latter stages of

did he keep his

large,

well-

and well-equipped army sequestered in Zambia while

trained,

allowing ZANLA to carry the burden of the fighting?

and caution,

was it because he was planning

or

to eliminate

Zimbabwean

his competition

shadowed Nkomo*

in a

Questions

civil war?

Was his

simply due to his conservatism

failure to commit his forces

army

his own

to use his

post-independence
continually

like these

political ambitions.

Doubt was

often cast upon Nkomo's

personal courage

and dedication because of his propensity for avoiding arrest

by being abroad
In December

first

1958,

All-Africa

Nkomo travelled

declared

in Rhodesia

and

on

to

from

there

to

state of emergency was

February 1959.

2 6

attend the

Accra to

Conference and

Peoples'

While Nkomo was in Egypt,

Cairo.

banned

during turbulant times in Southern Rhodesia.

The ANC

was

detained.

members were arrested and

Among those arrested were the entire leadership

of the ANC,

minus,

over

500

of

its

of course,

101

Joshua Nkomo.

Dn the advice

of friends

for the objectives

London and sought support
Ihile Nkomo was abroad,
throughout the world.

the National Democratic Party

The NDP was simply a new

it had

the same leadership,

predecessor.

party with the

January

naae for the banned ANC as

structure,

and goals

Mawema was elected the

Michael

president of

Salisbury of

to

as its

his appointment

understandiag that
the return

temporary pending

Nkomo.

was formed on

(NDP)

1960.

was

up an external

in

of the ANC

the new

twenty-month

which time he set

self-imposed exile during

ANC office

began

He instead

arrest (Ref. 66]-

face

Nkomo did not return home to

he claims,

in Egypt,

Joshua

Nevertheless, many members of the NDP believed Nkomo

to be a coward for not returning to Rhodesia.

of Nkomo,

broke away from the NDP to

as mentioned earlier,

form the Zimbabwe

National Party

the Pan-African Socialist Party

In October
to lead the NDP.

1960,
At

on 28 November 1960,

These critics

(ZNP)

later became

which

(PASJ)

Nkomo finally returned to Rhodesia

the NDP inaugural conference elections

Nkomo

defeated Leopold Takawira,

Malianga, Ndabaningi Sithole,

Moton

and Jlawema for the presidency

of the NDP.

The NDP was banned on

December 1961.

Ironically,

Nkomo was again out of the country (this time in Tanganyika)

and thus escaped arrest.

The

established on 17 December

1961.

20

September

1962,

this time in Lusaka,

Rhodesia,
could

ZAPO was

Coincidental!

government.

exert

sympathetic

not,

the Shodesian

Nkomo was again abroad,

Northern Rhodesia.

While in Northern

conclusion that nothing useful

by party

therefore decided to set up

would

y or

was

ZAPO",

3nly nine months later, on

also banned by

Nkomo came to the

be achieved

NDP*s successor,

action
a

within Rhodesia.

ZAPO government-in-exiie that

pressure on the ON,

the
bodies in order to bring

102

He

OAO,

and

about

change

ether
in

This plan did not please the other ZAPU

Southern Rhodesia.
leaders.

At the time of the ZAPU crackdown,

including Robert Mugabe,

leaders inside Southern Rhodesia,

Leopold Takawira, and

J. Z.

to the tribal reserves for

Moyo, had been arrested and taken

three months detention.

They were shocked to

provide leadership to his followers.

find out that he instead intended

up his government -in-ex ile.

The ZAPU

would return to Rhodesia to

leaders had expected that Nkomo

set

all of the ZAPU

to

go to Dar-es-Salaam to

Nkomo did this against the

advice of nationalist leaders in Northern Rhodesia.

Shamuyarira quotes Sikota

JJina,

the

publicity secretary of

ONI? as saying that

the Northern Rhodesia

Nathan

Joshua Nkomo had

been

strongly advised that his political leadership and

the
solution to the
Southern
Rhodesia crisis
presence in the
almost entirely depends on his
whatever the
country and among his
people,
Remaining away
in
Northern
circumstances.
will have the
Rhodesia, or in any other country,
weakening morale among the
effect of seriously
ranks of the toiling n asses of Southern Rhodesia.

Shamuyarira continues to

note that "recalling the

six leaders in Africa to prove

dence are always preceded by

ment of the leader,

,n

names of

that 'liberation and indepen-

sacrifice,

and even imprison-

Sikota added:

Nkomo has no alternative but to be one of them

Southern Rhodesia freedom struggle
is to
start
seriously and
his leadershio pristige
is
maintained.
[Ref. 67]
Mr.

if the

Using a disguise and

Lusaka to Dar-es-Salaam,

double,

Nkomo travelled from

where he mat with President Julius

Nyerere and Ndabaningi Sithole.

The leaders pressured Nkomo

to return to Southern Rhodesia to suffer the same

as his ZAPU comrades.

restraints

Nkomo was finally persuaded and flew

back to Rhodesia where he

spent three months restriction at

Kezi south of Bulawayo.

Although
April 1964)

Nkomo would

eventually

(beginning on

16

spend more than ten years under restriction, his

103

initial success at avoiding arrest aid restriction reflected

unfavorably upon him and would have a lasting effect on his

Whether Nkomo's motivation in this period was that
careerhe feared detention and enjoyed the good life of a celebrity

believed that

actually sincerely

abroad or

influence the situation in Rhodesia

abroad

based

organization

by

will

could

he

means of

never

be

best

political
known.

Nevertheless, the fact of the matter is that thase incidents

Nkomc's personal courage and

cast doubt upon

the nationalist cause.

dedication to

will be seen later on, they were

As

contributing factors in tna formation of ZANU in 1963 by his

lieutenants who

disinchanted

confidence in

lost

had

his

leadership ability.
did things

than an

Nkoao repeatedly

political career,

Throughout his

appear to be

that either made him

ambitious opportunist or,

nothing more

much worse,

seemed to

compromise his fellow nationalists and their goals.

habits

of

agreements

making

with

reputation

as

white

the

government,

advisers and

consulting his
a

and negotiating

poor decisions

separate
without

nothing for

did

allies,

black nationalist

usually

Nkomo*s

leader.

Indeed,

his
the

combination of his poor decisions, willingness to compromise

on

his

principle when

it

was expedient to do

nationalist comrades

apparent fraternization with the enemy,

The

earliest

interested in furthering
the

nationalist

cause

cost him the

hint

exclusion of

the decision-making

in

aggrandizement eventually
majority in Zimbabwe.

so,

that Nkomo

and constant self-

trust of
was

his own career than

oa me in

deserted the UNP to run against

process,
the black

probably

more

in furthering

January 1954 when Nkomo

Mika Hove as an independent

candidate for the Hat abelel and seat in the federal election.
Although Nkomo was defeated by Hove in this election,
this

104

indication that

the first

was

no intention

Nkomo had

his party and

man and would desert both

being a number-two

of

his comrades to insure this.

That Nkomo was mors than capable of making bad deciand probably willing to

sions,

demonstrated at

was

ples,

London Constitutional

the 1961

As mentioned earlier, ykomo, at the invitation

Conferenceof

compromise on basic princi-

Whitehead,

Sir Edger

Minister of

Prima

the

Southern

Rhodesia, attended the conference as the NDP representative.

On 7

of the

provisions
provided
The effect

constitution,

new

parliamentary structure

for a

fifty "A" Roll

(white)

of this

that

that consisted
(black)

of

seats.

was to reinforce minority rule

Nkomo had agreed to this parliamentary

The HDP executive

the constitutional

the main

including one

and fifteen "B" Roll

provision

of black by whites.

structure.

reached over

agreement was

February 1961,

council unanimously rejected

proposals for franchise

and representa-

Nkomo, although he initially lefended his actions and

tion.

those of his fellow constitutional

realize that the

On

strong.

delegates,

soon came to

opposition from tha NDP executive was too

February 19 61,
Nkomo issued a statement in

constitutional agraement.
In
explaining why he had changed his mind,
Nkomo noted that "a

which

he

repudiated

tha

leader is he who expresses the

sane

leader

can disregard

the

wishes of his followers;

voice

of his

people

no

and

supporters."

[Ref. 68] This action by

Nkomo damaged his
cradibilitly with all of the parties involved.
The British

and Southern Rhodesian governments felt that Nkomo could not

be trusted

to adhere to an

the other hand,

agreement.

The nationalists, on

felt that Nkomo would commit them to agree-

consulting them and thus compromise them on

basic principles.
In spite of his repudiation of the const-

ments without
itution,

Nkomo was never able

effects of this incident.

105

to completely neutralize the

the events leading

paper,

completed his
for

called

this

in

up to the formation of ZAND typi-

leadership weaknesses.

of Nkomo's

fied some

earlier

several times

mentioned

was

As

term of

detention in

meeting

of

the

After Nkomo

Rhodesia in

ZAPtJ

executive

1962,

he

council

in

At this conference, which began on 12 April

Dar-es-Salaam.
1963, Nkomo proposed his plans to form a government-in-exile

President

Tanzania.

in

council,

Nkomo

was needed

leadership

*s

executive

the ZAND

and

opposed Nkomo on this issue

as discussed earlier,

grounds that

on the

Nyerere

inside

Bhodesia and that the liberation struggle could

only be successful if ZAPO operated from inside of Rhodesia.
which was beginthe ZAPO executive council,
Additionally,
Southern

ning

to have

about

doubts

called for the formation of

with

both of

leadership

policy of confronta-

the white Rhodesian regime.

these

proposals.

Nkomo disagreed

this

At

convinced that Southern Rhodesia

time Nkomo

was

would receive its indepen-

dence as part

of a package deal to end

Federation.

He

believed

abilities,

new political party to replace

and a more aggressive

the banned ZAPO

tion against

Nkomo

that it

the Central African

was

necessary

for

powerful nationalist organization to be in existence outside

of the

with the

country to negotiate
British.

This

the terms of

was in

the independence

direct conflict

with the

beliefs of the ZAPO executive committee which believed inde-

pendence and

majority rule

could not

be obtained

negotiation but would have to be taken by force.

Not

wishing to

executive council,
196 3.

yield

to the

Nkomo returned to

Once back in Rhodesia,

Nkomo

wishes

through

[Ref. 69]
of the

ZAPO

Salisbury on 2 July
made plans to hold an

conference at Cold Comfort Farm on

10 August
1963.
Nkomo's purpose in holding the conference was to reassert
his own leadership
of ZAPO and his authority over the ZAPO
open

106

council.

executive

including the ZAPO

Conference.

Farm

invited

NfcooiD

executive council,
executive

The

members of

all

ZA?U

Cold Comfort

to the

declined

the

made clear to the

ZAPO"

council

invitation.

Nkomo's true colors had been

The doubts

executive council while it was in Dar-es-Salaam.

cause and his willingness

about Nkomo's dedication t3 their

self-sacrifices were reaffirmed by

to undergo
for an

his preference

external government and

Nkomo had also shown himself to be an unethical,

Tanzania by lying

He had told

to them.

them that Nyerere

had requested their presence in Tanzania.

surprised to see them there and

more needed in Rhodesia [Ref. 70].

go along

with the

executive council

wishes of

that they were

Then, Nkomo had refused

duly-constituted

his own

obliged to.

was legally

as he

when the

In fact,

Nyerere told them that

council members arrived in Tanzania,

he was very

disho-

the executive council to

He had seduced

nest opportunist.

to

for negoti-

Rhodesian regime and the 3ritish.

ating for change with the

But

his proposal

To add

injury to insult, Nkomo left eleven members of the executive

council

financially stranded

in Dac-es-Salaam

so that

could return to Rhodesia to lobby against their wishes.

Rhodesia,

route to

stopped in

Nkomo

countries to appeal to their leaders

the upcoming Addis Ababa Conference

number

ship of

August 1963,

the Rev.

eleven ZAPO
Nkomo.

in May 1963

ANU was formed

Ndabaningi

Sithole)

executive council members

At Cold Comfort Farm on

more that 5,000

the leader

ZAPO members,

of ZAPO and

13

of African

which would

[Ref. 71]

(under the leader-

after seven
had voted

of the

to depose

August 1963, in front of

Nkomo reaffirmed

suspended the

himself as
rebellious executive

council members from the nationalist movement.

107

En

for support for him at

establish the Organization of African Unity.

On

he

In his Cold

if not. dishonest,

Contort Farm speech, Nkomo was vague,

Describing the

recent events within ZAPU.

explaining the

in

Dar-es-Salaam conference, he said:

Dar-es-Salaam then
ware in
us
who
Ten of
Duties ware allocated to each one of
discussed.
consultations with everyone
After full
us.
out our
to carrying
we
all got down
concerned,
One of the important duties of
respective tasks.
certain stage,
I and a
our plan was that after a
colleagues had to return
certain number of ly
would be after the
it was agreed,
This,
home.
[Ret. 72]
Addis Ababa Conference.
Nkomo said

nothing about

council to

his plans

the opposition

to sabotage

his efforts

nor of

executive council with other

efforts of the

before and during the Addis-Ababa Conference.

he had supposedly

the support

executive

of the

the

African states

Talking about

received for his

plans from

other African countries at the Addis Ababa Conference, Nkomo

said that:

Our case was

The conference went off very well.
well received.
To suggest
any form of reluctance
by any of the independent countries because of one
the biggest
lie ever
told
reason or another is
about our political and diplomatic relations with
African countries,
[Ref. 73]
fact

In

number

Ghana and Algeria,

criticized
inaction

of African

were critical of Nkomo's

his plans

within Southern

August 1963,

Nkomo's

external

for an

Rhodesia.

weakness as

become quite apparent and had caused

nationalist

movement.

plans.

Svidentally,

They

government and

his

Ref . 74] Thus,

by

nationalist

including

countries,

leader had

complete split in the

Nkomo's position

of

supremacy within the nationalist movement was more important

to him than the strength,
the

solidarity,

and effectiveness of

movement itself.

During
1964 and

1974,

the period

Nkomo

nationalist leader.
only three occasions.

he was

kept

Indeed,

under detention

relatively

low profile

he was in the

The first was when he

Salisbury on 29 October 195

to

108

between
as

public eye on
was flown to

discuss the ODI problem with

The next occasion was

British Prime Minister Harold Wilson.

when he was again summoned

Salisbury to meed with George

to

the Commonwealth

Thompson,

Secretary,

in

the course

of

negotiations between Harold Wilson and Ian Smith

the
Fearless negotiations*
breakdown
of
following the
further

appearance as

final public

Hkomo's

February

when

1972

interviewed

was

he

1969 and 1970 there were dramatic rifts

suffered

had

battlefield defeats in 1967 and

Kalanga leaders

communicate

leaders and

political

this precluded

truly

and

was unable

commanders or

guerrilla

his

Shona

the

Nkomo

their

there were

Second,

1968.

Finally,

of ZAPO.

with either

because of

lines between

ethnic

along

between and military

was that the credibility of

The first reason

guerrilla commmanders

in

There were several reasons for

and political wings of ZAPO".

disagreements

Pearce

the

In particular, as discussed earlier,

the organizarion.

the

10

the necessary leadership over

Nkomo's inability to exercise

these rifts.

by

was on

ZAPO suffered because of

During this period,

Commission.

detainee

to

the

coordinated

effort within ZAPU.

Between the

and the

in 197U

time Nkomo was released

1979 Lancaster

several efforts to negotiate

In December 1974,

Smith-

ments forming the new ANC,

was an

House Agreement,

he made

separate settlement with Ian

Nkomo
which,

was a signatory to agreeas previously

organization that combined the ANC,

FROLIZI.

from detention

ZAPO",

discussed,
ZAND",

and

The purpose of this organization was to provide

united front of

all the nationalist organizations

tiate directly with the Smith

regime.

to nego-

After talks between

the ANC and the Smith regime broke down at Victoria Falls on
26

August

Smith for

1975,
a

Nkomo began

separate

secret negotiations

settlement.

Bishop Jiuzcrewa expelled

with Ian

September 1975,
Nkomo from the ANC for initiating

109

On

11

unauthorized negotiations
government.

Smith

head the

ANC

to

Muzorewa's authority and

attended

was

which

conference,

the

in late September

own ANC congress

holding his

collaborating with

who desired

Nkomo,

responded by challenging

himself,
this

with and

1975.

mostly

6,000

by

At

pro-Nkomo delegates,

Nkomo was elected president of his own

offshoot of the ANC.

Shortly after this, Nkomo began prel-

with Smith to

iminary meetings

reopening formal negotiations.

announced their intent
and Nkomo
which began in early March

effect of

detrimental

to

to negotiate

As discussed earlier,

tional settlement.

The

discuss the possibility of

1
December 1975,
Smith
On
the negotiations,

collapsed on 19 March 1976.

whole incident was extremely

1976,

this

Nkomo's

constitu-

image

as

nationalist

leader.

First,

Nkomo appeared to be an opportunist who would colla-

borate

with

anyone

order

in

nationalist leader in Rhodesia.

by negotiating with Smith,
in

efforts

his

movement by

dominant

the

it appeared that,

Second,

Nkomo was playing into his hands

divide

to

become

to

conquer

and

nationalist

the

encouraging rifts within it.

Finally,

Nkomo

appeared to be compromising with, if not yielding to,

Smith

on

basic principles.

The Victoria

majority rule.

broken down over the issue of

willing to

negotiate with

Nkomo was

Nkomo it

not as adament

Falls Conference

If Smith was

could only

be because

nationalist leaders

as the other

over the procedures for obtaining majority rule.

appeared

was selling

that Nkomo

enhance his own position after

Nkomo would
1978.
in

the

believed

Patriotic
that

nationalist

out

Thus,

it

the nationalists

to

settlement.

make the same

this time,

At

had

mistake again

in August

Nkomo was a partner with Robert Mugabe

Remembering

Front.

Nkomo might

leaders and

be

thus

110

the

might

1976,

more moderate
be again

Smith

Ian
of

willing

the
to

negotiate

Robert

Zambia on

without the knowledge of his

Nkomo,

of the guerrilla war,

partner,

Adnidst an intensification

separate agreement.

August 1978.

14

prospects for

secretly with

Ian Smith

Unfortunately for

Nkomo,

net

Mugabe,

Smith-Nkomo deal

looking

an idealist

Nkomo

political

for a

trying

opportunist

peaceful

1978.

Was

solution or

the

to get

all

when ZAPU

were shattered
on 4 September

shot down the Rhodesian airliner

in

deal

best

for

himself? To the other nationalist leaders, it appeared that

again tried to sell them
Nkomo was
an opportunist who had
Nkomo* s

out.

shattered and

was

nationalist movement

credibility within the

would

he

completely

never be

trusted

again.
1

Guerrilla

3 as

Nkomo's failures in the February 1980 elections were

due at least in part to

The elections showed that ZIPRA did not have as

rilla war.

the country as Nkomo

much influence in
tion,

earlier ZIPRA failures in the guerclaimed.

the ways in which Nkomo utilized,

forces again

his guerrilla

In addi-

or did not utilize,

raised questions

about Nkomo's

integrity and real motivations.

As

discussed elsewhere in this study, both ZIPRA and

their defeats at the hands of the security

forces in the late 1960* s, had decided to change their guerZANLA,

after

Greater emphasis

rilla strategy.

mobilizing

the

population in

local

was to

order

be placed

to

popular base of support for the guerrilla forces.

much more successful

difference
support.

was due

in this respect
to

the

methods of

provide

ZANLA was

was ZIPRA.

The

establishing

this

ZANLA concentrated on politicizing the population

and preparing the people for

struggle.

than

upon

Consequently,

by

111

sustained and long-drawn-out

the time the February
1980

around,

elections

came

political

organization

within

support by

villages

This

ZANO/ZANLA
country-wide

ttugabe*s victory.

key to

to mobilize popular

had sought

other hand,

on the

had

then.

was the

political infrastructure
ZIPRA,

villages

most

establishing logistical support centers in the

people by publicizing its
the
and by arousing
The political eduacaton

victories over the security forces.

of the

population was not emphasized by ZIPRA.

ZIPRA

was

able

to

obtain

Thus, while

support

material

from

there was

population in the areas within which it operated,

no

political

or

ideological

at election

Consequently,

time

infrastructure with

political

basis

guerrilla struggle
ultimately failed

really did

ZAP'J

which to

success was due to

While ZANLA's

this

for

of

ZIPRA

the military

[Ref.

75]

After the military

was ZIPRA.

late 1960's,

the

saw the

ZANLA was much more successful in

s,

its conduct of the war than

defeats

campaign.

military,

aspects and ignored the political aspects.

During the 1970*

not have a

the fact that it

concentrated on

because it

support.

run its

political and

as both

the

ZIPSA

struggled

had

internal rivalries and factionalism.

with

While these internal

ZANLA had taken the initiative and

struggles were going on,

picked up momentum in the war effort.

ZANLA's North Eastern

offensive, which was launched in December 1972 and supported

by

FRELIMO,

was

much more

ambitious

anything ZIPRA had bee able to organize.

Portuguese in Mozambique

than

The defeat of the

in 197U previded ZANLA

base and opened up a huge

into Rhodesia.

and effective

with

new

border for infiltration of forces

In 1970, ZANLA's Eastern and Southern offen-

sives insured that ZANLA would maintain the military initiative

over

ZIPRA

and

effectively

defined

the

areas

in

Rhodesia in which Nkomo's ZIPRA

foroes could not operate if
they wanted to avoid clashes with ZANLA.
3y 1979,
it had

112

become apparent

confined to

that most

of ZIP3A*

and the northern Midlands while ZANLA

[Ref.

been

Mashonaland West,

North

most of Mataba leland,

rest of the country.

activities had

controlled most of the

76]

Thus, because of the high levels of ZANO politicization and ZANLA military activity throughout Rhodesia and the

relative inactivity in these areas by ZAPU/ZIPRA,

obvious to

the population by

most of

it became

ZANLA had

1930 that

shouldered most of the burden of the guerrilla struggle.

fact, ZANLA had won the war

Nkomos
he had

hopes for

another damaging blow

the

1933

knowledge that

ZANLA comrades.

on the other

ZIPRA,

rillas in Rhodesia.

about twenty-five percent of its

By late

forces,

hand,

on 2,500 to 3,000

while ZAPO had only about 12,000 [Ref. 78],

To make

by the

the

At

refused to equip or train

and eguipped

Soviets

with

the Soviets had

sams time,

This imbalance of

ZANLA forces.

forces brought accusations from ZANU

matters

much of it as

worse, Nkomo's Zambia based army was trained,

modern Soviet weapons.

in Zimbabwe

trained guerrillas

have 21,03

conventional force,

had only

[Ref. 77] 3y the 1930 elections,

fighting in Rhodesia.

ZANU claimed to

given

there were approximately 10,030 to 11,000 ZANLA guer-

1977,

men,

elections were

whan it becama public

out on his

been holding

In

that Nkomo was holding

his army in reserve in Zambia to defaat ZANO in any post-in-

the two organizations.

dependence civil war between

Thus,

Nkomo was suspected of allowing ZANLA to win the war for him
after which he planned to aliminate ZANLA with his own army.
[Ref. 79]

Whether or
forces

actually planned

not Nkomo

to eliminate

ZANO

will

never be

known.

clear, though, is that by the 1980 elections,

most

influential

military

force

113

in

to use

What

his
is

ZANLA was the

Rhodesia.

It:

had

politicized

successfully

and

population

it had

Additionally,

support

their

earned

percentage

large

of

and

loyalty.

shouldered the largest burden

without the benefit of Soviet assistance.

fight,

to capitalize on Nkomo*s

Mugabe was able

in Rhodesia in order

his forces

motives,

his character,

the

of the

Finally,

refusal to commit

doubts on

to cast further

and ultimate goals.

while

Thus,

Nkomo had a sizeable military force in March 1980, it was of

no assistance to him in the
its

activity and

lack of

probably

elections.

In fact,

because of

location in

Zambia,

ZIPRA

was

political liability to Nkomo.

Ethnic Base

One reason for Nkomo's failure in the 1980 elections

was that he failed to

belongs to the Ndebele tribal

(5%)

group.

which include tie Ndebele

speakers,
made

of the

up 19%

As of 1980,

Ndebele

and the Kalanga

(14*)

African population

which include

Shona speakers,

Joshua Nkomo

expand his ethnic base.

the Karanga

in Zimbabwe.
(22%),

Zezuru

Korekore (12$),
Ndau (3%),
and other
miscellaneous small groups, made up approximately 74% of the
(18%), Manyika

(13%),

[Raf. 80] Severally speaking,

the
Ndebele occupy the western third of Zimbabwe while the Shona
African

population*

dominate the

eastern two-thirds

of the

country [Ref. 81].

ethnicly diversify ZAPO beyond its

was reflected in the March 1980 elec-

That Nkomo was unable to

largely Ndebele base

tion results.

Parliamentary

election

results show

took 62.99? of the votes cast (57 seats)

24.11% (20 seats)

and the UANC took only

that

ZANU-PF

while PF-ZAPU took

8.28*

(3

seats).

ZANU claimed

except

widespread loyalty among all the electorates

the two Matabeleland
provinces where PF-ZAPU won

fifteen of sixteen contested seats.

of the election results is

as follows:

114

The regional breakdown

Votes

Party

Vote

of

Manicaland--1 1 seats
34.13
262,972
6.23
19,608
1.58
4,992

ZANO-PF
OANC
PF-ZAPO

Seats
11

Mashonaland Central--6 seats

33.84
146,665
ZANO-PF
3.57
14,985
OANC
2.26
PF-ZAPO
3,947
ZANO-PF
UANC
PF-ZAPO

ZANO-PF
PF-ZAPO
OANC

Mashonaland East
505,313
75,237

seats
1530.45

onaland West
203,567
37,388
28,728

14

11.90
4.56

28,805
flash

3 71.95
seats

13.39
10.15

1
1

Matabeleland North--10 seats

79.05
313,435
PF-ZAPO
10.04
ZANO-PF
39,819
7.64
30,274
OANC

9
1

Matabeleland South 5 seats

36.43
148,745
PF-ZAPO
11,787
6.85
ZANO-PF
3.26
OANC
5,615
ZANO-PF
PF-ZAPO
OANC

ZANO-PF
OANC
PF

Bidla
5

85^35
94,960
30,245

se

l5?72

3
4

27. 12

3.64

Victoria 11 seats
37.32
285,277
4.47
14,615
1.87
6,107
[Ref. 82]

11

tribalism in ZAPO surfaced as early

As discussed earlier,
there were repeated disa-

The problem of
as

1969.

greements between the members of

the ZAPO executive council

over how the organization was to be governed while Nkomo was

under detention.

One faction

consisted of

the Sindebele

speaking Kalingas of the executive council and included J.D.

Moyo,

the

treasurer,

George

Silundika,

the

publicity

director, and Hasocha Ndlova, the assistant secretary.

other faction led by James
and

George

entirely of
1971,

Nyandoro,
Shonas.

Chikerema and

the

Chikerema,

the acting president

secretary-general,

After repeated

disputes in

Nyandoro left ZAPO in

115

The

consisted
1970 and

October 1971 to

played an important role

that the central
it is important to note

Although ethnicity

form FROLIZI.
in this dispute,

groups concerned

the two

difference between

The two factions were

strategy that was to be implemented.

best
on how
to
able to agree
not

among

support

popular

mobilize the

Although

masses.

the

the guerrilla

eventually

ZAPO"

the organization was never

regrouped behind Moyo,

able to

extent necessary to insure

politicize the population to the

strong base of support.

he
After Nkomo was released from detention in 1974,
balance
that
there was
a
always careful to insure
was
a

between Ndebele and Shona speakers

in

prevent any

order to

Nevertheless,
Shonas in

Dn his executive council

future splits

accuse him

continued to

critics

token leadership positions

the Ndebele orientation of

party.

placing

of

to disguise

in order

party.

the

within the

Responding to these

accusations, Nkomo ran some of his most senior Shona leaders

as PF-ZANU

the

these candidates,

All of

1980 elections.

ception of

constituenties in

candidates in the Mashonaland

who

Austin Chambati,

with the ex

Mashonaland West,

ran in

Martyn Gregory notes that one of the ironies

of this
defeat is that what started out as an effort by
Nkomo to increase the prestige of the Shonas in ZAPU actuwere defeated.

ally resulted in the strengthening

[Ref.

83]

During

election campaign,

the

efforts to neutralize the

"father

or tribal leader.
his

made

other

popularily held 7iew of Nkomo

of Zimbabwean nationalism'

his position as a national

Nkomo

accusations of Ndebele favortism.

ZAPO attempted to exploit the

as the

of the Ndebele position.

leader

and

to emphasize

rather than as

regional

When Nkomo returned from exile in Zambia,

first stop was at

rally in Salisbury,

city of 3ulawayo in Matabel eland.

116

not in his home

In his campaign speeches

he

con iii: udx ly

ciupudoj.i.'ra

burying

and the

reconciliation,

national

lor p-~dci

.ic5i

tiis

personal and

of

tribal

animosities.

broaden ZAP0*3 ethnic base

Nkomo's efforts to

Yet,

were unsuccessful for several reasons.

population in

politicized the

had not

reinforcing

First of all,

provide

order to

infrastructure

political

for

ZAPO
a

elections.

the

despite being well trained and equipped by

Secondly, ZIPRA,

number of

flamboyant successes

against the Rhodesian security forces,

did not have as much

achieving

the Soviets and

prestige among the people as did ZANLA.

ZIPRA had confined

its activities

North

Matabeleiand,

mostly to

2ANLA was active in most

and the northern Midlands.

West,

Consequently, by the 1980 elec-

of the rest of the country.

tions, ZANLA was,

at least better

if not in control of more of the country,

known in more of the country than was ZIPRA.

ZANU*s decision to run separately from

Finally,

elections was probably, at least to

its view

of Nkomo

House Conference,

as

only expected

Nkomo was

should

he

liability.
6

tribalist.

During

the Lancaster
the ZAND

which advised him that

viewed

be

in the

certain extent, due to

Matabeleiand and

seats in

to win

ZAPO*

messages from

Enos Nkala,

therefore

as

an

electoral

[Ref. 84]

Externa l Support ers

The Soviet Onion,

as East Germany and North

and

Mugabe received

treasurer in Salisbury,
that

Mashonaland

most

consistently

sometimes assisted by allies such

Korea,

loyal

was Joshua

external

Nkomo^ oldest

supporter.

support began in 1965 when the first group of fifty-two

recruits went to Moscow,

military training.
sending

recruits

Pyongyang,

This
ZAPO*

and Peking to undergo

Shortly after that time,

ZAPO ceased
to
China and Looked mostly
to
the

117

Soviet support of ZAPO

Soviet-bloc countries for support,

In 1976, Rhodesian mililtary

continued throughout the war.
1970
ZIPRA r
and 1976
between
intelligence reported that

playing

although it was

the war,

very small role in

had

been sending large numbers of guerrillas on extended courses

and North Korea [Ref. 85].

Cuba,

in Russia,

In May 1978,

Cuba and East Germany began airlifting massive quantities of

In June 1978,

refugees [Ref. 86].

Havana,

and

increased support for his cause [Ref.

and July 1978,

87].

capitals to seek

Between February

approximately 2,000 ZIPRA guerrillas based in

Zambia attended
in

visited Moscow,

Nkomo

number of eastern European

ZAPU sponsered

Zambia to aid

medical supplies to

food and

Angola where

six-month Cuban operated training course

they were trained not only in guerrilla

tactics, but also in conventional military tactics.

seventy-two

same period,

that

launchers.

[Ref.

88]

reported that the Soviet [Jnion

rillas

in

Zambia

with

137

advisers in

Zambia

artillery and

use of light

forces in the

instructed ZIPRA

rocket

Cuban

During

In September

1978,

it

was

had provided the ZIPRA guer-

missiles

5AM-7

[Ref. 89].

Throughout the fall and winter of 1978-79, both humanitarian

and

military

aid

ZAPO"

April 1979 Rhodesian elections,

by the

Soviet supplied and Cuban

relatively large

tional force in Zambia.

situation,

the

anion,

and Yugoslavia to

Democratic Republic, Cuba,

Thus,

Soviet

the

from

Nkomo

announced

Rhodesian government no
cated weaponry

were prepared

Peeling

to introduce

block aid

increased.

NXomo had

trained convenin

his military

1979

monopoly

that

the

on sophisti-

trained ZIPRA fighters

sophisticated weaponry against

his Cuban

the Rhodesian security forces [Ref.

Eastern

April

on 15

longer had

and that

confident

German

to ZAPCJ

90].

intensified during

year the Muzorewa government was in office.

118

the

On 2S May 1979,

reported

Telegraph

London Daily.

the

from

war materials to direct

and supplying

training,

had changed

Russian aid

changed dramatically.

advising,

control and organization of the ZIPR& military effort.

ambassador to

was also

who

article reported

The

officer.

Lusaka,

The

7assily Solodonikov, the

Russian effort was directed by Mr.

Soviet

of

Zambian based guerrilla forces

So?iet assistance to Nkomo's

had

nature

that the

senior

KGB

increased Soviet

that the

involvement with ZAPO had been prepared by a twelve-man team

assigned to Nkomo's movement in Lusaka

The team had recommended drastic changes in ZIPRA
in 1978.
intelligence,
operations,
after reviewing the logistics,
of Soviet officials

communications, reconnaissance, and general staff procedures

of the army.

As a result,

dismissed while
training.

others were

Onion

sent to

important

held an

was

stepped-up
period.

rocket launchers,

and SAM-7 missiles

91] Other examples of

support to ZAPO were common during

considerably.

President

June

In

Erich

denounced the new

[Ref.

1979,

Honecker
S

ZIPRA.

in

including mortars,

increased eastern block

this

position

to ZIPRA,

Delivery of military supplies

anti- personnel mines,

Union for

the Soviet

not attended a training course in

No one who had

Soviet

the

number of ZIPRA coamanders were

in

and Joshua

meeting between
Nkomo,

GDP.

former

the

regime and reaffirmed East

mixh-Muz orewa

Germany's support of ZAPO [Ref. 92],

In late July 1979, the
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Military Command reported that it was
intercepting increasing

quantities of

communist made

arms

during clashes with ZAPO guerrillas [Ref. 93].

Overall,

Nkomo's close relationship with the Soviet

Onion was probably a hindrance to him in the 1980 elections.

There

are

several reasons

Nkomo's efforts
first

involves

this

why

aid was

to become Zimbabwe's prime

the

problem

119

of

harmful

minister.

politicization

of

to

The
the

As discussed earlier,

population.

Nkoao's election campaign

seriously damaged because ZAPU hid failed to establish

This was due in
political infrastructure in the villages.
was

the Soviet

theories

of guerrilla

part to

which

differ from the Maoist approach adopted by ZANU.

The

between the two philosophies

of guerrilla

described by Hex Nhongo when he

left ZAPU to

basic difference

were well

warfare,

large

war

Finding the ZANU and Chinese emphasis on

join ZAND in 1971.

political education much greater than

that of the Russians,

Nhongo noted that:

the Soviet Union they had told us that the

decisive factor of the war is the weapons,
when I
where
there were Chinese instruc?ot to Itumbi.
ors,
I was told that the decisive factor was the
Now I agree
people.
contradiction.
This was a
with the Chinese.
[Ref. 94]
In

The Chinese

method was

rillas were

fighting so that

teach tha

masses why

the guer-

they would support

the guer-

Soviet emphasis on weaponry

The

rillas.

to

engagements

with the

establishing

and conventional

prevented ZAPU

security forces

from

grass-roots political organization within the

could provide

villages that

base of support

for Nkomo's

election campaign.
The second detrimental effect of Soviet aid was that
it

probably made

Soviets.

Nkomo appear to be too

vast

majority

Consequently,
really

not have any single dominant

Mugabe and ZANU did

source of support.

Nkomo,
of

his

support

from

the

Soviets.

he was always open to accusations that he was

just fronting
ZAPU

received the

on the other hand,

for the

Soviets.

prospects worsened in April 1979

that

dependant upon the

was

completely

Nkomo s
1

election

whan accusations were made

controlled

by

the

Soviets.

[Ref. 95]

This

question

of

Nkomo's

dependency

upon

the

Russians was further complicated by the fact that Mugabe had

tried and failed to get
aid from the
Soviets for ZANU.

120

was able

Mugabe

Thus,

without Russian

argue

He could

than ZIPHA.

that they would be available

so

Mugabe and ZAND)

in a post-

Finally, he could cast doubts about

independence civil war.

intentions

ZANLA,

his Russian equipped

that Nkomo was holding

opponents (i.e.,

to defeat his

show that

did more fighting

assistance,

forces in reserve in Zambia

the true

He oould

his disadvantage.

Nkomo's to

advantage of

this apparent

use

to

of Nko mo and his

Russian supporters by

suggesting that they were not truly dedicated to the nationalist cause because
all the
flay

they were not interested

nationalists in the

1979,

PP.

in supporting

Questioned on this issue in

Mugabe stated that:

Mr.

we stil+ do not
receive direct arms shipments from Russia and we have naver condemned them
for that.
3ut we have argued that such equipment
should be
shared by all those
fighting in
Zimbabwe.
Now that wa have unity, this should not
be a problem.

we
As
far as ZANU is concerned,
have
plenty of weapons with which to fight the war, but
what we need badly is sophisticated equipment like
to air
missiles and lDng-range rDckets.
? round
he war is
changing and these are the weapons we
need.
[ Ref .
96]

the only other external supporter who

Oddly enough,
had an

effect on Nkomo's ability

was his old adversary, Ian

Smith

deserted Bishop

minority to

Smith.

Muzorewa

support Nkomo's

Nkomo might be distasteful,

Mugabe because he was

compromise.

nationalist

On
and

1980 election

February 1930,

called on
Noting

party.

Smith

win the

the

Ian

white

that although

called for opposition to

Marxist with which there could be no

Expressing

and leadership abilities,

of

to

doubts about

Muzorewa*

political

Smith suggested that Nkomo's brand

leadership would offar

the best

future for

black and white Rhodesians.

for

African parties,

Nkomo's party.

Although whites could not vote

Smith called on the whites to support

Warning the whites of the danger of

victory, Smith said:

121

Mugabe

Tell your workers that the Marxists will

their
their goats r
take everything they have:
Tell them they will also
cattle, and chickens.
take away their children. [Raf. 97]
When one has

This event was the fatal blow to Nkcmo's

need any enemies.

Again

credibility.

of fraternizing

being accused

he was

a political deal and

with the RF and of making

at the expense

his principles

Smith he doesn't

supporter like Ian

compromising

fellow nationalists.

of his

Thus, Smith's actions had an effect axactly opposite of what

he had intended.

BISHOP ABEL MOZOREWA

B.

1 -

Biographical Backgr ound

Abel Tendekayi Muzorewa was born on 14 April 1925 to

the Old CJmtali Methodist Center.

peasant family living at

father,

Muzorewa's

Philemon

Haadi

ancestry back through the Sakombe

grandmother was

fraternal

houses of the Makoni tribe,

Salisbury and Omtali.

member of

one of

with

of the

Warozvi 3hona,

ground certainly was not.

strict,

church as
eight

and

His

royal

Methodists,

sisters

his

Zimunya tribe

the ancestors of
If

his religious backfather serving

the

The lives of Abel and his

revolved,

around the Methodist Church.

spiritually

Discipline,
sharp, temper.
humour--those
words summarize my upbringing.
Add regular Bible
lessons plus Church-going, and you have the ingredients which have molded my character and that of
my five brothers and three sistars.
[Ref. 98]
*

and

Muzorewa describes

childhood in the following manner:

122

of Muzorewa's parents were

Both

pastor and teacher.

brothers

socially,
his

devout

of the

ancient Zimbabwe.

building

Muzorewa's ethnic background was mixad,

very

rule.

caae from the area between

who

the royal families

were credited

his

Muzorewa's maternal grandfather was

while his grandmother was

which

one

member of

traced

whose members had

tribe,

of Portuguese

during the days

fled Mozambigue

Muzorewa,

religious convictions

Muzorewa credited his parents'

with forming his character.

life, his actions as

In later

specifically his emphasis on moderation

would be effected by his family and reli-

nationalist leader,
and negotiation,

this point

Muzorewa further elucidates

gious upbringing.

when he says in his autobiography that:

f ather 1 s, i eep
religious convictions,
My
which he lived out
and the irreproachable life in
Sundays,
left an indelible
what he preached on

impression upon

me.

Like father, ay mother is a devout oerson.

Hers however was a faith which taught more through
persuasion,
compassion,
and example than through
This was effecformal teaching and discipline.
[fief. 99]
tive and long-lasting.

tribal

As

child,

Muzorewa

tradition required
spent his

grandparents who lived

at

for

early years
the foot of

with his

which

School,

was run

by

maternal

Mount Samzaguru near

Tikweri Mountain in the Makoni Reserve.

Muzorewa began his Sub-standard

first-born

the

At the age of nine,

education at the Chinyadza

English

Methodist missionaries.

when Abel was thirteen years old, his father sent him to the
Old Umtali boarding school

Old Umtali,

for further education.

While at

Muzorewa underwent what he calls his "spiritual

rebirth":

Although I had been brought up in a devout

Christian home, I made that morning my own commitment to follow Christ as my Savior.
On that day
of
days Christ gave me a spiritual microscope,
spectacles,
and earphones to see and hear
for
myself what Christ offers.
I realized that I was
a sinner,
but that Sod loves me and forgives me.
[Ref.

100]

believe that the Christian faith aives a

centre to all of life.
It is an ethic
not :just
but for
for the professional minister,
every believer.
It
is a call to
each person to
seek Christ in his personal life.
With it you can
go anywhere in the world,
to
work as a farmer or
driver, politician,
or nurse,
and find Christ to
be
your source of
happiness,
strength,
and
victory.
[Ref. 101 ]
5

Muzorewa
finished

remained

Standard Pour.

at

UmtaLi until

That year

123

he

194

when

transferred to

he
a

he received a
in 1943,
Methodist school at Nyadiri where,
Between 1944 and 1948, Muzorewa
Standard Five certificate.
served as a teacher in the lower primary school grades and
as

evangelist.

lay

entered

then

He

After completing

Old Umtali.

Theological Seminary,

Hartzell

the

his

was ordained
minister of the
a
he
theological studies,
After working as a pastor
Methodist Church in August 1953.
in the Eusape area

He spent

degree.

colleges in Missouri
Degree and

to study

United States

to the

larship

Muzorewa went on

for five years,

years from

the

Upoa

scho-

theological

through 1962

1958

and Tennessee and earned

Master's Degree.

in

Bachelor's

returning to Rhodesia,

pastor of the Old Umtali

he became the

for

Mission.

In 1964,

Muzorewa was appointed the national director of the church's

Christian Youth Movement and

1966 he became the secretary

in

Muzorewa was consecrated

of the Student Youth Movement.

bishop of the United Methodist Church in Rhodesia at

Basutoland in August

mony at

first black

Rhodesia.
2

bishop ever in
[Ref.

Thus,

1963.

he

cere-

became the

the United Methodist

Church in

102]

Early Political Career

Bishop

Muzorewa

general public in September

ties banned him
the time,

became

first
197

was

black residential suberb of

of an office in Salisbury.

to

the

when the Rhodesian authori-

from entering the Tribal

Muzorewa

well-known

pastor in

Trust Lands.

At

the upper-middle class

Marimba Park and was working out

The

reason for the banning was

that Muzorewa had spoken out against government proposals to

tax church managed black schools

black land tenure.

and government policies on

Up to this time,

in public politics had been

Muzorewa's involvement

very limited.

to change*

124

This was all soon

to solve the Rhodesian

British government was again anxious

As discussed earlier in this study,

crisis.

that the

it became apparent

the fruits of

the British-Rhodesian efforts were the Smith-Home proposals.

Since the proposals were basically amendments to the illegal

not

black nationalist

and since

1969 constitution

leaders had

even been consulted during their formulation,

wide-spread black

opposition to

In October

four former members of the

1971,

executive councils,
and Josiah

Msipa,

Edson

ZAPU and ZANU

Michael Mawema,

decided to form

Cephas

new unity

the first Zimbabwean nationalist

Using the same initials as

they named it the

the African National Congress,

African National Council

at mobilizing

proposals.

constitutional settlement proposals.

movement to oppose the

movement,

tha Smith-Home

Sithole,

Chinaraano,

there was

In order that their efforts

(ANC).

popular opposition

to

the

proposals and

in

negotiating with the British and Rhodesian governments might

be

successful,

they

national reputation
nor ZANU.

needed to find a neutral leader of

who had been
a member of
neither ZAPU

As a politically neutral but well known national

religious leader, Muzorewa fit the bill.

the

four nationalist leaders

asked

him

to

lead

Smith-Home proposals.
to

their

request

and

in

its

fight

After much thought,

on

16

Decenber

discussed at length earlier in

proposals were
and

the

Pearce

Ref .

the

African

103] As was

Bishop Muzorewa

in

not acceptable to

British

the

mobilizing enough support to

Commission that the constitutional

and the ANC were successful

the

this study.

against

Muzorewa agreed

1971

National Council was officially founded.

convince

1971,

approached Bishop Muzorewa and

ANC

the

In November

government

proposals.

125

the majority

abandoned

the

of Africans

Smith-Home

series

This

of

unlike Nkomo,

perfectly
when

But

within

leader

What is interesting about this is that Muzorewa,

Zimbabwe.

was

significant for
Muzorewa very suddenly

nationalist

known

best

the

as

very

vents was

First of all,

Muzorewa's future.
emerged

he

did not seek national political stature.

be solely

satisfied to
drafted,

was

religious

accepted

he

the

He

leader.

challenge.

Ironically, Muzorewa was selected to head the ANC because he

and unknown

apolitical

relatively

was

political

the

in

Nevertheless, Muzorewa would soon find that he too

to a position
of national
liked politics and would aspire

world.

Finally, Muzorewa would arrive on the national

of Sod whose
personal reputation
political scene as a man

leadership.

and integrity were above reproach.

years

would

later he

candidate

national

enter the

whose personal

nationalist

elections as

true motivations

honor and

very much in doubt among the electorate.

Muzorewa's reputation as

seven

But, like Nkomo,

were

Never again would

leader be as high as

it was in 1972.

Smith-Muzorewa Negotiations

had been created solely

Although the ANC

the

Smith-Home proposals,

the organization

discuss

an

as a

Muzorewa saw

base from

groups

parties,

and

such as

10

role for

urge whites

the original

members either left

to consult

with

the

the Centre Party and

more

progressive

the Rhodesia Party,

new settlement.

In early

Smith and Muzorewa began unofficial discussions.

March 1973,

Finally,

on 17

the ANC

July 1973,

to

Muzorewa continued to address

over the possibility of reaching

1973,

further

Although

up when its senior

the country or were arrested,

white

which to

alternative settlement.

ANC executive broke

to oppose

became

during

126

legal political

a
a

peak

On

party.

in the guerrilla

war,

Ian Smith invited Muzorewa to bagin official talks on a

constitutional settlement.
Smith

the next

during

were

the talks

Like Nkomo, Muzorewa had damaged his reputation

broke down.

negotiations

undertaking

with

uncompromising

an

Ian

First of all, he had been discredited with the main-

Smith.

stream of the nationalist movement

six

of which

On 20 June 1974,

discussed earlier in this paper.

by

meetings

fourteen

details

the

months,

ten

over

held

Muzorswa

and

members

of

imprisoned

the

Sithole and

including

when,

executive

ZAND"

wrote

Mugabe,

March 1974,

on 20

council,

condemning

letter

Muzorewa for negotiating with the illegal regime and calling

on

to

him

negotiations

cease

immediately.

Obviously,

negotiate if he did not have

Muzorewa was in no position to

the backing of those who controlled the guerrillas.

as

after the

discussed earlier,

leaked

based upon the 1971 proposals.

reprinted

reneging on

The

of any

dishonest for

The nationalists

condemned him

In reality,

Muzorewa

agreement either without raading

had added

Ian Smith

In any case,

looking like either

certain

it or

previously agreed

to

Muzorewa same out of the incident

traitor to his cause or

naive fool

His reputation as a nationalist leader would never

or both-

completely recover from this incident.

In

FROLIZI

1974.

Rhodesian Front called him

an agreement.

probably signed the

amendments.

the existence

was

this incident was extremely damaging to his

for selling out on their principles.

before

Muzorewa,

27 September

on

had previously denied

such agreement,

reputation.

Bishop

by

Rhodesian Herald

in the

Since Muzorewa

agreed to a settlement
document to this effect,

and signed

August 1973

dated 17

talks broke down Ian Smith

Muzorewa had

report that

Second,

December 1974,

(Sithole,

the leaders

Ref .

104]

of ZANO,

ZAPO",

and

Nkomo, and Chikerema respectively), at the

127

urgings cf the presidents :f the Frontline States, agreed to

united

front under

National Council with

Muzorewa as

dissolve their organizations

of the African

the name

and form

The mission of the new ANC was to negotiate

its president.

government in

the Rhodesia n

directly with

order to

bring

The failure of

about a peace settlement and majority rule.

Victoria Falls Conference, the internal

and the evenbickering among the four nationalist leaders,
tual break-up of the organization ware discussed at length
the new ANC at the

leadership shortcomings
tiveness as

*ere due in

the new ANC

failures of
a

of

Muzorewa*

Muzorewa.

on the

as the

leader of

had influence over neither

1975 when,

Thus,

defected from the new ANC,

The united

had

as he

The final blow

came in September

for appointing incompetent politileaders to

lead the

The

along with Sithole,

inefficient leader.

no longer

position of strength

the ANC-formed ZLC.

condemned Muzorewa,

fairly well

Declaration," the members of the

of guerrilla

military wing of

than an

the leader of the new ANC

ZANLA DARE condemned him

shambles.

ZANU and

ZANLA nor ZIPRA.

in the "Mgagao

cians instead

He worked

Thus, Muzorewa could never hope

with Smith from

to Muzorewa as

number of ways.

but failed to realize that Sithole was

control of his guerrillas.

to negotiate

ineffec-

Muzorewa demonstrated

lacked political insight.

way out

to the

upon the rivalry between Muzorewa

and Nkomo to divide the organization.

with Sithole of ZANO,

that the

no small part

manifested itself in

leader

Ian Smith was able to play

that he

however,

Let it be said,

earlier in this paper.

by late 1976,

ZLA,

the

ZANLA DARS also

as an incompetent,

when Sithole also

organization was in a
front had proved to be nothing more
Muzorewa'

strong leader might have

welded the
nationalist organizations
into a united,
strong ANC,
but
Muzorewa was not the man to do it.
illusion.

128

3y

lats "375,

situation was becoming

tha

ripe for

When the Geneva

3ishop Muzorewa to be seduced by Ian Smith.
Bishop Muzorewa found
Convention convened in October 1976 r
that ZAND and ZAPD had broken with his ANC and were partici-

pating in the conference as the Patriotic Front

the interim government and

tha structure of

the security forces.

On

Patriotic

Front

as the

legitamate

sole

Muzorewa'

With

nationalist

prestige within

anxious to negotiate a separate internal

before he lost his position as a nationalist

be very

settlement

On

leader all together.

that he

that he

Muzorewa for

January 1977,

wanted to

Smith announced
the Geneva

begin negotiations

with

Throughout

internal settlement.

separate

British proposals at

was rejecting the

Convention and

Muzorewa conducted informal exploratory talks with the

The details of

Smith regime.

these talks and

surrounding them were discussed earlier

important to

note that

several

in this

Frontline

announced

on

February

support behind the

lating the

substance

States,

the
1977

It

which

quick agreement

Oid

that

Committee
throwing its

Liberation
it was

PF and that it would assist

guerrilla war.

paper.

First, following the lead

with Smith was to his advantage.

the

the events

events occurred

evidently convinced Muzorewa that reaching

of

to support

Smith felt that he

nationalist movement fading rapidly,

would

is

the control of

that they were going

organization in Rhodesia.

1977,

On 14

January 1977, the leaders of the

Frontline States announced

the

the convention broke down over the issues of

December 1976,

the

(PF)

Second,

the PF had

it in esca-

agreed in

Anglo-American peace proposals and had

renewed negotiations with the British.
In January 1978, PF
leaders met with the Anglo- American
representatives at
Malta.

to the

Muzorewa

was

angered by

exclude him from the ceasefire

129

British

intentions

to

negotiations and feared that

it was part of

scheme to make Nkoao the

future leader of

105] Finally, Muzorewa had gotten Smith to

one-vote as
commit himself to majority rule and to one-man,
Zimbabwe.

[fief,

precondition to the talks.

Formal negotiations between Smith and Muzorewa began
The
internal agreement was signed by
1977.
in November
and Sithole on 3 March 1978.
Smith, Muzorewa, Chief Chirau,
a

details of

The

Nevertheless,

earlier in this paper.

the settlement

settlement were

internal

the

to Muzorewa

political

with

dealt

the significance of
future was

that it

further damaged his credibility and apparent integrity.

Also, it appeared that he

terms with the leaders of the PF.

had rushed

they could

reach an

eight

of the police,

army,

white-dominated

bureaucracy.

of parliament.
was contrary

Thus,

for the

whites,

service by

and public

judiciary,
a

seats

and provided for the control

giving them the power of veto,

minority was still in

the

the agreement reserved twenty-

Finally,

one-hundred assembly

of the

agreement with

the primary leadership posi-

British and insure for himself

tion in Zimbabwe.

undercut Mugabe

in order to

into the agreement

Nkomo before

and

discussing its

the agreement without even

had entered into

He

Consequently,

white

the

position to usurp many of the powers

Muzorewa had

to the visws

made an agreement that

wishes of the

and

other nation-

alist leaders and organizations and to the majority of black

Zimbabweans.
*

The Interim Government and the 192.9 Elections

Muzorewa'

of

lack

effectiveness

making bad

decisions,

decisions,

continued during the

ment was in power.

sional government,

or

at least

and

knack

being a partner

for

to bad

period the interim govern-

On 14 September 1978, the iciterim proviciting the escalation of

130

the guerrilla

war

banned ZAND and ZAPU from Rhodesia,

by ZANLA and ZIPRA,

excluding these two parties

thus effectively

pating in the scheduled national elections.

from particiIt

appeared to

most nationalists that MuzDrewa was eliminating the competi-

entrench his own

order to further

tion in

government fail

the transitional

only did

meaningful social

but Muzorewa

reforms,

position.

Not

to achieve

any

himself assisted,

wittingly or unwittingly, in the obstruction of reforms.

April

Brian

1978,

Hove,

brutality in

and Order,

his first

public

with his

thereafter clashed

Muzorewa, Sithole,
his remarks.

The loss of Hove,

people.

the ruling

amount

the

Hilary

soon

Squires,

opportunities for

Hove

Executive Council

demanded of Hove that

and Chirau)

refused and returned

in London after only

legal practice

considerable

statement and

co-Minister,

the agreement" and

he withdraw

and

Squires accused Hove of "breaking the

blacks in the police.

(Smith,

tJANC

spoke out against

the judiciary and career

over changes in

spirit of

of the

Law,

co-Minister of Justice,
police

member

In

to a

in office.

few days

cost Bishop Huzorewa

true

reformer,

of

credibility

with

Zimbabwean

the

[Ref. 106]

transitional government's failures,

Chief among the

however, was its total lack of success in achieving interna-

tional recognition, ending the sanctions, or ending the war.

The

Frontline States

continued to

United States and Great Britain

transitional government.

support

the PF.

withheld recognition of the

In early

March 1973,

the transi-

tional government appealed to the JN for recognition.

March,

The

On 10

Sithole was prevented from addressing the ON General

Assembly by

coalition of

world countries.

Council voted
Obviously,

Finally,

African,
on

131

and third-

March 1978, the ON Security

to condemn the interim

in the eyes of the

socialist,

Rhodesiaa government.

rest of the world,

Muzorewa

not the

was

Failure to

authentic leader of the Zimbabwean

achieve international recognition also

to

failure

the

end

and

sanctions

people.

meant

improve

to

Zimbabwe-Rhodesia's economic condition.

Muzorewa as

The ineffectiveness of

leader

more apparent than in his failure to end the war.

had hoped that a settlement

lead to

ceasefire.
-

escalated."

war

The

Instead,

much to Smith's chagrin, the

this

reason for

Consequently,

Ian Smith

with Muzorewa and Sithole would

it

was

very

simple.

over the ZANLA and ZIPRA

Muzorewa had absolutely no control

guerrillas.

was no

in his power to end

was not

the war.

The national

September 1978,

from

elections,

were

which

finally

had been

held in

postponed

April

1979.

Muzorewa*s UANC, running on a platform of its ability to end

achieve international

the war,

and institute

tions,

social reform,

seventy-two black seats in

was

sworn

in as

recognition,

the Prime

How did Muzorewa manage to

of the

Muzorewa

In June,

Minister of

Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

win such an overwhelming victory

1979 elections because,

Muzorewa and the UANC

since ZAND and

legally prohibited from participating

of the country,

won fifty-one

Parliament.

when he ran on a record of failures?

won the

end the sanc-

ZAPO were

in the political life

there was

no other influential nationalist

party to run against them.

The security forces and auxili-

aries

loyal to

voter

turn-out that

overwhelming.

Muzorewa were
would make

In short,

mobilized to
his victory

Muzorewa and

default.

132

the

insure

high

appear to

be

UANC won

by

the

Mu zorewa and

Minister

Prime

5.

128

Election

Campaign
Bishop auzorewa*

2 f f ectiveness

mentation of
tion

the country

in

same bureaucracy

the

Unable

implemented.

slightest-

the

in

that ran

the

With

the hands of

during the

than

civil

Rhodesian

reforms were
promises of
his election

very few meaningful social

Front government,

ending the

had not improved the situa-

security forces still in

police and

service,

The national elections and the imple-

new constitution

national leader

period he was the prime- minister

did not improve during the

of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

as

to fulfill

obtaining international

war,

recognition,

auzorewa was

and ending the ON sanctions,

thus legitamacy,

of Great Britain,

yield to the pressures

finally forced to

the Commonwealth Nations,

and

the Frontline States,

and the ?F

to agree to an all-parties constitutional conference.

discussed

As

earlier,

accepted the

British constitutional

beginning of

the Lancaster House

the

With

December

signing
the

1979,

government became

scheduled for

of

the winning

ZANO-PF and

over

PF-ZAPO"

surface,

On the

appear that auzorewa and the UANC had

the

in

of the

in

Huzorewa

elections that

of the

0.

Agreement

House

priority

the very

September 1979.

talks in

number one

February 193

proposals at

Lancaster

the

government

Salisbury

the

it

were

would

number of advantages

1980 election

campaign.

That the UANC lost the elections despite having these advan-

tages was due

largely to .luzorewas lack of

and the artificiality of his

let

alone

popular base

national leader,

nationalist leader.

In January

1980,

machine that had won the

Thus,

position as

Muzorewa-OANC political
elections was still in place.

the same
19 79

Muzorewa, unlike Mugabe and Skomo,

133

was in the envious

who had an election campaign

position of being an incumbant

organization with very rscent and successful experience at

experience in
UANC's recent
The
winning elections.
experience in operating under
mobilizing the voters and
had remained virtually unchanged by the
terms of the Lancaster House Agreement, gave Muzorewa a head

election laws that

This advantage was magnified by

start over his competitors.

the fact that ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU, who obviously had neither

organizations nor recent election campaign

were not legalized in Rhodesia
experience inside Rhodesia,
begun his
until more than a month after Muzorewa had
overt political

election campaign.

107]
Bishop Muzorewa also took
[

Ref .

advantage of his position

within the government to enhance his election campaign.

realizing that

late November 1979,

national elections
released

were just

gaining the support of the electorate.

that the

of the OANC

trade mark

Muzorewa

corner,

political prisoners

hundreds of

settlement and

final

around the

In

the hope

in

of

Martyn Gregory notes

during the

1980 election

campaign was that it was able to combine its close relationship

government with

with the

its

ability to

monopolize

private transport facilities and key

public venues in order

to neutralize the opposition parties

during the late stages

of the campaign.

An example of this was the Huruyadzo rally

in the Zimbabwe Grounds in

The UANC hired nine

Salisbury.

trains and 500 coaches to ferry supporters from all over the
country to the four-day rally.

all-party
possible

Election

Council

violence between

It had been agreed to by the

that,
the

in

political

order

to

parties,

prevent
no

two

parties would be allowed to hold rallies in the same city or

area at the same time.

Thus,

when the UANC announced its

plans to hold this rally from Thursday 21 February to Sunday

24 February,

all other parties

134

were prohibited from organ-

izing rallies in the capital on the weekend 'before the elecalso demonstrated the
The high cost of this rally
tions.

Nevertheless,

financial resources at Muzorewa's disposal.

number

Muzorewa's campaigning advantages.

Hef

all

of

108]

External Su pport ers

6.

Bishop Muzorewa's

campaigns.

presidential

lection campaign

addition to

In

and stickers,

T-shirts,

was an extrava-

similar to American

was in many ways vary

gant affair that

hats,

neutralized

factors effectively

other

of

the usual

party

ANC provided those who

the

attended the February Salisbury rally with 60,000 free meals

every

day,

included athletics, boxing,

speech was delivered by

ostentatious arrival in ona of

ANC

by a West German firm.

which

weightlifting,

wrestling,

and

part of the rally occurred

The only political

film shows.

when a

and entertainment

accomodations,

free

Muzorewa,

who had

made an

four helicopters lent to the

[Sef.

109] It was readily appa-

rent to all who followed Muzorewa's campaign that it was the

finest campaign

that monay

reservoir of funds came

seemingly endless
three sources

Bishop Muzorewa's

could bay.

big

western Europe and

business

(both in

principally from

southern Africa and in

the United States),

South

Africa,

and

white Rhodesians.

Muzorewa

received

considerable

from business interests in

South Africa,

Great Britain,
mated
(0.

S.)

that the
from

Anglo-American
million

to

UANC

had

western

received
business

Corporation probably

the bishop's campaign.

for

British

support

the United States,

and other western countries.

1980, it was reported that

Confederation

financial

more

The OAO esti-

million

that 355

corporations.

donated
[Sef,

more than

110]

The
$5

In January

in Great Britain officials of the

Industry

135

(CBI)

had

met

with

Shortly thereafter,

aign-

Fund" was set up in

denied any involvement with the

of the fund were affiliated

his camp-

"Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Electoral
Although CBI officials

Britain.

Great

support to

financial

discuss giving

Muzorewa to

all of the directors

fund,

Most of the money was

with CBI.

donated by subsidiaries of British corporations in Rhodesia.

Organizers of the fund claimed that there had been no violaof the contributions had actu-

tion of the sanctions as all

ally been raise inside

Rhodesia.

of

[Ref.

111] Muzorewa's

largest supporters were mining corporations,

to

include the

American Union
Anglo-American Corporation,
Carbide Corporation, and Johannes Consolidated Investment of
Lonrho Group,
South Africa.

Throughout the
the

bishop and

military,

and

the

tenure of

the Muzorewa

received considerable

ANC

political

Voice

of

both

support from

government interests in South Africa.

sponsered

government,
financial,

private

In April 1979,

Zimbabwe reported

the PF

Muzorewa

the

that

and

receive
military
to
hardware,
from South
Africa
primarily counterins urgency aircraft,
South
[Ref. 1121.
Tne aircraft were transhipped through
Africa from arms dealers in the United States and western

regime

Europe,

was

continuing

inspite

of the

That same

sanctions.

J N

month.

economic and
military alliance with South Africa.
In a
South African
radio interview,
the bishop declared that such cooperation
Bishop Muzorewa

would insure

expressed his support

prosperous future for

that such prosperity would

in

independence of the new state.

Between June

and

1978

made several trips to South

for his

for an

government from

government [Ref. 114].

Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and
turn assure the stability and
[Ref.

113]

July 1979,

Africa

Bishop Muzorewa

in order to gain support

both private

individuals and

Finally, in late 1979,

136

the

number of

SodCu.

a mi. can

citi^ciiSi

1ppo.z3n1.x7

established

Formed in order to
communist counof Russian and other

Rhode sian Democracy."

"Fund for

counter the influence

southern Africa,

tries in

approval and

the

African government,

encouragement of the South

the

winii

provided millions

the fund

dollars to Muzorewa's election campaign.

The landslide

seem to indicate that

[Ref.

nature of the election

115]

results would

Muzcrewa*s extravagant campaign style

limitless financial resources were

and seemingly

of

of little

First,
There are several reasons for this phenomena.
Muzorewa's close relationship with white business interests
help.

both within and

outside of Rhodesia damaged his

black nationalist leader.

image as

the fact that Muzorewa

Second,

considerable financial and political support

from individuals and in and the gorenment of an apartheid

was receiving

South Africa appeared

The UANC,

black nationalist

fraternizing with

be a contradiction.

to the voters to

organization,

southern

racism in

bastion of

the last

was viewed as

Finally, the fact that Bishop Muzorewa himself was

Africa.

somewhat less than

candid in disclosing the

sources of his

campaign funds caused the voters to suspect the worst.

asked by

reporter at

about the sources of his

"None of
this line

February

1980 press conference

campaign funds,

your business."
of questioning,

When

the

When

Muzorewa replied,

the reporters

persisted in

bishop replied,

"I

am not

interested in answering that question. .. We have said that it

does not matter where we get our funds, as long as it is not
from

Communists."

Muzorewa's
said:

aids,

Matters
in

were

defending

"What did you expect him

limitless?

We have funds

what advantage does it give

flamboyant style

net

helped when

the bishop* s
to say,

one

brusqueness,

that our funds our

to suit our needs, of course,

us to adait it."

of Muzorewa's election

137

of

bur

[Ref.

116] The

campaign,

coupled

with his own secretivensss

not

about his sources of funds, could

thoughts about his

give the elsotorate second

help but

suitability as a national leader.

Guerrilla and Ethnic Base

7-

Bishop Muzorewa simply did not have the

of popular support.

support

enjoyed

other

the

by

nationalist

two

Nkomo could call on ZIPRA and the Ndebele-speaking

leaders.

Sugabe had ZANLA and the

regions of Zimbabwe for support.

Shona majority

to back

But Bishop

him up.

nor an ethnic group that he

neither an army
own.

and

was his lack of a base

Nkomo and Mugabe,

his two opponents,

popular

between Muzorewa

striking difference

The most

it was nearly

Consequently,

organize any kind of

could call his

impossible for

him to

grass-roots support for

country-wide,

had already

Mugabe and Nkomo

his campaign.

Muzorewa had

cornered the

market in that area.

Muzorewa' s relationships with

zations had been extremely poor

object of the ire of ZIPRA
that

conflict.

could be

they were

officers to

convinced

only through

attained

violent

Bishop Muzorewa had

the guerrillas by appointing

inexperienced junior
ZLA.

while

As chairman of the new ANC,

again angered

Muzorewa was the

and ZANLA because he advocated

negotiated settlement

their goals

almost from the very begin-

In the early 1970's,

ning of his career.

peaceful

the guerrilla organi-

politicians and

command positions

in the

Consequently, ZIPRA and ZANLA never were united under

the ZLA.

Muzorewa

during the periods

campaign,

rslations with

over them was no

lack of influence

Council and the

poor

and

better illustrated than

he was a member of

Prime Minister.

the guerrillas

the ruling Executive

Daring his

1979 election

Muzorewa had campaigned on his ability to end the

138

thousands of PF guerrillas would

He had claimed that

war.

surrender when they realized that ha had achieved the ideals

for

which

fighting.

they had been

that motivated Ian Smith to come

this was one of the factor

to

Muzorewa

terms with

first

in the

place.

to convince

was unable

Minister Muzorewa

discussed earlier,

As

But

more than

guerrillas to surrender to the new government.

guerrillas intensified the war

was also

Muzorewa

As such,

Operations.

he

the security forces.

of

few

Instead, the

As prime minister,

effort.

Minister

the

Prime

Defence

and

Combined

had at least nominal control over

close identification with

Jiuzorewa's

commanded and manned security forces caused his

image as a nationalist political leader to plummet when the
security forces intensified the coun terinsurgency effort in
the white

1979.

weaknesses

Muzorewa*s

his inability

exemplified by
the

and senior

was the chairman,

Internal Settlement
the

Internal

was responsible

for

the prime minister,

who

which

cabinet officers and security

Just before the signatories of the March

force commanders.

Council,

were

to control

March 1978

the

consisted of

prosecuting the war,

1978

Council,

the War

Settlement,

and unwillingness

Prior to

security forces.

leader

national

as a

prime

formed

their four-man

minister's chairmanship

of

Executive
the

War

Council was abolished and the seats formerly occupied by the

cabinet
Thus,

assumed

ministers were

the black signatories to

ally excluded from participating

military policy.

Muzorewa

[Ref.
1

over

90^ of

white civil

servants.

the settlemnent were virtuin the decisions affecting

117]

influence over security

seem to have increased after

in April 1979.

by

his election as prime minister

The state of martial

the country

matters does not

by mid-1979,

139

law,

which extended

enabled the

white

forces to

security

referring

without

Muzorewa

to

terrorism"

"suppression of

the

pusue

Zimbabwe-Rhodesia

the

or

administration,
refugee camps in Mozambique and Zambia
During Muzorewa*

parliament for guidence.

guerrilla bases and

approximately one-half million people were

attempt to
forcibly confined in "protected villages" in an
starve the guerrillas of their support in the rural areas,
bombed,

were

and

auxiliaries

186

loyal

to

Sithole

Incidents like these severely damaged

"man of God" and "champion of unity."
ZANU-PF and

tion campaign,

being

both responsible

and

forces

the

sought to show both that Muzorewa

and that

portrayed

Muzorewa as
the

security

controlling

in

them.

was in collusion with the

responsible for

and thus

he still did

the two nationalist organizations

Exploiting the situation,

security forces

image as

During the 1980 elec-

actions of

impotent

being

as

Muzorewa'

PF-ZAP(J

for

massacred.

were

power to end

have the

not

their atrocities
the war.

alienation from the nationalist guerrillas was completed when he came out in favor of the presMuzorewa's

Finally,

ence of South African troops in Zimbabwe during the election

There were

campaign.

Zimbabweans that

regime

than to

minister,

Muzorewa was
them.

but the

he was an

Ref .

black

the former

white

been the

prime

may have

controlled
[

minds of

the

closer to

Muzorewa

white

still calling the shots.

In

doubts in

no

security forces

118]

Muzorewa's downfall was that

the final analysis,

artificially created leader with

of support.

The great

situations that

were

irony is

brought Muzorewa

that the
to

the

uythical base

conditions and

forefront of

the

national political scene were the same situations and conditions that

would ultimately bring

late-comer to

the national

asked by the nationalists to

about his

political scene,

downfall.

Muzorewa was

lead the ANC precisely because

140

his

was

with

neutral

organization

national

?.o

or

because he was apart

Smith negotiated with him
nationalist movement.
A candifrom the mainstream of the
following.

Muzorewa was able to win the 1979

date with no popular base,

elections only

because there

because of

the ability

voters

the polls.

to

the security

Thus,

he collapsed in

surprising that
failure to end

of

Faced with

viable competition in
a

of the black population,

C.

1980

been

elections.

His

to achieve

control

security

the

of state.

head

and having

the elections

guerrilla army nor

large sector

his defeat was inevitable.

ROBERT M0GAB2
1 -

Biosrahical Background
Robert Gabriel Mugabe

in the

"Christian village"

Mission.

The son

of

youth tending cattle,

was born on 21

young

carpenter,

fishing,

teacher.

which gualified him as

College in South

Bachelors

and Masters

and then at

In 1950 he went

Africa where

the first of six university degrees.

in Law and

taught at Kutama for

Initially Mugabe

schools in the region.

Hare University

Mugabe spent his

years of primary education

the low salary of two pounds per month,

of other

Kutama

and boxing with other boys.

and two years of teacher training,

Standard

February 1924

Jesuit operated

at the

Mugabe completed six

At Kutama,

have

sanctions,

credibility as

destroyed his

neither

ths

and to

forces had

the support of

should not

and

get the

forces to

it

to end the

the war,

recognition,

international

real competition

was no

number
to Fort

he obtained

(Three of his degrees,

a

Bachelors

in Public

Administration,

would be earned by correspondence while he

was in detention.)
While in South Africa,
Mugabe came into
contact with members of the youth

141

wing of the South African

African Communist

the South

Congress and

African National

During that period he also started to read the works

Party,

trated

attempts to

his

in

He considered

politics.

Mugabe was frus-

to Rhodesia,

On returning

of Karl Marx.

involved

get

himself

in

nationalist

revolutionary and

nationalist leadership in Rhodesia

In the mid- 1950*3 he moved
too conservative for his tastes.
to Northern Rhodesia where he was exposed to that country's
Four
Kenneth Kaunda.
most important nationalist leader,
found the

militant and

after

later,

years

Mugabe took

teaching post

obtained its

Ghana had

While there,

there.

heavily influenced by that country's leader,

that Mugabe met and married

It was there

[Ref.

Kwame Nkrumah.

his wife,

Sally.

The Ascetic Militant

from Joshua Nkomo and

Robert Mugabe is as different

Bishop Abel

Muzorewa as

any man

physically imposing Nkomo is

a

he was

119]

2-

is

independence,

bible-thumping

to be.

flamboyant showman.

preacher.

imposing, flamboyant, nor

could hope
Robert

Mugabe is

The

Muzorewa
neither

Quiet and subdued, he

preacher.

is rather the thinking man's revolutionary.

Raised

Roman Catholic,

with protestant revivalism

teacher,

intellectual,

taste for Nkomo

persuasion.

Mugabe was never infected

as were Nkomo and

and philosopher,

flamboyant methods,
An ascetic
who doesn'
1

Muzorewa.

Mugabe had little

but instead preferred

smoke

or drink

and

Mugabe is more comfortable reading a book by

Karl Marx, Mao-Tse-tung, or Mahatma Sandhi than on the elecrarely smiles,

tion campaign circuit.

tant

single political

Mugabe has said that the most impor-

influence on

life was

Mahatma

whose "passive resistence" inspired nationalists in

India and Africa [Ref. 120].
Mugabe believes that

Gandhi,
both

his

142

personal and

collective se lf-sacrifioe

are the keys to success in

and self-discipline

any endeavor and he imposed these

standards both upon himself and his party [Ref. 121].

Unlike Nkomo and Muzorewa, who never really got much
beyond the concepts of "independence" and "majority rule,"
Robert Mugabe had an ideology within which he operated.
Mugabe was and is

Marxist.

As such,

simply aimed at obtaining independents

but

countrymen,

into a socialist
aign,

also at
society.

and the vote for his

eventually transforming

Zimbabwe
election camp-

During the 1980

basic platform

Mugabe's

his struggle was not

was the

nationalization of
the introduc-

industry, the radical redistribution of land,

tion of sweeping state controls, and the public ownership of

the country's natural resources,

water, and forests.

to include land,

Mugabe himself probably best described

Zimbabwe after the elections

his vision of

minerals,

when during the

election campaign he told an interviewer that:

If the whites

believe

in. democracy

then

cannot come about by

imposition,
there will have
the areas where vou
to be
a demarcation between
collectivise and areas which must remain in individual hands until
you
can
cultivate understanding.
.There will be some who will not want to
put their
eight acre,
ten acre land
six acre,
units together with the others.
lou cannot actually compel.
You can develoo
an understanding,
raise
towards
a
consciousness
acceptance.
Therefore you do not force out those whiles who
want to remain as users of land.
But they have to
accept that the land belongs to the state and they
will not be in any different
position from the
Africans.
But
of course
you have
to maintain
the
system of private land use.
I don't see how this
can be disadvantageous to those whites who want to
remain as growers of tobacco.
But a lot of things
will have to be done to reform the present system.
[Ref.

122]

The fact

that Mugabe had

ating under enabled him maintain

143

ideology he was operhis consistency,

and thus
an

his

Mugabe never

Unlike Nfkomo and Muzorewa,

principles,

entered into any separate dt internal agreements or compromises with the Rhodesian or 3ritish governments.

For Mugabe,

The best agreement one could get at

and
necessarily the best agreement,
any given time was not
He
Mugabe was willing to hold out for the best agreement.
was a revolutionary.
was not simply
he
a freedom fighter,
compromise was treason.

it was Mugabe

Ultimately,
rence to

unswervingly consistent adher-

basic set of principles aad goals that earned him

the confidence of the voters in the 1980 elections.

Mugabe also differed from Nkomo

extent of

and Muzorewa in the

Although Nkcmo

his militancy.

was willing

carry on the guerrilla struggle indefinitely,

open to a peaceful,

never would

priciple,

negotiated

negotiated settlement.

believed that

From the

change could

military force.

In

foreseeing the

Victoria Falls talks,

planned

an

beginning,

Mugabe

be brought

about only

through

he

ZAPU was not

failures of the

That same year,

militant, enough.

new ANC

and the members of

intensification

Mugabe's view,

than

in

very

armed struggle.

form ZANU because

1975,

Muzorewa,

In 1963, he had begun to organize the mili-

tary wing of ZAPU for the

he helped

he was always

really accept anything other

solution.

to

of

the

and the

the ZANU DARE

guerrilla

war.

In

the RF regime would only be willing to seri-

ously negotiate an agreement

acceptable to the nationalists

once it had been brought
to its
knees or defeated on the
battlefield.
It was Mugabe s consistently militant attitude
that would

endear him to the

guerrillas and enable him to

begin the election campaign with the majority of the country
already under his control.

144

Early Political Career

3-

Ghana in

Rhodesia from

Returning to

1960,

Robert

Lecturing about what he had observed

Mugabe joined the NDP.

soon becam a popular speaker

he
Ghana and independence,
October 1960,
township of Salisbury.
In
in the Highfield
Mugabe chaired the NDP CoQgress and was elected Information
in

and Publicity Secretary.

NDP was banned in 1961,

When the

Mugabe, along with the rest of the NDP leadership, continued

his activism in ZAPO".
a

When ZAPU was also banned,

his collegues

number of

the armed struggle."

we would establish

decided "that

an underground movement waich would

train an army and start

Mugabe was

123] That same year,

[Ref.

Mugabe and

charged with "sedition and subversive statements" for referthe Rhodesian Front as

ring to

"bunch of

cowboys."

bringing the Queen's

also charged with

wife was

His

name into

saying that
she was
doing nothing for the
When Joshua Nkomo called the members of the ZAPU

dis-esteem for
Africans.

executive

to Dar-es- Salaam

government-in-exile,

in

Mugabe

1963

wife jumped

and his

made their way through Botswana

discuss forming

to

to Tanzania.

bail and

On returning

home to Rhodesia in December 1963, Mugabe was imprisoned for

four months for jumping bail.

dissatisfaction among

With the

over Nkomo

creation of

executive

the ZAPU

leadership gualities, the stage was set for the

ZANO.

Just

before

was formed,

ZAND"

Mugabe

returned to Ghana where he

persuaded the Nkrumah government

to train fifty guerrillas.

On returning to Rhodesia, he was

driving force behind the formation of ZANU in August 1963.

year after ZANU was formed,

began

over ten

Mugabe not
but

only earned

also taught

unlike Nkomo

years in

it too was banned and Mugabe

detention.

While in

three additional

other detainees.

and Sithole,

145

academic degrees,

But more

Mugabe kept

detention,

importantly,

his communications

to

war effort

plan the

influence
[Ref.
u

with his colleagues,

Consequently,

ZANO open.

within

he was able

maintain his own postion of

in
prison.
though
he
was

and

even

ZANO

leaders of

and military

~ne ot ner political

channels with

124]
-

Gu err illa 3ase

that Mugabe had

the greatest assets

One of

in the

relationship with the

The closeness of Mugabe to his guerrilla
ZANLA guerrillas.
forces gave him several distinct advantages over his oppoFirst, the fact that the ZANLA guerrillas recognized
nents*
Mugabe as their leader gave him an advantage in all negotia1980 elections was

tions

as

he was

able

negotiate

to

power to end

election results.

or

position

of

the country.

Additionally, ZANLA had the highest visi-

Indeed,

any guerrilla organization in

control of most of the

ZANLA was in

country by late 1979.

politicized

regardless of

continue the war,

bility and best reputation of

ZANU

from

His control over the ZANLA guerrillas meant that

strength.
he had the

the nature of his

the main vehicle by which

ZANLA was

Zimbabwe's

black

rural,

population.

Mugabes close association and identification with an organization that had both won

war and politically indoctri-

the

nated the population was probably

the

1980 election outcome.

As discussed earlier, on

suspended as the president of

tive

the determining factor in

committee

Secretary-General,

members

November 1974 Sithole was

ZANO by the imprisoned execu-

Robert

and

was selected

Mugabe,

represent ZANO

conference with the Frontline State leaders in Lusaka.

as
at the

When

the Frontline State leaders refused to recognize Mugabe as

representative of ZANO,
reinstated Sithole.

the executive committee reluctantly

In December 21974,

146

Sithole,

along with

Nkomo,

Muzorewa,

Chikerema

and

which formed

Declaration of Unity,

"

from detention that

same aonth as

the

"Zimbabwe

the new ANC.

Released

signed

of the "Detente

result

to the unification of

Scenario," Mugabe was totally opposed

organizations under the ANC, negotiations

and any discussion of de-emphasizing
with the Smith regime,

the nationalist

Believing

guerrilla effort.

the

that

had

the war

not

progressed far enough to force any real concessions from the

regime,

Smith

secretly in

committee met
ZANU DARE.
war effort

parolad

the

At

members of the ZANU central

Lusaka with the members of the

that meeting it was decided to intensify the

and to

send the

six central

committee members

home to Rhodesia to recruit soldiers for ZANLA.

Mugabe was

sent to recruit in Salisbury and Mashonaland North.

thousands of ZANLA recruits crossed

the next several months,

the

During

border from Rhodesia into Mozambique.

By

March 1975, the pressure was again on ZANU.

March Sithole

was re-arrested.

Herbert Chitepo on

18

With the

On

assasination of

the entire ZANU political and

March,

military leadership in Zambia was placed in detention by the

Kaunda

government.

The

members

of

the

ZANU

central

committee held an emergency meeting,

chaired by Mugabe,

Salisbury on 25 March 1975.

meeting it was decided

to

send Mugabe

provide

Ar that

Edgar Tekere

and

leadership

out

of

external

ZANU's

for

the country

in

to

members.

Specifically, their mission was to try to get aid from countries such as Mozambique,

contact

with

Mozmbique.

improving

and

Tanzania,

assist the

ZANLA

and China and to make

guerrillas

in

The two men were to place specific emphasis upon

ZANLA's logistical

situation

and upon

the new ZANLA recruits

whs
were being
Mozambique were
being properly
trained and

that

[Ref.

based

125]

147

insuring
sent

to

treated.

Mugabe arrived
With the exception

he would

support,

Mozambique

April 1975.

in early

of trips abroad to

obtain international

spend the rest of the

war in

Mozambique

While in Mozambique, Mugabe spent most

with his guerrillas.

of his

in

time politicizing

the recruits

teaching

them what

the revolution was about, why the war was being fought,
why they had

about the

to join the war effort.

history of their country

nationalist movement.

Because of

He

and

also taught them

and the history

of the

his efforts in indoctri-

nating the guerrillas in the nationalist cause and his willingness to live and work with the guerrillas, Mugabe had won
the

support and loyalty of the guerrillas by late 1975.

''Mgagao Declaration"

of 11

September 1975,

in

which

The

the

guerrilla commanders denounced the ANC and Sithole and first

acknowledged Mugabe as their leader,
has already
been
discussed at length.

On 24 January 1976,

the imprisoned

DARE leaders in Zambia sent Mugabe a personal latter with an

attached declaration

in

for removing Sithole

and pledged their support

leadership of ZANU.

which they explained

In the letter,

their reasons
to Mugabe's

the DARE members* said:

On line with our party policy and party procedure,

we decided that
man in the
you as the number two
party would automatically take over the leadership
party until
the
congress was
of
the
party
convened.
We
communicated this decision to the
Comrades at Mgagao and they in turn made the
famous Mgagao statement denouncing the ANC-ZLC and
calling upon you to lead the ANC.
We also started
an extensive
campaign to inform all our members
decision and urged them to
and organs or our
openly and publicly support the stand taken by the
Comrades at Mgagao.
The response of our oarty
members and ordinary Zimbabweans has been over-

whelming.

Because of lack of communication with you

it was difficult for as to make a formal statement
to the world of our decision until we got to know
Now that we know your position we are
your stand.
in a position to make a formal declaration calling
upon you to immediately take over the Darty leadership-. .. The burden and responsibility of leading
Should
our party and revolution now rests on TOO.
we shall be glad to
we be released by our captors
Let us stress again that
join you in the field.
our decision to have you as our
party leader was
reached after

exhaustive consultations
148

aad takes

the vi=ns of most

into account
file members of the party.

of the

rank and

The declaration added that:

Our revolution is
passing.
a
highly critical
with the
great
period.
The crisis coincides
crisis within our party (ZANU) which was initially
the tragic and untimely
murder of
sparked off by
our dynamic chairman Comrade Herbert Chitepo on
1975 by agents of
imperialism and
the 18th March
and the
of Zimbabwe revolution
the enemies
subsequent attempted decimation of the leadership
external wing
by the Zambiah
of the party's
later
the
defection
and
Government
and
capitulation of Rev.
Ndabaningi Sithole to the
dark reactionary forces in the African National
A gigantic task is therefore beina
Council (ANC).
presented to the responsible leaders of our party
and failure to perform it will involve the danger
of a
complete collapse of our revolution.
The
situation is such that any further delay will be
fatal.
It
is within the perspective that after
consultations
much soul-searching and extensive
with all the
external organs of the party (armed
districts,
forces in the camps,
branches,
and
provincial councils in Zambia and abroad) DARE has
come to the final and irrevokable conclusion that
the only man who can serve our
revolution by
providing a viable leadership in our liberation
We members of
movement is Robert Gabriel Mugabe.
DARE solemnly, publicly declare:
1.
That Comrade Robert Mugabe is now the
provisional leader of our party (ZAND)
and our
revolution pending the convening
of a
party
Congress and" we call upon all Zimbabweans ana all
Progressive forces in the world to support the
ynamic leadership of Comrade Mugabe in Zimbabwe.

That Rev.
2.
with immediate effect
spokesman.

Ndabaningi Sithole ceases

leader and

to be the party

3.
That Comrade Mugabe
from now onwards
will be the party's spokesman in the ANC national
united front and other forums.

U.
That the statement by the Comrades at
Mgagao,
Tanzania,
pledging their support to
Comrade Mugabe's leadership was in full conformity
with the party's revolutionary line.

That the unity of our people, the

5.
ldentitiy of their aims,
the unity of their views
and their disposition to unite in carrying out the
struggle are the
elements characterizing the
common strategy that must be opoosed to that which
imperialism is developing on a* continental scale
in

Africa.

That the principla objective of our

.6,
revolution is the seizure or power by means of
destruction
of
the
racist
politial-nilitary
machine and its replacement by the people in arms
order to change the existing "economic and
in
social order.
.

149

7.
That armea revolutionary , struggle,
constitutes the fundamental and principal form of
our revolution.

That all other forms of struggle must

8.
serve to advance and not to retard the development
of this fundamental form of struggle.

That guerrilla warfare as a genuine

9.
expression of the people*s armed struggle is the
waging and developing revomost adequate form of
lutionary warfare in our country in particular and
Southern Africa in general.
That the leadership of the revolution
10.
requires an organizing principal, the existence of
a unified political and military command, in order
to guarantee victory.
11.
revolutionary struggle
That our
decisive
contribution to
the
constitutes
a
and humanity to
historic struggle of
Africa
[Hef. 125]
liberate themselves from slavery.

Mugabe had secured the allegi-

Thus, by early 1975,

guerrilla leaders in Zambia and

ance of both the imprisoned

the

operating

guerrillas

Nkomo

would each

claim

of 1976,

Suzorewa,

control the

to

Realizing that it would be necessary,

tiations,

determine which

to

rillas really

political leaders
Machel of

One final comment

ZANIA

the guer-

Mozambique

list of their

Mugabe's name was at the top of the list

Machel received from the ZANLA commanders.

the

and

guerrillas.

ZIPA

asked the ZIPA guerrilla commanders to write

political leaders.

Sithole,

while conducting nego-

President

recognized,

Mozambique.

and

controversies involving the ANC

During the negotiations and

in the first nine months

Tanzania

from

guerrillas

[Ref.

is necessary about the

allegiance

to

Mugabe.

127]

extent of
Nkomo,

Muzorewa, and Sithole always seemed to be in positions where

they had to lobby among the guerrillas
for support.
This
was not the

case with Mugabe.

the guerrillas

to be their

He

was

actually drafted by

political leader.

other three nationalist leaders,

Unlike the

Mugabe had demonstrated a

hard-line attitude and willingness to undergo the same hardships as the guerrillas.
Thus, he endeared himself to them.
He was one of them and they wanted him as their leader.
150

External Su pport ers

type

The

support

external

of

received by

from that

differed considerably

of their support from a single

by

ZAPU and

ZANU
the

each received the majority

While Nkomo and Muzorewa

UANC.

received

source,

the former from the

African and Western

Soviets and the latter from southern
Mugabe received support from a wide
business interests,

Although the assistance given

variety of different sources.
communist bloc countries was signifito Mugabe and ZANU by

considerable aid from western

third-world countries,
and a number of

received

they also

cant,

European countries r

The large

African nations.
gave Mugabe

number of advantages over his opponents in the

First the large number and variety of ZANU

1980 elections.

external supporters tended

representatives

as

macy

ZANU's supporters

variety of

to give Mugabe and

Zimbabwean

of the

ZANU legita-

people.

this was de facto international recognition,

effect,

Muzorewa government

thing the

Mugabe

Second,

association

with any

Muzorewa could
and white

and ZANU

had been

unable to

single supporter.

business interests,

obtain.

While Nkomo

being puppets of

be accused of

some-

their close

tainted by

were not

respectively,

In

and

the Soviets
it

was very

difficult to accuse Mugabe of fronting for forces other than

the Zimbabwean people.

one

of

the

key

Mugabe's

factors

in

apparent independence was

his

credibility

with

the

electorate.

During the
the

majority

China.

of

1960's and early 1970* s,

its military

assistance

ZANU received
from

Communist

As discussed earlisr, the People's Republic of China

assisted ZANU by providing training in China, weapons,

advisers, and, most importantly,
a theory of how to conduct
a guerrilla war.
During this period, ZANU also received aid
(PRC)

from Romania,

Yugoslavia,

and North Korea,

151

who

were all

communists.

with tha Chinese

closeiy alligned

With the death of Mao and

in Africa in the mid- 1970*

128]

decrease of Chinese intervention

ZANU started receiving less aid

continue to give ZANU at

Although China would

from China.

[Ref.

Mugabe was forced to look

least a nominal quantity of aid,

for other sources of support.
In mid and late

Mugabe began lobbying

197 8,

of communist,

third-world,

countries for

support for ZANU/ZANL&.

fall

summer and

In the

representatives visited

his

including the
Ethiopia,
Irag,

socialist countries,

number of communist and

Soviet Union, Cuba, Vietnam, North Korrea,

Romania,

number

and western European

African,

Mugabe and

of 1978,

Mugabe personally travelled over

and Yugoslavia.

countries that had tradition-

25,000 miles seeking aid from

With the exception of the Soviet

ally only supported ZAPU.

Union,

where Mugabe claimad no ona of importance would talk

to him,

he was extremely successful in obtaining financial,

and military support foe ZANU.

logistical,

reason for Mugabe's

rent to

success was that it

these countries

that ZANLA was

fighting in Zimbabwe-Rhodasia and that,

[Ref.

129] The

was becoming appa-

doing most'

of the

of all the nation-

alist organizations, ZANU was the most representative of the

Zimbabwean people.

Communist countries
which Mugabe

sought and

ZANU officials

1980,

western Europe,
Norway.
[Ref.

visited
to

with food,

130] India

financial

itself,

ZANU's

countries

aid,

and supplied

these

152

in

and

countries

medical supplies.
ZANU considerable
the organization

supplies [Ref. 131].

strongest

and

West Germany Denmark and

and
also gave

and Pakistan

Between 1979

number of

clothing,

political and moral support

with foodstuffs and medical
Africa

places from

the only

obtained aid.

to includa Spain,

In addition

provided ZANU

were not

most

Within

consistent

Ghana,

Angola,

Tanzania,

supporters were Mozambique,

and

Nigeria.
Of ZANUs African supporters,

Presidents Nyerere and

strongest and the most consistent.

Tanzania and
Besides providing diplomatic support for ZANU,
bases,
equipment,
Mozambique provided ZANLA * ith training,
Machel were

far the

by

military support.

and other

military aid for ZANU/ZANLA from

While they
from

were somewhat

tha Soviet Union and Cuba.

getting assistance

successful in

Soviet

the

Cuba,

obtain increased

renewed their efforts to

State presidents

Onion

two Frontline

the

1978,

In

continued

policy

her

of

supporting only ZAPU/ZIPEA.

In September

1978,

with Fidel Castro in

Mugabe mat

Addis-Ababa. The meeting had two purposes.

relations.

strengthen Cuban-ZANU
guerrillas were

ZANLA

being

At

The first was to

over 500

that time,

near Addis-Ababa

trainad

by

Cuban advisers were also training ZANLA

Cuban instructors.

forces in Mozambique and Angola.

was more than willing to

Castro told Mugabe that he

provide ZANU with training,

food,

medical supplies, and international support and generally to

develop closer relations with ZANU.

Mugabe

that Cuba

ZANLA.

Cuba was

and

with Castro.
the Soviets

called

position to

weapons

This was the sacond

ZANU wanted Castro
to convince

hardware to ZANLA.
In

no

ZANLA

to

Union for arms

without

Soviet

reason for Mugabe's meeting

to

use his influence with

start supplying

military

[Ref. 132]

October

upon the

them to

to

he also told

provide arms

dependant upon tha Soviet

transfer

could not

approval.

was in

However,

1978,

Soviet

Machel had assigned

Presidents
Onion

Nyerere

to start

his own FPLM troops

and

supporting

Machel
ZANU.

to accompany ZANLA

guerrillas on operations inside of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

They
had reported back to Machal that the ZANLA
guerrillas had

153

extremely successful

been

in gaining

that they were

population and

support of

the

the

against the

winning the war

Nyerere and Machel argued that the Soviets

First, they argued
should support ZANO for several reasonsthat the divisions within the Zimbabwean nationalist movesecurity forces.

start giving ZAND" the

China and
ZAPO*

in order to

tions and insure

Sino-Soviet

the

by

feud.

feelings about

should put aside its

they argued,

Russia,

giving

exacerbated

being

were

ment

sans support she

had been

unite the two nationalist organiza-

nationalist victory in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

China was incapable of providing ZANLA with the type

to bring the war to a
and quantity of weapons it would need
Also,

successful

conclusion.

believed

leaders

that

Thus,

Frontline

two

the

Russian weapons

State

critical

were

to

ZANLAs success.

[Ref. 133]
Throughout late 1978 and early 1979,

Mugabe main-

tained the hope that Russia would supply ZANO with armaments
[Ref.

But Russian

134],

were continuing

Soviets

not forthcoming.

aid was

to back

ZAPU and

if ZANO

Soviet military aid, it would have to join ZAPO.

ZANO refused to yield to Soviet

given up all

Machel could

failure to

obtain Soviet aid

1980 elections.
was

wanted

Mugabe and

wishes and by July 1979 had

hope of obtaining Sovist

those that

The

weapons,

spare them.

[Ref.

except for

135] Mugabe's

probably assisted him

in the

For having been snubbed by the Soviets, it

very difficult for anyone to

claim that he was fronting

for them.
6

Political Mobilization of the

the key factor in the Mugabe-ZANO

instrument

of this

victory in the 1980 elec-

the electorate by ZANO.

mobilization

154

lector ate

number of times previously,

As has been mentioned a

tions was the mobilization of

was

the ZANLA

The

guerrilla

The party was able to use the rural political

organization.

infrastructure that was sat up

to sipport the guerrillas to

get the votes on election day.

the ZANLA guerrilla

According to Josiah Tongogara,

the ZANLA guerrilla fighters of the early 1970s

commander,

were more like political

training

very generalized

given

were

They

commisars than guerrilla soldiers.

guerrilla

in

warfare, but very specialized training in mass mobilization.

special emphasis was placed

guerrilla*s training,
upon his political education.
The guerrilla recruits were
taught about the grievances they would be fighting to
During

correct, namely the deprivation of the land, the limitations

of the number of cattle a family could keep,

education and

opportunities,

job

healthcare service.
capitalism,

communism,

inferior African

and the

the guerrilla recruits

Additionally,

discussed the writings of 3arx,

restrictions on

Lenin,

and Mao,

and colonialism,

and

analyzed

studied the

history, geography, climate, vegetation, agriculture,

life, minerals, industry,
the

country of

Zimbabwe.

taught that their

population,
Finally,

and economic base of

the guerrillas

primary source of supply,

other assistance was the people of Zimbabwe,

all came.

[Ref.

wild-

shelter,

were
and

from whom they

136]

Thus, the guerrillas would go into the Tillages with

the idea

of winning

the "hearts

people through persuasion.

tical

cadre would

answer

and minds"

Initially,
the

villagers' questions

political commisars

local

the guerrilla poli-

their grievances and the goals of the war.

would infiltrate

of the

about

Gradually, they

into the

villages as

installing them first as teachers in

the schools and later in
positions in the local government.
At this
more formalized political infrastructure
time,
a
would be set up within the village.
An intelligence network
permanent residents,

155

and eliminate the security

would be established to identify

force informants among the populatioa.

discredit,
would challenge, embarrass,

and finally destroy

government sponsered civilian admin-

the credibility of the

be established the councils

It its place would

istration-

Next, the guerrillas

responsibility for the

When possible,
logistical support of the guerrilla effort.
the members of these councils were elected by the population
and committees

who would

Officers were

at large.

have the

as transportation,

areas such

manage specialized

appointed to

agriculture,

and

only at the village

Councils were established not

health.

finance,

level, but also at the district and provincial levels.

If

involving great expense had

decision of great importance or

to be made, it was generally referred from the village level

up

district

to the

or

regional level.

whose sole mission

"shadow" government,

this

was to support the

so as to avoid detection

only emerged at night

guerrillas,

Finally,

by the Rhodesian security forces.

[Ref.

Through these techniques,

ZANLA

137]
was able to influ-

ence, if not control, the vast majority of rural Rhodesia by

the late 1970's.

these

ZANLA was most successful

grass-roots

Mashonaland,

infrastructures

political

Manicaland,

in

and Victoria provinces,

organizing
in

the

although

their success was by no means limited to just these regions.

Although guerrilla
claims of controlling over 90*
of the

country were probably somewhat

exagerated,

great extent of guerrilla

mony to the

the best testi-

control was probably

given by the actions of the Rhodesian government.

the Rhodesian

Minister of

Justice opposed

areas of the country under martial

In 1974,

placing certain

law because to hand over

the maintenance of law and order to the army would be admit-

ting that
areas.

the civil

government had

But between March

1978

156

lost control

of those

and mid-1979 over 95% of the

brought under

country was

Rhodesian standards,

martial law.

Thus,

white

by

greater portion of the

control of the

country had been lost to the guerrillas,

[Ref.

138]

percentage of

Having control

of

Zimbabwean population,

in

January and February 1980 ZANLA's

to insure that

mission was

large

the black

local support of

the

the guer-

If
rillas was transferred into votes for Mugabe and ZANLA.
election results are considered a good indication, ZANLA was

extremely successful in this endeavor.

Since ZANLA already

had the loyalty of the local population,

its political cadre

did

not view

convincing

their task

them

of

they spent

Instead,

trying to

as

the correctness

insure that

where the

were,

voting

be able

and

to

The ZANLA

candidates

who the

places were,

Considerable effort was also spent

position.

for voting.

voters knew

or

their efforts in

voters would

the black

that the

made sure

ZANO's

of

the greatest part of

fulfill the mechanical requirements

cadre

converting voters

one of

how to

vote.

in countering the decep-

tive and confusing literature and verbal propaganda that was

being

disseminated by

These

efforts

were

the

concentrated in

highest illiteracy rates.

were used to

and

0"ANC

keep morale up,

especially

ZANLA cadre

did not

the

when pro-fluzorewa

the ZANLA cadre would move

night and

people back on the right track.

the

with

areas

When the auxiliaries intimi-

dated villagers during the day,

villages at

the

forces.

Campaign rallies and sing-alongs

auxiliaries were in the area.

into the

the security

hold meetings

to get

the

At the rallies and meeting,

emphasize

Muzorewa's or

Nkcmo's

shortcomings or waste much effort in praising the ZANU platform.

Instead, they reminded the people of ZANLA s decisive
1

role in the war and thus

to the guerrilla army.

appealed to their sense of loyalty

[8ef. 139]

157

In

conclusion,

probably most accurate,

landslide election

the most

one of

interesting,

and

the reasons for ZANO's

analyses of

victory was provided

by a

high ranking

ZAPU official when he said that:

The PF lost
the election
two years .ago
when ZANU began intensive
political campaigning.
using ZANLA to politicize the masses.
ZANLA moved
into the former* ZIPRA areas at this time,
such as
Hashonaland West.
They held pungwes (meetings)
percent of the country.
for two years covering 80
factor about the elecThis is the most important
tion results. ..Of ZIPRA. 99 percent were Ndebele
speaking and therefore they had language difficulties in Shona speaking
areas. ..We concentrated in
one area of the
country for recruitment of
soldiers.

Commenting on

accusations of

ZANCJ

intimidation

the official stated that ZANU probably

of

voters,

would have won

less seats without intimidation,

peDp *.
Zimbabwe.. .It would would be idiocy to say there
was corruption by the British in favour of Mugabe.
ZANU(PF)
beat
the British,
the
Americans,
and
South Africa at their own aame.
[ Ref .
140]

158

few

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Lemelle, Tilden J. "The Zimbabwe Elections:

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22

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ZAPO.
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9.

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10.

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Sl3 vko, Joe;
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12.

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Nyangoni, African Nationalism in Zimbabwe,

p.

14.

Nyangoni, African Nat iona lism in Zimbabwe,

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15.

Wilkinson, "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe,"

343.

75.

159

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82.

31,

85.

16.

Ibid.

17.

Ibid., pp. 343 - 344.

18.

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Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, " p. 25b.

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Nyandoro,
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Chimutengwende,
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21.

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African National Cou ncil.
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Nyangoni and Nyandoro, eds.,
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22.

"Letter to the British Foreian

Sithole,
Ndabaningi.
Commission,
Secretary on
the Pearce
(Salisbury
Prison,
January 197 2),
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'*

23.

24.

Maxey,

Kees.

Collmgs, 1975,

The Fight for Zimbabwe.

p. do.

London:

Rex

Zimbabwe News (Lusaka),

30 September 1967,
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&*iT]cTnson7~" 1T F"rom

25.

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26.

Wilkinson, "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe,

27.

Maxey, The Fight for

28.

Rhodesian Herald {Salisbury), 13 February 1969, p.

6,
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Afri can
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29.

Zimba bwe, pp.

"

p.

236.

98 - 130.

101.

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(TxTord: oxford~"u*nivec si ty press
T9TZ, d.~TH2T^
,

160

30.

Observations on
Moyo,
J. Z.
ZAPO, 25 February~T9TO~7 p. 32

31.

"Zimbabwe African Peoples anion:

Chikerema. James.
ZAPO,
Reply to Observations on Our Struggle," Lusaka:
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32.

Martin, David and Johnson, Phyllis.

London: Paber and Faber,
Zimb abwe.

33.

Ibid.,

34.

Ibid., pp.

140 - 141.

35.

Ibid., pp.

147 - 149.

36.

Ibid., pp. 149

37.

7
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(Lusaka,
reprinted in Nyangoni and Nyandoro,
December 1974),
Zimbabwe
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p.
~
2957

33.

"Salisbury Declaration" (Salisbury: 11 December

Zimbabwe
reprinted in Nyangoni and Nyandoro,
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Independence Mo vemen t s Select Do cumen ts,
29o"~ r
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p.

Our ~Struggle.

Lusaka:

The Struggle for

19H7, p7~T23.

124.

151.

ANC.

ANC.
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39.

Martin and Johnson, ~I he Struggle for Zimbabwe,

-202.

40.

Ibid.

41.

Ibid.

42.

Ibid.,

p.

43.

U.S.

Department

pp.

pp.

200

219 - 221.
229.
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State.

Department

of

State

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44.

Michael.
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for T775. " PoXTcjr,
~ed.
""UTcEael Clough."
Berkeley?
Instifufe ofTnTernat iona 1 Studies, 1932, p. 22.
Clough,

161

45.

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Geneva
Constitutional
ANC-ZLC's Position
October
quoted in Nyangoni,
1975,
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29,
African Nationalism in Zimb abwe, pp. 116 - 117.

46.

"Robert Mugabe's Opening Statement at the Geneva

quoted in Nyangoni,
Convention." October 29 r
1975,
African Nationalism in Zimbabwe, p. 117.

47.

Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zim babwe,

48.

New York Times,

49.

Zvobgo,

10

Chengetai

p.

263.

January 1977.
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"Rhodesia's Internal Settlement

Affairs

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1977
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vol. V, no.1 (Januafy~T9B0J: 25~ = ~27T~
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50.

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Henry Porter Wolsely.
London: Springwood Books,
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51.

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52.

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53.

Washington Post,

54.

London DaiLy. Telegraph, 25 April 1978.

55.

Zvobgo, "Rhodesia's Internal Settlement, " p. 32.

56.

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57.

Clough, "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe," pp. 38

58.

Congressi onal Record,

59.

a.N.
21

60.

"

p.

31.

July 1978.

39.

26 July 197 8.

General Assembly Resolution, A/33/452

December 1978 (GA/5932)

Zvobgo,
p.

Rh ode sia:
End ing an
197H, pp7 176 -T77."

(XXXIII)

"Rhodesia's Internal Settlement 1977

1979,"

36.

61.

New York Times,

62.

Clough, "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe,"

June 1979 (text of Carter speech).

162

p.

45.

of

63.

Ibid., p.

1*7.

64.

Ibid.,

?.

52.

65.

Ibid.,

p.

54.

66.

African Nationalist Leaders in

Diana.
Mitchell,
5"HU.~ laTisbury
Cannon Fress7
Zimbabwe: flhc^s Who in
T^H(T7"pT 417
:

67.

Shamuyarira, Crisis in Hhodesia, p.

68.

Leaders in Zimbabwe Who

Mitchell African Nationalist
"
Who in 19f27~p- ^4.

69.

Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia, pp.

70.

Ibid.

71.

Ibid.

72.

Ibid.

73.

Ibid.

74.

Ibid.

75.

Gregory, "Zimbabwe 19 80:

Politicization Through Armed
Struggle and Electoral Mobilization," pp. 73 - 75.

76.

Ibid.

77.

Man c heste r Guardian,

78.

Smiley, Ian.
"Zimbabwe, Southern Africa, and the Rise
of Robert
Mugabe."
Foreign Affairs vol.
no.
58,
(Summer 1930): 1073.

79.

17
Times
(London) ,
November
Guardia n. 16 May 1979.

80.

"Zimbabwe:
vol.

81.

1,

pp.

174.

174

177.

177 - 178.

no. 2

16

May 197 9.

1978 and;

Manchester

the Coalition Eniama." A fric a Confid ent ial

(16 January 1980 J: 3.

Nelson, Harold D. ;Dobert, Margarita;

McDonald, Gordon
McLaughlin, James; Marvin, 3arbara;
and Moeller,

C.

163

Area Handbook for RhodesiaPhillip W.

American 0niversity7~T975, pp. 7T -~7B.

Washington:

82-

Politicization Through Armed

Gregory, "Zimbabwe 19 80:
Struggle and Electoral Mobilization," pp. 63 -65.

83.

Ibid.,

84.

Manchester

85-

Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, p. 75.

86.

Tanzania Daily News

87.

M ancheste r

88.

Times (London), 24 July 1978.

89.

Daily

90.

Facts and
Africa.
Holland Committee on Southern
~7o""Apr!I
Repo rts Press
Cuttings on Southern Africa,

91.

Daily. Teleagagh

92.

O.S.
Joint Publications Research
Translations on Sub- Saha ra Africa,

p.

7527 December

G uardi an,

G uardi an,

T elegr aph

Dar-es-Salaam)

14 May

1978.

June 1978.

(London),

(London),

Translations

1979.

16

September 1978.

28 May

1979.

on Sub-Sahara

Service
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July
1979,
p.
August

93.

JPRS,

94.

Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, p. 88.

95.

Foreign
Broadcast
Information
Sub -Saharan Africa Da ily Report,

11

Africa,

Service
(F3IS).
April 197 9, p. Ej.

96.

Manchester Guardian,

11

97.

Man cheste r Guardi an,

98.

Muzorewa, Abel Thendkayi Rise Up_ and Walk.

Edited by
Norman E.
Thomas.
London"' Evans Brothers Limited,

May 1979.
February 19 80.

1978, p. 4.

164

99.

Ibid-,

p.

5.

100,

Ibid.,

p.

21.

101.

Ibid.,

p.

22.

102.

African Nati onalist Le ade rs

Mitchell,
!kls who 19SJJ7 p7~98 .

103,

Muzorewa, Rise Up and Walk, pp.

104

Martin and

105.

African Nationalist Leaders

Mitchell,
Ihols Who 19STJ7~p7~10TT

106,

Martin and

122-124.

Johnson,

Johnson,

The

in

92 - 95.

for
Strujgla
A1

The Struggle for

Zimbab e,
in
"

Ibid.

109.

Ibid.

110.

Ibid.

111

Manchester Guardian,

112

pp.

Politicization through Armed

regory, "Zimbabwe 19 80:
truggle and Electoral Mobilization," p. 30.

108,

dd.

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe,

293 - 294.
107,

Zimbabwe

p.

81.

21

December 1979.

Holland Committee on Southern

Africa.
Re ports Press
Cuttinas on Southern Africa,

TT79 .-T7
113,

Ibid.

114

FBIS.
p.

Fact and
~25~ April

Sub-Saharan Africa Daily Report ,

5 July 1978,
FTnanci II Time s 7^35 don) , 2o June 1979.

E6 ana';

115

Mancheste r Guardian,

116

New York Times,

117

Gregory, "Zimbabwe 1980:

Politicization Through Armed
Struggle and Electoral Mobilization," p. 79.

21

11

January 1980.

February 193 0.

165

118.

119.

Ibid-

77

pp.

81.

The Struggle for

Johnson,

Martin and
2

02-203.

Zimbabwe,

pp.

120.

Ibid.

121.

Obse rver

122.

Sun day Times

123.

Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, p. 203.

124.

Ibid.,

125.

Ibid., pp.

204 - 205

125.

Martin and

Johnson,

127.

Ibid.,

128.

Observer (London),
February 1979.

129.

FBIS.
Sub-Saharan Africa Daily Report, 3 July 1978,
p. E6 anaT~3Bserver T"E^onr7 Z9 0~ctoD"er 1978.

130.

Holland Committee on Southern

Facts and
Africa.
""317 June
Reports Press Cuttings on Southern Africa,
TT7ff7~p.
o7~23~Iugust~19*78,~p7 TTf 27r"TT5v ember 1978,
Sub-Saharan Africa Daily, Report, 30
3 and; FBIS.
p.
June 1978, p. E3 and*~~7imes T^no'onfT TT January T980.

131.

Holland Committee on Southern

Africa.
Facts and
Reports Press Cuttings on Southern Africa, 22 Decemoef
13" TTTpfil Ty797"?7~9T 8~"June 1979, p. 11.
TT7H7~P-

132.

(London), 23 December 1979.

p.

January 1980.

27

204.

211-213.
p.

(London)

The Struggle for

Zimbabwe,

pp.

243.
11

June 1973 and; New Ysrk Times,

Manchester Guardian,

7ronHonrT~29"nc?o5er
t

20

September 1978 and;

Observer

1978.

133

Martin and

134.

Newsweek, vol.
14 (2 October 1978),
XCII, no.
and; TTew York Times, 7 February 1979.

Zimbabwe.
Johnson.
The Struggle for
pp.
316 - 317 and; Manchester guardian, "77 OcT oEIr"~7978.

166

d.

71

135.

136.

137.

Observer (London),
Martin and

81-82.
Ibid.

pp.

Johnson,
88

Politicization
Mobilization,"

July 1979.

The
Struggle ~for
~

Zimbabwe,

pp.

- 90 and;
Gregory,
"Zimbabwe 1980:
Through Armed Struggle and Electoral

p.

69.

138.

Gregory, "Zimbabwe 1980:

Politicization Through Armed
Struggle and Electoral Mobilization," p. 69.

139.

Ibid.

140.

Martin and

331 - 332.

Johnson,

The

167

Struggle for

Zimbabwe,

p.

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