Equal Protection

1. Garcia v Drilon
Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. 179267

June 25, 2013

JESUS
C.
GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and
ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE
ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
I concur with the conclusion reached in the ponencia ably written by the Honorable Estela Perlas-Bernabe. With due
respect, however, I submit that the test to determine an equal protection challenge against the law, denying statutory
remedies to men who are similarly situated as the women who are given differential treatment in the law, on the basis of
sex or gender, should be at the level of intermediate scrutiny or middle-tier judicial scrutiny rather than the rational basis
test used in the ponencia of Justice Bernabe.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails: (1) the Decision dated January 24, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CEB-SP No. 01698 dismissing the Petition for Prohibition with Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (Petition for
Prohibition) which questioned the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," and sought a temporary restraining order and/or injunction to prevent the
implementation of the Temporary Protection Order (TPO) and criminal prosecution of herein petitioner Jesus A. Garcia
under the law; and (2) the Resolution dated August 14, 2007, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the said
Decision.
At the outset, it should be stressed that the Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision and Resolution, did not pass upon
the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 and instead dismissed the Petition for Prohibition on technical
grounds, as follows:
1. The constitutional issue was raised for the first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals by petitioner and not
at the earliest opportunity, which should be before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, Bacolod City, acting
as a Family Court, where private respondent Rosalie Garcia, wife of petitioner, instituted a Petition for Temporary
and Permanent Protection Order[s]1 under Republic Act No. 9262, against her husband, petitioner Jesus C.
Garcia; and
2. The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 can only be questioned in a direct action and it cannot be the
subject of a collateral attack in a petition for prohibition, as the inferior court having jurisdiction on the action may
itself determine the constitutionality of the statute, and the latters decision on the matter may be reviewed on
appeal and not by a writ of prohibition, as it was held in People v. Vera. 2
Hence, the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution denied due course to the Petition for Prohibition "for being fraught
with fatal technical infirmities" and for not being ripe for judicial review. Nevertheless, four out of the five issues raised by
the petitioner here dealt with the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262. More accurately put, however, the

Court of Appeals refrained from touching at all those four substantive issues of constitutionality. The Court of Appeals
cannot therefore be faulted for any erroneous ruling on the aforesaid substantive constitutional issues.
In this instant Petition for Review, the only issue directly in point that can be raised against the Court of Appeals Decision
and Resolution is the first one cited as a ground for the appeal, which I quote:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION WAS A
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.3
Under the circumstances, whether this Court should consider this Petition for Review as a proper occasion to pass upon
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 shall be a separate subject matter that is tackled below after the abovequoted first issue is disposed of.
On the Propriety of Raising the Issue of Constitutionality in a Summary Proceeding Before the RTC Designated as a
Family Court
Petitioner assails the Court of Appeals ruling that he should have raised the issue of constitutionality in his Opposition 4 to
private respondents petition for protective orders pending before the RTC for the following reasons:
1. The Rules on Violence Against Women and Children (A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC), particularly Section 20 thereof,
expressly prohibit him from alleging any counterclaim, cross-claim or third party claim, all of which are personal to
him and therefore with more reason, he cannot impugn the constitutionality of the law by way of affirmative
defense.5
2. Since the proceedings before the Family Court are summary in nature, its limited jurisdiction is inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality.6
I agree with Justice Bernabe that the RTC, designated as a Family Court, is vested with jurisdiction to decide issues of
constitutionality of a law, and that the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 can be resolved in a summary proceeding,
in accordance with the rule that the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, otherwise it may
not be considered on appeal.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Republic Act No. 9262 provides:
Sec. 20. Opposition to Petition. (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It
must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order
should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of
action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner cites the above provision, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, as one of his grounds for not challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 in his Opposition. The error of such reasoning is that it treats "any cause of
action" mentioned in Section 20(b) as distinct from the "counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint" referred to in
the said Section 20(b). On the contrary, the language of said section clearly refers to a cause of action that is the "subject"
of the counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party complaint, which is barred and which may be litigated in a separate civil
action. The issue of constitutionality is not a "cause of action" that is a subject of the aforementioned prohibited pleadings.
In fact, petitioner admitted that such prohibited pleadings would allege "claims which are personal to him." 7 Hence,
Section 20(b) cannot even be invoked as a basis for filing the separate special civil action of Petition for Prohibition before
the Court of Appeals to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262.

What obviously escapes petitioners understanding is that the contents of the Opposition are not limited to mere
refutations of the allegations in the petition for temporary and permanent protection order. While it is true that A.M. No. 0410-11-SC requires the respondent to file an Opposition and not an Answer, 8 it does not prevent petitioner from challenging
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 in such Opposition. In fact, Section 20(a) directs petitioner to state in his
Opposition why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued against him. This means that petitioner
should have raised in his Opposition all defenses available to him, which may be either negative or affirmative. Section
5(b), Rule 6 of the Rules of Court define negative and affirmative defenses as follows:
(a) A negative defense is the specific denial of the material fact or facts alleged in the pleading of the claimant
essential to his cause or causes of action.
(b) An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the material
allegations in the pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him. The affirmative
defenses include fraud, statute of limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel, former
recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and any other matter by way of confession and avoidance.
In Bayog v. Hon. Natino,9 the respondent, in a complaint for ejectment before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC),
raised as one of his defenses, the MCTCs lack of jurisdiction over the case in light of the agricultural tenancy relationship
between him and the petitioner. The MCTC applied the Rule on Summary Procedure and issued an Order stating that it
could not take cognizance of the Answer, for being filed belatedly. This Court ruled that while the MCTC was correct in
applying the Rule on Summary Procedure as the complaint was one for ejectment, it should have met and ruled squarely
on the issue of jurisdiction, as there was nothing in the rules that barred it from admitting the Answer. Hence, the MCTC
should have heard and received evidence for the precise purpose of determining whether or not it possessed jurisdiction
over the case.10
Similarly, the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 is a matter that would have prevented the trial court from
granting the petition for protection order against the petitioner. Thus, petitioner should have raised it in his Opposition as a
defense against the issuance of a protection order against him.
For all intents and purposes, the Petition for Prohibition filed before the Court of Appeals was precipitated by and was
ultimately directed against the issuance of the TPO, an interlocutory order, which under Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-1011-SC is a prohibited pleading. An action questioning the constitutionality of the law also cannot be filed separately even
with another branch of the RTC. This is not technically feasible because there will be no justiciable controversy or an
independent cause of action that can be the subject of such separate action if it were not for the issuance of the TPO
against the petitioner. Thus, the controversy, subject of a separate action, whether before the Court of Appeals or the
RTC, would still have to be the issuance of the TPO, which is the subject of another case in the RTC.
Moreover, the challenge to the constitutionality of the law must be raised at the earliest opportunity. In Dasmarias Water
District v. Monterey Foods Corporation,11 we said:
A law is deemed valid unless declared null and void by a competent court; more so when the issue has not been duly
pleaded in the trial court. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity. x x x. The settled rule
is that courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. (Citation
omitted.)
This Court held that such opportunity is in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve it, such that "if it is not
raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on
appeal."12 The decision upon the constitutional question is necessary to determine whether the TPO should be issued
against petitioner. Such question should have been raised at the earliest opportunity as an affirmative defense in the
Opposition filed with the RTC handling the protection order proceedings, which was the competent court to pass upon the
constitutional issue. This Court, in Drilon v. Lim,13 held:
We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority
being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the

criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all
civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, even as the accused in a criminal
action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the
proceedings taken against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the
Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases
in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Citation omitted, emphases ours.)
Furthermore, the filing of a separate action before the Court of Appeals or the RTC for the declaration of
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 would result to multiplicity of suits. It is clear that the issues of constitutionality
and propriety of issuing a protection order raised by petitioner are inextricably intertwined. Another court, whether it is an
appellate court or a trial court, cannot resolve the constitutionality question in the separate action without affecting the
petition for the issuance of a TPO. Bringing a separate action for the resolution of the issue of constitutionality will result in
an unresolved prejudicial question to the validity of issuing a protection order. If the proceedings for the protection order is
not suspended, it does create the danger of having inconsistent and conflicting judgments between the two separate
courts, whether of the same or different levels in the judicial hierarchy. These two judgments would eventually be the
subject of separate motions for reconsideration, separate appeals, and separate petitions for review before this Court
the exact scenario the policy against multiplicity of suits is avoiding. As we previously held, "the law and the courts frown
upon split jurisdiction and the resultant multiplicity of actions." 14
It must be remembered that aside from the "earliest opportunity" requirement, the courts power of judicial review is
subject to other limitations. Two of which are the existence of an actual case or controversy and standing. An aspect of the
actual case or controversy requirement is the requisite of "ripeness." This is generally treated in terms of actual injury to
the plaintiff. Thus, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. This direct adverse effect on the individual will also be the basis of his standing as it is necessary
that the person challenging the law must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. 15
In this case, the petitioners challenge on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 was on the basis of the protection
order issued against him. Verily, the controversy became ripe only when he was in danger of or was directly adversely
affected by the statute mandating the issuance of a protection order against him. He derives his standing to challenge the
statute from the direct injury he would sustain if and when the law is enforced against him. Therefore, it is clear that the
proper forum to challenge the constitutionality of the law was before the RTC handling the protection order proceedings.
The filing of a separate action to question the constitutionality of the law amounts to splitting a cause of action that runs
counter to the policy against multiplicity of suits.
Moreover, the filing of the Petition for Prohibition with the Court of Appeals countenanced the evil that the law and the
rules sought to avoid. It caused the delay in the proceedings and inconvenience, hardship and expense on the part of the
parties due to the multiplicity of suits between them at different court levels. The RTC where the petition for protection
orders is filed should be trusted, instead of being doubted, to be able to exercise its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of
constitutionality within the mandatory period set by the rules.
In gist, there is no statutory, reglementary, or practical basis to disallow the constitutional challenge to a law, which is
sought to be enforced, in a summary proceeding. This is particularly true considering that the issue of a statutes
constitutionality is a question of law which may be resolved without the reception of evidence or a full-blown trial. Hence,
said issue should have been raised at the earliest opportunity in the proceedings before the RTC, Bacolod City and for
failure of the petitioner to do so, it cannot be raised in the separate Petition for Prohibition before the Court of Appeals, as
correctly ruled by the latter, nor in a separate action before the RTC.
On the Court Resolving the Issue of Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262
Notwithstanding my position that the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the Petition for Prohibition because of
petitioners failure to raise the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 at the earliest opportunity, I concur that
the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, 16 should still pass upon the said issue in the present Petition. Notable is

the fact that not only the petitioner, but the private respondent as well, 17 pray that the Court resolve the constitutional issue
considering its novelty and paramount importance. Indeed, when public interest requires the resolution of the
constitutional issue raised, and in keeping with this Courts duty of determining whether other agencies or even co-equal
branches of government have remained within the limits of the Constitution and have not abused the discretion given
them, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure and resolve the constitutional issue. 18
Aside from the technical ground raised by petitioner in his first assignment of error, petitioner questions the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 on the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. NO. 9262 IS
DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. NO. 9262 RUNS COUNTER
TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE
STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. NO. 9262 AS INVALID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY
OFFICIALS.19
On the Constitutional Right to Equal Protection of the Laws
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 for making a gender-based classification, thus,
providing remedies only to wives/women and not to husbands/men. He claims that even the title of the law, "An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children" is already pejorative and sex-discriminatory because it means
violence by men against women.20 The law also does not include violence committed by women against children and
other women. He adds that gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under it
because its avowed purpose is to curb and punish spousal violence. The said remedies are discriminatory against the
husband/male gender. There being no reasonable difference between an abused husband and an abused wife, the equal
protection guarantee is violated.
Pertinently, Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above provision was lifted verbatim from the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which in turn was a slightly modified
version of the equal protection clause in Section 1, Amendment 1421 of the United States Constitution.
In 1937, the Court established in People v. Vera 22 the four-fold test to measure the reasonableness of a classification
under the equal protection clause, to wit:
This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the three grand departments of our government
and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivisions thereof, and on many constitutional powers, like the police
power, taxation and eminent domain. The equal protection of the laws, sententiously observes the Supreme Court of the
United States, "is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." Of course, what may be regarded as a denial of the equal
protection of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated.
Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis,
and not made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited
to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied.)

In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the main have followed the foregoing
"rational basis" test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law
unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. 23
However, over time, three levels of tests were developed, which are to be applied in equal protection cases, depending on
the subject matter24 involved:
1. Rational Basis Scrutiny the traditional test, which requires "only that government must not impose differences
in treatment except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation." Simply put, it
merely demands that the classification in the statute reasonably relates to the legislative purpose. 25
2. Intermediate Scrutiny requires that the classification (means) must serve an important governmental objective
(ends) and is substantially related to the achievement of such objective. A classification based on sex is the bestestablished example of an intermediate level of review.26
3. Strict Scrutiny requires that the classification serve a compelling state interest and is necessary to achieve
such interest. This level is used when suspect classifications or fundamental rights are involved. 27
Recent Philippine jurisprudence has recognized the need to apply different standards of scrutiny in testing the
constitutionality of classifications. In British American Tobacco v. Camacho, 28 this Court held that since the case therein
neither involved a suspect classification nor impinged on a fundamental right, then "the rational basis test was properly
applied to gauge the constitutionality of the assailed law in the face of an equal protection challenge." 29 We added:
It has been held that "in the areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along
suspect lines nor infringes constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." Under the rational basis
test, it is sufficient that the legislative classification is rationally related to achieving some legitimate State interest. x x
x.30 (Citations omitted.)
Echoing the same principle, this Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Puno in Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas) Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 31 stated:
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition
and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When
these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require
a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.
xxxx
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing
the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational
basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against
persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered
down view would call for the abdication of this Courts solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution
and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the
government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature
of the actor. (Citations omitted.)
This was reiterated in League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, 32 and Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v.
Commission on Elections,33 wherein the Court, although applying the rational basis test, noted that there are tests, which

are more appropriate in other cases, especially those involving suspect classes and fundamental rights. In fact, Chief
Justice Puno expounded on this in his Separate Concurring Opinion in the Ang Ladlad case. He said that although the
assailed resolutions therein were correctly struck down, since the classification was based on gender or sexual
orientation, a quasi-suspect classification, a heightened level of review should have been applied and not just the rational
basis test, which is the most liberal basis of judicial scrutiny. Citing American authority, Chief Justice Puno continued to
elucidate on the three levels of scrutiny and the classes falling within each level, to wit:
If a legislative classification disadvantages a "suspect class" or impinges upon the exercise of a "fundamental right," then
the courts will employ strict scrutiny and the statute must fall unless the government can demonstrate that the
classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Over the years, the United States
Supreme Court has determined that suspect classes for equal protection purposes include classifications based on race,
religion, alienage, national origin, and ancestry. The underlying rationale of this theory is that where legislation affects
discrete and insular minorities, the presumption of constitutionality fades because traditional political processes may have
broken down. In such a case, the State bears a heavy burden of justification, and the government action will be closely
scrutinized in light of its asserted purpose.
On the other hand, if the classification, while not facially invidious, nonetheless gives rise to recurring constitutional
difficulties, or if a classification disadvantages a "quasi-suspect class," it will be treated under intermediate or heightened
review. To survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important governmental interest and be
substantially related to that interest, but the justification for the classification must be genuine and must not depend on
broad generalizations. Noteworthy, and of special interest to us in this case, quasi-suspect classes include classifications
based on gender or illegitimacy.
If neither strict nor intermediate scrutiny is appropriate, then the statute will be tested for mere rationality. This is a
relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Courts awareness that the drawing of lines which creates distinctions is
peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. The presumption is in favor of the classification, of the
reasonableness and fairness of state action, and of legitimate grounds of distinction, if any such grounds exist, on which
the State acted.34 (Citations omitted, emphases supplied.)
This case presents us with the most opportune time to adopt the appropriate scrutiny in deciding cases where the issue of
discrimination based on sex or gender is raised. The assailed Section 3, among other provisions, of Republic Act No.
9262 provides:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act:
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship,
or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family
abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x. (Emphases
supplied.)
The aforesaid law also institutionalized remedies such as the issuance of protection orders in favor of women and children
who are victims of violence and prescribed public penalties for violation of the said law.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 which denies the same protection orders to husbands
who are victims of wife-abuse. It should be stressed that under aforecited section of said law violence may not only be
physical or sexual but also psychological and economic in nature.
The Honorable Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen in his concurring opinion notes that "Husband abuse maybe an
under reported form of family violence." While concurring with the majority opinion, he opines as follows:
Nevertheless, in a future case more deserving of our attention, we should be open to realities which may challenge the
dominant conception that violence in intimate relationships only happens to women and children. This may be

predominantly true, but even those in marginal cases deserve fundamental constitutional and statutory protection. We
should be careful that in correcting historical and cultural injustices, we may typecast all women as victims, stereotype all
men as tormentors or make invisible the possibility that in some intimate relationships, men may also want to seek succor
against acts defined in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9262 in an expeditious manner.
Since statutory remedies accorded to women are not made available to men, when the reality is that there are men,
regardless of their number, who are also suffering from domestic violence, the rational basis test may be too wide and
liberal to justify the statutory classification which in effect allows different treatment of men who are similarly situated. In
the context of the constitutional policy to "ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men" 35 the level
of scrutiny applicable, to test whether or not the classification in Republic Act No. 9262 violates the equal protection
clause, is the middle-tier scrutiny or the intermediate standard of judicial review.
To survive intermediate review, the classification in the challenged law must (1) serve important governmental objectives,
and (2) be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. 36
Important and Essential Governmental Objectives: Safeguard Human Rights, Ensure Gender Equality and Empower
Women
Republic Act No. 9262 is a legislation that furthers important, in fact essential, governmental objectives as enunciated in
the laws Declaration of Policy, as quoted below:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.- It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and
guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members
particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in keeping with
the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the Provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the
Child and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
This policy is in consonance with the constitutional provisions, 37 which state:
SEC. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
SEC. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution.
x x x.
By constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed to ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully
enjoyed by everyone. It was one of the countries that voted in favor of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), which was a mere two years after it gained independence from the United States of America. In addition, the
Philippines is a signatory to many United Nations human rights treaties such as the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention Against Torture, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
among others.
As a signatory to the UDHR, the Philippines pledged itself to achieve the promotion of universal respect for and
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 38 keeping in mind the standards under the Declaration. Among
the standards under the UDHR are the following:
Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience
and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

xxxx
Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are
entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such
discrimination.
Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law. (Emphasis ours.)
The Declaration of Policy in Republic Act No. 9262 enunciates the purpose of the said law, which is to fulfill the
governments obligation to safeguard the dignity and human rights of women and children by providing effective remedies
against domestic violence or physical, psychological, and other forms of abuse perpetuated by the husband, partner, or
father of the victim. The said law is also viewed within the context of the constitutional mandate to ensure gender equality,
which is quoted as follows:
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before
the law of women and men.39
It has been acknowledged that "gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women's ability to
enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men." 40 Republic Act No. 9262 can be viewed therefore as the
Philippines compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),
which is committed to condemn discrimination against women and directs its members to undertake, without delay, all
appropriate means to eliminate discrimination against women in all forms both in law and in practice. 41 Known as the
International Bill of Rights of Women, 42 the CEDAW is the central and most comprehensive document for the
advancement of the welfare of women.43 It brings the women into the focus of human rights concerns, and its spirit is
rooted in the goals of the UN: to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person,
in the equal rights of men and women. 44 The CEDAW, in its preamble, explicitly acknowledges the existence of extensive
discrimination against women, and emphasized that such is a violation of the principles of equality of rights and respect
for human dignity.
In addition, as a state party to the CEDAW, the Philippines is under legal obligation to ensure their development and
advancement for the improvement of their position from one of de jure as well as de facto equality with men. 45The
CEDAW, going beyond the concept of discrimination used in many legal standards and norms, focuses on discrimination
against women, with the emphasis that women have suffered and are continuing to suffer from various forms of
discrimination on account of their biological sex.46
The Philippines accession to various international instruments requires it to promote and ensure the observance of
human rights and "continually affirm its commitment to ensure that it pursues gender equality in all aspects of the
development process to eventually make real, a gender-responsive society." 47 Thus, the governmental objectives of
protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, which includes promoting gender equality and empowering women,
as mandated not only by our Constitution, but also by commitments we have made in the international sphere, are
undeniably important and essential.
The Gender-Based Classification in Republic Act No. 9262 is Substantially Related to the Achievement of Governmental
Objectives
As one of the countrys pervasive social problems, violence against women is deemed to be closely linked with the
unequal power relationship between women and men and is otherwise known as "gender-based violence." 48Violent acts
towards women has been the subject of an examination on a historic world-wide perspective. 49 The exhaustive study of a
foreign history professor noted that "from the earliest civilizations on, the subjugation of women, in the form of violence,
were facts of life,"50 as three great bodies of thought, namely: Judeo-Christian religious ideas; Greek philosophy; and the
Common Law Legal Code, which have influenced western societys views and treatment of women, all "assumed
patriarchy as natural; that is, male domination stemming from the view of male superiority." 51 It cited 18th century legal
expert William Blackstone, who explained that the common law doctrine of coverture reflected the theological assumption

that husband and wife were one body before God; thus "they were one person under the law, and that one person was
the husband,"52 a concept that evidently found its way in some of our Civil Code provisions prior to the enactment of the
Family Code.
Society and tradition dictate that the culture of patriarchy continue. Men are expected to take on the dominant roles both
in the community and in the family. This perception naturally leads to men gaining more power over women power,
which must necessarily be controlled and maintained. Violence against women is one of the ways men control women to
retain such power.53
The enactment of Republic Act No. 9262 was in response to the undeniable numerous cases involving violence
committed against women in the Philippines. In 2012, the Philippine National Police (PNP) reported 54 that 65% or 11,531
out of 15,969 cases involving violence against women were filed under Republic Act No. 9262. From 2004 to 2012,
violations of Republic Act No. 9262 ranked first among the different categories of violence committed against women. The
number of reported cases showed an increasing trend from 2004 to 2012, although the numbers might not exactly
represent the real incidence of violence against women in the country, as the data is based only on what was reported to
the PNP. Moreover, the increasing trend may have been caused by the continuous information campaign on the law and
its strict implementation.55 Nonetheless, statistics show that cases involving violence against women are prevalent, while
there is a dearth of reported cases involving violence committed by women against men, that will require legislature
intervention or solicitous treatment of men.
Preventing violence against women and children through their availment of special legal remedies, serves the
governmental objectives of protecting the dignity and human rights of every person, preserving the sanctity of family life,
and promoting gender equality and empowering women. Although there exists other laws on violence against women 56 in
the Philippines, Republic Act No. 9262 deals with the problem of violence within the family and intimate relationships,
which deserves special attention because it occurs in situations or places where women and children should feel most
safe and secure but are actually not. The law provides the widest range of reliefs for women and children who are victims
of violence, which are often reported to have been committed not by strangers, but by a father or a husband or a person
with whom the victim has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Aside from filing a criminal case in court, the law provides
potent legal remedies to the victims that theretofore were not available. The law recognizes, with valid factual support
based on statistics that women and children are the most vulnerable victims of violence, and therefore need legal
intervention. On the other hand, there is a dearth of empirical basis to anchor a conclusion that men need legal protection
from violence perpetuated by women.
The law takes into account the pervasive vulnerability of women and children, and the seriousness and urgency of the
situation, which, in the language of the law result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation
of liberty.57 Hence, the law permits the issuance of protection orders and the granting of certain reliefs to women victims,
even without a hearing. The law has granted authority for barangay officials to issue a protection order against the
offender, based on the victims application. The RTC may likewise grant an application for a temporary protection order
(TPO) and provide other reliefs, also on the mere basis of the application. Despite the ex parte issuance of these
protection orders, the temporary nature of these remedies allow them to be availed of by the victim without violating the
offenders right to due process as it is only when a full-blown hearing has been done that a permanent protection order
may be issued. Thus, these remedies are suitable, reasonable, and justified. More importantly, they serve the objectives
of the law by providing the victims necessary immediate protection from the violence they perceive as threats to their
personal safety and security. This translates to the fulfillment of other governmental objectives as well. By assuring the
victims instant relief from their situation, they are consequently empowered and restored to a place of dignity and equality.
Such is embodied in the purpose to be served by a protection order, to wit:
SEC. 8. Protection Orders.- A protection order is an order issued under this act for the purpose of preventing further acts
of violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of this Act and granting other necessary relief. The relief
granted under a protection order serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any
disruption in the victims daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control
over her life. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

In furtherance of the governmental objectives, especially that of protecting human rights, violence against women and
children under this Act has been classified as a public offense, 58 making its prosecution independent of the victims initial
participation.
Verily, the classification made in Republic Act No. 9262 is substantially related to the important governmental objectives of
valuing every persons dignity, respecting human rights, safeguarding family life, protecting children, promoting gender
equality, and empowering women.
The persistent and existing biological, social, and cultural differences between women and men prescribe that they be
treated differently under particular conditions in order to achieve substantive equality for women. Thus, the disadvantaged
position of a woman as compared to a man requires the special protection of the law, as gleaned from the following
recommendations of the CEDAW Committee:
8. The Convention requires that women be given an equal start and that they be empowered by an enabling environment
to achieve equality of results. It is not enough to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of men. Rather,
biological as well as socially and culturally constructed differences between women and men must be taken into account.
Under certain circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and men will be required in order to address such
differences. Pursuit of the goal of substantive equality also calls for an effective strategy aimed at overcoming under
representation of women and a redistribution of resources and power between men and women.
9. Equality of results is the logical corollary of de facto or substantive equality. These results may be quantitative and/or
qualitative in nature; that is, women enjoying their rights in various fields in fairly equal numbers with men, enjoying the
same income levels, equality in decision-making and political influence, and women enjoying freedom from
violence.59 (Emphases supplied.)
The governments commitment to ensure that the status of a woman in all spheres of her life are parallel to that of a man,
requires the adoption and implementation of ameliorative measures, such as Republic Act No. 9262. Unless the woman is
guaranteed that the violence that she endures in her private affairs will not be ignored by the government, which is
committed to uplift her to her rightful place as a human being, then she can neither achieve substantive equality nor be
empowered.
The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against classification. The nonidentical treatment of women and men under Republic Act No. 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give
substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical,
social, and culturally endowed differences between men and women.
Republic Act No. 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of
domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender
equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in
favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence,
said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is
therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
The Issuance of the TPO did not Violate Petitioners Right to Due Process
A protection order is issued under Republic Act No. 9262 for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a
woman or her child.60 The circumstances surrounding the availment thereof are often attended by urgency; thus, women
and child victims must have immediate and uncomplicated access to the same. Hence, Republic Act No. 9262 provides
for the issuance of a TPO:
SEC. 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by the
court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte determination that such order should be issued. A court may
grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court
shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall

order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of
law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the
issuance of a PPO.
The ex parte issuance of the TPO does not make it unconstitutional. Procedural due process refers to the method or
manner by which the law is enforced. It consists of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of
being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal. 61 However, it is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those involved
herein. Republic Act No. 9262 and its implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that
pervasive, sovereign power of the State to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public (in this
case, a particular sector thereof), as well as the protection of human life, commonly designated as the police power. 62
In Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 63 the Court enumerated three instances when notice and/or hearing may be dispensed
with in administrative proceedings:
These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such as:
1. In proceedings where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary abatement of a nuisance
per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges
(Section 63, Local Government Code, B. P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters showing
obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate threats to public health and decency, and the
cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not precluded from
enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person affected, such as the
summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary
appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.
The principles behind the aforementioned exceptions may also apply in the case of the ex parte issuance of the TPO,
although it is a judicial proceeding. As mentioned previously, the urgent need for a TPO is inherent in its nature and
purpose, which is to immediately provide protection to the woman and/or child victim/s against further violent acts. Any
delay in the issuance of a protective order may possibly result in loss of life and limb of the victim. The issuing judge does
not arbitrarily issue the TPO as he can only do so if there is reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of
violence against women and their children exists or is about to recur based on the verified allegations in the petition of the
victim/s.64 Since the TPO is effective for only thirty (30) days, 65 any inconvenience, deprivation, or prejudice the person
enjoined such as the petitioner herein may suffer, is generally limited and temporary. Petitioner is also not completely
precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time. Following the issuance of the TPO, the law and
rules require that petitioner be personally served with notice of the preliminary conference and hearing on private
respondents petition for a Permanent Protection Order (PPO) 66 and that petitioner submit his opposition to private
respondents petition for protections orders.67 In fact, it was petitioners choice not to file anopposition, averring that it
would only be an "exercise in futility." Thus, the twin rights of notice and hearing were subsequently afforded to petitioner
but he chose not to take advantage of them. Petitioner cannot now claim that the ex parte issuance of the TPO was in
violation of his right to due process.
There is No Undue Delegation of Judicial Power to Barangay Officials
A Barangay Protection Order (BPO) refers to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay, or in his absence the
Barangay Kagawad, ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts of violence against the family or household
members particularly women and their children. 68 The authority of barangay officials to issue a BPO is conferred under
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9262:

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. - Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to
the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section
5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the
applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is
unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad.
If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad
that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time for the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15)
days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally
serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect is personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
Once more, the urgency of the purpose for which protection orders under Republic Act No. 9262 are issued justifies the
grant of authority to barangay officials to issue BPOs. Barangay officials live and interact closely with their constituents
and are presumably easier to approach and more readily available than any other government official. Their issuance of
the BPO is but part of their official executive function of enforcing all laws and ordinances within their barangay 69 and
maintaining public order in the barangay.70 It is true that the barangay officials issuance of a BPO under Republic Act No.
9262 necessarily involves the determination of some questions of fact, but this function, whether judicial or quasi-judicial,
are merely incidental to the exercise of the power granted by law.71 The Court has clarified that:
"The mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in
order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute
an exercise of judicial powers. Accordingly, a statute may give to non-judicial officers the power to declare the existence of
facts which call into operation its provisions, and similarly may grant to commissioners and other subordinate officers
power to ascertain and determine appropriate facts as a basis for procedure in the enforcement of particular laws." (11
Am. Jur., Const. Law, p. 950, sec. 235)72
Furthermore, while judicial power rests exclusively in the judiciary, it may be conceded that the legislature may confer on
administrative boards or bodies, or even particular government officials, quasi-judicial power involving the exercise of
judgment and discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative functions. But in so doing, the legislature must
state its intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if
they are to be valid, only to those incidental to or in connection with the performance of administrative duties, which do not
amount to conferment of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts. 73 In the case of a BPO, it is a mere
provisional remedy under Republic Act No. 9262, meant to address the pressing need of the victims for instant protection.
However, it does not take the place of appropriate judicial proceedings and remedies that provide a more effective and
comprehensive protection to the victim. In fact, under the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 9262, the issuance of a
BPO or the pendency of an application for a BPO shall not preclude the victim from applying for, or the court from
granting, a TPO or PPO. Where a TPO has already been granted by any court, the barangay official may no longer issue
a BPO.74 The same Implementing Rules also require that within twenty-four (24) hours after the issuance of a BPO, the
barangay official shall assist the victim in filing an application for a TPO or PPO with the nearest court in the victims place
of residence. If there is no Family Court or RTC, the application may be filed in the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court or the Metropolitan Trial Court.75
All things considered, there is no ground to declare Republic Act No. 9262 constitutionally infirm.
TERESITA
Associate Justice

J.

LEONARDO-DE

CASTRO

2. Biraogo v Philippines Truth Commission

EN BANC

LOUIS BAROK C.
BIRAOGO,

G.R. No. 192935

Petitioner,

- versus THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF

2010,
Respondent.
x-----------------------x
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN,
REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP.
SIMEON
A.
DATUMANONG, and REP.
ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.,
Petitioners,

- versus -

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.

OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY

G.R. No. 193036

Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:

FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Respondents.

December 7, 2010

x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.

--- Justice Jose P. Laurel[1]

The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of
government are established, limited and defined, and by which these powers are distributed among the several
departments.[2] The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all
persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. [3] Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter
what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more
tailor itself to the whims and caprices of government and the people who run it. [4]

For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases [5] both of which essentially assail the validity and
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010.

The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis
Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the
legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution [6] as it usurps the constitutional authority of the
legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.[7]

The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C.
Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent
members of the House of Representatives.

The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then
Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, Kung

walang corrupt, walang mahirap. The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble
objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.

To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate
reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration.

Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing
the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions of said executive order read:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1
CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines solemnly enshrines the
principle that a public office is a public trust and mandates that public officers and employees, who are
servants of the people, must at all times be accountable to the latter, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives;
WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable acts of defiance of this principle and
notorious violation of this mandate;
WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which seriously affects the political, economic, and
social life of a nation; in a very special way it inflicts untold misfortune and misery on the poor, the
marginalized and underprivileged sector of society;
WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached very alarming levels, and undermined the
peoples trust and confidence in the Government and its institutions;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding certain reports of
large scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the
appropriate cases against those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil,
restore the peoples faith and confidence in the Government and in their public servants;
WHEREAS, the Presidents battlecry during his campaign for the Presidency in the last elections
kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap expresses a solemn pledge that if elected, he would end
corruption and the evil it breeds;
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out
the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and
which will recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;
WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives the President the continuing authority to reorganize
the Office of the President.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, President of the Republic of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek and find the
truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that
shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the
previous administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon
to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who will act as an
independent collegial body.

SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an
investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily
tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to
in Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter submit its
finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
In particular, it shall:
a)

Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft and corruption which it will investigate;

b)
Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the cases of large scale
corruption which it has chosen to investigate, and to this end require any agency, official or employee of
the Executive Branch, including government-owned or controlled corporations, to produce documents,
books, records and other papers;
c)
Upon proper request or representation, obtain information and documents from the Senate and the
House of Representatives records of investigations conducted by committees thereof relating to matters
or subjects being investigated by the Commission;
d)
Upon proper request and representation, obtain information from the courts, including the
Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Court Administrator, information or documents in respect to
corruption cases filed with the Sandiganbayan or the regular courts, as the case may be;
e)
Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their testimonies and for that purpose, administer oaths or
affirmations as the case may be;
f)
Recommend, in cases where there is a need to utilize any person as a state witness to ensure that
the ends of justice be fully served, that such person who qualifies as a state witness under the Revised
Rules of Court of the Philippines be admitted for that purpose;
g)
Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate prosecutorial authorities,
by means of a special or interim report and recommendation, all evidence on corruption of public officers
and employees and their private sector co-principals, accomplices or accessories, if any, when in the
course of its investigation the Commission finds that there is reasonable ground to believe that they are
liable for graft and corruption under pertinent applicable laws;
h)
Call upon any government investigative or prosecutorial agency such as the Department of Justice
or any of the agencies under it, and the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, for such assistance and
cooperation as it may require in the discharge of its functions and duties;
i)
Engage or contract the services of resource persons, professionals and other personnel determined
by it as necessary to carry out its mandate;
j)
Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it deems necessary to effectively and
efficiently carry out the objectives of this Executive Order and to ensure the orderly conduct of its
investigations, proceedings and hearings, including the presentation of evidence;
k)
Exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate and necessary in connection with the
objectives and purposes of this Order.
SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. x x x.
SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. x x x.
SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. x x x
SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. x x x.
SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x.
SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x.

SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or Give Testimony. Any government official
or personnel who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon subpoena issued by the Commission or
who, appearing before the Commission refuses to take oath or affirmation, give testimony or produce
documents for inspection, when required, shall be subject to administrative disciplinary action. Any private
person who does the same may be dealt with in accordance with law.
SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the Commission.

x x x.

SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. The Office of the President shall provide the
necessary funds for the Commission to ensure that it can exercise its powers, execute its functions, and
perform its duties and responsibilities as effectively, efficiently, and expeditiously as possible.
SECTION 12. Office. x x x.
SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. x x x.
SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. The Commission shall accomplish its mission on or
before December 31, 2012.
SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. x x x.
SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the Commission. x x x.
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the
President there is a need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to
include the investigation of cases and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations,
such mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive Order.

SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Order is declared unconstitutional, the
same shall not affect the validity and effectivity of the other provisions hereof.
SECTION 19. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30th day of July 2010.
(SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III
By the President:
(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
Executive Secretary

Nature of the Truth Commission

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad
hoc body formed under the Office of the President with theprimary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an independent collegial body, it is essentially an entity within the Office
of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one. [8]

To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9,
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate,
resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite
people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if
probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose
criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.

The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have been created as official, transitory
and non-judicial fact-finding bodies to establish the facts and context of serious violations of human rights or of
international humanitarian law in a countrys past.[9] They are usually established by states emerging from periods of
internal unrest, civil strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for transitional justice.

Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following characteristics: (1) they examine only
past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3)
they are temporary bodies that finish their work with the submission of a report containing conclusions and
recommendations; and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State. [10] Commissions
members are usually empowered to conduct research, support victims, and propose policy recommendations to prevent
recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations, the commissions may aim to discover and learn more about past
abuses, or formally acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for prosecutions and recommend institutional
reforms.[11]
Thus, their main goals range from retribution to reconciliation. The Nuremburg and Tokyo war crime tribunals are
examples of a retributory or vindicatory body set up to try and punish those responsible for crimes against humanity. A
form of a reconciliatory tribunal is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, the principal function of which
was to heal the wounds of past violence and to prevent future conflict by providing a cathartic experience for victims.

The PTC is a far cry from South Africas model. The latter placed more emphasis on reconciliation than on judicial
retribution, while the marching order of the PTC is the identification and punishment of perpetrators. As one writer [12] puts
it:
The order ruled out reconciliation. It translated the Draconian code spelled out by Aquino in his
inaugural speech: To those who talk about reconciliation, if they mean that they would like us to simply
forget about the wrongs that they have committed in the past, we have this to say: There can be no
reconciliation without justice. When we allow crimes to go unpunished, we give consent to their occurring
over and over again.

The Thrusts of the Petitions

Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. A perusal of the arguments of the petitioners in both
cases shows that they are essentially the same. The petitioners-legislators summarized them in the following manner:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to
create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office
of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an
entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent statutes when it vested the Truth
Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the Department of Justice created under the
Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species
even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
(e) The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 violates the consistent and general
international practice of four decades wherein States constitute truth commissions to exclusively
investigate human rights violations, which customary practice forms part of the generally accepted
principles of international law which the Philippines is mandated to adhere to pursuant to the Declaration
of Principles enshrined in the Constitution.
(f) The creation of the Truth Commission is an exercise in futility, an adventure in partisan
hostility, a launching pad for trial/conviction by publicity and a mere populist propaganda to mistakenly
impress the people that widespread poverty will altogether vanish if corruption is eliminated without even
addressing the other major causes of poverty.
(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not constitutionally challenged is of no moment
because neither laches nor estoppel can bar an eventual question on the constitutionality and validity of
an executive issuance or even a statute.[13]

In their Consolidated Comment,[14] the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), essentially
questioned the legal standing of petitioners and defended the assailed executive order with the following arguments:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress to create a public office because the
Presidents executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct
investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), [15] Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1416 [16] (as amended by
P.D. No. 1772), R.A. No. 9970,[17] and settled jurisprudence that authorize the President to create or form
such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ),because it is a fact-finding body and
not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly
created for laudable purposes.

The OSG then points to the continued existence and validity of other executive orders and presidential issuances
creating similar bodies to justify the creation of the PTC such as Presidential Complaint and Action
Commission (PCAC) by President Ramon B. Magsaysay, Presidential Committee on Administrative Performance
Efficiency (PCAPE)by

President

Carlos

P.

Garcia

and

Presidential

Agency

on

Reform

and

Government

Operations (PARGO) by President Ferdinand E. Marcos.[18]

From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda, the following are the principal issues to be resolved:
1.

Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective

petitions and question Executive Order No. 1;

2.

Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of

powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices,
agencies and commissions;

3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and

5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.

Essential requisites for judicial review

Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, the Court needs to ascertain
whether the requisites for a valid exercise of its power of judicial review are present.

Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case.[19]

Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put at issue.

Legal Standing of the Petitioners

The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file their petition for failure to demonstrate
their personal stake in the outcome of the case. It argues that the petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or
are in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PTC. Not claiming to be the subject of
the commissions investigations, petitioners will not sustain injury in its creation or as a result of its proceedings. [20]

The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legislators to
assail Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body
to which they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution
and present the complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court. As
held in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,[21]
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any
member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.

Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to
their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators. [22]

With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to question the creation of the
PTC and the budget for its operations.[23] It emphasizes that the funds to be used for the creation and operation of the
commission are to be taken from those funds already appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and disbursement
of funds for the commission will not entail congressional action but will simply be an exercise of the Presidents power
over contingent funds.

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any
personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an
assertion of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over
presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution. The case of David v. Arroyo[24] explained the deep-seated rules
on locus standi. Thus:
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In
private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest is the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general

public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a
stranger, or in the category of a citizen, or taxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show that
he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and taxpayer standing in public
actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a
taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is
affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public
concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: In matter of mere
public right, howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of every
citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public
grievance be remedied. With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held that the right of a citizen
and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury
cannot be denied.
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy
or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in
public service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent direct injury test in Ex
Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to
invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that
he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a
general interest common to all members of the public.
This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Vera doctrine was
upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers
Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the
Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included. Citations omitted]

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be
relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires,
such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.[25]
Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,[26] the Court held that in cases of paramount importance
where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed
to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the firstEmergency
Powers Cases,[27] ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive
orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance [28] laid down in CREBA v. ERC and
Meralco[29] are non-existent in this case. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers
matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in
the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.
Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the
Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of all. [30] Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know
the status of the Presidents first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of

the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the
Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to
society.

Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission

In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not
merely an adjunct body of the Office of the President. [31]Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he
must be empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law. According to petitioner, such
power cannot be presumed[32] since there is no provision in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the
President to create a truth commission. [33] He adds that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting the
President the continuing authority to reorganize his office, cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truth commission
considering the aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as reorganize, transfer, consolidate, merge, and
abolish.[34] Insofar as it vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize the Office of the President to the extent of
creating a public office, Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution
and must be deemed repealed upon the effectivity thereof.[35]
Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation of a public office lies within the
province of Congress and not with the executive branch of government. They maintain that the delegated authority of the
President to reorganize under Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code: 1) does not permit the President to create a
public office, much less a truth commission; 2) is limited to the reorganization of the administrative structure of the Office
of the President; 3) is limited to the restructuring of the internal organs of the Office of the President Proper, transfer of
functions and transfer of agencies; and 4) only to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.[36] Such continuing authority
of the President to reorganize his office is limited, and by issuing Executive Order No. 1, the President overstepped the
limits of this delegated authority.

The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the creation by the President of a fact-finding
body such as a truth commission. Pointing to numerous offices created by past presidents, it argues that the authority of
the President to create public offices within the Office of the President Proper has long been recognized. [37]According to
the OSG, the Executive, just like the other two branches of government, possesses the inherent authority to create factfinding committees to assist it in the performance of its constitutionally mandated functions and in the exercise of its
administrative functions.[38] This power, as the OSG explains it, is but an adjunct of the plenary powers wielded by the
President under Section 1 and his power of control under Section 17, both of Article VII of the Constitution. [39]

It contends that the President is necessarily vested with the power to conduct fact-finding investigations, pursuant
to his duty to ensure that all laws are enforced by public officials and employees of his department and in the exercise of
his authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the

discretion of his officials.[40] The power of the President to investigate is not limited to the exercise of his power of control
over his subordinates in the executive branch, but extends further in the exercise of his other powers, such as his power to
discipline subordinates,[41] his power for rule making, adjudication and licensing purposes [42] and in order to be informed on
matters which he is entitled to know.[43]

The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita,[44] where it was held that the President has the power to
reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with his constitutionally granted power of control
and by virtue of a valid delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.

Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control necessarily includes the power to create offices. For the OSG,
the President may create the PTC in order to, among others, put a closure to the reported large scale graft and corruption
in the government.[45]

The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to
reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates reorganization as
limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3)
transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the
provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or
alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said
provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.

To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced
supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term restructure an alteration of an existing
structure. Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of
Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary,[46]
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or
agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of
the power that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive
Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy
in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this
purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In
Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of
functions." It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices
or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB
is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is
subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied]

In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control. Control is essentially
the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.[47] Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the
power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid
delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.

The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the President to create a
public office?

According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above provision finds statutory
basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772. [48]The said law granted the President the continuing authority to
reorganize the national government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to
transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize
salaries and materials. This decree, in relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in several
cases such as Larin v. Executive Secretary.[49]

The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a public
office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President
Marcos of the authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the national government including the power to create
offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last Whereas clause:
WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will necessitate
flexibility in the organization of the national government.

Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416,
as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficioupon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in
Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even the Solicitor General agrees with this view. Thus:

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was enacted was the last whereas clause of P.D.
1416 says it was enacted to prepare the transition from
presidential to parliamentary. Now, in a parliamentary form of
government, the legislative and executive powers are fused,
correct?
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

Yes, Your Honor.

That is why, that P.D. 1416 was issued. Now would you agree with
me that P.D. 1416 should not be considered effective anymore

upon the promulgation, adoption, ratification of the 1987

Constitution.
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ:

Not the whole of P.D. [No.] 1416, Your Honor.

The power of the President to reorganize the entire National
Government is deemed repealed, at least, upon the adoption
of the 1987 Constitution, correct.
Yes, Your Honor.[50]

While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D.
No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the
President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).

As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government
is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the
Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create
bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of
such authority.[51] As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus:[52]
x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and
restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among
three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the
laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in
such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the
Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It
also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his
power over the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on
the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is
more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative
nor judicial has to be executive. x x x.

Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the
powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. [53] One of the recognized powers
of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoccommittees. This

flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department
of Health v. Camposano,[54] the authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative
committee to look into the administrative charges filed against the employees of the Department of Health for the
anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled:
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be
doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees
faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the
same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
[Emphasis supplied]
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into
matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his
duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the
objective of the investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the
Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the government structure, the Court is not
inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have changed.
On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the
operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of
existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of
Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of
the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. [55] Moreover, since the amount that would be
allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.
Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate
The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well
recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof. [56] As the
Chief Executive, the president represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the
officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to directly assume the functions of the executive
department.[57]

Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and
to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body
as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been said that Quasi-judicial powers involve the
power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with
the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. [58] In simpler terms, judicial discretion is

involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly
authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies.

The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court
in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.[59] Thus:
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,
research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into
systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official
inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the
facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient
inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and
accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire;
to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the
exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial
or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide,
determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and
duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle
judicially: x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or
quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine
finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to
decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the
entry of a judgment." [Italics included. Citations Omitted]

Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is
not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review as
may be provided by law.[60] Even respondents themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power.
[61]

Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their
respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. As
pointed out by the Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the
commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation.[62] The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less
adjudication on the merits of the charges against them, [63] is certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase,
when in the course of its investigation, under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary
interpretation from that of the petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate
complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. [64]

At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other
similarly authorized government agencies. Thus, in the case of Ombudsman v. Galicia,[65] it was written:
This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The
Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government
agencies such as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The
power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public employees and officials is likewise
concurrently shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local Government Code
in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the
local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective officials. [Emphasis supplied].

Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the Ombudsman to investigate criminal cases under
Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in
the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency
of government, the investigation of such cases. [Emphases supplied]

The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a preliminary
investigation or the determination of the existence of probable cause. This is categorically out of the PTCs sphere of
functions. Its power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC
commits no act of usurpation of the Ombudsmans primordial duties.
The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the
Revised Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate
the commission of crimes.

Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded
conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa
Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have
a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not
deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations
of graft laws.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President, the Court finds
difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1 reads:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend
that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the previous
administration as its sole object makes the PTC an adventure in partisan hostility. [66] Thus, in order to be accorded with
validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of
former President Arroyo.[67]

The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and corruption must encompass
acts committed not only during the administration of former President Arroyo but also during prior administrations where
the same magnitude of controversies and anomalies [68] were reported to have been committed against the Filipino
people. They assail the classification formulated by the respondents as it does not fall under the recognized exceptions
because first, there is no substantial distinction between the group of officials targeted for investigation by Executive
Order No. 1 and other groups or persons who abused their public office for personal gain; and second, the selective
classification is not germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption. [69] In order to attain constitutional
permission, the petitioners advocate that the commission should deal with graft and grafters prior and subsequent to the
Arroyo administration with the strong arm of the law with equal force. [70]

Position of respondents
According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1 identifies the previous administration as the initial subject
of the investigation, following Section 17 thereof, the PTC will not confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption
solely during the said administration. [71] Assuming arguendo that the commission would confine its proceedings to officials
of the previous administration, the petitioners argue that no offense is committed against the equal protection clause for
the segregation of the transactions of public officers during the previous administration as possible subjects of
investigation is a valid classification based on substantial distinctions and is germane to the evils which the Executive
Order seeks to correct.[72] To distinguish the Arroyo administration from past administrations, it recited the following:
First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports of large scale graft and corruption in
the previous administration which have eroded public confidence in public institutions. There is,
therefore, an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large scale graft and
corruption in the government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against
those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the peoples faith and
confidence in the Government and in their public servants.
Second. The segregation of the preceding administration as the object of fact-finding is warranted
by the reality that unlike with administrations long gone, the current administration will most likely bear the
immediate consequence of the policies of the previous administration.
Third. The classification of the previous administration as a separate class for investigation lies in
the reality that the evidence of possible criminal activity, the evidence that could lead to recovery of public

monies illegally dissipated, the policy lessons to be learned to ensure that anti-corruption laws are
faithfully executed, are more easily established in the regime that immediately precede the current
administration.
Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions of their predecessors to investigations to
provide closure to issues that are pivotal to national life or even as a routine measure of due diligence and
good housekeeping by a nascent administration like the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), created by the late President Corazon C. Aquino under Executive Order No. 1 to pursue the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth of her predecessor former President Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies, and
the Saguisag Commission created by former President Joseph Estrada under Administrative Order No,
53, to form an ad-hoc and independent citizens committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances
surrounding Philippine Centennial projects of his predecessor, former President Fidel V. Ramos.
[73]
[Emphases supplied]

Concept of the Equal Protection Clause

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied
in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a
separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from
the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular
act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal
protectionclause.[74]

According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. [75] It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. [76] The purpose of the equal protection clause is to
secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities. [77] In other words,
the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. [78]

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. [79] Its inhibitions
cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of
a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. [80]

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What
it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test
has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It
is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. [81] Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification.[82]

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who
naturally belong to the class.[83] The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made
with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal
degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be
treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class
is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him. [84]

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to
the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or underinclude those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union[85] and reiterated in a long line of cases,[86]
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but
on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they
were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It
does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory
within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple
inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere
fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must
not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This
Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. [Citations omitted]
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration[87] only. The intent to single out
the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the
questioned executive order. Specifically, these are:

WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during theprevious administration, and which will
recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek and find the
truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that
shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during
the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken
thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an
investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily
tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to
in Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter submit its
finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. [Emphases supplied]
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a
class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other past
administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the previous
administration only. The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for
distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which were also blemished by similar widespread reports of
impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it,
Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification. [88]

The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit the scope of the intended
investigation to the previous administration only. The OSG ventures to opine that to include other past administrations, at
this point, may unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness. [89] The reason given is
specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble objective of the PTC to stamp out or end corruption and
the evil it breeds.[90]

The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that the earlier reports involving the earlier
administrations were already inquired into is beside the point. Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have
already prescribed can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC expected to conduct
simultaneous investigations of previous administrations, given the bodys limited time and resources. The law does not
require the impossible (Lex non cogit ad impossibilia).[91]

Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating
almost a centurys worth of graft cases. However, the fact remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary

classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other past
administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations. While reasonable
prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional. In the often quoted
language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,[92]

Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if applied and
administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust
and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial
of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution. [Emphasis supplied]

It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope is limited. The Court, however, is of
the considered view that although its focus is restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws
should not in any way be circumvented. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered.
[93]

Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional. [94] While the thrust of

the PTC is specific, that is, for investigation of acts of graft and corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to survive, must be read
together with the provisions of the Constitution. To exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of substantial
distinctions would only confirm the petitioners lament that the subject executive order is only an adventure in partisan
hostility. In the case of US v. Cyprian,[95] it was written: A rather limited number of such classifications have routinely
been held or assumed to be arbitrary; those include: race, national origin, gender, political activity or membership in a
political party, union activity or membership in a labor union, or more generally the exercise of first amendment rights.
To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all
persons who naturally belong to the class. [96] Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or
so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a class, but must be of such a nature as to embrace
all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and
circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of the
members of the class must be brought under the influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are the
members of the class.[97]

The Court is not unaware that mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the equal
protection clause.[98] Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and does not include all the
evils within its reach.[99] It has been written that a regulation challenged under the equal protection clause is not devoid of
a rational predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete. [100] In several instances, the underinclusiveness was not
considered a valid reason to strike down a law or regulation where the purpose can be attained in future legislations or
regulations. These cases refer to the step by step process. [101] With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does

not run the risk of losing the entire remedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover
every evil that might conceivably have been attacked.[102]

In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous administration was picked out
was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed
executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or report to
be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the past. The equal protection clause is violated by
purposeful and intentional discrimination.[103]

To disprove petitioners contention that there is deliberate discrimination, the OSG clarifies that the commission
does not only confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption committed during the previous administration.
[104]

The OSG points to Section 17 of Executive Order No. 1, which provides:

SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the President there
is a need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the
investigation of cases and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such
mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive Order.

The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the discretion to expand the scope of
investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption committed in other past administrations, it does
not guarantee that they would be covered in the future. Such expanded mandate of the commission will still depend on
the whim and caprice of the President. If he would decide not to include them, the section would then be meaningless.
This will only fortify the fears of the petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1 was crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of
officials and personalities of the Arroyo administration.[105]

The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in the case of Virata v. Sandiganbayan,[106] that the
PCGG Charter (composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14) does not violate the equal protection clause. The
decision, however, was devoid of any discussion on how such conclusory statement was arrived at, the principal issue in
said case being only the sufficiency of a cause of action.
A final word
The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive
department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the
Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this

issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present political situation calls for it to once again explain
the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nations thrust to progress.

The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial
Power that includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial review which is the power to declare a
treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of the application, or operation
of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however,
have been fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of
government, on the other. Many times the Court has been accused of asserting superiority over the other departments.
To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be a good source of enlightenment, to wit: And
when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. [107]
Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but
rather simply making sure that any act of government is done in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it
by the Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more
authority of proscribing the actions under review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void
and unconstitutional.
It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards the
betterment of the nation and its people. But then again, it is important to remember this ethical principle: The end does
not justify the means. No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be
employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed. [108] The
Court cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined
principles.
The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law.
Expediency must not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude. [109]

Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth commission as nobly envisioned by the present
administration. Perhaps a

revision

of

the

executive

issuance

so

as

to

include

the

earlier

past

administrations would allow it to pass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution. Of all
the branches of the government, it is the judiciary which is the most interested in knowing the truth and so it will not allow
itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to its attainment. It must, however, be emphasized that the search for the truth must
be within constitutional bounds for ours is still a government of laws and not of men. [110]
WHEREFORE,

the

petitions

are GRANTED. Executive

Order

No.

is

hereby

declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of
Executive Order No. 1.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

See separate opinion (concurring)

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

See
opinion
Justice

Please see dissenting opinion

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

dissenting

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate

Associate Justice

I certify that Justice Velasco left his concurring vote

concurring & dissenting opinion
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
Associate Justice

See separate concurring

opinion

See separate opinion (concurring)

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

ARTURO D. BRION

See

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

See separate concurring

opinion

see my separate concurring opinion

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

Se
e separate dissenting opinion
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate

Associate Justice

Se
e separate opinion (concurring)
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate

Associate Justice

See dissenting opinion

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate
Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
3. Yrasegui v Philippine Air lines
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 168081

Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,

- versus -

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,

Respondent.

October 17, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:

THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed because of his failure
to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.

He is now before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari claiming that he was illegally dismissed. To
buttress his stance, he argues that (1) his dismissal does not fall under 282(e) of the Labor Code;

(2) continuing

adherence to the weight standards of the company is not a bona fide occupational qualification; and (3) he was
discriminated against because other overweight employees were promoted instead of being disciplined.

After a meticulous consideration of all arguments pro and con, We uphold the legality of dismissal. Separation pay,
however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or based on equity. This is so because
his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.

The Facts

Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He
stands five feet and eight inches (58) with a large body frame. The proper weight for a man of his height and body
structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew
Administration Manual[1] of PAL.

The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised him to go on an extended vacation
leave from December 29, 1984 to March 4, 1985 to address his weight concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to meet the
companys weight standards, prompting another leave without pay from March 5, 1985 to November 1985.

After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to return to work. But petitioners weight problem
recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.

On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal weight. In line with company policy,
he was removed from flight duty effective May 6, 1989 toJuly 3, 1989. He was formally requested to trim down to his ideal
weight and report for weight checks on several dates. He was also told that he may avail of the services of the
company physician should he wish to do so. He was advised that his case will be evaluated on July 3, 1989.[2]

On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. It was discovered that he gained, instead of losing,
weight. He was overweight at 215 pounds, which is 49 pounds beyond the limit. Consequently, his off-duty status was
retained.

On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon personally visited petitioner at his residence to check
on the progress of his effort to lose weight. Petitioner weighed 217 pounds, gaining 2 pounds from his previous
weight. After the visit, petitioner made a commitment [3] to reduce weight in a letter addressed to Cabin Crew Group
Manager Augusto Barrios. The letter, in full, reads:

Dear Sir:
I would like to guaranty my commitment towards a weight loss from 217 pounds to 200
pounds from today until 31 Dec. 1989.
From thereon, I promise to continue reducing at a reasonable percentage until such time that my
ideal weight is achieved.
Likewise, I promise to personally report to your office at the designated time schedule you will set
for my weight check.
Respectfully Yours,
F/S Armando Yrasuegui[4]

Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained
overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he
satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks.

Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he was given one more month to comply with the
weight requirement. As usual, he was asked to report for weight check on different dates. He was reminded that his
grounding would continue pending satisfactory compliance with the weight standards. [5]

Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks, although he was seen submitting his passport for processing at
the PAL Staff Service Division.

On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check would be dealt
with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates. [6] Again, petitioner ignored the directive and did not
report for weight checks. On June 26, 1990, petitioner was required to explain his refusal to undergo weight checks. [7]

When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed at 212 pounds. Clearly, he was still way over his
ideal weight of 166 pounds.

From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed up his case requesting for leniency on the latter
part of 1992. He weighed at 219 pounds on August 20, 1992 and 205 pounds on November 5, 1992.

On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company
standards on weight requirements. He was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge within which to file his answer
and submit controverting evidence.[8]

On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer.[9] Notably, he did not deny being overweight. What he
claimed, instead, is that his violation, if any, had already been condoned by PAL since no action has been taken by the
company regarding his case since 1988. He also claimed that PAL discriminated against him because the company
has not been fair in treating the cabin crew members who are similarly situated.

On December 8, 1992, a clarificatory hearing was held where petitioner manifested that he was undergoing a
weight reduction program to lose at least two (2) pounds per week so as to attain his ideal weight. [10]

On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight, and
considering the utmost leniency extended to him which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years, his
services were considered terminated effective immediately. [11]

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, [12] petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL.

Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA Dispositions

On November 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Reyes ruled[13] that petitioner was illegally dismissed. The
dispositive part of the Arbiter ruling runs as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the
complainants dismissal illegal, and ordering the respondent to reinstate him to his former position or
substantially equivalent one, and to pay him:
a. Backwages of Php10,500.00 per month from his dismissal on June 15, 1993 until reinstated,
which for purposes of appeal is hereby set from June 15, 1993 up to August 15, 1998 atP651,000.00;
b. Attorneys fees of five percent (5%) of the total award.
SO ORDERED.[14]

The Labor Arbiter held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of the job of
petitioner.[15] However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not
hamper the performance of his duties. [16] Assuming that it did, petitioner could be transferred to other positions where his
weight would not be a negative factor.[17] Notably, other overweight employees, i.e., Mr. Palacios, Mr. Cui, and Mr. Barrios,
were promoted instead of being disciplined.[18]

Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). [19]

On October 8, 1999, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution directing the reinstatement of petitioner without
loss of seniority rights and other benefits.[20]

On February 1, 2000, the Labor Arbiter denied[21] the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution[22] of PAL.

On March 6, 2000, PAL appealed the denial of its motion to quash to the NLRC. [23]

On June 23, 2000, the NLRC rendered judgment[24] in the following tenor:
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the Decision of the Arbiter dated 18 November 1998 as
modified by our findings herein, is hereby AFFIRMED and that part of the dispositive portion of said
decision concerning complainants entitlement to backwages shall be deemed to refer to complainants
entitlement to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent instead of simply backwages, from date of dismissal until his actual reinstatement or finality
hereof. Respondent is enjoined to manifests (sic) its choice of the form of the reinstatement of
complainant, whether physical or through payroll within ten (10) days from notice failing which, the same
shall be deemed as complainants reinstatement through payroll and execution in case of non-payment
shall accordingly be issued by the Arbiter. Both appeals of respondent thus, are DISMISSED for utter
lack of merit.[25]

According to the NLRC, obesity, or the tendency to gain weight uncontrollably regardless of the amount of food
intake, is a disease in itself.[26] As a consequence, there can be no intentional defiance or serious misconduct by
petitioner to the lawful order of PAL for him to lose weight.[27]

Like the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC found the weight standards of PAL to be reasonable. However, it found as
unnecessary the Labor Arbiter holding that petitioner was not remiss in the performance of his duties as flight steward
despite being overweight. According to the NLRC, the Labor Arbiter should have limited himself to the issue of whether
the failure of petitioner to attain his ideal weight constituted willful defiance of the weight standards of PAL.[28]

PAL moved for reconsideration to no avail. [29] Thus, PAL elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. [30]

By Decision dated August 31, 2004, the CA reversed[31] the NLRC:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition. The assailed NLRC
decision is declared NULL and VOID and is hereby SET ASIDE. The private respondents complaint is
hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[32]

The CA opined that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC because it looked at wrong and
irrelevant considerations[33] in evaluating the evidenceof the parties. Contrary to the NLRC ruling, the weight standards
of PAL are meant to be a continuing qualification for an employees position.[34] The failure to adhere to the weight
standards is an analogous cause for the dismissal of an employee under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code in relation to
Article 282(a). It is not willful disobedience as the NLRC seemed to suggest. [35] Said the CA, the element of willfulness
that the NLRC decision cites is an irrelevant consideration in arriving at a conclusion on whether the dismissal is legally
proper.[36] In other words, the relevant question to ask is not one of willfulness but one of reasonableness of the standard
and whether or not the employee qualifies or continues to qualify under this standard. [37]

Just like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable.[38] Thus,
petitioner was legally dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. [39] It is obvious
that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for being
overweight.[40]

On May 10, 2005, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. [41] Elaborating on its earlier ruling, the CA
held that the weight standards of PAL are a bona fide occupational qualification which, in case of violation, justifies an
employees separation from the service.[42]

Issues

In this Rule 45 petition for review, the following issues are posed for resolution:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PETITIONERS OBESITY CAN BE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDER PARAGRAPH (e) OF
ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PETITIONERS DISMISSAL FOR OBESITY CAN BE PREDICATED ON THE BONA FIDE
OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION (BFOQ) DEFENSE;
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT UNDULY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST WHEN HE WAS DISMISSED
WHILE OTHER OVERWEIGHT CABIN ATTENDANTS WERE EITHER GIVEN FLYING DUTIES OR
PROMOTED;
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT BRUSHED ASIDE
PETITIONERS CLAIMS FOR REINSTATEMENT [AND] WAGES ALLEGEDLY FOR BEING
MOOT AND ACADEMIC.[43] (Underscoring supplied)

Our Ruling

I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) [44] of the Labor Code.

A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute a continuing
qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be dismissed the moment he is
unable to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards. The dismissal of the employee would thus
fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. As explained by the CA:
x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere orders of the employer; they were the
prescribed weights that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her
position in the company. In other words, they were standards that establish continuing
qualifications for an employees position. In this sense, the failure to maintain these standards does not
fall under Article 282(a) whose express terms require the element of willfulness in order to be a ground for
dismissal. The failure to meet the employers qualifying standards is in fact a ground that does not
squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one that falls under Article 282(e) the other
causes analogous to the foregoing.
By its nature, these qualifying standards are norms that apply prior to and after an employee is
hired. They apply prior to employment because these are the standards a job applicant must initially
meet in order to be hired. They apply after hiring because an employee must continue to meet these
standards while on the job in order to keep his job. Under this perspective, a violation is not one of the
faults for which an employee can be dismissed pursuant to pars. (a) to (d) of Article 282; the employee
can be dismissed simply because he no longer qualifies for his job irrespective of whether or not the
failure to qualify was willful or intentional. x x x[45]

Petitioner, though, advances a very interesting argument. He claims that obesity is a physical abnormality and/or
illness.[46] Relying on Nadura v. BenguetConsolidated, Inc.,[47] he says his dismissal is illegal:
Conscious of the fact that Naduras case cannot be made to fall squarely within the specific causes
enumerated in subparagraphs 1(a) to (e), Benguet invokes the provisions of subparagraph 1(f) and says
that Naduras illness occasional attacks of asthma is a cause analogous to them.
Even a cursory reading of the legal provision under consideration is sufficient to convince anyone
that, as the trial court said, illness cannot be included as an analogous cause by any stretch of
imagination.
It is clear that, except the just cause mentioned in sub-paragraph 1(a), all the others expressly
enumerated in the law are due to the voluntary and/or willful act of the employee. How Nadurasillness
could be considered as analogous to any of them is beyond our understanding, there being no claim or
pretense that the same was contracted through his own voluntary act. [48]

The reliance on Nadura is off-tangent. The factual milieu in Nadura is substantially different from the case at
bar. First, Nadura was not decided under the Labor Code. The law applied in that case was Republic Act (RA) No.
1787. Second, the issue of flight safety is absent in Nadura, thus, the rationale there cannot apply here. Third, inNadura,
the employee who was a miner, was laid off from work because of illness, i.e., asthma. Here, petitioner was dismissed for
his failure to meet the weight standards ofPAL. He was not dismissed due to illness. Fourth, the issue in Nadura is
whether or not the dismissed employee is entitled to separation pay and damages. Here, the issue centers on the

propriety of the dismissal of petitioner for his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. Fifth, in Nadura, the employee
was not accorded due process. Here, petitioner was accorded utmost leniency. He was given more than four (4) years to
comply with the weight standards of PAL.

In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioners claims that obesity is a disease. That he
was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper
attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner
himself claimed that [t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can
do it now.[49]

True, petitioner claims that reducing weight is costing him a lot of expenses. [50] However, petitioner has only
himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company physician, per the advice of PAL.[51] He
chose to ignore the suggestion. In fact, he repeatedly failed to report when required to undergo weight checks, without
offering a valid explanation. Thus, his fluctuating weight indicates absence of willpower rather than an illness.

Petitioner cites Bonnie Cook v. State of Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals,
[52]

decided by the United States Court of Appeals (First Circuit). In that case, Cook worked from 1978 to 1980 and from

1981 to 1986 as an institutional attendant for the mentally retarded at the Ladd Center that was being operated by
respondent. She twice resigned voluntarily with an unblemished record. Even respondent admitted that her performance
met the Centers legitimate expectations. In 1988, Cook re-applied for a similar position. At that time, she stood 52 tall
and weighed over 320 pounds. Respondent claimed that the morbid obesity of plaintiff compromised her ability to
evacuate patients in case of emergency and it also put her at greater risk of serious diseases.

Cook contended that the action of respondent amounted to discrimination on the basis of a handicap. This was in
direct violation of Section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, [53] which incorporates the remedies contained in Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Respondent claimed, however, that morbid obesity could never constitute a handicap
within the purview of the Rehabilitation Act. Among others, obesity is a mutable condition, thus plaintiff could simply lose
weight and rid herself of concomitant disability.

The appellate Court disagreed and held that morbid obesity is a disability under the Rehabilitation Act and that
respondent discriminated against Cook based on perceived disability. The evidence included expert testimony that
morbid obesity is a physiological disorder. It involves a dysfunction of both the metabolic system and the neurological
appetite suppressing signal system, which is capable of causing adverse effects within the musculoskeletal, respiratory,
and cardiovascular systems. Notably, the Court stated that mutability is relevant only in determining the substantiality of

the limitation flowing from a given impairment, thus mutability only precludes those conditions that an individual can
easily and quickly reverse by behavioral alteration.

Unlike Cook, however, petitioner is not morbidly obese. In the words of the District Court for the District of Rhode
Island, Cook was sometime before 1978 at least one hundred pounds more than what is considered appropriate of her
height. According to the Circuit Judge, Cook weighed over 320 pounds in 1988. Clearly, that is not the case here. At
his heaviest, petitioner was only less than 50 pounds over his ideal weight.

In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant, becomes
an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may
not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, [v]oluntariness basically means that the just
cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element
runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and
habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in Article
282(a), (c), and (d).[54]

II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defense.

Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the
employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The qualification is
called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). [55] In the United States, there are a few federal and many state job
discrimination laws that contain an exception allowing an employer to engage in an otherwise unlawful form of prohibited
discrimination when the action is based on a BFOQ necessary to the normal operation of a business or enterprise. [56]

Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not exist if there is no statute providing for it.
[57]

Further, there is no existing BFOQ statute that could justify his dismissal. [58]
Both arguments must fail.

First,
Persons

[62]

the

Constitution,[59] the

Labor

Code,[60] and

RA

No.

7277[61] or

the

Magna Carta for

Disabled

contain provisions similar to BFOQ.

Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission (BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia
Government and Service Employees Union (BCGSEU),[63]the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the so-called
Meiorin Test in determining whether an employment policy is justified. Under this test, (1) the employer must show that it
adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job; [64] (2) the employer must establish
that the standard is reasonably necessary [65] to the accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3) the employer

must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related
purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol,[66] this Court held that in order to justify a BFOQ, the employer
must prove that (1) the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and
(2) that there is factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to
properly perform the duties of the job.[67]

In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. [68] BFOQ is
valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance. [69]

In Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWTO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.,[70] the Court did not hesitate to
pass upon the validity of a company policy which prohibits its employees from marrying employees of a rival company. It
was held that the company policy is reasonable considering that its purpose is the protection of the interests of the
company against possible competitor infiltration on its trade secrets and procedures.

Verily, there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be applied if it has no supporting statute. Too, the
Labor Arbiter,[71] NLRC,[72] and CA[73] are one in holding that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. A common
carrier, from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the
safety

of

the

passengers

it

transports. [74] It

is

bound

to

carry

its

passengers

safely

as

far

as

human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances.[75]

The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the part of a common carrier. Thus, it is only logical to hold
that the weight standards of PAL show its effort to comply with the exacting obligations imposed upon it by law by virtue of
being a common carrier.
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its passengers. In
order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on
board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its
employees.

In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight
safety. It cannot be gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain agility at all times in order to inspire passenger
confidence on their ability to care for the passengers when something goes wrong. It is not farfetched to say that airline
companies, just like all common carriers, thrive due to public confidence on their safety records. People, especially the
riding public, expect no less than that airline companiestransport their passengers to their respective destinations safely
and soundly. A lesser performance is unacceptable.

The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not limited to serving meals or attending to the whims and caprices
of the passengers. The most important activity of the cabin crew is to care for the safety of passengers and the
evacuation of the aircraft when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to the core of the job of a cabin
attendant. Truly, airlines need cabin attendants who have the necessary strength to open emergency doors, the agility to
attend to passengers in cramped working conditions, and the stamina to withstand grueling flight schedules.

On board an aircraft, the body weight and size of a cabin attendant are important factors to consider in case of
emergency. Aircrafts have constricted cabin space, and narrow aisles and exit doors. Thus, the arguments of respondent
that [w]hether the airlines flight attendants are overweight or not has no direct relation to its mission of transporting
passengers to their destination; and that the weight standards has nothing to do with airworthiness of respondents
airlines, must fail.

The rationale in Western Air Lines v. Criswell[76] relied upon by petitioner cannot apply to his case. What was
involved there were two (2) airline pilots who were denied reassignment as flight engineers upon reaching the age of 60,
and a flight engineer who was forced to retire at age 60. They sued the airline company, alleging that the age-60
retirement for flight engineers violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Age-based BFOQ and being
overweight are not the same. The case of overweight cabin attendants is another matter. Given the cramped cabin
space and narrow aisles and emergency exit doors of the airplane, any overweight cabin attendant would certainly have
difficulty navigating the cramped cabin area.

In short, there is no need to individually evaluate their ability to perform their task. That an obese cabin attendant
occupies more space than a slim one is an unquestionable fact which courts can judicially recognize without introduction
of evidence.[77] It would also be absurd to require airline companies to reconfigure the aircraft in order to widen the aisles
and exit doors just to accommodate overweight cabin attendants like petitioner.

The biggest problem with an overweight cabin attendant is the possibility of impeding passengers from evacuating
the aircraft, should the occasion call for it. The job of a cabin attendant during emergencies is to speedily get the
passengers out of the aircraft safely. Being overweight necessarily impedes mobility. Indeed, in an emergency situation,
seconds are what cabin attendants are dealing with, not minutes. Three lost seconds can translate into three lost
lives. Evacuation might slow down just because a wide-bodied cabin attendant is blocking the narrow aisles. These
possibilities are not remote.

Petitioner is also in estoppel. He does not dispute that the weight standards of PAL were made known to him
prior to his employment. He is presumed to know the weight limit that he must maintain at all times. [78] In
fact, never did he question the authority of PAL when he was repeatedly asked to trim down his weight. Bona

fides exigit utquod convenit fiat. Good

faith

demands

that

what

is

agreed

upon

shall

be

done. Kung ang tao ay tapat kanyang tutuparin ang napagkasunduan.

Too, the weight standards of PAL provide for separate weight limitations based on height and body frame for both
male and female cabin attendants. A progressive discipline is imposed to allow non-compliant cabin attendants sufficient
opportunity to meet the weight standards. Thus, the clear-cut rules obviate any possibility for thecommission of abuse or
arbitrary action on the part of PAL.

III. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was discriminated against by PAL.

Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a convenient excuse to discriminate against him.
[79]

We

are

constrained,

however,

to

hold

otherwise. We

agree

with

the

CA

that

[t]he

element

of

discrimination came into play in this case as a secondary position for the private respondent in order to escape the
consequence of dismissal that being overweight entailed. It is a confession-and-avoidance position that impliedly
admitted the cause of dismissal, including the reasonableness of the applicable standard and the private respondents
failure to comply.[80] It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation. [81]
Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an affirmative allegation, petitioner has to prove his
allegation with particularity. There is nothing on the records which could support the finding of discriminatory treatment.
Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by simply naming the supposed cabin attendants who are allegedly similarly
situated with him. Substantial proof must be shown as to how and why they are similarly situated and the differential
treatment petitioner got from PAL despite the similarity of his situation with other employees.

Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed overweight cabin attendants, petitioner miserably failed
to indicate their respective ideal weights; weights over their ideal weights; the periods they were allowed to fly despite
their being overweight; the particular flights assigned to them; the discriminating treatment they got from PAL; and other
relevant data that could have adequately established a case of discriminatory treatment by PAL. In the words of the CA,
PAL really had no substantial case of discrimination to meet. [82]

We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative agencies, like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, are
accorded respect, even finality.[83] The reason is simple: administrative agencies are experts in matters within their
specific and specialized jurisdiction.[84] But the principle is not a hard and fast rule. It only applies if the findings of facts
are duly supported by substantial evidence. If it can be shown that administrative bodies grossly misappreciated evidence
of such nature so as to compel a conclusion to the contrary, their findings of facts must necessarily be reversed. Factual
findings of administrative agencies do not have infallibility and must be set aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness. [85]

Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably misappreciated evidence. We thus annul their findings.

To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guaranty [86] of the
Constitution. However, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
be invoked.[87] Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. [88] Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment,[89] which is the source of our equal protection
guarantee, is consistent in saying that the equal protection erects no shield against private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful.[90] Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee. [91]

IV. The claims of petitioner for reinstatement and wages are moot.

As his last contention, petitioner avers that his claims for reinstatement and wages have not been mooted. He is
entitled to reinstatement and his full backwages, from the time he was illegally dismissed up to the time that the NLRC
was reversed by the CA.[92]

At this point, Article 223 of the Labor Code finds relevance:

In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee,
insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal.
The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior
to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The
posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.

The law is very clear. Although an award or order of reinstatement is self-executory and does not require a writ of
execution,[93] the option to exercise actual reinstatement or payroll reinstatement belongs to the employer. It does not
belong to the employee, to the labor tribunals, or even to the courts.

Contrary to the allegation of petitioner that PAL did everything under the sun to frustrate his immediate return to
his previous position,[94] there is evidence that PALopted to physically reinstate him to a substantially equivalent position
in accordance with the order of the Labor Arbiter.[95] In fact, petitioner duly received the return to work notice on February
23, 2001, as shown by his signature.[96]

Petitioner cannot take refuge in the pronouncements of the Court in a case [97] that [t]he unjustified refusal of the
employer to reinstate the dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the employer
failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution [98] and even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor
Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the employee
during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. [99] He failed to prove that he complied with the return to
work order of PAL. Neither does it appear on record that he actually rendered services for PAL from the moment he
was dismissed, in order to insist on the payment of his full backwages.

In insisting that he be reinstated to his actual position despite being overweight, petitioner in effect wants to render
the issues in the present case moot. He asks PAL to comply with the impossible. Time and again, the Court ruled that
the law does not exact compliance with the impossible. [100]

V. Petitioner is entitled to separation pay.

Be that as it may, all is not lost for petitioner.

Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation pay. This may be deduced from the language
of Article 279 of the Labor Code that [a]n employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of
his actual reinstatement. Luckily for petitioner, this is not an ironclad rule.

Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee as an act social justice, [101] or based on
equity.[102] In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) does not reflect
on the moral character of the employee.[103]

Here, We grant petitioner separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay for every year of service. [104] It
should include regular allowances which he might have been receiving. [105] We are not blind to the fact that he was not
dismissed for any serious misconduct or to any act which would reflect on his moral character. We also recognize that his
employment with PAL lasted for more or less a decade.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED in that petitioner
Armando G. Yrasuegui is entitled to separation pay in an amount equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay for every year of
service, which should include his regular allowances.

SO ORDERED.

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
4. Duncan v Glaxo
Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 162994

September 17, 2004

DUNCAN
ASSOCIATION
OF
DETAILMAN-PTGWO
vs.
GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.

and

PEDRO

A.

TECSON, petitioners,

RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
Confronting the Court in this petition is a novel question, with constitutional overtones, involving the validity of the policy of
a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated May 19, 2003 and the Resolution dated March 26,
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62434. 2
Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical
representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson had undergone training and orientation.
Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by
existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with coemployees or employees of competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a
possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an employee is expected to inform management of any
existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies.
If management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential conflict between such relationship and the employees
employment with the company, the management and the employee will explore the possibility of a "transfer to another
department in a non-counterchecking position" or preparation for employment outside the company after six months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxos products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals 3(Astra), a
competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astras Branch Coordinator in Albay. She supervised the district managers and medical
representatives of her company and prepared marketing strategies for Astra in that area.

Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his District Manager regarding the conflict of
interest which his relationship with Bettsy might engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy in September
1998.
In January 1999, Tecsons superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a conflict of interest. Tecsons
superiors reminded him that he and Bettsy should decide which one of them would resign from their jobs, although they
told him that they wanted to retain him as much as possible because he was performing his job well.
Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy against entering into a relationship with an employee of a
competitor company. He explained that Astra, Bettsys employer, was planning to merge with Zeneca, another drug
company; and Bettsy was planning to avail of the redundancy package to be offered by Astra. With Bettsys separation
from her company, the potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. At the same time, they would be able to avail of
the attractive redundancy package from Astra.
In August 1999, Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem. In September 1999, Tecson applied for a
transfer in Glaxos milk division, thinking that since Astra did not have a milk division, the potential conflict of interest would
be eliminated. His application was denied in view of Glaxos "least-movement-possible" policy.
In November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked
Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied.
Tecson sought Glaxos reconsideration regarding his transfer and brought the matter to Glaxos Grievance Committee.
Glaxo, however, remained firm in its decision and gave Tescon until February 7, 2000 to comply with the transfer order.
Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte
sales area.
During the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecson was paid his salary, but was not issued samples of products
which were competing with similar products manufactured by Astra. He was also not included in product conferences
regarding such products.
Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance machinery level, they submitted the matter for voluntary
arbitration. Glaxo offered Tecson a separation pay of one-half () month pay for every year of service, or a total
of P50,000.00 but he declined the offer. On November 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
rendered its Decision declaring as valid Glaxos policy on relationships between its employees and persons employed with
competitor companies, and affirming Glaxos right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory.
Aggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals assailing the NCMB Decision.
On May 19, 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision denying the Petition for Review on the ground that the
NCMB did not err in rendering its Decision. The appellate court held that Glaxos policy prohibiting its employees from
having personal relationships with employees of competitor companies is a valid exercise of its management
prerogatives.4
Tecson filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate courts Decision, but the motion was denied by the appellate
court in its Resolution dated March 26, 2004.5
Petitioners filed the instant petition, arguing therein that (i) the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the NCMBs finding that
the Glaxos policy prohibiting its employees from marrying an employee of a competitor company is valid; and (ii) the
Court of Appeals also erred in not finding that Tecson was constructively dismissed when he was transferred to a new
sales territory, and deprived of the opportunity to attend products seminars and training sessions. 6

Petitioners contend that Glaxos policy against employees marrying employees of competitor companies violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution because it creates invalid distinctions among employees on account only of
marriage. They claim that the policy restricts the employees right to marry.7
They also argue that Tecson was constructively dismissed as shown by the following circumstances: (1) he was
transferred from the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area to the Butuan-Surigao-Agusan sales area, (2) he
suffered a diminution in pay, (3) he was excluded from attending seminars and training sessions for medical
representatives, and (4) he was prohibited from promoting respondents products which were competing with Astras
products.8
In its Comment on the petition, Glaxo argues that the company policy prohibiting its employees from having a relationship
with and/or marrying an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives and does
not violate the equal protection clause; and that Tecsons reassignment from the Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales
area to the Butuan City-Surigao City and Agusan del Sur sales area does not amount to constructive dismissal. 9
Glaxo insists that as a company engaged in the promotion and sale of pharmaceutical products, it has a genuine interest
in ensuring that its employees avoid any activity, relationship or interest that may conflict with their responsibilities to the
company. Thus, it expects its employees to avoid having personal or family interests in any competitor company which
may influence their actions and decisions and consequently deprive Glaxo of legitimate profits. The policy is also aimed at
preventing a competitor company from gaining access to its secrets, procedures and policies. 10
It likewise asserts that the policy does not prohibit marriage per se but only proscribes existing or future relationships with
employees of competitor companies, and is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause. It maintains that
considering the nature of its business, the prohibition is based on valid grounds. 11
According to Glaxo, Tecsons marriage to Bettsy, an employee of Astra, posed a real and potential conflict of interest.
Astras products were in direct competition with 67% of the products sold by Glaxo. Hence, Glaxos enforcement of the
foregoing policy in Tecsons case was a valid exercise of its management prerogatives. 12 In any case, Tecson was given
several months to remedy the situation, and was even encouraged not to resign but to ask his wife to resign form Astra
instead.13
Glaxo also points out that Tecson can no longer question the assailed company policy because when he signed his
contract of employment, he was aware that such policy was stipulated therein. In said contract, he also agreed to resign
from respondent if the management finds that his relationship with an employee of a competitor company would be
detrimental to the interests of Glaxo.14
Glaxo likewise insists that Tecsons reassignment to another sales area and his exclusion from seminars regarding
respondents new products did not amount to constructive dismissal.
It claims that in view of Tecsons refusal to resign, he was relocated from the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area
to the Butuan City-Surigao City and Agusan del Sur sales area. Glaxo asserts that in effecting the reassignment, it also
considered the welfare of Tecsons family. Since Tecsons hometown was in Agusan del Sur and his wife traces her roots
to Butuan City, Glaxo assumed that his transfer from the Bicol region to the Butuan City sales area would be favorable to
him and his family as he would be relocating to a familiar territory and minimizing his travel expenses. 15
In addition, Glaxo avers that Tecsons exclusion from the seminar concerning the new anti-asthma drug was due to the
fact that said product was in direct competition with a drug which was soon to be sold by Astra, and hence, would pose a
potential conflict of interest for him. Lastly, the delay in Tecsons receipt of his sales paraphernalia was due to the mix-up
created by his refusal to transfer to the Butuan City sales area (his paraphernalia was delivered to his new sales area
instead of Naga City because the supplier thought he already transferred to Butuan). 16
The Court is tasked to resolve the following issues: (1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Glaxos policy
against its employees marrying employees from competitor companies is valid, and in not holding that said policy violates
the equal protection clause of the Constitution; (2) Whether Tecson was constructively dismissed.

The Court finds no merit in the petition.

The stipulation in Tecsons contract of employment with Glaxo being questioned by petitioners provides:

10. You agree to disclose to management any existing or future relationship you may have, either by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies. Should it pose a possible
conflict of interest in management discretion, you agree to resign voluntarily from the Company as a matter of
Company policy.
17
The same contract also stipulates that Tescon agrees to abide by the existing company rules of Glaxo, and to study and
become acquainted with such policies.18 In this regard, the Employee Handbook of Glaxo expressly informs its employees
of its rules regarding conflict of interest:
1. Conflict of Interest
Employees should avoid any activity, investment relationship, or interest that may run counter to the
responsibilities which they owe Glaxo Wellcome.
Specifically, this means that employees are expected:
a. To avoid having personal or family interest, financial or otherwise, in any competitor supplier or other
businesses which may consciously or unconsciously influence their actions or decisions and thus deprive
Glaxo Wellcome of legitimate profit.
b. To refrain from using their position in Glaxo Wellcome or knowledge of Company plans to advance their
outside personal interests, that of their relatives, friends and other businesses.
c. To avoid outside employment or other interests for income which would impair their effective job
performance.
d. To consult with Management on such activities or relationships that may lead to conflict of interest.
1.1. Employee Relationships
Employees with existing or future relationships either by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees of competing
drug companies are expected to disclose such relationship to the Management. If management perceives a
conflict or potential conflict of interest, every effort shall be made, together by management and the employee, to
arrive at a solution within six (6) months, either by transfer to another department in a non-counter checking
position, or by career preparation toward outside employment after Glaxo Wellcome. Employees must be
prepared for possible resignation within six (6) months, if no other solution is feasible. 19
No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Glaxos policy prohibiting an employee from
having a relationship with an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of management prerogative.
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs
and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive
pharmaceutical industry.

The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxos
employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of
the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility
that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.
That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on
investments and to expansion and growth.20 Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on
social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers.
The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of
fair play.21
As held in a Georgia, U.S.A case,22 it is a legitimate business practice to guard business confidentiality and protect a
competitive position by even-handedly disqualifying from jobs male and female applicants or employees who are married
to a competitor. Consequently, the court ruled than an employer that discharged an employee who was married to an
employee of an active competitor did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 23The Court pointed out that the
policy was applied to men and women equally, and noted that the employers business was highly competitive and that
gaining inside information would constitute a competitive advantage.
The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution as petitioners erroneously
suggest. It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those
acting under color of its authority.24 Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that the
equal protection clause erects no shield against merely private conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful. 25 The only
exception occurs when the state 29 in any of its manifestations or actions has been found to have become entwined or
involved in the wrongful private conduct.27 Obviously, however, the exception is not present in this case. Significantly, the
company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with the policy. Indeed, the
application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.
In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo
does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its employees and those of competitor companies.
Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own choosing. What the company merely
seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may arise out of such relationships. As
succinctly explained by the appellate court, thus:
The policy being questioned is not a policy against marriage. An employee of the company remains free to marry
anyone of his or her choosing. The policy is not aimed at restricting a personal prerogative that belongs only to
the individual. However, an employees personal decision does not detract the employer from exercising
management prerogatives to ensure maximum profit and business success. . . 28
The Court of Appeals also correctly noted that the assailed company policy which forms part of respondents Employee
Code of Conduct and of its contracts with its employees, such as that signed by Tescon, was made known to him prior to
his employment. Tecson, therefore, was aware of that restriction when he signed his employment contract and when he
entered into a relationship with Bettsy. Since Tecson knowingly and voluntarily entered into a contract of employment with
Glaxo, the stipulations therein have the force of law between them and, thus, should be complied with in good faith." 29 He
is therefore estopped from questioning said policy.
The Court finds no merit in petitioners contention that Tescon was constructively dismissed when he was transferred from
the Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area, and when he
was excluded from attending the companys seminar on new products which were directly competing with similar products
manufactured by Astra. Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when
continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in
pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. 30 None
of these conditions are present in the instant case. The record does not show that Tescon was demoted or unduly

discriminated upon by reason of such transfer. As found by the appellate court, Glaxo properly exercised its management
prerogative in reassigning Tecson to the Butuan City sales area:
. . . In this case, petitioners transfer to another place of assignment was merely in keeping with the policy of the
company in avoidance of conflict of interest, and thus validNote that [Tecsons] wife holds a sensitive
supervisory position as Branch Coordinator in her employer-company which requires her to work in close
coordination with District Managers and Medical Representatives. Her duties include monitoring sales of Astra
products, conducting sales drives, establishing and furthering relationship with customers, collection, monitoring
and managing Astras inventoryshe therefore takes an active participation in the market war characterized as it
is by stiff competition among pharmaceutical companies. Moreover, and this is significant, petitioners sales
territory covers Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte while his wife is supervising a branch of her employer in
Albay. The proximity of their areas of responsibility, all in the same Bicol Region, renders the conflict of interest not
only possible, but actual, as learning by one spouse of the others market strategies in the region would be
inevitable. [Managements] appreciation of a conflict of interest is therefore not merely illusory and wanting in
factual basis31
In Abbott Laboratories (Phils.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,32 which involved a complaint filed by a
medical representative against his employer drug company for illegal dismissal for allegedly terminating his employment
when he refused to accept his reassignment to a new area, the Court upheld the right of the drug company to transfer or
reassign its employee in accordance with its operational demands and requirements. The ruling of the Court therein,
quoted hereunder, also finds application in the instant case:
By the very nature of his employment, a drug salesman or medical representative is expected to travel. He should
anticipate reassignment according to the demands of their business. It would be a poor drug corporation which
cannot even assign its representatives or detail men to new markets calling for opening or expansion or to areas
where the need for pushing its products is great. More so if such reassignments are part of the employment
contract.33
As noted earlier, the challenged policy has been implemented by Glaxo impartially and disinterestedly for a long period of
time. In the case at bar, the record shows that Glaxo gave Tecson several chances to eliminate the conflict of interest
brought about by his relationship with Bettsy. When their relationship was still in its initial stage, Tecsons supervisors at
Glaxo constantly reminded him about its effects on his employment with the company and on the companys interests.
After Tecson married Bettsy, Glaxo gave him time to resolve the conflict by either resigning from the company or asking
his wife to resign from Astra. Glaxo even expressed its desire to retain Tecson in its employ because of his satisfactory
performance and suggested that he ask Bettsy to resign from her company instead. Glaxo likewise acceded to his
repeated requests for more time to resolve the conflict of interest. When the problem could not be resolved after several
years of waiting, Glaxo was constrained to reassign Tecson to a sales area different from that handled by his wife for
Astra. Notably, the Court did not terminate Tecson from employment but only reassigned him to another area where his
home province, Agusan del Sur, was included. In effecting Tecsons transfer, Glaxo even considered the welfare of
Tecsons family. Clearly, the foregoing dispels any suspicion of unfairness and bad faith on the part of Glaxo. 34
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario*, JJ., c

5. People v Cayat

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45987

May 5, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CAYAT, defendant-appellant.
Sinai Hamada y Cario for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.

MORAN, J.:
Prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), the accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain
Province, was sentenced by the justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos (P5) or suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. On appeal of the Court of First Instance, the following information was filed against
him:
That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of the Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused, Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and illegally receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under his
control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors
which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No.
1639.
Accused interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, he admitted all the facts alleged in the information, but
pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced in his demurrer and submitted the case on the pleadings. The
trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pesos (P50) or supper subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. The case is now before this court on appeal. Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 read:
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within
the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or
drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines
and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of
this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly
authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy
any such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe.
SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon conviction thereof,
be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not
exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court.
The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:
(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;
(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and.
(3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state.
Counsel for the appellant holds out his brief as the "brief for the non-Christian tribes." It is said that as these less civilized
elements of the Filipino population are "jealous of their rights in a democracy," any attempt to treat them with
discrimination or "mark them as inferior or less capable rate or less entitled" will meet with their instant challenge. As the
constitutionality of the Act here involved is questioned for purposes thus mentioned, it becomes imperative to examine
and resolve the issues raised in the light of the policy of the government towards the non-Christian tribes adopted and
consistently followed from the Spanish times to the present, more often with sacrifice and tribulation but always with
conscience and humanity.
As early as 1551, the Spanish Government had assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude toward these inhabitants, and in
the different laws of the Indies, their concentration in so-called "reducciones" (communities) have been persistently
attempted with the end in view of according them the "spiritual and temporal benefits" of civilized life. Throughout the
Spanish regime, it had been regarded by the Spanish Government as a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity" to
civilize these less fortunate people living "in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "the moral and material
advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws." (Decree of the

Governor-General of the Philippines, Jan. 14, 1887.) This policy had not been deflected from during the American period.
President McKinley in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, said:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed by
Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and
government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by
civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal government should, however, be
subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should
be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.
Since then and up to the present, the government has been constantly vexed with the problem of determining "those
practicable means of bringing about their advancement in civilization and material prosperity." (See, Act No. 253.) "Placed
in an alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization," the present government "has
chosen to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with humanity and with the national conscience."
(Memorandum of Secretary of the Interior, quoted in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660, 714.) To this end,
their homes and firesides have been brought in contact with civilized communities through a network of highways and
communications; the benefits of public education have to them been extended; and more lately, even the right of suffrage.
And to complement this policy of attraction and assimilation, the Legislature has passed Act No. 1639 undoubtedly to
secure for them the blessings of peace and harmony; to facilitate, and not to mar, their rapid and steady march to
civilization and culture. It is, therefore, in this light that the Act must be understood and applied.
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be
reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. (Borgnis vs.Falk Co., 133
N.W., 209; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61; 55 Law. ed., Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39
Phil., 660; People and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. Vera and Cu Unjieng, 37 Off. Gaz ., 187.)
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or
whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon
the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the
geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in
tribal relationship apart from settled communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) This distinction is
unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.
The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their
Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.
That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or
drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and
liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act.," is
unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience
of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the nonChristian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise
their standard of life and civilization.
The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times
as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the assumption that
the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the Legislature understood that the
civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security.
Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its
operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the
equality of its application.

Appellants contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the
government to seize and forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of the
non-Christian tribes is violative of the due process of law provided in the Constitution. But this provision is not involved in
the case at bar. Besides, to constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not always necessary. This rule is
especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to particular
cases. (McGehee, Due Process of Law p. 371, cited with approval in Rubivs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) Due
process of law means simply: (1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative
department of the government; (2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation; (3) that it shall be enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure prescribed; and (4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of the
class. (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal by the United States Supreme Court, 218 U.S., 302: 54
Law. ed., 1049.) Thus, a person's property may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing;
or property used in violation of law may be confiscated (U.S. vs. Surla, 20 Phil., 163, 167), or when the property
constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case (Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil., 439, 442).
Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said that the police power is the most
insistent and least limitable of all powers of the government. It has been aptly described as a power co-extensive with selfprotection and constitutes the law of overruling necessity. Any measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals,
education and good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its
wealth and prosperity (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U.S., 27), is a legitimate exercise of the police power, unless shown to be
whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual, the same must be upheld.
Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all
obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of
their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater
Philippines.
The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary, all
measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent
right to equality in tht enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true
equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate
measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in
view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. It is indeed gratifying that the non-Christian
tribes "far from retrograding, are definitely asserting themselves in a competitive world," as appellant's attorney
impressively avers, and that they are "a virile, up-and -coming people eager to take their place in the world's social
scheme." As a matter of fact, there are now lawyers, doctors and other professionals educated in the best institutions here
and in America. Their active participation in the multifarious welfare activities of community life or in the delicate duties of
government is certainly a source of pride and gratification to people of the Philippines. But whether conditions have so
changed as to warrant a partial or complete abrogation of the law, is a matter which rests exclusively within the
prerogative of the National Assembly to determine. In the constitutional scheme of our government, this court can go no
farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had the power to enact the law. If the power exists, and we hold it does
exist, the wisdom of the policy adopted, and the adequacy under existing conditions of the measures enacted to forward
it, are matters which this court has no authority to pass upon. And, if in the application of the law, the educated nonChristians shall incidentally suffer, the justification still exists in the all-comprehending principle of salus populi suprema
est lex. When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of
persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental
inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the
paramount interests of the nation (Cf. Boston Beer Co. vs. Mass., 97 U.S., 25; 24 law. ed., 989).
Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Conception, JJ., concur.

6. International School V Quisimbing

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000]
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs. HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as
the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the Superintendent of
International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent School, mostly Filipinos,
cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is, of course,
beside the point. The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long
honored in this jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests on fundamental notions of justice. That is the principle we uphold
today.
Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic
educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.
[1]
To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section
2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to
employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from
Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and
regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection
of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1)
foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member should be
classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire:
a.....What is one's domicile?
b.....Where is one's home economy?
c.....To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible for
bringing that individual to the Philippines?[2]
Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is classified as a local hire;
otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign-hire.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more
than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to
endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The School explains:
A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his home country, leave his family and
friends, and take the risk of deviating from a promising career path-all for the purpose of pursuing his

profession as an educator, but this time in a foreign land. The new foreign hire is faced with economic
realities: decent abode for oneself and/or for one's family, effective means of transportation, allowance for
the education of one's children, adequate insurance against illness and death, and of course the primary
benefit of a basic salary/retirement compensation.
Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is confronted again with the same economic reality after his
term: that he will eventually and inevitably return to his home country where he will have to confront the
uncertainty of obtaining suitable employment after a long period in a foreign land.
The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an
international level in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of international education. [3]
When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner International School
Alliance of Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members" [4] of the
School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of
whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the
parties.
On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to
bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction
over the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the
parity and representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.
Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the
grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members, numbering 38 in all, with nationalities
other than Filipino, who have been hired locally and classified as local hires. [5]The Acting Secretary of Labor found that
these non-Filipino local-hires received the same benefits as the Filipino local-hires:
The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to all, regardless of race. Truth to tell, there are
foreigners who have been hired locally and who are paid equally as Filipino local hires. [6]
The Acting Secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary rates:
The principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find application in the present case. The international
character of the School requires the hiring of foreign personnel to deal with different nationalities and
different cultures, among the student population.
We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries and benefits accorded to foreign hired
personnel which system is universally recognized. We agree that certain amenities have to be provided to
these people in order to entice them to render their services in the Philippines and in the process remain
competitive in the international market.
Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited contract of employment unlike the
local hires who enjoy security of tenure. To apply parity therefore, in wages and other benefits would also
require parity in other terms and conditions of employment which include the employment contract.
A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the conditions and provisions for salary and
professional compensation wherein the parties agree as follows:

All members of the bargaining unit shall be compensated only in accordance with
Appendix C hereof provided that the Superintendent of the School has the discretion to
recruit and hire expatriate teachers from abroad, under terms and conditions that are
consistent with accepted international practice.
Appendix C of said CBA further provides:
The new salary schedule is deemed at equity with the Overseas Recruited Staff (OSRS)
salary schedule. The 25% differential is reflective of the agreed value of system
displacement and contracted status of the OSRS as differentiated from the tenured status
of Locally Recruited Staff (LRS).
To our mind, these provisions demonstrate the parties' recognition of the difference in the status of two
types of employees, hence, the difference in their salaries.
The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an established
principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated by
legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A classification is reasonable if it is
based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial
distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no
amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation package in order to
attract them to join the teaching faculty of the School. [7]
We cannot agree.
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy
against these evils. The Constitution [8] in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith."
International law, which springs from general principles of law,[9] likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of
law include principles of equity,[10] i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is
reasonable.[11] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,[12] the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights,[13] the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, [14] the Convention
against Discrimination in Education,[15] the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation[16] - all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The
Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and
discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution[17] specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions are not
restricted to the physical workplace - the factory, the office or the field - but include as well the manner by which
employers treat their employees.
The Constitution[18] also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor
Code[19] provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an
affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure
equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment. [20]
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and
penalizes[21] the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work of equal

value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra, in Article 7 thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and
favourable conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:
a.....Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
i.....Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any
kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those
enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;
x x x.
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for
equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should be paid similar salaries.[22] This rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding.
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires.
[23]
The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the
presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If
the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the
others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for
the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25%
more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they
perform under similar working conditions.
The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary
rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay.
"Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or recompense for services performed." Similarly, the
Philippine Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the "[c]onsideration paid at regular intervals for the rendering of
services." In Songco v. National Labor Relations Commission,[24] we said that:
"salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or industry in another
man's business. Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman
soldier, it carries with it the fundamental idea of compensation for services rendered. (Emphasis
supplied.)
While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the
prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same
salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve
as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are
adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.
The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," [25] "to afford labor full
protection."[26] The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. [27] These
relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining

agreements included, must yield to the common good. [28] Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to
public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary
rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services
rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires
contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.
We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.
A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of
the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law." [29] The factors in determining the appropriate collective
bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as
substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests
Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. [30] The basic test of an asserted
bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees
the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.[31]
It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of
collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated
separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar
functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to
local-hires. These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance, are
reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreignhires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective
bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on official leave.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.