Alexander the Great

Alexander the Great

By

Krzysztof Nawotka

Alexander the Great, by Krzysztof Nawotka

This book first published 2010
Cambridge Scholars Publishing
12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright 2010 by Krzysztof Nawotka

All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
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ISBN (10): 1-4438-1743-0, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-1743-1

CONTENTS

Preface ....................................................................................................... vii

Chapter I: Childhood, Family, Macedonia .................................................. 1
1. Birth of Alexander
2. Macedonia
3. The Argead dynasty
4. Philip II and the rebuilding of the Macedonian state
5. Philip II and Alexanders Macedonian army
6. Alexanders childhood and school years
Chapter II: The Heir to the Throne ............................................................ 43
1. At his fathers side
2. Chaeronea
3. The congress at Corinth and the beginning of the Persian war
4. The Pixodarus affair
5. Cleopatras wedding
6. Death of Philip
Chapter III: The New King........................................................................ 83
1. The takeover. Philips funeral
2. War in the north
3. The destruction of Thebes
Chapter IV: From Abydus to Alexandria ................................................ 109
1. Granicus the first victory
2. Freedom for Greeks of Asia
3. From Halicarnassus to Cilicia: the campaign in Asia Minor
4. The battle of Issus
5. Phoenicia. Syria and Palestine
6. The son of Ammon

vi

Contents

Chapter V: King of Asia.......................................................................... 213

1. From Memphis to Mesopotamia
2. The revolt of Agis III
3. The battle of Gaugamela
4. Babylon, Susa and Persepolis
5. The death of Darius III
6. Philotas affair and the fall of Parmenion
7. The conquest of eastern Iran
8. Time of intrigues and anxiety
Chapter VI: Expedition to India .............................................................. 295
1. From Sogdiana to the Indus
2. Taxila and Porus
3. Hyphasis the end of the expedition
4. Towards the Ocean
Chapter VII: The Last Years ................................................................... 331
1. In the footsteps of Cyrus and Semiramis
2. Empire in crisis
3. The weddings at Susa
4. The mutiny at Opis
5. Greece in 324: the exiles and a new god
6. The death of Hephaestion
7. Return to Babylon
Chapter VIII: Death, Last Plans, Tomb ................................................... 371
1. The king died
2. Alexanders legacy
3. Alexanders tomb
Bibliography............................................................................................ 387
Index........................................................................................................ 419

PREFACE

Alexander III, King of Macedonia, son of Philip II and heir to Achaemenid

kings of Persia, is one of the most fascinating and frequently discussed
figures of world history. By contemporaries he was more commonly hated
rather than admired or loved, but soon after his death his legend began and
it is still alive today. A belletristic account of his life and deeds the socalled Alexander Romance was in ancient, the medieval and early
modern times one of the most universally known books in Europe, Asia,
and Africa having some 80 versions written in 24 different languages. The
books protagonist was the first in Western Civilization to be hailed Great,
in all probability a title already bestowed upon him when the generation
remembering his deeds was still alive, at the court of his onetime brother
in arms Ptolemy I of Egypt. Alexanders brief reign marks a borderline
between two great epochs of ancient times: the Classical and the
Hellenistic. And this is by no means merely a convention in historiography.
Without any exaggeration one can say that after his death the world was
no longer the same as when he had ascended the Macedonian throne,
regardless of whether one believes that this was a direct consequence of
Alexanders actions or simply the effect of general historic processes that
were underway in the second half of the 4th century BC. Someone who so
much personifies this great turning point in the history of the Western
civilization naturally attracts scholarly interest. On the other hand, the
specific aura and charisma of this young ruler, the scale of his conquests
and the exotic landscapes and peoples encountered during a tireless trek of
over 35,000 km spanning three continents is what the broader public have
always found particularly appealing.
That is why for a long time now not even a year has passed without a
new book on Alexander. Apart from detailed studies, a number of
complete monographs now exist whose authors frequently stress that they
are not biographies. Strictly speaking if we were to apply the same
rigorous definition of what a biography is to antiquity as we do to later
epochs, virtually no biography related to this period could be written. But
since so many non-biographies of Alexander already exist, I believe that
there is space for a new biography, if only somewhat relaxed genre
defining criteria are applied. This necessitates presenting Alexander as a
component of the historical processes in his epoch and considering his

viii

Preface

influence on the developments in Greece, Macedonia, the Persian Empire

and neighbouring countries. Another reason for focusing more on
Alexander as a person is the growing awareness that ancient societies were
far less institutionalised than was assumed in modern times and in fact
they operated on a much more personal level. Today we know that
concepts as obvious in modern states as automatic procedures or Weberian
impersonal rational bureaucracies were quite unheard of not only in the
feudal Persia of the Achemenids but also in 4th-century Greece and
Macedonia. In a world where borders as we understand them today did not
exist and relationships between people from various countries were
frequently stronger than loyalty to a particular state, the significance of
such a powerful personality on the shaping of events cannot be overrated.
Finally, although Alexander is considered to be the greatest military
commander of ancient times and, indeed, much of this book deals with the
wars fought during his reign, it was not this authors intention to make a
meaningful contribution to military history. Instead it is hoped that this
book will interest the reader in Alexander as a man and politician of
outstanding talents and unparalleled charisma, but also one who erred in
judgment and more than once displayed grave character faults.
Three reasons may be found to justify the writing of yet another book
entitled Alexander the Great. First, of the many books on this subject the
last comprehensive, serious and, indeed, in this authors opinion, the most
important monograph was published over twenty years ago (Bosworth
1988) and since then our perception of various aspects of antiquity has
changed. Of particular value has been the rapid progress in study of the
Achaemenid Persia, which has been experiencing an extraordinary boom
in its last three decades. Ancient Persia has in many ways now been
rediscovered. This has come about thanks to: the Persepolis tablets (some
of which have only recently been published), other oriental and
archaeological sources, detailed analyses of references made by the
classical authors and a general movement away from the purely western
perspective that had prevailed for years. Especially since P. Briants
monumental synthesis (1996), our understanding of how the Achaemenid
state was run and therefore also the Macedonian conquests from the
Persian perspective have had to change. Moreover, our general knowledge
of eastern societies and their response the Macedonian invader has been
broadened by a systematic uncovering of sources from these regions,
particularly ones originating from Babylon. Finally, in recent years many
important monographs have come out on: history and topography of
territories covered by Alexanders expedition (in general Wood, 1997);
Macedonia (Hammond, 1989; Borza, 1990; Errington, 1990) Iran, India,

Alexander the Great

ix

and other regions of the ancient world (e.g. Holt, 1988; Eggermont, 1993;
Karttunen, 1997; Habicht, 1999; Debord, 1999; Sartre, 2001, 2003; Speck,
2002); specific aspects of 4th-century history such as the attitude of
mainland Greece towards Macedonia (Jehne, 1994; Blackwell, 1999); the
way the elites functioned in Greece (Herman, 1987; Mitchell, 2002) and
Macedonia (Heckel, 1992); the position of women in Macedonia (Carney,
2000) and Persia (Brosius, 1996); Macedonian colonization (Fraser, 1996);
finances and numismatics (Le Rider, 2003; Holt, 2003); history of art and
ideology (Stewart, 1993; Cohen, 1997) as well as the first monographs on
Darius III (Briant, 2003), Olympias (Carney, 2006), and new biographies
of Philip II (Hammond, 2002; Corvisier, 2002; Worthington, 2008). To
that there is a plethora of new books on military history, although without
much real progress except for the critical assessment of study of
Macedonian army logistics pioneered by Engels in 1978 (Roth, 1999). All
this new knowledge and all these new interpretations clearly require the
actions and personality of Alexander to be once again reviewed.
Second, for a long time it has been a common knowledge that the
most serious obstacle faced in Alexander research is the number and
quality of historical sources available. A few authors were already writing
about Alexander in his lifetime and over a dozen more wrote about him
not long after his death when they still had access to eyewitness accounts.
Unfortunately all these works have disappeared almost without a trace.
The earliest extant historical work to mention Alexander at least in passing
is that of Polybius, who wrote in the mid 2nd century BC, whereas the most
important ancient accounts date from the 1st and 2nd centuries AD. The
quality of these accounts depends not only on the considerable time that
had elapsed between the time of writing and the epoch of Alexander, but
also on the methods the authors used, frequently relying on a single
source. Ancient Alexander historians are customarily classified into two
groups depending on the sources they use. One is the works of Flavius
Arrianus (Arrian) and the anonymous Itinerarium Alexandri, which are
based on the writings of Alexanders companions the King of Egypt
Ptolemy I and Aristobulos. Their accounts are of greater value for events
prior to 327 BC, for they made use of the now missing books of the
famous historian Callisthenes of Olynthus, who also accompanied
Alexander. The second category, commonly called the Vulgate, includes
Diodorus, Curtius Rufus and Justin, who above all based their writings on
the Alexandrian historian Cleitarchus, Ptolemys contemporary. Plutarch
cannot be included in either of these groups, for this outstandingly erudite
scholar made use of the works of as many as 24 different authors, mainly
Alexanders contemporaries, in an extraordinarily modern way. To the

Preface

modern reader Arrians rhetoric is more palpable than that of the Vulgate
authors and for this reason he was for many years considered to be the
most trustworthy source. However, his methodology in fact simply relied
on rejecting information that might in any way cast Alexander in a
negative light and thus his stance primarily reflects the Macedonian
propaganda version of events. W.W. Tarn and N.G.L. Hammond both
largely rely on Arrian and to give him greater credibility they maintain the
theory regarding the existence of the Royal Journal (ephemerides), which
was allegedly kept at Alexanders court throughout his reign and later
taken to Alexandria in Egypt, where it served as a source for Ptolemy and
thus also indirectly as a source for Arrian.
Source research in recent decades has uncovered so much new
information regarding Alexanders history that writing a new biography
has become both possible and necessary. Commentary on Arrian and
other studies by A.B. Bosworth (1980, 1988a and 1995) have shed new
light on Arrians methods, his reliance on earlier sources and generally
allowed us to wonder whether the significance of this ancient author
regarding the life and times of Alexander may have been somewhat
overrated. At the same time the value of the so-called Vulgate authors
have undergone a positive reappraisal, particularly thanks to new
commentaries (Atkinson, 1980, 1994 and 2009) and other studies
(Baynham, 1998a) on Curtius Rufus, who for all his extravagant rhetoric
and moralising is a very valuable author especially in that he was well
informed about events within the Persian camp. Although today hardly
anyone believes in the existence of the so-called mercenary source, i.e. an
account written by a Greek mercenary in the Persian camp that Curtius
Rufus and Diodorus had seen, evidence corroborating what these authors
write about the Persian camp has been found. Therefore we can assume
that the Vulgate authors had indirect access to this information from
earlier historians who had actually heard the oral accounts of Greek
mercenaries on Persian pay. Interest in Plutarch is currently undergoing a
genuine revival, whereas the commentary to his Alexander (Hamilton,
1999; 1st edition in 1969) is rightly considered to be classics of the genre.
Historical and philological commentaries have also appeared to his other
work: On the Fortune or the Virtue of Alexander the Great (DAngelo,
1998; Cammarota, 1998; Nawotka, 2003). Finally scholars have now more
boldly made use of smaller anonymous works such as the Metz Epitome
(which is associated with the Vulgate group though it makes no references
to the others and is based on the works of historians a generation after
Alexander) or extant fragments of the writings of Alexanders
contemporaries Ephippus and Chares. The author of this book agrees with

Alexander the Great

xi

those (Plezia, Bielawski, 1970) who argue that the document found in an
Arab manuscript is the translation of a genuine letter from Aristotle to
Alexander regarding the treatment of Greeks and barbarians. With newly
discovered 4th-century Greek inscriptions as well as already well known
but newly researched ones we have an increasingly better understanding of
Alexanders policies towards the Greeks and how they were received
differently on the east coast of the Aegean and differently on the west
coast. Of particular value is the steadily increasing amount of eastern
sources, which not only allow us to more accurately establish the dates of
key events but also move away from the Eurocentric view held in some
earlier studies. That is also the value of later, even mediaeval Zoroastrian
sources maintaining the Persian tradition, which unlike the western
sources was consistently hostile towards Alexander.
Third, one should note how historical interpretations have changed
over recent decades. In the period immediately after World War II the
immense influence of W.W. Tarns book (1948) gave Alexander the image
of a benign propagator of the Western civilization and the brotherhood of
the various peoples within one empire. The work of another great scholar
from that period, F. Schachermeyr (1973), gave us the heroic image of this
great Macedonian and it is not surprising that the first edition of his
monumental biography (1947) is entitled Ingenium und Macht. However,
scholars subscribing to this traditional view of Alexander (e.g. Hammond
or Lane Fox) are now very much a minority among historians. The tragic
consequences of 20th-century militarism and totalitarianism, a gradual
departure from European colonialism and the mission of taking up the
white mans burden as well as from the traditional world outlook in the
postmodern era inevitably led to a revision or even deconstruction of
Alexander the Greats character. The process of diminishing Alexanders
greatness has been continuing since the 1950s. A decisive blow to the
predominance of Tarns image of Alexander was delivered by E. Badian
(1960, 1964), for whom the Macedonian prefigured the 20th-century
dictators Stalin and Hitler, being preoccupied with organising large-scale
purges and surrounded by the loneliness of power. The next step in the
new trend was to reject the notion that Alexander was motivated by any
grand ideas or non-military objectives. Todays chief proponents of this
minimalist view, represented above all by P. Green, A.B. Bosworth and I.
Worthington, have reduced Alexanders life to purely a matter of military
history. Excluding his talents as a commander (although sometimes
questioned too), Alexander has now all too frequently been depicted as a
megalomaniac, alcoholic (most vividly: OBrien 1992; more balanced:
Kets de Vries, 2004), tyrant and hothead who for no profound reason laid

xii

Preface

waste to the local cultures of Europe, Asia and Africa and thus, as it is
sometimes asserted, is to be blamed for radical Islams hatred of the West
(Prevas, 2004). Such extreme views may only be expressed if one treats
sources very selectively, and that surely indicates that the pendulum of
reaction against the over idealisation of the great Macedonian has swung
too far in the opposite direction (Holt, 1999a; Briant, 2002). Nonetheless, I
believe, that without either idealizing or deconstructing Alexander, his
times may be reassessed from a non-military perspective. For instance in
the light of recent research of 4th-century Greek society it is worthwhile to
consider the reasons why Macedonian policies succeeded or failed on
either side of the Aegean Sea. The last quarter centurys breakthroughs in
research into Achaemenid Persia in fact demand that the effectiveness of
Alexanders policies in the various countries of the Persian Empire be
reviewed in terms of his attitude towards Achaemenid tradition and
cultural conflicts during his campaign in the East. Although for a long
time yet to come no doubt no one will dare formulate any grand theories
the way Tarn did, there is now enough room to make careful
generalisations and sum up the historical discussions of the last few
decades.
This book presents the story of Alexander strictly on the basis of
ancient sources. In the footnotes I have endeavoured to refer to all primary
and most secondary ancient sources. On the other hand, for all effort to
synthesise modern scholarship in this book, no attempt has been made to
cite all modern literature concerning Alexander and his epoch. The sheer
volume of such works would make the task quite unfeasible and, from the
point of view of most readers, both tedious and unnecessary. Those
specifically interested in historiography concerning Alexander the Great
can refer to specialist literature dealing with this subject (e.g. Seibert,
1972). Footnotes in this book may serve to inform the reader of the most
important historical discussions of recent decades. The names of ancient
authors and the titles of their works are quoted using the abbreviations also
applied in the Oxford Latin Dictionary and Liddell, Scott, Jones GreekEnglish Lexicon. The titles of periodicals are abbreviated according to
LAnne Philologique. When ancient times are discussed in this book,
unless otherwise stated, all given dates are BC/ BCE.
Finally, I have the pleasant task of thanking all the people and
institutions without whose help this book would never have been
published. The several years of research and especially the enquiries made
in the libraries of Vienna and Oxford were possible thanks to generous
grants from the Polish State Committee for Scientific Research and the
Lanckoroski Foundation as well as the hospitality of St Johns College

Alexander the Great

xiii

Oxford within the Oxford Colleges Hospitality Scheme and on other

occasions. I am grateful to the University of Wrocaw for financing my
trips to Turkey and Iran for the purposes of seeing for myself the
topographic problems Alexanders expedition must have encountered. The
English version of this book is based on the Polish edition of 2007, with
numerous improvements and corrections. The translation was produced by
Witold Zbirochowski-Kocia, whose careful attention to details, linguistic
skills and patience I would like to acknowledge in this place. It could be
made thanks to a grant from the Foundation for Polish Science which had
also supported the Polish edition of my book. I have presented various
research problems at conferences in Rzeszw, Barcelona, Krakw and
Wrocaw as well as historical society meetings and seminars in Wrocaw,
Warsaw, Toru, Liverpool, Taipei, Delhi, and Delphi. I would like to
thank those, too many to name here, who provided insightful and
frequently critical comments during the discussions that followed my
lectures. Some mistakes I have been able to correct thanks to talks with
many scholars. Among those I am particularly grateful to, are: Prof.
Fergus Millar, late Prof. Jzef Wolski, Prof. Ewa Wipszycka-Bravo, Prof.
John Davies, late Prof. Tadeusz Kotula, Prof. Alicja Szastyska-Siemion,
Prof. Maurice Sarte, Prof. Christopher Tuplin, Prof. Leszek Mrozewicz,
Prof. Andrzej o, Dr. Zofia Archibald, Dr. John Ma, Dr. Gociwit
Malinowski, Nicholas Purcell and Robin Lane Fox. But I dedicate my
most heartfelt thanks to my wife, Magorzata Modyska-Nawotka, who
has over the years provided the unstinting support that allowed me to
research and write this book.

CHAPTER I:
CHILDHOOD, FAMILY, MACEDONIA

1. Birth of Alexander
In Antiquity people believed that the birth of someone destined to be great
was accompanied by signs, portents and strange happenings. Alexanders
biographer, Plutarch, states that his mother, Olympias, dreamt of a fiery
thunderbolt that had entered her body, whereas his father, Philip II,
envisioned in his dream a seal on his wifes body in the shape of a lion,
which allegedly foretold the extraordinary lion-like nature of his son.
Another persistently repeated tale has Philip seeing in a dream on the night
of consumption Olympias having sexual intercourse with a giant serpent,
presumably an incarnation of the god Ammon from the Siwah Oasis in the
Libyan Desert. According to a much later legend, emerging no doubt after
Alexanders visit to Siwa, Philip was then told by the Apollo Oracle at
Delphi to henceforth offer sacrifices to Ammon and was also told a
prophecy that he would lose the eye with which he had seen the deity lying
next to Olympias.1 Such tales could emerge from the traditional view that
Olympias had in her native Epirus engaged in mysterious Orphic rituals,
which were much feared by the Greeks, and an important element of this
practice was the breeding of serpents in her home.2 The belief that
Alexander was conceived by the god Ammon did not mean in the opinions
of contemporaries that he was not the son of Philip. After all, they knew
the myth of Alexanders forebear Heracles, who was the son of Alcmene
but also of the god Zeus. At various stages in his career, Alexander
himself sometimes boasted that he was the son of Philip and at other times
allowed people to believe that he was conceived by the god Ammon.3
1

Ephor., FGrH, 70 F217; Plu., Alex., 2-3; Paus., 4.14.7; Luc., Alex., 7; Just.,
11.11.3, 12.16; It. Alex., 12; see Baynham, 1998, p. 149; Hamilton, 1999, pp. 4-6.
For an alternative version of the legend, but one still maintaining the notion of
divine conception and lion shaped seal, see: Ps.-Callisth., 1.4-8.
2
Cic. Div., 2.135: Plu., Alex., 2.9; see Lane Fox, 1973, pp. 44-45.
3
Ogden, 1999, pp. 27-28.

Chapter I

The Greek authors, always eager to synchronize historic events, state

that Alexander was born the same night one of the Seven Wonders of the
World, the Temple of Artemis at Ephesus, was burnt down by Herostratus
in the desire of immortalizing his name. The goddess was too busy
assisting Olympias in the birth of Alexander to protect her own temple
from destruction. Iranian magi living next to the temple lamented, for they
foresaw that what had happened that night would bring great misfortune to
Asia, which meant the Kingdom of Persia.4 Plutarch reports an anecdote
that Philip, while laying siege to the town of Potidaea, in one day received
news that his army commander Parmenion had routed the Illyrians, that his
race-horse had won a race at the Olympic Games, and that his wife had
given birth to Alexander. We know nothing more about the battle with the
Illyrians and therefore have no means of establishing the date. There is an
image on Philip IIs coins of a cloaked rider with a Macedonian hat
(kausia) on his head commemorating an Olympic victory, though we
cannot be certain whether they refer to an individual horse race or a
chariot race. Far more significant is that fact that this was almost certainly
the first ever Macedonian victory at the Olympic Games. Although
Herodotus does in fact report an earlier success at the time of Philips
predecessor Alexander I, this was possibly just a propaganda ploy
invented by the Macedonian court, for this kings name has not been
preserved on the list of Olympic victories. Philips Olympic success
probably occurred on 26th July 356, whereas Alexander was born on the
sixth day of the Athenian month Hekatombaion, called Loos in
Macedonia, which according to modern calculations would have most
probably been either 19th or 20th July 356.5

2. Macedonia
Alexanders fatherland was situated to the north of Thessaly with borders
that have not been precisely defined but most certainly did not resemble
the borders of todays Macedonian state (FYROM)6 and were much closer
4

Hegesias, ap. Plu., Alex., 35-36 (FGrH, 142 F3); Timae., ap. Cic., N.D., 2.69;
Cic., Div., 1.47; Plu., Alex., 2.7. Burning of Artemisium by Herostratus: Str.,
14.22.1; Solinus, 183.23. Magi in Ephesus: Str., 14.1.23. See Briant 1996, p. 875;
Shabazi 2003, pp. 7-14. Asia as the Persian empire: Nawotka 2004.
5
Plu., Alex., 3.5-8; Plu., mor., 105a; Just., 12.16.6. Brown 1977, pp. 76-77; Badian
1982, p. 38; Bosworth 1988, p. 19; Hammond 1992, pp. 356-357; Hamilton 1999,
pp. 7-9. Alexander I at the Olympic Games: Hdt., 5.23; but see Borza 1982, pp. 813; Thompson 1982, p. 113.
6
On fluidity of the name Macedonia see: Czamaska, Szulc 2002.

Childhood, Family, Macedonia

to the borders of todays Greek province of Macedonia. The fluidity of

Macedonias borders even in Antiquity means that from the political
history point of view it is most convenient to define the borders as the
circumference of those territories ruled by Macedonian kings excluding
the conquered areas of Greece, Thrace and Asia. During the reigns of
Philip II and Alexander the kingdom was divided into two: Lower
Macedonia in the east and Upper Macedonia in the southwest. At the start
of his reign Philip II only had control of Lower Macedonia, which was
indeed the cradle of the Argead dynasty.
Upper Macedonia is a mountainous region stretching from the Emathia
Plain to the Pindos Mountains and including the catchment area of the
river Haliakmon as well as the upper reaches of the river Axios (Vardar).
Almost the entire region (90%) is over 500 m above sea level, whereas
50% is above 1,500 m. In that part of the Balkan Peninsula the main
mountain ranges run longitudinally. The Haliakmon Valley is situated
between two such ranges, those of the Pindos Mountains and the southern
ranges of the Dinaric Alps (Peristeri, Vitsi, Vourinos). In Antiquity Upper
Macedonia was divided into several smaller states and in the Haliakmon
Valley itself there were: Orestis in the north, Tymphaeaa to the south and
Elimeia to the east of Tymphaea. The remaining Upper Macedonia states
were situated further east and separated from Lower Macedonia by the
Vermion range, namely: Palagonia in the north and Lyncestis and Eordaia
in the south. Upper Macedonia was ethnically mixed. Apart from the
Macedonian tribes such as the Elimeians and Lyncestis, there were tribes
more closely related to the Greek Molossians of Epirus, such as the
Orestians. Illyrian elements have also been traced among the inhabitants of
this part of Macedonia. The ethnic diversity of Upper Macedonia is
considered an important factor accounting for its looser ties with the
central authorities in Lower Macedonia. The Upper Macedonia tribes were
ruled by their own dynasties, the most important of which was the
Lyncestis royal family, the Bacchiads once expelled from Corinth by the
tyrant Cypselus. Relations between the Argeads and the ruling families of
Upper Macedonia were frequently marked by mutual distrust and political
rivalry. If we add to that the basic weakness of the Lower Macedonia
government, it is hardly surprising that before Philip ascended to power,
bonds between the Argead kingdom and the Upper Macedonia states were
at best loose.7
Lower Macedonia was situated by the Thermaic Gulf, in an alluvial
valley where the silt had accumulated from the rivers Haliakmon, Axios,
7

Errington 1990, chapter i; Billows 1994, p. 3.

Chapter I

Ludias and Gallikos. It was surrounded by mountain ridges (Paiko, Voras,

Vermion and Pieria) and the Pieria plain at the foot of Mount Olympus.
One has to remember that in the 4th century BC the shore of the Thermaic
Gulf was some 30 km further inland than it is today and thanks to the river
Ludias seafaring ships could sail up to the port of Pella, the capital of
Philip and Alexanders kingdom. A large part of low-lying Emathia
situated above that river was in Antiquity a barren uninhabitable
marshland. The area was not drained until the 1920s, and no traces of
earlier permanent human settlement have been found there. Attempts to
drain these marshes during Philips reign were doomed to fail because
contemporary technical knowledge was quite inadequate to deal with the
sheer scale of the task. Worse still, the predominance of marshland in parts
of Lower Macedonia resulted in malaria epidemics that affected not only
the local population but also agricultural output. Settlements were
concentrated on terraces on the sides of the bordering mountains. On the
south side of the lower course of the Haliakmon and to the south of the
Emathia, close to todays village of Vergina, lay the first Agread capital
Aegae. The fertile and well irrigated parts of Macedonia allowed for the
growing of crops and rearing of cattle. In the 4th century many Macedonians
were still engaged in herding, taking cattle up in the mountains in the
summer and then taking the herds down to lower lying areas for the
winter. We also know that wine was produced, though on account of its
cooler climate outside of the seacoast there were no olive trees, so typical
for the Mediterranean zone. At least 1/3 of ancient Macedonia was
covered with forests and all wood collected from these forests belonged to
a royal monopoly. This was both economically and politically very
important because the sea powers of the Greek world, particularly Athens,
lacked their own forests and therefore were forced to import wood from
Macedonia.8
By the end of Philip IIs reign the Kingdom of Macedonia covered a
territory of 43,000 km2, which was several times larger than even the
largest of the ancient Greek states. Thanks to the conditions of its soil and
climate Macedonia was able to produce abundant crops capable of feeding
a large number of people despite obviously primitive agricultural methods.
Although no sources provide enough data to adequately estimate the
number of Philip II or Alexanders subjects, the number of soldiers these
rulers were able to deploy in Macedonia itself indicates that the
demographic potential must have been large, though probably not over
8

Geography of Macedonia principally after: Borza 1990, pp. 23-57, 287-299; also
Corvisier 2002, pp. 37-41; Thomas 2007, pp. 23-32.

Childhood, Family, Macedonia

two million as Hammond believed.9 Historians have tried to calculate

ancient Macedonias population on the basis of 19th-century census
records, assuming that under the backward and unindustrialised Ottoman
Empire the population size would have been more or less the same as it
had been in the same area in Antiquity when it was supported by cattle
herding and primitive agriculture. According to such estimates
Macedonias population at the start of Alexanders campaign was
approximately 1-1.5 million. However, there are other theories which
suggest that populations in the pre-industrialised age did grow, though so
slowly as to be indiscernible. Accordingly the population of Macedonia at
the end of Philip IIs reign would have amounted to approximately
660,000. Even if we take the lowest of these estimates, at the time of
Philip and Alexander there would have been roughly three times more
Macedonians than inhabitants of the largest Greek polis of Athens, with
populations well under 300,000 and in that 100,000 citizens of both sexes
at the most.10
The matter of ancient Macedonians ethnicity is one of the most hotly
discussed issues regarding those times. Ancient sources frequently
mention speeches or simple remarks being uttered in Macedonian by
Alexander or other Macedonians of his day or from the later times of the
Diadochi. For years scholars have been arguing whether or not by stating
that something was said in Macedonian meant that they were merely using
a Greek dialect or in fact a quite separate language. The academic dispute
has become even more heated on account of the more than century-old
political conflict over territory and independence. Both sides of the
political dispute have tried to gain a moral advantage over their opponents
by resorting to historical arguments as to the right to land on account of
its ethnic past. At the turn of the 20th century Macedonia the
southernmost state of the Balkans at the time of the emergence of modern
nationalisms was ethnically a very complex country with a predominance
of Slavic elements. That was when the Greeks started claiming there rights
to the land on account of its ancient history. The reason the Greeks felt
they had a stronger claim to Macedonia than for instance the Bulgarians
was because, according to them, the Macedonian state had for so long had
a Greek ethnicity and it was already clearly visible in Antiquity, especially
during the reigns of its most illustrious rulers Philip II and Alexander the

Hammond 1994, p. 40, n. 38.

Billows 1994, pp. 198-206. Population of Attica: Hansen 1991, pp. 90-94. Low
estimates for Attica (ca. 200,000) and Macedonia (660,000) are after Corvisier
2000, pp. 32-44. Thomas 2007, p. 49 lists 700,000 for Macedonia under Philip II.
10

Chapter I

Great. This official Greek stance is shared by many Western historians.11

However, the other, Southern Slavic (Macedonian and Bulgarian), side
also willingly use historic arguments. They stress the non-Greek ethnic
character of ancient Macedonians and claim that they were the predecessors
of todays Southern Slavs. With such reasoning they have even tried to
posthumously Slavicise Alexander the Great.12
Unfortunately, pre-Hellenistic Macedonians are one of the mute
nations of history in that they have not left any traces of literature or
monumental inscriptions. Even the quite numerous graves of Macedonian
aristocrats contain no inscriptions. Only half of the 140 or so words
claimed by ancient authors to be Macedonian are undeniably of Greek
origin and even in these cases contemporary linguists do not discern a
typically Greek evolution of particular words. Moreover, although all the
ancient inscriptions discovered in Macedonia, especially in recent decades,
are in Greek, this does not mean this was the everyday language of
Macedonians. Indeed, the rulers of Thrace, Scythia and Illyria
commissioned monuments with Greek inscriptions and yet we know that
Thracians, Scythians and Illyrians had their own non-Greek languages. At
the time Greek was simply the preferred language among the cultural
elites of much of the Mediterranean area, as Latin later was in medieval
Europe. It should be remembered that in the pre-Hellenistic age all Greeks
spoke and wrote in their local dialects, not in the standardised form of the
language, koine, which in fact developed only at the start of Hellenistic
epoch. Ca. 6300 inscriptions found in Macedonia are predominantly in
(Attic) koine, some in various Greek dialects of the coastal cities and only
a tabula defixionum of Pella possibly in the local dialect close to NorthWest Greek. Obviously the Attic dialect or koine could not have been the
native language of the local inhabitants. Indeed, the predominance of Attic
dialect inscriptions may in fact indicate that for the local population Greek
was a foreign language and that the literary Attic form had been learned
only at school. Ancient authors testify that the ordinary Macedonian did
not fully understand Greek.13 This fact did not stop the most outstanding
supporter of the claim that ancient Macedonians were actually Greeks,
N.G.L Hammond, from espousing the quite curious view that the
11
Presentation of Greek position: Kallris 1954-1976; similar: Lane Fox 1973, p.
30; Cawkwell 1978, pp. 22-23; Hammond 1979, pp. 39-54; Hammond 1999, pp.
31-33; OBrien 1992, p. 26; Corvisier 2002, pp. 49-50; Worthington 2004, pp. 7-8;
Panayotou 2007. See: Borza 1990, pp. 3-12, 90-97.
12
Mikoajczak, Stamatoski 2002; Moroz-Grzelak 2002; Danforth 2003.
13
Borza 1990, pp. 90-94; Borza 1994; Borza 1999, pp. 41-43. See now Panayotou
2007 for Macedonian as a Greek dialect.

Childhood, Family, Macedonia

Macedonian language was, indeed, a Greek dialect but one unintelligible

to the Greeks.14
Although most of the evidence does suggest that in the 4th century
Macedonian was a separate language to Greek, one cannot consider this
issue closed. After all, there is no clear dividing line between a different
dialect and a different language. For instance, many consider present-day
Macedonian to be in fact a dialect of Bulgarian. However, ethnic identity
is not only determined by language, it also depends on the awareness of
belonging to a different ethnic group or nation. Belonging to an ethnic
group depends on a subjective conviction that some common factors exist
binding a group of people together and distinguishing them from other
ethnic groups. Such factors may include: common ancestry, a common
history, culture, association with a particular territory or a sense of group
solidarity. Analysis of all extant sources unequivocally shows that in the
5th and 4th centuries the Greeks did not regard Macedonians to be part of
their ethnic group nor did the Macedonians themselves ever claim to be
Greek. It was only in the Hellenistic epoch that Macedonians became fully
Hellenised and it was only with the growing dominance of Rome in the
Balkan Peninsula that a sense of affinity developed between the
Macedonians and Greeks. It was then that Alexander the Great was
belatedly included in the pantheon of Greek national heroes. By the time
of the Roman Empire Plutarch was willingly using Alexander of
Macedonia as an example of how Greek military prowess was equal to that
of mighty Rome. However, in Alexanders day the Macedonians had a
separate ethnos. What is more, they were aware and proud of it. The
undeniable closeness of Macedonian to Greek would have made the latter
language partly intelligible to most Macedonians. A similar situation can
be seen today among Scandinavian or Slavonic nations whose members
can understand respectively another Scandinavian or Slavonic language
even if they have never been taught it.15
Even if 4th-century Macedonians distinguished themselves ethnically
from their Greek neighbours they most probably had the same proto-Greek
roots as members of the historic Greek tribes. Moreover, the Macedonian
royal court was already becoming Hellenised in the 5th century and
especially intensively during the reign of Archelaus the patron of many
Greek artists including Euripides. This state of affairs was partly due to a
desire to have political influence in the Greek world, but no doubt also due
14

Hammond 1995; now also Worthington 2008, p. 8.

Weber 1968, p. 389; Badian 1982; Haarmann 1986, pp. 260-262; Borza 1990,
pp. 90-97, 305-306; Borza 1992; Borza 1996; Hall 2000, pp. 19-26, 170-172, 177;
Nawotka 2003, p. 27; Thomas 2007, pp. 32-37.
15

Chapter I

to Macedonian awareness of the attractive aspects of contemporary Greek

culture, which indeed fascinated many Mediterranean countries of that
epoch. Naturally the ruling dynasty and aristocracy were the first to be
Hellenised. The frescos and numerous artefacts found in recent decades in
Macedonian graves from the second half of the 4th century show that the
royal court favoured Greek and especially Attic art.16
During the reign of Philip II Macedonia was still predominantly a rural
country where cities, unlike in Greece, played a very peripheral role in
both the political and economic sense. Despite efforts made by the
administration (incidentally a fact much exaggerated by many historians),
Philips kingdom remained poor. Before Philips reign there was virtually
nothing that could be called a city in Upper Macedonia, though
archaeologists have uncovered the remains of fortified settlements which
must have been the commercial centres of the rural communities. In Lower
Macedonia the only urban centre of note was the kingdoms capital Pella,
which was by no means the poor and small town described by
Demosthenes. In fact the length of its defensive walls at the time of Philip
II (7-8 km) was comparable to the length of the walls of Athens (6.5 km),
and although it might not have been as populous as Athens, Pella needs to
be regarded as an important urban centre.17 The other towns of Edessa,
Dion and Aegae were much less significant though the last of these, even
after it ceased being the capital, still maintained its status as the burial
place of Macedonian kings and the centre of their cults. Ancient sources
do not clearly state when the royal residence was transferred from Aegae
to Pella, but historians believe it occurred during the reign of the states
reformer Archelaus. Pella had no natural defence advantages and this was
a malarial region, but it was situated on an important trade route, along
which at the time of the Early Roman empire the famous road via Egnatia
was built. Furthermore, while the coastline remained under the control of
the Greek colonies of Pydna, Methone and the Chalcidian League, Pella,
with its access to the Aegean via the river Ludias was the Kingdom of
Macedonias only seaport. This allowed Macedonia to export timber
brought down the river Axios from the nearby mountains as well as no
doubt minerals and agricultural products.18
It was not their economic but their political significance that
distinguished Macedonian cities most from those of Greece. In the Greek
world the city and surrounding rural areas (chora) generally constituted a
16

Barr-Sharrar 1982.
Diod., 18.66. Montgomery 1985; Montgomery 1997; Hammond 1994, p. 56;
Thomas 2007, pp. 81-83.
18
Greenwalt 1999; Corvisier 2002, pp. 53-57.
17

Childhood, Family, Macedonia

separate state (polis). Of course there were numerous exceptions to this

rule. There were large poleis, such as Athens, which would include more
than one urban settlement with inhabitants who had typically urban
occupations. On the other hand, there were also many small states that did
not have a single urban centre. Nevertheless, by the mid 4th century for the
Greeks the polis was almost always associated with citizenship and the
natural political centre. In accordance with contemporary convictions they
would also naturally have a democratic system of government.19 In the
Classical period no Macedonian urban settlement could be characterised as
a polis. At most some had limited autonomy but still under the supervision
of a royal prefect. Thus Macedonia avoided the political fragmentation so
typical in Greece, while all the subjects considered themselves to be
Macedonians first and only next the inhabitants of, for instance, Pella,
Edessa or Dion.20
This form of social organisation, different from the polis concept and
called ethne, was also present in neighbouring Thessaly as well as to a
large extent in Thrace. Moreover, these three countries, which were much
larger than Greek states, also kept the tribal system throughout the
Classical period. In Thrace it was still present at the time of the Roman
empire. On account of the fact that everywhere this social structure was
eventually succeeded by the polis, one cannot regard ethne to have been a
viable alternative but instead an earlier stage in the evolution of society. A
typical structure for ethne societies, even in 4th-century democracy
dominated Greece, was the oligarchy or aristocracy. The political
significance of the ruling classes rested on their control of outlying
territories or of smaller towns which, as in Greece, did not have the status
of independent states.21
The 4th-century Greek historian Theopompus states that in Macedonia
during the reign of Philip II there were 800 aristocratic hetairoi whose
revenues from landed property equalled that of 10,000 of the wealthiest
Greeks.22 It is now impossible to verify this statement and it may be a
rhetorical exaggeration. Significant, however, is the very fact that
contemporary observers perceived Macedonia to be a country dominated
by a wealthy aristocracy. Their wealth has been confirmed by the
archaeological uncovering of some 100 warrior graves whose lavishness
resembled more those of nobles from the Mycenaean age or those of
contemporary Thracian aristocrats than those of Greeks of classical age.
19

Arist., Pol., 1286b20. See Gauthier 1984, p. 86; Quass 1979.

Errington 1990, pp. 222-234.
21
Archibald 2000.
22
FGrH, 115 F225b.
20

10

Chapter I

The most sumptuous sepulchres are the royal graves at Vergina, which
shall be discussed in detail in Chapter III. The number of hetairoi during
Philip IIs reign rose to approximately 1,800. This would have been so not
only because of a natural rise in the number of Macedonian aristocrats
resulting from the countrys prosperity, but also from a large influx of
foreigners, especially Greeks. The closeness between the king of
Macedonia and his aristocrats is apparent in their name, hetairoi, which
simply means companions the kings companions. The hetairoi
accompanied the king in battle as well as in hunting and feasting, yet in
the monarchs regular presence they were bound by none of the
submissiveness and strict adherence to court ceremony that was so typical
of ancient states of the East. The lack of an administrative or court
hierarchy meant that both Philip II and Alexander ruled with the aid of
their closest entourage, especially a group of seven to eight
Somatophylakes (personal bodyguards). Despite their name, the latter
were not only to physically protect their king but also serve as officers
carefully selected from the kings most trusted men to carry out special
missions. The king, who wore no unique garments or head covering
distinguishing him from his wellborn subjects, was probably addressed by
name. Indeed, the ancient authors draw our attention to the fact that there
was generally little social distance between Macedonian kings and their
subjects, who in the Classical and Hellenistic periods still had easy access
to their monarch and relative freedom to speak out (parrhesia) in his
presence. The abilities of riding a horse, using weapons and hunting were
an essential part of every young Macedonian aristocrats education. The
hunting down of the first wild boar and the killing of the first enemy in
battle were elements of the Macedonian rites of passage. It was only then
that a young aristocrat was entitled to wear a belt and feast, as was the
fashion in the ancient world, in a half reclined position. The Greeks were
shocked by a peculiar form of pederasty practiced by Philip IIs hetairoi in
which the adult could be the passive partner in a homosexual
relationship.23 Macedonian aristocrats loved breeding horses which
originated from the famous Median Nesaian breed brought over to
Macedonia during the Persian rule.24
Little is known about Macedonias lower social orders before the
Hellenistic period as they were not an object of interest to ancient authors.
The usual custom in the Balkan states was for the aristocracy to rule over a
serf majority, who in Thessaly were called the penestai. And such was no
23

Theopomp., FGrH, 115 F225. Flower 1994, pp. 109-119.

Errington 1990, pp. 152-154, 219-220; Billows 1990, pp. 19-22; Borza 1990, pp.
85-88; Badian 1996, pp. 11-12; Heckel 2003, pp. 206-208.
24

Childhood, Family, Macedonia

11

doubt also the social structure in aristocratically dominated Macedonia.25

This social structure probably determined the composition of the
Macedonian army, whose only valuable element was the aristocratic
cavalry. This would have been so on account of the fact that in most
ancient states the army was composed of citizens or subjects who were
obliged to equip themselves for war at their own cost. Therefore lacking
their own adequately protective (and expensive) armour, proper training
and no doubt motivation, serfs were a lightly armed infantry of virtually
no military value, especially when pitched against the phalanx: the basic
Greek formation of classical times which had for centuries dominated
battlefields in the Mediterranean zone. The phalanx was also a product of
the given social structure and mentality of the polis, inhabited as it was by
a predominantly free and relatively well-off peasantry. The polis citizen
would acquire his own hoplite equipment, which included a breastplate,
helmet, greaves, a large circular shield, a spear and a sword. It is estimated
that in all such equipment would have cost approximately 300 drachmas,
which was more or less as much as a hired worker could earn in a year.
This meant that genuinely poor landless people who had to support
themselves by working for others could not become hoplites. On the other
hand, hoplite armour was considerably cheaper than the purchase of a
warhorse, which could cost from 500 to 6,000 drachmas. Moreover the
feeding and care of such a horse could be compared to the annual
expenditure of a family of six. The fact that riders were expected to cover
all these costs meant that only the very richest could afford to serve in the
cavalry, which traditionally remained the preserve of aristocracy.26
Therefore the predominance in Greek armies of hoplites, i.e. middle-class
soldiers, reflects the egalitarian and democratic aspect of the polis.
Apart from being relatively well trained, the hoplites were noted for
their courage, determination, ability to maintain discipline on the
battlefield and solidarity among brothers in arms. These were
characteristics associated with the civic nature of the polis, where the
decision to wage war was decided at public gatherings by the votes of
citizens after open and free debates. The amateur composition of the
citizens army determined its preferred military tactic which was to try to
resolve a war with one rapid hoplite attack. The phalanx was usually eight
ranks deep and would advance on the enemy by breaking into a run in an
attempt to break his lines with a massed full frontal assault, i.e. without
any complicated manoeuvres or use of tactical reserves. The only
25
26

Billows 1994, pp. 9-10.

Figures after Hanson 1999, especially pp. 104-105, 226-227.

12

Chapter I

contemporary formation capable of withstanding such an attack was

another phalanx. Greek city-state armies were, however, reluctant to fight
protracted wars far from their polis. Such was the prestige of the phalanx
as the most important formation in the Greek army that for a long time
some of the wealthier citizens chose to serve in the heavily armed infantry
rather than the traditional preserve of the aristocracy, the cavalry. This
exceptional prestige stemmed not only from the fact that the infantry
decided the outcomes of battles and therefore also the fate of the city-state,
but also because being a hoplite required particular courage and physical
prowess. What is more, in some states, such as Sparta, weaker men served
in the cavalry, whereas the phalanx was reserved for the very best
warriors. This image of Greek city-state armies started to change in the 4th
century when the cavalry regained importance and highly trained
mercenary light infantry (peltastai) units were introduced. Nevertheless,
up to the Battle of Chaeronea or even later faith in the citizen hoplite
armys ability to deliver the decisive blow was upheld in Greek military
doctrine.27
Ancient sources provide no convincing evidence of the permanent
existence of a fully battle worthy infantry in the Macedonian army before
the reign of Philip II and Diodorus actually claims that Philip was the
creator of the Macedonian phalanx.28 Some historians even claim that on
account of the social conditions the creation of such a hoplite infantry
would have been impossible. Contemporary states lacking appropriate
social or cultural conditions to have their own citizens hoplite army
usually hired mercenaries. Such a course of action was taken up by the
Great King and satraps of the western provinces of Persia, the rulers of
Egypt as well as the tyrants of Thessaly, though in the last of these
countries attempts to form its own heavy infantry had been made since at
least the 6th century. The primitive level of agriculture combined with the
aristocratic character of the state meant that Macedonian kings lacked the
financial resources to hire very well trained but expensive Greek
mercenaries. Before the reign of Philip II Macedonias army was usually
limited to the aristocratic cavalry and primitive light infantry, both of
which stood little chance against the Greek phalanx on the battlefield. That
is why throughout most of the Classical period Macedonian was a
militarily weak state on whose territories the armies of stronger Greek
states frequently intervened.29 This situation changed radically under
27

Hanson 1999, pp. 84-141; van Wees 2000, pp. 87-88; Lendon 2005, pp. 102105.
28
Diod., 16.3.1-3.
29
Greenwalt 1999, p. 171; Archibald 2000, p. 230.

Childhood, Family, Macedonia

13

Philip II and his reorganisation of the Macedonian army will be discussed

later in this chapter.

3. The Argead Dynasty

Macedonian tradition, preserved by Herodotus and Thucydides, speaks of
wanderings of the ancestors of the Macedonians, their conquest of Pieria
and other lands in Lower Macedonia as well as of the expulsion or
subjugation of the original inhabitants. Modern research has confirmed
that such events indeed took place around 650. It was then that the
Makedones conquered Lower Macedonia or at least the part of it in the
vicinity of Aegae, which today is associated with the archaeological
remains near the village of Vergina. Aegae became a Macedonian bastion
and the first capital of the Macedonian state, if at this early stage one can
use such a term.30 Other Macedonian tribes occupied the lands of the
Elimeia and Lyncestis in Upper Macedonia. In all probability while these
tribes were still moving the Makedon warriors were led by the Argeads,
the first Macedonian royal dynasty. It was under their leadership that over
the last 100 or 150 years the tribes went on to conquer the whole of Lower
Macedonia.
According to Herodotus, the Macedonian dynasty was descended from
Temenos of the Heraclids, the refugee from Argos. Scholars who accept
this version call it the Temenid dynasty and explain the relative stability of
their position in Macedonia as a result of their external origins.31 However,
Herodotuss version is not confirmed by other ancient sources, whereas
the key elements origins traced back to the Greek heroes, especially
Heracles are a bit too typical of the genealogical tales deliberately made
up for Greek or Hellenised aristocrats to be believed. Presumably it was
invented no earlier than after the Persian wars at the court of Alexander I,
which was then trying to use Hellenophile propaganda to sway Greek
public opinion and improve relations with Athens. Philip II and Alexander
III, on the other hand, had specific political motives to stress their
genealogical affinity with Heracles in particular.32
Alexander I was the actual founder of the Macedonian state and
historically its first ruler. As a very talented political player he was
consummately able to exploit not only the Persian occupation of Thrace
30

Hdt., 8.136-138; Th., 2.99. Borza 1990, pp. 84-85.

Hdt., 8.137-139. Hammond 1979, pp. 3-14, 152.
32
Badian 1982, pp. 34-36; Borza 1982, pp. 7-13; Huttner 1997, pp. 65-85; Hall
2000, p. 64.
31

14

Chapter I

and Macedonia but also their subsequent defeats at Salamis (480) and
Plataea (479) by the league of Greek states. During the time of Persian
dominance Alexander I was a loyal vassal of Darius I and Xerxes I. He
gave away his sister Gygaia to the Persian aristocrat Bubares and adopted
the Persian system of administration as well as elements of Persian culture.
Thanks to his ties with Persia, Alexander I consolidated his control over
Lower Macedonia and subjugated the mini states of Upper Macedonia.33
But at the same time he also maintained contact with Athens, selling her
Macedonian timber to build a fleet. Although tales of the Macedonian king
helping the Greeks during the 480-479 wars with Persia, particularly just
before the Battle of Plataea, are most probably apocryphal, Alexanders
loyalty to the Persian suzerain certainly did not survive Xerxes European
defeat. Alexander Is adroitness in liaising with both the Persian invader
and the ultimately victorious Greeks, particularly Athens, enabled a
peripheral and backward Macedonia to become for a short while a regional
power in its part of the Balkans.34
The next attempt to build a strong Macedonian state was undertaken by
Archelaus (413-399). He was an ally of Athens in the final phase of the
Peloponnesian War and tried to reform his weak and peripheral state by
building roads and fortresses. It was presumably his decision make Pella
Macedonias capital because, according to Xenophon, in 382 it was the
most important city in the land and it is hard to imagine that the shifting of
the capital would have occurred in the years of chaos that followed
Archelauss death.35
Besides, the reasons for the move could only have been economic as in
military terms Pella was in a more vulnerable position than the old capital
at Aegae. Indeed, thanks to the river Ludias, Pella had access to the sea,
which allowed the king of Macedon to make additional profits from the
export of timber and other forest products (pitch and resin) as well as other
natural resources. Political stability as well as the external security
provided by Archelaus reign allowed Macedonia to become prosperous,
as is testified by the high quality of its silver in two-drachm coins that
were issued in that period. Thucydides also attributes Archelaus with
arming his soldiers with the hoplon, which for a long time was
interpreted as evidence that he had created a heavy (hoplite) infantry.
Currently a more sceptical opinion prevails which notes the lack of any
33
Fol, Hammond 1988, p. 249; Borza 1990, pp.100-105; Brosius 2003a, pp. 230231.
34
Borza 1990, pp. 113-115, 123-131.
35
X., HG, 5.2.13. Hammond 1979, pp. 139-140; Borza 1990, pp. 166-171;
Greenwalt 1999, pp. 163-164.

Childhood, Family, Macedonia

15

trace in the sources that such weapons were used by Macedonians at the
time as well as the fact that the ancient authors suggest Macedonias
military weakness at the start of the 4th century. However, we know that
Archelaus conducted an aggressive foreign policy and towards the end of
his reign he ordered military intervention in Thessaly on the side of the
Aleuad aristocratic family. It was thanks to this intervention that
Macedonia gained the borderland region of Perrhaebia, which provided it
with an important link to Greece. Moreover, a Macedonian garrison was
briefly installed in Thessalys chief city Larissa. However, Archelaus
successes were short-lived as Macedonian troops had to withdraw from
Thessaly as Spartan forces, then imposing hegemony over the whole of
Greece after the Peloponnesian War, moved in. Nonetheless the
Thessalian expedition is noteworthy in that it showed the direction of
Macedonian expansion which became so important in the times of Philip
II and Alexander. Even if Archelaus had actually formed some hoplite
units, they would have in all certainty been disbanded in the years of chaos
that followed his death.36 This monarch had promoted the Hellenisation of
the Macedonian elites by organising theatre festivals in Dion and inviting
to his court numerous Greek artists, including Zeuxis, Agathon, Timotheos
and Euripides, who reportedly was torn apart by a pack of dogs in Pella.37
It was this policy of Hellenisation that would prove to be his lasting
legacy.38
Archelaus other achievements, administrative ones, came to nothing in
the anarchic early decades of the 4th century, when the Argead dynasty
was blighted by assassinations and political coups. Mini states broke away
from Argead control in Upper Macedonia and the whole country was
subjected to repeated invasions and looting by neighbouring nations,
particularly the Illyrians. At the time of the Theban hegemony over Greece
Macedonia became de facto a Boeotian fief. As a guarantee of his loyalty,
King Alexander II had to give to the Thebans hostages, including his own
brother Philip, who spent three years in Thebes and returned to Macedonia
in 364. Shortly afterwards war broke out between Macedonia and the
Illyria, which was then rising in power and whose king, Bardylis, defeated
in battle Philips brother, King Perdiccas III, killing him and some 4000 of

36

Th., 2.100.2; Polyaen., 2.1.17; X., HG, 5.2.40. Milns 1976, pp. 92-93; Markle
1978, p. 485; Cawkwell 1978, p. 31; Borza 1990, pp. 165-166; Snodgrass 1999, p.
116.
37
Satyr., Vit. Eur., fr. 39.21; St.Byz., s.v. Bormskoj. Schorn 2004, pp. 310-311,
340.
38
Borza 1990, pp. 161-177.

16

Chapter I

his troops.39 Most history books state that the battle took place in 359,
though some historians believe that it happened somewhat earlier in 360.40

4. Philip II and the rebuilding of the Macedonian state

Born in 383 or 382, as the third son of King Amyntas III and Princess
Eurydice probably originally from the Upper Macedonian kingdom of
Lyncestis, Philip was a long way down the line of succession to the throne.
For this reason he was probably not regarded to be a particularly important
member of the family, which would account for the fact that he was so
willingly selected to be handed over to alien powers as a hostage when it
became a political necessity. When his father was still alive Philip was
given to the Illyrians to ensure Macedonian tributes were paid on time and
then in 367/366, together with 30 other Macedonians, he was next handed
over to the Thebans. Though we know very little about the young
Macedonian princes stay in Thebes, historians stress its significance of
this episode in the life of Philip the future king and military innovator.
According to a legend preserved in a work by Diodorus Philip lived in the
house of the father of the Theban leader Epaminondas and together with
the latter was taught Pythagorean philosophy. This must be an apocryphal
tale as by then Epaminondas would have been around fifty and most
certainly engaged in warfare and power politics rather than learning
Pythagorean doctrine. Much later anecdotal Greek sources present Philip
as a rather uneducated man who was hardly likely to have studied
philosophy. We can only presume that from his stay in Thebes Philip
gained respect for the Boeotian army and the innovative tactics employed
by their generals as well as personal contacts with the elites of Thebes,
which was then the most powerful state in Greece.41
After his return to Macedonia, Philip received from his brother
Perdiccas III a province to govern, and it was then that he began to form
his own military units. Philip did not take part in his brothers battle
against Bardylis, and when Perdiccas was killed, Philip along with his
nephew Amyntas, became the obvious candidate to the Macedonian
throne. Various ancient sources provide two versions of what happened
next. One states that on account of the crisis the Macedonians immediately
39

Diod., 16.2.4-5; Polyaen., 4.10.1. Pajkowski 2000, pp. 148-155.

Borza 1990, p. 200.
41
Diod., 16.2.2; Plu., Pel., 26.4-8; Plu., mor., 334c-d ; Just., 7.5.1-2; Scholia in
Aeschin., 3.112; Suda, s.v. Kranoj. Ogden 1999, pp. 12-13; Carney 2000, p. 41;
Hammond 1994, pp. 8-10; Corvisier 2002, pp. 69-73.
40

Childhood, Family, Macedonia

17

handed the throne to an already experienced, probably twenty-three-yearold Philip rather than the still infant Amyntas. The other claims that the
child was made king while his uncle ruled in his name as a regent. For
historians studying Macedonias political situation after Perdiccas death
the notion of putting an infant on the throne seems absurd, thus opinions
that Philip immediately succeeded his bother as ruler prevail, being at the
same time a guardian of the heir Amyntas.42 Philips early ascension to the
throne is also confirmed by an inscription of Olveni in Lyncestis.
However, another inscription (of Lebadeia in Boeotia) seems to confirm
that the royal title was also held by Amyntas. If these contemporary
inscriptions refer indeed to Amyntas IV and Philip II, they prove beyond
doubt that both were rulers of Macedonia. In such a case Philip may have
been a regent for his nephew and received the royal title two years after
Perdiccas death. This is the version of his biographer Satyrus, who states
that Philip reigned for 22 years, whereas he died 24 years after his brother
Perdiccas. If we take into account not only the political aspects of the
Macedonian monarchy but also the religious ones, the thesis that Philip II
and Amyntas IV reigned simultaneously becomes more plausible. Whilst
Philip had de facto political and military control, Amyntas was left with
religious functions that were his by right of inheritance. With time Philips
position in Macedonia became so strong that for the rest of his life
Amyntas IV was never in a position to have his uncle cede him some of
the authority that was his by right. One can assume that Philip never
considered Amyntas to be a serious political rival and for this reason did
not kill him, though the murdering of relatives with rival claims to the
throne was quite common in the Argead family.43
The Illyrian victory over the Macedonians in 359 put both Philip and
his country in such a difficult position that its very existence as an
independent state became uncertain, for apart from Bardylis victory new
threats appeared from the Paionians, Thracians, Athenians as well as a
number of claimants to the throne from other branches of the Argead clan.
The way in which Philip II pulled Macedonia out of this crisis proved to
be characteristic of his entire reign: he was able to correctly prioritise
foreign policy issues; he usually preferred to use diplomacy but was able
to decisively use military force when the former proved unreliable or
42

Just., 7.5.9-7.6.2; Satyr., F25 ap. Ath., 13.5; Diod., 16.1.3, 16.2.1. Cawkwell
1978, pp. 27-28; Griffith 1979, pp. 208-209, 702-704; Borza 1990, p. 200; Anson
2009.
43
Philips inscription: Hatzopoulos 1995; Amyntas inscription: IG, vii.3055;
Satyr., F25 ap. Ath., 13.5. Goukowsky 1991; Tronson 1984, p. 126 ; Hammond
1994, pp. 23-24; Corvisier 2002, pp. 74-76; Schorn 2004, pp. 423-424.

18

Chapter I

ceased serving its purpose and he was also skilled in using bribery to
achieve his political goals. First Philip had to deal with all the pretenders
to the Macedonian throne: Argaios (who was supported by Athens),
Pausanias (who was backed by Cotys the king of the Odrysians),
Archelaus, Arrhidaeus and Menelaus. By withdrawing Macedonian troops
from Amphipolis, Philip avoided a conflict with Athens, which had always
wanted control of this city. It was with money that Philip managed to stave
off the danger of another Paionian invasion and persuade the son of Cotys,
who had in the meantime been murdered, to get rid of Pausanias. The
invasion force of 3,000 Athenian mercenaries in support of Argaios came
later than had been planned and though initially they managed to capture
Aegae, ultimately they were defeated. The Athenians were forced to hand
over their pretender to Philip, but they were allowed to keep Amphipolis.
The Macedonian army was reorganized in the first year of Philips reign,
and in 358 he was already deploying it in serious military operations
beyond Lower Macedonias borders. At the start of that year, he made use
of the Paionian kings death and subjugated their state. Next, having
rejected peace proposals, he launched an offensive against Bardylis. In a
pitched battle at Lyncestis the Illyrians lost 7,000 soldiers and had to cede
all the territories in Upper Macedonia they had previously captured from
the Kingdom of Macedonia. Peace was secured through the marriage of
Philip to the Illyrian princess Audata.44 The hold over Upper Macedonia
was, on the other hand, made safer thanks to his marriage to Phila, who
was most probably a member of the royal family of Elimeia. These were
the first of a series of matrimonial unions which, in the short-term rather
than the long-term, worked to Philips political advantage. They are
presented as such in more or less chronological order by his biographer
Satyrus: Philip always married a new wife with each new war he
undertook. In the twenty-two years of his reign at any rate he married
Audata of Illyria, and had by her a daughter, Cynane; he also married
Phila, a sister of Derdas and Machatas. Wishing to put in a claim to the
Thessalian nation as his own besides others, he begot children by two
women of Thessaly, one of whom was Nicesipolis of Pherae, who bore to
him a daughter called Thessalonice, while the other was Philinna of
Larissa, by whom he became the father of Arrhidaeus. He acquired also
the kingdom of the Molossians by marrying Olympias, by whom he had
Alexander and Cleopatra. And when he subjugated Thrace, Cothelas the
Thracian king came over to his side, bringing with him his daughter

44

This paragraph mostly after: Hammond 1994, pp. 23-28.

Childhood, Family, Macedonia

19

Medea and a large dowry. By marrying her he thus brought home a second
wife after Olympias.45
Having successfully protected Macedonia against all the dangers that
immediately followed Perdiccas death, Philip started Macedonias
gradual expansion to become a powerful Balkan empire. His pretext to
intervene in Thessaly in 358 was the disputes between successive tyrants
of the city of Pherae near the Gulf of Pagasae. The citys tyrants were
trying to unite the country, which was traditionally ruled by an inland
aristocracy, by force. Philip sided with the aristocrats and married a
woman called Philina, who was most probably a member of the Aleuads,
the largest aristocratic family in Thessaly. He returned to Thessaly in the
years 354-352 when the Pheraean tyrants, in alliance with the brilliant
Phocian leader Onomarchus, tried once again to take over the country.
This was when Philip faced his most critical test as a military and political
leader. The Macedonians were defeated twice in battle, but Philip gained
the support of the Thessalian League, which appointed him lifelong archon
and thus also gave him command of its troops. The office of archon
(president) had in fact been created by the Thessalian League quite
recently, in 369, to reorganise and consolidate its military forces against a
contemporary tyrant of Pherae. Philip now had at his disposal the united
forces of Macedonia and Thessaly including some 20,000 infantry and
3,000 cavalry with which at the Battle of the Crocus Field in 352 he finally
defeated Onomarchus army, including approximately the same number of
infantry but only 500 cavalrymen. With this victory Philip was able to
force the tyrants out of Pherae and become the unquestioned ruler of
Thessaly. Perhaps he also received the title of tagos, which had been held
by an earlier ruler of Thessaly, Jason of Pherae, whose relative Nicesipolis
Philip married. The reaching of an understanding between Philip and the
Thessalian aristocracy was facilitated by the fact that both Macedonia and
Thessaly were still relatively primitive civilizations with value systems
more reminiscent of the Homeric era than the Greek polis of the second
half of the 4th century. A characteristic feature of their culture was the
binding of ritualised friendship (xenia) between the elites of different
states by exchanging gifts and appropriate favours to the aristocracies. The
most famous example of this tradition is related in Book 6 of The Iliad
where Diomedes and Glaucus, from opposing sides, meet on the battlefield
outside Troy but do not fight when they realise they are bound by the ties
of xenia between their families. In the Archaic period, when the state was
45
Satyr., F25 ap. Ath., 13.5, perhaps after Theopompus. Schorn 2004, pp. 421-430.
Carney 2000, pp. 51-81 relates the long scholarly discussion on this passage.

20

Chapter I

still a relatively new and weak entity, aristocrats from various Greek poleis
and even from beyond Greece world were bound together by xenia, which
meant there was greater solidarity within their social group than political
loyalty towards their particular countries. Such was the world of the
charismatic leader of the Athenian aristocrats Alcibiades at the time of the
Peloponnesian War, but by the 4th century identification with ones polis
became a stronger force dictating the political actions of the social elites
rather than their ritualised friendships, which were now strictly relegated
to their private lives. Yet this was not the case with Thessaly, which was
still ruled by great aristocratic families, whose representatives now
showered Philip with gifts and with whom he was now bonded by two of
his seven marriages. On account of the countrys strategic location, the
subjugation of Thessaly and its subsequent loyalty throughout Philip and
Alexanders reigns was the foundation stone of the empires of both of
these two great Argeads. By controlling Thessaly they not only had control
of the road between central Greece and Macedonia, but also the ability to
raise a very large army, especially an unmatched cavalry of 3,000-6,000
riders, whose contributions to the victories at Issus and Gaugamela cannot
be overrated.46
The threat from the Illyrians brought Macedonia closer to the
Molossian kingdom in Epirus. This tribal state was, like Macedonia itself,
situated on the borderlands of the Greek world. It was ruled by the Aiacid
dynasty, which traced its origins to Neoptolemus the son of Achilles. After
Neoptolemus death the Molossian throne was taken over by his brother
Arybbas. In 357 Arybbas sealed his alliance with Philip II of Macedonia
by giving him as wife his niece Olympias, who in her childhood may have
also been called Myrtale or Polyxena. Plutarch cites from an unknown
source a story in which Philip becomes enamoured of her during their first
encounter while she was performing initiations in the Cabiric mysteries at
Samothrace. Regardless of the historical veracity of this romantic tale, this
is widely regarded to have been a political marriage. Soon afterwards the
weak Molossian kingdom became a de facto vassal state of Macedonia.
Most probably in 342 Philip II installed Olympias brother Alexander on
that kingdoms throne. Alexander had spent several years at the
Macedonian court, where he gained the trust of his powerful brother-inlaw. According to some sources, he had also become an object of Philips

46

Cawkwell 1978, pp. 58-62; Griffith 1979, pp. 220-223; Buckler 1989, pp. 48,
58-84; Rhodes 1994, pp. 585-586; Sprawski 2000; Sprawski 2004; Hammond
1994, pp. 45-49; Corvisier 2002, pp. 205-222. On xenia see: Herman 1987 and
Mitchell 2002. Thessalian cavalry: Lendon 2005, pp. 98-102.

Childhood, Family, Macedonia

21

homosexual desires. The hapless Arybbas and his sons had to seek refuge
in Athens.47
Of equal importance was Macedonias expansion to the northeast. Here
the first city Philip conquered was Amphipolis, an important colony
founded by the Athenians in 437/436 on the river Strymon not far from its
estuary into the Aegean. After 424 it broke away from Athens but
continued to be much desired territory and was repeatedly but each time
unsuccessfully besieged by the Athenians. Unlike the Athenians, who in
preceding years had in vain tried to make Amphipolis surrender by
imposing a blockade, Philip captured the city in 357 after an aggressive
siege during which the walls were demolished with battering rams.
Amphipolis was permanently incorporated into the Macedonian kingdom.
That same year Philip II also took Pydna. This city was allied to Athens,
but at the time the Athenians were engaged in war with rebellious
members of the Second Maritime League. The next city he took over in
357 was Crenides in Thrace together with its adjacent gold mines. This
was done in response to a request made by the Greek inhabitants
themselves, who preferred the Macedonian ruler to the Odrysian king
Cersobleptes. Under Philip IIs rule Crenides maintained its Greek
character and system of government, like Amphipolis, but it did change its
name to Philippi, which was the first instance in the Greek world of a city
being named after its founder. Exploitation of the mineral resources of
Thrace gave Philip the incredibly vast by ancient Greek standards annual
revenue of 1,000 talents and went a long way to cover the costs of his
constant wars. By 355 Philip gained full control of the Thermaic Gulf.
Methone was the last city Philip captured on this seaboard, during the
siege of which he lost his right eye, struck by an arrow fired from the
beleaguered city. The struggle to subjugate Thrace lasted intermittently
almost throughout Philips reign as a result of which a large part of that
country was indirectly ruled by the Macedonian king perhaps on the
principles of the Persian satrapy system. However, the most important
stage in the conquest of territories to the east of Macedonia was the
conflict with the Chalcidian League. In the 4th century Greek cities on the
Chalcidice Peninsula formed a federal state with common citizenship, law,
coinage and a powerful army. When he was still weak Philip II won the
leagues favour by ceding it Potidaea. But in 349 he waged war, the
47

Diod., 16.72.1, 19.51; Plu., Alex., 2; Plu., Pyrrh., 1; Satyr., ap. Ath., 13.5; Paus.,
1.11.1; Just., 7.6.10, 8.6, 9.7, 17.3.14; Tod, GHI, 173. Griffith 1979, pp. 305-308,
504-506; Borza 1990, pp. 207-208; Hammond 1994, pp. 30, 120-122; Carney
1987, p. 41; Carney 2000, pp. 62-64; Carney 2006, pp. 12-16; Corvisier 2002, pp.
91-93.

22

Chapter I

climax of which was the siege of Olynthus. Athenian indecision,

procrastination and finally inadequate help sealed the fate of the city,
which was stormed and destroyed by Philip in 348. The conquest of
Thrace and Chalcidice allowed Philip to grant generous allotments of land
to his hetairoi and other veterans, which increased the number of
Macedonias potential army recruits, and among the beneficiaries ensured
feelings of gratitude to the king. Philips and Alexanders commitment to
founding settlements in freshly conquered land is attested in 4th-century
inscriptions from that area.48
The primary reason Philip II of Macedonia got involved in Greeces
internal politics was the Third Sacred War, which like all the sacred wars
was fought in defence of the Delphic Shrine of Apollo, to whom Philip
showed particular reverence since the start of his reign. The wars
outbreak may be seen as an outcome of the political chaos in Greece
towards the end of the first half of the 4th century, when after the death of
the great Theban general Epaminondas at the Battle of Mantinea in 362
none of the contemporary major powers were strong enough to impose full
hegemony. Many Greek states also experienced internal strife (stasis), in
which foreign powers got involved. This is what affected the tiny polis of
Delphi. In 363 a group of supporters of neighbouring Phocis were expelled
from Delphi on the instigation of Thebes and her allies in the
Amphictionic Council, which was in charge of Apollos sanctuary. In 357
the Amphictionic Council passed a motion (probably raised by Delphi and
supported by Thebes and her allies) imposing a heavy fine of 500 talents
on the Phocians, who were charged with farming land belonging to
Apollo, i.e. the Delphic sanctuary. The Phocians did not pay the fine, for
which they were condemned at the next gathering of the Amphictionic
Council in 356. It was then that the Phocian political leaders Philomelus
and Onomarchus, having secured the backing of Sparta, which had also
been burdened with an equally heavy fine for crimes perpetrated against
Thebes, managed to persuade the Phocian League to invade Delphi and
take over her treasures and the sanctuary. Indeed, that was what happened,
as a consequence of which Philomeluss troops also massacred Locrian
soldiers who had come to defend Delphi. This lawlessness was accepted
by Athens and Sparta, which by de facto supporting the Phocians wanted
to punish Thebes and use the fact the latter would be preoccupied with the

48

Momigliano 1975, p. 132; Kienast 1994, pp. 24-27; Borza 1990, pp. 212-216;
Hammond 1994, pp. 31-40; Spawforth 2007, p. 92. Inscriptions: Syll.3 332, SEG
36.626, 40.542; see Errington 1998.

Childhood, Family, Macedonia

23

Delphic conflict to achieve their own political objectives. In October 356

the Amphictionic Council declared war on the Phocians.49
A relatively weak Phocian militia was augmented with mercenaries
hired for money that had been stolen from the Delphic sanctuary. Taking
the Amphityonic Councils side in this armed conflict were the Boeotian
League, Thessaly and other smaller states which wished to punish the
sacrilegious plunderers. In 355, chiefly supported by Thessaly, Thebes
defeated the Phocians at the Battle of Neon. Erroneously considering this
victory the end of the conflict, Thebes, for Persian money, now sent her
best commander Pammenes and 5,000 hoplites to Asia Minor. Meanwhile
the new Phocian leader Onomarchus raised a new mercenary army and
restarted the war. Philips aforementioned victory over the Phocians at the
Battle of the Crocus Field in 352 gave him control of Thessaly, but it, too,
did not end the Sacred War, for there were other Greek states on the
Phocian side. Among them was Athens, where Demosthenes, the leader of
an anti-Macedonian party and one of the greatest orators of Antiquity, was
now rising to prominence. However, Philips subsequent victories in
Thrace and on the Chalcidice Peninsula forced Athens to finally try and
secure a status quo through the Peace of Philocrates (thus named after the
head of the Athenian delegation to the King of Macedonia) in 346. Soon
afterwards Philip ended the Sacred War by occupying Phocis without a
battle and accepting the capitulation of the Phocian army from their leader
Phalaikos. The Amphityonic Council ordered the Phocians to disarm and
remain disarmed until they had repaid the last instalment of their
reparations for the plunder of Delphi. Philip, on the other hand, was
rewarded for his services by being granted the Phocians seat at the
council. On top of that he was awarded the privilege of having precedence
in consulting the oracle (promanteia). This prestigious right had
previously belonged to the Athenians, who were now also being punished
for their sacrilege. These were the rewards for thirteen years of building up
Macedonias strength which ratified Macedonias position of a fully
fledged Greek power. A tangible sign of Philips new status was the
emission of gold coins, which historians first date immediately after the
Peace of Philocrates.50

49

Buckler 1989, pp. 5, 9-29.

Cawkwell 1978, pp. 62-68, 77-113; Montgomery 1985, pp. 42-44; Buckler
1989, pp. 30-142; Hammond 1994, pp. 45-49, 90-108; Corvisier 2002, pp. 222236.
50

24

Chapter I

5. Philip II and Alexanders Macedonian army

The dominance Philip II gained over Greece and much of the Balkan
Peninsula followed by Alexanders conquest of the Persian Empire would
not have been possible without a powerful army. Philip built his army
virtually ex nihilo and continued building it throughout his reign. The
number of Macedonian soldiers Philip deployed in the 358 pitched battle
against the Illyrians included 10,000 infantry and 600 cavalry,51 which,
considering the battles significance, must have represented the
Macedonian states full military might. When 24 years later Alexander led
12,000 phalangites and 3,500 cavalry into Asia, he left another 12,000
infantry and 1,500 cavalry in Europe. Such a massive rise in numbers over
a time of just one generation was only possible thanks to territorial
expansion and therefore also a population expansion allowing for a larger
number of army recruits. On the other hand, the Macedonian armys
expansion also reflected Philip IIs revenues, for all these soldiers, be they
Macedonians or mercenaries, had to be paid.
The basic type of military formation in Philip IIs army was the
Macedonian phalanx, which differed quite considerably from the similarly
named Greek phalanx. Diodorus describes how this infantry was formed
as follows: Having strengthened the army units and properly equipped the
soldiers, he constantly organised armed exercises. He also invented a form
of tight formation and the equipment for his phalanx.52 Attempts have
been made to interpret this passing comment as referring to the fact that
Philip had his soldiers arm themselves in accordance with his own
stipulations from their own private funds.53 This, however, is an over
interpretation of Diodorus text, in which he clearly states that Philip
provided the equipment for his men. In all probability in 359 Philip II
made a breakthrough in military history by deciding that his troops would
be supplied with arms at the states expense. This was of course a huge
burden for the royal treasury, but as later events in his reign showed it
was one the state was able to bear. This was so especially when we
consider that a thus equipped army resulted in future victories, which in
turn gave the monarch additional revenues in the form of loot, tributes,
slaves (who were always an easily sellable commodity), taxes and various
other assets that could be gained from conquest. In this way Philip was
able to create a fully armed infantry out of all sorts of recruits, be they
even serfs or people simply not rich enough to buy their own hoplite
51

Diod., 16.4.3.
Diod., 16.3.1-2 after Philips contemporary Ephorus; see Hammond 1994, p. 25.
53
Griffith 1979, pp. 420-421.
52

Childhood, Family, Macedonia

25

panoplia.54 The fact that the king was able to provide armour for each
infantryman meant that the creation of an army was limited only by the
availability of men in the recruiting age, which in populous Macedonia
could be tens of thousands of recruits. By contrast, in a typical polis the
figure would not even be in thousands but more often than not in
hundreds, for the number of adult males usually ranged between 230 and
1250.55
The most basic and famous element of the Macedonian phalangites
weaponry, one which distinguished them from the soldiers of other
contemporary formations, was a spear or pike called the sarissa.56 Though
no complete sarissa has survived to this day, accounts from ancient
sources, iconographic images and quite numerous metal remnants of
various types of sarissai have provided considerable information about
this spear. We know that the shaft was made of very hard and elastic
cornel-wood (cornus mas), which grew in abundance in Macedonia. The
philosopher Theophrastus, who was a contemporary of Philip II and
Alexander and knew Macedonia well, states that the longest sarissai of
that period measured 12 cubits. Unfortunately it is difficult to determine its
precise length in modern measurements as a cubit (the length of a forearm)
could vary between 44 and 52.5 cm. Most historians estimate that the
sarissa in Philip II and Alexanders day measured between 4.5 and 5.5 m.
According to Polybius, the spears length was extended in the Hellenistic
period to approximately 16 cubits (over 6 m), which increased its range
but diminished the Macedonian phalanxs manoeuvrability.57 The infantry
used three quite different types of sarissa. The lightest version weighed
approximately 3 kg. It was also one of the two shorter versions, measuring
4.5 m, and had a relatively light iron spearhead. The other shorter version
was of the same length, but as well as having a longer spearhead and
ferrule (together measuring c. 0.5 m) it also had a metal spike at the base.
Thus it weighed approximately 5.35 kg. The longer version of sarissa
measured 5.5 m and its wooden shaft was considerably thicker than in the
shorter types so as to reduce its vibrations when in use. The spearhead was
with a ferrule and as in the other shorter version the butt end also had a
metal spike. On account of its additional length and thickness it weighed c.
6.2 kg. These measurements have been arrived at on the basis of excavated
metal parts of the sarissa and reconstructions of the spear made by
54

Errington 1990, pp. 238-239; Billows 1994, pp. 13-14.

Ruschenbusch 1985.
56
On sarissa mostly after Markle 1982.
57
Thphr., HP, 3.12.2; Plb., 18.29.2. Griffith 1979, p. 421; Mixter 1992; Noguera
Borel 1999.
55

26

Chapter I

archaeologists. There were several reasons why the sarissa was weighted
down by a metal spike at the base. Firstly, it counterweighted the
spearhead and ferrule, thanks to which the phalangite could grasp the spear
further back with 2/3 or even 4/5 of the spear in front of him. Thus the
range of phalangite sarissai was considerably greater than that of the
spears of their opponents. The metal spikes could also be fixed in the
ground when the sarissai were used against cavalry attacks. Finally, if a
sarissa was broken in battle, a phalangite could continue fighting with the
rest of the shaft by using the spears pointed butt as a replacement
spearhead.
The phalangites weaponry was supplemented with a sword or dagger.
Macedonian swords excavated at Vergine are about 55 cm long and their
shape indicates that they were used for both cutting and thrusting. In battle
the sword was a reserve weapon to be resorted to once the sarissai were
broken and of no further use. The sword was also used when the phalanx
formation was broken as the sarissa, unlike hoplite spears, was not
suitable for man-to-man fighting. Swords were also naturally used when
storming city walls in situations where sarissai were totally ineffective.58
Archaeologists examining an ancient cemetery at Vergine have
uncovered the graves of ordinary Macedonian soldiers who had most
probably served in the phalanx and were buried with elements of their
fighting gear. One of the reasons why these finds are so significant is the
fact that they date from immediately after the reign of Alexander the Great
and therefore provide us with an insight into how soldiers of that time
were equipped, many of whom would have served under Alexanders
command. The graves contain the spearheads of both sarissai and hoplite
spears, though the latter actually outnumber the former by approximately
three to one. No doubt to a certain extent this reflects proportions in which
both types of weapon were used in Alexanders army. The phalangites
would have been trained to use both the sarissa and the hoplite type of
spear, just as they would have been taught to use the sword and no doubt
also the javelin. All sorts of weapon were used depending on the situation
and the sarissa was in all probability reserved for pitched battles. The lack
of spearheads of an indisputable sarissa type to be found during the
excavation of Olynthus has even led some scholars to believe that
originally Philips phalanx was armed with ordinary hoplite spears and
that the sarissa was introduced only towards the end of his reign.59

58
59

Markle 1982, pp. 101-102.

Markle 1978; Markle 1982, pp. 98-99.

Childhood, Family, Macedonia

27

No source actually states that Macedonian phalangites did not wear

abdominal armour, but, on the other hand, nor is such armour mentioned
in any of the major sources. It is not mentioned either in the inventory of
the Macedonian soldiers gear inscribed at Amphipolis during the reign of
Philip V or in Polyaenus description of how Philip II trained his phalanx:
Philip used to train the Macedonians before battles, making them take
their arms and march for 300 stades [54 km] carrying their helmets,
shields, greaves, sarissas, plus in addition to their arms a stock of
provisions and all the utensils necessary for daily life. It is difficult to
treat the exclusion of such an important item as body armour from both
lists as a mere coincidence and it is therefore fair to assume that in all
probability, with the exception of officers, most 4th- and early 3rd-centrury
phalangites did not wear metal body armour. Some of them at least,
however, are very likely to have worn non metal armour, e.g. linen or
leather corselets.60 Various explanations are given by military historians
for this. Some are of the opinion that this was Philips decision reflecting
new trends in Greek armies. Certain sources suggest that after the
Peloponnesian War there was a discernable trend in reducing the amount
of protective armour worn by hoplites, some of whom went into battle in
leather jerkins instead of the heavy and expensive bronze armour. This
could have been a result of hoplites imitating the highly effective peltast
mercenaries, who did not wear armour. It could also simply mean that
people were now being recruited to serve in the phalanx who could not
afford a full set of armour. Another possible reason could have been the
sheer advantage of dispensing with armour that weighed from over a
dozen to 20 kg during long marches. Thus alleviated soldiers had a far
greater ability to surprise the enemy and perform much more flexibly in
the battlefield, for such phalanx could carry out the more complex
manoeuvres; ones for which the armies of Philip and Alexander were
famous. Finally, armour was superfluous when arrows and javelins raining
down on the Macedonian phalanx could be deflected by a dense forest of
sarissai. Moreover the greater length of the sarissai meant that Greek
hoplite spears could not anyhow reach the Macedonian phalangites.61
These are all very hypothetical arguments, however, especially when even
sources describing successive battles fought by Alexander tell us that the
Macedonian phalanx incurred loses in clashes with Greek hoplites.
Therefore even with their longer sarissai Macedonian phalangites were
60

Feyel 1935; Polyaen., 4.2.10 in Krentz translation. Griffith 1979, pp. 422-423;
Lush 2007.
61
Markle 1982, p. 94; Borza 1990, pp. 288-289; Hammond 1994, p. 18-19. On
deflecting arrows by the dense forest of sarissai: Plb., 18.30.3-4.

28

Chapter I

not invulnerable. Above all the argument that armour was superfluous is
countered by the fact that phalangite officers wore it. In accordance with
the universal custom of that period, officers were recruited from higher
social groups than ordinary soldiers and therefore they would have been
able to afford to buy armour if it offered them significant protection during
battle. This suggests that there may have been non-military reasons for not
equipping Macedonian phalangites with abdominal armour, which, apart
from the shield, was the most expensive item of a phalangites gear. It is
therefore plausible that Philip took into account the fact that most
phalangites could not afford abdominal armour and, what is more, on
account of the cost of constant wars, nor could his treasury. In other words
he realised he would have to economise on this particular expenditure.
Having to decide between a small, at most a couple of thousand-strong,
hoplite army and a much larger though less well armoured army of
phalangites, Philip chose the latter. As it turned out, he made the right
decision.62
Thus a phalangites protective armour was generally limited to the
helmet and shield. The phalangites helmet did not offer as much
protection as that of the hoplites (among whom the most popular sort was
of the Corinthian type), but it was lighter to wear and did not limit the field
of vision so much. Both these factors would have been significant for the
Macedonian phalanx, which had to be very mobile and flexible. The
phalangite suspended his shield on a strap around his neck and shoulder as
he needed to hold his long sarissa with both hands. Moreover, his shield,
called the telamon, was much smaller than the hoplite aspis shield; the
former measuring on average 60 cm in diameter as opposed to ca. 90 cm
in diameter of the aspis. This reduced size meant that the shield would not
hinder movement when marching in battle formation. Although the
telamon offered less protection, it allowed the Macedonian phalanx to
fight in a tighter formation than its Greek equivalent.63
Even the shortest sarissa was more than twice as long as the hoplite
spear, which in the 4th century measured approximately 2.1-2.2 m and
weighed slightly over 1 kg. These two different types of weapon were
used differently. The hoplite would grip his spear with his right hand more
or less in the middle and when attacking the enemy he would raise it above
his head so as to thrust it on the opponent from above. The phalangite, on
the other hand, need both hands to hold his long sarissa. The best
description of a phalanx attacking with sarissai is provided by Polybius:
62
63

Griffith 1979, pp. 423-424; Billows 1990, p. 31; Billows 1994, pp. 12-13.
Markle 1982, pp. 92-93; Markle 1999; Lendon 2005, pp. 123-124, 417-418.

Childhood, Family, Macedonia

29

That when the phalanx has its characteristic virtue and strength, nothing
can sustain its frontal attack or withstand the charge can be easily
understood for many reasons. For since, when it has closed up for action,
each man, with his arms, occupies a space of three feet in breadth, and the
length of the pikes is according to the original design sixteen cubits, but
has now been adapted to the actual need of fourteen cubits, from which we
must subtract the distance between the bearer's two hands and the length
of the weighted portion of the pike behind, which serves to keep it
couched four cubits in all it is evident that it must extend ten cubits
beyond the body of each hoplite when he charges the enemy grasping it
with both hands. The consequence is that while the pikes of the second,
third, and fourth ranks extend farther than those of the fifth rank, but even
those of the fifth rank extend two cubits beyond the bodies of the men in
the first rank. Of course this is only possible when the phalanx has its
characteristic close order as regards to both depth and breadth This
description is both true and fine, and it is evident that each man of the first
rank must have the points of five pikes extending beyond him, each at a
distance of two cubits from the next. From this we can easily conceive
what is the nature and force of a charge by the whole phalanx when it is
sixteen deep. In this case those further back than the fifth rank cannot use
their pikes so as to take any active part in the battle. Therefore they do not
severally level their pikes, but hold them slanting up in the air over the
shoulders of those in front of them, so as to protect the whole formation
from above, keeping off by this serried mass of pikes all missiles which,
passing over the heads of the first ranks, might fall on those in front of and
behind them. But these men by the sheer pressure of their bodily weight in
the charge add to its force, and it is quite impossible for the first ranks to
face about.64
Written virtually as an addendum to his account of the 197 battle of
Cynoscephalae, Polybius description of a contemporary Macedonian
phalanx includes many significant characteristics in common with the
phalanx formation of the last of the great Argeads. The most significant
feature mentioned is the extension of the sarissai held by five ranks of
phalangites in front of the first rank. Of course one should not imagine that
these pikes were held in a stationary position in all probability each
phalangite would be manoeuvring and thrusting his weapon in an attempt
to get at the enemy. With five ranks taking part in the fighting that was
two ranks more than in the Greek phalanx, and that of course gave the
Macedonian phalanx a natural advantage. The Macedonian phalanx in
64

Plb., 18.29-30.

30

Chapter I

Philip IIs time and for most of his sons reign was most probably eight
ranks deep. According to the account of Callisthenes, that was, indeed,
how many ranks there were in Alexanders phalanx at the Battle of Issus
in 333.65 The three ranks that did not directly engage in battle formed a
tactical reserve which could, for instance, turn about if the enemy tried to
attack the phalanx from behind. Ancient sources testify that various
manoeuvres were carried out by the phalanxes of Philip II and Alexander:
the last ranks turning round to face the opposite direction; moving aside to
let through charging chariots or feigning a retreat from the battlefield. We
also know that the Macedonian phalanx was able to fight in both loose and
tight formations, depending on what the situation required. If we add to
this the ability of phalangites to expertly use diverse weapons, it becomes
very apparent that these skills were acquired through persistently long and
rigorous training. The above-mentioned sources (Diodorus and Polyaenus)
recount intensive exercises with weapons and 30-stadion marches fully
armed, with provisions and other necessary equipment. Such training not
only developed physical strength and endurance, but also made the
phalanx act as a single unit automatically and reliably able to follow the
commanders orders even in the thick of battle. In fact Philip required such
toughness and staying power not just form the phalangites but from all his
soldiers. Polyaenus recounts an anecdote about Philip dismissing a
mercenary officer, Dokimos of Tarentum, for taking a warm bath, which
apparently even Macedonian women would not do after giving birth to a
child.66
Philips phalanx comprised large units called taxeis (taxis in the
singular), each including approximately 1,500 soldiers. At the start of his
Asian campaign Alexander had eight such units. During his reign
particular taxeis were recruited from particular regions. We know of taxeis
being recruited from the Upper Macedonia regions of Tymphaea, Orestis
and Lyncestis as well as Elimeia. We do not know if the whole
Macedonian army was recruited on a territorial basis, but it is certain that
at the time of his expedition to Asia Alexander respected this rule,
allocating troops sent on by Antipater to army units recruited from the
same region. Respecting soldiers territorial loyalty was a way of building
a sense of unity, solidarity and pride in the Macedonian army. Smaller
military units called lochos comprised 240-256 soldiers. The smallest

65

Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35. Griffith 1979, p. 420.

Cawkwell 1978, p. 34; Manti 1992, pp. 37-38; Lloyd 1996, pp. 171-174; Hanson
1999, p. 150; Corvisier 2002, pp. 102-105. Polyaen., 4.2.1.
66

Childhood, Family, Macedonia

31

military unit, called the dekas, in Philip IIs time comprised ten soldiers,
whereas under Alexander the number was increased to 16.67
On account of the significant reduction in armour Macedonian
phalangites could not be categorized like the hoplites of the Greek phalanx
as a classical heavy infantry. Yet despite this formal dissimilarity, the
Macedonian phalanx performed exactly the same role in the battlefield as
the Greek phalanx, only the Macedonian phalangites generally performed
their task better. One of the significant organisational differences between
Greek hoplite phalanxes and those of Philip II was the elimination of
supply trains and a reduction in the number of army servants. In the
Macedonian army there was a servant to every cavalryman and one
servant to every ten phalangites, whereas in the Greek army every hoplite
was usually accompanied by his own servant who actually took no part in
the fighting. The limited number of servants greatly enhanced the
Macedonian armys mobility and logistical capabilities. Unable to rely on
supply trains and servants to be employed as porters, the phalangites were
forced to greatly limit the amount of camp equipment they took on
expeditions. Moreover, given that similar numbers of soldiers were
involved, the Macedonian army required more or less half as much food as
a Greek army regardless of whether they were fighting on behalf of their
own polis or as mercenaries serving the Persians. Without the supply trains
the Macedonian army was able to move surprisingly quickly and stay in
occupied territories for much longer, living, as was the military custom of
those times, off the enemys land, i.e. plundering or commandeering food
and other property.68
The Greek armies of the 4th century included elite groups of heavy
infantry of which the most famous was the so-called Theban Sacred Band,
founded in 378. This fairly small unit of just 300 hoplites, according to
ancient sources, comprised specially selected pairs of homosexual lovers.
In the opinion of Greek military theorists, this guaranteed that each soldier
would rather get himself killed in battle than show himself up in front of
his lover as a coward. Apart from the sexual orientation, purely physical
attributes were also taken into consideration and each such soldier
underwent thorough infantry and cavalry training so as to make the Sacred
Band a fully professional unit whose military value could at least be
compared to that of todays commando units. They were commanded by
67

Anaximenes, FGrH, 72 F4; Diod., 17.57.2; Curt., 4.13.28; Arr., An., 3.16.11.
Milns 1976, pp. 89, 103-105; Errington 1990, pp. 242-243; Lloyd 1996, pp. 171172; Sekunda 2007, pp. 330-331.
68
Fron., Str., 4.1.6. Garlan 1994, p. 689; Hanson 1999, pp. 149, 174-176; van
Wees 2000, p. 109; Carney 2006, pp. 67-68.

32

Chapter I

the very best Theban commanders: Epaminondas, Pelopidas and

Pammenes. In pitched battles the Sacred Band would be positioned
opposite the strongest section of the enemys frontline. Its task was to
break through the ranks of this part of the enemys phalanx and kill the
enemys leader, at which point the battle was usually victoriously ended.
There are also known cases of the Sacred Band carrying out military
operations on its own.69 Historians presume that here too the Theban
example inspired Philip, who, according to Theopompus, decided to form
an elite infantry battalion comprising the tallest and strongest
Macedonians. In Philips time they were called the pezhetairoi (foot
companions) and modelled on the aristocratic cavalry hetairoi
(companions), which no doubt served to raise the new battalions
prestige and sense of self-esteem. The pezhetairoi served as the royal
guards and the elite unit must have been created early on because,
according to Demosthenes, it was already present in 350. Alexander,
wishing to win over the infantry, extended the prestigious name
pezhetairoi to refer to the whole phalanx, whereas the elite unit,
comprising by then most probably 3,000 soldiers, was re-named
hypaspists. The new name was derived from the word aspis, the hoplite
shield, which suggests that the hypaspists were armed similarly to the
hoplites. In the Macedonian army, especially under Alexander, the
hypaspists were entrusted with performing the most difficult and
physically demanding tasks such as the capturing of cities or crossing
mountainous barriers, while in the battle they often covered the exposed
right flank of the phalanx.70
The continuous stress on creating a strong Macedonian infantry did not
mean the Macedonian cavalry was neglected. On the contrary, Philip II
greatly enlarged and enhanced this part of his army. During his reign the
number of cavalrymen rose from approximately 600 at the time of his first
battle in Illyria to 3,500 by the end of his reign. These figures only refer to
the Macedonian cavalry, but from 352 Philip II and Alexander also had at
their disposal large cavalry units recruited from Thessaly and other
countries. The Macedonian cavalry comprised two basic formations: the
hetairoi or Companion cavalry, originating from the traditional aristocracy
who had formed the core of the Macedonian army before Philips rise to
power, and the prodromoi or Scouts. The hetairoi wore abdominal armour
69

DeVoto 1992.
Theopomp., FGrH, 115 F348; D., ap. Phot., s.v. peztairoi; EM, s.v.
peztairoj; Hsch., pezetaroij; Anaximenes, FGrH, 72 F4. Milns 1976, pp. 89-96;
Griffith 1979, pp. 414-418; Errington 1990, pp. 244-245; Billows 1990, p. 32;
Ashley 1998, p. 40; Lendon 2005, p. 125; Thomas 2007, pp. 78-79.
70

Childhood, Family, Macedonia

33

and helmets, and in terms of protective as well as offensive gear they were
better equipped than most of the opposing cavalries they encountered in
Philip II and Alexanders time. The prodromoi, on the other hand, were a
typical light cavalry. They also had good horses and a high military value
equivalent to that of the Thessalian cavalry. Thessalian horsemen wore
less armour than the hetairoi and instead of the sarissa, each rider had two
javelins and a curved sword. The light cavalry also included contingents
from Thrace and Paionia.71
The fact that another verified name for these mounted scouts is
sarissophoroi allows us to assume that their chief weapon was the sarissa.
This was also a weapon of the hetairoi. Iconographic sources show that
unlike the Sarmatian cavalry or Macedonian infantry the Macedonian
cavalry held the sarissa with just one hand, not both. This was possible
because the sarissa used by the cavalry, alternatively called the xyston,
was shorter (4.5 m, and some historians even believe it to have been no
longer than 3 m) and lighter than its equivalent used in the infantry.
Another difference in the cavalry version was an iron sleeve in the centre
of the shaft. Its purpose is not entirely clear and one cannot be certain that
historians who claim that it was used to bind two separate parts of the shaft
are right: the sleeves length (16 cm) was just not long enough. Perhaps
the sleeve was put on a single dogwood shaft to give the rider a better grip
on the spear. Like the heavy infantry sarissa, the cavalry equivalent had an
iron tipped stub serving as a reserve spearhead if the front part of the spear
was broken, which happened quite frequently in battle. Moreover it
provided a counterbalance so that the cavalryman was able to hold 60% of
the spear (counting from the tip of the spearhead) in front of him, which
meant that he had a better chance of spearing an opponent before being
struck himself. We do not know when Philip II equipped his cavalry with
sarissai. Some historians presume that they were first used at the Battle of
Chaeronea. Apart from the sarissa, riders also had slightly curved swords
used for cutting and javelins. The hetairoi, fitted in armour and holding
long spears, should not be compared to a European cavalry in the Middle
Ages, for in antiquity two basic pieces of equipment later considered to be
indispensable were quite unknown: the saddle and the stirrups. Without
these not only controlling a horse was much more difficult than in later
times but also the riders stability on the horse left a lot to be desired. This
of course made the training of riders a very long and difficult process, but
it also affected the method of fighting. The Macedonians were the first in
71

Garlan 1994, p. 687; Hammond 1996, pp. 31-32; Hanson 1999, p. 150; Lush
2007, pp. 16-17.

34

Chapter I

the west to successfully master cavalry charges with lances where the
momentum of the charging horse greatly increased the weapons impact.
However, the hetairoi could not use their sarissai like a medieval lance
which was aimed at the easiest target, i.e. the opponents chest and
stomach, for without a saddle the recoil from the impact could easily
knock the charging rider off his horse. To avoid this, Macedonian riders
aimed their sarissa at the opponents head. Though this was a much more
difficult target to hit, if correctly executed, it greatly reduced the risk of
being thrown off ones horse.72
The 4th century brought to Greece a cavalry renaissance, for in
preceding centuries it had been a completely marginalised part of the
armed forces. Poleis, at least the larger ones, now expanded their old
cavalry units or founded quite new ones. In Athens the number of riders
was increased to 1,000. However, the Greek cavalry still by and large
played secondary roles: carrying out reconnaissance, protecting the
phalanx flanks during battle and chasing the defeated enemy. The great
reformers of the Boeotian army Pelopidas and Epaminondas had
experimented with using the cavalry to attack the flanks of enemy
phalanxes and that could not have escaped Philips notice. But it was only
when Philip became king that the cavalry started being used to attack and
break up enemy infantry formations on a large scale, and later this method
of warfare was further developed with great success by Alexander. The
Macedonian cavalry attacked in a wedge formation, which was an idea
adopted from the Scythians either directly or via the Thracians. The
hetairois basic tactical unit, called the ile, comprised 136 cavalrymen who
when attacking formed a wedge of sixteen ranks in which the number of
riders in each rank was follows: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15 and 16. Such a configuration enabled the cavalry unit to effectively
search for weak points in the enemys infantry formations. It also made a
difference in the midst of the battles chaos and noise when normally the
commanding officers verbal orders or signals could go unnoticed by the
riders. With the commanding officer at the front of a wedge shaped
formation the hetairoi could always see him and therefore even in the
thick of battle they were able to tactically retreat and carry out other
manoeuvres.73

72

Markle 1982, pp. 89-91; Manti 1983; Manti 1994; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 74-75;
Borza 1990, pp. 203-205; Mixter 1992, pp. 25-27; Hammond 1996, pp. 30-31.
73
Arr., Tact., 16.6. Markle 1978, p. 486; Lane Fox 1973, p. 75; Daniel 1992;
Corvisier 2002, pp. 107-108; Worthington 2004, p. 12; Carney 2006, pp. 65-66;
Sekunda 2007, pp. 331-332.

Childhood, Family, Macedonia

35

However, the greatest breakthrough in 4th-century western warfare

concerned military engineering and siege techniques. The first ever war
machines in Greek history were used by Pericles in 440/439 during the
Athenian siege of Samos. They included a battering ram and special sheds
(chelonai) to protect the soldiers beneath the walls. Siege machines were
also used during the Peloponnesian War, though here they did not prove to
be very successful. More often than not cities were forced to surrender
after a long blockade or alternatively a traitor was found to open the gate.
Thus even the armies of great military powers frequently needed many
months to defeat a relatively small city-state; the most spectacular example
was the two-year (429-427) siege of Plataea by the Peloponnesians and
Thebans. The taking and not only besieging of enemy fortresses was
begun by the tyrant of Syracuse Dionysius the Elder in the long lasting
war against the Carthaginians in Sicily. In 397, during the famous siege of
the islands main Punic fortress Motya, he successfully used siege towers.
This machine he had in fact copied off the Carthaginians, who had
preserved the Near Eastern techniques of siege warfare. It was also during
this siege that catapults, a Greek invention, were for the first time used.74
Though Dionysius military engineering achievements had been
known in Greece since around 375, the large scale application of these
methods was first begun by Philip II. Already in 357, at the start of his
reign, he captured Amphipolis using battering rams to destroy part of the
citys walls. In his next important siege Olynthus 349/348 he used not
only battering rams but also machines throwing projectiles. During
excavations in this town archaeologists have discovered many large
bronze spearheads measuring 6.6-7 cm. Some bear Philips name and were
therefore without a doubt fired by the Macedonian kings soldiers. These
had been the heads of 1.8 m-long spears with an approximately 2.5 cm
diameter that could be fired some 300 m from a catapult which did not
resemble later machines of that name. This original catapult, referred to in
some sources as the oxybeles, was more similar to the medieval crossbow
and, indeed, it fired bolts.75 It was after the capture of Olynthus that the
greatest advances in siege warfare were made. At the 340 siege of
Perinthus Philip had at his disposal battering rams, bolt firing machines,
city wall scaling ladders and siege towers that were 36 m tall, therefore
higher than the cities fortifications. At that stage the towers were probably
not yet mobile. Instead they were transported in parts and reconstructed
close to the enemy fortress walls. At the next battle, that of Byzantium,
74
75

Diod., 12.28.2-3, 13.54.7, 14.49-53.

Aen. Tact., 32.8; Diod., 16.8.2. Marsden 1977; Snodgrass 1999, pp. 116-117.

36

Chapter I

Philips army now had improved siege machines constructed by Polyeidus

of Thessaly. Undoubtedly these would have already included stone
throwing catapults which utilised the energy accumulated in coiled ropes
lines made from human hair.76

6. Alexanders childhood and school years

Extant ancient sources provide surprisingly little information on the first
13 years of the future great conquerors life. What we have are chiefly
anecdotes mainly preserved in the works of Plutarch. The obvious purpose
of these anecdotes was to illustrate Alexanders personality and his
philosophical virtues, which were incidentally compatible with the method
Plutarch had formulated himself: For it is not Histories that I am writing,
but Lives; and in the most illustrious deeds there is not always a
manifestation of virtue or vice, nay, a slight thing like a phrase or a jest
often makes a greater revelation of character than battles where thousands
fall77 At the same time, however, events that we would consider to be
noteworthy are frequently left out. For example, we know Alexander had a
sister called Cleopatra but we do not know the date she was born and
historians can only speculate that it was either in 355 or 354. Cleopatra
was to play an important role in Macedonias history after her brother had
set off on his expedition to the East.78
No doubt soon after his birth Alexander was handed over to a wet
nurse, a well born Macedonian woman by the name of Lanice. It is
possible that the honour of feeding the royal son led to a very strong
family tie with Argead dynasty because three of her sons served
Alexander, two of whom fell at Miletus. Lanices brother Cleitus the
Black became one of Alexanders closest companions, who saved his life
at the Battle of the Granicus only to be later, in 328, speared to death by
Alexander when the latter was in a drunken rage. Historians agree that in
his childhood Alexander was very much under his mothers care and that
he had inherited from her his characteristic impulsiveness, whereas from
Philip level headedness. Alexanders rivalry with his father has frequently
been used as an example to stress how close he was to his mother. These,
however, are mere speculations and historical sources do not allow us to
make such assumptions. On the other hand Olympias may have been
76
Diod., 16.72-76; Ath. Mech., 10.5-10 and Vitr., 10.13.3 (both after
Agesistratos). Marsden 1977; Ferrill 1997, pp. 170-175; Hanson 1999, pp. 155160; van Wees 2000, p. 403; Worthington 2008, pp. 31-32.
77
Plu., Alex., 1.2. Unz 1985, p. 171; Hamilton 1999, pp. xxxviii-xxxix.
78
Satyr., ap. Ath., 13.5. Carney 2000, pp. 75-76.

Childhood, Family, Macedonia

37

instrumental in appointing various teachers for Alexander, among them

Leonidas, who was for a time her sons main tutor, and Lysimachus from
Acarnania, a land neighbouring to Epirus. We know the professional
specialisations of some of the teachers, for example his teachers of music,
but of course there also had to be teachers who were experts of grammar,
arithmetic, rhetoric and astronomy. The names of these teachers are given
in the Alexander Romance but they are not confirmed in other sources and
are therefore not utterly credible. Though sources do not mention this, an
obvious part of the Macedonian princes education, as of every Macedonian
aristocrats education, would have been horse riding and use of weapons.79
Leonidas was a stickler for discipline and it was in such a spirit that he
educated the young Alexander. One day he rebuked Alexander for using
sacrificial incense too liberally saying that he would be able to make such
offerings of incense only once he had conquered the lands from where it
came. Alexander took this incident to heart and later from among the
things he had plundered in Gaza he allegedly sent his teacher 500 talents
of incense and 100 talents of Myrrh, urging him to show the gods
magnanimity.80 With regard to Lysimachus there is a tale that he
introduced the fashion for Alexander and his circle to adopt the names of
Homeric heroes. Lysimachus called himself Phoenix after Achilles
companion; Alexander became Achilles and his father Peleus. We do not
know whether it was Lysimachus who instilled into Alexander his
fascination with Homer but it is certain that Homer was Alexanders
favourite author. Indeed, more than once in his life Alexander tried to
achieve things equal to those achieved by Homers heroes Achilles in
particular. It is possible as well that Alexanders admiration of Achilles
was fostered by his mother Olympias who counted Achilles among her
ancestors.81 Alexander had quite a thorough education in literature, he
knew Euripides by heart and had read other tragic authors, as well as the
dithyrambic poets Telestes and Philoxenus, the historian Philistus and
certainly other authors too. Most of this literature must have been read

79

Curt., 8.2.8-9; Plu., Alex., 5.7-8; Arr., An., 4.9.3-4; Just., 12.6; Ps.-Callisth.,
1.13.4. Berve 1926, no. 462; Wilcken 1967, pp. 53-54; Hamilton 1965, p. 117;
Hamilton 1974, pp. 29-32; Hamilton 1999, p. 16; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 45-46;
Carney 1987, p. 42; Carney 2000, pp. 64-65; Fredricksmeyer 1990, p. 301; Heckel
1992, pp. 34-37.
80
Plu., Alex., 25.6-8; Plu., mor., 179e; Plin., Nat., 12.62.
81
Plu., Alex., 5.8, 8.2; Plu., mor., 327f ; Hom., Il., 9.168-169. Berve 1926, no. 481;
Dascalakis 1965, p. 170 ; Hamilton 1999, p. 14; Carney 2006, p. 6; Thomas 2007,
p. 97.

38

Chapter I

during his school years rather than in adult life when he was so preoccupied
with politics and military affairs.82
Although they are far from coherent with one another, all the stories of
the young princes upbringing indicate that from the earliest years his
parents devoted a lot of attention to it. In the case of Philip, who made all
the most important decisions in the palace and state, this would suggest
that from the start he envisioned Alexander to be his successor instead of
his other son Arrhidaeus, who was born almost at the same time as
Alexander. This could be associated with the fact that the mental
retardation of Arrhidaeus was noticed early in his childhood and this made
the Philips other son quite unsuitable as a candidate to the throne.83
Ancient sources include anecdotes showing Alexander to have been a
boy of great physical dexterity, emotionally mature well above his age,
interested in the outside world, ambitious and aware of his own
importance. He excelled in running but, despite the insistence of his father
and colleagues, refused to compete in the Olympic Games on account of
the fact that unlike him the other competitors would not be monarchs.
Indeed a later legend has him competing in a chariot race at Olympia
against the sons of other kings and satraps. Such tales served to foretell
Alexanders negative attitude to sport or rather his disregard for
sportsmen. When later looking at statues of Olympic and Pythian victors
displayed at Miletus Alexander asked: and where those men of such
magnificent bodies were when the barbarians besieged your town? His
biographer Plutarch interprets Alexanders reservations regarding sport as
an element of the perceived image of a philosopher king who valued the
fine arts, literature and philosophy more than athletic challenges.
Alexanders intellectual maturity and early plans (or perhaps just dreams)
of conquering Asia are illustrated in an anecdote about how at the
Macedonian court, at a time when Philip was absent, emissaries of the
Great King were received by Alexander. He was said to have amazed the
ambassadors by not asking questions as most people his age would have
done about the legendary wealth, the hanging gardens and other wonders
of the Achaemenid court, but about the network of roads, the distances to
places and the position held by the Great King in battle formations.
Finally, Alexanders ambitions and urge to act are expressed in the
concern he is said to have shown on receiving news of his fathers
victories that as a consequence there would be nothing of significance left
for him to later conquer. The most famous incident related by biographers
82
83

Plu., Alex., 8.3 ; Nikobule, FGrH, 127 F2.

Carney 1987, p. 42.

Childhood, Family, Macedonia

39

from Alexanders childhood, one illustrating his ability to control men and
beasts as well as to succeed where others failed, is his taming of a horse
called Bucephalus. This magnificent black Thessalian stallion had been
offered for sale to Philip by a man called Philoneicus, but the horse would
not allow itself to be mounted. Later legend even has it devouring human
flesh. However, Alexander, who had cleverly noticed that the horses wild
behaviour resulted from the fact that it was afraid of its own shadow, was
able to calm the animal down, mount it and then ride it. The onlooking
Macedonians, who after all had expert knowledge of horses, were amazed
and his proud father, Philip, was said to exclaim: My son, seek thee out a
kingdom equal to thyself; Macedonia has no room for thee! Bucephalus
was then given to Alexander as a gift by his fathers Greek companion
Demaratus of Corinth, having bought it for the record sum 13 talents at a
time when the average mount cost just one fifth of a talent. Bucephalus
was Alexanders favourite charger throughout his mission east, right up to
India, where it died at an exceptionally old age for a horse. The association
of famous personalities with exceptional horses is a popular topos in
ancient biographies. Nonetheless, with the exception of the amazing claim
that the horse ate human flesh (alluding to the myth of Heracles and the
man-eating mares of Diomedes), the authenticity of the taming of
Bucephalus cannot really be doubted. It was probably first related by
Chares, Alexanders court-marshal.84
In 343/342 Philip employed a new preceptor for Alexander: Aristotle.
He educated Alexander for two years, until 340. The place selected for
their studies was near Mieza, to the south of Macedonia at the foot of
Mount Vermion. This academy also served as a garden shrine to the
Nymphs, with benches and cloisters, and it had already become a tourist
attraction by Plutarchs times. The encounter of the most famous of the
Greek philosophers with a pupil who would become the greatest military
leader of antiquity is the ideal stuff of legends, and, indeed, very much was
made of this episode in the medieval perception of Alexanders life
history. However, in 343/342 Aristotle had not yet written the great works
that would ensure him unrivalled renown over the centuries and so at that
stage he was merely one of many intellectuals active in Greece at the time.
Therefore it would not have been because of his academic status, or rather
not only for this reason, that he was selected to be Alexanders tutor from
84
Diod., 17.76.6; Plu., Alex., 4.8-6.8; Plu., mor., 179d, 331b, 342b-c; Chares, ap.
Gel., 5.2.1-3; Plin., Nat., 8.154; Ps.-Callisth., 1.13, 15, 17, 19; EGen., b208; EM,
s.v. boukfaloj. Brown 1977, pp. 77-78; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 47-48; Baynham
1995, pp. 5-9; Stoneman 1997, p. 15; Hamilton 1999, pp. 13-16; Nawotka 2003,
pp. 26-31, 132-133.

40

Chapter I

among other Greek luminaries (including Isocrates) willing to be

employed by the generous ruler of Macedonia. Working in Aristotles
favour was family tradition, for his father, Nicomachus, had been the
physician of King Amyntas III. Therefore we have reason to believe that
Aristotle was more trusted by the Macedonian court than most other Greek
intellectuals. Someone having such close family connections with the
court and Macedonia in general would not also have raised concerns
among the Macedonian barons, whose opinions Philip had to take into
consideration. According to an attractive though not confirmed by any
sources hypothesis put forward by Werner Jaeger, Philips selection of
Aristotle to become his sons tutor was due to the philosophers ties with
Hermias of Atarneus. This former student of Plato Academy had
succeeded Eubulos (who had been murdered) to become the tyrant of
Atarneus and Assos in Mysia and Erythrai in Ionia and there built a small
state independent of the Great King of Persia. He invited to Assos a group
of philosophers from Platos school. Among them was Aristotle, to whom
Hermias gave away his adopted daughter Pythias. Before he was arrested
by the Greek commander Mentor on the orders of Artaxerxes III in 341,
Hermias had entered into secret negotiations with Philip of Macedonia as a
possible ally against Persia. Werner Jaeger suggests that Aristotles
departure from Assos to Pella may have been associated with these secret
negotiations.85 Of course this is just a hypothesis and it is at least equally
likely that Philips decision to employ Aristotle was based on the
philosophers high qualifications as a scholar and mentor.86
Regardless of whether or not Aristotle had participated in those secret
political negotiations, his task in Macedonia was to educate Alexander. In
4th-century Greece there was no royal route to philosophy and therefore we
may assume that the young princes curriculum was no different to that of
other boys from good homes. Isocrates, who had been greatly disappointed
by the fact that not he but Aristotle had been selected for the post, wrote a
letter to Alexander accusing his tutor of, indeed, not teaching practical
subjects that would be of use to the prince when he became king of
Macedonia. According to Plutarch, the subjects Aristotle selected included
ethics, politics and medicine. He also gave Alexander a copy of The Iliad
which he himself had revised; thus it may be said that the young princes
85

Plu., Alex., 7; Ps.-Callisth., 1.13.4; Diod., 16.52.5-8; D., 10.31-34; Did., In D.,
col. 4.59-6.66. Jaeger 1948, pp. 120-122; Hamilton 1965, p. 118; Brocker 1966;
Wilcken 1967, pp, 54-55; Chroust 1967; Plezia 1968; Green 1974; pp. 52-54;
Badian 1982, p. 38; OBrien 1992, p. 19; Rubinsohn 1993, pp. 1308-1309; Debord
1999, pp. 417-419; Corvisier 2002, p. 263; Green 2003.
86
Griffith 1979, pp. 518-522; Errington 1990, pp. 77-79.

Childhood, Family, Macedonia

41

education started the conventional Greek way with literature and Homer in
particular. It is difficult not to presume that the heroic ideology and cult of
manly virtue (aret) so very apparent in Alexanders adult life had some
connection with the education he had received from Aristotle the author
of a dithyrambic poem praising Hermias aret and heroic death cruelly
inflicted upon him by the Persians. Other authors Aristotle instructed
Alexander to read may have also included Pindar; for when in 335 having
Thebes destroyed Alexander ordered Pindars house to be spared. In all
probability Alexander also received elementary instruction in dialectics
and eristics (the art of disputation). A major issue that remains unknown is
the impact Aristotle as a political thinker had on Alexander. There is no
evidence that as a monarch Alexander adopted his mentors views
regarding the ideal state, which was inspired by the Greek model: a polis
counting approximately 5,000 citizens. Alexander also did not heed advice
to treat barbarians as enemies or even animals, though, in accordance with
his teachers views, he did treat the Greeks living in Asia Minor as allies.
Extant Arabic translations of Aristotles letters to Alexander as well as
references to their correspondence by other authors show that the two must
have for a long time exchanged views on political matters. There can be no
doubt that Aristotles school inspired or at least consolidated in Alexander
the conviction that Greek culture was supreme in the entire world.
However, the Hellenisation of the East and cultural homogeneity
stretching from the Adriatic to the Hindu Kush following Alexanders
conquests were no doubt an unforeseen consequence of this education.
Perhaps of greater importance than the formal knowledge passed on during
lectures at Mieza was the personal contact Alexander had in his formative
years with the greatest mind of the ancient world. The intellectual curiosity
that was aroused at the time indubitably accounts for the fact that
Alexander took learned men with him on his expedition east, gave
instructions to pass back to Aristotle information about the plants and
animals found there and gave financial support for Aristotle to conduct his
research.87
Scholars assume that Alexanders education at Mieza was not in the
form of private lessons but provided in the company of other young
Macedonian aristocrats including those who would later become his
87

Plu., Alex., 7.5-8.3. Ehrenberg 1938, p. 92; Merlan 1954; Wilcken 1967, pp. 5558; Plezia 1968; Stern 1968; Bielawski, Plezia 1970; Seibert 1972, pp. 72-73;
Green 1974, pp. 57-62; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 53-56; Bosworth 1988, pp. 20-21;
Rubinsohn 1993, pp. 1310-1312; Thomas 2007, pp. 196-197. Plutarch devoted his
De fortuna seu virtute Alexandri to the topic of Alexanders arte and his cultural
mission in the East.

42

Chapter I

closest companions. Indeed, the young prince was surrounded by wellborn Macedonians of his own age who were his playmates. But he was
also accompanied by older boys who Philip selected so that through their
(aristocratic) behaviour and advice they would help his son enter the adult
world. At the Macedonian court Philip must have run an institution of
sorts comprising royal boys (pages). They were the descendants of
aristocratic dynasties who were brought up among the kings entourage,
frequently carrying out tasks normally reserved for personal servants on
the basis that to be able to give instructions well one should first learn to
listen to instructions. Indeed graduates of this school later became hetairoi
and army commanders. However, while they still served as royal boys at
the royal court, they remained, in a sense, hostages ensuring the loyalty of
their aristocratic families. Among the young Macedonians sent to Mieza to
be together with Alexander educated by Aristotle there may have been his
closest friend Hephaestion. Other contemporaries who the sources claim
were brought up alongside Alexander included: Cleitus the Black,
Perdiccas and the sons of Aristotles friend Antipater. It is perhaps
therefore not surprising that Alexanders companions on his expedition
east were not only military commanders but also people with intellectual
interests: they kept journals, grew exotic plants, studied the languages of
the east and learnt about the spiritual world of India.88

88

Wilcken 1967, p. 55; Green 1974, pp. 55-57; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 51-54; Heckel
1986, p. 302; Heckel 1992, pp. 205-208; Thomas 2007, pp. 126-127; Heckel
2009a, p. 71.

CHAPTER II:
THE HEIR TO THE THRONE

1. At his fathers side

By 340, when his education at Mieza was drawing to an end, Alexander
probably had already acquired the features and posture remembered by his
contemporaries and subsequent generations. Later, after he had ascended
to the throne, Alexander nurtured a canonical image of his person by
commissioning works from the epochs greatest artists: sculptures by
Lysippus, paintings by Apelles and gem engravings by Pyrgoteles. Today
credence is no longer given to the existence of an artistic monopoly
allegedly granted to these artists by their most famous patron; nonetheless
their works did form a canon of how Alexander was visualised and this
image has been reproduced over the centuries.1 For many years after the
great Macedonians death the mere sight of his statue made Cassander,
who remembered him well, shake with fear. Therefore it is safe to assume
that the portraits made during his life accurately captured his characteristic
features. 2 Although none of these works have survived, their countless
copies as well as Plutarchs portrayal and mentions in the works of various
other authors allow us to visualise the kings external appearance.
Perhaps Alexanders external feature that contemporaries found most
striking was his height, which belied his heroic fame and the expectations
of those who already knew how great he was. Being admitted to the tent
and invited to be seated, they had fixed their eyes on the kings face,
because, I suppose, to those who estimated spirit by bodily stature his
moderate size seemed by no means equal to his reputation. Curtius
Rufuss words describing the reaction of Scythians on seeing Alexander
can certainly also apply to many others who had first heard of the
Macedonians achievements and only later saw him in person. This
ancient author claims a similar impression was made on Queen Thalestris
1

Plu., Alex., 4.1; Plu., mor., 335a-b; Arr., An., 1.16.4; Cic., Fam., 5.12.7; Hor., Ep.,
2.1.237-241; V.Max., 8.11, ext. 2; Plin., Nat., 7.125
2
Plu., Alex., 74.6. Bosworth 1988, p. 20; Hamilton 1999, pp. 206-207.

44

Chapter II

of the Amazons, who had also expected the greatness of the famous leader
to be matched by an appropriately great physique. 3 Some historians in
good faith assume that Alexander was of average height and therefore on
the basis of measurements of skeletons found in contemporary
Macedonian graves estimate that he was approximately 1.7 tall. But this
must be an exaggeration for the sources leave us with no doubt: Alexander
was short, to the extent that when he sat on the captured throne of (the tall)
Darius III, a table had to be provided for him to rest his feet on. On the
other hand, thanks to physical exercise Alexander developed a strong and
muscular body.4
A feature of Alexanders posture that has frequently been noticed and
imitated is his raised head with the neck slightly skewed to the left. That is
indeed how Lysippus presents him, but the very fragmentary references in
historical sources do not allow us to establish whether this was a symptom
of some illness or simply a manner adopted over time by Alexander. It is
thanks to Plutarch and the polychromy on the so-called Alexander
Sarcophagus that we know he had a fair complexion with ruddy cheeks,
neck and chest. Citing Aristoxenus, the 4th-century peripatetic philosopher,
Plutarch states that Alexanders body and breath had a pleasant smell. This,
historians interpret as being a reflection of the tradition that Alexander was
of divine or heroic status, for the ancient Greeks believed that pleasant
scents were a characteristic attribute of both gods and heroes. The images
on the Alexander Mosaic, on coins and in the form of sculptures all show
Alexander to have a straight nose, a slightly protruding jaw, full lips and
eyes deep set beneath a strongly pronounced forehead. Alexanders hair,
which according to Aelian was fair but in the Alexander Mosaic appears to
be brown, was combed back above the forehead with a centre parting so
that it fell to the sides like a lions mane. According to the unverified and
late tradition of the Alexander Romance, Alexander had heterochromic
eyes, one being light in colour and the other dark. This same source
maintains that he had sharp teeth, like those of a snake. Such features
served to stress the legend of Alexanders superhuman nature.5
Contemporaries were struck by the fact that the young ruler had a
smoothly shaven face, in sharp contrast to the Greek tradition of adult men
3

Quotation is: Curt., 7.8.9. Curt., 3.12.16, 6.5.29; Diod., 17.37.5.

Stewart 1993, pp. 72-73. Diod., 17.66.3; Curt., 5.2.13-15; It. Alex., 14.
5
Plu., Alex., 4.1-4; Plu., mor., 55d, 335a-b; Plu., Pomp., 2.1 ; Plu., Pyrrh., 8.1 ;
Ael., VH, 12.14 ; Ps.-Callisth., 1.13.3; Iulius Valerius, Res gestae Alexandri
Macedonis, 1.7; S. Aurelius Victor, Epitome de Caesaribus, 21.4; Johannes
Tzetzes, Ep., 76; idem, Chiliades, 11.368. Bieber 1964, pp. 50-55; Bosworth 1988,
pp. 19-20; Killerich 1993; Stewart 1993, pp. 72-78; Hamilton 1999, pp. 11-12.
4

The Heir to the Throne

45

having beards. In the 4th century the lack of a beard had the unequivocally
negative connotation of a shamefully passive homosexual lover. Such an
image was particularly ill-suited to the image of leader and conqueror;
therefore it is unsurprising that in c. 330 a Greek vase painter from Apulia,
unaware of how the Macedonian king really looked, depicted him as a
bearded warrior. Yet, although indubitably aware of the negative
associations, Alexander consciously decided to look the way he did, to
demonstrate as he did more than once in his life that the social canons,
customs and general outlooks held by ordinary mortals did not apply to
him. His role model and point of reference was an ancestor on his
mothers side: Achilles. In the 4th century Achilles was presented in Greek
art as a young and beardless hero. The rhetorician Polyaenus (perhaps in
an attempt to rationalise this aesthetic decision) even claims that
Alexander ordered his soldiers to shave their beards so that the enemy
would not be able to catch hold of them. 6 Like with other aspects of
Alexanders appearance the fact that he shaved was subsequently imitated
by many others that was how rulers of major Hellenistic monarchies had
their likenesses presented in countless portrayals, especially on coins.
With this effective promotion of self-image, Alexander became the first
ever person in Western culture known by name to have started a fashion
trend.
The impression Alexander made on contemporaries comprised a
mixture of contradictory stimuli. The energetic gait, muscular and athletic
physique, and hoarse voice all contributed to the image of a tough,
masculine warrior and leader of men. This contrasted with his smooth face;
the hair combed back, the impression of moist slightly bulging eyes and
fair complexion, all of which were in the 4th-century cultures of
Macedonia and Greece associated with gentleness and effeminacy. When
to this he added the upward gaze and characteristic turn of the neck,
Alexanders appearance and posture must have given him an electrifying,
charismatic aura.7 However strong the impression Alexander made on his
contemporaries, he was not considered outstandingly handsome in his
lifetime. It was in a later tradition started in the 2nd century AD that he
became a model of male beauty, reflecting a general idealisation of the
Macedonian ruler that was far greater than the reality of his times.8

Chrysippos, ap. Ath., 13.18; Polyaen., 4.3.2. Dover 1978, pp. 71, 87, 144; Lane
Fox 1973, pp. 40-41; Stewart 1993, pp. 74-75, 78-86, 150-157.
7
Plu., Alex., 4.1-2; Plu., mor., 53c, 335b; Plu., Pyrrh., 8.1-2 ; It. Alex., 15.
Bosworth 1988, pp. 19-20; Stewart 1993, pp. 73-74.
8
App., BC, 2.151; Arr., An., 7.28.1; Apul., Fl., 7. Stewart 1993, p. 73.

46

Chapter II

It must have been sometime between the finishing of his education and
338 (a year of intensive war and politics) that an anecdote passed on by
Athenaeus from Alexanders contemporary Theophrastus and regarding
the Macedonian royal couples problem with Alexanders upbringing took
place. It was then that a worried Olympias ascertained that her teenage son
lacked interest in the opposite sex. Theophrastus explained this lack of
interest as a consequence of Alexanders excessive drinking. Alcoholic
abuse was indeed characteristic of Macedonian aristocrats, including his
father Philip. A lack of libido, however, was most certainly not a typical
Macedonian trait. With Philips approval, Olympias recruited a ravishing
Thessalian hetaira called Callixeina (perhaps referred to elsewhere as
Pancaste) to seduce the heir to the throne. We cannot be sure, however,
whether she, or his mothers requests were able to change Alexanders
lifestyle.9
While Alexander pursued his studies under Aristotles instruction at
Mieza, Philip made use of Athenss military standstill following the Peace
of Philocrates and continued Macedonias expansion north. In 342 he
completed the subjugation of Epirus by installing Olympiass brother
Alexander on the throne. In a sense as if making use of this situation, he
also conquered and annexed to Epirus the Greek cities of Cassopia,
situated between the Ambracian Gulf and the Adriatic.10 That same year,
342, Philip started another campaign in Thrace against Cersobleptes, from
whom he had already taken the town of Crenides and the gold yielding
mountains of Pangaion. In fighting lasting until 340 Philips annexations
of Thracian territory reached Mount Haemus (Stara Planina) and the Black
Sea coast. Philips sway over Thrace was augmented with garrisons and
newly formed cities, the most important of which was Philippopolis, and
through the installation of a Macedonian strategos (general) as the new
ruler of this land that was conquered by Macedonia but not incorporated
into it.11
The Peace of Philocrates was resented by many in Athens. In 342 this
resentment led to an undeclared war with Macedonia simultaneously
waged on several fronts. Swift Athenian intervention prevented Ambracia,
an important city in western Greece, from falling into Philips hands. In
the Thracian Chersonese a unit of mercenaries supporting a newly formed
party of Athenian cleruchs and commanded by the general Diopeithes
9

Ath., 10.45 after Theophrastus (F578); Ael., VH., 12.34. Odgen 2009, p. 209.
Diod., 16.72.1; D., 7.32. Hammond 1994, pp. 120-122; Corvisier 2002, pp. 167170.
11
Diod., 16.71.1-2; D., 82, 35; Arr., An., 1.25.2. Cawkwell 1978, pp. 116-117;
Hammond 1994, pp. 122-125; Corvisier 2002, pp. 184-186.
10

The Heir to the Throne

47

attacked Cardia, which was allied to Philip. As a result they captured a

Macedonian envoy. Another Athenian army attacked Philips Euboean
allies in Oreos and Eretria. These local conflicts strengthened in Athens
the arguments of the anti-Macedonian party led by Demosthenes, who was
striving to create a league of Greek states against Philip and
unsuccessfully trying to gain financial support of the Persian ruler
Artaxerxes III. Probably already in 342, when broad negotiations
concerning trade, combating piracy as well as rights to the town of
Potidaea and the disputed Island of Halonnesos in the north Aegean had all
failed, the prospect of war became inevitable and only a pretext was
needed to start it.12
Open hostilities erupted in 340 when Philip decided to attack the city
of Perinthus, which had refused to support him in his war with Thrace and
was politically gravitating towards Athens. The element of surprise and
the advantage of Macedonian siege technology were to ensure a rapid
victory. However, quite unexpectedly, the Perinthians put up stiff
resistance. By the time Macedonian battering rams broke through the
defensive walls new fortifications had been set up deeper within the city,
which was shaped like an amphitheatre on the side of a mountain.
Entrance into the Marmara Sea via the Hellespont was guarded by an
Athenian squadron and the Macedonian fleet was too weak to force its
way through and impose a blockade on the city. Thus Perinthus was able
to constantly receive supplies from the sea. The Byzantines provided the
beleaguered city with arms and their very best soldiers. Also the Great
King instructed his satraps in Asia Minor to supply Perinthus with food,
money, arms and mercenaries. 13 As the siege was protracting, Philip
decided to simultaneously attack Byzantium the largest city on the trade
route between the Black Sea and the Aegean through which a fleet sailed
annually to deliver vital grain to Athens. In September 340 the first thing
Philip did was to unexpectedly seize the entire grain fleet of 230 ships
before it met up with its escort. This brought him handsome profit but also
meant open war with Athens, which was indeed soon afterwards officially
declared. The Athenian squadron, commanded by the famous general
Phocion, together with reinforcements from Chios, Rhodes, Kos and
Persian Asia Minor came to Byzantiums aid. This second siege also
12

Cawkwell 1978, pp. 118-135; Griffith 1979, pp. 510-516; Hammond 1994, pp.
125-132; Corvisier 2002, pp. 236-247.
13
Diod., 16.74.2-76.4 (our principal source here; Diodorus probably follows
Ephorus); Plu., Alex., 70.5; Plu., mor., 339b; D., 11.5; Arr., An., 2.14.5; Paus.,
1.29.10; Theopomp., FGrH, 115 F222; Did., In D., col. 10.34-62. Cawkwell 1978,
pp. 135-136; Griffith 1979, pp. 567-573.

48

Chapter II

ended in failure. This no doubt gave a great sense of satisfaction to the

Macedonian kings enemies but had little effect on the future course of the
war.14
When setting out with his army on the campaign in the Marmara Sea
basin, Philip was on this occasion able to leave Macedonia under the
charge of his successor. Alexanders studies under Aristotles instruction
at Mieza were now finished, he was sixteen years old, and in ruling
families boys of that age were considered to have reached adulthood.
Alexander could therefore now be entrusted with running affairs of the
state. Statements made by the Athenian orators Isocrates and Aeschines
confirm that at least since 342 or perhaps even since 346 Alexander was
considered to be the official heir to Macedonian throne, though at such an
early age he did not yet have any serious responsibilities. That did not
happen until he finished his studies in 340. That was when control of the
country was symbolically handed over to Alexander together with his
fathers royal seal, which gave the young prince the right to issue edicts.
Of course in his independent actions Alexander could rely on the
guidance of his fathers carefully selected advisors, among whom the most
important was Antipater over a dozen years Philips senior, he was a
highly talented servant of four generations of Argead rulers. It was during
this regency the Alexander won his first military victory in quelling the
anti-Macedonian rebellion of the Maedi, a Thracian tribe inhabiting the
Strymon Valley. This ended a whole campaign to expel the Thracian
population from their chief city and replace them with settlers from other
regions. Thus Alexandropolis was founded, the first of many towns
allegedly founded by Alexander. In naming the colony the way he did
Alexander was following the example of the naming of Philippopolis,
showing that he was striving to equal and later outmatch his fathers
achievements. If, quoting from an anonymous source, Stephanus of
Byzantium is right in stating that Alexander was 17 when the city was
founded, it would have been towards the end of his regency in 339.15

14

Diod., 16.76.3-772; D., 11.6; 12.53; 18.76, 244, 302; 50.6, 19; Aeschin., 3.256;
Plu., Phoc., 14; Theopomp., FGrH, 115 F292; Philoch., FGrH, 328 F54, 55; Just.,
9.1. Cawkwell 1978, pp. 136-140; Griffith 1979, pp. 573-591; Ashley 1998, pp.
142-144; Corvisier 2002, pp. 247-248.
15
Plu., Alex., 9.1; Isoc., Ep., 4 and 5; Aeschin., 1.167-169; St. Byz., s.v.
Alexndreiai. Wilcken 1967, p. 58; Griffith 1979, p. 558; Hatzopoulos 1986, p.
288; Bosworth 1988, pp. 21, 245-246; Greenwalt 1989, p. 40; Hamilton 1999, pp.
22-23; Heckel 1992, pp. 38-49; Fraser 1996, pp. 26, 29-30 (for identification of the
third Alexandreia of Stephanus of Byzantium with Alexandropolis).

The Heir to the Throne

49

The next time Alexander participated in a northern campaign it was at

his fathers side. According to our main source, Justins rather unclear text,
the objective of this campaign was to capture the realm of the Scythian
king Atheas. The opposing armies clashed in Dobruja, probably not far
from the city of Istros (Histria). The Scythians were defeated in a pitched
battle, their elderly king was killed and allegedly 20,000 of them were
captured as were an equivalent number of Scythian horses. It was perhaps
soon after this event that the Greek cities on the west coast of the Black
Sea came under Macedonian rule, for by Alexanders reign the region was
administered by a certain Zopyrion, whom the sources refer to as the
governor of the Hellespont or Thrace. On their way back home after the
defeat of Atheas Scythians the Macedonian army was confronted by a
Thracian or Illyrian tribe called the Triballi. They demanded a share in the
spoils in return for permission to pass through their territory. Philip
refused and a battle ensued in which the booty was lost and the
Macedonian king was wounded in the thigh. As a result Philip would be
lame for the rest of his life.16

2. Chaeronea
The Scythian campaign only for a while drew Philips attention away from
the situation in central Greece, where in 339 local disputes over the city of
Amphissa in Locris led to the outbreak of the Fourth Sacred War. The
Thessalians mobilised their forces very gradually. This was perhaps for
fear of Athens and Boeotia reacting. But another reason may have been an
understanding reached with Philip for the Thessalians had requested the
Macedonian king to enter the war. In the autumn of 339 the Macedonian
army seized the city of Elatea, which was situated in Phocis close to the
Boeotian border. This sent a shockwave through the Greek world and
inclined Thebes, which had until then been an ally of Macedonia, to accept
Demostheness offer of making an alliance with Athens in a war against
Philip. From that moment on the new allies swiftly mobilised a citizen
army as well as 10,000 mercenaries who took up strategic positions
blocking all the mountain passes into Boeotia. Partisan warfare and minor
skirmishes lasted from the end of 339 to mid 338. Then in the summer of
338 Philip managed to dislodge the mercenaries from the mountain passes,
which enabled him to take Amphissa and end the Fourth Sacred War. The
16

Just., 9.1-3, 12.2.6; Luc., Macr., 10.10; Arr., An., 5.26.6; Curt., 10.1.44; Did., In
D., col. 13.3-7. Nawotka 1997, pp. 30-31; Hammond 1994, pp. 135-137; Musielak
2003, pp. 54-56. See Bloedow 2002 on Philips goals in this war.

50

Chapter II

most significant outcome of this, however, was now the presence of

Philips army in Boeotia, where a showdown between Macedonia and a
coalition led by the two most powerful Greek states was certain to ensue.17
After peace negotiations initiated by Philip failed the problem could
only be solved by force. The decisive battle the largest in Philips reign
took place at Chaeronea in Boeotia. Plutarch states that it happened on the
seventh day of Metageitnion, which would have been sometime in August
or early September. The Greek army took up a good defensive position
between the hills and the Kephissos stream which Philip had to break
through in order to reach lower Boeotia and Thebes. The battlefield was
on flat terrain about 3 km in breadth, which was ideal for hoplite
formations and as the commanders reckoned unsuitable for the
Macedonian cavalry. When taking into account that it was part of Greek
military tradition to strive to resolve wars in one pitched battle, which so
far had always been won by citizen hoplite armies, and that now such an
army had taken up such a favourable battle position, the Greek
commanders must have taken up the Macedonian challenge with
confidence. Philip deployed 30,000 infantry and over 2,000 cavalry
against 35,000 Greek infantry and 2,000 horsemen. The Macedonian
armys inferior numbers and worse tactical position were compensated by
the superior quality of its troops and above all a far superior command.
Philip led the Macedonian phalanx on the right wing and entrusted the left
wing and cavalry to his son and heir accompanied by Macedonias best
chief officers. On the Greek side the Athenians held the left wing,
mercenaries and detachments from allied states positioned themselves in
the centre, whereas the Boeotians with the very best hoplites held the right
wing. Owing to the excellent training of his troops, Philip slightly
withdrew the right wing in the first phase of the battle, making the
Athenian hoplites stretch and somewhat break up their battle formation. It
was then that Philip attacked. After some heavy fighting the Athenians
were forced to retreat. However, the battles outcome was actually
resolved on the other wing, where the Macedonian cavalry under
Alexanders command managed to break through Boeotian ranks. Thus the
strongest section Greek line was crushed, which signified the entire armys
defeat. The Athenians and Boeotians, defeated on their respective wings,
fled for their lives. Only the Sacred Band of Thebes held their ground.
According to Plutarch all 300 soldiers of this elite unit were killed in battle
by Alexanders men. Much later the famous Lion of Chaeronea was
17

Cawkwell 1978, pp. 140-144; Griffith 1979, pp. 585-596; Londey 1990; Borza
1999, pp.58-64; Hammond 1994, pp. 143-148; Ashley 1998, pp. 149-152;
Corvisier 2002, pp. 249-254.

The Heir to the Throne

51

erected above their grave, in which archaeologists later uncovered 254

skeletons arranged in seven rows. Perhaps only that many soldiers took
part in the battle or maybe the rest of the Sacred Band were just wounded
and survived. A thousand Athenians lay dead on the battlefield as did a
similar number of Boeotians and considerable numbers of other Greek
allies who had fought in the centre, especially the Achaeans. The
Macedonians captured 2,000 Athenians and many other Greeks.18
The annihilation of the Sacred Band symbolically marked the end of
hoplite dominance on the battlefield as indeed the political dominance of
the type of state they defended the powerful Greek polis. From the
purely military point of view, Chaeronea marked a turning point in the
history of Western warfare in that for the first time a battle was essentially
won by the cavalry. Here the infantry secured a large part of the front line
thus allowing for a horseback riders offensive. This was also probably the
first time the Macedonian cavalry fought using sarissae, which were so
effective against the Boeotian infantry. At Chaeronea the infantry was
deployed to hold the front line against a greater number of enemy troops
and then the decisive blow was delivered with a heavy cavalry charge.
This would become Alexanders favourite tactic with which at the head of
his charging companion cavalry he carried off successive victories against
the Persians. To his fathers joy, the outstanding role in the fighting played
by the heir to the throne made the Macedonians hail Alexander as their
king, whereas Philip remained their military leader.19
After the battle Philip treated each of his chief vanquished enemies
very differently. With Macedonian troops now able to access all parts of
Boeotia, the king had his erstwhile allies, the Thebans, completely at his
mercy and punished them very harshly. They not only had to pay ransoms
for hostages but also for the privilege of burying their fallen soldiers. A
Macedonian garrison was now installed in the Theban citadel of Cadmea.
Anti-Macedonian politicians were either executed or exiled, whereas 300
previously exiled supporters of Philip were now allowed to return. On top
of this, the Boeotian cities that the Thebans had destroyed were now
rebuilt, which greatly weakened the position of Thebes in the Boeotian
League. Philips harsh treatment of the Thebans may have resulted not
only from the correct assumption that this polis was the linchpin of Greek
18

Diod., 16.85.5-86; Plu., Alex., 9.2-3; Plu., Cam., 19.9; Polyaen., 4.2.2, 4.2.7;
Fron., Str., 2.19; Paus., 7.6.5, 9.40.10 ; Str., 9.2.37 ; Just., 9.3. Cawkwell 1978, pp.
144-149; Griffith 1979, pp. 596-603; Hammond 1994, pp. 148-154; Carlier 1996, p.
111; Ashley 1998, pp. 154-157; Hamilton 1999, p. 23.
19
Plu., Alex., 9.4; Plu., Pel., 18.5. Borza 1990, p. 225; DeVoto 1992, pp. 17-19;
Sabin 2007, pp. 127-128.

52

Chapter II

resistance against Macedonia but also because of its traditionally strong

ties with Persia. The Thebans had not only backed the Persian side during
the Greco-Persian wars at the start of the 5th century but also in more
recent times when they helped Artaxerxes III in quashing the satrap revolts
in Asia Minor and in his conquest of Egypt in the years 343-341. The
Theban stance could not have gone unnoticed by Philip, who was already
planning war with Persia at the time. Other Greek states were also
punished. Macedonian garrisons were installed in Corinth, Ambracia and
Chalcis, thus placing strategic routes into the Peloponnesus and Euboea as
well as northwestern Greece under Macedonian control.20
After Chaeronea everyone in Athens was expecting the Macedonians
to launch a direct attack. In what now seemed to be an unavoidable
situation, extraordinary military and political measures were resorted to.
The strategos Lysicles was made a scapegoat for the defeat at Chaeronea,
while political leadership was held firmly in the hands of the war party
headed by Demosthenes, Hypereides and Lycurgus. The Attic populace
were evacuated into the city, whose walls underwent repairs and were next
manned with soldiers. The Athenians took in anti-Macedonian refugees.
For the sake of increasing army numbers, unconstitutional steps were even
considered such as actually granting citizenship rights to the metoikoi and
liberating those slaves who were able to fight. Athens could afford to resist
Philip for a long time on account of her powerful fleet assuring a constant
flow of provisions into the city. But the showdown never materialised.
Instead the victorious Macedonian king released from captivity
Demostheness political opponent Demades, which was a clear signal that
he was willing to start peace negotiations. Captured Athenians were set
free without a ransom, whereas the remains of those who had fallen were
delivered to Athens by a delegation of the highest ranking Macedonian
officials including Alcimachus, Philips closest companion Antipater and
the heir to the throne Alexander. With the emerging possibility of finding
a peaceful end to a war that had already been lost the mood in Athens
changed. Negotiations were entrusted to pro-Macedonian or rather just
anti-war politicians Aeschines, Phocion and Demades. There were prices
to be paid by the Athenians for peace, the heaviest of which was the loss
of Thracian Chersonese and thus also control of the Black Sea grain
import route. Other territory, however, remained in the hands of the
Athenians. It was also probably then that Philip magnanimously granted
the Athenians the Oropus region, which had been disputed with Boeotia

20

Cawkwell 1978, pp. 167-168; Corvisier 2002, p. 255; Zahrnt 2009, pp. 19-20.

The Heir to the Throne

53

and was now ceded to Athens no doubt in order to enflame anew an almost
forgotten disagreement between Athens and her Chaeronean allies.21
Philips conditions for ending the war with Athens were milder than
had been expected. The Athenians expressed their gratitude by granting,
probably on motion of Demades, the Macedonian dignitaries appropriate
awards. Athenian citizenship was bestowed on Alcimachus, Antipater,
Philip and therefore in a way also automatically on his son and heir
Alexander. Moreover, a statue of Philip was erected in the Agora, whereas
Alcimachus and Antipater were also awarded the honorary title of
proxenos. The Macedonian kings very moderate treatment of Athens after
the Battle of Chaeronea is usually put down to political motives. Philip
was planning war against Persia and therefore could not afford to prolong
the conflict in Greece; besides, the Athenian fleet of an estimated 350
warships could be of considerable use to him. Besides, plundering of
Attica, once occupied by Xerxes, would weaken Philip Panhellenic cause
in the planned war with Persia. There are also opinions that the
determination and energy the Athenians had shown in preparing for the
continuation of war inclined the Macedonians to conversely seek a
peaceful solution. However, we may also assume that for the parvenu
Macedonian laying siege to and eventually destroying Athens in the
words of Thucydides, the school of Hellas was contrary to what
throughout his life he had striven for, full acceptance in the Greek world.22

3. The congress at Corinth and the beginning

of the Persian war
From the battlefield of Chaeronea the Macedonian army marched to the
Peloponnesus and there accepted the capitulations of the poleis that had
sided with Thebes and Athens. The army also conducted a punitive raid
into Laconia as a result of which Sparta lost border territories to
Macedonias allies Argos, Messenia and the Arcadian states. Sparta was
thus weakened, but Philip did not punish it further, no doubt because he
21

Griffith 1979, pp. 604-609; Hammond 1994, pp. 155-157; Habicht 1999, pp. 1112; Brun 2000, p. 65; Corvisier 2002, p. 256. On the date of transfer of Oropus to
Athenian control (338 or 335) see Faraguna 2003, p. 100.
22
Hyp., Philippides, fr. 8; Hyp., ap. Harp., s.v. Alkmacoj; IG ii2 239; Plu., Dem.,
22; Paus., 1.9.4; Scholia in Aristid., Panathenaikos, 178.16; Just., 9.4.5. Cawkwell
1978; p. 167; Cawkwell 1996, pp. 98-99; Osborne 1983, pp. 69-70 (T69); Griffith
1979, pp. 619-620; OBrien 1992, p. 26; Whitehead 2000, p. 41; Badian 2000, pp.
54-55; Brun 2000, pp. 64-65; Hammond 1994, p. 157; Carlier 1996, p. 116;
Corvisier 2002, p. 256 ; Worthington 2008, pp. 155-156.

54

Chapter II

wished to use it as a counterbalance: fear of the regions former ruling

power seeking to exact revenge would in the future naturally incline the
other Peloponnesian states to maintain their alliance with Macedonia. Thus
two major land powers of Greece, Thebes and Sparta, were weakened and
kept in check by their neighbours.23 In the autumn of 338 Philip sent an
invitation to all the Greek states, described by many as more like a veiled
order, to attend a meeting which was to be held at Corinth the following
spring. The choice of Corinth was not made by chance. It was there that in
480 the majority of states in continental Greece formed a symmachia
(alliance) which victoriously opposed the great army of Xerxes I. More
recently, in 344, the Corinthians sent the famous general Timoleon to
overthrow the Carthaginian tyranny in Sicily and victoriously fight for
freedom of the Greeks in the West. The historic symbolism of Corinth
destined it to become the place where yet another initiative was made to
unite the Greeks in a common cause.24
Alexander in all probability did not accompany his father in the
Peloponnesian campaign but instead, after his mission to Athens, he was
sent back to Macedonia. There are some scant references in our sources
that at the time there was trouble on Macedonias northern border. It must
have been then that Alexander engaged in the short and victorious war
against the Illyrians which is mentioned by Curtius Rufus in his
description of events that happened much later.25 However, we know of no
other details about this war.
With the exception of Sparta, all the poleis of mainland Greece as well
as some of the island states, such as Chios and Eresus on Lesbos, accepted
Philips invitation. During two sessions in 337 they accepted a resolution
ratifying a new state of affairs in Greece. We know it thanks to an
inscription found in Athens containing an extensive extract of the oaths
made by the Greek states in their treaty with Philip. The signatories were
obliged to: remain at peace and not to wage wars on other member states;
not to occupy their cities, forts or ports; not to oppose Philips rule or that
of his successor (i.e. Alexander); not to interfere in the internal affairs of
any other state and to oppose anyone who breached the treaty as specified
by the synedrion (council) and ordered by the hegemon of the league, who
was naturally the king of Macedonia. If, as modern historians believe, the
charter drawn up by Antigonus Monophthalmus and Demetrius Poliorcetes
in 302 repeats the resolutions made in 337, then at Corinth some other
23

Ryder 1965, pp. 150-162 ; Hammond 1994, pp. 157-158; Ashley 1998, pp. 159160; Corvisier 2002, pp. 258-259; Faraguna 2003, p. 101; Zahrnt 2009, p. 20.
24
Lane Fox 1973, p. 93; Flower 2000, p. 98.
25
Curt., 8.1.25. Heckel 1979, p. 390.

The Heir to the Throne

55

important decisions were made to guarantee a conservative social peace,

namely, a ban on expelling citizens against current laws as well as a
rejection of the traditional lower class demands such as the redistribution
of land or annulment of debts. The treaty accepted in Corinth took the
form of a universal peace (koine eirene) and the Greek states that signed
this treaty in modern historiography are known as the League of Corinth.26
In the 4th century, which experienced plenty of wars and general chaos,
the koine eirene was a popular diplomatic device resorted to as many as
six times in attempts to restore political stability though not to great
effect. But the Corinth universal peace included new solutions. Apart from
naming a hegemon, it also called into being a council (synedrion) in which
each member state had a number of delegates proportionate to its size.
Thus all signatories to it formed a Philip-led alliance (symmachia) at the
same time. For Philip the universal peace formula was a convenient tool to
impose Macedonian hegemony over Greece without immediately exposing
the political implications. According to the treaty signed in Corinth
hegemony was only a means of guaranteeing a universal peace demanded
by Greek public opinion. One should not interpret the League of Corinth
as a mere tool of Macedonian tyranny, though nor was it, as Philip and
Alexanders apologists claim, a voluntary union of Greek states under the
benevolent leadership of the Macedonian descendents of Heracles.27 The
principle agreed at Corinth of not interfering in the internal affairs of other
states effectively meant a universal, be it foisted, agreement to support
pro-Macedonian oligarchies and tyrannies even though such forms of
government were by then outdated in Greece. Although not even his
enemies in Greece questioned Philips leadership, the free hand he was
granted to act against breaches of the treaty went far beyond the nominal
principle of equality in the koine eirene. On the other hand, the universal
peace did force Macedonia to act within the law and not at will. On more
than one occasion the synedrion acted as a mediator in disputes between
smaller Greek member states. Epigraphic evidence presents a case of the
council arbitrating in a dispute between Melos and Kimolos over three
islets one which was eventually resolved in favour of Kimolos. This of
course does not alter the fact that the universal peace signed in 337 and
then again when Alexander succeeded his father enshrined in legal terms

26

[D.] (=Hypereides?), 17; Diod., 16.98.3; Just., 9.5.1; IG ii2 236 = Syll.3 260;
Moretti, ISE 44. Heisserer 1980, pp. xxiii-xxvi; Bosworth 1988, pp. 189-193;
Blackwell 1999, pp. 38-40; Faraguna 2003, p. 101; Poddighe 2009, pp. 103-106.
27
Opposing views: Cawkwell 1969, p. 167 and Hammond 1994, pp. 158-164;
1996, pp. 22-23. Ryder 1965, p. 106; Adams 1999.

56

Chapter II

Macedonian control over Greece at the end of Philip IIs reign and under
Alexander.28
In the autumn session of 337 the decision was also made to wage war
against the Great King under the pretext that Persia had broken the
universal peace.29 This decision officially set in motion a chain of events
leading to war with Persia, Alexanders conquest of the Achaemenid
Empire and the start of what 2,200 years later was referred to as the
Hellenistic Epoch. This was a genuine turning point marking the start of
one of the most profound revolutions in Mediterranean civilization, though
we may assume that for those participating, the importance of these events
was not as apparent as it would be for observers in later centuries. The
resolution was passed by the synedrion of the League of Corinth at a time
when Alexander was still the heir to the throne and so the decision to wage
war on Persia actually belonged to his father. The momentous consequences
of this decision have made it the subject of great controversy among
modern historians, particularly with regard to the moment when Philip
decided to attack the powerful Persian Empire and also as to what his
objectives in this war were.
In the 4th century the Greek attitude towards Persia was quite
ambivalent. The most powerful empire that had ever existed both terrified
and fascinated the Greeks. Its sheer size, the fact that it encompassed
virtually all known lands to the east of Greece, meant that it was
frequently simply referred to as Asia as if in a sense the empire and the
continent were one and the same a continent of whose boundaries before
Alexanders expedition the Greeks had no idea. Its population, at the start
of the expedition an estimated 30 to 35 million people, greatly exceeded
the demographic potential of not only individual poleis or Macedonia but
even the entire Greek world. The Greeks called the ruler of Persia the
Great King or simply the King. Unlike the kings of Sparta, Macedonia or
of the Molossians in Epirus, who were all referred to by name, the Persian
monarch was a king par excellence. The way Greeks referred to the
Persian monarch indeed reflected the way Persian monarchs wished to be
referred to in writing. For instance Darius Is inscription at Behistun states:
I am Darius, the great king, king of kings, the king of Persia, the king of
countries. The king of kings title, adopted from Urartu no doubt via the
Medes, demonstrated the Persian rulers superiority over local princes and
kings as well as the universal character of his monarchy. The Great King
28

Tod, GHI 179. Bosworth 1988, pp. 191-192; Billows 1990, pp. 190-194; Jehne
1994, pp. 7-28; Blackwell 1999, pp. 39-48; Adams 1999; Corvisier 2002, pp. 257262; Zahrnt 2009, pp. 23-25; Poddighe 2009, pp. 103-106.
29
Billows 1990, p. 193; Faraguna 2003, p. 102; Poddighe 2009, pp. 105-106.

The Heir to the Throne

57

was surrounded by an abundance of luxury that would have greatly

impressed Greek observers and his courts opulence and magnificence was
quite unmatched elsewhere. One of the aspects of this lifestyle was huge
feasts in which even as many as 15,000 banqueters could participate.
However, by all accounts contemporary Greek observers did not know that
this was a form of redistributing royal wealth among the banqueting court
aristocracy and palace guards. Among the court attendants Greek sources
mention the ubiquity of eunuchs. Their prominent role in ancient Persia
was for a long time interpreted by modern historians as a clear symptom of
chronic decadence in the Achaemenid state, one whose history had
descended into a continual series of harem intrigues. Today we know that
only some of these so-called eunuchs were castrated slaves employed in
harems; whereas others described as such in Greek sources were in reality
high-ranking dignitaries and no doubt members of the Iranian aristocracy.
The Great King wore special attire. In the case of Artaxerxes II it was
allegedly worth 12,000 talents, which was 15 times more than the cost of
building the Parthenon in Athens. He travelled in a richly ornamented
chariot which he ascended using a gold stool. In the palace courtyard
Lydian carpets were laid out for him so that his foot never touched the
ground. He would meet his subjects on formal occasions which precluded
normal conversation. Anyone who approached him had to wear a white
cloak out of respect for the sacredness of the Persian monarchy. Although
he was served by hundreds of courtiers, the king always ate his meals
alone, separated by a screen from his own family and the court aristocracy.
The Great King only drank water from the river Choaspes in Elam and
Chalybian wine from Syria, supplies of which were taken with him
wherever he travelled. Delicacies were served at the monarchs table from
all parts of his domain to symbolically reflect his material and political
strength. Such complex court ceremonies, which the Greeks found quite
astounding, were meant to create an image of an authority of superhuman
proportions of a hero guarding a universal monarchy.30
Modern scholarship used to advance a theory that a symptom and also
a cause of the decline of the Achaemenid state was an alleged economic
crisis in the 4th century. In his classic book A. Olmstead compares the
Achaemenid rulers to a vampire sucking blood in the form of tributes out
of its victim, the economy. Instead of reinvesting these tributes, the Persian
rulers were supposed to feel satisfied with a primitive thesaurization. The
30

Eddy 1961, pp. 44-47; Frye 1964, pp. 36-37; Cook 1985, pp. 225-231; Briant
1996, pp. 202-216, 236-237, 274-326; Wiesehfer 1996, pp. 29-30, 39-41;
Aperghis 2001, p. 77; Llewellyn-Jones 2002 (astoundingly conservative approach
to eunuchs issue); Nawotka 2004; Brosius 2007, pp. 26-27.

58

Chapter II

economy thus deprived of ores and state care was supposed to have
experienced crisis that terminally weakened the empire, which was then
easily defeated by Alexander. Today we know that such theories based on
Greek sources overly sticking to certain stereotypes are untenable.
Actually only a small proportion of collected taxes were thesaurized,
whereas most of the revenue was spent on the army, the administration,
the royal and satraps courts. 4th century documents attest uninterrupted
continuation of the royal economy with taxes, storage, redistribution
throughout the Persian empire from Bactria to Idumea. Moreover, the state
was investing in major irrigation projects to stimulate agriculture and
economic growth. Not only is there no proof of a shortage of ores but
numismatic evidence shows a steady rise in the use of coins in trade,
especially in Egypt and Asia Minor. The long period of peace could not
but have benefited traditional trading nations such as the Phoenicians and
Greeks of Asia Minor. Evidence of this is not only an increased circulation
of money in 4th-century Ionia but also the number of monumental building
projects in that part of the Greek world, which was noticeably larger than
in the preceding century.31
Among the major achievements of the Achaemenid Empire to be
particularly noticed and admired by the Greeks were the excellent roads
linking its major centres. Their total length has been estimated to be
13,000 km. Archaeologically uncovered sections of ancient Persian
highways reveal a very carefully levelled, 5-7 metre wide gravel road.
Where necessary such roads cut through rock. Thanks to these highways
more or less kept safe by the state authorities and with postal stations
approximately every 30 km a royal messenger could cover 2,400 km from
the Aegean coast to Susa within one or two weeks, while a normal journey
on this road would not exceed three months. The royal court was nearly
always on the move. Every year it travelled hundreds of kilometres along
these highways, known as the Royal Road, between the four capitals of
Babylon, Susa, Persepolis and Ecbatana, spending a few months in each.
As custom dictated, on his journeys the monarch would always be greeted
by the local people with gifts.32
Although he was never deified by his Persian subjects, the Great King
ruled by the grace of the Iranian Lord of Wisdom Ahura Mazda.
According to the doctrine formulated by the prophet Zarathustra and
least the later Achaemenids if not all of them were its adherents Ahura
31

Olmstead 1948; contra: Kuhrt 1990; Stolper 1994, p. 259; Carlier 1995, p. 145;
Dandamayev 1999, pp. 296-298; Debord 1999, pp. 22-23; Briant 2009.
32
Hdt., 5.50.3. Mellink 1988, p. 216; Cuyler Young 1988, pp. 79-81; Graf 1994;
Debord 1999, pp. 34-36.

The Heir to the Throne

59

Mazda fought a cosmic battle against the essence of evil Angra Mainyu
(Ahriman). It was the kings mission to lead the state along the road of
justice, enlightenment and truth. This did not imply suppressing the
religious practices of his pagan and non-Iranian subjects but naturally
those who opposed the Great King as the guardian of the Truth were
amoral followers of lies and indeed are described as such in royal
Achaemenid inscriptions. Awareness of the Zoroastrian doctrine in Greek
literature is famously expressed in The Histories of Herodotus, where he
states that young Persians were taught three things: horse riding, archery
and telling the truth. The empire was bound by numerous cultural and
religious taboos. According to Ahura Mazdas law the king of Iran could
only be a Persian Aryan from the Achaemenid dynasty who happened to
be endowed with a special charisma of kingship, in ancient Persian called
khvarenah. Connected with fire and light, it was an internal force (mana)
which predestined someone to hold power. However, it could not be
acquired by force but only inherited down the male line of the ruling
dynasty. A monarch possessing khvarenah stood at the head of a
hierarchical society personifying perfect unity in a multi-ethnic monarchy.
Numerous works of Persian art, particularly friezes at Persepolis, present
the image of a just, sovereign and unlimited royal rule over many nations
and symbolically over the entire world.33
The Greeks were shocked by the behaviour of Persian women, which
was far more open than that of women in their own country. This was
especially true of the Persian court, where aristocratic women were
granted a higher status and were therefore more visible. Persian women
did not hide within the walls of palaces or houses but played an active role
in social and economic life; they owned property and managed it
themselves. Worse still, Persepolis tablets show that even women who
were commoners could have active professional lives. Generally
misogynistic Greek authors saw in all this yet another symptom of Persian
decadence. Notice was taken of the fact that apart from official wives, the
Great King also had 360 concubines and a similar number of female
musicians who played and sang for his pleasure. From among the Kings
numerous children only the sons of official wives had the right to
succession, whereas the children of his concubines, a vast array of royal
relatives well documented in the sources, accompanied the monarch at
banquets, during hunting and in military expeditions. According to Curtius
Rufus, Darius III would be accompanied by 200 propinqui and 15,000
cognati. But the number of those children entitled to the throne was also
33
Frye 1964, pp. 45-46; Schwartz 1985, p. 677; Cuyler Young 1988, pp. 99-105;
Wiesehfer 1996, pp. 30-33; Briant 1996, pp. 183-195, 222-229.

60

Chapter II

very large, which, as naturally happens, made succession a very emotive

political issue in Persia. In the last 70 years of the Achaemenid rule
violence became a practically inseparable part of the process of succession.
Shortly after ascending the throne in 405/405 Artaxerxes II had to fight a
war against his brother Cyrus the Younger. Artaxerxes IIs son Artaxerxes
III protected himself against potential pretenders by conducting a great
purge among the male members of the dynasty. He himself perished in
338, apparently in the Greek tradition of being poisoned by a highly
placed courtier called Bagoas, though an almost contemporary Babylonian
tablet seems to indicate that the king died of natural causes. In 336 Bagoas
also murdered Artaxerxes IIIs son and successor Artaxerxes IV, who was
also known by his earlier name of Arses. After eliminating the main
Achaemenid line the ambitious Bagoas helped install on the throne a
member of a lesser branch of the dynasty stemming from Darius II called
Artashata, by Justin probably erroneously called Codomannus, who on the
throne adopted the name Darius III. And it was Darius III who finally
outsmarted Bagoas by forcing him to drink a poison that the latter had
actually prepared in order to kill the king. Naturally the problems with
succession weakened the Persian state, which could not have escaped
Philip IIs notice, all the more so because Pella became the natural refuge
for those who rebelled against the Great King, such as the satrap
Artabazus and the mercenary general Memnon.34
4th-century Greeks were generally very ignorant not only about the
Persian Empires geography but also about the actual state. Although
many years had passed and contacts with Persia had been intensive,
knowledge of the Persian Empire and her peoples did not go far beyond
what had been written by Herodotus. Unfortunately the writings of Ctesias
of Cnidus, a physician at the court of Artaxerxes II in the early 4th century
and therefore someone who knew Persia well, are more noted for their
lightness of style and penchant for tales of romance and intrigue than for
insight into Persian realities. The Greeks were very familiar with the
western provinces of the Achaemenid Empire, but their knowledge of its
core territories to the east of the Zagros Mountains, i.e. Iran, was more in
the realms of legend than reality. Tablets found in Persepolis testify that
the Persian state closely monitored the travels of foreigners east of the
Zagros Mountains and that there is no evidence of Greek travellers or
34

Curt., 3.3.9-25; Just., 10.3.3; Diod., 16.52.3. 17.5.3-6; SEG 27.942; Babylonian
tablet BM 71537. Badian 1985, p. 422; Cook 1985, pp. 226-228; Guyot 1990, pp.
189-190 (no. 17); Wiesehfer 1996, pp. 82-85; Brosius 1996, pp. 83-97, 123-180;
Brosius 2003a, p. 235; Briant 1996, pp. 292-296, 789-790, 799; Briant 2003, pp.
64-65; Hammond 1994, p. 129-130; Heckel 1997, p. 197; Walker 1997, p. 22.

The Heir to the Throne

61

diplomats ever visiting that particular Persian capital. 35 Greeks, most

probably forced labourers, employed in Fars were deliberately disfigured
because the Persians knew that in such a state taboos concerning beauty
and the flawlessness of the human body would effectively prohibit their
return to Greece. As far as we can tell, Persepolis, which played such a
crucial role in the Persian state, was basically unknown to the Greek
public before Alexanders expedition. The Persian capital where the Great
King usually accepted Greek envoys was Susa in Elam to the west of the
Zagros Mountains.36 Indeed, in Greek literature written before Alexanders
expedition Susa is mentioned at least 36 times, whereas Persepolis no
more than twice.37
Furthermore the Greeks did not understand that the Achaemenid
Empire was basically a feudal state, not a tyranny ruled by an almighty
despot. They knew that the state was divided into satrapies, but they were
not aware of the way in which satraps were subordinate to the Great King.
The 26 satrapies that had functioned under Darius III were taken over
virtually unchanged by Alexander during his conquest of the Achaemenid
Empire. The fact that there was a network of trusted informants poetically
called the kings eyes and ears by Herodotus is also confirmed in Eastern
sources, but the Persian state was not controlled by a secret police force.
Nor was it controlled by the states efficient and well developed
bureaucracy operating in the Achaemenids home province of Fars about
which we know from thousands of the clay tablets found at Persepolis. As
is usual in a system not based on a written constitution but on custom and
the charisma of kingship, the significance of the central government and
its ability to mobilise forces rested to a large extent on the rulers
personality. With someone of the strong and outstanding personality of
Artaxerxes III no one could resist the state, whereas when the ruler was
weak, the state became sluggish. Many of the satraps were members of the
ruling family, but all of them were bound by the feudal principle of loyalty
and fealty. According to Xenophon, in a conversation between King
Agesilaus and the satrap Pharnabazus the satrap turned down the Spartans
proposal to defect and free himself from the Great King by replying: If
the king sends another as general and makes me his subordinate, I shall
choose to be your friend and ally; but if he assigns the command to me
35

Cook 1985, p. 241.

Curt., 5.5; Diod., 17.69.3-4; Just., 11.14. Briant 1996, pp. 755-756; Tuplin 1996,
pp. 137-140.
37
Under the name Parsa/Persai: Arist., Mir., 838a; Ctes., FGrH, 688 F36. Ctesias,
however, could have in mind Fars (Persis) or even Pasargadae and not Persepolis,
Gombiowski 1981, pp. 19-21.
36

62

Chapter II

so strong, it seems, is the power of honour you may well be assured that
I shall wage war upon you to the best of my ability. This expression of
feudal mentality is a good illustration of how the Persian Empire was
administered. There once someone was made a satrap he held that position
for life and any attempts to remove him from his post frequently led to
rebellion. A satrap, like every high-ranking Persian official, was a vassal.
The Persian word for vassal was bandaka, which the Greeks, not
understanding Persian social structures, translated as doulos, i.e. slave. To
modern historians studying Persian history mainly from Greek sources the
Achaemenid Empire for a long time gave the impression of being a
despotic state where the monarchs subjects were basically his slaves.
Today we know that the Great King was not a tyrant standing above the
law. His government also served the interests of the aristocracy and magi.
Moreover, together they were all bound by tradition and established
ideology to serve as the guardians of what was for Iranians the one and
only true religion.38
Another factor to consider was the great war of Xerxes I in the years
480-479, his occupation of mainland Greece and the destruction of
Athenian temples, which for centuries was considered to be the
quintessential act of eastern barbarity. Although defeated in the great 5thcentury wars, Persia had not ceased being a threat to Greek states in the
century that followed, though there were no more epic battles where Greek
hoplites had to defend the freedom of their poleis against many thousands
of barbarians driven on with whips as recorded by Herodotus. Aware of
the ineffectiveness of earlier military efforts, the Persians now changed
their policy. Intricate diplomacy and financial support distributed to
various Greek states in the last part of the Peloponnesian and during the
Corinthian War in the beginning of the 4th century let Persia to eventually
recover all its lost territories in Asia Minor. The empire also gained
control of numerous Greek islands in the Aegean, whereas the chaos of the
4th century allowed successive Persian rulers to continue influencing
events in mainland Greece through the skilful use of subsidies, diplomacy
and the threat of military intervention. No wonder that to Greek public
opinion Persia was the enemy par excellence. Even in 341 Demosthenes,
who was after all looking for Persian help against Philip II, had to assure

38

X., HG, 4.1.37 in Brownsons translation (Loeb). Frye 1964, pp. 36-37; Barcel
1993, pp. 217-218; Hornblower 1994, pp. 54-56; Billows 1994, pp. 60-70; Carlier
1995, pp. 143-144; Briant 1996, pp. 350-351; Klinkott 2000.

The Heir to the Throne

63

the Athenians that the Macedonian monarch was an even greater threat
than the Great King.39
Many Greek physicians, artists and architects were employed in the
courts of the Great King and his satraps, whereas for good pay Greek
mercenaries served in Persian armies in their thousands. The best Greek
commanders fought in the many wars that took place in the western
regions of the vast Achaemenid empire in the 4th century including: King
Agesilaus of Sparta, Pammenes of Thebes, the Athenians Conon,
Iphicrates, Timotheos, Chabrias, Chares, Charidemus as well as the
brothers Mentor and Memnon of Rhodes. Yet Greek authors, particularly
Diodorus, who is our major source for this era, overstate the importance of
Greek generals and mercenaries in wars fought by Persia in the 4th century.
They concentrate exclusively on the role played by Greek soldiers on the
Persian pay. That is why many modern historians have succumbed to the
illusion of Persias military weakness against Alexanders imminent
invasion and have willingly portrayed it as a colossus with feet of clay.
Looking at Alexanders defeat of Persia with the benefit of hindsight it is
easy to forget that for most of the 4th-century before the Macedonian
conquest, despite internal problems, the Achaemenid state had generally
experienced political successes. Artaxerxes II recovered the Greek cities of
Asia Minor that had been lost in the 5th century. At the start of his reign
Artaxerxes III quelled the rebellion of the western satraps, next in 345 he
crushed the resistance of Phoenician cities before finally in 343 reconquering Egypt, which for 61 years had been independent of Persia. In
Asia Minor, which was much closer to Greece, tyrants attempting to gain
quasi-independence, such as Hermias of Atarneus, were removed. The
Great Kings authority over the satraps was once again restored and, after
ending his military actions, Artaxerxes III ordered them to disband their
mercenary armies, so as they would no longer be able to act too
independently. The reign of Artaxerxes IV (338-336) was too short-lived
to allow us to assess it. On the other hand, his successor, Darius III, will
probably always be associated with the odium of defeat and incompetence,
because he had the misfortune of facing in battle the greatest military
leader of ancient times Alexander the Great. However, when Darius
ascended the throne he was already a known figure. Under Artaxerxes III
he had acquired fame as a warrior. Moreover, the fact that he had managed
to take over the throne and dispose of Bagoas without causing political
unrest indicates that he must have acquired the trust of the Iranian
aristocracy and magi. We also know that at the start of his reign he briskly
39

D., 10.33.4. Badian 1985, p. 427; Hammond 1994, p. 165; Tuplin 1996, pp. 153154; Flower 2000, p. 104.

64

Chapter II

quelled Khababashs rebellion in Egypt thus once again restoring peace to

the Persian Empire.40
In 4th-century Greek literature there is a strong tendency to contrast the
manliness and triumphant valour of the Greeks with Persian effeminacy
induced by excessive luxury. To a certain extent this was a continuation of
a theme that had already appeared in the work of Herodotus, whilst at the
same time it also reflected the popular views of the school of Hippocrates
which noted how climate and living conditions affected human character
and behaviour. Ctesias gossipy and sensationalistic Persica provided
colourful examples to support such theories. According to the most
important political writers of 4th-century Greece Plato, Aristotle,
Isocrates and Theopompus the Persians were typical barbarians
degenerated by luxury, gluttony and sex. They were regarded to have the
mentality of slaves, whose behaviour betrayed a mixture of cowardice,
servility, arrogance and pride. These views were expressed most
effectively by the writer, soldier and philosopher Xenophon. His most
famous work, Anabasis, relates the story of Greek mercenaries (including
Xenophon himself) who, serving the pretender to the Persian throne Cyrus
the Younger, venture as far as Babylon and then after Cyruss death fight
repeated battles against the Persians until they reach Greek settlements on
the Black Sea coast. On the other hand, in his Hellenica the same author
glorifies the Spartan king Agesilaus and his struggle for the freedom of
Greek cities in Asia Minor. Xenophon contrasts hard, athletic, seasoned
Greek fighters with feeble and unmanly Persians: And again, believing
that to feel contempt for one's enemies infuses a certain courage for the
fight, Agesilaus gave orders to his heralds that the barbarians who were
captured by the Greek raiding parties should be exposed for sale naked.
Thus the soldiers, seeing that these men were white-skinned because they
never were without their clothing, and soft and unused to toil because they
always rode in carriages, came to the conclusion that the war with them
would be in no way different from having to fight with women.41
These well written and popular books as well as the works of other
anti-Persian authors, particularly Ephorus of Cyme author of the first
Greek universal history, which was later used as a source by Diodorus,
Strabo, Plutarch and Pompeius Trogus give the impression that the
40

Parke 1933, pp. 105-112, 122-132, 165-169; Starr 1976, pp. 63-66; Ruzicka
1993, pp. 85-91; Hornblower 1994, pp. 45-48; Burstein 2000; Brosius 2003, pp.
170-171. One new book (Briant 2003) is largely devoted to the image of Darius III
in historiographic tradition.
41
H., HG, 3.4.19 in Brownsons translation (Loeb). Momigliano 1975, pp. 129137; Starr 1976, pp. 50-60; Wiesehfer 1996, pp. 80-85; Tuplin 1996, pp. 153-162.

The Heir to the Throne

65

Persian Empire was weak and the only forces of value were the Greek
mercenaries. Xenophon relates what Antiochus of Arcadia, a envoy to the
Persian court, said: the King had bakers, and cooks, and wine-pourers,
and door-keepers in vast numbers, but as for men who could fight with
Greeks, he said that though he sought diligently he could not see any.
Nonetheless such views cannot be regarded as reflecting the true state of
affairs but merely the Hellenocentric outlook of the authors, who regarded
the polis to be the universal model for a proper state and a states military
power to be measured by its ability to deploy a citizens army of hoplites.
Yet the basic Persian military formation was the Iranian cavalry, whereas
Greek mercenaries were only hired in the western part of the empire.
Despite the large numbers of mercenaries employed, as many as 20,000
soldiers in the 340s, they never formed independent armies realising Greek
political aims. Instead they were merely a part of the Persian army,
following the orders of the Great King and his satraps. These mercenaries
were commanded by Persian or Greek officers, in return for whose loyal
service the king would frequently grant them land and gradually
incorporate them into the ruling aristocracy. Naturally the lack of a native
infantry was a potential source of danger to the state, but only in the
eventuality of the Great King no longer being able to recruit Greek
mercenaries. As long as the market for mercenaries remained open, the
recruitment of Greeks was not a sign of any weakness or decline but of
Persian appreciation of the difference between Greek and Asian infantry.
In antiquity infantry soldiers were drafted from the peasantry and those in
the Asian part of the Persian Empire were too poor to be able to afford
hoplite armour, they lacked the social models of how to behave like
phalangites and, besides, serfs never made good recruitment material for
such military formations. Therefore, on account of Persias social structure,
the Great King could not use his Asian subjects to form large efficient
infantry units and thus the drafting of Greek mercenaries was the simplest
alternative. The only Persian infantry formation of military value, though
also inferior to the Greek hoplites, was what the ancient authors call the
immortal guard. The name itself is actually yet another example of how
little the ancient Greeks understood Persia. The Persian name for the guard
was anuiya meaning servants or companions, whereas the Greeks
confused the name with another Persian word anua, which indeed means
immortals. Thanks to the skilful use of Greek mercenaries, Iranian cavalry
and a fleet provided by Greek and Phoenician cities, the rulers of Persia
were for a long time able to successfully realise their foreign policy.42
42
X., HG, 7.1.38, after Brownson (Loeb). See also Plb., 3.6.9-12 for the importance
of Xenophons picture of Persias weakness. Hornblower 1994, pp. 80-83, 92;

66

Chapter II

This fact, even though it was painfully felt by the Greeks, especially
those living in Asia Minor, had no effect on the popularly held myth of
contemptible Persian military ineptitude and low morale. The 4th-century
Persian victories over the Greeks were explained simply by the lack of
unity among Greek states. It is worth noting that in the 4th century,
especially after 386 when the Persians regained full and, as it seemed,
permanent control of Greek cities in Asia Minor, Greek political authors
began treating compatriots living in that region as one political entity and
it was then that calls for their liberation first appeared. Some scholars
assume that many of the contemptuous opinions about Persians were
inspired by Greeks living in Asia Minor, who were hoping for a new
Greco-Persian war that would free them from the Great King. By
emphasising the structural weakness of the Achaemenid Empire they
wished to facilitate the decision of mainland Greeks to invade. Plutarch
even names an associate of Plato, Delios of Ephesus, who was apparently
sent as an envoy from Asia Minor to Alexander to persuade him to invade
Persia and liberate the Greeks there. 43 Unfortunately we do not know
Plutarchs source.
The main theme in Greek political literature after the Peloponnesian
War concerned a lack of political stability and constant conflicts, which no
doubt reflected the mood among the Greek public. The remedy advocated
by writers and orators was to unite the conflicting poleis with a common
cause. It was at the start of the 4th century that the idea of Panhellenism
first appeared in speeches given by the famous sophist Gorgias of Leontini
and the Athenian rhetorician Lysias. This concept stressed that, despite
their various differences, the Greeks had much more in common with each
other than with barbarians. The most influential 4th-century propagator of
Panhellenism was Isocrates. After years of unsuccessfully searching for a
polis capable of uniting the Greeks, in 346 Isocrates decided that Philip II
was the best suited ruler to become hegemon and tried to persuade Greek
public opinion that this was the case. According to a plan that Isocrates
had formulated most fully in several works (Panegyricus, Philippus and
letters he wrote to Philip II), the union of Greek states was to be built on a
common cause to fight their arch enemy Persia. One of the things the
Athenian author could not bear was the fact that, unlike his Greek
compatriots, the barbarians in Asia were living in prosperity and their
Wiesehfer 1996, pp. 90-92, Briant 1996, pp. 803-809. About mercenaries in
general see now: Trundle 2004.
43
Seager, Tuplin 1980; Flower 1994, p. 89; Hornblower 1994, p. 211. The
embassy of Delios: Plu., mor., 1126d; see Brunt 1993, p. 291; Flower 1994, p.107;
Ruzicka 1997, pp. 124-125.

The Heir to the Throne

67

economy was thriving. One could say that this conflicted with his sense of
justice. Isocrates was not alone among the Greeks in thinking that they
were created by nature to rule over barbarians like the Persians.
Experiences of the great Persian wars in the 5th century served as evidence
that by diverting its energies away from internal conflicts to overseas
expansion a united Greece would ultimately defeat Persia. For Isocrates
the key issue was to remedy Greek demographic and social problems
without starting a revolution involving the redistribution of land and other
actions that could harm the rich. Through the large-scale colonisation of
conquered land in Asia, war with Persia was to be a painless way of
alleviating Greeces social tensions. Philip would be rewarded with wealth
and fame as well as esteem among the Greek peoples. In keeping with the
Greek literary tradition, Isocrates enhanced his arguments with references
to mythology, which in J. Burchkhardts words, was the ideal basis of
Greek existence. Isocrates argued that as the descendent of Heracles Philip
was bound to conquer Asia and there found new cities. Finally it should be
stressed that in Antiquity there was nothing unethical in conquering other
countries for, quite unlike today, war was seen as a natural state of affairs,
though of course prolonged conflicts were not considered a good thing.44
Although Isocratess views are well known, the extent to which he and
other Panhellenists influenced the decisions made by Philip II and later by
Alexander remains highly controversial. Indeed, Isocrates does not overtly
claim that Philips decision to invade Persia was made on his persuasion.
The only fairly certain thing is that both the Greek elites and the general
Greek public feared and disliked Persia. The Greek elites were people the
Argead kings were very much in touch with and whose acceptance they on
more than one occasion were eager to gain. Moreover, among the
proponents of war with Persia were Aristotle and Callisthenes, who were
very close to Philip and Alexander. The fact that Persia was indeed
perceived as the arch enemy of Greece should lead us to rejecting the
opinion that the Panhellenic idea of invading Persia was just a propaganda
ploy or a mere marketing tool used by Isocrates to draw the attention of
potential clients, especially Philip II, to his school. Sanctioned by the
League of Corinth, Philips declaration of war against Persia had two
official goals: to liberate the Greeks in Asia Minor and to avenge crimes
committed by the Persians 150 years earlier, particularly the destruction of
Greek temples by Xerxes. Regardless of how sincere these declared
reasons for war were, they corresponded well with the public mood and
44

Wilcken 1967, pp. 34-38; Dobesch 1968, pp. 137-149; Markle 1976; Perlman
1976; Jehne 1994, pp. 7-19; Hammond 1994, p. 164-165; Huttner 1997, pp. 81-85;
Flower 2000, pp. 98-104.

68

Chapter II

would certainly have helped Philip become popular in Greece. In return

for participation in the war, Philip, and Alexander after him, offered the
Greeks a share in the plunder, including newly conquered territories, as
well as the satisfaction of righting the wrongs previously perpetrated by
Persia. From Philips point of view an additional advantage in calling for a
universal attack on Persia could have possibly been greater unity within
the League of Corinth, which apart from the negative goal of preventing
intestine conflicts had also a positive aim of defeating Persia. On top of
that, victory would provide everyone and especially Philips supporters in
Greek cities with wealth from the booty, which would make stronger their
political position. This in turn would strengthen the ties between the poleis
and Macedonia. Moreover a defeated Persia would no longer be able to
interfere in Greek politics and thus threaten Philips position as
hegemon.45
We do not know when exactly the plan to invade Persia was born.
Ancient sources do not give us an unequivocal answer, whereas the
extreme views of modern historians such as claims that Philip had already
planned to invade Persia as early as the late 350s are only hypothetical as
are claims associating the idea with Hermias of Atarneus. Philips actions
in that period can be explained perfectly well in the context of his Greek
policy and therefore it does not seem necessary to add hypothetical
explanations unsupported by evidence. The only thing we can be certain of
is that Isocrates had been advocating war with Persia since at least 346. It
is very likely that the planning of the invasion of Persia only began with
the conquest of Thrace and its reorganisation modelled on a Persian
satrapy in 342. However, Philip started implementing these plans only
after the Battle of Chaeronea. In 341 Philips arch enemy Demosthenes
could just presume that the Macedonian ruler had anti-Persian intentions
but he still had no concrete evidence. Artaxerxes III only started regarding
Macedonia as a threat after the siege of Perinthus in 340/339; from that
moment on we can talk of Philips anti-Persian plans with a high degree of
certainty.46

45

Diod., 16.89; Arr., An., 2.14.5-8; Just., 11.5.6; revenge as a pretext for Philip:
Plb., 3.6.12-14. Varying interpretations of modern scholarship: Markle 1976;
Dbrowa 1988, pp. 24-28; contra Flower 2000. See Lane Fox 1973, pp. 92-93;
Badian 1982, p. 38; Errington 1981, p. 83; Errington 1990, p. 103; Gehrke 1996, p.
26; Brosius 2003a; Bloedow 2003; Poddighe 2009, pp. 99-107.
46
For a review of modern scholarship see Errington 1981. Badian 1983, pp. 67-68;
Bosworth 1988, p. 18; Errington 1990, pp. 88-89; Hornblower 1994, p. 95;
Corvisier 2002, pp. 262-263, 271-276.

The Heir to the Throne

69

Another historical controversy concerns Philips war objectives,

particularly whether he intended to conquer the whole of the Persian
Empire or only the part in Asia Minor. In his Philippus Isocrates lays out
three scenarios for the Macedonian ruler: destruction of the entire Persian
Empire, the conquest and Greek colonisation of Asia Minor from Synope
to Cilicia or at least the liberation of the regions Greek cities. The
arguments used in Darius III letters to Alexander indicate that Philips
plans or rather what was being said about his plans referred to the
conquest of Asia Minor scenario. If one can argue ex post, it is
characteristic that the actions of one of the most talented among the
Successors and Philips contemporary Antigonus Monophthalmus
concentrated on the eastern Mediterranean zone but not Iran. Perhaps this
also reflects the scope of territorial interest that had been formulated by
Philips entourage.47
It would be a gross oversimplification to view Persian Asia Minor
prior to Philip and Alexanders planned expedition from the point of view
of Greek political authors and see there exclusively a dichotomy of
politically subjugated Greeks and the oppressive Persian rulers. Of course
in Asia Minor there was a developed Persian administration and the
country was divided into at least six satrapies: Hellespontine Phrygia,
Lydia, Great Phrygia, Caria, Lycia and Cappadocia. In the Persian system
of government which we know most about from Greek sources in
reference to Asia Minor the satrap had great power, imitating the
authority of the Great King locally. On his territory the satrap had civil
authority: the right to collect taxes, part of which was kept for the needs of
his army and administration, whilst the rest he sent on to the capital. The
satrap most usually governed his territory through a more often than not
local aristocracy, which in many cases meant permission to run their
regions with considerable autonomy, like local principalities. It was a
general rule that the satraps were totally responsible for the provinces
entrusted to them: only some of the empires most important garrisons had
soldiers directly under the Great Kings command. Satraps were
nominated almost exclusively from among members of the Iranian
aristocracy. The most notable exception from this rule was Caria, where
the position of satrap in the 4th century was held by members of a local
dynasty, the Hecatomnids of Mylasa: Hecatomnus, Maussolus, Idrieus and
Pixodarus. This dynasty indeed shows a tendency noted in other regions of
Asia Minor if not the entire empire, to make the office of satrap hereditary
in one family. After the collapse of the Achaemenid Empire some of these
47

Billows 1990, pp. 3-4; Ellis 1994, pp. 788-789; Hatzopoulos 1997, p. 43.

70

Chapter II

great Iranian families went on to found new, gradually Hellenised

dynasties that ruled over states in Asia Minor. Not all of Asia Minor was
actually ever under effective Persian rule. Some peripheral areas
maintained de facto or even quite official independence from the Great
King, the best example of which was the large Greek city of Heraclea on
the Black Sea coast. Moreover, the pragmatic Persians were more
interested in colleting tributes, which was easier, than subjugating
highland regions that were difficult to control, frequently inhabited by
wild tribes, as in Cilicia Trachea, and economically worthless. Such areas,
though frequently bounded from all sides by Persian satrapies, were
allowed to run their own affairs as they pleased. Furthermore, one should
not think of states in ancient times the same way we think of their 20stcentury counterparts. Regardless of whether they were in Asia Minor or on
any of the islands under the Great Kings rule, a state was not cut off from
the outside world (not even the Greek world) by some iron curtain. In
antiquity political borders were wide open for trade and demographic
mobility.48
Certain parts of Asia Minor including the Daskyleion in
Hellespontine Phrygia, the regions of Celaenae and Colossae in Great
Phrygia and Paphlagonia were intensively colonised by Iranian
cavalrymen who received land for their military service. Much larger
landed estates in Asia Minor were awarded to Persian aristocrats who in
return were obliged to muster hundreds of horsemen in the event of war.
Persian kings willingly provided refuge for members of the Greek elites
forced for one reason or another to leave their poleis. Apart from the
famous Greek refugees ostracised at the time of the 5th-century Persian
wars such as the victor of Salamis, Themistocles, or the Spartan king
Demaratus there were dozens of other less well known migrs. These
distinguished people were also granted vast estates in return for providing
armed forces. The cavalry recruited from these three sources together with
the cavalry units from some of the native populations were the basis of
satraps armies in Asia Minor, which were nearly always on standby,
ready to fight. Both Greek and Persian culture influenced the local
populace and also competed with one another as models for the social
elites. The local upper echelons of society were Hellenised and Iranicised
in more or less equal measure as is particularly well illustrated in the
archaeological remains of Lycian culture and the few extant inscriptions
from that region. Although Lycian was the primary language of the local
administration, the Lycian aristocracy spoke Greek and employed Greek
48
Jacobs 1994, pp. 117-146; Hornblower 1982; Hornblower 1994, pp. 74-82, 214222; Sartre 1995, pp. 7-14, 45-48; Debord 1999, pp. 139-140.

The Heir to the Throne

71

artists and craftsmen to carve monuments expressing themes deeply rooted

in Iranian culture, for instance extolling the skills of riding and archery.
Likewise the stelae and other monuments at Daskyleion, the capital of the
satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia, give evidence of a Greco-Iranian
cultural synthesis and its impact on in this case the Phrygian elites. Traces
of Iranian cultural influence, for instance in the form of Iranian cults,
could still be found in Asia Minor at the time of the Roman Empire.49
We do not know whether there was a clearly formulated Achaemenid
policy regarding what form of constitution Greek states within the Persian
Empire should have. Nevertheless, Greek sources do show a clear
evolution of political systems in Asia Minor from democracies in the
second half of the 5th century supported by powerful Athens to oligarchies
in the 4th century. Most probably the main reason for this was a natural
tendency for satraps to choose political solutions that were most
convenient from their perspective. That would have been to entrust power
to elite social groups within poleis under their control, and thus oligarchies
were formed. For the Persian aristocrats who represented Achaemenid
authority in Asia Minor, the rule in the cities of wealthy elites must have
also appeared the natural and most familiar way of running affairs. This
was the system that had predominated for much longer also in cities that
were only now being Hellenised, for instance in Caria. Moreover, the
Hecatomnid dynasty, particularly the famous Maussolus, was known as a
protector of the oligarchic system in Greek states such as those of Rhodes,
Chios, Kos, Erythrai and Miletus.50
With the mandate he had received at the 337 second council session of
the League of Corinth, in the spring of 336 Philip sent to Asia Minor a
corps commanded by Parmenion, Amyntas and Attalus as an advance
force of the main Macedonian and allied armies. The situation in the
Achaemenid Empire seemed to be favourable from the Macedonian point
of view. The much feared Artaxerxes III died and the weak government of
his son Artaxerxes IV, soon to be murdered, augured an inadequate
Persian response to an attack by Philips forces. While he was still alive,
Artaxerxes III had disbanded the vast mercenary army that had quelled
rebellious nobles and tyrants such as Hermias of Atarneus. Moreover the
49
Starr 1977; Mellink 1988, pp. 213-231; Boyce, Grenet 1989, pp. 197-209;
Hornblower 1994, pp. 230-232; Briant 1996, pp. 718-719; Debord 1999, pp. 20-21,
183-188; Kaptan 2003; Shabazi 2003, pp. 11-12; Raimond 2007; Briant 2009, pp.
156-160.
50
Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 171-175; Hornblower 1982, pp.107-137; Hornblower
1994, pp. 227-229; Nawotka 1999, pp. 33-34; Nawotka 2003a, pp. 21-26; Debord
1999, pp. 328, 404.

72

Chapter II

commander of this mercenary army, Mentor of Rhodes, was by then most

probably dead, for the sources no longer mention him after 338. The
Macedonian advance force with an estimated strength of approximately
10,000 men initially had a number of military successes and occupied
large swathes of land in Asia Minor. Although there was no general antiPersian uprising, there is on the other hand no evidence to support the
view that virtually all the poleis in Asia Minor resisted the Macedonians.
At least some of the Greek cities greeted them as liberators. A genuine
democratic revolution erupted at Ephesus, no doubt led by Heropythus,
and a statue honouring the Macedonian king was raised at Artemisium.
The important cities of Cyzicus and Erythrai allied themselves with
Macedonia. It is perhaps also then that the satrap Ariobarzaness statue
was pulled down in the Troad. Already before the start of the Asia Minor
campaign Philip had managed to gain influence on the islands. Most
notable was an alliance with the tyrants of Eresus on the island of Lesbos,
who even became members of the League of Corinth.51
The series of Macedonian successes came to an end when Darius III
nominated Memnon of Rhodes, brother of Mentor, to take over command
of the defensive war. This probably happened after Philip IIs death but
still in 336. Ancient sources do not record any information of the new
Macedonian king, Alexander, overseeing the campaign in Asia Minor that
year. Instead he most probably left all the decisions to the commanders his
father had nominated. Heading a force of 5,000 Greek mercenaries
Memnon started a vigorous campaign against a numerically far superior
Macedonian army, but one commanded by less talented generals. The
Macedonians suffered the first defeat at the Battle of Magnesia. The
sources do not provide an unequivocal answer as to which of the cities
bearing that name the battle refers: the more northern Magnesia ad
Sipylum or the Magnesia on the Maeander to the south of Ephesus. As a
result of this defeat the invading army turned back north towards the
Hellespont. We know that at Ephesus Memnons mercenaries helped in
carrying out a counter-revolution that re-established a pro-Persian
oligarchy headed by Syrphax. Philips statue at Artemision was destroyed
as was the grave of the citys heroised democratic leader. One may assume
that in most of the other cities in Asia Minor pro-Persian governments
were restored too. Memnon next crossed Mount Ida and quite
51
Diod., 16.89.2, 16.91.2, 17.2.4, 17.7.7; [D.], 17.7; Arr., An., 1.17.11; Just., 9.5;
IG xii.2.526. Cawkwell 1978, p. 170; Ruzicka 1993, pp. 84-85; Hammond 1994,
pp. 167-168; Lott 1996; Briant 1996, p. 837; Debord 1999, pp. 421-425; Nawotka
2003a, pp. 23-24. Heckel 1997, pp. 194-195 formulates an unfounded hypothesis
of universal resistance to Macedonian army.

The Heir to the Throne

73

unexpectedly attacked Cyzicus, almost capturing it. Meanwhile Parmenion,

whose mission it officially was to liberate Greeks, somewhat ironically
captured the Greek town of Gryneion and sold its inhabitants as slaves.
This was the last Macedonian victory in this part of the war. Memnon
successfully relieved the beleaguered city of Pitane, which like Gryneion
was situated in Aeolis, and next we known that in the Troad he fought
another victorious battle against the Macedonians, this time led by Calas,
who may have temporarily taken over command from Parmenion. The
Macedonians were now forced to retreat to the promontory of Rhoeteium
on the Hellespont. The ancient authors do not provide information
allowing us to establish the exact chronology of these events. Nevertheless,
their description of Memnons campaign, especially the elements of
swiftness and surprise in his attacks would suggest that it was a short
campaign, perhaps lasting from the autumn of 336 to the summer of 335.
Philip IIs death as well as the uncertainty that accompanied Alexanders
transition to the throne and confirmation as the new hegemon delayed the
expedition of the main Greco-Macedonian force into Asia Minor by one
and a half years. Left to fend for itself the first expeditionary corps
suffered defeat and only some of the men would have survived to later see
the arrival of Alexanders army at Abydos.52

4. The Pixodarus affair

Plutarch is the only source noting a serious conflict between Philip and
Alexander caused by a diplomatic offer made by Pixodarus, the satrap of
Caria and Lycia. This last male member of the Hecatomnid dynasty
wanted an alliance with the Macedonian king which would most probably
have implied greater autonomy or even complete independence from
Persia. The offer was to arrange for a marriage between Philips son
Arrhidaeus and Pixodarus oldest daughter, Ada II she is called Ada II to
distinguish her from Pixodarus sister Ada I, whom he overthrew as satrap
in 341/340. With these diplomatic negotiations underway Alexanders
mother, Olympias, as well as some of his friends started to fear that this
was a sign of Philips intention of now making Arrhidaeus his heir. They
therefore persuaded Alexander to act. Through the mediation of the actor
Thettalus, Alexander suggested to Pixodarus that he should marry his
daughter. When Philip discovered this, he went to Alexanders quarters
52

Diod., 17.7; Arr., An., 1.17.11; Polyaen., 5.44.4-5; Just., 9.5.8-9. Parke 1993, pp.
178-179; Cawkwell 1978, p. 177; Errington 1990, p. 104; Hammond 1994, pp.
168-170; Briant 1996, pp. 837-838; Ashley 1998, pp. 160-162; Debord 1999, pp.
423-426.

74

Chapter II

accompanied by Parmenions son Philotas. There Philip berated Alexander

for besmirching his good name and wishing to associate himself with the
daughter of a Carian, a barbarian rulers slave. In addition to this the
king now expelled from Macedonia Harpalus, Nearchus, Erigyios and
Ptolemy. The king had most probably himself nominated them to be
Alexanders advisers but at a critical moment it turned out they had given
the heir erroneous counsels, that is, ones contrary to the kings intentions.
The four men were recalled from exile immediately after Alexanders
ascension to the throne and accompanied him on his expedition as
members of his closest circle of friends. With his Macedonian matrimonial
plans foiled, Pixodarus remained loyal to the Great King and gave his
daughter in marriage to the Iranian aristocrat Orontobates. After
Pixodaruss death, Darius III nominated Orontobates his father-in-laws
successor as satrap of Caria and Lycia.53
Even if Plutarch is our single source, this story is plausible as it
contains elements that were typical for Philips practice of using marriage
as means of gaining temporary goals. What does need to be reviewed,
however, is the traditional dating of the Pixodarus affair to have happened
in the spring of 336. Although in his biography of Alexander Plutarch
describes this incident after the far more serious conflict at Cleopatras
wedding, this does not mean the events really followed each other in that
chronological order. Evidence that this was not so is the presence of
Olympias in the Pixodarus affair though she was not in Macedonia in the
period between Cleopatras wedding and Philips death. Moreover, the
uncompleted marriage arrangements conducted in parallel with other
negotiations must have lasted some time. The most probable year would
have been 337, when Philip was searching for allies in Asia Minor for his
war against Persia and when the chaos following the death of Artaxerxes
III could have inclined Pixodarus to search for alternatives to remaining
loyal to the Persian monarchy.54
This affair is the first recorded symptom of tension between Alexander
and Philip, which exploded into a violent conflict at the time of the kings
last marriage. It is curious how easily Alexander allowed himself to be
convinced that Arrhidaeus could become a serious rival to the throne, even
though objectively speaking no such danger existed. Alexanders mentally
retarded half-brother was able to ride a horse, participate in the offering of
53

Plu., Alex., 10.1-4; Str., 14.2.17. Debord 1999, p. 59. On Alexanders friends see
Heckel 1992, pp. 205-208.
54
Bosworth 1988, pp. 21-22; Develin 1981, p. 95; Ruzicka 1992, p. 101. The story
is put in doubt by: Hatzopoulos 1982; Hammond 1996, p. 27; Debord 1999, pp.
59-62; Corvisier 2002, pp. 267-268.

The Heir to the Throne

75

sacrifices and other ceremonies, such as sitting passively on the throne if

nothing else was required of him. This, however, was probably the most
he was able to do and thus the sources do not mention anything he ever did
independently. Later, after his ascension, it became clear that Alexander
saw no danger from his half brother because he spared him his life even
though Arrhidaeus was the only other remaining male member of Argead
dynasty. It would appear that for reason the atmosphere at the Macedonian
court in 337 inclined Alexander to feel very insecure as heir to the throne,
so much so that he could have behaved irrationally.55 Perhaps the failed
attempt at getting a wife for Arrhidaeus, marrying off one of Philips
daughters to Amyntas IV and the not much later last marriage of Philip
were giving Alexander and Olympias an impression of Philips designs to
isolate them at the court.56

5. Cleopatras wedding
In 337, shortly after his return from Corinth, Philip married for a seventh
time. On this occasion the bride was a Macedonian by the name of
Cleopatra though Arrian called her Eurydice the niece of Attalus, the
one who later on together with his father-in-law, Parmenion, headed the
first Macedonian expeditionary force into Asia Minor. The sources relate
this marriage in the context of growing tensions between Alexander and
Philip, exacerbated by Olympias, who is usually portrayed as an ill-willed
and quarrelsome woman. During the wedding feast there occurred an
incident that created serious rift within Argead dynasty and the
consequences almost led to an important international conflict. The
Alexander Romance includes an anecdote that on entering the banqueting
hall Alexander promised his father to invite him to his mothers wedding
when he, Alexander, would give her away to another king. From then on it
only got worse. An essential part of all Macedonian feasts was the
drinking of vast quantities of undiluted wine, which inevitably led to
inebriation. It was in such a state that Attalus raised a toast wishing the
newly weds to produce future kings that were pure blooded and legitimate
heirs. Alexander was never so drunk as not to notice even an imagined
insult let alone one that was real. No doubt expressing the secret opinions
of much of the Macedonian aristocracy, Attalus was referring to
Alexanders mothers foreign origins and, what was less obvious, to the
presumed fact that she was an adulteress. A livid Alexander shouted out
55
56

Badian 1963; Bosworth 1988, p. 22; Carney 2001, pp. 65-80.

Weber 2009, p. 86.

76

Chapter II

But what of me, base wretch? Dost thou take me for a bastard? and next
hurled his goblet at Attalus, who responded by throwing his cup at
Alexander. Apart from the markedly unreliable Alexander Romance, none
of the other sources claim that any of the missiles hit their intended targets.
We may assume that Attalus at least missed for Philip abruptly rose with
drawn sword in defence of the formers honour. The king fortunately did
no one any harm for according to Plutarch and the Alexander Romance
anger and the surfeit of alcohol had denied him control of his legs: the
manoeuvre just ended with him falling flat on his face. Alexander is
reported to have then mockingly remarked: Look now, men! here is one
who was preparing to cross from Europe to Asia; and he is upset in trying
to cross from couch to couch. Justin presents a less spectacular version of
this incident in which the king was physically restrained from killing his
son and heir by friends. Whichever way it happened, the consequence was
that Alexander and Olympias immediately left Pella and headed for Epirus
to the court of Olympiass brother Alexander. The heir to the throne next
travelled to an Illyrian kingdom that the sources fail to name.57
Modern historians have for a long time been trying to politically
interpret these events. For a while credence was given to Justins statement
that Philips marriage took place after he had divorced Olympias. Such a
version of events suited both Roman and later European views on
marriage in civilised societies, i.e. that it ought to be monogamous.
However, save for the unreliable Alexander Romance, this version is
contradicted by all the other sources. The authors of these two later works
did not realise that Argead views on marriage were quite different from
those associated with civilised behaviour in their day and age. Meanwhile
if only the aforementioned passage from Satyrus suggests that Philip had
throughout his adult life more than one wife and that perhaps polygamy
was traditional in Macedonias ruling dynasty. Olympias was not Philips
first wife and she had had younger women vying for the kings attention
before, but such rivalries had not previously led to conflicts, at least not
ones to be mentioned in the sources. Therefore neither sexual jealousy nor
the fact that Philip had married yet another woman while he was at least
still formally the husband of Olympias could have been the reason for the
rift in the royal family.58
As far as is known, the Macedonian court differed from polygamous
courts in the East in that there was no formal hierarchy among the
57

Plu., Alex., 9.5-11; Arr., An., 3.6.5; Paus., 8.7.7; Just., 9.7.2-6; Satyr., F25 ap.
Ath., 13.5; Ps.-Callisth., 1.20-21. Excessive wine drinking: Ephippus, ap. Ath.,
3.91. On the name of Philips new wife see Badian 1982a.
58
Carney 1987; Greenwalt 1989; Ogden 1999, pp. xiv-xvi; Carney 2006, pp. 22-26.

The Heir to the Throne

77

monarchs wives with no official first wife. In practice, however, the

mother of the successor to the throne became the most important wife of
the king. At a relatively early stage it had become apparent that Alexander
was the designated heir. Indeed, it was Alexander who had been provided
with an expensive education under Aristotles instruction, it was he who
already as a child had received foreign envoys and as a teenager had
governed as regent. Besides, he had no competition for in 337 Philips
only other son was the mentally retarded Arrhidaeus. Arrhidaeuss
disability had become apparent no later than in his school age and
therefore he could not have been seriously considered as a successor at
least since then. Justin claims that after Philips death Alexander murdered
a brother called Caranus but we cannot even be certain that Caranus ever
existed. He is not included in the list of Philips descendants compiled by
Satyrus from all the sources known to him. Moreover, Justin says that
Caranus was the son of Philip and Cleopatra. Thus if Pompeius Trogus or
his epitomiser Justin had not simply invented Caranus, he would have
naturally been born after the wedding incident. If we accept anthropological
findings regarding states with a polygamous ruling family, we can assume
that Macedonia lacked a clear and codified procedure for succession to the
throne. We only know that the successor had to be a member of the
Argead family. Unless the throne was taken over as the result of a coup,
which indeed happened all too often, the successor was usually a son the
deceased king had nominated to be his heir, though not necessarily the
eldest son. While Alexander was the only known heir, his position and that
of his mother Olympias were secure. All this could now change. Philip
was still only 45 or 46 years old and could well have occupied the throne
for another 20 years or more. Therefore if Cleopatra bore him a son and if
Philip so wished, nothing could stop him from nominating this younger
son to be his heir instead of Alexander. Worse still, Olympias was an
Epirote whereas Cleopatra was a Macedonian. That the matter of the
successors nationality was important to many among the aristocracy is
quite apparent in what Attalus said at the wedding feast. Therefore it is
easy to understand why this particular marriage was so worrying to
Olympias and her son.59
Philips decision to marry Cleopatra is generally regarded to be an
aspect of his internal policy. By marrying a Lower Macedonian aristocrat
whose uncle and guardian was the apparently influential Attalus the king
59

Badian 1963, p. 246; Hatzopoulos 1986; Carney 1987, pp. 37-48; Greenwalt
1989; Ogden 1999, pp. 3-4, 18-19, 24; Mirn 2000, pp. 39-44; Carney 2006, pp.
32-36. The case of Caranus: Just., 11.2.3, 9.3.7; Satyr., ap. Ath., 13.5; Heckel 1979;
Unz 1985; Carney 2000, p. 77.

78

Chapter II

intended to strengthen his ties with the Macedonian elite. This thesis,
though popular in modern historiography, lacks substantiation in ancient
sources. We know nothing about the origins of Attalus and Cleopatra. It is
only from our general knowledge of Macedonian society that we can
assume they were aristocrats. However, this does not entitle us to
speculate as to their exact position within Macedonian society. Events
following Philips death and the ease with which Attalus was removed
from any position of authority indicate that this aristocrat was far less
powerful than has been commonly assumed. Moreover, Satyrus
biography of Philip cited by Athenaeus and Plutarch clearly state that the
king married Cleopatra out of love. The moralist Plutarch adds that Philip
fell in love with her despite his senior age. It is hard not get the impression
that such unequivocal information from the sources is simply being
ignored by supporters of the theory that Philips marriage to Cleopatra had
an essentially political objective,60 and that this stems from the opinion
that Philip (as perhaps all outstanding political figures) was always
rational, weighing up every single decision in terms of profit or loss. Yet
with the lack of any powerful arguments to dismiss the information
provided by Plutarch and Satyrus it is more sensible to accept it. It would
not have been the first or the last time a middle-aged man lost all common
sense and fell in love with a woman young enough to be his daughter.61
Accepting hypothetically that the motive was love, not political calculation,
most certainly does not imply the situation was any less worrying to
Olympias and Alexander. After all, if the king was able to take such an
extraordinary step as allowing his emotions to decide on yet another
marriage, one could expect anything of such a man.
The falling out between Philip and Alexander did not last long.
Ultimately Alexander was still the only heir to the Macedonian throne and
a very competent one at that. Philip was certainly aware of the fact that the
outburst of rage he had provoked and his sons departure for Illyria did not
serve the Macedonian state. Experiences from the earlier history of the
Argead dynasty showed that quarrels between a monarch and family
members often led to the emergence of pretenders to his throne. That is
why Philip willingly accepted the excuses provided by the trusted hetairos
Demaratus of Corinth and through his mediation got Alexander to return
to Macedonia. A similar reconciliation with Olympias was out of the
question. Besides, she was at the time actually trying to persuade her
60

E.g. Hamilton 1965, pp. 120-121; Hamilton 1999, p. 24; Green 1974, pp. 88-91;
Corvisier 2002, pp. 265-267; Carney 2006, pp. 33-34. On Attalus: Heckel 2009, p.
27.
61
Heckel 1986, pp. 295-298; Borza 1990, pp. 206-208.

The Heir to the Throne

79

brother to wage war on Philip in defence of her honour and position.

Indeed these were certainly more than empty threats as Philip felt it
necessary to take diplomatic steps to strengthen the bond between himself
and Alexander of Epirus. The latter already had reasons to be grateful to
Philip for installing him on the throne in place of his uncle Arybbas, but
now Philip offered him his and Olympiass daughter Cleopatra, and
therefore the Epirote kings own niece, as a wife.62

6. Death of Philip
The wedding ceremony was to take place at the original capital of
Macedonian, Aegae. Once peace in the Balkans was secured with the
marriage of Alexander of Epirus to his daughter, Philip intended to set off
with his Macedonian and allied forces on the planned invasion of Asia
Minor. In accordance with custom the king first consulted the Delphic
Oracle to learn whether he would defeat the Persians. The answer he
received was as follows: Wreathed is the bull. All is done. There is also
the one who will smite him. As on many other occasions, Pythias words
were subjected to conflicting interpretations. For Philip it implied the
slaughter of Persians like the slaughter of sacrificial beasts. Diodorus,
however, sees in these words a clear prophesy of Philips own death. It
used to be believed that the wedding between Alexander of Epirus and
Philips daughter Cleopatra was held in the summer of 336, but according
to more recent research into the chronology of events concerning
Alexander the Greats reign it seems more likely that the wedding took
place in the autumn of that year, perhaps in October, though some scholars
very precisely date Philips death to have occurred on 25th September. The
wedding took place the day before the Macedonian kings death. At dawn
the following day games were to be held at the citys theatre, which was
then filled to capacity with guests from Macedonia and Greece. Philip
approached the theatre accompanied by his son and heir as well as by his
son-in-law; having instructed his bodyguards to keep some distance away,
so that he could show the Greeks friends and allies gathered there how
much he trusted them. If archaeological assumptions regarding the
location of Philips palace at Aegae are correct, it was just some 60 metres
from the theatre. On the way the Macedonian king had fallen a short
distance behind his companions. That was when a young man from among
his bodyguards called Pausanias ran up and thrust his sword through Philip
thus killing him. The assassin next started to flee, but before he could get
62

Plu., Alex., 9.12-14; Just., 9.7. Bosworth 1988, pp. 22-23.

80

Chapter II

to his horse, he stumbled on a vine and fell. This allowed the royal guards
to catch up and instantly spear Pausanias to death. Among the guards
Diodorus mentions Alexanders later companions: Leonnatus, Perdiccas
and Attalus.63
In a letter written to Darius III four years later Alexander accused the
Persian king of dispatching the assassins who killed his father.
Alexanders most famous modern biographer, W.W. Tarn, calls this
accusation which today would be termed indirect perpetration of murder
the official Macedonian courts version. 64 Unfortunately we do not
know when this version emerged. Certainly none of the ancient sources
relating what happened at Aegae in 336 mentions it. Therefore it could
have merely been invented for propaganda purposes in the war against
Darius III in 332. In describing the events of the autumn of 336 the ancient
authors devote a lot of attention to Philips assassin, Pausanias. Fairly
typically for the Macedonian court, it was apparently a sordid homosexual
affair that drove this bodyguard to commit the crime. For Pausanias,
originally from the Upper Macedonian land of Orestis, had in his early
youth been Philips lover. When Philip found another homosexual lover,
also by the name of Pausanias, the future assassin offended his rival in
such a way as to make him commit suicide. But before committing suicide
the other Pausanias related everything to Attalus, the uncle of Cleopatra.
Later at a banquet Attalus let Pausanias the future assassin get drunk and,
according to Justin, together with other guests proceeded to rape him.
Diodorus, on the other hand, claims Attalus had his muleteers gang rape
him. This most probably happened in 337 or at the start of 336, not long
before the departure of the first Macedonian expeditionary corps to Asia
Minor. The rape victim complained to Philip, but the king did not punish
Attalus, who was then very much a court favourite as the uncle and
guardian of the kings newly wed wife Cleopatra. Instead Philip tried to
appease Pausanias with gifts and promotion to the rank of a somatophylax
(personal bodyguard). Now Pausaniass anger turned against the king and,
what is worse, he recalled from the teachings of the philosopher
Hermocrates the thought that one can acquire the highest fame by killing
someone who had achieved the greatest things. Thus personal revenge and

63

Diod., 16.91-94; Just., 9.6; Plu., Alex., 10.5. Date in October: Bosworth 1980, pp.
45-46; Hatzopoulos 1982a. Date on 25 September: Grzybek 1990, pp. 21-28;
Hauben 1992, p. 146. Careers of Leonnatus, Perdiccas and Attalus: Heckel 1992,
pp. 91-106, 134-163, 180-183. Archaeology of Aegae: Andronicus 1984, pp. 38-47.
64
Arr., An., 2.14.5; Curt., 4.1.12. Tarn 1948, I, p. 3.

The Heir to the Throne

81

a desire for fame are the most frequently mentioned motives behind the
murder.65
The ancient authors also mention a story originating from other sources
now difficult to unequivocally identify which claims that Olympias
persuaded Pausanias to commit the murder and that Alexander at least
knew if not actually actively encouraged the assassin too. Olympias
allegedly even paid homage to the dead assassins body by placing a gold
wreath on it, arranging a funeral with sacrificial offerings and offering the
assassins sword to Apollo. The fact that Pausanias had had a prepared
escape the horses were also allegedly left for him by Olympias would
imply the existence of a conspiracy against Philip. Thus modern historians
have suggested that Pausanias was not arrested and put on trial but
instantly killed for fear that he would reveal the names of other
conspirators. 66 However, it is difficult not to get the impression that
attempts to establish who would have been party to this real or presumed
conspiracy are more to do with whether or not one believes in the
culpability or innocence of Philips successor than with scrupulous
analysis of very equivocal sources. Olympiass involvement would seem
plausible if we consider her very bad relationship with Philip and the very
real sense of danger following Philips marriage to Cleopatra. After
Philips death the successors mother, Olympias, gained a position of
unquestioned authority, and the many times she showed ruthlessness
clearly demonstrate that she was capable of any crime. The same
arguments may be used to also implicate her son. Furthermore neither any
of the Lyncestis princes nor anyone else from beyond Philips dynasty had
enough authority to wrest control of the state from the Argeads, who had
ruled it for centuries. 67 Opponents of this theory point to the fact that
Olympias has had an extremely bad press, presumably ever since her
mortal enemy Cassander started inciting against her. Thus ancient authors
found it easy to suspect her of any crime. This was especially so as
Olympias clearly breached the conventions regarding women of her time,
and all the ancient authors relating the death of Philip were males with
fairly conservative outlooks. However, neither she nor her son is
65

Arist., Pol., 1311b1-3; Diod., 16.93-94; Plu., Alex., 10.5-6; Just., 9.6. Date: Fears
1975, p. 120; Mortensen 2007, p. 374, n. 15; Miller 2007, p. 138.
66
Diod., 16.94.3; Plu., Alex., 10.5-6; Just., 9.7. C.B. Welles, n. 2 to p. 101 in
Diodorus in Loeb Series; Green 1974, p. 107. The strongest case for a conspiracy
involving Olympias and Alexander: Worthington 2008, pp. 184-186.
67
Khler 1892, pp. 497-514; Hamilton 1965, pp. 120-122; Develin 1981; Carney
1987, pp. 46-48; Badian 1963; Badian 2000, pp. 54-58; Corvisier 2002, pp. 268269.

82

Chapter II

implicated in Aristotles account of the assassination, which is the only

extant version written by a contemporary and also an exceptionally
valuable one on account of the philosophers excellent connections with
Macedonian elites. Finally, the personal motive of the assassin is plausible
and fully sufficient to explain this extreme action. 68 Of course such
arguments, largely based on the silence of the only available contemporary
source, can be dismissed, but only in the realms of speculation.
Thus the case of Philips murder remains not entirely solved. We only
know that Alexander was the greatest beneficiary of his fathers demise as
he now inherited the throne, but that does not automatically make him a
conspirator. 69 Not every inheritor resorts to murder, and fortuitous
coincidences also occur in the lives of ordinary people, not only those of
ruling families.

68

Fears 1975; Ellis 1981; Burstein 1982, pp. 69-70; Borza 1990, p. 227; OBrien
1992, pp. 36-40; Hammond 1994, pp. 175-176; Briant 2002, p. 9; Mortensen 2007.
69
Lane Fox 1973, pp. 21-25; Carney 2006, p. 39.

CHAPTER III:
THE NEW KING

1. The takeover. Philips funeral

In extant ancient sources there is no complete account of the critical events
that occurred at the time of Philips murder. Remarks scattered here and
there allow us to establish what happened though not necessarily the
chronological order in which it occurred. It is not hard to imagine that
immediately after Philips death there was chaos, but it did not last long.
Alexanders friends rallied to his support, most probably all like
Alexander of Lyncestis according to Arrian armed as for battle to ensure
his safety and thus also to declare their allegiance in his claim to the throne.
Antipater, Philips oldest and most respected general and advisor,
delivered a speech assuring the support of the Macedonian army, which
was stationed in and around Aegae. Bearing in mind the might of the
Macedonian army, one can assume that immediately after declaring their
personal allegiance, Alexanders supporters went to speak to the soldiers.
It was most probably at a rally of soldiers that took place then and not at
a more formal meeting assumed by some modern historians but unknown
to the ancient sources that Alexander was declared king. It was also then
that he would have personally promised to relieve his subjects of all duties
other than military service. He would have then proclaimed the
continuation of Philips policies, which had been so popular in Macedonia;
symbolically this continuation was confirmed by keeping Philips coinage
unchanged until 333. The situation must have been serious for Alexander
to have thought it necessary to make such promises when the states
finances were in such a sorry state barely 60 talents in the treasury and
200 or even 500 talents of debt left behind by Philip. In all certainty on the
day of the assassination Alexander, before letting them leave, turned to the
Greek dignitaries gathered at the theatre to appeal for their loyalty.1

Arr., An., 1.25.2, 7.9.6; Ps.-Callisth., 1.26; Diod., 17.2.2; POxy. 1798 = FGrH
148 F1 with emendation as in Parson 1979. Wilcken 1967, pp. 61-62; Badian 1963;

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Although Alexander had been for a long time designated by Philip as

his successor, this did not mean his ascension to the Macedonian throne
was a matter of certainty. The rights to succession have been a hotly
debated issue among modern historians, who correctly view this as part of
a broader question of the Macedonian states constitution. This matter is
worthy of attention not only because it explains changes in the historic
process that occurred in 336 and at other times during Alexanders reign,
but also because of the relative popularity of the constitutionalist school in
history of Macedonia, most notably represented by N.G.L. Hammond.
This stance was first formulated in a German study of state law which
described Macedonia under the Argeads and during the Hellenistic period
as a constitutional monarchy. According to this study successors to the
throne were either elected or their nominations were ratified in a legally
defined way by an assembly of Macedonians. At times of war, especially
when it was waged in a distant land, the Macedonian army would
supposedly take over the rights of the Macedonian assembly. According to
historians of the constitutionalist school this assembly also had the right to
ratify international agreements and to try those accused of treason. In most
situations, however, the Macedonians, though quite aware of their rights,
allowed their monarchs to rule in an uninhibited way.2
This theory is to a large extent based on the statement that Macedonian
kings ruled ode bv, ll nmJ, which roughly translated means not by
force, but on the basis Macedonian law words which Arrian has the
philosopher Callisthenes say in a speech praising Macedonians. The other
major pieces of evidence are four known cases of formal assemblies of the
Macedonian army regarding legal issues: during the trial of Philotas in 330,
on the Hyphasis in 326, at Opis in 324 and during the election of
Alexanders successor in 323. However, the greatest importance should be
attached to the words Arrian attributes to Callisthenes as they allow for the
interpretation of the other events. If Macedonia was ruled according to a
set of laws that applied to everyone, not just the subjects, then we may
assume that in 330 Alexander had Philotas tried by an assembly of soldiers
as he himself did not have the right to condemn him for treason. Few
Thompson 1982, p. 116; Bosworth 1988, pp. 25-26; Baynham 1994, p. 337; Le
Rider 2003, pp. 48-63. Debts: Plu., mor., 327d (after Onesicritus).
2
Grainier 1931; Aymard 1950; Wilcken 1967, pp. 24, 61; Schachermeyr 1973, pp.
34-36, 304-305, 492-497; Briant 1973, pp. 318-320; Ellis 1976, pp. 24-25;
Hammond 1979, pp. 153, 160-162; Griffith 1979, pp. 389-392; Bosworth 1988, p.
26; Hammond 1989, pp. 60-70; OBrien 1992, p. 40; Hatzopoulos 1996, i, pp. 261322; Hammond 1994, pp. 6-7, 37-38, 185-188; Worthington 2003, pp. 72-73;
Rzepka 2006.

The New King

85

words in the Greek language have more different meanings than nomos,
the term used by Arrian. It can mean custom, constitution or even
melody. One of the meanings is obvious: law and constitutional norm,
but to assume that Arrian had this meaning in mind without knowing the
strict legal context is dangerous. One hardly needs to mention that the
encomium Callisthenes delivered in honour of Macedonians to officers of
Alexanders army did not concern matters of jurisprudence, which
naturally require very precise legal language. If, on the other hand, we
reject the notion that the word was intended to mean law and
constitutional norm, we demolish the methodological basis on which
modern historians of ancient Macedonia have founded their constitutionalist
theory. One also needs to remember that this speech, like generally all
speeches in the works of ancient authors attributed to historical figures,
does not relate the actual words uttered by the philosopher but words used
by Arrian over half a millennium after the lives of Callisthenes and
Alexander. Therefore it could be argued that we are referring to the views
of an ancient author rather than the actual views of the historical figure he
is writing about. Epideictic orations, which combined all the known
resources, images, concepts and formulations used by orators, were very
popular in Arrians day and so here we are probably dealing with a topos
frequently appearing in Greek literature, one that contrasts force with law
and custom. If that is the case, Alexander probably had Philotas tried by
his soldiers not for legal reasons but for political ones (more on this in
Chapter V.5). The decisions imposed on Alexander by his own army on
the river Hyphasis and at Opis should be all together excluded from the
debate over the Macedonian constitution as both were the rebellions of
soldiers against their leader, but ones in which they did not so much want
to dispose of him as to make him change decisions that happened to be
unfavourable to them. Therefore these rallies of Macedonian soldiers were
not a consequence of constitutional rights but a show of force, rebellions
in which the soldiers temporarily got the upper hand.3
Once the constitutional theory started being questioned as based more
on a priori imaginings of how an ancient society evolved rather than on
sources regarding the history of Macedonia, a different interpretation
emerged in historiography. According to some historians, Macedonian
monarchs had absolutist aspirations, which they tried to realise insofar as
they were able to overcome opposition from powerful Macedonian barons.
The barons were to make up a royal council which, if there were
controversies within the royal family, would resolve the matter of royal
3
Arr., An., 4.11.6. Lock 1977; Errington 1978; Anson 1991; Virgilio 2003, pp. 3537. On the word nomos see Ostwald 1969, pp. 20-54.

86

Chapter III

succession.4 Unfortunately, there is also no evidence in the sources that

such a permanent royal council ever existed. There was of course a
meeting of Macedonian leaders to decide Alexanders successor after his
death at Babylon but the exceptionality of this event does not allow us to
presume that such a royal council was a regular institution. Likewise it is
very dangerous to draw general conclusions, as some constitutionalists do,
from the way Macedonian soldiers behaved during Alexanders expedition
and worse still to imply that soldiers also behaved in such a way before
Alexanders time. Soldiers who spent over a dozen years on a campaign
beyond there homeland mostly in each others company developed a type
of solidarity that is characteristic for mercenaries. As had already been
observed more than once among mercenaries in Greece, at times when
there was a conflict of interests and the future seemed uncertain, a kind of
military democracy emerged to usurp power for the sake of a common
cause. That was what happened in the Macedonian army towards the end
of Alexanders reign and at the start of the Hellenistic age, but there is no
evidence that such a system functioned in Macedonia before the Asian
expedition. 5 To recapitulate: both perennial succession crises in
Macedonia and the lack of evidence of a universally accepted system of
succession allow us to assume that no such system existed.6 The effective
rejection of claims made by pretenders was effectively a kind of rites of
passage for new rulers who had to prove they were worthy of the position
of power they held. That too was Alexanders situation after Philips death.
After being acclaimed king the first step Alexander had to take was to
avenge his fathers death. Alas Pausanias was already dead, so the most
Alexander could do was have his corpse strung up. Meanwhile a search
was started for accomplices. An unnamed individual was immediately
sentenced to be pounded to death. The exceptional cruelty of the sentence
and the context in which this fragmentary piece of information appears
indicates that the victim must have been considered in some way
responsible for Philips death. 7 Alexanders position continued to be
uncertain. Plutarch even writes that All Macedonia was festering with
revolt and looking towards Amyntas and the children of Aeropus. Insofar
as the sons of Aeropus, i.e. the princes from Lyncestis, could not seize
power on their own, there can be no doubt they were important members
4

Errington 1978; Greenwalt 1989, pp. 19-20, 31, 34-36. The alleged royal council:
Hammond 1979, pp. 158-160.
5
Borza 1990, pp. 231-242.
6
Borza 1990, pp. 234, 243-245; Ogden 1999, pp. 3-4.
7
Just., 9.7; POxy 1798 = FGrH 148 F1. Perhaps Diod., 17.2.1 and Plu., Alex., 10.7
allude to this event too.

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87

of an aristocratic opposition to the faction supporting Alexander. The

existence of a large aristocratic opposition to the new ruler is confirmed by
the defection of some high-ranking Macedonians to the court of the Great
King and their later emergence in his army. Amyntas IV, in turn, had lived
in the shadow of his uncle Philip when the latter was king though by the
Macedonian courts standards his fate was not the worst. Philip had
indeed stripped him of any meaningful power but he had spared him his
life, sent him on diplomatic missions and even gave him his daughter
Cynane as a wife. Thus after Philips death Amyntas became the natural
focus for those who were dissatisfied with Alexanders ascension to the
throne. Much later Philotas would be accused of helping Amyntas, which
regardless of the veracity of the charge confirms the significance of
this particular Argead in 336. Alexanders situation was unexpectedly
weakened even more with the return from Epirus of a vengeful Olympias.
One of her victims was the newly born child of Philip and Cleopatra (a
daughter by the name of Europa), killed in the mothers arms, though
probably not baked alive as Pausanias relates on the basis of some
sensationalist source. The distraught Cleopatra committed suicide, perhaps
forced to take her life by Olympias. Some modern historians try to justify
Olympias on the grounds that infant deaths were of little meaning to
people in those times and that dynastic murders within the Argead family
were very frequent. Thus, they argue, Olympias had not actually broken
any social norms. Ancient sources, however, view it differently. His
mothers actions angered Alexander for they stirred up an unnecessary
conflict with Cleopatras uncle Attalus, who was still very popular in the
army, and potentially also with Attaluss father-in-law, Parmenion.
Olympias had allegedly also burned the body of Philips murderer,
Pausanias, ceremonially adorned with a gold wreath, on a pyre and then
burying the remains. Even if these claims are no more than spiteful
rumours, the deaths of Cleopatra and Europa happened for real. In order to
cover up this very bad impression Alexander could do no more than allow
the bodies of Cleopatra and Europa to be buried in Philips grave.
Meantime Attalus, who was in Asia Minor, decided not to rebel against
Alexander, although he did exchange correspondence with Demosthenes,
who was urging him to do so.8
8

Plu., mor., 327c; Arr., An., 1.17.9; Arr., Succ., fr. 1.22; Curt., 3.11.8, 6.9.17,
6.10.24; Paus., 8.7.7; Plu., Alex., 10.7, 20.1; Diod., 17.2.3, 17.3.2, 17.48.2;
Polyaen., 8.60.1; Just., 9.7, 12.6. Wilcken 1967, pp. 62-63; Badian 1963; Bosworth
1971, pp. 102-103; Bosworth 1988, pp. 25-26; Errington 1978, pp. 94-95; Burstein
1982, pp. 159-161; Ellis 1982; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 38-39; Prandi 1998; Baynham
1998, p. 147. Apology of Olympias: Carney 1993; Carney 2006, pp. 43-48.

88

Chapter III

Alexander did not allow his real or perceived political rivals live long,
though there is no reason to assume as E. Badian does that immediately
after his ascension a great purge was started in which all potential enemies
were eliminated. This certainly did not happen straight away as is best
testified by the case of Attalus, who if only for his quarrel with Alexander
at Cleopatras wedding should have been the new kings first victim. And
yet Attalus was still alive at the start of 335 during Memnons counteroffensive against the Macedonian expeditionary corps in Asia Minor. The
first to be killed were the two princes from Lyncestis, Arrhabaeus and
Heromenes, charged with being involved in the conspiracy to murder
Philip. Their brother Alexander of Lyncestis saved his life by prudently
declaring his support to king Alexander immediately after Philips death.
Besides, he was the son-in-law of Antipater, the most powerful member of
Alexanders circle, which may have been another reason why Alexander
refrained from the Macedonian custom of sentencing to death all the
members of a family accused of conspiracy against the monarch. It was for
such a conspiracy that Alexanders rival to throne Amyntas IV was killed.
This must have happened before the summer of 335, for then Alexander
could offer the hand of Amyntas now widowed wife, Cynane, to his ally
Langarus, king of the Agrianians. In face of such vigorous measures taken
by Alexander to secure his position, Attalus tried to save his own skin by
showing himself to be totally loyal to the new monarch and submitting to
him the letters he had received from Demosthenes. But all this was to no
avail for Alexander had decide to eliminate the man who had dared insult
him verbally and then raise his hand in anger at him during Cleopatras
wedding. The king sent a unit of soldiers to Asia Minor headed by his
trusted officer Hecataeus. This unit joined the army commanded by
Attalus and Parmenion and then killed the first of these two commanders.
There can be no doubt that the murder of a popular general in the middle
of his camp could not have been carried out without the active cooperation
of the other Macedonian commander, Parmenion, who put his allegiance
to the increasingly more powerful monarch above loyalty to his son-in-law.
We do not know when exactly Attalus was killed, but it most probably
happened in the second half of 335. In any case Alexander saw to it that
before his expedition to the East no member of Cleopatra and Attaluss
family remained alive. Scholars believe that Parmenion made a secret deal
with Alexander by which in return for Attaluss head Parmenion was
guaranteed a position of power and influence under the new king. This
may largely explain why by the start of the Asian expedition so many

The New King

89

posts in the Macedonian army were held by Parmenions relatives and

protgs.9
On the symbolic level the most important undertaking in the first days
of Alexanders reign was to organise a funeral befitting his tragically
killed father. Indeed Diodorus, Justin and a fragment of an anonymous
history of Alexander found on an Oxyrhynchus papyrus all mention that
one of the first actions of the new monarch was to have his servants
arrange the burial of Philips body.10 Although there is no mention of it in
the sources, it is generally assumed that Philips body was burnt on a pyre
and next his charred bones were deposited at the Argeads traditional
burial site. Archaeologists have serendipitously located this very
necropolis of the Macedonian kings situated in Aegae, todays village of
Vergina. Already in 1855 the French archaeologist L. Heuzey discovered
the significance of the areas most prominent feature, the so-called Great
Tumulus. The Great Tumulus is an artificial mound with a 110 m diameter
and 12 m high that Antigonus Gonatas had erected to protect royal
Macedonian graves from total plunder; indeed, already in 274/273 they
had been broken into by Celts from an Aegae garrison that Pyrrhus had
founded. In 1976 excavations at the Great Tumulus carried out under the
direction of Manolis Andronikos revealed three graves. Only one of them,
Tomb I, had already been robbed in ancient times. In keeping with
Macedonian custom, these do no bear any inscriptions, but the lavishness
and high artistic quality of the items found within undisturbed graves leave
no doubt that they were those of Argead family members from the second
half of the 4th century.11
Up to this point the opinions of all historians concur. The controversy
begins with attempts to associate the charred remains found in specific
tombs with specific historical figures. Naturally, the controversy primarily
concerns Tombs II and III, which were found intact. The mere fact that an
ancient royal tomb was uncovered that had not been robbed is extremely
rare in archaeology, but here we can talk of an even greater find in that the
Vergina graves are those of the Argeads from a period when this dynasty
greatly influenced the world. The remains of the most famous of the
Argeads, Alexander the Great, are not to be found there he was buried in
Egypt therefore scholars have concentrated on finding the last resting
9

Diod., 17.2; Curt., 6.9.17; Arr., An., 1.5.4; Arr., Succ., fr. 1.22; Just., 11.2, 11.5,
12.6.14. Badian 1964, p. 193; Burstein 1982, pp. 159-161; Ellis 1982; Will 1986,
pp. 31-32; Heckel 1986, pp. 299-300; Bosworth 1988, pp. 26-28; OBrien 1992, p.
44; Prandi 1998.
10
Diod., 17.2.2; Just., 11.2.1; POxy 1798 = FGrH 148 F1.
11
Andronicos 1984, pp. 17-62.

90

Chapter III

place of his father. The less problematic of the two tombs is No. III, where
a teenage king was buried. This was in all probability Alexander IV, the
son of Alexander the Great and his Iranian wife, Rhoxane, who was born
in 323 and murdered in 310/09. The matter looks quite different with
Tomb II. It comprises two chambers: thee main chamber contains the
remains of a man who had died at approximately the age of forty+ and
then there is also an antechamber containing the remains of a woman at a
younger age. Only two Argeads could possibly be associated with the
mans body: Philip II or his son Arrhidaeus (Philip III), who was murdered
in 317 and formally buried in spring the following year. Already in 1978
M. Andronikos announced that this was Philip IIs resting place and this
despite reservations expressed by some non-Greek scholars from the start
was generally accepted as a fact and continues to be the official stance of
Greek academics to this day. If this could be confirmed beyond a
reasonable doubt, Andronikoss find would be one of the most astounding
archaeological achievements of all time. The Greek archaeologist has
based his claim on several premises: the age of the man being estimated at
around 46 rather than 40 (which was the age of Arrhidaeus when he was
killed); the apparently hasty manner in which the tomb was built; the fact
that one leg of the skeleton is slightly shorter than the other, which could
be explained by the wound Philip had received and the discomfort it later
caused him when wearing standard length grieves as well as the discovery
of five ivory heads which could represent Philip, Olympias and Alexander.
Finally attention is drawn to the style of the mural paintings in the
chambers, which is more appropriate to the years 336-335 than to 316.
Encouraged by Andronikoss hypotheses pathologists from the universities
of Manchester and Bristol, equally familiar with research into ancient
Egyptian mummies as with modern forensic science, conducted detailed
examinations of the bone fragments and established that buried in grave II
was a man aged from 35 to 55 and a woman who had died at an age
anywhere between 20 and 30. Fragments of the mans skull allowed for a
simulated reconstruction of his face. And in this reconstruction the experts
even noticed a deformation in one of the eye sockets, which was
interpreted as resulting from damage caused by an arrow. The socket also
includes protrusions which the experts interpreted as a consequence of the
healing process and the specific work of the muscles after the loss of an
eye perhaps the eye Philip lost at the siege of Methone.12
12

Andronicos 1978; Andronicos 1984, pp. 97-232; Green 1982; Lane Fox 1980,
pp. 77-95; Bernhardt 1992, pp. 72-73; Prag, Musgrave, Neave 1984; Musgrave
1991; Hammond 1994, pp. 179-182; Drougou 1996; Prag, Neave 1997, pp. 53-84;
Worthington 2008, pp. 234-241.

The New King

91

These arguments do not satisfy everyone. The age at death of those

found in Tomb II, calculated insofar as contemporary science would allow,
could apply equally well to the ages of Philip II (c. 46) and Cleopatra (c.
20) as to the ages of Philip III (c. 40) and his wife, Adea-Eurydice. Using
the ivory heads found in Tomb II as an argument is also not valid because
the identification of only 5 out of 20 is reasonably certain. Even more
dubious are the arguments concerning the wall paintings; certain elements
in them, especially lion hunting scenes, had not appeared in Greek art
since the archaic period and only reappeared after Alexanders expedition
to Asia and intensive contact with Oriental monumental art. Some scholars
even note that the architectural form of the Macedonian tombs at Vergina,
especially Tombs II and III, resemble the house-tomb of Cyrus the Great
at Pasargadae, which Europeans saw for the first time only after 331. More
importantly, the barrel-vaulted roofs appear in Europe for the first time in
their fully developed form at Vergina and we may assume that this form
was introduced to Greek architecture from Iran thanks to Alexanders
expedition. Moreover, the grieves of uneven length found in Tomb II do
not match what would have been Philips physical proportions, as the
longer one would have been worn on his right leg, the leg which in fact
was shorter on account of the incurred wound. Such grieves were, on the
other hand, used by Persian archers who had one grieve shorter for freer
movement of the leg when firing arrows from a semi-kneeling position.
On coins the Persian king is frequently portrayed as an archer and
therefore such grieves could have been part of a captured royal Persian
outfit. This would have included a spear that Persian archers used, and that
too was found in the tomb, as was an oriental quiver (gorytos). The very
opulence of the artefacts found in Tomb II contradict Andronikoss thesis
insofar as sceptics query whether the treasurys virtually empty coffers at
the start of Alexanders reign would have allowed for the purchase of such
a quantity of high quality items crafted out of precious materials, including
large amounts of gold. The most important counter arguments concern the
ceramic items found in Tomb II: two Athenian salt cellars that have been
dated as originating from some time between 325 and 295. The
chronology of Athenian ceramics has been established to an estimated
accuracy of ten years. As the salt cellars could not have been placed in the
burial chamber before it was sealed, Tomb II could not have been created
before 325. Alexander would have buried his father before the start of his
Asian campaign in 334, a campaign from which he never returned. This
argument is enforced by the examination of ceramic items found in a
Macedonian grave at Derveni which are very similar to those from Tomb
II at Vergina and have been dated as originating form the last quarter of

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Chapter III

the 4th century. Also some metal artefacts from Tomb II point to a
markedly later date than 336. 13 A renewed examination of the bone
fragments attributed to Philip did not confirm any evidence of damage
caused by an arrow or indeed any other deformities claimed in earlier
studies. Moreover, the changes and cracks in the mans long bones are
characteristic for a body that had been buried for some time before being
cremated. We know that the body of Philip III Arrhidaeus was buried in
the autumn of 317 only to be exhumed and cremated in the spring of 316.
No sources, however, mention Philips body being burnt after an initial
period of interment.14
In other words, the less attractive theory that Philip III Arrhidaeus and
his wife Adea-Eurydice were buried at Tomb II of the Great Tumulus at
Vergina appears to be closer to the truth. Despite the marginalisation of
this mentally retarded monarch, he was the king of Macedonia at a time
when the great empire created by Alexander was still intact, at least in
theory. The opulence of the tomb is therefore hardly surprising, especially
as Cassander would make every effort to please those Macedonians loyal
to the Argead dynasty by showing his respect to Olympiass victim Philip
III Arrhidaeus. By organising a lavish funeral for the son of Philip II,
Cassander declared that he was the rightful successor to the Argead
dynasty. This association he soon afterwards formalised by marrying
Philips daughter Thessalonice. Apart from the crown, Philip III
Arrhidaeus also inherited from his half-brother other treasures and regalia,
some of which were presumably also deposited in his burial chamber. The
sceptre, shield, armour and helmet had in all probability belonged to
Alexander. The weapons and armour found with the remains of the young
woman in the antechamber may be explained by the historically well
documented military training Adea-Eurydice had received. In light of what
has been said above, it seems most probable that the cist grave known as
Tomb I of the Great Tumulus, which had already been robbed in ancient
times, was the burial place of Philip II. The tomb may not have contained
artefacts as precious as those found in Tombs II and III, but the
archaeologically discovered bones of a middle aged man, young woman
and infant would seem to have belonged to Philip II, his last wife
Cleopatra and their child, which had been born just days before her
fathers death. A full report regarding the archaeological findings in this
13

Boyd 1978; Lehman 1980; Lehman 1982; Green 1982; Burstein 1982, pp. 144146; Rotroff 1982; Rotroff 1984; Borza 1990, pp. 260-263, 272-274, 311; Faklaris
1994, p. 616, n. 61; Themelis, Touratsoglou 1997, pp. 183-185, 220-222; Borza
1999, pp. 69-70; Pelagia 2000, p. 191; Gill 2008.
14
Bartsiokas 2000; Schuster 2000; Gill 2008.

The New King

93

grave has not yet been published, but all the indications seem to show that
the mans body had been inhumed and not cremated. This undermines
conventional views regarding ancient Macedonian burial customs.15
Having taken over control of Macedonia, the young king Alexander
had yet to secure for himself a position in Greece as had been enjoyed by
his father before his death. Numerous delegations had arrived from Greece
to attend the games that were to be held after Cleopatras wedding at
Aegae. It was to them that Alexander now turned as the new king of
Macedonia asking them to remain loyal. This appeal was to no avail for
the death of the feared Philip to be replaced by a young and as yet
inexperienced Alexander at a time of crisis was too much not to have
awakened in many a Greek state the hope of breaking free of the existing
political order. Indeed, it immediately became apparent that the many did
not accept the new balance of power. As usual, we know most about how
the situation developed in Athens. Phocions sober remark that with
Philips death the Macedonian army had lost only one soldier had no affect
of the populace. Instead Demosthenes anti-Macedonian rhetoric
triumphed and the Athenians sent out delegations to other states to
encourage them to break their ties with Macedonia and voted honours for
Philips assassin. The Thebans voted to expel their Macedonian garrison.
The Aetolians renewed their confederation, which had been disbanded by
Philip, and contrary to the universal peace helped those whom the
Macedonians had earlier banished return to Acarnania. The Macedonian
garrison at Ambracia was expelled. Almost every state in the Peloponnese
broke its ties with Macedonia: the Arcadians refused to recognise
Alexanders hegemony; there was a general uprising in Elis and Argos,
whereas the Messenians expelled the leader of the local oligarchy that had
been supported by Philip. With Philips death unrest also awakened among
the barbarian tribes to the north of Macedonia.16
In light of this situation some of Alexanders advisors recommended
caution. They felt Macedonia should pull out of Greece and concentrate on
defending her northern borders as this had always been the most
dangerous region. This seemed especially sensible when Alexander
encountered opposition from perhaps the least expected quarter: the
Thessalians blocked the Tempe pass linking their country with Macedonia
15

Borza 1990, pp. 245-246; Borza 1999, pp. 70-71; Carney 1992; Pelagia 2000, p.
191; Gill 2008.
16
Aeschin., 3.77-78, 160; Theopomp., FGrH, 115 F235; [D.] 17.3.3, 4.7; Plb.,
18.14.5-7; Diod., 17.3; Plu., Alex., 11.1-3; Plu., Dem., 22-23.2; Plu., Phoc., 16;
Just., 11.2.4-5. Bosworth 1988, p. 188; Brun 2000, pp. 71-72. A putative Athenian
honorific decree for Pausanias: SEG 19.63, as restored in Miller 2007.

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Chapter III

and declared full independence. The young king, however, rejected the
cautious approach and set about resolving the first international crisis of
his reign by actually dealing with Thessaly first and thus he immediately
demonstrated a style of leadership that would be characteristic throughout
his reign. Instead of trying to force the pass, Alexander led his army along
the coast and instructed his soldiers to carve steps out of the side of Mount
Ossa. The speed and unconventionality of this manoeuvre caught the
Thessalians quite off guard, who gave up the moment they saw the
Macedonian army appear behind them. At a council meeting of the
Thessalian League Alexander delivered a speech in which he reminded
those gathered of their common ancestor, Heracles, gave them appropriate
pledges so that they could trust him. In return, like Philip before him,
Alexander was elected archon.17
This time it did not come to war in central and southern Greece. The
Amphictyonic Council at Delphi immediately voted for Alexanders
continued leadership of Greece. He acquired the support of Ambracia by
graciously recognising her independence. The Macedonian army next
appeared post-haste in Boeotia, which was enough to cow the Thebans and
incline them to return to an alliance with Macedonia. In response to news
of these events, the Athenians resorted to their traditional strategy in times
of danger of evacuating the rural population to behind the Long Walls. At
the same time they tried to avert war by sending a delegation to Alexander.
The young king accepted the delegation courteously, all the more so as the
main leader of the war party Demosthenes, who was officially supposed to
be part of this delegation, instead decided to return home. Now all
Alexander had to do was summon the most important council in Greece,
the synedrion of the League of Corinth. Having politely listened to
Alexanders speech and no doubt reflected on the swiftness of his armys
actions, the delegates elected the young king the supreme commander of
Greek forces in the war against Persia. Moreover, they declared the
participation of all the poleis in this war, which was to avenge all the
wrongs previously committed by Persia against Greece. As Alexanders
hegemony in Greece now seemed secure, the Macedonian army marched
north to quell disturbances on the northern border. Now it also seemed
possible to resume preparations for the invasion of Asia Minor, which,
although interrupted by Philips death, was due to start in 335.18 As before,
a small Macedonian garrison was left behind in the Peloponnesus. The
17

Diod., 17.4.1; Plu., Alex., 11.3-4; Polyaen., 4.3.23; Just., 11.3.2. Ellis 1981, p.
108; Bosworth 1988, pp. 28, 189; Stoneman 1997, p. 20.
18
Aeschin., 3.161; Arr., An., 1.1.2; Diod., 17.4.2-9; Plu., Alex., 11.4, 14.1; It. Alex.,
16.

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commander of this garrison, Corrhagus, became a key player in one of the

most glaring breaches of the universal peace, which forbade forcing a
change in the constitution of any member state of the League of Corinth.
Thanks to his help a famous wrestler called Chairon overthrew a
democracy at Pellene and set up a tyranny instead. No attempt was made
at the synedrion of the League of Corinth to resolve the problem, even
though this was very much its remit. Such violations of the Leagues
charter could not but have tarnished the appraisal of the king of Macedonia
as hegemon of the League.19
It is in association with his stay at Corinth that one of the best known
anecdotes about Alexander originates. Flocked by Greek politicians and
intellectuals Alexander was puzzled by the distinct absence of the Cynic
philosopher Diogenes of Sinope and so decided to pay him a visit. The
king found the philosopher on the outskirts of Corinth basking in the
sunlight. Alexander approached Diogenes and asked him if there was
anything he wanted. In response Diogenes asked Alexander not to stand
between him and the sun. Alexanders entourage burst out laughing and it
was then that Alexander, astounded by the philosophers casual manner
and complete unconcern for worldly affairs, is said to have uttered the
famous words: If I were not Alexander, I should be Diogenes. This story,
mentioned in ancient literature as many as 22 times, is almost certainly
apocryphal; probably invented by a pupil of Diogenes the Cynic
Onesicritus, who served Alexander as a steersman. To Greek writers the
scene is attractive as it shows the confrontation of two men from radically
different parts of society the monarch and the Cynic who rejected all
forms of property and the conventions of the polis both, in their own
way, were free to philosophise.20 Another apocryphal tale is said to have
taken place during Alexanders return from Corinth to Macedonia. At
Delphi the oracle refused to foretell Alexanders future, so the king
entered the temple and pulled out Pythia by force. It was then that the
priestess explained that Alexander was invincible, which was indeed the
prophecy he had been hoping for. The actual visit to Delphi most probably
took place at the end of 336 or at the beginning of 335 and during that visit
Alexander may well have donated the 150 gold coins (philippeioi) to the
temple which are featured in the Delphic register.21

19

[D.], 17.10; Paus., 7.27.7; Ath., 11.119. Bosworth 1988, p. 194.

E.g. Plu., Alex., 14.2-5; Plu., mor., 331f-332c, 605d-e, 728a-b. Berve 1926, ii, pp.
417; Nawotka 2003, pp. 106-107; Heckel 2006, p. 113, s.v. Diogenes [1].
21
Plu., Alex., 14.6-7; Syll.3 251. Stoneman 1997, pp. 21-22; Hamilton 1999, pp.
34-35; Miller 2000, p. 271; Squilace 2005, p. 308; Poddighe 2009, pp. 101-102.
20

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Chapter III

2. War in the north

In the spring of 335 Alexander set out from Amphipolis to Thrace with an
army of no more than 15,000 soldiers. It included specially selected
detachments of phalanx from Upper Macedonia, cavalry units also from
Upper Macedonia as well as Bottia and Amphipolis, light infantry, archers
and slingers. The composition of this army and its size would indicate that
the objective was to be a short preventive war to secure Macedonian rule
in areas that Philip II had not managed to fully pacify. The borderland had
to be secured before the great expedition to Asia. The entire war is know
to us mostly from Arrians account, who used Ptolemy as a source, and it
is hard not to get the impression that it is an exaggerated glorification of a
war that was after all quite a minor one. The paucity of geographical
information makes it difficult for us to trace the movements of
Alexanders army in the Balkan Peninsula. The Macedonian troops
marched north via Philippopolis and other territories subjugated by Philip
II until they reached the Haemus mountain range (Stara Planina), which
was part of still free Thrace. It is impossible to establish which pass
Alexander chose, Shipka or Trojan, but either way the army had to force
its way through. Arrian writes about Thracians lying in wait on the
mountain ridges above the given route hoping to break up the Macedonian
phalanx as it passed by sending wagons hurtling down the steep slopes.
Alexanders response to this was to tell the soldiers to try and get out of
the way, and if that was impossible, to lie flat on the ground and cover
themselves with their shields. At the same time Alexander ordered his
archers to fire at the Thracians, while he together with an elite unit of
hypaspists and Agrianians prepared on the left flank to attack. Though on
account of the technical difficulties of rolling wagons down mountain
slopes as well as the very limited protection small Macedonian shields
could possibly offer this fragment may have well been invented, there is
no reason to doubt that Alexander won that battle. The more lightly armed
Thracians were unable to withstand the Macedonian phalanx and having
suffered heavy losses, allegedly as many as 1,500 were killed, fled from
the mountain. Alexander had all the plundered booty, the most valuable of
which was Thracian women and children, shipped for sale to Macedonia
via the Greek seaports.22
The next phase of the war was against the Triballi, who lived on the
river Lyginos (perhaps Rositsa). The king of the Triballi, surrounded by
women and children, took shelter on an island called Peuke on the Danube.
22
Arr., An., 1.1-2.1; Polyaen., 4.3.11; Diod., 17.8.1-2; It. Alex., 16. Bosworth 1988,
pp. 28-29; Bloedow 1996; Heckel 1997, pp. 189-191; Ashley 1998, pp. 166-169.

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On account of Arrians description of an island with steep banks and fast

flowing waters, it is unlikely to have been the Peuke Island, known from
other sources, which is situated where the Danube flows into the Black
Sea. Perhaps it is as Illiescu presumes an island further west, nearer the
Iron Gate Gorge. The Triballian army avoided the Macedonians, not
daring to fight them in the open, and instead returned to areas the
Macedonians had vacated. Alexander, who always had good reconnaissance,
realised the Triballian tactic and launched a surprise attack on the enemy
as it pitched camp in a wooded valley. First the Macedonian archers
started firing arrows. In response to this the Triballi left the forest to attack
the archers, but instead they found themselves in a trap. The Macedonian
cavalry was positioned on both wings of the Macedonian phalanx as well
as in the centre. The Macedonians fired missiles at the barbarians and then
moved in for the final kill. The fleeing barbarians lost some 3,000 men,
whereas the Macedonians reportedly lost only 11 horsemen and 40
infantrymen. Alexander next marched to the Danube, which he reached
three days later. There he met up with ships he had ordered to sail to the
Danube from Byzantium via the Black Sea. This flotilla, however, turned
out to be too weak to force a landing on the steep banks of the island
occupied by the barbarians. To make matters worse, in the meantime a
Getae army of 4,000 horsemen and over 10,000 infantry assembled on the
opposite bank of the Danube. Alexander would not have been himself if he
had not interpreted this situation as a challenge to be taken up. It is in
relating these events that Arrian speaks for the first time of Alexanders
uncontrollable longing (pothos) to cross real and imagined barriers, which
in this case told him to cross to the other side the Danube despite the facts
that an enemy army had gathered on the bank and that the Macedonian
lacked enough vessels to take them there. The latter problem was soon
dealt with by the confiscation of all local boats and construction of rafts
out of leather tents stuffed with hay. During the night time crossing,
perhaps somewhere between todays town of Svishtov on the south bank
and Zimnicea on the north side, the Macedonians managed to transport
1,500 cavalry and 4,000 infantry. The following day Alexander led his
army against the Getae, who were surprised not only by the achievement
of the Macedonian engineers but also by the quantity and quality of the
Macedonian phalanx. The Getae did not withstand the impact of the
Macedonian cavalry, personally commanded by Alexander, and fled to
their weakly defended fort situated 5.5 kilometres from the Danube.
However, when the Macedonians caught up with them, they abandoned

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their positions and fled into the steppe. Alexanders army captured their
city, razed it to the ground and returned to the southern bank.23
One cannot accept the late Roman Itinerarium Alexandri claim that
Alexander continued his northern campaign from the Danube along the
Black Sea coast all the way to the Sea of Azov and on the way back also
defeated the Dacians, Getae and Maedi.24 There is no trace of this in other
sources and besides, in the very eventful spring of 335 there would have
been no time for such a long campaign. Instead there followed a short lull
in the fighting whilst Alexander concentrated on diplomacy. After
Alexanders impressive display of military might in two victorious battles
the Triballian king sent envoys, no doubt to establish conditions for
capitulation. These conditions must have included the supplying of
Alexander with soldiers for Diodorus mentions a Triballian contingent
among detachments of Odrysians and Illyrians in a 7,000-strong North
Balkan corps in his army that invaded the Persian Empire in 334. News of
the Macedonian victories spread far and wide enough for Alexanders
camp on the Lower Danube to be also visited by envoys from other
peoples that had not yet been conquered, including Celts from the North
Adriatic region. Not knowing the Macedonian kings future plans but
seeing the speed and effectiveness of his actions, the Celts preferred to
diplomatically demonstrate their peaceful disposition and thus avert a
possible invasion. There is no evidence to suggest that Alexander was
actually planning such a campaign at the time, so there probably was no
need for serious negotiations with the Celtic envoys. Alexander must have
nevertheless been very pleased with himself after such a successful
campaign for he asked the Celts what they feared most; expecting of
course that they would say it was him. However, instead they said they
feared one day the sky would fall on their heads. Despite his obvious
disappointment with this answer, he nonetheless agreed to an alliance and
probably did not impose on them the same obligations as on the defeated
Thracians or Triballi.25
In the early summer of 335 Alexanders army left the Danube region
and marched south to Macedonia. On the way Alexander stopped in the
land of the Agrianians, ruled by his ally, King Langarus. Return to the
homeland was temporarily made impossible for news had arrived from
territories to the northwest of Macedonia of hostile actions by the Illyrian
ruler Cleitus, the son of Bardylis, whom Philip had defeated in 359.
23

Arr., An., 1.2-4; Plu., Alex., 11.5-6. Iliescu 1990; Hammond 1996, pp. 47-49;
Ashley 1998, pp. 169-170.
24
It. Alex., 16.
25
Arr., An., 1.4.6-8; Str., 7.3.8; Diod., 17.17.4. Alessandri 1997, pp. 131-148.

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Cleitus was supported by Glaucias, the king of the Illyrian Taulanti tribe
from the vicinity of Epidamnus, as well as by the Autariatae. This posed a
threat to Upper Macedonia, especially to Lyncestis. Alexanders decision
to conduct a swift counterattack suggests he wished to show he was
particularly interested in maintaining security in this land, where
dissatisfaction must have been smouldering ever since less than a year
earlier he had two members of the countrys former royal family executed.
Langarus and part of the Agrianian army attacked the Autariatae, the
weakest tribe in the coalition, ransacked their land and made it impossible
for them to join Cleitus or Glaucias. Alexander crossed Paionia and
marched his army along the Erigon (Crna) to reach the Lyncestis fortress
of Pellion, which was held by Cleitus (the exact geographic location of
this fortress is unknown). After offering up human sacrifices the
barbarians went to confront the Macedonians, but soon they were forced to
retreat to within the walls of their town. The following day the conducting
of the siege was hampered by the arrival of large detachments of Taulanti.
Alexanders relatively small army now found itself between the forces of
Cleitus and Glaucias, who had been constantly trying hard to trap
Alexander in mountainous terrain. But able to rely on the excellent
training of his men the Macedonian king skilfully turned his army around
and marched it through the mountains occupied by the Taulanti. Surprised
by this unexpected military manoeuvre the Taulanti did not dare to attack
the Macedonians. The last element of Alexanders manoeuvre was to cross
the river Eordaicus with Macedonian archers and catapults keeping the
barbarians at a safe distance. Arrian relates that during their retreat the
Macedonians did not lose a single soldier. In the war, however, Alexander
did allegedly suffer injuries after being hit by a stone and later receiving a
blow with a mace. Once Alexanders army was on the other side of the
river, the armies of Cleitus and Glaucias were able to unite and form a
single camp. Convinced that the Macedonians happy to have escaped the
trap had headed for their homeland, the Illyrians felt so safe that they did
not bother to fortify their very large camp and even failed to put guards on
watch. This of course did not escape the notice of Macedonian scouts.
Alexander was thus aware of the enemys carelessness and on the third
day after his retreat he decided to attack the Illyrians. He personally
commanded the night time river crossing of the first detachments
comprising Agrianians, archers, hypaspists and some of his phalangites,
after whom the rest of the Macedonian army followed. Alexander did not
wait for all of his army to assemble and instead chose to make full use of
the element of surprise: he ordered the Agrianians and archers to attack the
enemy immediately. Suddenly aroused from sleep the Illyrians did not put

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up much resistance. Many were killed in the camp, whilst others fled for
their lives abandoning their weapons. Many of those who were not taken
as slaves were killed during a chase that lasted all the way to the
mountains where the Taulanti lived. After a short while Cleitus resolved
not to defend Pellion, so he had it torched and fled to the land of the
Taulanti. 26 The victorious Illyrian campaign could not be continued on
account of extremely disturbing news from Greece, but this was not an
empty victory without any political consequences. After their defeat in 335
the Illyrians did not threaten Macedonias border for the rest of his reign.
There was an Illyrian contingent in the army that crossed the Hellespont
the following spring, therefore there is also reason to presume that
Alexander was able impose terms for peace on their rulers in a treaty that
has not been recorded in historiography. Finally, in the 335 campaign
Alexander had won a series of victories with very small losses and this
without a doubt earned him the trust of his army, which at the start of this
young rulers reign had been far from certain.27

3. The destruction of Thebes

During Alexanders war with the Illyrians members of the antiMacedonian faction that had been expelled after the Battle of Chaeronea
secretly returned to Thebes. They were helped by allies within the city
who were also hoping to free their country from the imposed treaty with
Macedonia. Although the sources do not explicitly mention this, the first
thing the returned exiles and their allies at Thebes must have done was to
overthrow the citys pro-Macedonian oligarchy. The exiles also managed
to lure two Macedonians out of their garrison at the Cadmea and kill them.
Most probably the following day they appealed to the gathered Theban
populace to break their treaty with Macedonia. The mood in many Greek
states at the time was favourable to such ideas. Despite the adroitness with
which he had forced some and just persuaded others to renew their
commitment to the universal peace they had originally agreed with his
father, Alexander was still a new and as yet untried force in Greece.
Moreover, the mildness with which in the autumn of 336 he had treated
the states that had tried to renege the Macedonian treaty did not allow
those states to foresee the consequences if they attempted to go back on
their word again. In a society that valued age and experience Alexanders
26

Arr., An., 1.5-7; Diod., 17.8.1; Plu., mor., 327a; It. Alex., 16. Bosworth 1982, pp.
65-73; Hammond 1996, pp. 49-58; Pajkowski 2000, pp. 158-164.
27
Diod., 17.17.4. Bosworth 1988, p. 32; Hammond 1996, pp. 54-58; Ashley 1998,
pp. 174-175.

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youth was an opportunity for politicians like Demosthenes to win over

crowds by calling him a boy. Yet another factor were the covert activities
of Persian diplomacy. Orators mention vast sums which Demosthenes
received from Darius III Demosthenes mortal enemy Aeschines
mentions 70 talents and Dinarchus speaks of as many as 300 talents. One
cannot assume these sums mentioned in political speeches against
Demosthenes to be accurate, but there can be no doubt that Persian money
was handed to anti-Macedonian politicians in order to make diversionary
actions in Persias favour. Allegedly after the capture of Sardis documents
got into Alexanders hands listing the amounts of money given to Greek
politicians by the Persians. We know that some of the money that the
Persians gave to Demosthenes was passed on to Thebes. In all likelihood
Demosthenes also used this money to purchase weapons and armour, so
that all that citys citizens, even those who did not belong to the hoplite
class, could fight. As one would expect in a society without mass media,
Greece most probably learned of events that occurred during North Balkan
campaign from the spring to the early autumn of 335 from rumours. And
the rumour was that Alexander, already absent from Macedonia for several
months, had been wounded or even killed by the Triballi. Demosthenes
was eager to spread such stories, though he himself would not have
invented them. From the legal point of view, childless Alexanders death
would have automatically terminated the Treaty of Corinth and ended
Macedonian hegemony.28
It was in such an atmosphere that the words of the Theban exiles
would have been well received. Anti-Macedonian politicians in the city
council presented a plan to wage war on Macedonia to the assembly and it
was accepted. The first action of this war was to surround the Macedonian
garrison at the Cadmea citadel with a double palisade thus cutting it off
from the Macedonian army if and when it came. The Thebans were
preparing to destroy the garrison but they ran out of time. Meanwhile they
turned to Athens, Argos, Elis and the states of Arcadia for help. Influenced
by the anti-Macedonian party and its leader Demosthenes, the Athenians
resolved to send military reinforcements to Thebes. These troops, however,
did not manage to set out from Attica to Boeotia before it was too late. It
was also probably then that emissaries were sent to Darius III who were
later captured by the Macedonians after the Battle of Issus. It seems the
Aetolian League and Sparta also considered opposing Alexander militarily.
28

Din., 1.10, 1.18; Aeschin., 3.239; Diod., 17.8.6; Plu., mor., 327c-d, 847c; Plu.,
Dem., 20.5, 23.1-2; Arr., An., 1.7; Just., 11.2. Wilcken 1967, pp.70-71; Bosworth
1980, pp. 73-75; Bosworth 1988, pp. 194-195. Rumors in Greece: Lewis 1996, esp.
pp. 75-96.

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Chapter III

In Elis there was most probably a coup because of which Macedonias

supporters were forced to leave the state and it was only after Alexanders
defeat that they could return. The Arcadian League sent its army to the
Isthmus and officially stayed neutral for this part of the war until more
became known. Thus the situation in Greece was developing in a way that
could lead to another Chaeronean Coalition and, what was worse, this time
financed by the Great King. Antipaters diplomatic efforts did stop the
Peloponnesians from marching north to help the Thebans but Alexanders
intervention now became essential.29
Cutting short his Illyrian campaign, Alexander marched his army
across the western lands of Upper Macedonia, Eordaia and Elimeia to
reach Thessaly within seven days. From Thessaly the Macedonians
marched south through the Thermopylae pass to reach Boeotia six days
later, in the second half of September 335. This, typically for Alexander,
very rapid advance generally surprised his enemies because at such a rate
contemporary communications could only forewarn them of the
approaching army by a matter of hours, not days. And this is what
happened this time as well. The Thebans had not only failed to block
Thermopylae pass, which would have enabled them to stop the invasion
until the reinforcements arrived, but also only learned of Alexanders army
when it had already reached Onchestus in Boeotia. Initially the Thebans
deluded themselves this was Antipaters corps or a Macedonian army
commanded by Alexander of Lyncestis; they may have still believed King
Alexander of Macedonia had been killed by barbarians. The following day
all became clear when a huge Macedonian army of 30,000 infantry and
3,000 cavalry personally commanded by Alexander started pitching camp
outside the walls of Thebes. The Macedonian monarch was hoping that the
mere show of strength would incline the Thebans to start negotiations for
capitulation. Despite verbal support from various states, above all Athens,
the Thebans were alone and able to deploy no more than 7,000 hoplites
from among the citizens plus some armed metoikoi and liberated slaves.
And as if this situation was not bad enough, the Macedonians were joined
by the mortal enemies of Thebes, Phocians, Plataeans, Thespians and
Orchomenians, all eager to avenge the destruction of their towns and other
wrongs inflicted upon them by Thebans in the past. Their and Thessalian
presence at Thebes gave Alexanders intervention semblance of a just war
waged by the united Greeks against those who breached the Panhellenic
29

Din., 1.18-21; Diod., 17.8.2-9.1; Plu., Dem., 23.1-2; Arr., An., 1.7.4, 1.10.1,
2.15.2; Fron., Str., 2.11.4; Just., 11.3.9. Bosworth 1980, pp. 233-234; Bosworth
1988, pp. 194-195; Heckel 1997, pp. 191-192; Habicht 1999, pp. 14-15; Faraguna
2003, p. 103.

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treaty of Corinth. Units of Theban cavalry and light infantry first launched
an attack on the encamped Macedonians which after the initial shock was
repulsed with ease. Alexander chose to delay his attack and give time for
the besieged to think. However, among the gathered Thebans voices to
continue the armed struggle prevailed. Alexander still tried to weaken their
resolve by announcing that any Theban went over to his side would fully
benefit from the Greek universal peace. In response the Thebans declared
that anyone from the enemy camp who wished to fight for Greek freedom
together with the Thebans and the Great King could come over to their
side. Plutarch adds that the Thebans replied to Alexanders demand for the
handing over of their anti-Macedonian politicians by proposing that in
return for peace the Macedonians should hand over their highest ranking
officers Antipater and Philotas.30
In the war of words the Thebans triumphed. The well aimed ridicule,
their spiteful mockery of the universal peace and the long preparations for
the anti-Persian campaign of united Greek states under the Macedonian
kings command in defence of Greek freedom touched a raw nerve.
Alexander was livid but that now also meant that the fate of Thebes was
sealed. Three days after the exchange of words the preparations for
storming the city were finished and the fighting began. Basically two
extant sources relate what followed: the rhetorical and pro-Theban account
of Diodorus and Arrians very concise description based on the account of
Ptolemy, who was very seriously wounded in the fighting and therefore
unable to witness the entire battle. It is indeed the brevity of
Arrian/Ptolemys report that arise suspicion, especially when it is
compared with Arrians extensive descriptions of Alexanders armys
much less important manoeuvres during the war in the north a few pages
earlier. By being so laconic in his description of the battle, Ptolemy gives
the impression of not wishing to expose all its aspects. For instance, unlike
other sources, it does not mention the heroism of the Thebans defending
their homeland against an enemy numerically many times superior. It is
certain that the most intensive fighting was at the palisade cutting the
Cadmea off from the main Macedonian forces and that the Theban
hoplites confronted their enemy outside those walls. Thanks to their
numerical superiority the Macedonians were able to fight the Thebans in
the field and simultaneously attack the palisade. The first attack on the
palisade by a detachment of Ptolemys phalangites, archers and Agrianians
was repulsed, while the numerically inferior but extremely well trained
30

Diod., 17.9.1-5, 17.11.2; Plu., Alex., 11.6-8; Arr., An., 1.7.4-11; Just., 11.3.
Bosworth 1988, p. 32; Hammond 1996, pp. 58-60; Hamilton 1999, p. 30; Poddighe
2009, pp. 107-108.

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Theban hoplites were for a long time able to hold off the Macedonian
phalanx. Then Alexander ordered a reserve detachment commanded either
by Perdiccas (according to Diodorus) or Antipater (Polyaenus) to launch a
direct assault on a part of the citys fortifications that were left unmanned.
Bearing in mind the concentration of Theban soldiers around the palisade,
there would have most certainly been more than one unmanned section of
the citys walls, while numerical superiority made it easy for Alexander to
deploy troops in another section of the front. News of the citys wall being
breached was immediately spread by the Macedonians, which provoked
panic in Theban ranks at the Cadmea. Making use of this confusion the
trapped Macedonian unit broke out of their garrison and attacked the
Thebans from behind. The Macedonians gave chase to the Theban soldiers
now fleeing in disarray to their city. The battle for the city was over and
instead began the indiscriminate slaughter of defenders and unarmed
civilians. The only Thebans not to be massacred were the cavalry, which
had not taken part in the fighting and now managed to escape from the
captured city.31
Apart from the Macedonians, Phocians and soldiers from smaller
Boeotian cities hostile to Thebes participated in the slaughter. 6,000
Thebans were massacred, but this was a costly victory for the Macedonian
army, which lost 500 men much more than had been killed during the
entire north Balkan campaign. A large difference in losses between the
defeated and victorious side was typical in ancient warfare for when one
side fell into disarray the other side could and would kill many with
impunity. Therefore the relatively large numbers of Macedonians killed
seems to confirm Diodoruss version of a lengthy and heroic resistance put
up by the Thebans. Along with the slaughter, there was looting and rapes.
Plutarch relates an anecdote about a woman called Timoclea who was
raped by a captain of the Thracian mercenaries but later managed to kill
her oppressor. Alexander, who had always had a good understanding for
what we would today call public relations, ordered the woman to be set
free, all the more so when it turned out that she was the sister of
Theagenes, the commander of the Sacred Band who had fallen at
Chaeronea. Similar mercy was not shown to other Thebans. Alexander did
not wish to personally pass sentence on this city and left the decision as
both Arrian and Diodorus claim to his Greek allies. On account of the
lack of available time it is doubtful that he summoned the synedrion of the
League of Corinth; instead a council was probably held at the Macedonian
31

Diod., 17.11-12; Arr., An., 1.8; Plu., Alex., 11.4-5; Polyaen., 4.3.12. Lane Fox
1973, p. 87; Bosworth 1980, pp. 79-84; Bosworth 1988, pp. 32-33; Flower 2000, p.
96.

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camp outside Thebes, comprising representatives of neighbouring antiTheban states. The defeated were reminded of their earlier offences,
especially their collaboration with Persia during the great war of 480-479,
for which at the time the city was already condemned to be demolished.
Added to this were additional charges regarding the destruction by Thebes
of other Greek cities and its current contacts with the Great King. There is
no doubt that Alexander could have rejected the extreme demands of the
citys Phocian and Boeotian enemies just as Sparta had rejected the
demands of her allies to destroy Athens after the Peloponnesian War.
However, he chose to accept the decision, as Polybius says, in order to
strike fear into the hearts of Greeks before his departure for Asia. Formally
only carrying out the resolution of his allies, Alexander ordered the
destruction of the whole of Thebes with the exception of the temples, the
poet Pindars house and the Cadmea citadel, where a Macedonian garrison
remained. With the exception of the priests, people bound by ritualised
friendship (xenia) with Macedonians and Macedonias political supporters,
the approximately 30,000 Thebans who survived the slaughter were sold
as slaves. The sale of such a vast number of slaves could only lower their
unit price, but for Alexander, who was beset with financial problems, the
440 talents he in this way received was of great use and perhaps helped
reduce the debt he had inherited after his father. The rural territories
belonging to Thebes were divided up among Boeotian poleis allied to
Alexander. The Macedonian king also had the cities of Orchomenos and
Plataea, which had been destroyed by Thebes, rebuilt and surrounded with
defensive walls because these cities were in particular considered to be
Macedonias mainstay in Boeotia.32
The ruthless destruction of Thebes deeply shocked Greece. The orators
lamented and Cassanders proclamation to rebuild Thebes in 316 gained
him a lot of popularity. Despite a prohibition that was imposed on all allies
the same day as the sentence on Thebes was passed, Athens and Akraiphia
accepted refugees from that city. To Greeks the destruction of Thebes was
a terrible act but one, according to contemporary rules of war, which was
quite legal and even just. This is demonstrated by the fact that in 334 a
bronze chandelier looted from Thebes was accepted as an offering from
Alexander to the temple of Apollo at Cyme. Aeschines argued that the
destruction of Thebes was just at the Athenian court of law, which would
32
Clitarch., ap. Ath., 4.148d-f (= FGrH, 137 F1); Plb., 38.2.13; Diod., 17.13.514.4; Plu., Alex., 11.10-12.6; Plu., mor., 259d-260d, 1090c; Arr., An., 1.8-9; D.
Chr., 2.33; Ael., VH, 13.7; Plin., Nat., 7.109; Just., 11.3-4. Wilcken 1967, pp. 7374; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 87-88; Bosworth 1980, pp. 84-91; Bosworth 1988, pp.
195-196; Hamilton 1999, pp. 30-32; Le Rider 2003, pp. 41-42.

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Chapter III

indicate that even there many were of this opinion. Rejoicing at Thebes
destruction of the personified Mt. Kithairon in Alexander Romance echoes
the same opinion albeit shrouded in mythological garb. Besides, there
were many hypocrites among the Greeks. For instance, for all his
lamenting over the fate of Thebes, the orator and Alexanders political
opponent Hypereides was not discouraged from purchasing a Theban
female captive for 20 minas, one who later became his mistress.33
As a political move the destruction of Thebes was a success for
although it certainly did not earn Alexander the love of the Greeks, it did
force them to respect him. Just like Philips destruction of Olynthus, so too
Alexanders destruction of Thebes served as a fierce reminder to the
Greeks, ensuring peace and pro-Macedonian order during his Asian
campaign. Meanwhile a hasty delegation of noted pro-Macedonian
politicians from Athens instantly arrived to congratulate Alexander on his
victories over the Triballi and Illyrians as well as his quelling of the
Theban uprising, even though Athens had actually actively encouraged it.
In response the Macedonian king demanded the handing over of prominent
anti-Macedonian politicians and generals on the charge of being
responsible for Chaeronea, hostility to Philip and himself as well as
inciting Thebes to rise. They were to be judged by the synedrion of the
League of Corinth. The sources give several versions of this list of
Macedonias enemies but all of them include the names of Demosthenes,
Lycurgus, Polyeuctus and the general Charidemus. The fate of Thebes
made it obvious that Alexanders demands had to be treated with the
utmost seriousness and so a heated debate ensued in Athens. Phocion
advised those mentioned on the list to selflessly take their lives for the
sake of their motherland and so that the city of Athens could be spared.
Demosthenes, as could well be expected, was of the opposite opinion and
likened the idea to sheep handing over their sheepdogs to the wolves. But,
like Philip sometime before him, Alexander was not looking for a
showdown with Athens and his heavy demands should be regarded more
as a bargaining tool to pacify Greece as fast as possible at a very small
cost to Macedonia. To that, waging war on Athens would have undercut
the Panhellenic stance of Alexander on the eve of the expedition to Persia.
Thus ultimately the pro-Macedonian orator Demades, allegedly for five
33

Orators: Aeschin., 3.133; Din., 1, passim. Other reference to public opinion:

Diod., 19.54.2; Plin., Nat., 34.14; Arr., An., 1.9; Plu., Alex., 13; Idomeneus, ap.
Ath., 13.58 (= FGrH, 338 F14); Plu., mor., 849d ; Ps.-Callisth., 1.46a. Exiles:
Diod., 17.14.3; Plu., Alex., 13.1; Paus., 9.23.5. Bosworth 1988, p. 196; Heckel
1997, p. 193; Flower 2000, p. 97; Nawotka 2003a, p. 30; Faraguna 2003, pp. 103104; Poddighe 2009, p. 108.

The New King

107

talents given to him by politicians on Alexanders list, helped negotiate a

compromise in which the accused would only be punished if their guilt
was proved according to Athenian law. Only Charidemus was forced to
leave Athens, and he headed for Darius IIIs court. The whole incident
changed Athenian politics for a long time. Politicians of the antiMacedonian camp realised erstwhile efforts to start a military conflict with
a powerful Macedonia had been ill-conceived and could only result in a
catastrophic defeat. Thus while Alexander lived, Athens maintained a cold
peace with Macedonia. Instead the Athenians concentrated on building up
their finances and arming themselves for a confrontation with Macedonia
at a later stage.34
If Athens with her powerful fleet and legendary defensive walls was
suing for peace with Macedonia, smaller Greek states must have been
doing the same with even greater anxiety. Arcadia recalled its troops from
the Isthmus and threatened to punish with death anyone inciting actions
against Macedonia. Expelled supporters of Macedonia now returned to
Elis. Requests for forgiveness were also sent to Alexander by the Aetolian
tribes, which was tacit signal that the Aetolian League, disliked by
Macedonia, no longer existed.35
The situation in Greece was now under control and the Macedonian
army could return north. The Greek uprising had caused the campaign
against Persia to be delayed by another year, but at least Alexanders
soldiers could return home in the autumn (October) in time for the Zeus of
Olympus feast, which was celebrated over nine days in Dion. Apart from
sacrifices, the festivities included dramas and competitions. Diodorus
describes a lavish banquet arranged by Alexander for friends, officers and
ambassadors which was held in a tent capable of fitting a hundred
banqueting couches. The army was rewarded with the meat of the
sacrificial beasts. It also must have been in the autumn of 335 that
Alexander reputedly received special advice from two of his most
important officers, Antipater and Parmenion. Both men suggested that
before his departure for Asia Alexander should marry and conceive an heir
to the throne. Bearing in mind that this king had the habit of personally
leading his army into battle and that after the purges of 336-335 their were
no other Argead claimants to the Macedonian throne, there is every reason
to accept that Alexanders advisers were right to express such concern
34
Aeschin., 3.161; Diod., 17.15; Plu., Dem., 23.3-5; Plu., Phoc., 17; Arr., An., 1.10;
Just., 11.4; Suda, s.v. 'Antpatroj. Bosworth 1988, pp. 196-197; OBrien 1992, p.
54; Rubinsohn 1997, pp. 117-118; Habicht 1999, pp. 15-18; Flower 2000, p. 97;
Brun 2000, pp. 74-77; Heckel 2009, p. 29.
35
Arr., An,, 1.10.1-2. Bosworth 1988, p. 196.

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Chapter III

over the states future. However, there is another aspect to this story in that
both Parmenion and Antipater had unmarried daughters historians
believe there were five in all. If Alexander were to marry one of these
daughters, the brides father would naturally guarantee for himself great
influence in the Macedonian state. We know that Alexander rejected this
advice, no doubt because he did not wish to offend the powerful adviser
whose daughter he would have to consider less worthy of marriage. For
the time being the young king preferred to keep rival parties at his court
parties in balance.36

36

Diod., 17.16; Arr., An., 1.11.1. Baynham 1994, p. 334; Baynham 1998; Weber
2009, p. 87.

CHAPTER IV:
FROM ABYDOS TO ALEXANDRIA

1. Granicus the first victory

If we take into consideration the differences in human and material
resources as well as the differences in territorial size between Macedonia
and the Persian Empire, then Alexanders expedition must be the most
remarkable military feat in world history. It should also be remembered
that in its 3,000-year history Iran has only been successfully attacked and
conquered from the west twice: in the mid 7th century AD by the Arabs, at
a time when Persia was severely weakened by total defeat in a war against
the Eastern Roman Empire, and by Alexander, at a time when the
Achaemenid Empire was actually experiencing a territorial and military
revival. An ocean of ink has been spilled on a generally futile debate over
Alexanders real motives for taking on such an immensely powerful
neighbour.1 As is usually the case, the state of the sources is to blame.
Only Arrian writes about Alexander being driven by an overwhelming
urge (pothos). It is probable that Arrian had derived this notion from a
source citing the exact words uttered by Alexander at key moments in his
career. Therefore even if we do not accept the romantic image of
Alexander constantly trying to achieve the seemingly impossible, we
cannot entirely reject pothos as a factor. It was indeed a part of
Macedonian culture to identify oneself with heroes from the past as well as
the need to prove ones worth in the eyes of ones companions (hetairoi)
through feats that others had failed to achieve. Therefore this
overwhelming urge to cross ever newer boundaries served to confirm that
Alexander reigned supreme over everyone else in terms of aret
(manliness/virtue). As the descendent of Heracles and Achilles, who in
Antiquity were unquestioningly considered to be historic figures, and also
as an avid reader of Homer, the young king was wont to measure his
achievements on a heroic scale. That is why more than once in his career
he tried not only to equal or outdo his contemporaries but also the deeds of
1

Discussion related in Seibert 1998.

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Chapter IV

mythological figures. 2 Of course modern historiography desires to find

more rational motives for an undertaking as great as the conquest of the
Achaemenid Empire, whose success, apart from the young kings personal
valour and ingenious army manoeuvres in the battlefield, would have
required effective intelligence gathering and hard-headed logistical
planning on a quite unprecedented scale.
Meanwhile the sources tell us nothing about Alexanders objectives
and plans. We do not even know if at the start of the campaign he merely
intended to realise his fathers limited aims, or whether from the outset he
planned to conquer the entire Persian Empire. The fact that the sources are
silent on these issues does not necessarily mean they are defective or
written too long after the events they describe. Conversely, they could just
as well be reflecting the actual situation, i.e. the lack of consideration of
such matters in Alexanders circle. Perhaps it is as W.W. Tarn put it that
Alexander decided to conquer Persia because he never thought of not
doing it. Decades before these events Plato had written3 that the natural
state of politics was war. And indeed in the Greek world a state could
always expect to be at war with its neighbours unless they were bound by
a peace treaty, whereas such treaties were anyhow usually only valid for a
limited period. If that was how the Greeks thought, then war would have
been even more natural to the king of Macedonia, who was traditionally
above all a tribal leader and only later a legislator, judge or administrator.
Moreover, one cannot forget that Alexander had to do something with the
immensely powerful and efficient but equally expensive war machine he
had inherited from Philip II. The Macedonian kings permanent revenues
from the exploitation of forests, mines, including gold mines, customs
duties and taxes were not enough to cover the cost of maintaining such an
army. Besides, Philip II had left his son a legacy of glorious victories but
an empty treasury. Even the booty taken from Illyria, Thrace and Thebes
was soon spent. According to the sources, by the spring of 334 Alexander
had only enough provisions to last his army for 30 days and 70 talents,
which would have sufficed for no more than two weeks of his armys pay.4
Therefore if neither Macedonias permanent revenues nor her traditional
2

Ehrenberg 1938, pp. 52-61; Brunt 1965; Goukowsky 1975, pp. 325-326; OBrien
1992, p. 50; Stewart 1993, pp. 78-88; Austin 2003, pp. 121-123.
3
Tarn 1948, p. 8; Pl., Lg., 625e.
4
Duris and Phylarchus after Chares, Aristobulus and Onesicritus all quoted in:
Plu., Alex., 15.2; Plu., mor., 327d-e, 342d. Badian 1985, p. 423; Ashley 1998, pp.
187-189; Hamilton 1999, pp. 36-37; Le Rider 2003, pp. 39-40; Nawotka 2003, pp.
36, 91; Austin 2003, pp. 122-124; Thomas 2007, pp. 59-61, 141-142 on
Macedonian monarchy.

From Abydus to Alexandria

111

plundering zones in the Balkans were enough to maintain such a huge

army, Alexander was left with the options of either demobilising this army
or invading Asia. As has been soberly noted by Seibert, although the first
option could have theoretically refilled the royal coffers within one or two
years, it is highly unlikely that this would have been a practical solution if
only on account of the fact that since his ascension to the throne Alexander
had had to fight for his political existence and was only victorious thanks
to the very army he had inherited from Philip.5 From the ideological point
of view, Alexanders plans were supported by the mission of the follower
of Plato, Delios of Ephesus, who had been sent by some Greeks of Asia
Minor to urge for a war of liberation against their Persian oppressors.6
The decision to wage war was made and in the early spring of 334,
most probably in March, the Macedonian army began its trek to the East.
The soldiers were personally commanded by Alexander. The administration
of Macedonia and control of Greece and the Balkans was handed over to
the tried and trusted Antipater, who was also left with 12,000 infantry and
1,500 cavalry. The sources give various figures for Alexanders army at
the start of the expedition. Citing after Callisthenes, Polybius states that
Alexander landed in Asia with 40,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry. Arrian
claims there were 30,000 infantry and over 5,000 cavalry, whereas Justin
states there were 32,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry. The most detailed
information regarding Alexanders army is provided by Diodorus. He
mentions 32,000 infantry, 12,000 of whom were Macedonians, 7,000 allies
(Corinthian League), 5,000 mercenaries, 7,000 soldiers from Odrysian,
Triballian and Illyrian tribes as well as 1,000 Agrianians and archers. The
cavalry was to include 5,100 horsemen: 1,800 Macedonians, 1,800
Thessalians, 600 from the League of Corinth and 900 riders from Thrace
and Paionia. Plutarch, known as having examined the largest number of no
longer extant sources, does not give a detailed breakdown of the numbers
of troops included but does state that the lowest figure for Alexanders
army was 30,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, whereas the highest figure
was 43,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. Both these assessments came from
authors who were Alexanders contemporaries Ptolemy and Anaximenes
of Lampsacus. None of these figures is so great as to be rejected as a
rhetorical exaggeration, which ancient authors indeed frequently used
when relating the size of armies or of battle losses. Only the much later
Itinerarium Alexandri stands out by stating that there were 5,000 cavalry
and only 10,000 infantry, though even here the infantry figure is given
only in reference to Alexanders own soldiers and therefore in all
5
6

Seibert 1998, p. 55; but see Wirth 1971, pp. 139-142.

Plu., mor., 1126d; see above n. 43 to chapter II.

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Chapter IV

probability Macedonians. Perhaps the different numbers given for

Alexanders army arises from the particular moment the sources relate
them. The lower number could refer to the size of Alexanders army that
left Macedonia, whereas the higher number could refer to Alexanders
army after the expeditionary corps of 336 joined it at Abydos. If that was
the case, we can estimate the overall number of Alexanders most essential
infantry, i.e. the phalanx, to be c. 15,000. Wishing to illustrate Alexanders
heroic and generous nature, Plutarch relates the following anecdote: on
leaving Macedonia the young king reportedly distributed among his
friends all his royal possessions, and when asked what he would keep for
himself, he replied hope. Despite its romanticism, this story seems to be
at least partly confirmed in an inscription at Calindoea in Mygdonia in the
north of the Chalcidice Peninsula stating that Alexander had granted
individual Macedonians land there. Of course this does not imply that he
gave away all his property for in Macedonias later history royal lands
certainly existed. It is, however, very plausible that he simply left some of
his property as a deposit against loans he had acquired for the military
campaign; Alexander had apparently raise 800 talents that way.7
Alexander was accompanied on his expedition to Asia by Thracian
princes. They were invited to do so in order to give the impression that this
was a privilege, but in reality they were also hostages ensuring that there
subjects and fellow tribesmen would not dare to rise. Historians believe
that this was also the purpose of taking the League of Corinth contingent.
This contingent was small, especially if we consider that Justin claims the
League of Corinth was able to muster 200,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry,
but that does not appear to have mattered to Alexander. We do not see him
using this contingent in any important actions in battles, more often than
not the king entrusted it garrison duties a necessary task but one of
secondary importance. Some scholars presume that the Greek states
dispatched only such soldiers they were glad to see the back of. Regardless
of that, it would be difficult to see great cohesion and military value in a
contingent of 7,000 hoplites from dozens of different poleis who had never
been on the same battlefield before, at least not on the same side.
Moreover, one has to remember that there were many Greek mercenaries
in the Persian ranks whom Corinthian League soldiers would not have
7

Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35 (= Plb., 12.19.1); Diod., 17.17.3-5; Arr., An., 1.11,
7.9.6; Plu., Alex., 15.1-6; Plu., mor., 327d-e; Just., 11.6; It. Alex., 17-18; Fron., Str.,
4.2.4. Milns 1966, p. 167; Hamilton 1974, p. 53; Hamilton 1999, pp. 36-37; Green
1974, pp. 155-156; Dbrowa 1988, p. 33; Bosworth 1988, pp. 259-260; Le Rider
2003, pp. 46-47; Worthington 2004, p. 48. Inscription of Calindoea: SEG 36.626;
see Errington 1998, pp. 79-82.

From Abydus to Alexandria

113

been eager to fight. It is also characteristic that of the mighty Athenian

fleet said to comprise as many as 400 triremes, only 20 ships were sent to
Asia and there is no mention of their making any significant contribution
to the campaign. The above comments could most certainly not be said
about the Thessalian contingent. Their cavalry was in no way inferior to
that of the Macedonians and in battles it played an equally important role.8
The Macedonian army marched alongside Lake Kerkini, crossed the
River Strymon at Amphipolis and then marched to the south of the
Pangaion Mountains via Abdera and Maroneia, crossed the river Hebros
(Maritza), passed the city of Pactya and crossed the river Melas at the foot
of the Thracian Chersonese (Gallipoli) to finally reach Sestus on the
Hellespont. Olympias escorted Alexander for the start of the journey up to
Amphipolis, where they parted company and she saw her son no more.
The whole route from Macedonia to the Hellespont was approximately
500 km long and it took Alexanders army 20 days to cover. The choice of
route was no doubt simply dictated by the road condition and the terrain,
but it is also worth noting that it was with slogans of vengeance for
Persian sacrilege in Greece that the campaign was started and now
Alexander was retracing in the reverse order the route taken by the great
army of Xerxes in 480.9
As today, in ancient times the Hellespont was considered to be the
border between Europe and Asia. The symbolic significance of this strait
is presented in Book vii of Herodotuss The Histories, where he describes
the great Persian army crossing the Hellespont on a pontoon bridge
straddling two continents as well as the speeches, sacrifices and prayers
that accompanied this momentous event. Regardless of the historical
veracity of this image, it did function in the collective memory of the
Greeks as a symbol of Persian might but also of something that displeased
the gods, namely Xerxes excessive pride or hubris in building a bridge
across two continents and thus overreaching the boundaries of what was
permissible to mere mortals. The Greeks knew that it was indeed his
hubris that sealed the ultimate fate of that entire expedition. Therefore it is
unsurprising that at the start of this campaign to avenge crimes committed
by Xerxes Alexander alluded not only to his expedition but also to the
very first pan-Hellenic campaign: the Trojan War, which in Alexanders
time was not considered to be a mere work of fiction but a genuine
historical fact and actually the very beginning of Greek history. It was also
8

Fron., Str., 2.11.3; Just., 9.5, 11.5. Bosworth 1988, pp. 264-266; Heckel 1997, p.
191.
9
Arr., An., 1.11.5; It. Alex., 18. Engels 1978, pp. 26-29; Bosworth 1988, p. 38;
Brosius 2003a, p. 228.

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Chapter IV

in association with the Trojan War that in 396 the Spartan king Agesilaus
began his expedition into Asia Minor to liberate Greek cities by offering
sacrifices at Aulis as Agamemnon had done before his expedition.
Therefore there was already an established symbolism associated with
political enterprises of the type that was undertaken in the early spring of
334. Before he crossed the Hellespont, Alexander headed for Elaius on the
southern end of Chersonese to offer sacrifices to Protesilaos, the first
Greek warrior of the Trojan expedition to set foot in Asia and be killed.
Arrian relates that the sacrifices were made with an intention that this
expedition would be more providential than that of Protesilaos. The visit to
this Greek warriors sanctuary linked the symbolism of the Trojan War
with the need to avenge the crimes committed by Xerxes. In 480 this was
the first Greek religious edifice in Europe to be destroyed by the Persians,
and indeed it was for the sacrilegious destruction of shrines that Alexander
was now intending to punish Persia. The emphasis on Panhellenic
symbolism was particularly important on account of the fact that
Macedonian leadership had so recently been questioned by Thebes. The
visit to Elaius and other religiously symbolic gestures cost the entire
expedition time. It has been estimated that the excursions to sanctuaries
Alexander made at the start of the expedition added 70 km to the route. In
other words, they must have delayed the armys progress by several days
although speed was such a high priority for the Macedonian king. This
illustrates just how important it was for Alexander to gain the favour of the
gods in what was much more than merely a logistical and strategic
undertaking.10
The crossing of the Hellespont commenced only after Alexanders
return from Elaius. The passage was between Sestus and Abydos, which
had clearly remained under Macedonian control ever since the expedition
in the spring of 336. The great operation of moving the army across the
Hellespont was entrusted to Parmenion, the most experienced of the
Macedonian commanders, who had at his disposal 160 warships and an
unspecified number of merchant vessels. Even if the strait was no more
than 1.5 km wide, the transporting of 40,000 troops as well as many herds
of horses and wagons must have taken some time. Even before the ships
started sailing Alexander ordered alters to be raised for Zeus, Athena and
Heracles, and exactly the same was next done on the Asian side.
Alexander sailed with part of the fleet (of 60 ships according to Diodorus)
personally steering the flagship. Halfway across the Hellespont he
10

Arr., An., 1.11.5. The story of Protesilaos: Paus., 4.2.7 (after the Kypria).
Instinsky 1949, pp. 9-22; Zahrnt 1996, pp. 130-134; Flower 2000, pp. 108-109;
Faraguna 2003, pp. 108-109.

From Abydus to Alexandria

115

sacrificed a bull and a liquid offering poured out of a gold bowl to

Poseidon and to the Nereids. Naturally the offerings to the sea god and
nymphs were to ensure a successful crossing of the Macedonian army, but
their form and location also corresponded to what Herodotus had written
about Xerxes sacrifices to the Sun on the day his army crossed over to
Europe. Again this was an allusion to the Persian wars at the start of the
fifth century and to the revenge which at that time was the main theme of
Alexanders expedition.11 The sources do not explain why at that time the
far mightier Persian fleet was not mobilised to attack the Macedonians
crossing the Hellespont and thus thwart the entire invasion. P. Briant
assumes that at the time Darius IIIs attention could have been focused on
quelling Khababashs revolt in Egypt and some disturbances in Babylon.12
The place where the fleet landed was called the Harbour of Achaeans
in memory of the landing of the Greek force bound for Troy. The first
member of the Macedonian expeditionary force to set foot on Asian land
was Alexander himself. By doing so he was following in the footsteps of
Protesilaos. Legend stated that Achilles had hesitated and did not land first
because he knew that the first Greek to do set foot on Asian soil would die
there. Thus Alexander was once again referring to the symbolism of the
Trojan War and at the same time rivalling Achilles for us a mythical
figure but for Alexander his real ancestor. The epic landing in Asia was
preceded by the thrusting of a spear into its soil a gesture whose
historical veracity there is no need to doubt. Even if Arrian does not
mention it, most of the other sources do. Moreover, it is not only perfectly
consistent with the logic of Alexanders actions but also provides
justification for his successors, the diadochi. According to both Greek and
Persian custom one of legitimate ways of getting possession of a country
was to wrest it from an enemy by force, and in the political terminology of
the day such territory was called land captured with the spear (doriktetos
chora). Therefore with this gesture Alexander was stating his intention to
conquer all or part of Asia and not to just plunder enemy land. It is in
reference to this that Plutarch sums up Alexanders achievements: For he
did not overrun Asia like a robber nor was he minded to tear and rend it, as
if it were booty and plunder bestowed by unexpected good fortune, after
the manner in which Hannibal later descended upon Italy, or as earlier
Teres descended upon Ionia and the Scythians upon Media. This was a
significant addition to the so far declared character of the expedition as
Panhellenic war of vengeance. Just as the earlier aspect of the mission had
been stressed for the benefit of the Greeks, so this new aspect was now
11
12

Diod., 17.16.2; Arr., An., 1.11.6-7; Just., 11.5. Instinsky 1949, pp. 41-53.
Briant 2003, pp. 67-70.

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Chapter IV

expressed more for the benefit of the Macedonian members of the

expedition. Later, Alexanders companions, the diadochi, would claim
their right to govern parts of his empire using the argument that the land
had been conquered with the spear, and no one questioned the legitimacy
of this line of reasoning.13
After this ceremony and after sacrifices being made to Zeus, Athena
and Heracles, Alexander and his retinue headed for Troy. In 480 it had
also been visited by Xerxes, who sacrificed there a thousand oxen to the
goddess Athena. In 334 this was a small town basking in the glory of the
epic war, the genuine or more likely fake relics of which were
enthusiastically shown to tourists. The inhabitants asked the distinguished
guest Alexander if he would like to see Pariss lyre (whose name was also
Alexander), to which the king sarcastically replied either that he already
had it or that he would willingly listen the Achilles lyre, the sound of
which, singing of the fame of men, relaxed him. The inhabitants of
Troy did not realise that Alexander had come for a more serious purpose
than just sightseeing. Still at the start of his expedition, Alexander wished
to fulfil all the religious obligations and once again emphasise the
campaigns pan-Hellenic character. Rulers and military commanders
frequently offered up sacrifices at Troy as this was the last (or first,
depending on where to the army was bound) Asian sanctuary on the route
to Europe, a continent which can indeed be seen from there. Alexander
visited the graves of the heroes in the town, honouring the memory of his
ancestor Achilles, another of Greek champions, Ajax, as well as of Priam.
The offering given to Priam was to avert his anger from Alexander as on
his mothers side the Macedonian was a descendent of Neoptolemus, the
one who had murdered the old king after the fall of Troy. At Achilles
grave Alexander expressed envy that the Greek champion had had Homer
to praise his deeds. Later literary tradition has Alexander laying a wreath
on the grave of Achilles, and Hephaestion laying a wreath on the grave of
Patroclus, thus drawing an obvious parallel between the mythical friends
and Alexander and his closest companion. At the temple of Athena
Alexander left his panoplia as a votive offering to the goddess and in
return took some armour that had allegedly been kept there since the
Trojan War. These valuable mementos Alexander had carried before him
into battle. Thus Athena, the guardian of the Greeks at Troy, became the
13

Diod., 17.17.2; Just., 11.5; It. Alex., 18; Plu., mor., 330d; Ps.-Callisth., 1.28.
Wilcken 1967, p. 83; Instinsky 1949, pp. 23, 31-38; Schmitthenner 1969, pp. 32-38;
Green 1974, p. 166-167; Briant 1980, p. 40; Briant 1993, p. 13; Mehl 1980;
Bosworth 1988, pp. 38-39; Flower 2000, pp. 119-120. Historicity of this event put
in doubt by Zahrnt 1996; contra Seibert 1998, pp. 56-57.

From Abydus to Alexandria

117

deity leading Alexander against his enemies.14 Strabo erroneously dates

Alexanders visit to Troy after the Battle at Granicus. He states that the
Macedonian king returned to Troy the status of a city and exempted it
from the obligation of paying tributes. Later, in a letter sent to Troy,
Alexander was to have promised to convert it into a great city. The
expansion of Troy was actually achieved through synoikism by
Lysimachus after Alexanders death. 15 The Macedonian kings stay at
Troy in all likelihood was not limited to a few hours only as while he was
there some of the regions notables visited him. Arrian names one of them:
Chares, an Athenian commander of mercenaries who had been granted
property at Sigeion by Artaxerxes III. He was one of the numerous lords of
the Troad, some of whom decided to side with Alexander.16 The sources
remain silent as to the impact Alexanders Trojan visit had on Greek
public opinion but it certainly raised the citys status in the Hellenistic era.
Still in the 4th century Troy became the centre of a confederation of Troad
cities, focused on the Sanctuary of Athena Ilias. Soon also Hellenistic
rulers Alexanders companions and their successors funded the raising
monumental edifices there.17
Once the entire Macedonian army had crossed the Hellespont,
Alexander joined his soldiers at Arisbe, whence the army marched briskly
east towards Daskyleion, the capital of the Hellespontine Phrygia. On the
first day the Macedonians reached Percote (today Urumbey) on the
Hellespont. On the second day they bypassed Lampsacus and camped by
the river Practius, which flowed into the Marmara Sea. The following day
Alexanders army reached Hermotus, this time circumventing the city of
Colonae but accepting the surrender of the town of Priapus, where a
Macedonian garrison was left. The examples of Lampsacus and Colonae
show that Alexander was deliberately avoiding large cities that had no yet
declared their allegiance. His priority was clearly to find a quick solution
on the battlefield. Thus by merely posing a threat, Alexander wished to
lure the satrap Arsites out into open territory and in a pitched battle score a
major victory at the very start of his campaign. Of the two roads from
Lampsacus to Granicus, Alexanders army would have probably chosen
the easier route to the north of the marshy lake Ece Gl, then across a plain
14
Diod., 17.17.2-3, 17.17.6-18.1; Plu., Alex., 15.7-9; Plu., mor., 331d-e; Arr., An.,
1.11.7-8, 1.22.2; Ael., VH, 9.38, 12.7; Just., 11.5; It. Alex., 18. Bosworth 1988, p.
39; Stewart 1993, pp. 83, 249, n. 62; Zahrnt 1996, pp. 144-145; Erskine 2001, pp.
105-106, 226-234.
15
Str., 13.1.26. Debord 1999, pp. 427-429.
16
Arr., An., 1.21.1. Hornblower 1994, p. 220.
17
Erskine 2001, pp. 230-234.

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already marching in battle formation. Modern scholars in general claim the

two armies clashed in May. Considering the facts that Alexanders army
had left Macedonia in early spring (March) and that it generally advanced
rapidly, the Battle of Granicus must have occurred in early May. E.
Grzybek, who has radically revised the dates of battles in Alexanders time,
has calculated that the Battle of Granicus took place on 8th April 334. This,
however, seems improbable if we consider that the army would have left
Macedonia at the start of spring and therefore in late March.18
The Persian authorities would have known of Alexanders expedition
for some time, perhaps as early as the moment it left Macedonia. However,
this time, unlike in 336-335, the Great King did not nominate a general to
conduct the defensive war and instead entrusted the task to the regions
satraps just as if this was merely a local conflict. The reason for this was
most probably a simple underestimation of the danger: Alexander had yet
to prove himself abroad as a commander and the previous Macedonian
expeditionary force had been easily defeated by barely 5,000 Greek
mercenaries, even if commanded by the brilliant general Memnon of
Rhodes. Darius contempt of Alexander may be reflected in the formers
spurious letter quoted in the Alexander Romance in which Darius
addresses Alexander as a spoiled child and has his ambassadors deliver
him toys. On the ground meantime the Persian army assembled to the east
of the river Granicus, thus blocking the road to Zeleia. Its strongest
formation was the cavalry, comprising over 10,000 men, as stated by
Diodorus, rather than 20,000 as Arrian claims. The armys composition
included Iranian military settlers from the western satrapies, contingents
from Paphlagonia, Hyrcania and Cilicia as well as detachments
commanded by nobles from satrapies in Asia Minor. Arrian claims that
there were approximately 20,000 mercenaries on the Persian side, but that
is highly unlikely as such large mercenary armies were raised only very
occasionally after a long period of preparation and under the personal
command of the Great King. It is clear that no such preparations had been
made prior to the Battle of Granicus and therefore we should accept that
only a small fraction of those 20,000 troops were mercenaries, whereas the
vast majority were local detachments of little military value. Diodorus
claim that the Persians had 100,000 infantry and Justins estimate that the
entire Persian army numbered 600,000 men obviously belong to the realm
of fantasy. There can be no doubt that the Persians had a far weaker
infantry than the Macedonians but that their cavalry was numerically
superior. Before the battle the Persian commanders held a council at Zeleia
18
Arr., An., 1.12.6-13.1. Foss 1973, pp. 495-496; Higgins 1980, p.132; Seibert
1985, pp. 30-32; Harl 1997, p. 313; Grzybek 1990, pp. 61-66.

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119

presided over by the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, Arsites, who was

also the overall commander of the Persian army by right of the fact that the
enemy was on his territory. As an experienced commander who knew this
particular enemy well Memnon was also invited to join, but not, as was
erroneously for a long time believed, as the commander of Greek
mercenaries. Memnon arrived at Granicus at the head of cavalry
detachment he had mustered, like other aristocrats, on his own estate. This
is certain because in their accounts of the battle our sources clearly report
him commanding such a cavalry unit. Although Memnon was undoubtedly
the best possible commander of infantry, the Greek mercenaries at
Granicus were commanded by a Persian called Omares.19
During this conference Memnon pointed to the disproportionate
strength of the Macedonian infantry when compared with the Persian
infantry and the fact that the enemy was personally commanded by King
Alexander whereas the Persians had no royal commander. For these
reasons he suggested that the Persian army should avoid battles and
instead retreat, employing a policy of destroying food and fodder for
horses on the way and even destroying towns. Next he suggested that the
war should be moved into Europe. Such advice indicates not only a sober
appraisal of the military might of the opposing forces but also good
intelligence on the enemys provisions for men and horses. According to
the calculations of D.W. Engels, a pioneer of research into ancient
logistics, the transporting of one days provisions (food and fodder) for the
Macedonian army required the employment 1,100 pack animals. In
Antiquity the transporting of an armys provisions was possible for more
or less ten days. Afterwards provisions had to be replenished, either by
ship or by living off the enemys land. Of course there is no way of
knowing how Memnons suggested tactics would have worked, but at that
time of year, before the harvest, when food was difficult to come by,
especially for such a large army, there is good reason to believe that this
scorched earth policy would have considerably hindered Alexanders
actions and at least delayed the first really decisive battle, in the meantime
compelling him do disperse his army into foraging parties. Memnons
advice, however, was rejected by Arsites, who declared that he would not
allow a single house to be burnt down in his satrapy. Other Persians
19

Diod., 17.18.2, 17.19.4-5; Arr., An., 1.12.8-10, 1.15.2, 1.16.3; Just., 11.6; Ps.Callisth., 1.36. Badian 1977, p. 283; McCoy 1989, pp. 414-417; Briant 1996, pp.
718, 840-841; Debord 1999, p. 430; Heckel 2006, pp. 162, 183; Sabin 2007, pp.
130-131; Heckel 2009, pp. 29-30. Erroneous opinion of Memnon commanding
mercenary soldiers is popular even today: Worthington 2004, p. 54; Matthews
2008, passim.

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supported this view, declaring (according to Diodorus) that Memnons

decision was below their dignity or (according to Arrian) quietly
suspecting that Memnon wished to prolong the war and thus be nominated
overall commander by Darius III. One has to note that Alexander and his
army also helped Memnons credibility to be undermined by sparing his
land, which, like the properties of his brother Mentor, was presumably
situated in the Troad on the former estates (peraia) of Chios and Mytilene.
This and the failure to give Memnon command of the infantry can only
confirm the claim in the sources that the satraps were jealous of him. Some
historians also suppose that the satraps wished to defeat Alexander with
the Iranian cavalry to in a sense compensate for the defeat of the earlier
Macedonian expedition by the Greek infantry. P. Briant also points to an
important aspect of Persian culture that prohibited them from accepting
scorched earth tactics. It was a fundamental part of Achaemenid ideology
that the Great King and his representatives, the satraps, were duty bound to
protect royal subjects. It was indeed this duty that gave the state the moral
right to demand tributes and other services from the people. Memnons
suggestion contravened this important principle and therefore if only for
this reason the satraps could not accept it.20 Thus the decisions fell and
now all there was left to do was fight the battle.
The Granicus is now known as the Kocaba ay, which in its lower
reaches up to the Marmara Sea is called Biga ay. It was along this stretch
of the river to the north of a tributary (today called Koa ayi) that the
battle was fought. On a 5 km long section from Koa ayi to the Iel
trench, confined by marshes in the north, there is a stretch of flat terrain
that was very suitable for cavalry. The ancient authors present Granicus as
a large river with a strong current and steep banks that made it difficult to
cross: for one can see that many parts of it are deep; its banks, as you see,
are very high, sometimes like cliffs, but most of his army were afraid of
the depth of the river, and of the roughness and unevenness of the farther
bank, up which they would have to climb while fighting, and precipitous
positions covered with infantry and cavalry, and through a stream that
swept men off their feet and surged about them. Today the Kocaba ay
(Granicus) has a channel 15-25 metres wide, whereas in May, the month
the battle is said to have taken place, the river is no more than 5-7 metres
wide, half a meter deep, and flows slowly. The eastern bank, which was
occupied by the Persians, is higher than the western bank, but both sides
20

Diod., 17.18.2-3; Arr., An., 1.12.9; Polyaen., 4.3.15. Engels 1978, pp. 18-22;
Briant 1980, pp. 43-45; Briant 1996, pp. 841-842; Seibert 1985, p. 37; McCoy
1989, pp. 428-430; Wirth 1989, p. 16; Heckel 1997, p. 195; Ashley 1998, pp. 187190; Debord 1999, pp. 434-435.

From Abydus to Alexandria

121

could be crossed by the cavalry. However, if the infantry tried to cross, the
phalanx line would undoubtedly have been broken and the resulting
confusion would not have rendered its attack effective.21
We have three major accounts of the battle, of: Arrian, Diodorus and
Plutarch. Their rhetoric is somewhat confusing and the accounts also differ
from each other with regard to certain details, such as the time of the day
the battle was fought. All the authors agree that the Macedonian army
reached the Granicus in the afternoon, but there are two versions of what
happened next. According to Diodorus the Macedonians set up camp and
attacked the Persians at dawn the next day. According to Arrian and
Plutarch the Macedonians attacked immediately, and this was possible
because on their way to the river they were already marching in battle
formation. Both Arrian and Plutarch also mention a council held by the
Macedonian commanders. According to Arrian, Parmenion advised
Alexander to postpone the attack until dawn the following day assuming
that the much inferior Persian infantry would not dare spend the night near
the river and that at daybreak it would be easy to cross. In response
Alexander is said to have uttered one of his famous sentences: I should
feel it a disgrace if, after crossing the Hellespont so easily, this small
stream should bar our way for a moment. Ancient authors more than
once relate disputes between Alexander and Parmenion regarding not only
military tactics but also the strategy of the entire war. In these accounts a
careful Parmenion weighing up the pros and cons of each possible move is
contrasted with a young and impatient Alexander eager to achieve great
things. In these confrontations, befitting his literary persona, Alexander
not only always wins the battle of words but is also always successful in
victoriously realising the very plans the old general advised him against.
Such accounts are therefore a literary topos, which makes it virtually
impossible to conduct historical analysis if we cannot even establish
whether such discussions between the Macedonians ever took place. This
topos was probably started in Callisthenes book, where Parmenion was
presented as foil to enhance Alexanders glory. In the case of Granicus,
delaying the battle would have given the weaker Persians an opportunity
to escape; whereas Alexanders determination to march swiftly shows that
he wanted a confrontation as soon as possible. Moreover the kings option
of attacking in the second part of the day was logical as it meant that the
Persians would have to fight with the sun in the eyes, whereas in the
morning the Macedonians would have been facing the sun in the east. The
21

Arr., An., 1.13.4; Plu., Alex., 16.2, 16.4. Topography of the battlefield: Janke
1904, pp. 126-135; Nikolaitis 1974; Foss 1973; Harl 1997, p. 304; Sabin 2007, p.
129.

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experienced Parmenion would have known that too. Therefore in all

probability the Macedonian army attacked at the first available opportunity:
in the afternoon the same day the army reached the banks of the river
Granicus.22
The Persian cavalry was positioned along the entire section of the
rivers eastern bank, whereas the Persian infantry was stationed on slightly
higher ground a certain distance behind the cavalry. Such a positioning of
the Persian army has been frequently criticised by modern historians as it
did not allow the Persian cavalry to gather enough momentum to make full
use of the force of its charge. It is obvious that the cavalry needed some
distance from the river bank to do this. However, the fact of the matter was
that the Persian cavalry tactic at the time was not to charge at the enemy in
tight formation with lances this was only first tried against Alexanders
army at Issus. An earlier tactic, still used at Granicus, was to approach the
enemy and thrown javelins at it, so as to disrupt the advancing battle
formations. Only then did they start to attack with curved swords. In the
escalating confusion the fast and well trained Persian horsemen usually
gained the upper hand. And that must have been what the Persians hoped
would happen on this occasion. Alexander traditionally commanded the
right wing together with the companion cavalry, whereas the left wing was
entrusted to Parmenion, who had the Thessalian cavalry and the Greek
allies under his command. The first unit to attack was composed of scouts
armed with sarissai, Paionians and one ile (squadron) of hetairoi all
commanded by Amyntas, the son of Arrhabaeus. The Persians in turn had
concentrated their best forces on their left wing this was where we are
told the satraps Arsamenes (or Arsames) of Cilicia, Spithridates of Lydia
and Ionia and Arsites himself were positioned. The commander of the
Cappadocian cavalry, Mithrobuzanes, was also probably a satrap.
According to Arrian the Persians had spotted Alexander in his magnificent
armour and wished to resolve the battle by clashing with him directly. Of
course this was also what Alexander wanted to achieve, and this feudal
code of conduct respected by aristocrats on both sides would ultimately
work to his advantage.23
Amyntas detachment was attacked as it tried to ascend the eastern
bank. First Persians threw javelins at the Macedonians and then advanced
towards the enemy, thus descending the bank and entering the river. That
was without doubt exactly what Alexander wanted to happen for he
22

Diod., 17.19.3 (similar in It. Alex., 20); Plu., Alex., 16.2-3; Arr., An., 1.13.2-7.
Badian 1977, pp. 271-277; Bosworth 1988, p. 41; Ashley 1998, pp. 191-192.
23
Diod., 17.19; Arr., An., 1.14. Badian 1977, pp. 277-287; Harl 1997, pp. 306-313;
Debord 1999, pp. 430-431.

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123

immediately attacked the Persians in the river channel, where they no

longer had the advantage of holding the high ground. The Macedonians
were better armed than the Persians, especially as they had longer spears
which were especially important in the first moment impact. The
ferociously attacking Companion cavalry personally led by Alexander
gradually pushed the Persians back up the eastern bank until both sides
were out on land above the river channel. Alexander himself was the focal
point of the entire battle, personally fighting many duels with Persian
aristocrats desperately trying to kill him. Alexanders spear broke at the
very start of the clash but one of the hetairoi, Demaratus, gave him his
own. It was then that Mithridates, Darius IIIs son-in-law, attacked
Alexander but was instantly killed with the sarissa spearhead thrust into
his face. Hereupon Rhoesaces, Spithridates brother, struck Alexander on
the head, crushing his helmet and possibly wounding him. Despite this, the
Macedonian king managed to kill the assailant with his spear. Meanwhile
Spithridates had raised his sword and was poised to strike down on
Alexander. Now it was Cleitus who managed to forestall the disaster by
hacking off the Persians arm at the shoulder. Alexander and those
Macedonians around him were also attacked by another group of Persian
aristocrats, courtiers and relatives of the Great King, among them
Pharnaces, the brother-in-law of Darius III, and Mithrobuzanes. Meanwhile
the battle was also being fought on the Macedonians left flank, but we
know virtually nothing about it apart from the fact that the Thessalian
cavalry distinguished themselves with superior riding skills and
manoeuvres. One can assume that when the Macedonian companion
cavalry defeated the elite cavalry squadron of Persian aristocrats, the rest
of the Persian cavalry fell into disarray and fled. But Alexander quickly
halted the chase to unite the Macedonian cavalry with the phalanx, who in
the meantime had crossed the Granicus. Now together they attacked the
Persian infantry. The local detachments immediately fled, whereas the
Greek mercenaries tried to negotiate terms for capitulation. But Alexander
refused to negotiate and instead personally led the attack. The fighting was
vicious though probably not as spectacular as in the earlier phase of the
battle. Alexanders horse was killed and most of the Macedonian
casualties were incurred in this particular clash. Of course the vast
numerical superiority of the Macedonians meant that the outcome was a
foregone conclusion. Despite a valiant effort, the Greek mercenaries were
defeated, with 2,000 of them taken captive. Alexander decided to make an
example of these prisoners by punishing them harshly: they were cast in
chains and shipped off to Macedonia as slaves. In doing so he was

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fulfilling the mandate of the League of Corinth which prohibited all

Greeks from militarily serving Persia.24
The Battle of Granicus was a decisive Macedonian victory. Here
Alexander displayed attributes as a military commander that would also
serve him well in other battles: an ability to assess the terrain and select
the most advantageous place to attack the enemy, an understanding of
when to attack and a strong faith in his own abilities as well as those of his
soldiers. Added to this was Alexanders reckless courage. He would risk
his life without considering the dramatic consequences his death, without a
nominated successor, would have to Macedonia.25 There is considerable
divergence in claims of how many soldiers were killed on either side. On
the Macedonian side figures vary from 34 (according to Plutarch, who
derived these figures from Aristobulus) to 129 (Justin). The Persians were
to have lost from 1,000 (Arrian) to 2,500 (Plutarch) cavalry and between
over 10,000 (Diodorus) and 20,000 (Plutarch) infantry. Of course one has
to bear in mind that ancient authors would minimise the number of those
killed on whichever side they considered theirs and exaggerate the
enemy losses. Thus only Justins figure for the number of Macedonians
killed seems in any way plausible, especially when we consider that as
many as 25 hetairoi fell and therefore losses among the less well trained
and equipped soldiers must have been proportionally higher. There can be
little doubt that the Persian losses were indeed high for Alexander was
wont to chase and destroy the defeated enemy, so that it could not regroup
and fight again. Many distinguished Persian aristocrats were also killed,
fighting courageously in the most difficult section of the battle against
Alexander and his Companions. The Persian commander-in-chief, Arsites,
managed to escape from the battlefield but, blaming himself for the defeat,
soon afterwards committed suicide. Alexander now undertook every
measure to gain from this military victory as much political and
propaganda capital as possible. He ensured that his wounded soldiers were
cared for and personally visited them. The families of those killed were
exempted from taxation. Alexander honoured the memory of the 25 fallen
hetairoi with bronze statues at Dion, the commission for which was given
to Lysippus, the greatest sculptor of the era. Of what was plundered from
the Persians Alexander sent to Athens 300 complete sets of armour as a
votive offering to the goddess Athena with the inscription Alexander the
son of Philip and all the Greeks except the Lacedaemonians from the
24

Diod., 17.19-21; Arr., An., 1.15-16; Plu., Alex., 16.3-14; Plu., mor., 326f-327a;
P.Hamb. 652; It. Alex., 21-23. Badian 1977, pp. 287-291; Bosworth 1988, pp. 4243; Harl 1997, pp. 313-324.
25
Badian 1977, p. 293; Bosworth 1988, pp. 42-43.

From Abydus to Alexandria

125

Barbarians who dwell in Asia. Thus at the Acropolis, whose temples had
been desecrated by Xerxes 146 years earlier, there was now visible
evidence that Alexander was realising the Panhellenic vendetta. It is also
possible that there was irony in Alexanders gesture, because among those
captured at Granicus and sent in chains as slaves to Macedonia there could
have been many Athenians though probably not majority as claimed in
Itinerarium Alexandri. Their release from captivity was for a long time an
object of Athenian diplomatic efforts. 26 The purple gowns, precious
utensils and other valuable items found in the Persian camp now became
the victors property. These things Alexander sent as a gift to his mother,
which she most probably next submitted as expensive offerings at
Delphi.27
A direct consequence of the Battle of Granicus was the capture of
Daskyleion, the capital of Hellespontine Phrygia, which surrendered to
Parmenion without putting up resistance. Alexander nominated the
Macedonian Calas his satrap in Phrygia and stipulated that the amount of
tributes collected was to be the same as it had been under Persian rule.
These first administrative decisions to be made on conquered land became
guidelines to be applied with only a few exceptions, discussed later in
all lands subsequently acquired by Alexander during his campaign: as an
heir of the Achaemenids Alexander took over their territories without
changing the established administrative and financial systems. Insofar as
we are able to judge on the basis of very imperfect numismatic evidence, it
was indeed as an Achaemenid successor that Alexander was perceived by
the Greeks of Asia Minor for he appears in satrap attire on coins
autonomously issued by some of their cities.28

2. Freedom for Greeks of Asia

The main Macedonian force commanded by Alexander now headed for
Sardis. The sources do not specify which route the army took other than
that it was through Lydia. This would imply that the Macedonians chose
the main road to the south east from Zeleia to the Macestus river valley,
thence via Thyateira and the Hermus river valley to Sardis. Such a route is
c. 270 km long and therefore the march would have lasted until the end of
May 334. Sardis, the capital of the former Kingdom of Lydia, was in
26
Diod., 16.21.6; Arr., An., 1.16.3-7; Plu., Alex., 16.15-18; Just., 11.6; It. Alex., 23;
Curt., 3.1.9; P.Hamb. 652. Hanson 1999, p. 130.
27
Plu., Alex., 16.19; Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, FGrH, 151 F1.1; Ps.-Callisth., 1.28;
Syll.3 252. Carney 2000, p. 86.
28
Arr., An., 1.17.1. Heckel 1992, pp. 355-357. Coins: Debord 2000.

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Chapter IV

Persian times a large, multi-ethnic city. Most of the population, however,

were Lydians and in the second half of the 4th century Lydian social elites
were intensively influenced by Hellenic culture, as is apparent in the citys
artwork from the late Achaemenid period. The citys other inhabitants
included Greeks, Carians, Babylonians, Iranians and other people bearing
Asianic names. The populace worshipped both local and Iranian gods
Ahura Mazda and Anahita. At Hierokome, situated in the rural district of
Sardis, there was a temple of Anahita run by magi right up to Roman times.
In Persian times and immediately after Alexanders conquest Sardis
maintained a certain degree of autonomy which allowed it to have
independent diplomatic relations with Miletus, but it had not yet acquired
the status of a Greek polis, which was to come in the Hellenistic period.
Sardis was significant as the seat of the satrap of the Sparda (the territory
of the former Kingdom of Lydia), who frequently also governed Ionia.
Being linked by the Royal Road with Susa, Sardis was also the
unquestioned centre of Persian authority in the whole of Asia Minor. The
garrison at the Sardis citadel was directly subordinate to the Great King as
was the keeper of the local royal treasury. For Alexander the capture of
this treasury was of prime importance for, despite the victory at the
Granicus, his finances were in a critical condition. According to both
literary sources and archaeological findings the citadel at Sardis, where the
treasury must have been located, was virtually impossible to capture
without a long, drawn-out siege.29
Yet this did not happen. Before Alexander reached the city, he was met
by the commander of the Sardis garrison, Mithrenes, accompanied by the
citys most influential citizens, who surrendered to the Macedonian king
the acropolis and treasury. Our sources do not explain why it happened
this way, but we can certainly not conclude that this was a spontaneous
gesture. Later examples of great cities surrendering without resistance
during Alexanders campaign Babylon or Susa show a certain
procedure. The surrendering commander always greeted the victor some
distance away form the city and showed his respect. Such was the
established custom not only in Achaemenid times but at least since the
time of the Neo-Assyrian Empire. Failure to surrender to the approaching
army outside the city was a sign of hostile intentions. Once this greeting
ceremony was completed, the official victor formally entered the city as its
new master. Although the sources do not always mention this directly, the
29

Diod., 17.21.7. Magie 1950, pp. 797-799; Seibert 1985, pp. 35-37; Bosworth
1988, pp. 44-45; Briant 1993, pp. 18-19; Briant 1996, pp. 722-725; Hornblower
1994, pp. 214-217; Debord 1999, pp. 432-433; Sartre 2003, p. 16. Dusinberre 2003
is a monograph of Sardis in Achaemenid period.

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127

formal capitulation of great and powerful cities was normally preceded by

secret negotiations to establish the terms and conditions of surrender, not
least compensation to the availing commander of the surrendering fortress.
That is what must have happened before the surrender of Sardis and
Mithrenes had a lot to bargain with; in return for capitulation he
guaranteed for himself a position in Alexanders closest circle as the first
Iranian, indeed first Asian to be so honoured. After the Battle of Issus
Alexander sent him on a mission to Darius IIIs captured family and later
appointed him satrap of Armenia. Mithrenes defection was no less
significant from Alexanders point of view, for it started an immensely
important process, never fully understood or accepted by contemporary
Greeks and Macedonians: the winning over of what P. Briant calls the
ethnoclass ruling the Achaemenid empire or, more simply put, the Iranian
aristocracy. With time, after battles personally lost by Darius III himself,
many Iranians would follow in Mithrenes footsteps. However, according
to Curtius Rufus, who frequently was well informed about the mood on
the Persian side at given times, the commandant of the Sardis citadel was
initially seen as a traitor among his compatriots. Having been greeted by
Mithrenes, Alexander set up camp 20 stades (c. 4 km) from Sardis and
instructed Amyntas the son of Andromenes to occupy the Sardis citadel.
Only then did he himself formally enter the city. In Sardis Alexander
resolved to build a temple to the Olympian Zeus. Interpreting as a sign
from the said deity a thunderclap that struck a spot where the palace of the
Lydian kings had once stood, Alexander decided to have the temple built
there. To the local population the thunderbolt had a symbolic meaning
suggesting that Alexander was the continuator of the ancient Lydian
dynasty that Cyrus the Great had overthrown over two centuries earlier.
Continuing Achaemenid administrative solutions, Alexander divided
authority over Sardis between three officials: Asander, the son of Philotas,
became the satrap of Lydia; Nicias was entrusted with the collection of
taxes and Alexanders Companion (hetairos) Pausanias was given
command of the garrison, which was to include a contingent from Argos.
Soon afterwards Alexander occupied part of the Aegean coast and islands,
which he added to Asanders satrapy, though most probably as a separate
hyparchy (administrative unit) governed by the Macedonian Philoxenus.
This way the administrative structure from before the 5th-century Persian
wars was restored. Alexander instructed Calas and Alexander of Lyncestis,
who commanded the Peloponnesian contingent, to confiscate Memnons
estates situated in what was now Calass satrapy. This was an ostentatious
measure taken against one of the Great Kings fiercest generals, but no
mass confiscations of the property of Iranian aristocrats in this region

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followed. In later times many of their descendants belonged to social elites

of the poleis of Asia Minor. In Achaemenid times these Iranian aristocrats
had held land in royal territories but after 334 their estates were gradually
incorporated into the poleis rural territories (chorai). The process almost
certainly began during Alexanders reign. The earliest extant documentary
evidence is a decree of the city of Amyzon in Caria issued in 321/320.
Both this decree, passed on the initiative of the satrap Asander, and later
actions by the Seleucids incorporating aristocratic property into the chorai
of poleis show that the monarchy was the main driving force behind the
process of transforming the administrative structure of Asia Minor. We do
not know what was meant in Arrians statement that Alexander had
allowed the Lydians keep their freedom as the satraps authority and the
level of tributes remained the same.30
Having made the essential administrative decisions, Alexander headed
for Ephesus, which lay on an offshoot of the Royal Road. In a story
written much later by Pausanias, sometime after a hunting excursion
during that four-day march Alexander fell asleep and in his dreams he saw
the goddess Nemesis, who showed him where to rebuild Smyrna.
Although this is a well established story, later officially commemorated on
coins issued in Smyrna, unfortunately one cannot dismiss the possibility
that like many stories of historical or mythological figures founding cities
this one was invented in Roman times.31 Ephesus, historically the second
most important Ionian city after Miletus, had always been of considerable
interest to the Persian authorities. They surrounded the city with care,
especially the temple of Artemis, and under Tiberius the Ephesians were
still referring to the citys right to asylum granted by the Persians. The
degree of respect to what was after all a pagan goddess accorded by the
Persian Zoroastrian state is apparent in the fact that at the turn of the 4th
century the satrap Tissaphernes issued coins with her image. The city also
had an Iranian colony and even centuries later the temple servant
(neokoros) of the Artemision was also called megabyzus, a word derived
from the Persian name Bagabuxa meaning satisfying or serving the
god.32
News of the Persian defeat provoked in Ephesus the second revolution
within three years. Greek mercenaries of the small garrison of Ephesus
30

Curt., 3.12.7; Arr., An., 1.17; Diod., 17.21.7; Plu., Alex., 17.1; It. Alex., 24. Lane
Fox 1973, pp. 140-141; Robert 1983, pp. 97-118; Briant 1985; Briant 1993; Heckel
1992, pp. 176-178, 385; Debord 1999, pp. 159-160, 185. On surrendering cities see
below chapter V.4.
31
Paus., 7.5.2. Debord 1999, p. 435.
32
Boyce, Grenet 1989, p. 206; Briant 1996, pp. 721-722; Shabazi 2003, pp. 7-14.

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129

commandeered two triremes and escaped from the city, taking with them
Amyntas the son of Antioch, who was a Macedonian aristocrat opposed to
Alexanders rule. Alexander entered Ephesus accompanied by the
previously expelled supporters of Macedonia and personally ended
oligarchic rule, establishing or rather re-establishing in its place a
democracy. No longer fearful of the oligarchs a crowd dragged their
leaders: Syrphax, his son Pelagon and his nephews, from the temple and
stoned them to death. But once the leaders were killed Alexander forbade
further retributions and, according to Arrian, the wisdom of this decision
earned him great popularity among the populace. A considerable part of
Alexanders actions in Ephesus focused on the Temple of Artemis the
goddess who according to legend had failed to save the Artemisium from
fire because she was preoccupied with assisting Olympias in labour.
Alexander now laid offerings to the goddess and arranged a military
parade. He also extended the asylum area around the temple to one stade
(c. 180 m) we do not know the size of the original asylum area. This was
an important privilege, and Ephesus would have to wait another 300 years
for it to be further extended. Moreover, Alexander decided that the tribute
from the city due to him should be deposited in the temples treasury. The
Artemisium lay within the citys boundaries and, as the division of church
and state was unknown in Antiquity, the temples treasury was actually
administered by the city; therefore Ephesus was paying itself tribute.
Strabo records an anecdote about an offer by Alexander to rebuild the
Artemisium from his royal funds which was rejected by the proud
Ephesians, who wanted for themselves the glory of rebuilding the temple.
Yet so as not to offend the monarch they explained that it was not befitting
for deity to build a temple for another deity. Although anecdotal nature of
this account does not necessarily undermine its historical veracity, it is
highly unlikely that something like that could have happened during
Alexanders first and only visit to Ephesus. Firstly, the current state of his
finances would have prohibited him from making such an offer. Secondly,
the Greeks attitude to religion was much too serious for them to have
proclaimed this young Macedonian ruler a god as early as in 334.
Nevertheless this story does illustrate Alexanders consistent interest in
Artemis of Ephesus, for whom he was willing to give donations even
when royal revenues were at their lowest. 33 Whilst in Ionia Alexander
must have also made a very generous donation for the construction of a

33
Arr., An., 1.17.10-18.2; Str., 14.1.22-23. Bosworth 1980, pp. 132-133; Higgins
1980, pp. 132-134; Badian 1996, pp. 24-25; Nawotka 2003a, pp. 23-24, 29.

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temple to the goddess Athena Polias in the city of Priene as it is recorded

in an inscription on the temple to this day.34
Arrian writes that while Alexander was in Ephesus emissaries came
from Magnesia and Tralles to surrender their cities to him. The king
accepted their capitulation and provided these Greek cities military
protection by sending there Parmenion with a force of 5,000 infantry (half
of whom were Macedonian and the other half mercenaries) as well as 200
hetairoi. He sent another force under the command of Alcimachus to the
cities of Ionia and Aeolis with instructions: He ordered the oligarchies
everywhere to be overthrown and democracies to be established; he
restored its own laws to each city and remitted the tribute they used to pay
to the barbarians. In Caria somewhat later that year Alexander said that
he had started the war with Persia in order to liberate the Greek cities.
These two simple remarks quoted in the sources have aroused a major
historical debate regarding Alexanders attitude towards the Greek cities
of Asia Minor. Stances in this debate are between two extreme views. One
claims that Alexander genuinely restored freedom to the poleis of Asia
Minor and invited them to join the League of Corinth. The opposite view
claims that actually nothing changed: tributes continued to be extracted
even if under a different guise and that the pro-Persian cliques called
oligarchies were merely replaced by pro-Macedonian cliques forming
puppet regimes called democracies. If nothing had indeed changed, then
the decisions made by Alexander at Ephesus would have only been for
propaganda purposes.35
Historical debate has allowed us to establish that in all probability,
unlike certain island states, the poleis of Asia Minor never became
members of the League of Corinth. The sources do not mention anything
like this happening, whereas for Alexander the League was never such an
important political tool as to make it necessary for him to recruit so many
new members. Other controversies, however, remain. Perhaps a way out of
this academic deadlock would be to look at the liberation issue from the
point of view of the Greeks in Asia Minor and on the basis of their
concepts of sovereignty and freedom. To the 4th-century Greeks a free
polis was one which had its own laws, controlled its rural territories, could
decide on the settlement or expulsion of foreigners, had its own foreign
policy and made independent financial decisions, including ones
concerning taxes. The most important of these criteria was the first, which
34

IPriene, 156. Heisserer 1980, pp. 143-144, 156-158.

Arr., An., 1.18.2; Diod., 17.24.1. Detailed discussion of the issue of freedom of
Greeks in Asia Minor with reference to all extant sources: Nawotka 2003a. Now
see also Mileta 2008, pp. 21-40. Here I provide a summary and conclusions.
35

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131

the Greeks called autonomia though today we would call it sovereignty

rather than autonomy. A free polis could belong to a military alliance
and pay contributions to a common cause. However, the imposition of a
duty to pay tributes was contrary to their concept of sovereignty. In the 4th
century a view emerged and became predominant from the 330s onwards
that democracy was the typical system of government for a free polis.
Therefore not only tyranny (which is obvious) but also oligarchy was
considered incompatible with what they believed to be the natural
constitution of a free Greek state.
One of the visible and therefore important to modern scholars
aspects of ancient Greek democracy was the transparency of government,
namely the freedom to express views and a tendency to publish the results
of public debates, i.e. the decrees of the council and people. Oligarchies
felt it important to have unwritten laws that were only fully known to the
initiated ruling elite. Conversely, democracies in many cases even forbade
the use of laws that had not been published in writing and therefore indeed
followed principles that also apply to modern states today. It is fortunate
that at least some inscriptions in stone of the resolutions passed by ancient
Greek democracies have survived to this day. However, this is only a
small fraction of evidence giving us merely a tiny glimpse into the
histories of numerous poleis; such local histories were of only minor and
sporadic interest to the ancient authors. Although most of the ancient
inscriptions are gone, the numbers that have survived from particular
poleis may be assumed to be statistically proportionate to the original
numbers. The association of the number of inscriptions a polis produced
with the type of government it had is very well illustrated in the states of
continental Greece. That is why we have approximately 1,400 decrees
from democratic Athens and only a few similar documents from very large
but oligarchic poleis such as Sparta, Thebes or Corinth. More significantly,
in the history of Athens alone we can trace that many more inscriptions
were produced in periods of democratic rule than in its periods of
oligarchic rule.
The same principle of associating the number of public inscriptions
decrees of the council and people with the type of government may be
applied to the poleis of 4th-century Asia Minor. The inscriptions of about
half of the 60 or so ancient poleis of Ionia, Aeolis and Caria have survived
to this day. Although taking into account the problems with the exact
dating of Greek inscriptions, one can say that in the years 334-301 three
times more public documents were produced in this region than in years
400-335 preceding Alexanders expedition. Thus the average annual
number of decrees passed rose six fold after Alexanders arrival in relation

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to the average year before his arrival. The trend is most noticeable in large
cities producing a proportionately large number of inscriptions. The most
striking example is Ephesus, where from the entire 4th century up to
Alexander the citys popular assembly left behind just one extant
inscription, whereas for the last third of the century as many as 44. Both
their large number as well as the evidence of working of the legislative
process at the time show that this was a vibrant and active democracy.
This indeed also confirms the image of Ephesus presented by the ancient
authors, especially Arrian, of a city whose population predominantly
opposed its oligarchic government, which had to basically rely on the
support of the Persian garrison.
There are other examples that can be shown but it is more important to
see the general picture of political changes within the Greek poleis of Asia
Minor in 334 as transpires from extant epigraphic sources. In Ionia, Aeolis
and the Greek cities of the Carian coast the arrival of the Macedonian
army was followed by a legislative explosion, which is a typical sign of
democratic government. Not all the poleis under Persian rule were ruled
by oligarchies, but even those that did manage to preserve their democratic
systems became much more active and radical after Alexanders arrival.
An example of such democratic revitalisation and a greater opening up of
public initiative is Iasus in Caria, which in 334 was liberated from the
restrictions imposed upon it by its Hecatomnid rulers. In Alexanders time
we have not only an active assembly but even evidence of assembly pay
(ekklesiastikon) being paid to enable participation of even the poorest
citizens without their having to suffer financial loses. In Greek political
theory assembly pay was an aspect of the most radical type of democracy
and its appearance in Asia Minor at that time is a measure of how deep the
political changes were after Alexanders arrival. The decision to topple
oligarchies and establish democracies in Ionia, Aeolis and Caria had
fundamental and far-reaching consequences. Whereas up to Alexanders
reign oligarchies and democracies had been considered equally legitimate
forms of government, the Hellenistic era saw the decided predominance of
democratic systems of government in the Greek world. Though
Alexanders decisions were not the only reason for this change, they did
contribute to the triumph of democracy.
Fortunately, to this day we have an extensive fragment of inscribed
text from Alexanders address to the Ionian city of Priene which sheds
light on another two important issues concerning the status of poleis in
Ionia, Aeolis and Caria: the control of rural territories and state finances.
After his victory at Granicus Alexander considered himself the rightful
successor of the Achaemenids and therefore he felt authorised, as is

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recorded in this inscription, to carefully delimitate royal territories from

those belonging to Priene. Only the inhabitants of the former were obliged
to pay tributes (phoros), whereas the inhabitants of the rural areas
belonging to Priene as well as the inhabitants of the city itself were not.
This confirms the abovementioned passage from Arrian stating that
Alexander freed the Greek poleis from the paying of tributes. Unlike other
Greek states in the region, Priene was also relieved from having to pay
contributions (syntaxis) for the war against Persia, most probably on
account of it taking on other military obligations. To many historians the
difference between tribute (phoros) and contribution (syntaxis) seems to
be no more than in the way they sound. To them the latter was simply the
same tax with a nicer name but nonetheless going to a ruler who decided
everything. However, 4th-century Greeks had a very different opinion on
the subject and in all known documents from the period the two forms of
taxation were carefully distinguished. We know that the poleis of Asia
Minor made individual alliances with Alexander through treaties and
although we do not know their content, we can assume that they formed
the basis for collecting syntaxis. One needs to remember that to most of
these cities the war against Persia was one of liberation. Insofar as we are
able to discern, only the oligarchies, which relied on Persian support to
remain in power, thought differently. Therefore the collecting of
contributions, like in other military alliances, was something quite obvious.
Priene, some of the island poleis as well as some of the Asian mainland
Greek states provided soldiers and ships for the war effort and therefore
did not have to pay contributions. It is probable that Alexander collected
syntaxis up until 330, that is, while he was still fighting the war with the
Corinthian Leagues mandate. Although the level of contributions was
probably similar to that of the tributes, at least some of the poleis soon
began to feel the financial benefits of the political change for now their
territories were integrated with the landed properties of Iranian aristocrats
and that meant a broader tax base for the citys treasury.
These facts should not, however, be used to paint an idealised picture
of Alexander in 334 being the altruistic liberator of Asia Minor willingly
supported by the regions poleis. The examples of Miletus and Aspendus
as well as of Tyre beyond the Greek zone (see Chapter IV.5) show that in
the war between Alexander and Darius III there was no option of
remaining neutral. In those days neutrality was a privilege of only very
powerful states or ones of such marginal importance that the belligerent
powers saw no need to have them on their side. Some of the poleis in Asia
Minor joined Alexanders side of their own free will. The Macedonian
king offered alliances with all states in Ionia, Aeolis and Caria that

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guaranteed independent rule and even the running of independent foreign

policies, though of course not as far as the war against the Great King was
concerned. Inscriptions show that after 334 the poleis of Asia Minor were
sending out ambassadors and signing treaties with other states, even those
beyond Alexanders sphere of influence. They also acquired the support of
influential foreigners by granting them citizenship and official rewards for
services rendered. In other words, they had their own foreign policies like
normal Greek states.
As usual we can only make assumptions as to what Alexanders true
intentions were. Purely military considerations were without doubt of
considerable importance. Despite his victory at Granicus, Alexander was
still in a much weaker position than the powerful Persian Empire and he
needed allies. The poleis of Asia Minor, which ten years earlier had
supplied Artaxerxes III with 6,000 hoplites for his Egypt expedition,
possessed considerable military potential. The experiences of Ephesus,
Miletus and the island states show that Macedonian or Persian garrisons,
generally composed of small Greek mercenary units, could only function
with the support of the citizens. The hostile stance of the Ephesians made
the citys mercenary garrison flee, whereas the public support for the
oligarchy at Miletus allowed it to fight the Macedonians. Moreover many
poleis in Asia Minor were surrounded by defensive walls and were
therefore mighty fortresses. Alexander did indeed have siege engines that
made it possible to capture any of these cities individually, but he lacked
the time and means to make laying siege to all of them feasible. By
winning the cities over to his side Alexander avoided the necessity of
expensive and time consuming sieges. One must also not forget the
ideological aspect. The war against Persia was started under the slogan of
liberating the Greeks of Asia Minor. Therefore at the very start of his
campaign Alexander had to convincingly liberate some of these cities to
remain credible in the Greek world. With the perspective of time we can
clearly see that this positive image was indeed the one Greeks of Asia
Minor saw in him. For centuries later Alexander was still recognised in
their collective memories as a benefactor and liberator. Some cities even
worshipped him as a god.
Alexander also gained the support of adjacent islands. Some had taken
Philips side during Parmenions offensive and even joined the League of
Corinth. However, once Memnons counteroffensive started proving to be
successful, most switched back to the Persian side. After Granicus the
situation changed yet again and the supporters of Macedonia returned to
power. The best illustration of this an inscription from Chios which
contains an edict issued by Alexander in 334 to settle affairs after yet

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another political change. In this document Alexander appears as the

hegemon of the League of Corinth. As such he orders the return to Chios
of the pro-Macedonian exiles and for their political opponents to be
brought before the Leagues court to be tried for treasonable collaboration
with the Persians. Moreover, he calls together a college of legislators to
write a democratic constitution for the polis. This may have been a
violation of the Corinth resolutions, which forbade the imposition of
constitutional changes, but it certainly suited Alexanders Asia Minor
policy of relying on democracies in Greek states. Finally Chios, along with
other island poleis, was obliged to contribute to the war effort. In its case it
provided 20 triremes, that is, as many as the mighty Athens.36
Alexander most certainly did not rest his further military plans solely
on political declarations, even if they were as far-reaching as the restoring
of liberty to the Greek cities of Ionia and Caria. Having fulfilled his
religious obligations at Ephesus, he set off with the rest of his army to
Miletus. It was to this city that some of those defeated at Granicus had fled,
including for a time Memnon, before he moved on to Halicarnassus.
Hegesistratus, the commander of the Greek mercenary garrison serving the
Persians at Miletus, sent letters to Alexander expressing his willingness to
capitulate. No doubt he was under the impression of Macedonian
successes in other parts of western Asia Minor. Yet in the meantime the
Persian side had started preparing its revenge for these early defeats. The
Great King had appointed the tried, tested and trusted Greek military
leader Memnon commander-in-chief of his land army and navy in that part
of Asia Minor. Now a huge Persian armada comprising 400 ships provided
by Phoenician, Cypriot and Greek cities still under Persian rule sailed
towards Miletus. Expecting this relief to arrive in time, Hegesistratus
changed his mind and decided to defend the city after all. However, a
much smaller fleet of 160 ships commanded by Alexanders admiral
Nicanor managed to precede the Persian fleet by three days. Despite its
numerical inferiority, this fleet was able to take up an advantageous
position in the Miletus roadstead by the island of Lade, which could now
be defended by a formidable crew of Thracians and 4,000 other
mercenaries. When the Persian fleet eventually arrived it was forced to
moor near the Mycale peninsula, some 15 km from Miletus. All it could
now do was to try and entice the enemy into battle out in the open sea.
According to Arrians here somewhat implausible account, the usually
cautious Parmenion was also supposed to advise Alexander to do so, but
Alexander sensibly rejected this idea on account of the quantitative and
36

Syll.3 283. Heisserer 1980, pp. 79-95.

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qualitative superiority of the enemys fleet, being as it was manned by

more experienced crews. Alexander forbade his men to respond to the
Persian fleets daily provocations. Instead he had his troops guard the
mouth of the river Maeander, from where the Persian sailors had been
taking drinking water. Henceforth the Persians had to sail to their base at
Samos for their daily supplies of food and water, which further hindered
their freedom to manoeuvre around Miletus.37
Miletus was situated on the tip of a peninsula, 2 km long and 1 km
wide, jutting out northwards into the sea. The city, even if smaller than in
Hellenistic and Roman times, was surrounded by strong walls. Outside
there was a weakly fortified settlement (so-called external town) situated
most probably on Kalabak-Tepe hill, where the centre of old Miletus had
been in Archaic times. It was taken over by Alexanders troops without
resistance. For two days the Macedonians tried, unsuccessfully, to breach
the main citys walls and finally Alexander ordered siege engines to be
brought up. This development, together with the effective see blockade,
changed the mood within the city. Now Glaucippus, the leader or one of
the leaders of the local oligarchy speaking on behalf of the citizens and the
Greek mercenaries, put forward an offer to Alexander: the city would
remain neutral and the port would be open to both sides of the conflict.
Alexander responded by instructing Glaucippus to tell the Milesians to
prepare for battle because the city was to be stormed at sunrise. The siege
engines destroyed a large section of the wall and Macedonian soldiers
entered the city. The defenders, deprived of the support of their fleet,
which was forced to look on helplessly, now only thought of saving their
own lives. On account of the Macedonian fleet being in the port, the 300
Greek mercenaries were unable to get to the Persian ships, so instead they
waded over most probably to what was one of two islets c. 250 m to the
north east of the Miletus peninsula. After what had happened to their
comrades at Granicus, they were ready to fight to the end; meanwhile the
Macedonians had already lowered the ladders from their ships and were
poised to attack. This time, however, Alexander was merciful to the brave
Greek soldiers and spared them their lives on condition that they served
him. The inhabitants of Miletus were also more fortunate than those of
most cities that were taken by force at the time when the victors law
meant a right to plunder and the selling of captives as slaves. But this
wars official mission was Panhellenic revenge for Persian crimes against
the Greeks and in this context no other city, except for perhaps Athens,
was more ideologically symbolic than Miletus. This city had led the Ionian
37

Arr., An., 1.18-19 (principal source); Diod., 17.22.1. Lane Fox 1973, pp. 131133.

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revolt of 499 and six years later it was captured by the Persians, destroyed
and its people deported to Asia. A repetition of the Theban solution here
could have led the Greek public to draw on very obvious parallels with the
actions of the maligned Xerxes. Alexander therefore had no option but to
forgive Miletus for taking the wrong side in the war. A visible sign of the
grace of the new ruler was his acceptance of the title, though not the
responsibilities, of Stephanephoros, the eponymous official in Miletus,
who gave the name to a year.38
Despite the important role it had played in the siege, Alexander
decided to disband his fleet after the capture of Miletus. This surprising
and controversial decision Alexander justified by the fact that his ships
would be unable to compete out at sea with the much stronger Persians
and that he could defeat the enemy fleet by capturing the seaports of Asia
Minor with his land forces. This was a risky assumption as it is difficult to
imagine how Alexanders army could have held all the important centres
along the coastline. Indeed, a year later Alexander saw it fit to start
rebuilding his fleet. Nevertheless, capturing the seaports could
significantly hinder the Persian fleet as ancient ships needed to moor next
to the land at night for the oarsmen to rest and were unable to carry large
supplies of food and water. Therefore their effective fighting range did not
exceed 30 nautical miles from their bases. However, the real reason for
disbanding the fleet was no doubt the lack of financial resources, a
problem which is indeed mentioned in the sources. Even the relatively
small number of 160 ships with approximately 32,000 sailors and oarsmen
would have probably cost Alexander 160 talents at month, for it was the
royal treasury that had to cover these costs rather than the cities that
actually provided the ships. Up to that point ancient authors do not record
any really significant amounts of captured booty. It has been estimated that
the keeping of the army and fleet cost Alexander 450 talents a month,
which greatly exceeded the funds he had at his disposal. That is most
probably why Alexander decided to take only enough ships to transport his
men and equipment, whereas the Athenian contingent no doubt served
primarily as guarantee of Athens loyalty.39

38

Arr., An., 1.19; Diod., 17.22; Plu., Alex., 17.2; Milet i.3.122.ii.81. Bosworth
1980, p. 141, Bosworth 1988, p. 250; Romane 1994; Graeve 2000.
39
Arr., An., 1.20.1; Diod., 17.22.5. Lane Fox 1973, pp. 134, 143; Bosworth 1980,
pp. 141-143; Bosworth 1988, p. 47; Badian 1985, p. 428; Romane 1994, p. 69;
Briant 1996, p. 845; Ashley 1998, pp. 91-92; Le Rider 2003, pp. 103-108, 115-117.

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3. From Halicarnassus to Cilicia:

the campaign in Asia Minor
The capture of Miletus did not end Persian resistance on the south-western
coast of Asia Minor. The most important Persian fortress in the region was
Halicarnassus, which Alexander could not leave to the rear of his army for
fear of it becoming the base for a counteroffensive in Ionia. Here Memnon
managed to raise a large army of mercenaries, no doubt partly composed
of garrison detachments that had escaped from other cities in Ionia and
Aeolis. Additional help could also be provided by the crews of Persian
ships. Control of the seaport also meant that the fortress had a constant
supply of provisions. Memnons tactic was in all likelihood to try and
wear out Alexanders army in a hard, protracted siege so that later, with
Halicarnassus still in Persian hands, the Asia Minor counteroffensive
could be launched. Although the city had existed since the start of the 9th
century, the Halicarnassus the Macedonians saw in 334 was really the
creation of Maussolus, who in 370 moved his capital there from Mylasa.
Maussolus greatly increased the citys size by populating it with the
inhabitants of neighbouring towns that had been incorporated into
Halicarnassus through synoikism. One of the reasons why Maussolus
transferred his capital to Halicarnassus was the desire to have greater
control over the Greek seacoast and island states, something which the
inland Mylasa could not provide. The citys most important feature was its
defensibility. It overlooked the bay and Maussolus had over 5 km of
massive walls built for its protection. Citadels were built at the end of the
two peninsulas on both sides of bay: the one on Zephyros rock was also
the satraps palace, whereas the other on the Salmakis peninsula was
simply a military stronghold. There were jetties extending from both
peninsulas that further narrowed the entrance into the bay and made the
city easier to defend from the sea, though this was not that significant in
334 as the Persian fleet dominated the sea anyway. Whilst waiting for
Alexanders army to arrive, Memnon carefully strengthened weak points
in the citys fortifications. Before the fighting began he also sent his
family to Dariuss court, ostensibly on his own initiative to ensure their
safety, but more likely than not this was the Great Kings guarantee that
his Greek commander would remain loyal.40
The Macedonian army reached Halicarnassus by the end of summer or
in early autumn, having occupied on the way the coastal cities of Caria.
40
Ar., An., 1.20.2-3; Diod., 17.23.4-6; Vitr., 2.8.10-11. Bean, Cook 1955; Ruzicka
1992, pp. 34, 137-138; Debord 1999, pp. 303, 375-376, 385-386.

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We may assume that at least Iasus went over to Alexanders side of its
own accord for Gorgus, a prominent citizen of that city, remained in
Alexanders circle for years and in the Macedonian command reached the
important post of hoplophylax (warden or arms). 41 Correctly expecting
Halicarnassus to put up a stiff resistance, Alexander had his army pitch
camp 5 stades (900 m) from the citys walls. Immediately on the first day
the Macedonians attacked the fortifications, to which the defenders
responded with a sally from the Mylasa gate. Both the attacks were
unsuccessful but a certain pattern in the fighting already emerged.
Halicarnassus could not be taken without siege engines and until those
arrived, the only option was to impose a blockade. In the meantime
Alexander tried to capture Myndus situated on the eastern edge of the
Bodrum peninsula. Apparently someone had promised to secretly open the
gate, but the night-time attack failed. The collaborator had either changed
his mind or been discovered. The defenders put up a stiff resistance and
were supported by soldiers shipped over from Halicarnassus 16 km away.
It turned out that without siege engines and ladders, which the
Macedonians had also failed to take, the town could not be taken.
Alexander ordered a retreat to the camp outside Halicarnassus.42
However, even before the siege began in earnest Alexander did have a
significant political success. He was offered the support of Maussolus
sister Ada (I), who had ruled Caria in the years 344/43 341/40. Persians
only recognised as satraps the male members of the Hecatomnid dynasty.
That is why Artaxerxes III did not intervene when control of Caria was
wrested from Ada by her brother Pixodarus, the same one who in 337 had
tried to become Philip IIs ally by offering the hand of his daughter Ada (II)
to Arrhidaeus in marriage. After Pixodarus death Darius nominated Adas
(II) eventual Iranian husband Orontobates to be the next satrap.
Meanwhile Maussolus sister had to make do with just the fortress at
Alinda (later renamed Alexandria ad Latmum). With the arrival of the
Macedonian army in Caria Ada sensed the opportunity. She surrendered
Alinda to Alexander and offered to recognise him as her son. This was in
accordance with a Near Eastern tradition of extending paternal or maternal
terminology to include people beyond the biological family if it served the
legitimisation of rule over conquered territories. Adas support could
prove to be of key importance in also gaining the support of the Carian
people whilst their satrap Orontobates was at war with the Macedonians.
Alexander therefore accepted the Carian princesss kind offer. He left her
41

Ephippus, FGrH, 126 F5. Heisserer 1980, pp. 169-203; Debord 1999, pp. 146148.
42
Arr., An., 1.20.4-7.

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in control of Alinda and after the capture of Halicarnasus nominated her

satrap of Caria, though he gave actual command of the regional army to
the Macedonian Ptolemaios. This division of power formed a certain
pattern that was also visible in Alexanders later nominations. Whilst
giving military control to Macedonians, Alexander entrusted civilian
control to oriental rulers who knew local conditions, customs and the ins
and outs of the Achaemenid administration. According to an anecdote
passed on by Plutarch, Ada took up her new maternal role in all
seriousness. Every day she sent Alexander treats and offer him the services
of the very best bakers and cooks. According to this tale Alexander
naturally declined these offers, putting physical exertion always above the
delights of the table.43
Alexander continued a military technique practiced under Philip II
whereby siege engines were first dismantled, transported in component
parts usually by sea and within a relatively short space of time
reassembled just outside the besieged citys walls. The Macedonians were
fortunate in that the Persian fleet failed to capture their shipment of siege
engine parts. After Halicarnassus the same siege engines were also used at
Tyre and Gaza. They belonged to a new generation of machinery that had
been constructed with the benefit of experience gained from the great
sieges at the end of Philip IIs reign. Their chief constructor was Diades
the apprentice and from 334 successor of Philip IIs master engineer,
Polyeidus of Thessaly. 44 Among his inventions was a drill called the
trypanon, which had a roof to protect it against missiles cast down by the
defenders as it was brought up against a city wall. Wall fragments could
also be dislodged with the korax or raven. One of the most difficult and
refined of the available technical constructions was the mobile siege
tower.45
Once the machines were reassembled a series of attacks on the city
commenced. The accounts of these attacks given by Arrian and Diodorus
differ from each other substantially. As with his description of the siege of
Miletus, Arrian considerably downplays the difficulties Alexander must
have encountered and gives the impression that the siege was a short
struggle easily won by the Macedonians. We can almost be certain that
this was not the case, for why then would Alexander have spent so much
43

Arr., An., 1.23.6-8; Diod., 17.24.2-3; Plu., Alex., 22.7-8; Plu., mor., 127b, 180a,
1099c. Berve 1926, no. 674; Wilcken 1967, pp. 93-94; Bosworth 1980, pp. 152154; Bosworth 1988, pp. 229-230; Hornblower 1982, pp. 45-51; Ruzicka 1992, p.
144; Brosius 1996, pp. 21-22; Debord 1999, pp. 139-140, 160.
44
Diod., 17.24.1; Ath. Mech., 10-15.9; Vitr., 10.3-8. Marsden 1977.
45
Ath. Mech., 14.4; Vitr., 10.3.7.

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141

time camped outside Halicarnassus? Despite his oratorical style, Diodorus

account seems much more plausible as it most probably was based
directly or indirectly on an account given by one of the citys defenders,
and therefore someone not inclined to glorify Alexander. 46 The
Macedonians began by filling up the moat. Next they brought up the siege
towers and roofed battering rams. This way they managed to create an
opening in the wall through which they tried to enter the city. However,
amid the rubble the defenders, ably commanded by Memnon, were able to
repulse the attackers. In the night Memnon organised a sally beyond the
walls to set fire to the siege towers. The initially surprised Macedonian
guards did manage to put out the flames in time and there ensued a
ferocious battle beneath the walls in which Memnons soldiers were
supported by citys defenders raining down missiles on the Macedonians
from the walls. 47 Later on the siege engines toppled two of the citys
towers, but Memnon managed to get a new wall raised behind the rubble
and thus seal off the breach. Nor did he idly observe further Macedonian
attempts to breach the walls but instead raised a wooded tower on the
other side from which catapults fired missiles at the attackers. Soon
afterwards another battle began beneath the walls. The ancient authors
claim that this mle was started accidentally by two drunken
Macedonians who decided to raid the city on their own and got into a fight
with some Halicarnassian volunteers, to which gradually soldiers from
both sides joined. The scale of this incident and the sheer improbability of
it being started without the prior knowledge of commanders on either side
suggest that it may have in fact been another raid by the defenders which
was noticed by the Macedonian drunks, who then raised the alarm.
Alexanders personal intervention eventually forced the defenders to
retreat into the city. Nevertheless it was Alexander who now requested a
truce so that the bodies of fallen Macedonians could be taken away, which
in Antiquity signified the acknowledgement of a lost skirmish. Despite the
opinions of the Athenian mercenary commanders Ephialtes and
Thrasybulus, Memnon did allow the bodies of the fallen to be taken away.
Arrian, who glorifies Alexander, naturally fails to mention this episode.48
The following day the siege engines were moved up to the improvised
wall behind the breach. During a successive raid the defenders had
managed to burn down one siege tower and several siege sheds.
Nonetheless the defenders situation was worsening on account of
46

Bosworth 1980, p. 147.

Diod., 17.24.3-25.5; Arr., An., 1.20.8-10. Bosworth 1988, p. 48.
48
Diod., 17.25.5-6; Arr., An., 1.21.1-4. Lane Fox 1973, p. 138; Bosworth 1980, p.
146; Romane 1994, pp. 72-73; Ober 1996, pp. 56-61; Wheeler 2007, p. 212.
47

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persistent Macedonian attacks against ever weaker fortifications. It was for

this reason the Memnon summoned a war council to decide what to do
next. He accepted the suggestion of the Athenian Ephialtes to launch yet
another sortie but this time with a much larger number of men. Ephialtes
himself was put in charge of two thousand of the best soldiers, half of
whom were given torches. At daybreak the mercenary hoplites personally
commanded by Ephialtes formed a deep phalanx and attacked the
Macedonians while the torchbearers set fire to the machines. Once again
Alexanders swift intervention saved the engines from destruction, but in
the battle that now raged between the old and new walls Ephialtes and his
men were decidedly gaining the upper hand. With missiles raining down
on them from the walls, the Macedonians were forced to retreat. Making
use of the moment, Memnon sent another unit of men to attack. Alexander
was saved from defeat by a detachment of veterans that now entered the
fray. Once the valiant Ephialtes, who had been fighting at the very front of
the phalanx, was slain, the defenders of Halicarnassus were forced to
retreat. They suffered heavy casualties, especially when a bridge they were
fleeing across to return to the city collapsed. Arrian states that on that day
Memnon lost 1,000 men, whereas Alexander lost only 40. The latter figure
is of course unacceptable when one considers that the battle lasted hours
and the Macedonian casualties included the commander of the kings
bodyguards, the commander of the archers as well as other officers.
Though victorious on the battlefield, Alexander stopped his soldiers from
chasing the defenders into the city. Arrian explains this as a desire to give
the Halicarnassians a chance to surrender and thus spare the city. Such
reasoning is rather unconvincing in a situation where the decision whether
or not to surrender rested with Memnon, not the citys inhabitants. The
battle had shown the defenders determination to fight. For this reason and
on account of the lateness of the day Alexander most probably decided not
to risk turning a hard-fought victory into defeat in an all-out assault on the
city.49
Nevertheless the scale of inflicted losses and the serious damage to the
fortifications made putting up further resistance pointless; another
Macedonian assault could well have resulted in the citys capture and the
loss of all the armed forces gathered there. That is why that same night
Memnon and Orontobates resolved to evacuate Halicarnassus. At
approximately midnight the wooden towers on the walls, the ammunition
sheds and the houses closest to the walls were all set ablaze. Behind this
49

Diod., 17.26-27.4 (principal source); Arr., An., 1.22; Curt., 5.2.8, 8.1.36. Lane
Fox 1973, pp. 138-139; Green 1974, pp. 197-199; Bosworth 1980, pp. 147-148;
Bosworth 1988, p. 49; Ashley 1998, pp. 208-209.

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143

screen of smoke and flames Memnon evacuated weapons from the military
magazines and some of the soldiers to the island of Kos. The remaining
soldiers occupied the Salmakis fortress and the citadel on the Zephyros
rock. At dawn Alexander saw the smouldering ruins of Halicarnassus and
two strongholds still very much in enemy hands. A long and costly siege
was at most only a partial success. On the one hand, thanks to advanced
Macedonian siege techniques and the immense energy and determination
of Alexander and his soldiers the city of Halicarnassus was taken, which
no doubt gave the Macedonians some satisfaction. On the other hand, the
military situation in Asia Minor did not change significantly for in Caria
Memnon was still holding a military base, although with much reduced
harbour. Alexander decided not to try and capture the two fortresses.
Instead he ordered the city to be razed to the ground, sparing only the
Mausoleum and temples. One can assume that for a time Halicarnassus as
a city was dead, perhaps the synoikism was dissolved and the inhabitants
moved back to their original settlements. Alexander left Ptolemaios in
command of 3,200 soldiers to guard the two Persian fortresses, which
were surrounded by moats and embankments.50
The siege of Halicarnassus had dragged on until at least the middle of
autumn. The onset of winter did not mean a break in the hostilities, but
Alexander did expect the intensity of the fighting to lessen for a while. For
this reason he sent back to Macedonia under the command of his
bodyguard, Ptolemaios the son of Seleucus those soldiers who had
recently married, so that they could spend the winter with their wives.
Arrian claims that this act, more than any other, won the Macedonian
troops over to Alexander. The campaign must have cost many more lives
than the ancient authors record for the officers sent back to the homeland
together with the newly-weds were ordered to raise as many infantry and
cavalry reserves as possible. One of the officers, Cleander, was dispatched
to Peloponnesus to levy mercenaries at Cape Tainaron, the main recruiting
centre in Greece.51
The rest of the army was divided in two. Parmenion together with the
baggage train, one ile of hetairoi, the Thessalian cavalry and Corinthian
League detachments headed for Sardis. His next objective was Phrygia.
This regions satrap, Atizyes, had fought at Granicus but managed to
escape and now took refuge in his satrapy. Phrygia had undergone
intensive Iranian colonisation and therefore Macedonian occupation of this

50

Diod., 17.27.5-6; Arr., An., 1.23. Bosworth 1988, p. 49; Ruzicka 1992, pp. 145146; Ashley 1998, p. 209; Heckel 2006, p. 235, s.v. Ptolemy [5].
51
Arr., An., 1.24.1-2; Curt., 3.1.1. Heckel 1992, p. 286.

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territory would deprive the Persians of a major recruiting ground. 52

Alexander and the bulk of the army now moved east to Lycia and
Pamphylia. This campaign no doubt lasted until the start of 333 and its
objective, according to Arrian, was to occupy the coastline. Obviously this
could not have meant the occupying of the entire myriad of natural
harbours in this province, but only the cities that had furnished ships to
Memnon and that could provide him with a base. The late season in the
year paradoxically worked to the advantage of the Macedonians for,
although it somewhat hindered troop movement, it more importantly
deprived enemy seaports of the protection that would otherwise have been
provided by the powerful Persian fleet. The construction of ancient ships
was too weak to withstand the waves of a rough sea, therefore military
vessels suspended all operations from November to March. Thus in the
winter Memnons predominance at sea had very little significance.
According to Arrian thirty cities surrendered to Alexander without a
struggle; the author actually mentions Hyparna, Telmessus, Pinara,
Xanthus, Phaselis and Patara with its important harbour. But our sources
do not tell us the exact route taken by the Macedonian army. Bearing in
mind Alexanders war objectives and the winter conditions, which would
have made crossing the mountains between Lycia and Pisidia very difficult
if not impossible, it is most likely that the Macedonians chose the seacoast
route. Though it only became apparent a year later, one of the
consequences of the Lycian campaign was the acquisition of the Lycian
fleet.53
It is likely that Alexander stayed at Phaselis until the end of the
334/333 winter. It was reportedly there that he received news of the real or
only supposed treason of the last son of Aeropus of Lyncestis, Alexander,
an experienced officer and commander of the Thessalian cavalry, which
was the second most important cavalry formation after the hetairoi.
Parmenion captured a Persian called Sisines, whom as a trusted envoy,
Darius III had ostensibly sent to the satrap Atizyes. Sisines, however,
revealed that the real objective of his mission was to reply to secret
correspondence that had been sent by Alexander of Lyncestis via the
Macedonian fugitive Amyntas. Sisines was supposed to tell Alexander that
Darius pledged to give the traitor 1,000 talents of gold in return for the
assassination of his namesake, the Macedonian king. After discussing the
matter with his friends, the king instructed Parmenion to have Alexander
of Lyncestis arrested and imprisoned. The arrestee was eventually
executed without trial shortly after the end of the Philotas affair.
52
53

Arr., An., 1.24.3. Bosworth 1980, pp. 155-156; Debord 1999, p. 449.
Arr., An., 1.24.3-6, 2.20.2. Keen 1996; Debord 1999, pp. 449-450.

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145

Command of the Thessalian cavalry, which remained part of Parmenions

army, was most probably taken over by Philip, the son of Menelaus, who
had up until then commanded the allied Peloponnesian cavalry. This
version of how the treason was discovered is given by Arrian, whose
source was Ptolemy, and it is indirectly confirmed by Justin. Diodorus,
however, gives a different version in which the arrest occurred many
months later, shortly after the Battle of Issus, and Alexander received
news of the planned assassination in a letter from Olympias. Arrians
version is also unconvincing because it includes a lengthy episode in
which the Macedonian king discovers the evil intentions of Alexander of
Lyncestis through mysterious omens. This seems to suggest that Arrian
himself had doubts about Sisiness alleged mission and therefore tries to
further justify the arrest with signs from the heavens. Whatever the truth, it
is at this time that the sources fall silent about Alexander of Lyncestis.
Moreover, even if he was only arrested after the letter from Olympias,
there is no reason to doubt that Parmenion had actually sent Sisines with
his story to Alexander. One way or another, Alexander, the son of Aeropus,
was certainly out of favour with the king by 333.54
Alexanders next step in his campaign in the coastal provinces of Asia
Minor was the occupation of Pamphylia. The first objective in this
province was the city of Perge. Some of the army with supply wagons
travelled along a road specially built by Thracian soldiers over Mount
Climax, while Alexander and rest of the army took the road along the
coast of the Gulf of Antalya. When the winds blew from the south, parts of
this road would be flooded by the sea. However, when Alexanders army
reached these sections the winds changed direction and blew from the
north, thus allowing the army to pass. This of course was interpreted by
Alexander and his soldiers as a sign that the gods were favourable to
them.55 In Pamphylia Alexander took Perge and next headed for Side. On
the way he received envoys from Aspendus with whom he made an
agreement that in return for a lump sum payment of 50 talents and a herd
of horses specially bred for the Great King he would not station soldiers in
their city. After capturing Side and installing a local garrison, Alexander
learned that Aspendus was not intending to keep its part of the deal. At
stake were not only prestige and the money from the tribute but also the
strategic significance of Aspendus, which lay at the estuary of the river
54

Arr., An., 1.25.3-9; Just., 11.7.1; Diod., 17.32.1, 17.80.2; Curt., 7.1.5-9. Lane
Fox 1973, pp. 143-148 (questions Arrian); Bosworth 1988, pp. 50-51; Heckel 1992,
pp. 357-359; Hammond 1996, pp. 88-89.
55
Callisth., FGrH, 124 F31; Arr., An., 1.26.1-2; Plu., Alex., 17.6-9 (quoting
Menander, fr. 751); J., AJ, 2.16.5; App., BC, 2.149; Ps.-Callisth., 1.28.

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Eurymedon. For these reasons Alexander immediately led his army to that
city. At the mere sight of the Macedonians the Aspendians again changed
their mind. This time the terms and conditions of capitulation were much
harsher: the previously agreed war contribution was doubled; now there
was also an obligation to pay tributes; the city was put under the control of
the local satrap and now it was also obliged to submit hostages. Being
situated in Pamphylia, Aspendus was clearly not included in the declared
restoration of freedom that applied to the cities of Ionia, Aeolis and Caria,
and as a polis that had broken a treaty it could not expect much mercy
from its conqueror.56 It was most probably then that Alexander nominated
Nearchus, a trusted companion since his early youth, satrap of Lycia.57
From Aspendus the Macedonian army returned to Perge and thence it
headed for Phrygia. The first and perhaps greatest obstacle was the city of
Termessus (today Glk). Situated some 40 km to the north-west of Perge
in Pisidia, Termessus guarded a pass into the Maeander valley. On account
of the inaccessible Pisidian Mountains surrounding it, the city had not
been subjugated to the rule of Persian satraps and now its inhabitants also
had no intention of allowing the Macedonians to pass through their land.
The terrain was shaped in such a way that there was only one road leading
through a narrow valley between two mountains at an altitude of 1,000 m.
This road the Termessians easily blocked, but deceived by the sight of the
Macedonians appearing to be calmly bivouacking, they returned to their
city leaving behind only some guards to keep watch. Alexander then
launched a surprise attack with Macedonian archers, light infantry and
some specially selected hoplites. Next he led his army through this
dangerous zone. Despite Strabos claim, the Macedonians did not take the
city of Termessus for they lacked the necessary siege equipment. 58
However, the fight with the Termessians inclined the inhabitants of
another Pisidian city called Selge, who were bitter enemies of their
neighbours the Termessians, to offer an alliance with the Macedonian king.
Alexander willingly accepted their offer and next marched his army for
Sagalassus, which was situated 80 km to the north and belonged to a chain
of fortresses stretching all the way to Celaenae. Thanks to the farming of
fertile valleys this was a large and prosperous city. Its Pisidian inhabitants
had the reputation of being good soldiers and their defensive position was
all the more difficult to capture on account of it being located on a 20056
Arr., An.,1.25.5-27.4; It. Alex., 26. Debord 1999, p. 451-452; Nawotka 2003a, p.
30.
57
Arr., An., 3.6.6. Bosworth 1980, p. 284; Heckel 1992, p. 228.
58
Arr., An., 1.27.5-8; Str., 14.3.9. Magie 1950, pp. 263-264; Bosworth 1980, pp.
169-170.

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147

300 m ridge. Moreover, they were now supported by a detachment of their

kinfolk, the Termessians, who had already once been defeated by
Alexander. At the start of the battle of Sagalassus, the Pisidians initially
had the upper hand. They successfully repulsed an attack by the
Macedonian archers and even killed their commander, Cleander. However,
they were unable to withstand an attack by the Agrians and a much better
armoured phalanx. Approximately 500 Pisidian soldiers were killed and
the rest fled from the battlefield. The escape of those lightly armoured
barbarians was made easier because, though better in battle, Macedonian
armour was heavier and this made it harder for the soldiers wearing it to
keep up. Moreover, the mountainous terrain precluded the use of cavalry.
However, the Macedonians were able to capture the city and the
occupation of the rest of Pisidia posed not further major problems.59
Alexanders army next set its course for Phrygia to meet up with
Parmenions corps. Their route cut across the Anatolian Plateau from
Sagalassus via what is today the city of Isparta, thence west to the northeastern shore of the salt lake Ascania (Burdur Gl) and next north to
reach Celaenae, some 30 km to the north west of the said lake, on the fifth
day. Being the residence of the satrap of Phrygia, the city had a garrison
comprising 100 Greek mercenaries and 1,000 Carian soldiers, whose
armour and training were traditionally considered equal to those of the
Greek hoplites. These soldiers abandoned the city and instead decided to
defend just the acropolis. Arrian grossly exaggerates in calling it
impenetrable for it was connected to the ridge of a neighbouring mountain
to the southeast. Alexander occupied the city and began beleaguering the
acropolis. However, the good fortifications and without doubt the
defenders fighting skills made the siege a prolonged affair. The defenders
offered to capitulate if a relief force did not arrive within 60 days. And that
is what eventually happened. Alexander left a garrison of 1,500 soldiers at
Celaenae. As satrap of Phrygia he appointed Antigonus Monophthalmus
(the One-Eyed), who had so far commanded the allied Greek infantry.
Antigonus who in 333 was around 49 and therefore much older than
Alexander became a leading figure in the Diadochi period after the
kings death. His nomination as satrap was the first really important
appointment in his career and it was only now that he was able to show his
considerable leadership and administrative skills as well as charisma
which would later distinguish him from all the other Diadochi. His satrapy
was of key strategic importance in Asia Minor as it encompassed the
junction of major routes including the Royal Road, which any army
59

Arr., An., 1.28; Plu., Alex., 18.1; It. Alex., 26. Magie 1950, p. 1139; Bosworth
1980, pp. 159-172; Debord 1999, p. 454.

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wishing to control this part of the continent had to use. One has to
remember that so far only a small part of Asia Minor the Aegean coast
and a few inland regions in the west of this vast peninsula was in
Macedonian hands. The Persian generals were now raising an army in the
north of Asia Minor. Bearing indirect testimony as to their preparations for
a counteroffensive was the large-scale production of coins at the mint in
Sinope; this money was needed to pay the soldiers. Thanks to these coins
we know the names of the chief Persian commanders: Mithropastes,
Hydarnes and the satrap of Caria Orontobates. No doubt on the Great
Kings instructions, these generals were preparing to cut Alexanders line
of communication with the Asia Minor coast and thus themselves gain
access to the Persian fleet. Before he left Celaenae or according to
Arrian later in Gordium, Alexander received envoys from Athens who
requested him to release their fellow citizens who had been captured at
Granicus. These prisoners were, however, much too valuable as hostages
ensuring Athenss continued loyalty at what was still a very uncertain time.
Therefore Alexander promised the envoys that he would release the
captives but only once the war was ended.60
From Celaenae Alexanders army marched across Phrygia to Gordium,
where it was supposed to meet up with Parmenions corps. The 290-km
journey must have taken the soldiers about a month, though they were
marching on the well built Royal Road. Taking into account the several
month long campaigns in Lycia, Pamphylia and Pisidia as well as the trek
across Phrygia, one can assume that Alexander reached Gordium no
earlier than in May 333. The fact that the sources record no incidents
during the march across Phrygia suggests that the area had already been
pacified by Parmenion. Alexanders complicated itinerary so far as well as
the actions undertaken on his instructions by his commanders suggest that
occupying the entire coastline to deprive the Persian fleet of a base was
not the Macedonian kings only objective. The aim of this campaign seems
also to have been the conquest of the whole of southern and central
Anatolia, which, despite their defeat at Granicus, was still in Persian
hands.61
Gordium, situated on the river Sangarius, on the border between both
Phrygias (Great Phrygia and Hellespontine Phrygia) and onetime capital of
60

Curt., 3.1.1-10 (principal source); Arr., An., 1.29.1-3, 5-6. Magie 1950, p. 983;
Bosworth 1980, pp. 172-174; Atkinson 1980, pp. 80-84; Seibert 1985, pp. 54-56;
Briant 1996, p. 851. The career of Antigonus Monophthalmus: Briant 1973;
Billows 1990; Heckel 1992, pp. 50-56.
61
Arr., An., 1.29.3; Diod., 17.27.6; Curt., 3.1.11. Bosworth 1980, p. 174; Seibert
1985, p. 56; Debord 1999, p. 455.

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149

the Phrygian state, was long past its former glory. First destroyed by the
Cimmerians at the start of the 7th century and then again by Cyrus the
Great in 547/546, it was now rebuilt but its previous political importance
was gone. In Persian times it was not the residence of satraps but of lower
ranking officials. The city itself was quite large, archaeologists have
established that it covered an area of 100 hectares, but now it was chiefly a
centre for local crafts and trade. The district that at the time of the
Phrygian state had been inhabited by powerful political elites, in
Alexanders day was the site of workshops.62 The most important edifice
in the Gordium acropolis was the temple of the Phrygian deity called
Basileus (King). The Greeks and Macedonians associated him with Zeus,
therefore the father of Heracles, the mythical ancestor of the Argeads. It
was there, or according to certain authors in a palace in that acropolis, that
Gordiass legendary cart was kept. Gordias was the father of Midas, the
founder of the Phrygian dynasty. According to legend, Gordias was a
simple peasant who once whilst ploughing received a sign from Zeus in
the form of an eagle landing on the yoke of his oxen. The famous cart was
fastened to the yoke by an intricate knot (or knots) of cornel bark with the
ends of the fastening hidden. Legend also had it that whoever managed to
untie this knot would become ruler of Asia. Towards the end of his stay in
Gordium Alexander went to the acropolis to examine the famous cart.
Though according to popular 4th-century legends the Phrygians original
homeland was Macedonia, one need not suppose that this was why
Alexander decided to go there. He could have simply wanted to see the
cart out of curiosity, according to Arrian, driven by an insurmountable
urge (pothos). Assuming that the Gordian knot legend originated from the
time of the Phrygian monarchy, i.e. at the start of the first millennium, the
word Asia would have had its original Hittite meaning, referring to the
north-western part of Asia Minor, in other words, more or less the area
covered by the Phrygian monarchy. With time the meaning of the word
was extended to encompass the entire continent, and in the political sense
the Achaemenid Empire (see Chapter V.3). Bearing in mind his intention,
officially declared at the Hellespont, to conquer the Persian Empire and
the fact that he always attached great importance to symbols and
prophesies, Alexander could not but rise to the challenge, especially when
he was accompanied by a crowd of Macedonians and local inhabitants.
With the ends concealed, the knot was impossible to untie, so Alexander
was forced to resort to an unconventional solution. The sources provide us
with two versions as to what happened next. A version originating from
62
Arr., An., 1.29.5; Just., 11.7.3. Bosworth 1980, p. 175; Mellink 1988, pp. 228231; Voigt, Young 1999, pp. 191-241.

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Aristobulus states that Alexander removed a pin that was slotted through
the carts shaft and this way also separated the yoke from the shaft. The
other version, belonging to the Vulgate and therefore originating from
Cleitarchus, states that Alexander cut the knot with his sword completely
(Arrian, Curtius) or partially (Plutarch, Justin); in the Plutarch and Justins
version Alexander merely wished to find the ends of the binding bark
which enabled him to next untie the knot. Arrian himself was unable to
decide which version of separating the yoke from the cart was more
plausible, therefore today scholars can only conclude that the version
where Alexander cut the knot with his sword, being so much more vivid
and characteristic of the young kings impetuous nature, was generally
preferred by the ancient authors. Whichever version was true, Alexander
and his companions returned from that site convinced that a prophecy had
been fulfilled, as was confirmed that very night by Zeus with thunder and
lightning. The following day a grateful Alexander offered sacrifices to the
gods.63
It was at Gordium that, after a long trek across Asia Minor, the newlymarried men returned from their winter stay in Macedonia. Accompanying
them were new reserves: 3,000 infantry and 300 cavalry from Macedonia
and as well as 200 horsemen from Thessaly and 150 from Elis. This was
the first of three batches of reinforcements from Macedonia and Greece
that Alexander would receive in 333. The constant need for new troops
resulted not only because of larger numbers of soldiers left on garrison
duty in newly and not necessarily completely conquered territories but also
because of losses incurred as a result of the war. Apart from those killed in
the actual fighting, which the sources inform us about, there must have
also been losses which the sources ignore, for instance, as a result of
wounds after which soldiers were incapacitated and perhaps eventually
died. Moreover, it should be noted that if in European campaigns in early
modern times twice as many soldiers died from diseases than were killed
in battles, then proportion must have been at least similar in Alexanders
day. This problem would have been compounded in the Macedonian army
by the state of ancient medicine, which may have been adequate for
treating wounds but virtually helpless against diseases. Finally, the

63

Arr., An., 2.3; Curt., 3.1.14-16; Plu., Alex., 18.2-4; Just., 11.7; Marsyas, FGrH,
135/6 F4. Tarn 1948, ii, pp. 262-265; Bosworth 1980, pp. 194-188; Hamilton 1999,
pp. 46-47; Zahrnt 2001; Squilace 2005, pp. 211-213. Alexanders visit and the
legend of origins of the Phrygians: Fredricksmeyer 1961. Pothos as curiosity:
OBrien 1992, p. 50. Asia in this context: Schachermeyr 1973, p. 192; Atkinson
1980, p. 87; Oost 1981, pp. 265-266; Nawotka 2004.

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necessity to recruit more soldiers in 333 was also of course associated with
the impending confrontation with the great army of Darius III.64
The Persian counteroffensive of 333 began with the arrival of spring.
Darius III now appointed Memnon the commander-in-chief of the entire
war and further strengthened his position with additional funds for him to
be able to maintain the great fleet and mercenary army. Memnon almost
certainly realised the futility of trying to confront the superior Macedonian
army in a pitched battle and that is why he reverted to his original plan
once proclaimed in Zeleia to the satraps of Asia Minor and consisting of
shifting the war to Greece. The first step to this end would be an
occupation of the Aegean archipelago, which would provide Memnon with
a base for operations in Greece. This would also make it possible to next
occupy the Hellespont and thus effectively cut Alexander off from
Macedonia. War in Greece and a serious threat to Macedonian security
would force Alexander to return to Europe. A similar manoeuvre had been
successfully conducted by Persia 60 years earlier, when they skilfully
applied diversionary tactics in Greece to effectively stop the Spartan King
Agesilaus military operations in Asia Minor. From his base on the Island
of Kos Memnon set sail with 300 ships north towards the largest island
poleis. At least some of these were ruled by oligarchies that towards the
end of Philip IIs reign had switched to his side and joined the League of
Corinth. Now in face of Memnons formidable fleet they quickly changed
sides again. Chios switched allegiance without a struggle. Four of the five
states on Lesbos surrendered instantly: Antissa, Methymna, Pyrrha and
Eresus. In the largest state Mytilene, however, the garrison of mercenaries
that had been sent there by Alexander and the citizens decided to resist.
Memnon therefore cut the city off from the other states by constructing a
double stockade stretching to the sea on either side and also blocked the
seaport with his ships, thus depriving the defenders of any hope of
receiving help. He then managed the lure the much weaker Mytilenean
fleet into a sea battle which his navy easily won. Memnon also had time to
concentrate on things other than the siege of Mytilene. The Greek states of
the Cyclades came over to his side, others he was able to win over with
bribes. The pro-Macedonian camp was now beset by terrifying rumours of
an imminent invasion of Euboea.65

64
Arr., An., 1.29.4. Bosworth 1980, pp. 174-175; Ruffin 1992; Salazar 2000, pp.
68-72.
65
Arr., An., 2.1.1-2; Diod., 17.18.2, 17.29; Fron., Str., 2.5.46. Burn 1952, pp. 8283; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 152-153; Hamilton 1974, p. 63; Hammond 1996, pp. 89-90;
Debord 1999, pp. 457-459.

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News of Memnons successes demonstrated all too vividly just how

dangerous Alexanders decision to disband his fleet in the autumn of 334
really was. He could now only passively look on as events in the Aegean
unfolded. His attempt to defeat the Persian fleet by depriving it of ports in
Asia Minor had so far failed. It is possible that Alexander extended his
stay at Gordium for more than initially intended because of what was
happening in the Aegean and uncertainty as to whether or not he would
have to return to Macedonia.66 It was then that his strategy changed; allied
states were instructed to start rebuilding ships, which were next to join up
at the Hellespont with the remnants of the squadron Alexander had kept
after his capture of Miletus. Hegelochus was appointed commander of the
Hellespontine region and Alexanders trusted officer, Amphoterus the
younger brother of Craterus, was appointed his subordinate commander of
the fleet. They were entrusted with what was at that stage the quite
impossible mission of liberating Lesbos, Chios and Kos. For this purpose
they were given 500 talents. Another 600 talents was sent to Antipater,
thanks to which a second Macedonian squadron of ships was assembled
for the defence of Greece. The ships were sent from Euboea and the
Peloponnesus and the fleet was commanded by Proteas.67
We will of course never know whether or not the much delayed steps
to build a Macedonian naval force would have been able to stop the
Persian counteroffensive, had Memnon lived longer. As it happened,
during the siege of Mytilene Memnon fell ill and died. If there was a
turning point in this phase of the conflict between Alexander and Darius, it
would be the death of Memnon, a man trusted by the Great King and
endowed with a strategic perception and tactical skills that no
contemporary could match, apart from Alexander. On his deathbed,
Memnon appointed as acting commander, until a further decision was
made by the Great King, his brother-in-law Pharnabazus. The new
commander was assisted by another Persian aristocrat Autophradates.
Initially nothing changed in the way the Persian forces prosecuted the war;
under the new command the Persians vigorously attacked Mytilene. Soon
the inhabitants decided to capitulate, but they secured for the mercenary
garrison the right to freely leave the city. Pharnabazus terms for
capitulation were as follows: an annulment of the citys alliance with
Alexander; the return of exiles, who were to receive back half of their
previously owned property; the acceptance of Persian suzerainty and,
under the pretext of saving the vanquished citizens face, a restoration of
66

Murison 1972, pp. 404-405.

Arr., An., 2.2.3-4; Curt., 3.1.19-20. Atkinson 1980, pp. 92-95; Heckel 1992, pp.
6-12.
67

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153

the provisions of the Kings Peace of 387/386 even though they had never
really applied to Lesbos. One of the former exiles was appointed tyrant of
Mytilene and a Persian garrison was now installed in the city, which was
commanded by Lycomedes of Rhodes and no doubt comprised Greek
mercenaries. Pharnabazus also ordered the defeated city to pay a
contribution, which was the first sign that in the Aegean the Persians were
beginning to have financial problems. Their monthly expenditure
exceeded 300 talents and now there were no more tributes coming in from
Asia Minor.68
After the settling of these affairs at Mytilene the Persian commanders
split up: Autophradates continued the conquest of other Greek islands,
while Pharnabazus sailed with the mercenary army to Lycia. This could
have led to the opening of a new and important front in Asia Minor for the
army of the Persian satrap Orontobates was still stationed in neighbouring
Caria. However, before this could happen, command of Pharnabazus
mercenaries was taken over by Memnons nephew Thymondas, sent by
Darius III to bring these troops over to the royal army. As a consolation,
Pharnabazus was officially appointed to the post previously held by
Memnon. So Pharnabazus now rejoined Autophradates and, commanding
100 ships, together they sailed for the island of Tenedos (today Bozca
Ada). The island capitulated on similar terms to those that had been
imposed on Mytilene. Hegelochus, the Macedonian commander of the
Hellespontine region, still did not have enough ships to be able to help
allies. This success was important insofar as it gave the Persian fleet a base
just off the coast of the Troad from which access to the Hellespont could
be easily controlled. And in those times it was via the Hellespont that all
the most important trade routes ran, for instance, the transport of Black
Sea grain to Athens. Meanwhile the ships of Autophradates, operating
from the island of Samothrace, posed a serious threat to Macedonia. Coins
provide evidence that Autophradates army actually landed in the Troad. It
was in the late summer or early autumn of 333 that they also landed in
Ionia and fought a victorious battle against detachments from Ephesus.
However, the Persians failed to capture this great city. A smaller Persian
squadron of ten Phoenician ships under the command of Datames sailed in
the opposite direction towards the Cyclades and lowered anchors by the
shore of the island of Siphnos. On receiving news of this the Macedonian
Proteas sailed with 15 ships from Chalcis in Euboea and attacked the
68

Arr., An., 2.1.3-5; Diod., 17.29.2-4, 17.31.3-4; Plu., Alex., 18.5; Curt., 3.2.21.
Wilcken 1967, pp. 96-97; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 153-154; Bosworth 1980, pp. 112113, 181; Briant 1996, pp. 851-852.

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enemy, capturing eight ships. This is the only recorded Macedonian

victory at this stage of the sea war.69
Despite this setback, Pharnabazus with his fleet of 100 ships retook the
island of Siphnos, having previously also captured Andros. Although
Curtius Rufus states that these events happened after the Battle of Issus,
the general chronology seems to indicate a lower chronology. The Battle
of Issus took place in late autumn, when the sailing season was already
finished, and therefore it is highly unlikely that major sea operations
happened soon afterwards. In the spring of 332, on the other hand, the
Persian fleet was already seriously depleted. It is therefore most likely
Pharnabazus actions in the Cyclades occurred in the early autumn of 333.
The weak island poleis had no option but to surrender to Pharnabazus, but
that there was anti-Persian feeling among the inhabitants is indicated by
the sources mentioning the installation of garrisons. Such garrisons were
not needed against the Macedonian fleet, which was too weak to make
longer excursions beyond its base. The islanders were also forced to remit
tributes, but this was not enough to pay for the fleet as big as this Memnon
had in 334. The sources record ever smaller numbers of Persian ships
engaged in successive sea operations: in the spring of 334 there were 400
at Miletus, the following spring Memnon had 300 at his disposal, whereas
in the autumn of that same year Pharnabazus had 100 in the Cyclades. The
other Persian fleet, commanded by Autophradates and operating near the
Hellespont, was so weak that a Greek fleet on the Macedonian side was
able to defeat it. Athens alone supplied the Macedonian fleet with 100
triremes, thus Persian supremacy at sea was steadily being whittled
away.70
A widely held opinion that Miletus was recaptured by the Persians is
most probably wrong as the only evidence for it is an amended passage in
Curtius Rufus. As the dominant sea power on this stretch of the Asia
Minor coast, the Persians under Pharnabazus command were able to exact
payments from Miletus and, no doubt, from other seaport towns that relied
on sea trade as an important part of their economy, but nothing more. The
financial problems at Miletus that resulted from these forced payments are
evident in the fact in 332/331 the expensive office of the eponymous
Stephanephoros was given to the god Apollo. Whenever a deity was
appointed to this office, the temple treasury covered the costs, but this only
69
Arr., An., 2.2; Curt., 3.3.1; Polyaen., 7.27.2; Plu., mor., 339f. Atkinson 1980,
pp.114-117; Bosworth 1980, pp. 183-184; Bosworth 1988, p. 53; Seibert 1985, pp.
59-60; Debord 1999, p. 460.
70
Curt., 4.1.36-37; [D.], 17.20. Atkinson 1980, pp. 288-290; Seibert 1985, p. 60;
Bosworth 1988, p. 53; Debord 1999, p. 461.

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155

happened when the economic situation was so bad that no mortal was able
to bear the financial burden of holding the states most prestigious office.71
Memnons death dashed Darius IIIs hopes of stopping Alexanders
invasion by the traditional means of attacking the enemy from behind, i.e.
by employing diversionary tactics in Greece. Diodorus and, in a
rhetorically modified version, also Curtius Rufus relate a conference
between the Great King and a circle of notables concerning future plans
for the war held at Babylon, which was the nearest Persian capital to the
actual fighting. Most of the Persian advisors were in favour of the king
personally leading the army, which in Persian history was something that
happened very rarely, in exceptional cases. The Athenian Charidemus,
who had fled from Alexander to the Persian court, was of a different
opinion and suggested that Darius III should keep far away from the
fighting while an army of hundred thousand troops, a third of which Greek
mercenaries, would march to confront Alexander. The Athenian himself
could command such an army. Darius was initially inclined in favour of
this more sober suggestion. However, the Persian notables did not like this
idea at all. Genuinely or just in the fervour of debate, they even accused
the Athenian of intending to treacherously hand over the Achaemenid
Empire to the Macedonian king. Charidemus had not had time to learn
Persian customs and assuming this to be a political debate like the ones he
knew from democratic Greece responded in a shockingly free manner: he
questioned the Persians courage. Unfortunately this insulted the Great
King, who by touching the Athenians belt sentenced him to death. The
sentence was immediately executed. Thus Darius III lost yet another brave
and competent Greek general, this time as consequence of a cultural
misunderstanding, and now he had no other option than to lead his army
himself.72
Alexander most probably stayed in Gordium until early summer
(June/July) 333 to allow his troops to rest after the arduous autumn and
winter campaigns and to wait for news from Greece and the Aegean Sea.
There he received envoys from Greece and Asia Minor. His authority was
put to the test when he ordered the tyrant of Heraclea Pontica, Dionysius,
to receive back those who had been banished by his father, Clearchus, and
restore democracy to his state. Unfortunately, Macedonian authority did
not stretch that far north and so the tyrant was able to ignore Alexander
with impunity. Soon after the Gordian knot incident (two days later
according to Arrian) Alexander and his army set off on the Royal Road in
a northeast direction. The first major city they encountered on this new
71
72

Curt., 4.5.13, 4.1.37; Milet i.3.122.iiI 83. Debord 1999, pp. 462-463.
Diod., 17.30; Curt., 3.2.10-19. Atkinson 1980, pp. 108-114.

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campaign was Ancyra, situated some 100 km from Gordium. It was there
that he was met by envoys from Paphlagonia, a land that was part of
Hellespontine Phrygia but which for much of the 4th century was ruled
only indirectly by the Persian satrap; his deputy was a local monarch who
was always eager to show his independence. It is possible, as Curtius
Rufus writes, that Alexander launched a short campaign to subjugate
Paphlagonia. The country remained part of Hellespontine Phrygia and was
put under the authority of Alexanders appointed satrap, Calas. That this
rule was weak or perhaps only nominal is reflected in the fact that no
tribute was imposed. Hostages were taken to ensure loyalty, but the next
year Paphlagonia returned to the Persian side.73
The next objective of the Macedonian invasion was Cappadocia; or
rather so-called Great Cappadocia for Pontic Cappadocia on the Black Sea
coast may have been a separate satrapy which remained always outside
Macedonian control. Ariarathes, this countrys king or perhaps satrap, not
only acquired at that time independence but even managed to gradually
expand his domain. The royal dynasty he founded was to rule Cappadocia
for the next three centuries. On account of its central location and
intensive Iranian colonisation, Great Cappadocia was strategically
important to anyone who wished to rule over Asia Minor. The sources
report no battles in this region. After occupying this province Alexander
appointed an oriental noble as satrap, most probably a local Cappadocian.
His real name is now impossible to identify as the ancient authors call him
either Sabictas (Arrian) or Abistamenes (Curtius Rufus).74
It was in Cappadocia that Alexander learned of Memnons death and it
was presumably soon after receiving this news that he decided to cross the
river Halys, which on more than one occasion in history delineated an
important border for the territorial aspirations of great powers. If that was
the case, Alexanders next objective must have been Mazaca the
residence of the satrap of Cappadocia. After that he led his army through
Tyana and over the Taurus Mountains to Tarsus, the capital of Cilicia. In
face of this sudden turn of events the countrys satrap, Arsames, tried to
apply the scorched earth policy that had once been suggested by Memnon.
Curtius Rufus criticises Arsames for not deciding to defend the Cilician
Gates (today called Glek Bogazi), the 1,050 metre high pass and Tarsus
73

Arr., An., 2.4.1; Curt., 3.1.22-24; Plu., Alex., 18.5; Memnon, FGrH, 434 F4.1.
Burstein 1976, pp. 73-74; Atkinson 1980, pp. 96-97; Bosworth 1980, p. 188;
Seibert 1985, pp. 62-63; Debord 1999, pp. 301, 455.
74
Arr., An., 2.4.2; Str., 12.4.1; Curt., 3.4.1. Bosworth 1980, p. 189; Atkinson 1980,
pp. 135-136; Seibert 1985, p. 63; Jacobs 1994, pp. 140-144; Heckel 2006, p. 44.
On Pontic Cappadocia see: Briant 1996, p. 761; Sartre 2003, p. 15.

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157

river valley that joins the Anatolian Highlands with the Cilician lowlands,
from what was in Alexanders day called the Camp of Cyrus (today
Pozanti) to Tarsus. However, the Cilician Gates could be easily bypassed
and even a determined defence could not have stopped Alexanders army.
On the other hand, the version of events given by Curtius Rufus was based
on an anonymous eyewitnesss account and is therefore more credible than
Arrians glorifying tale of Alexander personally leading a select unit of
soldiers against the Persian guards. However, Arsames scorched earth
tactics that devastated some of the land beyond the Gates also proved
ineffective. The inhabitants of Tarsus, who were terrified by Arsames
plans to burn their city, warned Alexander of what the satrap was doing.
The king immediately dispatched Parmenion with the cavalry and the
fastest marching troops to save the city. They covered the 55 km distance
from the Cilician Gates to Tarsus in a short enough space of time
(according to Justin in one day) to save the city. Arsames next joined up
with Darius IIIs army.75
Alexander reached Tarsus at the end of summer, after a short but tiring
campaign in central Anatolia. His stay there could well have marked the
end of his spectacular career, not because of any wounds incurred in
fighting the Persians but because of an illness. Aristobulus is of the
opinion that the king was simply exhausted. However, another source (one
the ancient authors do not identify) claims it was consequence of his
bathing in the river Cydnus, which flowed through Tarsus. Probably the
original and most plausible version was that Alexander bathed in water
that was too cold. Aristobulus, however, would not have wished to say
Alexander imprudently immersed himself in icy-cold water in summer and
therefore preferred to explain that the illness was a result of exhaustion.
The water of the Kydnos River, like that of other rivers flowing from the
snow covered mountains of Taurus, is extremely cold. Much later, on 10th
June 1190, it was as consequence of bathing in one of them (Calycadnus
also known as Saleph and today as Gksu) that Emperor Frederick
Barbarossa, who had been leading an up to that moment victorious Third
Crusade, lost his life. Alexanders dip in the Cydnus resulted in
convulsions, a high fever and insomnia. Such symptoms are usually
associated with pneumonia. The only physician in the camp to agree to try
and cure him was Philip of Acarnania, who prepared for the king a potent
medicine, according to Arrian a purgative. The ancient authors add greater
drama to the situation by relating a letter from Parmenion warning the king
against this very physician, who had allegedly been given 1,000 talents by
75
Plu., Alex., 18.5; Arr., An., 2.4.3-6; Curt., 3.4.1-15; Just., 11.8.2; It. Alex., 26-27.
Bosworth 1980, pp. 189-190; Seibert 1985, pp. 63-64.

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Darius III to poison Alexander. As always, Alexander is said to have

ignored the advice of his most important commander, drunk the potion
prepared by the accused physician and then given him the letter to read.
The physician swore he was innocent and promised that the kings health
would improve. Indeed, after some time Alexanders condition got better
and eventually he recovered his health. One can assume that this was
thanks to Alexanders extraordinarily powerful constitution, which was
able to overcome the disease and not succumb to Philips of Acarnania
medicine. Even if some of its more dramatic elements were merely
invented by the ancient authors, Alexanders serious illness was a fact and
it explains why he remained at Tarsus until the end of September 333.76
It was presumably during Alexanders illness, when there was a
serious danger of him dying and therefore of Macedonian control of
Cilicia and the whole of Asia Minor collapsing in chaos, that Harpalus
made his first escape. As a member of the ruling family in Elimeia and a
relative of one of Philip IIs wives, Harpalus had been one of Alexanders
hetairoi when he was just the heir to the throne. Along with the
successors other companions he was banished from Macedonia by Philip
II for his involvement in the Pixodarus affair but returned when Alexander
ascended the throne. On account of a physical disability Harpalus was
unable to serve in the Macedonian army but Alexander rewarded his
loyalty by appointing him the states treasurer. An evidently emotionally
weak Harpalus was unable to withstand the tense atmosphere during
Alexanders illness and on the whispered advice of a mysterious figure
called Tauriscus he absconded to Greece. There he spent most of his time
in Magara. Almost two years later, in 331, he returned to Alexander and
was quickly reappointed to his previously held position.77

4. The battle of Issus

Before he had fully returned to health, Alexander ordered the resumption
of the Cilician campaign and sent east his top commander Parmenion,
leading the Corinthian League army, Greek and Thracian mercenaries and
the Thessalian cavalry. Their objective was to secure a pass in the Amanus
Mountains between Cilicia and Syria. The Macedonian commander
76

Arr., An., 2.4.7-11; Diod., 17.31.4-6; Curt., 3.5-6; Plu., Alex., 19; Luc., Dom., 1;
Ps.-Callisth., 1.41 (rec. b); Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, FGrH, 151 F1.6; POxy.
1798 (= FGrH, 148), fr. 44; V. Max., 3.8, ext.6; Just., 11.8; It. Alex., 28-30.
Wilcken 1967, p. 98; Schachermeyr 1973, p. 202; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 161-162;
Green 1974, pp. 220-221; Bosworth 1980, pp. 190-192; Salazar 2000, pp. 190-192.
77
Arr., An., 3.6.7. Bosworth 1988, p. 57; Heckel 1992, pp. 213-217.

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159

occupied eastern Cilicia including the city of Issus, in the vicinity of which
the first battle between Darius III and Alexander was to be fought.
Unfortunately, the fairly vague descriptions in the sources do not allow us
to establish for certain which of the two passes Parmenion was heading for:
the Pillars of Jonah (Merkes Su) or the more distant Syrian Gates (Belen
Pass). If we accept Plutarchs suggestion that the Macedonian strategy at
the time was to shift the war into Syria, it seems more probable that
Parmenion secured the latter of these two passes. Next this expeditionary
force returned west to meet up with Alexanders army.78
By about mid October 333 Alexander had fully recovered his health
and the first thing he did was to take a daylong journey to the south west
of Tarsus to the city of Anchialos. Here was what in Antiquity was called
the Tomb of Sardanapalus, but it may have also been a monument to the
Assyrian King Sancheribs victory over a rebellious Cilicia. Sardanapalus
was a legendary figure whose name was derived from that of the last great
Assyrian king, Assurbanipal. On this tomb there was engraved a message,
reputedly in Assyrian: These are still mine what I ate, and my wanton
love-frolics. This was an allusion to the Assyrian kings love of
banqueting and sexual promiscuity. In all probability the inscription was
invented by the ancient Greek authors to contrast an unmanly and
debauched Sardanapalus with the energetic and chaste Alexander.79 From
Anchialos the Macedonian army marched 20 km further west to the
coastal city of Soli. Here Alexander founded a democratic system of
government, installed a garrison and charged the inhabitants an
extraordinarily high fine of 200 talents. He also took hostages, for which
reason three quarters of the fine soon filled the royal treasury. This drastic
action indicates that Alexanders finances were in a critical state at the
time. This is further confirmed by the fact that when after the Battle of
Issus the Macedonian army had acquired a lot of booty, Soli was relieved
from paying the rest of this fine. Military operations in western Cilicia
were ended with a seven-day campaign in the mountains around Soli that
were inhabited by independent and fairly primitive tribes. However, this
did not complete the conquest of Cicilia. Balacrus, whom Alexander had
appointed satrap of Cilicia, had to continue the pacification of the Taurus
mountain region and was indeed killed in fighting with the highlanders.80

78

Arr., An., 2.5.1; Diod., 17.32.2; Curt., 3.7.6-7; Plu., Alex., 20.4. Chronology:
Bosworth 1980, p. 192. Topography: Seibert 1985, pp. 64-65.
79
Arr., An., 2.5.2-4; Plu., mor., 330f. Bosworth 1980, pp. 193-195; Hammond
1996, p. 94; Nawotka 2003, p. 86.
80
Arr., An., 2.5.5-6; Curt., 3.7.2-4. Bosworth 1980, p. 195; Debord 1999, p. 164.

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Meanwhile war flared up again in a region that had seemed to have

been conquered: Caria. Its Persian satrap Orontobates, supported by the
citadels in Halicarnassus, managed to recapture several cities, including
Myndus and Caunus. In September or October 333 the Macedonian
generals Ptolemaios and Asander finally defeated Orontobates in a major
battle. Among those killed were the Persian satrap himself as well as 700
Persian infantry and 500 cavalry. The victory restored Macedonian control
of the coastline in the Ceramic Gulf, thus depriving Pharnabazus still
powerful navy of harbours in that part of Asia Minor. At the end of his
stay in western Cilicia Alexander held a military parade as well as
gymnastic and musical competitions before leading his army back to
Tarsus. 81 The time he spent on operations of secondary importance in
western Cilicia and the division of his forces into two indicate that
Alexander was quite unaware of the manoeuvres by the main Persian
forces, which at this stage posed a very serious threat to his army.
Darius III gave instructions for his army to gather at Babylon.
According to the ancient authors the size of this army ranged from
312,000 (Curtius Rufus) to 500,000 (Justin) or even 600,000 (Arrian and
Plutarch). Of course all these figures are grossly exaggerated, in keeping
with the tradition of ancient historians to always overstate the size of
Persian forces. The first to do so was Herodotus, who claimed the army of
Xerxes which in 480 invaded Greece comprised as many as 1,700,000
soldiers. On the other hand, one cannot doubt that the Persian army was
considerably larger than the Macedonian force. Curtius provides a detailed
breakdown of Darius IIIs army including (on information originating
from Callisthenes) 30,000 Greek mercenaries. Even if this figure is also
exaggerated, one can be certain that Greek hoplites were the primary force
in the Persian infantry. Although the other figures given by Curtius will
also not be accurate, the lack of a contingent from eastern Iran, the land of
the famous Persian cavalry, should not be doubted. It cannot be explained
by the sheer geographic distance of the east Iranian satrapies to the
battlefield as over one and half years had elapsed from Alexanders arrival
in Asia Minor to the point when his army reached Issus. Even in ancient
times in one and a half years such distances could be covered several times
over. But it seems most probable that Darius only decided to personally
lead his army against Alexander after Memnons death, and it would have
only been then that the Persian sides whole strategic concept of the war

81
Arr., An., 2.5.7-8; Curt., 3.7.3-4. Bosworth 1980, p. 197; Ruzicka 1992, pp. 147149; Debord 1999, p. 461.

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changed. This would have left too little time for the entire imperial army to
be mobilised.82
The Persian forces most probably set out from Babylon in September,
after the hottest part of the Mesopotamian summer ended and the harvest
had filled granaries to provide the soldiers with sufficient provisions.
Weighed down by huge baggage trains the Persian army needed two
months to cover the 900 km distance from Babylon to Cilicia, where in
November the battle against the Macedonians would be fought. The
crossing of the Euphrates itself lasted five days. Curtius Rufus colourfully
contrasts the elaborate Persian procession with the simplicity and
toughness of the Macedonian army. According to custom, the Persian
army would start marching at dawn. At the head of the column the sacred
fire would be carried on silver alters. This most characteristic of Persian
military rituals was also practiced in the Sassanid era, a thousand years
later. Following the flame there would be magi singing religious songs,
and behind them 365 youths dressed in purple. Both their number and the
colour of their attire were symbolic. Their number signified the days in the
Persian year and alluded to cosmic nature of the monarchs authority,
whereas purple was the colour of warriors. Behind them travelled Ahura
Mazdas (Jupiters, according to Curtius) chariot drawn by white horses
and Mithras (the Suns according to Curtius) horse. Next came a squadron
of cavalry and behind it marched the guard of 10,000 immortals and
15,000 specially selected horsemen, the so-called Kinsmen who were not
necessarily the monarchs relatives but nevertheless granted this honorary
title by the Great King. Then came the Royal bodyguards called the
doryphoroi (spearmen) or at other times the melophori after the appleshaped (melon) butts of their spears. Behind the bodyguards rode the Great
King wearing his ceremonial cloak and tiara, surrounded by 400 relatives.
The monarchs chariot was gilded and adorned with symbols of Ahura
Mazda and Mithra (Ninus and Belus according to Curtius) as well as the
Achaemenid eagle. Following him were 30,000 infantry, the royal horses,
and in carriages the monarchs mother, wife and children as well as 360
Royal concubines. Archers escorted the Royal treasure chests, which were
carried by 600 mules and 300 camels. And following on behind were the
courtiers, the servants and the rest of the army. To sum up, Darius IIIs

82

Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35 (= Plb., 12.18.2); Curt., 3.2.2-9; Diod., 17.31.2; Just.,
11.9.1; Arr., An., 2.8.8; Plu., Alex., 18.6; POxy. 1798 (= FGrH, 148) F44, col.
2.2/3. Atkinson 1980, pp. 99-108; Vogelsang 1992, pp. 219-221.

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marching army had as many aspects of a procession celebrating the sacred

nature of the Persian monarchy as it did of a military operation.83
The great Persian army eventually reached Sochoi, situated somewhere
in northern Mesopotamia in a place unknown to modern historians but
definitely on the eastern side of the Amanus Mountains, behind which
Parmenions corps was stationed. Darius now prepared for battle. In order
to increase his armys mobility he despatched most of the baggage trains
and courtiers to Damascus. According to the ancient authors, Alexanders
command was unaware of the Persian forces up until they were just a few
days march away from the Macedonian army. Unbelievable as this may
seem, this might well have been the case. Once his army progressed
beyond Caria, Alexander ceased being anyones liberator; beyond that
boundary population was more sympathetic to the legal Persian authorities.
The sources describe this attitude quite unambiguously in the cases of the
inhabitants of Soli and Issus. That is why it now became difficult for the
Macedonians to acquire reliable information about the enemy, and this
nearly led to their undoing. Darius, on the other hand, was kept very well
informed by his loyal subjects about the whereabouts of the Macedonian
invader.84
Having returned from western Cilicia, Alexander marched his army
further east across the coastal plain to the south of Tarsus without reentering the city. Soon afterwards he further divided his army into two. He
ordered Philotas to continue advancing with the cavalry across the Aleian
Plain to the river Pyramus (today Ceyhan), whereas he himself proceeded
with the infantry and the royal ile of cavalry to the seaside town of
Magarsus (today Karata). This town was actually the port to the city of
Mallus and it lay where in Antiquity the river Pyramus flowed into the
Mediterranean Sea. The only reason for Alexanders visit mentioned in the
sources was to offer sacrifices at the local temple to Athena. Alexanders
soldiers built a bridge (at an unknown place) to get across the Pyramus and
then his army proceeded to Mallus. One can suppose that it was in this city
or in its vicinity that Alexanders army was reunited with Philotass corps.
There the Macedonians also quelled some disruptions, perhaps fighting
between a democratic pro-Macedonian faction and a pro-Persian faction.
Alexander did not force the inhabitants of Mallus to pay tributes, not
because he was reverting to his previous policy of liberating Greek cities
but for the ideological reason that he was supposed to be related to them.
83

Curt., 3.3.8-25. Engels 1978, pp. 42-43; Atkinson 1980, pp. 120-133; Boyce
1982, pp. 286-287; Seibert 1985, pp. 68-69; Nylander 1993, pp. 150-151.
84
Arr., An., 2.5.5, 2.6.1; Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35 (= Plb., 12.17.2); Diod.,
17.32.2-3; J., AJ, 11.8.3.

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Legend had it that the city was founded by colonists from Argos, which
was also the homeland of Heracles, the mythological ancestor of the
Argead dynasty. However, as in the case of Soli, Mallus was obliged to
supply ships. The next stop on Alexanders itinerary was Castabalum,
which lay a days journey from Mallus. It was there that Parmenions
corps joined up with the main Macedonian army.85
While he was still at Mallus Alexander learned that Darius was
encamped in Sochoi. In response to this news he summoned a council.
Next he marched his army closer towards the Persians until he reached the
city of Myriandrus, whose exact location is unknown. We only know from
Xenophons Anabasis that the city lay 5 parasang (27 km) from the Syrian
Gates, therefore somewhere in the region of todays city of Iskenderun and
c. 140 km from Mallus. It took the Macedonian army five days to cover
this distance. The ancient sources do not concur as to what Alexanders
actual plan was. Arrian states that objective of the march was to attack the
Persian army where it was stationed. Curtius Rufus, on the other hand,
states that Alexander accepted Parmenions advice to seek confrontation in
a mountain pass where the terrain would not allow the Persians to make
use of their numerical advantage. However, although the Battle of Issus
did indeed take place in an area where numerical superiority failed to work
in the Persians favour, Alexanders actions contradict Curtiuss
explanation. Not only did he not secure all of the mountain passes into
Cilicia but, what is worse, he himself actually went through one of them to
the other side, where he expected to find the Persian camp. Therefore the
first version seems more probable, that is, an offensive plan to seek out the
enemy forces and attack them where they were stationed. That was why
Alexander crossed over to the other side of the Amanus Mountains. On the
way Alexanders army passed through Issus, which had previously been
occupied by Parmenion. This fairly small town was in a place known
today as Kinet Hyk, on a low (20 m) hill half a kilometre from the sea
and 7 km to the north west of todays town of Drtyol. The Macedonians
set up a field hospital at Issus for their wounded and sick soldiers; thus the
army was now free to move much faster. It has been estimated that
Myriandrus was over 30 km from Issus and the Macedonian army covered
that distance within one day. After this forced march, the Macedonian
army had to stop over at Myriandrus on account of a violent storm. It was
also there that Alexander received the disturbing news that Darius army
was no longer at Sochoi and had now reappeared behind them. At first he
could not believe this to be true, but the crew of a thirty-oar ship was sent
85

Arr., An., 2.5.8-9; Curt., 3.7.5; Str., 14.5.17; It. Alex., 31. Bosworth 1980, pp.
197-198; Huttner 1997, pp. 91-92.

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out to reconnoitre and later it confirmed that the Persians were now indeed
camped on the coast behind Alexanders army.86
Sochoi was situated on a broad plain that would have been ideal for the
massed Persian cavalry if the Macedonians had crossed one of the
mountain passes. The reason why the Great King left this strategically
advantageous position and moved into mountainous Cilicia, where the
terrain did no allow him to use his armys numerical superiority is one of
the greatest puzzles of the Macedonian-Persian war. Curtiuss suggestion
that the Great King decided to move into Cilicia on receiving news of
Alexanders illness is quite unconvincing on account of the chronological
sequence of events. Alexanders illness lasted some time and was then
followed by the Macedonian campaign in Cilicia, which in a way can
explain the Persian armys haste. Arrian writes about Dariuss drawn out
stay at Sochoi and uncertainty as to what Alexander was planning on
account of the surprisingly long time he was spending in Cilicia as well as
the imprudent advice of his Persian flatterers. The sycophants convinced
the Great King that Alexander was too fearful of the mighty Persian army
to advance any further. They encouraged Darius to engage Alexander in
battle in Cilicia, for even there the excellent Persian cavalry was capable
of defeating the Macedonians. Arrian and Plutarch show that the
Macedonian fugitive Amyntas who knew Alexander well assured the
Great King that the impetuous young ruler would be eager to fight. One
only had to wait for him to turn up wherever a prepared Persian army was
stationed. In Curtius account this were some anonymous Greek
mercenaries who offered Darius this more sensible advice badly received
by the Persian courtiers. We know that the Great King did not heed the
sober words of the real expert or experts, but the sources do not tell us why
he took the decision he did other than making some general comments
about fate and a propensity to follow bad advice.87
There is no reason to doubt the reports of sensible advisors in the
Persian camp, even if Curtius Rufuss account of mercenaries giving
advice is probably erroneously borrowed form the incident between
Charidemus and Darius at the Babylon conference. It is possible that one
of the reasons why such advice was rejected mentioned here by Curtius
and also referred to in descriptions of councils in the Persian camp
concerned the mistrust held by the Iranian aristocracy towards the Greeks,
86

X., An., 1.4.6; Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35 (=Plb., 12.17.2, 12.19.4); Arr., An.,
2.6.1, 2.7.1-2; Curt., 3.7.9-10. Engels 1978, pp. 47-51; Bosworth 1980, pp. 199202; Bing 1993.
87
Arr., An., 2.6.3-7; Plu., Alex., 20.1-4; Curt., 3.7.1, 3.8.1-11. Atkinson 1980, p.
170.

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165

whom they suspected of treason or at least being more concerned with

their personal interests than with those of the Persian state. The Great King
also had to consider logistical problems: in Antiquity an army as large as
his could not last long without new supplies of food, fodder and water.
The delivery of new provisions was not feasible at Sochoi, which was not
situated close to a river let alone near the coast. Even with the necessity of
bringing the provisions in on wagons and pack animals the local resources
of northern Mesopotamia and western Syria could not feed the great army
for long; that is why one way or another Darius had to move his soldiers
on from Sochoi. It was also no doubt for logistic reasons that the decision
was made to send the main baggage trains 300 km away to Damascus; this
way two parts of the great army did not have to seek provisions in the
same area. Another factor may have been ideological: a representative of
the heroic Persian monarchy could not idly wait for a numerically inferior
enemy to take the initiative. According to Murisons attractive theory, the
decision to move could have been made when intelligence reports came in
regarding the movements of the Macedonian army. Perhaps having learnt
that the enemys army had divided into two detachments, those of
Alexander and Parmenion, the Persians decided to launch a surprise attack
and deal with each of them separately. The manoeuvre was indeed
surprising. Dariuss army left Sochoi and marched north along the River
Karasu Valley passing the southern Amanus mountain range. The Persians
eventually crossed the mountains by passing through the so-called Amanic
Gates. This could have been one of two passes: Bahe, which today has
road and rail links running through it, or Hasanbeyli, which is situated a
bit further south. This 150-km march of the Persian army was not noticed
by the Macedonian scouts. However, Darius failed, if such was his
intention, to attack Parmenions corps when it was alone for it had in the
meantime rejoined the main Macedonian army. It also turned out that there
would be no battle between the two armies on the extensive Cilician
Lowlands for the previous day the Macedonians had headed south.
Apparently the Persian army had entered Cilicia the same night the
Macedonians entered Syria and thus they passed each other by a few
dozen kilometres. The Macedonian field hospital at Issus fell into the
hands of the Persians, who realising the failure of their manoeuvre now
vented their frustrated anger on the Macedonian patients. Some of the sick
soldiers were murdered while others had their hands hacked off and next,
having been shown the sheer size of the Persian army, they were allowed
to escape, no doubt in the hope that their terrifying tales would break the

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Macedonian will to fight. Indeed, these mutilated soldiers were the first to
inform Alexander that the Persians were now behind his army.88
The Persian strategy had surprised Alexander, who was now cut off
from his bases in Cilicia and the rest of Asia Minor. When we also
consider the superiority of the Persian fleet, which could cut off the supply
of provisions by sea, it becomes apparent that the Macedonian army was
now in a trap and the only way out of it was to defeat Darius III in a battle.
Alexander must have certainly been aware of the threat from the Persian
fleet for it was then that he performed the ceremony of driving his chariot
into the sea to pay homage to the sea gods Poseidon, Thetis, Nereus and
Nereids. Indeed, the Persians needed no more than an undecided draw on
the battlefield to further extend their strategic advantage.89 Fortunately for
the Macedonians, the Persian command also planned to rout their enemy
in a pitched battle. Having obtained information from the captured
Macedonians and the local population about where the enemy was located,
Darius sent his army south in the direction of the coastal plain around
Myriandrus and Syria, where there was a greater possibility of fighting a
battle in open territory. He was now aware that the coastal plain of
Iskenderun Bay was too narrow for him to make full advantage of Persian
numerical superiority. During a days march his army got no further than
the river Pinarus and there the Persians set up camp. Meanwhile Alexander,
having realised that the Persian army was no longer in Cilicia, summoned
a war council and declared his decision to confront the enemy in battle.
Arrian relates a speech Alexander is supposed to have given on this
occasion in which he drew attention to the tactical advantages of fighting
the battle in a confined space and of the superior combat quality of the
Macedonian soldier over feeble Asiatic slaves and mercenaries with no
real incentive to fight for Darius. He is also said to have mentioned the
rewards (booty) to be gained from defeating the Great King. Finally he
referred to historic examples, particularly Xenophons recorded
experiences of how in 401 Greek mercenaries victoriously marched from
Babylon to the Black Sea. Although speeches related by ancient author are
usually little more than demonstrations of a given historians rhetorical
talents, here one should not doubt that Alexander did actually gave a
speech. There was a tradition for commanders and politicians to deliver
88

Curt., 3.8.3-5, 3.8.13-13; Arr., An., 2.7.1; Plu., Alex., 20.4-5. Wilcken 1967, pp.
100-101; Murison 1972; Hamilton 1974, p. 67; Engels 1978, pp. 45-46; Bosworth
1980, pp. 199-201, 203; Bosworth 1988, p. 59; Seibert 1985, p. 59; Dbrowa 1988,
p. 50; Hammond 1996, p. 95.
89
POxy. 1798 (= FGrH, 148) fr. 44, col. ii. Tarn 1948, i, p. 24; Green 1974, p.
226-227; Briant 1996, p. 43.

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speeches to an assembled audience when important decisions were made,

so it is difficult to imagine that Alexander would have simply ordered his
soldiers to march towards superior enemy forces without words of
encouragement or explanations. Arrians account of what Alexander said
is presented in reported speech and therefore one cannot accuse him of
showing off with flowery language, which often occurs when ancient
authors claim to cite someone directly. Besides, Alexanders fairly
obvious arguments are confirmed in other accounts of a speech to his
soldiers before the battle by Curtius Rufus and Justin.90
Having spoken to his officers, Alexander ordered the soldiers to have
their dinner and at the same sent a unit of riders and archers to survey the
Syrian Gates, through which his army now had to return. The Macedonian
army occupied the mountain passes at around midnight, there the soldiers
rested among the rocks for the remainder of the night. Much later Cicero,
as a governor of Cilicia fighting highlanders, would as also pitch camp
there. Here too Alexander made sacrifices to the gods of the land where he
would engage in battle against Darius. At dawn the army proceeded
through the Syrian Gates, marching in a broad column stretching to both
sides of the narrow valley with the infantry first and the cavalry, which
was less useful in mountainous terrain, following on behind. Then when
the valley opened out, Alexander ordered his men to proceed in battle
formation as if to expect the Persians to attack at any moment. Parmenion,
commanding as usual the left wing, received categorical instructions to
keep to the coastline, so that the Persians would not be able to outflank
them. Callisthenes relates that Alexander had his army proceed for the last
40 stades (7.2 km) towards the enemy in battle formation. Polybius, who is
a harsh critic of this historian and eyewitness, notes that the unevenness of
the Cilician terrain would have sooner or later disrupted the line of the
phalanx and thus greatly weakened its military value against the enemy.
Therefore perhaps battle formations were made at a later stage; both
Curtius Rufus and Diodorus claim they were not drawn up until the
Persians were 30 stades away. One should also remember that Alexanders
army needed a lot of time to get through the mountain pass (7.5 hours
according to Engelss estimate), which suggests that the battlefield was not

90

Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35 (= Plb., 12.17.3-4); Plu., Alex., 20.5-6; Diod., 17.33.1;
Arr., An., 2.7; Curt., 3.10.3-10; Just., 11.9.3-4. Wilcken 1967, p. 101; Bosworth
1980, p. 204.

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far from the Syrian Gates if the two armies managed to clash that same
day in November 333.91
The battle known in historiography as the Battle of Issus was actually
fought some distance away from that town at one of the short rivers
flowing from the Amanus Mountains into the Iskenderun Bay, which the
sources call Pinarus, on a narrow stretch of lowland measuring 14 stades
(2.5 km) in width. The very limited topographical information that can be
derived from the ancient sources as well as the hydrological changes that
must have occurred in this part of the Mediterranean coast over the
centuries do not allow us to identify with any reasonable certainty which
of todays watercourses was once called Pinarus. Therefore it is very
difficult to accurately locate where the battle took place. Three possible
locations have emerged from an academic debate that has lasted over a
century: Deli ay, Kuru ay and Payas. At 20 km from Iskenderun, Payas
is the southernmost of these rivers. Kuru ay flows into the sea 3 km
further north, and it is another 8 km to the Deli ay. The attention of
modern scholars was first drawn to the Deli ay because it is the largest of
these rivers, the generally level terrain to the south would have made a 40stade march in battle formation possible and the gently sloped and low 2-3
m banks would not have precluded the cavalry charge described by Arrian.
On the other hand, the sources in no way suggest that Pinarus was the
largest river in the area, the Macedonians probably marched in battle
formation for a shorter distance than 40 stades and the coastal plain at Deli
ay stretches for 7.5 km, which is much more than the 14 stades described
by Callisthenes. Moreover, the distance from Deli ay to the Syrian Gates
is much too great to imagine that the Macedonian army could have
descended the mountains, reached this river and fought a battle all on the
same day. Inspections of the region by more recent historians (Hammond
and Lane Fox) have suggested that the Payas best fits the descriptions
given by the ancient sources. Its banks are steeper but the plain around it is
just 4 km wide which is much closer to the 14 stades mentioned by
Callisthenes than the 7.5 km at the mouth of the Deli ay.92

91

Plb., 12.17-20; Arr., An., 2.8; Diod., 17.33.1; Curt., 3.8.24; Cic., Att., 5.20.3.
Engels 1978, pp. 131-134; Bosworth 1980, pp. 206-207, 219; Bosworth 1988, p.
60. Date: Arr., An., 2.11.10.
92
Most important works arguing for identification of the Pinarus with these three
rivers are: for Deli ay Janke 1910; Seibert 1972, pp. 98-102; Atkinson 1980, pp.
471-476; for Kuru ay Bosworth 1988, p. 60; for Payas Lane Fox 1973, pp.
169-170; Engels 1978, pp. 131-134; Hammond 1992, pp. 395-396; Hammond
1996, pp. 97-101.

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Descriptions in the ancient sources of the battle fought between the

two armies in the afternoon of the same day the Macedonians had passed
through the Syrian Gates are not entirely clear. This results not only from
the fact that ancient authors were mainly interested in the personality of
Alexander but also because of the inherent chaos of battles in Antiquity,
where even the participants on the ground (and not for instance observers
from city walls or some other raised position) had a problem with
understanding what was actually happening. Already Polybius noted that
the description provided by Callisthenes, who was a contemporary to these
events, is unreliable on account of it not being compatible with the
battlefields topography. For the above reasons the following description
of the course of the Battle of Issus is also hypothetical. We know that the
Persians first positioned some cavalry and light infantry on the southern
bank of the Pinarus while the bulk of the Persian army assembled on the
northern (right) bank. Before the battle commenced the Persian cavalry
and light infantry returned to the right bank to join the main forces. The
Greek mercenary infantry was positioned in the centre with the Persian
cavalry to their right accompanied by a local infantry. Taking up positions
at both wings of this formation were the kardakes probably an Iranian
heavy infantry though no doubt of much lower quality than hoplites.
Indeed, apart from including them in the order of battle, the sources make
no mention of the kardakes in the actual fighting. This might mean that
they simply fled from the battlefield or alternatively that the ancient
authors were only concentrating on particular participants, above all
Alexander but also the Greek soldiers fighting on both sides. The left
Persian wing extended at an angle to the rest of the front line far into the
slopes of the mountains surrounding the coastal plain. The Great King
took up a central position but nearer the left wing and was surrounded by
bodyguards and elite cavalry. The Persian plan was most probably to stop
the Macedonian phalanx in the centre with the mercenary hoplites, have
the local infantry positioned on the hillside tie down as many of the
Macedonian troops as possible through diversionary tactics and then use
their cavalry on the right wing to deliver the decisive blow. 93 On the
opposite side Alexander arranged his phalanx eight ranks deep and
positioned it in the centre. Mercenary detachments were positioned behind
the phalanx. Parmenion was given command of the left wing, with
comprised the allied cavalry, Thracian foot soldiers and light infantry.
Alexander himself took command of the right wing, comprising the
93

Plb., 12.17.6-18 (after Callisthenes); Arr., An., 2.8.5-9, 2.8.11; Curt., 3.9.1-6.
Bosworth 1980, pp. 208-209; Atkinson 1980, pp. 203-208; Hammond 1996, pp.
101-103; Briant 1996, pp. 819-821; Sabin 2007, pp. 134-135.

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Macedonian and Thessalian cavalry. And it was with this force that he had
planned to resolve the final outcome of the battle. But before it even began,
Alexander learnt that most of the Persian cavalry was positioned opposite
Parmenions weaker detachments on the left wing, so he reinforced it with
his Thessalian cavalry. The Thessalians moved to the other wing from
behind the Macedonian formations, so that the Persians would not notice
the change. Against the local infantry facing his right wing Alexander
positioned two squadrons of cavalry as well as some Agrianians and
slingers.94
These last Macedonian units had the greatest fortune for the local
infantry on the Persian side did not take up the fight and just fled. Thus the
all-important Macedonian right wing faced no danger. The infantry who
were now no longer needed there moved to reinforce the phalanx in the
centre.95 The rest of the Macedonian army had the much more difficult
task of attacking the Persians across the river Pinarus. They were greeted
by a shower of arrows so dense that they collided with one another in the
air, as Diodorus with some artistic licence would have us believe. But the
sources do not tell us how effective this hail of missiles was. The left
Macedonian wing was unable to make progress against the massed Persian
cavalry, which managed to repulse Parmenions attack and then chase his
squadrons over to the southern side of the river. Here both sides were
engaged in intensive fighting up until the Persian frontline collapsed on
the other wing. 96 In the centre the mercenary hoplites attacked the
Macedonian phalanx before it had finished crossing the river. As the
Macedonians tried to ascend the fairly steep and brambly bank, parts of
their phalanx line got disjoined. This the Greek mercenaries exploited
mercilessly by concentrating on those sections in particular. On this
occasion the Greek hoplites fought with a far greater doggedness than was
normal for mercenaries. This was because the phalanx symbolised
Macedonian military dominance in Greece and therefore the mercenaries
were also fighting out of national pride and to show who the better
professional in the field was. In this clash the Greeks proved to be at least
no worse than the Macedonians. Even the Alexanders arch apologist
Arrian states that over 120 soldiers of the Macedonian phalanx perished,
which is more than the total number of Macedonian losses he records for
other battles such as Granicus (115) or Gaugamela (100). Bearing in mind
94

Plb., 12.19-21 (after Callisthenes); Arr., Ann., 2.8.9-11; Diod., 17.33.2; Curt.,
3.11.2-3; Plu., Alex., 20.8; It. Alex., 35. Hammond 1996, pp. 103-104.
95
Arr., An., 2.9.4.
96
Arr., An., 2.10.3, 2.11.2; Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35 (= Plb., 12.18.11); Diod.,
17.33.3; Curt., 3.11.13-15; It. Alex., 35.

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that Arrian always minimises the figures for Macedonian casualties, it is

safe to presume that the actual number of Macedonian phalangites lost at
Issus was somewhat greater than 120. Moreover, throughout Alexanders
reign we can be certain that it was in this battle the Macedonian phalanx
faced its greatest challenge and came closest to defeat.97
On the right flank Alexander with his Macedonian cavalry very
quickly attacked the local infantry and cavalry, intending this way to break
their resolve to fight. Without doubt he was consciously heading straight
for Dariuss chariot to kill or capture the enemys commander and thus
resolve the war with one blow. The strategic consideration was sure
strengthened by heroic principles of Alexander imitating or rivalling his
mythical ancestor Achilles in striving for glory in single combat with the
enemy leader. In order to protect the Great Kings chariot the elite Persian
cavalry moved forward commanded by Dariuss brother Oxyathres and
including distinguished Iranian aristocrats, of whom the sources mention
Sabaces the satrap of Egypt, Arsames, Atizyes, Bubaces and
Rheomithres. We know that the fighting with this elite force was ferocious;
all the above mentioned Persian aristocrats perished and Alexander was
wounded in the thigh. According to a romantic tale invented by his
chamberlain, Chares, this wound was inflicted by none other than Darius
himself. It is difficult not to get the impression that Darius had made a
tactical mistake in concentrating too much cavalry on the right flank,
where on account of the lack of space it could not effectively make use of
its numerical superiority. On the other hand, he had not deployed enough
soldiers to effectively secure his left flank, which was where Alexander
directed the main thrust of his attack. The Macedonian cavalry was
gradually prevailing over the enemy and posing an ever greater threat to
the Great King. Then all of a sudden the horses of the Royal chariot,
wounded by Macedonian spears, took fright and refused to respond to the
drivers bridles. For a while it looked as if they would throw the Royal
passenger off the chariot and into enemy hands. This moment of extreme
peril for the Great King is depicted in the famous Alexander Mosaic,
found at the House of the Faun in Pompeii. The Alexander Mosaic is
reportedly a second-century copy of a masterpiece painted, according to
Pliny, at the end of the 4th century by Philoxenus of Eretria for King
Cassander of Macedonia. It is said that at a critical moment Darius himself
took hold of the reigns and restored enough control over the horses so that
at least a second chariot could be brought up for him to board. The
situation was still extremely dangerous. In order to escape enemy capture
97

Arr., An., 2.10.4-7. Bosworth 1980, p. 214.

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the Great King next mounted a mare that had been specially kept tethered
behind the chariot and, casting away his Royal insignia, he rode away
from the battlefield. The escape was not an act of cowardice. Darius had
more than once proved his valour, and even in this battle he incurred a
wound whilst fighting. Nor did he leave at the very start of the fighting as
Arrian claims, but only after the situation on the battlefield made it
apparent he was in direct danger of being captured or killed. According to
Iranian beliefs, grave responsibilities rested on the monarchs shoulders
when commanding a war. For such situations were not only an armed
conflict between men but also a cosmic one where the Persian side
represented the forces of truth, goodness and light, whereas the enemy
represented the forces of lies, evil and darkness. Therefore in such a
struggle the Great King should not die or, worse still, get himself captured;
in such cases it was better for a monarch to retreat in order to be able to
continue the struggle at a later stage.98
Though consistent with the Zoroastrian principles of political theory,
regrettably, Dariuss escape could not have had a positive affect on the
logic of the battlefield. The Persian cavalry that had so far fought valiantly
in defence of the King now began to withdraw from the battlefield too.
Alexander could not immediately give chase for the situation in the centre
and on the left wing demanded immediate intervention. There the ever
weaker position of the Macedonian forces could still turn the battle in the
Persians favour. A determined attack was now launched on the flank of
the mercenary hoplites, who had up to that moment been successfully
bearing down on the Macedonian phalanx. But despite what Arrian says, a
resurgent Macedonian phalanx did not ultimately defeat the hoplite
mercenaries. Instead it must have been, as Curtius writes, that on seeing
their employer, the Great King leave the battle ground, they too started to
withdraw in an ordered fashion. This is confirmed by the fact that in
battles over the next three years there appeared some complete
detachments of several thousand Greek veterans of the Battle of Issus.
News of Dariuss escape and the retreat of the mercenaries spread
throughout the Persian ranks and led to the breaking up of other
detachments, including the cavalry on the left wing. By dusk the entire
98

Plb., 12.22.2 (after Callisthenes); Arr., An., 2.10.3, 2.11.4-8, 2.12.1; Diod.,
17.33.5-34.7; Curt., 3.11.7-11; Plu., Alex., 20.8-9 (quoting Chares: FGrH, 125 F6);
Plu., mor., 241b-c; Just., 11.9; Ael., NA, 6.48; It. Alex., 35; Ps.-Callisth., 1.41.
Atkinson 1980, pp. 229-237; Bosworth 1980, pp. 215-216; Bosworth 1988, pp. 6162; Nylander 1993, pp. 149-151; Hammond 1996, pp. 108-109; Briant 1996, pp.
239-242; Lendon 2005, pp. 136-138. Alexander Mosaic: Plin., Nat., 35.110.
Stewart 1993, pp. 130-150; Cohen 1997.

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173

great Persian army was in full retreat. Alexander triumphed in this first
major battle for the control of Asia thanks to his courage, determination
and tactical genius, which compensated for the strategic shortcomings, for
in that particular respect, in the autumn of 333, the enemy proved to be
superior. It should also be stressed that the Battle of Issus was primarily
and almost single-handedly won by the Macedonian cavalry, which was
better trained and better armed than its Persian opponent.99
It was only once he was certain of victory on all sections of the front
that Alexander sought to capture Darius. But by then the Great King had
covered a lot of ground moving rapidly and changing horses on the way.
Moreover, the chase was hampered by crowds of fleeing Persian soldiers.
Alexander is said to have pursued the Great King for 60 stades (11 km),
but now it was dark and, seeing the futility of advancing any further,
Alexander decided to turn back. As a consolation prize he had the Great
Kings chariot and his royal insignia: a bow, a shield and an outer garment
called the kandys.100 As happened so often in ancient battles, the reported
numbers of losses on the losing side were disproportionately higher than
the losses on the victors side, though of course we should not treat
literarily the ancient authors rhetorical descriptions of piles of killed
Persians, their bodies covering the entire field or of mountain ravines
being filled with corpses. Undoubtedly, as well as a given authors sense
of fantasy, the figures provided in the sources reflect Macedonian
propaganda. The most frequently cited figure for the number of Persians
killed is 100,000 or 110,000 (Arrian, Diodorus and Curtius) as opposed to
270-450 Macedonians killed. Justin reduces the number of Persian
casualties to 61,000. No doubt the figures given by the anonymous
historian on the Oxyrhynchus papyrus are much closer to the truth: 1,200
Macedonians killed, 53,000 Persians killed and a number of Greek
mercenaries killed which we do not know because that bit of papyrus is
damaged. We cannot accept that Dariuss army incurred the extremely
heavy losses described in the sources as several of its most important units,
including the Persian cavalry and the Greek infantry, left the battle in an
orderly fashion and therefore could not have been slaughtered like routed
soldiers. The high number of wounded Macedonians (4,500) given by
Curtius probably accurately reflects the consequences of a battle whose

99

Diod., 17.34.7; Curt., 3.11.11-16; Arr., An., 2.11.4-7; Just., 11.9; It. Alex., 35.
Lane Fox 1973, pp. 173-174.
100
Curt., 3.11.26, 3.12.1; Arr., An., 2.11.5-7; Plu., Alex., 20.10; POxy. 1798 (=
FGrH, 148), fr. 44, col. iii; Ps.-Callisth., 1.41.

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fate for a long time hung in the balance and in which the victorious side
also incurred heavy losses.101
While Alexander was still pursuing Darius, the rest of victorious
Macedonian army with ease captured the Persian camp and found there the
families of the Persian aristocrats as well as servants. The property of the
defeated enemy was plundered, whereas the hapless Persian women were
given to the Macedonian army rabble to be humiliated and raped. Only
tent or rather portable palace of Darius and his family were spared this
unseemly fate. Alexanders men secured it from the other soldiers as their
victorious leaders rightful property. Though most of the Persian baggage
train with the servants and treasure chests had been sent on to Damascus,
3,000 talents were found at the Persian camp after the battle. After
returning from his unsuccessful chase Alexander enjoyed a bath in
Dariuss gold tub and next attended a banquet in the Great Kings captured
tent, where, according to Plutarch, on beholding all the items of luxury he
is said to have commented: This, as it would seem, is to be a king. The
itinerant nature of the Persian state gave this tent a very important status
as the mobile residence of the Great King. Therefore its capture was also
symbolically very significant. As 200 years earlier Cyrus the Great had
sealed his victory over the king of the Medes, Astyages, by capturing his
tent and throne, so now the capturing of Darius IIIs tent by Alexander was
seen as a portent of the imminent defeat of the entire Achaemenid
monarchy.102
However, Alexanders most valuable trophy was not Darius property
but his family, which, according to Persian custom, accompanied him even
to where the fighting was. The Macedonians had captured Dariuss mother,
Sisigambis, his wife, Stateira, his daughters Stateira and Drypetis as well
as his son, Ochos. The sources relate a romantic tale, originally ascribed to
Callisthenes, regarding Alexanders first contact with Dariuss family. He
is said to have discovered that the family was in the Persian camp when he
entered the Great Kings tent and heard the Persian women lamenting
Dariuss death for that is what they believed at the time. The
Macedonian victor wished to console them with the news that Darius had
actually escaped and was still alive. First he instructed Mithrenes to tell
them this news, but then, realising that the sight of a Persian traitor might
be too painful for them, decided to send his hetairos Leonnatus, who also
101
Arr., An., 2.11.8; Diod., 17.34.8-9, 17.36.6; Curt., 3.11.27; Just., 11.9.10; POxy.
1798 (= FGrH, 148), fr. 44, col. iv. Bosworth 1980, p. 216-217.
102
Arr., An., 2.11.9-10; Diod., 17.35.2-36.1, 17.36.5, 17.37.2; Curt., 3.11.19-23;
Plu., Alex., 20.11-13; POxy. 1798 (= FGrH, 148), fr. 44, col. iii; Just., 11.10.1-5.
Briant 1996, pp. 200-201, 267-268.

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175

spoke Persian, instead. The following morning Alexander personally

visited the distinguished captives. In keeping with Persian custom the
women performed a ceremonial bow (proskynesis) before their new ruler.
Unfortunately they mistook the new ruler to be Hephaestion, who was
standing next to Alexander and visibly taller than him. When the eunuchs
explained the mistake to the women, a panic stricken Sisigambis is said to
have fallen to Alexanders feet apologising profusely for this obvious
insult to his majesty. This gives Alexanders biographers the opportunity
to present him raising the women to her feet with the words: Never mind,
Mother. For actually he too is Alexander. The Macedonian king allowed
the distinguished captives bury their fallen compatriots with honours and
ensured that they lived in conditions no worse than they had enjoyed at the
court of the Great King. Moreover, he promised to find worthy husbands
for Dariuss daughters and an appropriate education for his son. The
ancient authors stressed that Alexander showed due respect and propriety
towards his defeated enemys daughters and wife, even though she was
considered to be the most beautiful woman in the whole of Asia. This was
not a consequence of his homosexuality but of virtue and self-restraint. It
reflected Alexanders famous comment about Persian women being
torments to the eyes in the sense that their ravishing beauty hurt him
because of his self-imposed temperance. Nevertheless in this case
Alexanders behaviour seems to reflect his (or his advisors) deep
understanding of the Oriental ideology of authority. The women of the
ruling house also symbolised the state and in that sense they could transfer
the legitimacy of power from the defeated ruler to the victor. The victor,
on the other hand, should not only prove himself militarily but also show a
kingly respect for his opponent, particularly his mother. Therefore
Alexanders dignified treatment of Darius IIIs family was another step
towards his aim of gaining recognition among the Persian elites as the
rightful successor of the Achaemenid dynasty. 103 The first was after
Granicus, when he tried to win over the Iranian aristocrats.
The following day the bodies of fallen Macedonian soldiers were
buried with honours. Those who had distinguished themselves in battle
received rewards and Alexander personally visited the tents of wounded
soldiers, thought he himself was still suffering from the wound inflicted
during his fight with the Persian cavalry. This way he not only
103

Arr., An., 2.11.9, 2.12.3-8; Diod., 17.37.3-38.7; Curt., 3.12.1-26; Plu., Alex., 21;
Plu., mor., 338d-e; Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, FGrH, 151 F1.5; Apion, ap. Gel.,
7.8.1-3; Just., 11.9; It. Alex., 35, 37; Ps.-Callisth., 1.41. Keaeney 1978; Bosworth
1980, pp. 220-222; Bosworth 1988, pp. 63-64; Brosius 1996, pp. 21-22; Nawotka
2003, pp. 123-124.

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strengthened the bond with his army but also created for posterity a heroic
image of someone able to overcome physical injury in order to remain
fully active. It was also then that he appointed Balacrus, one of his
bodyguards, satrap of Cilicia. To commemorate the great victory at Issus,
the town closest to the battlefield, was renamed the city of victory
Nicopolis. With time, however, Issus reverted to its original name. Shortly
after the Battle of Issus the Tarsus mint issued Alexanders first coins in
Asia. These were large silver coins (tetradrachms), one of which equalled
four days of pay for a Macedonian or mercenary foot soldier. They bore
the images of the gods Zeus and Heracles, which were popular images on
coins in both Macedonia and Cilicia. The remarkable resemblance
between the Zeus on Alexanders tetradrachms and the image of Baal on
coins that had been produced at Tarsus for the satrap Mazaeus towards the
end of Persian rule in Cilicia indicates that Alexander had simply taken
over the same mint and the same staff now used the same dies to strike the
new coins. Naturally the issuing of coins is above all an economic
enterprise; one which was made possible thanks to the capture of
considerable amounts of precious metal at Issus. On the other hand, one
cannot but also associate it with the historic importance of the Battle of
Issus itself. After this great victory Alexander began speaking more openly
about his intention to rule over the entire Achaemenid Empire. From the
propaganda point of view this was therefore a good moment to issue a new
coin that stressed this claim.104

5. Phoenicia. Syria and Palestine

After an all-night flight the defeated king of Persia arrived at a place called
Onchai (exact location today unknown) somewhere on the Amik Plain in
western Syria (today Turkey, near Antakya in Antiquity Antioch on the
Orontes). He had gathered troops on the way, so that at Onchai there were
with him either 4,000 Greek mercenaries (according to Curtius) or 4,000
troops in all (according to Arrian). The king and these soldiers next made a
forced march east to cross the Euphrates at Thapsacus and thence to
Babylon. Despite the defeat, Darius had absolutely no intention of
surrendering. 105 We know that, apart from the soldiers accompanying
Darius, also large numbers of other Greek mercenaries had survived the
104

Curt., 3.12.13; Arr., An., 2.12.1-2; It. Alex., 36; St. Byz., s.v. Issj. Heckel
1992, pp. 260-261; Salazar 2000, pp. 186-187, 194; Le Rider 2003, pp. 161-169.
105
Arr., An., 2.13.1; Curt., 4.1.1-3; Diod., 17.39.1. Bosworth 1980, p. 222;
Atkinson 1980, pp. 267-268; Seibert 1985, p. 70.

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177

Battle of Issus. Unfortunately the sources give us inconsistent information

regarding the size of the groups and the routes they took to rejoin the rest
of the Persian army. At least 8,000 commanded by the Macedonian
Amyntas as well as the Greeks Aristomedes, Thymondas and Bianor
reached the city of Tripoli (in Lebanon), where Persian ships were
stationed. From there they sailed to Cyprus, where they divided into two
groups. 4,000 of these soldiers next sailed with Amyntas to Egypt, which
seemed to be an easy prey after the countrys satrap Sabaces had been
killed at Issus. In Egypt Amyntas, claiming to have been appointed by
Darius III the new satrap or overall commander of troops, succeeded in
capturing the important fortress of Pelusium. Next he sailed up the Nile to
Memphis, defeated the citys garrison in a pitched battle and allowed his
soldiers to plunder the area around the Egyptian capital. It was then that
Mazaces, who had genuinely been appointed Sabacess successor as satrap
of Egypt, launched a sally out of the beleaguered city and slaughtered
Amyntass dispersed soldiers.106 Another 8,000 Greek veterans of Issus,
no doubt including the remaining 4,000 mercenaries that had originally
sailed to Cyprus, eventually turned up in Crete, where they entered the
service of King Agis III of Sparta in his conflict against pro-Macedonian
party on that island.107
The rest of the Persian army that had survived the Battle of Issus made
its way into the interior of Asia Minor, where it continued the war against
Alexander. In the winter of 333/332 a significant number of Iranian
detachments together with their commanders, including the highest
ranking official in Persia, the hazarapati Nabarzanes, gathered in
Cappadocia, Paphlagonia and Cilicia. Some scholars presume that these
Persian forces were acting on the Great Kings orders and that their
mission was to cut Alexanders supply lines, recapture territories right up
to the coast so as to re-establish contact with the Persian fleet and even to
retake Sardis. Unfortunately, the ancient sources do not provide evidence
that could univocally lead us to such a conclusion. There is even no
evidence that there was any coordination between the actions of the
various Persian commanders. This would have indeed been extremely
difficult considering the means of communication between forces in those
times, that is, by using runners who would have had to have constantly cut
across enemy occupied territory. The Persian commanders did, however,
levy fresh troops in Cappadocia and Paphlagonia, and next entered Lydia.
106

Curt., 4.1.27-33; Diod., 17.48.2-5; Arr., An., 2.13.1-3. Parke 1933, p. 199;
Bosworth 1980, pp. 222-223.
107
Arr., An., 2.13.2; Diod., 17.48.1; Curt., 4.1.39-40. Badian 1961, p. 26; Atkinson
1980, p. 291.

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The Macedonian satrap of this district, Antigonus, did not have a large
force, but by skilfully exploiting the regions network of roads he was able
to separately defeat each of the three Persian armies in turn. After these
victories his army entered Lycaonia, while another Macedonian
commander, Calas, invaded Paphlagonia. These battles did not mark the
final defeat of the Persians in Asia Minor, large parts of which the
Macedonians never managed to conquer. Nevertheless, thanks to the
exceptional military talents of Antigonus the crisis in the region was
overcome and Alexander no longer had to fear his land connections with
Macedonia being cut.108
It was also in 332 that the fate of the Persian fleet was sealed and that
of the Aegean Sea campaign with it. In the spring Pharnabazus lost
successive squadrons of Phoenician kings returning to their homeland on
news of the advancing Macedonian army. Most switched their allegiance
to Alexanders winning side, whereas the ships of Tyre hurried to save
their beleaguered city. That same spring the squadrons of the Cypriot
kings also suddenly sailed away from Pharnabazuss fleet and joined
forces with the victorious Macedonian land army. Unrest spread across the
Greek islands of the Aegean. When a fleet of 160 ships commanded by
Hegelochus and Amphoterus led to a Macedonian occupation of Tenedos,
fighting started between pro-Macedonian and pro-Persian factions on
Chios. Pharnabazus managed to intervene in time. He imprisoned the
supporters of Macedonia and left a small detachment of troops to keep the
island secure for the pro-Persian politicians Apollonides and Athenagoras.
However, thanks to secret allies within the city, Hegelochus and
Amphoterus occupied Chios, arresting not only the pro-Persian politicians
but also Pharnabazus. Soon they also captured a pro-Persian tyrant of
Methymna in Lesbos, who sailed into the port of Chios with five ships
quite unaware that it was now in Macedonian hands. Then in the summer
of 332 the Macedonian flotilla sailed to Lesbos, where the sources report
that only the tyrant of Mytilene, Chares, put up resistance with the 2,000
mercenaries the Persian commanders had left behind. After a short siege
Mytilene capitulated on such terms that Chares and the mercenaries were
allowed to sail to Imbros. Charess resistance had been short-lived on
account of the pro-Macedonian stance of most of the inhabitants of this
largest of the poleis on Lesbos; it was for this stance that in 331 Alexander
rewarded Mytilene with financial compensation and land in Asia Minor
closest to the Island of Lesbos. The Macedonians went on to capture the
large island of Kos, while other islands not named in the sources now also
108

Diod., 17.48.5-6; Curt., 4.1.34-35, 4.5.13. Goukowsky 1975, p. 263; Billows

1990, pp. 41-46; Briant 1996, p. 851; Debord 1999, pp. 462-465.

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179

went over to their side. In November or December 332 Hegelochus could

report to Alexander that the war in the Aegean was over. The Macedonian
king ordered the captured leaders of the pro-Persian oligarchies to be sent
back to their home states to be punished; only Apollonides of Chios and
his companions were kept interned in Elephantine in southern Egypt.109
Immediately after the Battle of Issus Alexander dispatched Parmenion
to Damascus to capture the baggage train that was stationed there. Curtius
presents a very detailed and dramatic account that is not contradicted by
any of the much more concise accounts of other authors. Parmenion set off
with a small number of soldiers and after a forced march reached
Damascus on the fourth day. On the way he had capture a courier bearing
a message from the commandant of Damascus to Alexander with an offer
to give up the treasures. Unfortunately this messenger next escaped, which
made the Macedonians fear this was just a trap and the Persian general
uncertain whether his offer of capitulation was accepted. That was why the
Persian baggage train left Damascus in the middle of a ferocious blizzard.
Parmenion sent three ilai of cavalry after this train which caught up with it
and forced it to return to Damascus. Vast amounts of treasure fell into
Macedonian hands, including 2,600 talents, 7,000 pack animals and
30,000 captives. The greatest beneficiary was of course Alexander himself.
But the captured treasures of Issus and Damascus also enriched many of
the soldiers; according to Plutarch, the Thessalian cavalry in particular had
deliberately been sent with Parmenion to reward them for their valour in
the battle. Alexander received from Damascus a precious container which
Darius had allegedly used to keep perfumes; henceforth Alexander used it
to hold his copy of the Iliad and it accompanied him everywhere he went.
A real or fictitious letter from Parmenion cited by Athenaeus states that
among the captured royal servants there were: 329 female musicians, 46
wreath makers, 277 cooks, 29 cooking specialists, 13 dairy specialists, 17
drinks specialists, 70 pourers of wine and 40 perfumers. Among the
relatives of satraps and Persian notables captured at Damascus was a
Persian woman renowned for her exceptional beauty and Greek education
called Barsine, an Achaemenid after her father, Artabazus, and
successively the widow of first Mentor and next of Memnon. Now she
became Alexanders concubine; the fruit of their relationship was a son
called Heracles, who was born around 327 but was never recognised as
Alexanders legitimate heir. Also captured at Damascus were ambassadors
sent to the Great King by Greek states obviously in the expectation of
Alexanders defeat and of gaining some political benefits for themselves
109

Arr., An., 3.2.3-7; Curt., 4.5.14-22, 4.8.13; IG xii.2.6. Bosworth 1980, pp. 266269; Heisserer 1980, pp. 96-111, 118-139.

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out of it. The envoys from Athens and Sparta were to be kept under guard
in the Macedonian camp up until Darius IIIs ultimate defeat. The Theban
delegates, on the other hand, were released both on account of Alexanders
qualms about destroying their city as well as because Thebes and
Macedonia were officially at war and so their pro-Persian stance was fully
justified.110
The main Macedonian forces most probably stayed for some time near
Issus. It was then that Alexander carried out the administrative measures
and soon afterwards also made the first appointments concerning Syria.
Arrian mentions a certain Menon, son of Cerdimmas, whom he appoints
satrap of Coele-Syria, whereas Curtius states this same territory was put
under the control of Parmenion. In all probability both these sources are
using terminologies from later eras: Curtius is referring to the Koile Syria
of Hellenistic times, when it denoted the entire Syrian-Palestinian coast,
whereas Arrian is referring to the Early Roman Empire period, when
Coele-Syria exclusively denoted the north-western part of Syria. Therefore
we can assume that Menon was made military commander of northern
Syria, whereas Parmenion was given military control of the central and
southern coastal regions, a responsibility he soon passed on to
Andromachus. Sometime in 332 there also appears an Iranian satrap called
Arimmas, who is put in charge of civilian administration.111 Alexanders
armies no doubt set off south towards Phoenicia before the end of 333. By
choosing this direction, i.e. to conquer the Persian satrapy of Ebirnari
(Beyond the River, i.e. Euphrates) and later Egypt, Alexander may have
made the most important strategic decision of his life. After his victory at
Issus, Alexander was afforded the rare luxury in politics of having the
freedom to choose from a number of options. Instead of heading for
Phoenicia, he could have pursued Darius III, who was then fleeing to
Babylon. If successful, this other option incidentally much more in
keeping with Alexanders impulsive nature could have ensured a swift
victory in the war against the Great King. Some modern historians have
criticised Alexander for not opting for this rapid strategic solution. But
here we should only note that Alexanders strategy of conquering Syria

110

Curt., 3.12.27-3.13.17; Arr., An., 2.15.1-5; Diod., 20.20.1; Curt., 10.6.11;

Polyaen., 4.5.1; Ath., 13.87; Plu., Alex., 21.8-9, 24.1-3, 26.1; Plu., Eum., 1.7; Paus.,
9.7.2; Just., 13.2.7; Plin., Nat., 7.108; It. Alex., 41. Brunt 1975; Carney 2000, pp.
102-105.
111
Arr., An., 2.13.7, 3.6.8 (followed by It. Alex., 38); Curt., 4.1.4, 4.5.9. Bosworth
1980, pp. 224-225; Sartre 2001, p. 90.

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181

and Egypt first and defeating Darius later not only proved successful but
also minimised the risks of enemy diversions behind his line.112
The route the Macedonian army took most probably ran through the
Syrian Gates to the valley of the river Orontes (today Asi), thence via the
river Eleutherus valley between the Amanus Mountains and Lebanon to
the Mediterranean coast. When the Macedonian army entered Phoenicia,
Alexander was greeted with a gold crown handed to him by Straton
according to Arrian, the son of Gerostratus, the ruler of Aradus (which the
Phoenicians called Arwad today, Ar-Ruad in Syria). By then Straton had
probably already decided to take over the throne from his father for
Curtius describes him as the king of Aradus and in fact there are coins
from that land with this legend. It is even possible that Straton made this
decision while his fathers ships were still part of Autophradatess fleet
and the arrival of the Macedonian army gave the young pretender an
excellent opportunity to switch sides in the conflict for his personal gain.
Aradus was the northernmost Phoenician state and that is why the
Macedonians entered its territory first. In Persian times Phoenicia was not
a single administrative region (satrapy or province) but a collection of
small separate states individually subordinate to the satrap of Ebirnari.
These states had considerable autonomy. There were native monarchs
ruling as vassals of the Great King but also as the highest priests to the
local gods. The power of the monarchs was shared with councils of elders,
comprising the wealthiest Phoenicians. For most of the Persian period
relations between the autonomous Phoenician states and the central
authorities were exemplary. The naval might of the Achaemenid Empire
was based on the excellence of the Phoenician fleet. However, in the 4th
century these relations somewhat soured, most notably when Tabnit
(Tennes in Greek), the ruler of the largest Phoenician city-state, Sidon,
rebelled against Artaxerxes III, as a result of which the city was destroyed
and reputedly as many as 40,000 inhabitants slaughtered. When the
Macedonian army entered Phoenicia there was no longer any city-state
that dominated the others politically. Straton, the king of the first
Phoenician state to side with the conquering Macedonians was officially
confirmed as ruler of his kingdom by Alexander.113
When the Macedonian army was in the city Marathus (today Amrit in
Syria, 11 km to the south of Tartus), which was part of the kingdom of
Aradus, a messenger brought Alexander a letter from Darius III. This was
112

Badian 1985, p. 432; Ashley 1998, pp. 237-238.

Arr., An., 2.13.7-8, 2.20.1; Curt., 4.1.6; It. Alex., 38. Moscati 1968, pp. 24-29;
Bosworth 1980, p. 226; Atkinson 1980, p. 270; Seibert 1985, p. 80; Grainger 1991,
pp. 5-34; Maier 1994, pp. 319-330.
113

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the start of a long diplomatic correspondence between the two rulers. All
the major sources mention this exchange of letters, but the way in which
they present Dariuss successive proposals and Alexanders responses to
them is so convoluted that any attempt to reconstruct these events can only
be hypothetical. One can only be certain that Darius wrote to his adversary
on three occasions and that on each occasion he increased his offer. The
ancient authors all agree that in the letter received by Alexander at
Marathus Darius demanded the release of the captured members of his
family. According to Arrian, who gives the most detailed account of this
first diplomatic exchange, Darius also accused Philip and Alexander of
breaking their alliance with Persia and unjustly invading the country,
whereas the outcome of the Battle of Issus he attributed to the will of the
gods. In response Alexander recalled real and imagined wrongs committed
by Persians against Greece and Macedonia, accused Darius of lacking the
legitimacy to rule and finally declared himself by right of being
victorious in battle to be the rightful monarch of Asia, in other words,
the Persian Empire. In a much more general manner Curtius also relates
this exchange of views regarding responsibility for the war as well as other
rival claims and there is no reason to doubt that the two monarchs referred
to each other in this way. Alexanders letter was not addressed exclusively
to Darius but also to a much wider audience. His use of the arguments of
Panhellenic propaganda (Persian crimes in Greece) and his questioning of
Dariuss right to the Persian throne must have been directed more to public
opinion. In this letter Alexander for the first time so openly declares his
aspirations to the Persian throne. He refers to himself as the king of Asia,
which could only mean the ruler of the Achaemenid empire, reserving for
Darius at most the position of vassal. We know that at the moment of
writing this was far from the case as Darius still had control of most of the
empire, but it is the declaration itself that is important. For the first time
Alexander openly announced that he intended to capture the Achaemenid
throne and that this was his real war aim. Both Arrian and Curtius mention
Dariuss offer of peace and friendship in return for the freeing of his
family, but only Curtius also mentions the offer to pay a ransom, which
would have been quite natural in such situations. This last offer in the
peace negotiations is also mentioned in other sources and there is every
reason to believe that it was actually made. What we do not know is the
actual size of the ransom for the only sum mentioned in the sources
10,000 talents in Itinerarium Alexandri was probably copied from a later
offer made by Darius. Nevertheless, the amount offered must have been
vast because this was, after all, a ransom for the family of the Great King.
An exceptionally important part of Dariuss letter was his offer of peace

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and friendship since this was a de facto recognition of Alexander as a king

equal to ruler of Persia. In other words, Darius was resigning from the so
far maintained Achaemenid political theory that placed the Great King
above other monarchs and states. On the other hand, there is no mention
made of any territorial concessions, which at first sight might seem strange
in light of the war so far and the loss of much of Asia Minor. However,
this was only Dariuss first offer and he must have wanted to reserve some
concessions so that they could be used at a later stage in the negotiations.
Alexander rejected all of Dariuss proposals and responded with a letter
that was deliberately insulting. The impression seems to be that on this
occasion, as in later diplomatic exchanges, Alexander was trying to
provoke his adversary to confront him again militarily, so that the war
could be ultimately resolved on the battlefield. Moreover, in light of
inconsistencies in the sources regarding Dariuss offers, one cannot reject
outright the idea suggested by Diodorus that Alexander kept the Persian
monarchs real letter hidden and revealed to those around him a forgery
which concentrated mainly on who was responsible for the war. The real
offer might have been so beneficial to the Macedonian side that its
rejection would have angered those of Alexanders soldiers and officers
not interested in the continuing of the war after having already gained so
much. The genuine letter would have been kept hidden by the royal
secretary and not revealed until after Alexanders death. If that were the
case, our sources could have combined elements of one version of the
Great Kings letter with the other. However, this is only a hypothesis, as
there is not enough primary evidence to prove or disprove it.114
The Macedonian army left Marathus most probably at the start of
January 332 and headed south along the Phoenician coast. The next
Phoenician state they entered after Aradus was Byblos (Gubal, today Jbeil
in Lebanon), and it too capitulated without resistance. The decision to
surrender must have been made by the council of elders as the last king of
Byblus, Ainel (Enylus in Arrians Greek transcript), was still commanding
the Byblos squadron of ships in Autophradatess fleet.115 Soon afterwards,
under pressure from his subjects, the king of the next Phoenician state,
Sidon (today Saida in Lebanon), was also forced to capitulate. However,
despite his capitulation, King Abdashtart III (in Greek sources Straton) of
114

Arr., An., 2.14; Curt., 4.1.7-14; Diod., 17.39.1-2; Just., 11.12; It. Alex., 39-40.
Tarn 1948, i, pp. 36-37; Wilcken 1967, pp. 106-107; Griffith 1968; Lane Fox 1973,
p. 180; Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 222-227; Bosworth 1980, pp. 227-233; Mehl 1980,
pp. 185-186; Briant 1980, pp. 51-64; Bloedow 1995; Hamilton 1999, pp. 70-71.
115
Arr., An., 2.15.6, 2.20.1; Curt., 4.1.15. Moscati 1968, p. 26; Atkinson 1980, p.
279; Dbrowa 1988, p. 59; Sartre 2001, pp. 42-43.

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Sidon did not gain Alexanders trust perhaps because he was a son of the
king appointed to the throne by Artaxerxes III after the quelling of the
rebellion of Sidon. Therefore Alexander had him removed from power and
most probably executed. The ancient sources devote a great deal of
attention to the matter of the succession to the Sidonian throne. There is a
tale that in Hellenistic and Roman times would become a classic example
of the omnipotence of Tyche, the goddess of fortune, who could
unexpectedly topple people from the highest positions of authority and
raise others from the depths of obscurity. Having deposed Abdashtart,
Alexander learned that there was no rightful successor to the throne and so,
wishing to maintain the same political system as before, he asked his
closest companion Hephaestion to find an appropriate candidate. Well
born Sidonians informed Hephaestion of Abdalonymus, who was the only
surviving male member of the royal dynasty but a mere gardener. The
ancient authors with relish portray a scene of officials and soldiers
approaching this humble man at work in a garden, have him dressed in
ceremonial robes, presented before Alexander and then installed on the
throne. Regardless of whether or not this colourful description of events is
true, we know for certain that Abdalonymus did become king. Moreover,
he was the first Asian to be included among Alexanders Companions.
Abdalonymuss greatest contribution to posterity happened years later
when he commissioned the famous marble Alexander Sarcophagus. One
of the longer sides depicts Alexander and his companions fighting the
Persians at the Battle of Issus. The other side presents a lion hunt, which is
often interpreted as one of outings the newly nominated king of Sidon
organised in the Lebanon hills to entertain his benefactor and hetairoi.116
In the winter of 332 Alexander reached the last of the major
Phoenician cities Tyre. This would have been in February for we know
from Curtiuss account that at the time the inhabitants of Tyre were
celebrating the feast of Melqart-Baal and other sources state that this feast
was always held in that month. The victorious Macedonian march was
supposed to stop at this city until summer. Initially there were no signs of
the trouble that lay ahead. King Azemilcus was away with his Tyrian
squadron supporting Autophradatess fleet, so his son headed a delegation
appointed either by the peoples assembly (according to Arrian) or, more
probably, by an aristocratic council of elders. They greeted Alexander with
116
Arr., An., 2.15.6; Ath., 12.41; Curt., 4.1.15-26; Diod., 17.47 (Diodorus mistook
Tyre for Sidon); Plu., mor., 340c-e (Paphos is the setting of the story); Just.,
11.10.8-9. Lane Fox 1973, pp. 180-181; Atkinson 1980, pp. 278-283; Grainger
1991, pp. 30-31, 34-35; Stewart 1993, pp. 294-306; Heckel 1997, p. 199; Sartre
2001, pp. 44, 72; Nawotka 2003, pp. 128-129.

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a heavy gold crown as a sign of surrender and with food for the soldiers as
a sign of hospitality. Alexander accepted these gifts, but also announced to
the Tyrians that he wished to lay an offering at the temple of Heracles,
which is the name the ancient authors give to the god of Tyre, MelqartBaal. The sources do not fully explain why Alexander made such a request
let alone why he was so unyielding about it. Ultimately this request led to
a siege that lasted many months and ended with the destruction of Tyre.
Modern historians often suggest that, by entering the town with troops to
lay offerings at the temple, Alexander wanted to test the sincerity of the
Tyrian declaration and confirm its submission. However, this is not the
only possible explanation of the events that happened in February 332, all
the more so as one cannot point to any sensible strategic considerations
that would have forced Alexander to impose on the Tyrians an
unconditional surrender even at the cost of a many month long and costly
siege. This major conflict could also have been started by a cultural
misunderstanding which both sides were subsequently unable to stop from
escalating. As many other incidents in his life demonstrate, Alexander had
a very scrupulous habit of offering sacrifices to gods, particularly those
with whom he felt a close affiliation. And this was particularly true with
regard to his mythological ancestor Heracles. According to Tyrian
religious principles, on the other hand, no one but the king could lead a
procession to lay offerings to the citys god. Therefore, if they allowed
Alexander to lead such a procession, they would have to recognise him as
their king and thus renounce the sovereignty they had so jealously guarded
for centuries. Trying to find a way out that would leave their status of
sovereignty intact but also not offend the powerful Macedonian ruler, the
Tyrians suggested that Alexander should lay his offerings at a different,
allegedly even older temple of Melqart located in Old Tyre on the
mainland and therefore beyond the main city of Tyre. This refusal, albeit
polite, provoked one of Alexanders famous outbursts of anger. Now in a
quite different, indeed demanding tone he gave an ultimatum: they would
comply with his request or else he would have the city stormed. After
some hesitation, the Tyrians rejected the ultimatum but offered in return to
stay neutral and allow neither Macedonian nor Persian troops into the city.
Using such an argument in negotiations with Alexander was exceptionally
unfortunate, as Miletus had discovered one and a half years earlier. Only
one of the ancient authors, Curtius, claims that at this stage Alexander
tried to continue the negotiations; in his version Alexander once again sent
messengers to the Tyrians, but they had now decided on war and so killed
the messengers. Ancient accounts also relate (after Chares) that when
ordering the start of the siege, Alexander mentioned that he had had a

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dream in which Heracles took him by the hand and led him to Tyre.
Alexanders soothsayer interpreted this to mean that the city would be
taken but only after a long hard struggle as foretold in the twelve labours
of Heracles.117
Apart from the force of religious conviction, the Tyrians decision to
refuse the ultimatum was also based on a faith in the strength of their fleet
and the natural impenetrability of their city. For this great city with an
estimated population of 50,000 inhabitants was located on an island very
close to the shore and on more than one occasion it had proved able to
withstand even very large land armies. Phoenician mastery of the art of
siege warfare as well as of constructing fortifications was among the most
advanced of its day, whereas its fleet, with new five-row type ships, was at
least equal to that of the Greeks. Along the edge of the Tyrian island there
was a 45-metre wall of cemented together stone. In the past only a sea
blockade had been able to force Tyre to negotiate, but at the start of 332
the Persian fleet largely supported by Phoenician ships still prevailed in
the Aegean, and this must have certainly given the Tyrians a false sense of
security. The inhabitants were also counting on support from their
powerful colony Carthage, whose delegates were incidentally present at
the metropolis on account of the Melqart festival. Citizens unable to carry
arms were now shipped off to Carthage, not only for their own safety but
also to make food supplies in the city last longer for the defenders.
Diodorus attributes the Tyrians with the intention of holding the
Macedonian army tied down for as long as possible so that Darius could
have enough time to raise a new army. But perhaps these were just the
authors own speculations or those of the source he derived the
information from, for in 332 there is no evidence of any coordination
between the actions of Darius III and the defence of Tyre. Instead of
concentrating his forces and launching an attack on Alexander from
behind, the Great King wasted his time on ineffective diplomacy and as a
consequence not only lost Phoenicia but also Egypt.118
The island of Tyre was just four stades (700 m) from the shore.
Moreover the water in the strait between the island and the coast was very
shallow except for the part right next to the island, which was five metres
117

Arr., An., 2.15.6-16.8, 2.18.1; Curt., 4.2.1-7, 4.215-17; Diod., 17.40.2-3; Plu.,
Alex., 24.6; Just., 11.10; It. Alex., 42. Wilcken 1967, p. 109; Moscati 1968, pp. 2627, 30-41; Edmunds 1971; Lane Fox 1973, p. 181; Green 1974, pp. 247-248;
Atkinson 1980, pp. 298-299; Bosworth 1980, p. 235; Bosworth 1988, p. 65;
Bloedow 1998, pp. 270-276.
118
Diod., 17.40.3; Arr., An., 2.18.2, 2.21.4; Just., 11.10. Sartre 2001, pp. 73-74.
Population of Tyre: Hammond 1996, p. 113.

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deep. That is why Alexander instructed his men to construct a mole from
the mainland. Perhaps he was inspired by the tyrant of Syracuse Dionysius,
who in 397 had his engineers construct a causeway to capture the Sicilian
Punic fortress of Motya. Ultimately, this Macedonian engineering venture
also proved to be successful; today Tyre is connected permanently to the
mainland by this mole (a tombolo in fact) in time expanded with accretion
of sand. However, its construction and thus the capture of Tyre proved
much more difficult than Alexander had originally supposed. The king did
not just encourage his men with speeches recorded by the ancient authors
but is even said to have himself carried baskets with soil used to create the
mole. Initially the builders made rapid progress. Tree trunks were hauled
down from Mount Lebanon to create stakes that were easily driven into the
muddy seabed. These palisades delineated the moles outline and protected
the subsequently deposited rocks and stones from the effects of the waves.
The houses of Old Tyre were demolished and their masonry was used as
building material for the causeway. Initially merely amused by the
Macedonian efforts, the Tyrians changed their mind once the moles
structure started to emerge out of the water and came up ever closer to
their island. So they decided to counterattack by sailing up in light boats to
the edges of the mole and firing missiles at the builders, thus injuring
many. In response Alexander had two towers raised at the end of the mole
with war engines to ward off such attackers. The Tyrians also conducted a
successful land raid, inflicting heavy casualties among the Macedonians
employed in the gathering of stones. It was at about this time that
highlanders from the Antilebanon Mountains also launched an attack and
killed thirty Macedonians. Worse still, the Tyrians managed to sail a fire
ship to the end of the mole, which set ablaze the towers and war engines,
while missiles from nearby Tyrian triremes prevented Alexanders soldiers
from putting the flames out. It is possible that this fire not only destroyed
the towers but also the parts of the mole structure, which allowed the
waves to wash many of the stones away.119
By then it had probably become obvious that the city could not be
captured without the aid of a fleet. That was why Alexander set out with a
detachment of hypaspists and Agrianians to Sidon, which he designated to
be the gathering point for his navy. This was the time when
Autophradatess Persian fleet was already dispersing with its Phoenician
and Greeks contingents successively departing. It was also no later than
then that the Tyrian squadron commanded by King Azemilcus must have
119

Arr., An., 2.18.3-19.5; Curt., 4.2.7-3.7; Diod., 17.42-43; Str., 16.2.23; Plin., Nat.,
5.76; Polyaen., 4.3.3. Bosworth 1980, pp. 239-241. On the tombolo: Marriner 2009,
pp. 49-101.

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returned home as soon afterwards it was taking part in the conflict and,
although he had not been there when Alexander first arrived, this king was
captured in Tyre when the city finally fell. The ships of the other
Phoenician kings, Gerostratus of Aradus and Ainel of Byblus, now sailed
to Sidon; together with the Sidonian squadron they formed a force of 80
vessels. Next they were joined by ten ships from Lycia, three from Mallus,
three from Soli and probably ten from Rhodes though some sources
claim that island went over to Alexanders side only after the capture of
Tyre. At least some of the nine kingdoms of Cyprus also decided to
contribute to the victors side. The sources mention that among those
present at the siege were Androcles of Amathus, Pasicrates of Curium as
well as Pnytagoras of Salamis; as a reward for his services the last of these
was granted part of the Phoenician kingdom of Citium in Cyprus.
However, it is probable that even more kingdoms from that island
supported the Macedonian king for his fleet included as many as 120
vessels. The deflection of Phoenician and Cypriot squadrons effectively
marked the end of Persian dominance at sea and the ultimate vindication
of the strategy announced by Alexander at Miletus. The Cypriot rulers,
who had for a long time supported Persia, now wished to ingratiate
themselves to Alexander, buy his favour and thus maintain the status quo
on the island. That is why we later hear of the gifts offered to Alexander
by Pymiathon of Citium. The last element of the Macedonian kings
armada was a single Macedonian warship. Cleander also joined
Alexanders forces at Sidon with a unit of 4,000 Greek mercenaries that
had been hired in the Peloponnese.120
In the spring of 332, while allied sea states gathered their forces at
Sidon, Alexander set out from that city on campaign against the Itureans,
who inhabited Mount Lebanon and were hampering his soldiers who were
collecting logs in this area. Some historians reckon that Alexanders
expedition reached as far as the Bekaa Valley, but the sources only
mention an episode high up in the mountains, whose nights at that time of
year were bitterly cold. Curtiuss inaccurate claim that this expedition
occurred before the burning down of the towers and war engines on the
mole at Tyre is perhaps motivated by a desire to absolve Alexander for
this Macedonian failure. During his absence Alexander entrusted
command of the Tyre siege to Perdiccas and Craterus. For his expedition
he selected the best and fastest moving units several ilai of cavalry,
hypaspists, Agrianians and archers which suggest that he was expecting
120

Arr., An., 2.19.6-20.3; Duris, FGrH, 76 F12; Curt., 4.2.11; Plu., Alex., 24.4-5,
29.2-6, 32.10; Plu., mor., 334d-e; It. Alex., 42. Bosworth 1980, pp. 241-244;
Seibert 1985, pp. 80-82; Heckel 2006, pp. 224, 239.

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stiff resistance. No doubt his caution was well justified for, despite
numerous pacifications, the region was still plagued by bandits in Roman
times. There was an incident during this expedition that yet again
demonstrated Alexanders courage and bravado. His main units had
dispersed into this dangerous territory but the king decided to stay behind
with a small unit of soldiers and accompany Lysimachus, for his now aged
teachers strength had failed him. Dusk fell and his small detachment
faced the prospect of spending a bitterly cold night without a fire.
Alexander therefore decided to creep up on the enemy, who had fires
burning. He stabbed two of the barbarians to death and returned to his men
with a lighted brand from the enemys fire. In this way the Macedonians
were able to light a huge fire, which terrified some of the Itureans and
caused them to flee. The rest of the enemy were defeated in a nigh-time
skirmish. The sources provide no further information regarding the results
of this ten-day military campaign.121
In response to the Tyrian counterattack and the damage caused by
waves Alexander ordered the mole to be widened and new towers to be
constructed nearer its centre, so that they would be beyond the reach of
missiles fired from Tyrian ships. These works were carried out while
Alexander was away in Sidon and later on his expedition in Mount
Lebanon. A breakwater of tree trunks was constructed around the mole,
which was particularly important in the winter season, when sea storms
could easily destroy a construction raised with such difficulty. The greater
width of the mole offered the Macedonian soldiers better protection
against surprise attacks. Trees dragged down from the hills were used as
building material in their entirety and thrown into the sea whole, their
roots weighted down with stones. Unfortunately, the defenders soon found
a new method of counterattacking: they sent divers to release the stones
from the roots of these trees so that the timber floated up to the surface and
thus broke up the moles building structure. Curtius writes that in face of
these mounting problems Alexander considered giving up on the siege, but
eventually he resolved to continue it with the aid of his fleet. Besides,
despite everything, the engineering work was making progress. After some
time the walls of Tyre found themselves within the firing range of
Macedonian siege engines on wooden towers now constructed at the end
of the farther extended mole.122

121

Plu., Alex., 24.10-14 (after Chares, FGrH, 125 F7); Curt., 4.3.1; Arr., An.,
2.20.4; Polyaen., 4.3.4. Bosworth 1980, p. 244; Seibert 1985, p. 82; Ephal 1988, p.
148.
122
Diod., 17.42.6-7; Curt., 4.3.8-11.

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Some time after his return from the expedition against the Itureans
Alexander ordered the fleet gathered at Sidon to sail for Tyre. These ships
were instructed to sail in battle formation with hypaspists on board.
Therefore clearly Alexanders intention was to fight a sea battle against
the weaker Tyrian fleet. He personally commanded the right wing and
entrusted the left wing to Craterus and Pnytagoras of Salamis. The Tyrians
did initially wish to engage Alexanders fleet in battle, but when they
realised that this fleet included the mighty Phoenician and Cypriot
squadrons, they sensibly decided to stay in harbour blocking the entrance
with several rows of triremes. Alexander tried a feint attack to lure the
ships out to sea, but to no avail. The most Alexanders fleet could do was
to sink three of the most protruding Tyrian triremes. Moreover, the
Macedonian side also suffered losses; on top of the city fortifications the
Tyrians cruelly murdered some Macedonian hostages as their compatriots
helplessly looked on from the sea. However, although the sea operation
against Tyre was not spectacularly successful, it did at least stop the
Tyrian ships from hampering the work of the besiegers.123
However, the Tyrian defenders remained active. Soon they repaired the
parts of the city wall that had incurred damage and raised their own
wooden towers to fire missiles at the Macedonians on the mole. The
defenders used a number of ingenious machines and discovered ever
newer ways of weakening the enemys power to attack. They fired ropefastened metal tridents into the besiegers shields which were next
violently pulled away to leave the enemy exposed or catapulted them
together with the shield to a certain death. Tyrians captured other
Macedonians on the mole with hooks or simple nets fired from a war
engine called the crow. They lessened the impact of battering rams by
literally lowering cushions in the place where they struck the wall and
cutting the ropes from which the battering log was suspended with sickles
attached to long poles. Metal tipped spears fired from Tyrian war engines
also damaged the rigging of the enemys ships and wounded those on
board. A simpler but awfully effective weapon in this cruel war was to
pour blistering hot sand on the Macedonian soldiers below, which once it
got beneath their armour caused unbearable pain. Large stones had been
hurled into the sea to prevent the Macedonian ships from getting too close
to the city, and it was with the greatest of effort, under fire from the city
wall, that that these stones had to be removed by Macedonian divers so as
to clear the waterway. Tyrian divers, on the other hand, caused chaos in
the Macedonian fleet by cutting the anchor cables, which consequently
123

Arr., An., 2.20.6-10, 2.24.3; Diod., 17.43.3; Curt., 4.3.11-12. Bosworth 1980, pp.
244-246.

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had to be replaced with chains. All such measures further prolonged the
siege, forcing Alexander to once again consider whether there was any
sense in continuing it. The stiff resistance of the Tyrians as well as that
awkwardness of the topography meant that the siege lasted until the
summer and the final storming of the city did not occur until the end of
July or even early August.124
The Tyrians tried their luck once more in the open sea with a surprise
attack on the Cypriot ships that lay anchored blocking their northern (socalled Sidon) harbour. They chose to attack at midday, when the enemy
was less watchful and there was practically no one on deck. Earlier they
had also screened off the harbour mouth with canvas and now their ships
sailed out silently without the steersmen calling the oarsmen to keep in
time. The Tyrian squadron, which included modern quad- and
quinqueremes, were initially very successful against the moored Cypriot
vessels, sinking many including the flagships of Pnytagoras of Salamis
and Androcles of Amathus. Their luck turned, however, when an alerted
Alexander, who had been stationed on the southern side of the mole, sailed
with some hastily gathered quinqueremes and several smaller ships to
counterattack the enemy while they were still engaged in sinking the
Cypriot vessels. The Tyrians now had to save themselves by returning into
the harbour. Although the Tyrians lost only two ships and had inflicted
much heavier losses on the enemy, their strategic situation must have now
radically deteriorated. The sources make no further mention of the
defenders being able to challenge Macedonian dominance at sea.125
Once the Tyrian fleet was confined to port and no longer was able to
hamper Macedonian actions, Alexander gave the order to attack. Under the
cover of fire from Macedonian catapults, the mole was extended right up
to the island. Meanwhile Macedonian, Cypriot and Phoenician engineers
constructed yet more siege engines, some of which were mounted on
transport ships and triremes, the intention being to attack from both land
and sea. This first attack ended in failure: on the moles side the citys
mighty wall proved too strong for Macedonian battering rams. Nor did the
seaborne attack from north bring any success. From the southern side
seaborne siege engines on ships did manage to destroy part of the wall and
the Macedonians did lower draw bridges in an attempt to get in through

124

Arr., An., 2.21.1-7; Diod., 17.43.5-45.7; Curt., 4.3.13-4.1; Fragmentum

Sabbaiticum, FGrH, 151 F1.7.
125
There are two accounts differing in details: Arr., An., 2.21.8-22.5 and Curt.,
4.4.6-9; better being that of Arrian, Atkinson 1980, pp. 309-310. A hypothesis was
formulated about two sea battles, both won by Alexander: Abramenko 1992.

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Chapter IV

the breach, but this attack was also repelled. Moreover, a storm next
damaged some of the siege engine bearing vessels.126
The final assault commenced after a two-day respite when the sea had
calmed down. With no winds the siege engines mounted on ships could be
effectively used against the city wall, which was considerably weaker
from the side facing the sea. This was the 29th day of a Macedonian month
that is not named in the sources, but according the Athenian calendar it
would have been Hekatombaion, i.e. July/August. Therefore the assault
would have most probably occurred in the early August of 332. The
Macedonians attacked from all sides and their battering rams managed to
destroy a considerable section of the wall. Bridges were thrown over to
this breach and elite detachments of hypaspists and phalangites
commanded by Coenus landed. The remaining ships sailed round the
island with archers on board firing at the defenders to distract them from
the main thrust of attack. Alexander himself together with some hypaspists
scaled the citys wall from a tower on one of the ships and thence, via the
royal palace, reached the city. At the same time Phoenician ships broke
into the southern harbour while Cypriot ships entered the northern harbour
and their respective crews started occupying the city from both sides.
Paradoxically the only side where the sources record no breach was from
the mole which had been built with such great effort. Realising that the
enemy had entered the city from several directions, the Tyrians rallied to a
part of the city called Agenorion. But even there they were unable to
withstand the onslaught of Alexander and his hypaspists. Enraged by the
difficulties they had had to endure in the long siege, the Macedonians now
set about massacring the stubborn citys inhabitants. The number of
Tyrians killed has been estimated from 6,000 (Curtius) to 8,000 (Arrian),
with another 2,000 said to have been crucified on the mainland coast.
Probably rather 13,000 (Diodorus) than 30,000 (Arrian) inhabitants were
allegedly taken into slavery. The Sidonians, however, took pity on their
compatriots and saved 15,000 Tyrians by taking them on board their ships.
The victors mercy was only shown to King Azemilcus, some Tyrian
dignitaries and envoys from Carthage, who had all sought refuge in the
Temple of Melqart. The only available information regarding the size of
Macedonian losses for the entire siege and the two major assaults on the
city is 400 soldiers killed: it comes from Arrian and therefore probably has

126

Arr., An., 2.22.6-7; Curt., 4.3.13-18; Diod., 17.43.6-44.5. Bosworth 1980, pp.
250-251.

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as much to do with reality as all the other figures provided by this

author.127
Military historians give Alexander high notes for the siege of the
seemingly impregnable fortress defended by skilful and determined
citizens. The capture of mighty Tyre was an earthshaking event in this part
of the world, even recorded in the Bible as a prophesy in the second part of
the Book of Zachariah, which was written at the end of the 4th century.
Alexander, portrayed as the he-goat defeating the ram representing the
Persian king, is also featured in another prophesy (likewise written post
eventum) in the Book of Daniel originating from the mid 2nd century.
Meanwhile, the day after the citys capture Alexander paid his long
awaited visit to the Temple of Melqart. The offering of sacrifices was
accompanied with a military parade in full armour, a convoy of ships and a
sports contest held near the temple. The votive offerings laid before
Heracles/Melqart included a siege engine that had crushed the citys walls
and a Tyrian ship that had already once been offered to this god.
Alexander nominated a Macedonian called Philotas (not to be confused
with a son of Parmenion) as military commander of Tyre and the
surrounding areas. Tyre was not completely destroyed and under
Macedonian supervision the Phoenicians were allowed to gradually settle
there again, but the city never regained its earlier status. It is probably that
King Azemilcus continued to rule over the kingdom, but now as
Alexanders appointee. The Tyre mint continued to issue King
Azemilcuss coins, and by 331 it also started issuing Alexanders coins.
The fact that he had captured the most impregnable Persian fortress in the
Mediterranean and thus underpinned the likelihood of his claim to the
Achaemenid Empire may have inspired Alexander to start issuing in
332/331 staters gold coins, which according to Persian custom signified
royal sovereignty. Finally, before he moved on, Alexander received a
delegation from the League of Corinth with somewhat belated
congratulations for his victory at Issus in the autumn of the previous
year.128

127

Arr., An., 2.23-24; Curt., 4.4.10-18; Plu., Alex., 25.1-3; Diod., 17.46;
Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, FGrH, 151 F1.7; It. Alex., 43. Wilcken 1967, pp. 110111; Bosworth 1980, pp. 251-256; Heckel 1992, pp. 58-64; Hammond 1989, pp.
132-134.
128
Za., 9.2-4; Da., 8; Diod., 17.46.6, 17.48.5; Curt., 4.5.9-12; Arr., An., 2.24.6;
Just., 18.3, 19.4.1. Schachermeyr 1973, p. 218; Atkinson 1980, p. 325; Seibert
1985, p. 82; Ashley 1998, pp. 247-249; Le Rider 2003, pp. 170-188; Heckel 2006,
s.v. Philotas [8].

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During the siege of Tyre, at a time unspecified by the sources,

Alexander received another letter from Darius III, who had not been
dissuaded by the arrogant tone of his enemys response at Marathus to his
first peace proposal. Here too the various accounts given by the ancient
authors are as incongruous as their accounts of the first diplomatic offer.
Plutarch even states that Dariuss messengers reached Alexander during
his second stay at Tyre in the spring of 331. However, most of the authors
of the two major historical source traditions state that the messengers
arrived during the siege and therefore this version is more plausible. The
Great Kings demands were the same as before. However, he now made
changes to what he was proposing in return: the hand of his daughter
Stateira in marriage and a ransom of 10,000 talents (though the latter may
have also been a repetition of his earlier offer). On top of that he was now
agreeing to cede territory, up to the river Halys (according to Curtius,
Diodorus and Valerius Maximus) or up to the river Euphrates (according
to Arrian, Plutarch and Itinerarium Alexandri). The offer of ceding
territory up to the river Euphrates seems less likely as it would have
included regions that were still under Persian control. Moreover, this offer
is all the more improbable as it was made at the time when Alexander was
preoccupied with the siege of Tyre and therefore not really poised to
conquer more territories to the east. The river Halys, on the other hand,
marked a traditional boundary between East and West, and it had already
been presented as such in Panhellenistic literature in Philip IIs lifetime.
The area between the Hellespont and the Halys was the only part of the
Achaemenid Empire that had been intensively colonised by Greeks and
whose native elites had therefore also been to a large extent Hellenised.
This territory the Greeks knew well enough to effectively administer and
further colonise. If only for these reasons the acceptance of Dariuss
second offer would have been a realisation of Macedonias war aims from
the end of Philip IIs reign. That is how Parmenion saw it and said he
would accept the offer if he were Alexander. Alexanders response on
this occasion or after Dariuss third offer was to say that he also would
also accept the offer if he were Parmenion. This was yet another incident
demonstrating Alexanders maximalist attitude, as Arrian states: he
needed no money from Darius, nor a part of the country instead of the
whole; for the money and country all belonged to him. Allegedly, it was
only after receiving this second response that Darius began preparing for
the continuation of war.129
129

Arr., An., 2.25.1-3; Diod., 17.39.1-2, 17.54.1; Curt., 4.5.1-8; Plu., Alex., 29.7-8;
Just., 11.12; It. Alex., 43-44; V. Max., 6.4, ext. 3. Andreotti 1957, pp. 125-126;

From Abydus to Alexandria

195

The Tyrian resistance and the sea damage to their mole had not been
the only problems to beset the besiegers. D.W. Engels has calculated that
in the seven months that the siege lasted the Macedonian army (excluding
the allied fleet, which comprised over 40,000 people) consumed over
28,000 tons of grain, which was the soldiers basic diet. The traditional
means of feeding an army was to commandeer food from the land it
occupied, but that would not have been possible in the area around Tyre as
it could have only accounted for 7 % of the above-mentioned amount. It
was indeed primarily logistical concerns that drew Alexanders attention
to Palestine, which in Antiquity produced a surplus of grain. In the Persian
era the inland part of Palestine comprised three small, native entities,
Idumea and two autonomous statelets Samaria and Judah, living on hostile
terms with one another but being at the same time provinces of the
Ebirnari satrapy. The Persian governors in the more northern province of
Samaria came from a native dynasty, represented in Alexanders time by
Sanballat III. The more southern state of Judah was a theocracy centred on
the Temple in Jerusalem and its High Priest. This state did not have a local
ruling dynasty but the Great King still always nominated a governor from
among the native Jews. We do not know how authority was divided
between the governor and the High Priest, especially as both of them
issued a similar type of coin. In Alexanders day the Persian governor in
Judah was Yehizqiyyah and the High Priest according to Flavius
Josephus was probably Jaddua II, though it may in fact have been
Johannan. During the siege of Tyre Alexander requested these two
Palestinian states to supply him with soldiers and provisions. According to
Flavius Josephus, Sanballat III fulfilled these requests and sent 8,000
Samaritan troops to Tyre. For this the governor was rewarded with
permission to build a temple on Mount Gerizim that could compete with
the Temple in Jerusalem. The High Priest Jaddua, however, allegedly
remained loyal to Darius III, which angered Alexander and portended his
revenge after the capture of Tyre.130
There is a romantic version of the contacts between the Macedonian
ruler and the inhabitants of Judea originating from the Jewish oral tradition,
recorded in two independent works that of Flavius Josephus, general
considered better, and the Talmud, generally considered too belletristic
as well as from some versions of the Alexander Romance. The essential
Wilcken 1967, pp. 111-112; Goukowsky 1975, p. 264; Bosworth 1980, pp. 227229, 256-257; Hamilton 1999, pp. 76-77.
130
J., AJ, 11.8.2-4. Kazis 1962, pp. 4-11; Engels 1978, pp. 55-56; Ephal 1988, pp.
147-152; Tadmor 1994, p. 289; Briant 1996, pp. 734-735; Dandamaev 1999;
Briant 2009, pp. 152-155.

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element of this romantic version is victorious Alexanders visit to

Jerusalem with the intention of punishing the Judah for not helping him
during the siege of Tyre. But then events unfolded in a quite unplanned
way. When he met the High Priest, the king is said to have prostrated
himself to honour the God Yahweh. The presence of this imagined
element inclines some historians to doubt the credibility of the whole tale.
But this is exaggerated scepticism: Alexander was known to have been
curious of the world in general and of religion in particular, so a visit to a
unique monotheistic temple would be very much in keeping with his
personality. It is also important to stress that in the Jewish tradition
Alexander is a decidedly positive figure, a ruler who showed respect to the
Judaic religion and allowed the Jews to live in accordance with their faith
and culture. Flavius Josephus writes that Alexander visited Jerusalem after
the capture of Gaza. This, however, seems unlikely for by then Alexander
would have been preparing to enter Egypt and organising such a major
logistical operation would not have allowed him to take time off for any
detours. Besides, Arrian mentions that on the eve of the siege of Gaza
Palestine was already subjugated to the Macedonian king. This allows us
to speculate that Alexander would have had more time to visit Jerusalem
during the seven-month siege of Tyre as he had also had time for military
and hunting expeditions in Mount Lebanon. It was during one of these
hunts that Alexander found himself in grave danger; a lion would have
attacked him if Craterus had not killed the beast in the nick of time.
Observing this foolhardiness in which the king quite unnecessarily risked
his life and thus also the fate of the entire expedition as well as his
monarchy, a Spartan ambassador being held captive in the Macedonian
camp is supposed to have ironically praised him, saying: Excellent,
Alexander, you have been fighting a lion for the realm.131
In Palestine, despite the initial support provided to Alexander during
the siege of Tyre, it eventually turned out that Samaria would cause more
trouble than Judah. Towards the end of his stay in Egypt, i.e. in the late
summer of 331, the Samaritans rebelled. In unknown circumstances
Andromachus, the Macedonian military commander of southern Syria and
Palestine, was immolated by the Samaritans. Alexander naturally ordered
the perpetrators of this deed to be punished, the city of Samaria was
destroyed and a Macedonian colony established in its place. From then on
131

J., AJ, 11.8.4-5; Megillat Taanit, 9; Ps.-Callisth., (rec. g), 2.23-24; Arr., An.,
2.25.4. Kazis 1962, pp. 4-11; Seibert 1972, pp. 103-107; widerkwna 1996, pp.
86-89, 121; Stoneman 1997, pp. 36-37; Hammond 1989, p. 208; MelezeModrzejewski 1995, pp. 50-55. The lion episode: Plu., Alex., 40.4-5; FD 3.4.2.137;
see Hamilton 1999, p. 107; Stewart 1993, pp. 270-277.

From Abydus to Alexandria

197

Samaria was a Hellenistic city with a predominantly pagan population,

whereas the native Samaritan population lived mainly in Shechem and on
Mount Gerizim.132
The Macedonian army marched from Tyre towards Egypt along the
Mediterranean coast. They occupied coastal Palestinian cities on the way,
some of which belonged to Tyre or Sidon. There was most probably no
resistance. The feeding of the army during this 260-km march from Tyre
to Gaza would not have posed a major problem as it took place in August,
after the harvest, which in Palestine occurred in June. The fertile soils of
Galilee, the Plain of Esdraelon (Jezreel Valley) and the costal lowlands
could easily support the Macedonian army in the c. 11 days it took to
reach Gaza. In some places, however, there was a shortage of drinking
water, especially in summer when many of the streams and brooks dried
up. One can assume that supplying the army with drinking water was one
of the main tasks of the fleet commanded by Hephaestion, which
Alexander had instructed to sail alongside the Macedonian land forces.
Gaza, a former Philistine city on the border between Palestine and Sinai,
was an important fortress which armies moving into Egypt could not avoid.
It was also one of the destinations of caravan routes from Happy Arabia
(Yemen) used to transport incense and other valuable items for trade in the
Mediterranean area. Therefore control of this city gave access to lucrative
revenues; whoever held the city could bargain with the nomadic Arab
tribes that needed to be able to export the goods they had transported
across the desert.133
If Alexander had been hoping Gaza would capitulate without a fight,
he was disappointed. Guarding this mighty fortress, built on raised ground
overlooking a plain, was a detachment of Arab soldiers. They had
abundant supplies of food and fresh water from natural sources. Those
besieging the fortress, on the other hand, had to have food and drinking
water transported to them over considerable distances. The fortress was
commanded by Batis, whom Arrian calls a eunuch, though, as explained
earlier, this could simply mean he was a high-ranking Persian official. In
the extant fragments of the work of the Hellenistic historian, Hegesias,
Batis is called a king; he is also called a king in Semitic inscription (melek)
on a coin reputedly issued at Gaza. It is therefore probable that he was a
local Arab ruler whom the Great King had appointed to a high Persian

132

Curt., 4.8.9; Chron. Euseb., 2.223. Cross 1963; Seibert 1985, p. 90; Bosworth
1988, pp. 232-233.
133
Za., 9.5-8; Curt., 4.5.10. Delcor 1951, pp. 117, 120; Lane Fox 1973, p. 191;
Engels 1978, pp. 57-58; Hgemann 1985, pp. 47-49; Briant 1996, p. 736.

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office and entrusted with the defence of Gaza. 134 An attempt to

immediately capture Gaza failed, so Alexander had to prepare a siege and
have his war engines shipped over from Phoenicia. He spent two months
outside Gaza, probably in September and October 332, overseeing very
onerous engineering works. In order to be able to use their siege engines
the Macedonians needed to heap the hard sandy soil to build ramps leading
up to the knoll on which the fortress stood; at the same time they also
excavated the soil beneath the fortresss walls. The defenders did not look
on passively and instead organised raids on the besiegers. Alexander was
himself wounded twice during this siege once he was injured with an
arrow in his shoulder and on another occasion his leg was hit with a stone.
Once the ramp was ready the siege engines were brought up and the
storming began. The undermined sections of the wall collapsed but,
despite this, the defenders repelled three Macedonian assaults. Finally an
attack conducted simultaneously from various sides broke the citys
defences. The first to scale the wall was Neoptolemus of the royal Aeacid
dynasty from Epirus, and therefore a relative of Alexanders. The
Macedonians slaughtered the brave defenders; Hegesias mentions 4,000
and Curtius 10,000 killed. In keeping with the customs of that age, the
women and children were sold into slavery. Alexander had the captured
Batis tied to his chariot and dragged around the city. With this barbaric
deed Alexander was, in his own words, following the example of Achilles,
who in this way defiled the corpse of Hector at Troy. Gaza was now
settled with a new population, but it remained an important military base.
Before his departure for Egypt, Alexander sent Amyntas back to
Macedonia to raise yet more reinforcements, which would indicate that
during the 332 campaign the Macedonians incurred greater losses than the
ancient sources record.135

6. The son of Ammon

Egypt was that part of the Persian Empire where the rule of the
Achaemenids was the least stabilised. Although it had already been
conquered by Cambyses in 525, this country experienced many rebellions
and on more than one occasion broke itself free from the Great Kings
134

Arr., An., 2.25.4; Curt., 4.6.7; Hegesias, FGrH, 142 F5; J., AJ, 11.8; D.H.,
Comp., 18; It. Alex., 45. Delcor 1951, p. 119; Engels 1978, pp. 58-59; Bosworth
1980, pp. 257-258; Atkinson 1980, pp. 334-336; Briant 1996, pp. 287, 945.
135
Arr., An., 2.25.4-27.7; Curt., 4.6.7-30; Hegesias, FGrH, 142 F5; Diod., 17.48.7;
Plu., Alex., 24.4-5; Plu., mor., 341b; Plb., 16.22a.3-6; D.H., Comp., 18; Zonar.,
4.10. Bosworth 1980, pp. 257-260; Atkinson 1980, pp. 337-343.

From Abydus to Alexandria

199

control. The ancient authors routinely criticised successive Persian rulers

for treating the native population with cruelty and for not respecting the
countrys customs, culture and religion. The most notable example of this
allegedly was the killing of the divine Apis bull, first by Cambyses and
later also by Artaxerxes III. At least in the case of the first of these rulers
Herodotuss claim that he killed the Apis bull with his own hands is false
for contemporary sources record how Cambyses honoured the divine bull.
The accusations regarding Artaxerxes III are in turn a repeat of
Herodotuss topos of the sacrilegious ruler. Nevertheless, these incessantly
repeated tales are not merely colourful decorations to accounts of exotic
countries but a reflection of predominantly negative opinions of Persia in
Egypt passed on to the Greeks by informers from the Egyptian priestly
caste. Apart from the inevitable friction caused by differences in mentality
and culture between the invader and a subjugated people, Cambyses, the
first Persian ruler of Egypt, had deprived Egyptian temples of much of
their revenues and privileges. Darius I did help to better establish Persian
rule by founding new temples, codifying Egyptian law and building the
ancient equivalent of the Suez Canal, indeed linking the Red Sea with the
Mediterranean. However, in the 5th century subsequent Persian rulers
stopped visiting Egypt and no longer cared as much as Darius I or even
Cambyses for maintaining close relations with the political elite of that
country. Instead they tried to keep Egypt loyal with numerous garrisons of
Iranian, Semitic (in this number Jewish), Carian, Greek and Egyptian
soldiers: in Elephantine, Thebes, Abydos, Memphis, Faiyum and several
places in the Nile Delta. But neither they nor the bureaucratic and police
apparatus, the kings eyes and ears, were able to stop the revolt that in
404 led to Egypt breaking away from the Persian Empire.136
Despite the efforts of successive Persian rulers to recapture this rich
province, over the next 60 years Egypt remained an independent state
ruled by the last three native dynasties. For two generations the energetic
pharaohs of the 28th-30th dynasties employed large armies of Greek
mercenaries to protect Egypts sovereignty. As these mercenaries were
used to being paid with money rather than in kind, the Egyptian rulers
founded a large mint, probably in Memphis, producing such excellent
copies of Athenian tetradrachms that for a long time modern numismatists
were unable to distinguish them from the original. An unintended but
important consequence of this was the acquainting of Egyptians to the use
of coin money. With time at least the inhabitants of Memphis were even
using bronze coins in minor transactions. Thus even before the
136

Bresciani 1985, pp. 505-520; Ray 1988; Cuyler Young 1988, p. 51.

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Macedonian conquest, the Egyptians had started to acquire the abilities

and customs necessary for the functioning of a modern 4th-century
economy. It was Artaxerxes III who finally put an end to Egyptian
independence in 343. The last Egyptian pharaoh, Nectanebo II, fled abroad
according to the Alexander Romance he went on to father the great
Macedonian, Alexander. Greek authors paint a decidedly negative picture
of Artaxerxes IIIs rule in Egypt. Apart from demolishing the defensive
walls of major cities, temples were allegedly robbed; there were acts of
sacrilege and the theft of sacred scripts that were later sold back to the
priests by the corrupt chiliarch Bagoas. Egyptian sources, however, are
more equivocal. Some report the confiscation of land belonging to temples,
plunder and disruption in the social order, while others report life
continuing as normal and the temples being left undisturbed. As usual
some of the Egyptian elite both priestly and secular were able to adapt
quickly to the new situation and willingly cooperated with the new
authority. Clear evidence of social dissatisfaction with Persian rule came
with another rebellion when after the death of the active Artaxerxes III
there was no successor of adequate strength of personality to control
events. The rebel leader Khababash declared himself pharaoh and in the
years 338-336 held power at least in some parts of Egypt, including the
capital, Memphis. This rebellion, which was eventually quelled by Darius
III, was the source of great chaos for even most Egyptians regarded
Khababash to be a rebel rather than a monarch. He was not included in the
lists of kings and thus virtually condemned to be totally forgotten. The
Persian authority restored to Egypt by Darius III was strong and stable
enough to withstand the usurpation by Amyntas in the winter of
333/332.137
The ancient sources do not inform us of the objectives behind
Alexanders expedition to Egypt an expedition that delayed the final
showdown with Darius III by almost a year. Modern historians assume
that the conquest of this country was essential for the complete occupation
of the eastern Mediterranean area before the planned expedition into the
Asia interior. They note that the food resources of Syria and Palestine
would have been exhausted after the prolonged presence of the
Macedonian army. These resources had to be replenished before another
massive army set off to the East. On the other hand, we do know from the
ancient sources that Egypt made a great impression on Alexander. Like
many other ancient Greeks, he admired the Egyptian monuments and
137

Bresciani 1985, pp. 526-528; Lloyd 1994, p. 34; Briant 1996, p. 881; Le Rider
1997, pp. 83-88; Le Rider 2003, pp. 220-227; Debord 1999, p. 412; Burstein 2000.

From Abydus to Alexandria

201

towards the end of his life even planned to build a pyramid-shaped tomb
for his father.138
Gaza, which Alexander had captured in October 332, was 200 km
away from the nearest Egyptian city of Pelusium (today Tell el-Farama).
The route along the coast of the Sinai Peninsula was particularly
inhospitable: initially barren desert with absolutely no vegetation, later the
landscape changed into extensive coastal salt marshes. Rains in this part of
the Mediterranean coast could not be expected before November, and what
few wells there were had only small quantities of brackish water.
According to Arrian, the Macedonian army reached Pelusium on the
seventh day. No doubt the army marched so fast to minimise the time
spent in a territory deprived of food and water. The sources do not provide
any information about the logistic problems of this march but we know
from other cases of large armies crossing Sinai (from Cambyses to
Napoleon) that the previous preparation of food and water supplies was
essential. The armys long stay at Gaza made possible the setting up of
provisions magazines on the coast. Provisions could also have been
supplied by the fleet commanded by Hephaestion, which was floating
towards Egypt alongside the Sinai shore. Once the army reached Egypt, it
encountered no major problems. The sources do not record any resistance
being put up the Persian satrap Mazaces, who approximately half a year
earlier had defeated Amyntass mercenaries. We do not know what
proportion of the Macedonian army accompanied Alexander to Egypt,
though it is certain that considerable forces had to remain in Syria to
protect this newly captured country against a possible Persian attack.
Perhaps these forces were commanded by Parmenion for none of the
ancient authors makes any mention of him being present in Egypt.
Nevertheless, the superior strength of the invading Macedonian army was
unquestioned and also taking into account the unfavourable mood among
the Egyptians that is most probably why Mazaces surrendered Pelusium
to Alexander.139
The Macedonian fleet next sailed up the Nile from Pelusium to
Memphis, while Alexander and the land army marched along the no longer
existing Pelusium Nile Delta arm to n (Heliopolis to the ancient Greeks
and today a northeast suburb of Cairo). At n the army crossed over to the
138

Marasco 1964, p. 10; Seibert 1972, pp. 109-111; Schachermeyr 1973, p. 235;
Dbrowa 1988, pp. 63-64.
139
Arr., An., 3.1.1-3; Diod., 17.49.1; Curt., 4.7.2-3; Fragmentum Sabbaiticum,
FGrH, 151 F1.8; Just., 11.11.1; It. Alex., 48. Wilcken 1967, pp. 112-113; Lane Fox
1973, pp. 194-195; Engels 1978, pp. 59-60; Seibert 1985, pp. 84-85; Bosworth
1988, pp. 68-70.

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west bank of the Nile and marched 40 km up river to Memphis. Satrap

Mazaces went out to greet Alexander and surrendered to him the capital
and the whole of Egypt. The victors trophies included 800 talents from
the satraps treasury. To celebrate the occupation of the capital of such an
important satrapy Alexander organised gymnastics and musical contests.
Greek artists were invited to perform in these events, and no doubt given a
considerable amount of time to arrive. Apart from Alexanders own
soldiers, the spectators and audience must have included the so-called
Hellenomemphitai, i.e. the members of a Greek community that had
existed in Egypt since the 6th century and partly originated from the
mercenaries who had served the 26th Dynasty. Recorded events in
Memphis show that Alexander from the start took trouble to communicate
with the Greek and Egyptian communities separately and in accordance
with their different cultures. Apart from the Greek contests, Alexander
also laid offerings before the Egyptian gods. The Greek sources mention
Ammon-Ra (called by them Zeus), Osiris and Apis deity known but
alien to Greek culture. Unlike the offerings he laid before Tyrian god
Melqart, whom he associated with Heracles, here Alexander only wished
to officially honour the native peoples gods. In other words, he wished to
fulfil the traditional religious obligations of the ruler and thus publicly
legitimise his claim to authority. No doubt Alexander also laid offerings at
a Greek temple (Hellenion) that was located in the Greek district of the
city.140
The pharaonic coronation of Alexander, tentatively dated to his first
stay in Memphis in December 332 is a matter of scholarly debate. The
only source to mention it directly is the Alexander Romance, whose
account is vague and unclear but which is generally well informed about
Egyptian affairs. According to the Romance, Alexander was led by
Egyptian priests to the Temple of Hephaestus (Ptah) at Memphis, dressed
in the garments of an Egyptian king and seated on a throne. In fact
Egyptian documents issued in Alexanders times bear dates according to
regnal years of pharaoh Alexander. Numerous Egyptian reliefs present
Alexander in traditional pharaoh attire, and his name is written in the royal
cartouches as follows: Horus, who conquered foreign lands; king of
Upper and Lower Egypt, chosen by Ra, beloved by Ammon, the son of Ra,
Alexandros. A noticeable lack of certain elements that normally appear in
a pharaohs title has inclined some historians to reject the Alexander
Romance claim that the Macedonian king was crowned in Egypt.
140

Arr., An., 3.1.3-4, 3.5.2; Curt., 4.7.3-4; Ps.-Callisth., 1.34.1-2. Wilcken 1967, pp.
116-117; Bosworth 1980, pp. 262, 275; Thompson 1988, pp. 3-20, 83-84, 95-97,
106; OBrien 1992, p. 86; Stewart 1993, pp. 171-173; Bloedow 1988.

From Abydus to Alexandria

203

Monarchs who had not even ever been in Egypt let alone crowned there
were also recorded with pharaonic titles; Egyptian priests did that to give
the fictitious sense of an unbroken succession of rightful rulers of Egypt,
the interruption of which could upset the cosmic order and bring
catastrophe to the country. We know that the Egyptian coronation
ceremony was a long and tedious affair, which in the opinion of the
sceptical modern historians would not have appealed to an impatient
Alexander. Therefore they believe that he would have only agreed to
engage in the bare minimum of cult activities that could be expected of a
foreign ruler and keep the religious caste happy.141
It is easy to notice that such argumentation, on the one hand, is based
on a subjective understanding of Alexanders personality and, on the other,
it is also based on the fact that the principal sources remain silent about the
whole subject. We should, however, remember just how few historical
sources, both Greek and Egyptian, have actually survived. For example
there is only one source for the full Egyptian title of the great
Macedonians son, Alexander IV, and today we only have a mere copy of
the original from over 200 years ago. Thorough analyses of Alexanders
royal title in Egyptian inscriptions show that it was abbreviated in various
ways depending on the nature of the given document. Its most extended
form includes three of the five elements of a pharaohs full title. Therefore
Egyptian sources do not unequivocally refute Alexanders legitimate claim
to authority in Egypt. Indeed, any opinion on whether or not Alexander
was genuinely installed as pharaoh will remain hypothetical. Nevertheless,
a premise for an opinion can be formed by examining Alexanders policy
with regard to Egypts tradition, culture and religion and how it was
received by the Egyptian priestly establishment, which was best educated
and positioned to appreciate the nuances of the rulers government.
Alexander ordered a shrine in the Temple of Thutmose III to be restored in
his name. In 330 the high-priest of Thoth, Petosiris, collaborated with the
king to rebuild a temple to his god at Hermopolis Magna. Alexander also
funded the construction of a totally new religious edifice, the so-called
Temple of the Barque, that is, a chapel where the god Ammons sacred
boat was kept. This still extant structure is not significant on account of its
141

Ps.-Callisth., 1.34.2; 1st year of pharaoh Alexander in document Hawara

Papyrus 2 (Jasnow 1997, p. 95, n. 2). Wilcken 1967, pp. 113-114; Tarn 1948, I, p.
41; Schachermeyr 1973, p. 236; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 196-197; Hamilton 1974, p.
74; Green 1974, pp. 269-270. Tradition of Alexanders Egyptian coronation
rejected by: Badian 1985, p. 433; Bosworth 1988, pp. 70-71; Burstein 1991;
Burstein 1994; Stewart 1993, p. 174. Egyptian titles of Alexander: Wilcken 1967,
p. 114; Burstein 1991; Ladynin 1999.

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size, for it is only 5.7 m by 7.8 m large, but because of it location and
adornment. It is found in the central part of the Temple at Luxor, in an
area that could only be accessed by the priests and over which they had
total control. Although the building of the Temple of the Barque was
financed by the king, decisions regarding its detailed design and
ornaments were made by the priests of Ammon, who were the only people
in Egypt able to appreciate the significance of the various elements. The
temples walls are covered with reliefs depicting Alexander as a pharaoh
in the company of Egyptian gods. Art historians stress that these reliefs
strictly adhere to the classical Egyptian style, which can be distinguished
from the vast majority of works of art of the Late Egyptian period. The
fact that Egyptian priests made such an ideological and artistic decision
shows that they fully recognised the temples financial patron as a
legitimate ruler. Among his other investments was the reconstruction of
temples that had been raised by Nectanebo II, the last native ruler of Egypt.
Therefore Alexander did regard his Egyptian title seriously. He proclaimed
himself a continuator of the Egyptian monarchy and thus ideologically
distanced himself from the second Persian occupation of that country.142
Both Greek and Egyptian sources mention that Alexander laid
offerings to Egyptian gods, including those who took the incarnations of
animals and had no Greek equivalents, such as the Apis bull and the
Buchis bull. These are of course examples of the same devotion he
frequently showed towards Greek gods, but ones where he clearly
demonstrated an understanding of the different religious sensibilities of his
Egyptian subjects. This attitude is also reflected in a papyrus from Saqqara
containing an order made by one of Alexanders military commanders,
Peucestas, the son of Macartatus. This document written in Greek and
therefore addressed to Greeks and Macedonians forbids soldiers to enter
the necropolis of sacred animals at Saqqara, which the order declares to be
an area exclusively reserved for priests. One can assume that this order
was a repetition of the supreme commanders instructions. By protecting
the sanctity of the graves of animals worshiped by the Egyptians,
including Apis bulls, Alexander also eliminated a potential source of
conflict between his soldiers and the local population. The whole
programme of investing in temples and the respect shown to the most
important Egyptian gods indicate that Alexander behaved like the rightful
pharaoh of the Egyptians and consciously referred to the traditions of the
independent Egypt Nectanebo II had defended over a decade earlier.
Alexander was informed of Egyptian culture, tradition and expectations by
142

Porter, Moss 1929, pp. 44-45; Bell 1985; Raziq 1988; Burstein 1994, p. 382;
Stewart 1993, pp. 172-178; Menu 1998; Ladynin 1999, pp. 95-96.

From Abydus to Alexandria

205

local advisors, the high-priests of Ptah in Memphis and of Thoth at

Hermopolis as well as by high-ranking officials. It is to his own credit,
however, that he willingly made use of this expert knowledge. Thus the
king was able to proceed in accordance with the Egyptian theological
concept of ensuring the rule of Maat and thus securing Egypts success
and prosperity. This was achieved when the monarch performed the
appropriate rituals and sacrifices to release the divine world cycle and
maintain contact with the sphere of the gods. On the political level this
legitimised his authority in Egypt among the powerful priestly elite which
in the 4th century was able to deny legitimity even to some native rulers.
Alexanders policy of respecting Egyptian religious sensitivity does not
prove that he was really crowned pharaoh of Egypt but it does make it
plausible. The Alexander Romance provides the description of an
evidently genuine pharaoh coronation. The fact that the book claims the
ceremony took place at the Temple of Ptah in Memphis may explain why
throughout the Hellenistic era the post of high-priest at that temple was
unusually held by members of a single family. Moreover, though his reign
in Egypt was considerably shorter, Alexanders name appears in Egyptian
inscriptions nine times more frequently than that of his predecessor Darius
III. This would indicate that Alexander was far more accepted by the
countrys religious elites than the last of the Achaemenid kings.143
It was during his first stay in the Egyptian capital or after his return
from Siwah (according to Arrian) that Alexander decided on how Egypt
should be governed. Arrian states that he appointed two nomarchs or
rather in light of what has been found on an Egyptian ostracon from
Memphis satraps whose Greek names were Petisis and Doloaspis. The
names indicate that the first was an Egyptian and the second was an
Iranian. The nominations show that Alexander intended to maintain the
Persian system of administration into which he wished to enrol both
Persian and Egyptian elites. Petisiss early resignation from his nominated
position has led some historians to the not entirely justified theory that the
Egyptian elites had become disillusioned with the Macedonian rule.
Doloaspis became the sole satrap but his authority was limited to civilian
and judicial administration. As usual, Alexander entrusted military
commands in this satrapy to his own officers. He appointed the
Macedonians Pantaleon and Polemon as commandants of the already
existing garrisons at Memphis and Pelusium respectively. The Aetolian
143

Order of Peucestas: Turner 1974. It reflects the will of Alexander referred to in

Curt., 4.7.5. Thompson 1988, pp. 138-146; OBrien 1992, p. 86; Stewart 1993, pp.
171-178; Wirth 1993, p. 191; van Voss 1993; Menu 1998; Ladynin 1999, pp. 8687; Briant 2002, p. 117.

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Lycidas as well as the Macedonians Peucestas and Balacrus were also

given separate military commands, while the Nile estuary was to be
guarded by the Macedonian Polemon with a squadron of 30 ships. Arrian
notes that Alexander intentionally appointed such a large number of
commanders only answerable to him in Egypt, so that none of them could
possibly aspire to take over control of the whole country. Though never on
such a large scale as in Egypt, this practice would later also be frequently
applied by Alexander in the eastern satrapies. Nonetheless, there was a key
figure among the new authorities, Cleomenes of Naucratis, a Greek from
beyond the circle of Alexanders hetairoi who most probably acquired this
important position thanks to his administrative talent and experience he
had perhaps gained serving Persian satraps. Some sources mistakenly call
him the satrap of Egypt, though this may result from the informal power
he indeed held at the start of Macedonian rule in that country. Alexander
accepted an existing system of administration that had been originally
formulated during the 26th Dynasty and next adopted by the Persians. It
was essentially a centralised fiscal bureaucracy headed by an official
called a senti, or dioiketes in Greek. Apart from being appointed to this
extremely important position, Cleomenes was put in charge of the building
of Alexandria as well as the administration of part of Arabia, presumably
territories to the east of the Nile Delta. As well as the normal procedures
of collecting taxes, Cleomenes also resorted to unconventional methods of
extorting from temples loans the government would never pay back on the
threat of confiscating temple property; this practice had first been applied
by the Egyptian administration during the last period of independence
under the rule of the pharaoh Tachos. Cleomenes additionally saved
money by craftily not paying a months wages due to soldiers stationed in
Egypt. Moreover, he set up a network of informers in foreign markets to
establish where Egyptian grain could be sold at the most profitable price.
Cleomenes also ran the mint, most probably at Memphis, which initially
continued the issuing of coins from Persian times but towards the end of
his government it started striking tetradrachms and staters with
Alexanders portrait. Nominated at the end of 332 or beginning of 331,
Cleomenes was able to ensure the financing of Macedonian garrisons,
realize the building and renovation projects commissioned by Alexander
as well as pay for the very expensive founding of the city of Alexandria.
And on top of that he was able to amass 8,000 talents in the provincial
treasury, naturally at the cost of acquiring the reputation of a ruthless
financier.144
144
Arr., An., 3.5.2-7; Arr., Succ.,1.5; Curt., 4.8.4-5; Arist., Oec., 1352a-b; [D.],
56.7-8; Diod., 18.14.1; Paus., 1.6.3; Dexipp., FGrH, 100 F8.2; Ps.-Callisth., 1.34.7;

From Abydus to Alexandria

207

From Memphis Alexander went on an expedition up the Nile. We

cannot be certain whether he reached the Thebaid, though it is possible as
even with the means of transport in those days the excursion need not have
lasted longer than a month. On the other hand at some stage Alexander
did send a separate expedition to discover why the Nile flooded. We know
this from an account of Alexanders historian Callisthenes. What we
cannot be sure of is whether or not this was purely a geographic and
meteorological fact finding mission or whether its aim also involved
ascertaining the military strength and resources of the Kingdom of Meroe,
which was situated to the south of Egypt. A delegation from that country
visited Alexander at Babylon in 324. Thanks to the findings of this
expedition, Aristotle was able to formulate a theory that the Nile floods
were caused by seasonal rains falling in the region of the rivers source in
Ethiopia.145
On another journey from Memphis Alexander sailed with elite
detachments of hetairoi, hypaspists, archers and Agrianians down the
westernmost (Canopic) branch of the Nile right up to the sea. Before he
returned to the Egyptian capital in April 331, two important events
occurred: the founding of Alexandria and the visit to Siwah. Unfortunately
the ancient sources do not concur as to the chronology of these events and
there are similar differences of opinion among modern historians. The
current state of knowledge on this subject makes A.B. Bosworths
hypothesis the most plausible: Alexander selected the site for the new city
no doubt on the advice of people with expert knowledge of Egypt, such
as perhaps Cleomenes of Naucratis during his first visit there, but the
actual building began after his return from Siwah. First he had to consult
the oracle at Siwah and also make appropriate preparations, such as the
drafting of the citys plan. That is why a later date, 25th Tybi which in 331
corresponded to 7th April, was annually celebrated as the day the city was
founded. Alexandria was not the first city founded by Alexander but
politically, economically and culturally it was by far the most important.
The outline of the citys boundaries resembled a military cloak, the
chlamys, and measured 80 stades (14.5 km) in diameter. It was marked out
in accordance with Macedonian custom with flour, which a huge flock
of birds immediately devoured. The king was initially disturbed by this
phenomenon, but it was then explained to him that this was a good omen
Just., 13.4.11. Satrap Petisis in a demotic ostracon: Smith 1988; Jasnow 1997, p.
95, n. 2. Bosworth 1980, pp. 275-278; Atkinson 1980, pp. 364-367; Briant 1996,
pp. 425, 739, 878-881; Briant 2002, pp. 62-63; Le Rider 1997; Le Rider 2003, pp.
238-262; Heckel 2006, p. 224.
145
Callisth., FGrH, 124 F12a; Arist., FGrH, 646 T2a. Burstein 1976a.

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which meant Alexandria would attract many settlers from all over the
world. Plutarch relates a legend in which the idea of founding this city is
suggested by Homer, who visits Alexander in a dream. Nonetheless, the
most important reason clearly appears to have been commercial. Having
taken control of the eastern Mediterranean and gained knowledge of
Egypts economic potential, Alexander decided to found a major city on
the site of a trading settlement (emporion) called Rhacotis, which is hardly
mentioned in ancient sources. Alexandria became the gateway for trade
between Egypt and much of the Orient on one side and the lucrative
markets of the Aegean and later of the whole of the western world on the
other. This role could not be fulfilled by Naucratis as it was located too far
from the sea and by then experiencing a period of decline. The ancient
sources attribute the actual designing of Alexandria to Deinocrates of
Rhodes, who had been member of Alexanders circle of friends since at
least mid 332 and is also famous for planning to convert Mount Athos into
a huge sculpture of Alexander. The latter plan was rejected, but
Deinocrates talents were employed in the urban design of Alexandria.
Well positioned on an easy to defend isthmus between Lake Mareotis and
the Mediterranean Sea, the street grid was planned in such a way so that
strong winds would cool the inhabitants during Egyptian heat waves.
Settlers were brought in from the whole of Greece and that nation would
dominate the citys ethnic makeup over the next 1,000 years. The native
populations of surrounding villages were resettled in a separate district of
the city with its own temple to Isis and no doubt sanctuaries to other
Egyptian deities.146
Alexander set off from Lake Mareotis and proceeded via Paraitonion
(today Marsa Matruh) 600 km south west to the Siwah Oasis the
northernmost of the Libyan Desert oases. When Alexander was still by
Lake Mareotis (according to Curtius) or halfway to Siwah (according to
Diodorus), therefore most probably at Paraitonion, he received envoys
from the Greek colony Cyrene in Libya, who brought him a gold crown
and gifts, including 300 chargers. Later Alexander considered Cyrene to

146

Arr., An., 3.1.5-2.2; Plu., Alex., 26.3-10, 72.5-8; Plu., mor., 335c-d (architects
name is mistakenly Stasicrates); Diod., 17.52; Str., 17.1.6; Curt., 4.8.1-6; Vitr., 2,
pr. 2.3; Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, FGrH, 151 F1.11; Just., 11.11; It. Alex., 48-49;
Ps.-Callisth., 1.31.-33. Welles 1962; Wilcken 1967, pp. 117-120; Fraser 1972, i, pp.
3-7, ii, pp. 1-11; Fraser 1996, pp. 174-175; Bosworth 1980, pp. 263-266; Seibert
1985, pp. 85-86; Hammond 1996, pp. 124-126; Hamilton 1999, pp. 66-68; Hlbl
2000, pp. 9-10; Brown 2001; Nawotka 2003, p. 114.

From Abydus to Alexandria

209

be part of his domain therefore we can presume that this delegation came
to declare the colonys fealty and pay a tribute in the form of gifts.147
Situated in a depression surrounded by chalk mountains, Siwah had an
ample supply of water (today there are c. 300 wells) capable in ancient
times of supporting several settlements. This allowed for the existence of a
small Berber state ruled by a local royal dynasty, though not entirely free
of Egyptian influence. Its only claim to fame was a temple and the Berber
oracle of an ithyphallic deity, which for not entirely clear reasons started
being associated with Ammon. The high-priests of this sanctuary were the
Egyptianized kings of Siwah. A temple to Ammon was raised at Siwah
during the 26th dynasty, and it was still active in Alexanders day. The
local cult of Ammon as well as the oracle started to interest the Greeks
towards the end of the 6th century, initially just at Cyrene, which was 600
km away, but later also the inhabitants of mainland Greece. Of course, in
keeping with their customs, the Greeks called the Siwah deity Zeus.148 The
purpose of this long and arduous journey was not to fulfil any Egyptian
religious or monarchic obligations because pharaohs never visited this
oasis. The real reason was most probably because Alexander, who always
attached great importance to religious ritual and the possibility of
understanding closer the will of the gods, felt an irresistible longing to
visit an oracle that in the Greek world for a long time had been considered
infallible. Apart from this desire to ask important questions and, as people
of that era perceived it, have them answered, Alexander, as usual, also
wished to compete with his mythological predecessors Heracles and
Perseus, who had also supposedly visited Siwah.149
On his journey Alexander was accompanied by a detachment of
soldiers to protect him from nomads of the Libyan Desert and by baggage
carrying camels. The first stage of the journey was along the coast, but
from Paraitonion they had to cross 300 km of open desert. During this part
of the journey, which took them eight days, the Macedonians experienced
a violent sandstorm raised by a southern wind called the Khamaseen. After
this storm the desert landscape was quite altered, but the now lost
Macedonians were first saved by a shower of rain, which provided them
with much needed water, and then by a divine sign; Aristobulus states that
two ravens appeared, but the more imaginative Ptolemy claims they were

147

Diod., 17.49.2; Curt., 4.7.9; Arr., An., 7.9.8. Seibert 1985, p. 86.
Parke 1967, pp. 196-219; Bosworth 1977; Kuhlmann 1988, pp. 9-107; Hlbl
2000, p. 10.
149
Callisth., FGrH, 124 F14a (= Str., 17.1.43); Arr., An., 3.3.1. Wilcken 1967, pp.
121-123; Bosworth 1977, pp. 68-69.
148

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in fact two snakes speaking human voice. These ravens or snakes led
Alexander and his companions to Siwah.150
The first ever visit of an Egyptian monarch must have been a major
event in this statelet and of course Alexander was granted special
privileges to consult the oracle. He was allowed inside the temple, while
his companions had to wait outside and like ordinary pilgrims ask their
own questions to the oracle, if they had any, from there. The way it usually
worked was that the boat of Ammon would be carried in a procession and
the priests would observe and interpret its motions as questions to the
oracle were asked. The answers were normally just yes or no, but
Alexander was most probably instead or also given much more complex
verbal answers. The oldest known sources do not record what questions
Alexander asked, which has naturally given modern historians an
unlimited scope for speculation. There were no Greek or Macedonian
witnesses present to hear what Ammon told Alexander and Alexander
himself never revealed what he had been told, so we will never know what
really happened inside the temple at Siwah. Nonetheless, the visit to Siwah
changed the Macedonian king. Being far away from Siwah and Egypt, he
continued to worship Ammon and ask his oracle questions. For the rest of
his life he considered himself to be the son of Ammon. When soldiers at
Opis found the idea amusing, he burst into a rage. From Ephippus we learn
that in 324 at Ecbatana Gorgus of Iasus publicly crowned Alexander with
a gold wreath as the son of Ammon. The king would also appear as the
incarnation of Ammon with a purple robe and the horns of a ram. An
innumerable number of coins struck after Alexanders death present him
with Ammons horns, which gave rise to the Arab myth of Alexander the
two-horned (Dl-Karnain) later immortalised in the Quran. We know that
the moment Alexander entered the Siwah temple he would have been
greeted by the priest, like in the case of every pharaoh, as the son of
Ammon. But such a standard greeting, which Alexander would have
experienced on numerous occasions in Egypt, could not have made such
an impression so as to affect him for the rest of his life. Therefore in that
temple he must have heard something more, something that confirmed
what he already strongly believed in or a very specific prediction that soon
turned out to be true and therefore convinced Alexander of the oracles
total credibility. The speculations of ancient Greek authors on this subject
are diverse: Alexander may have asked if he would be victorious in all his
wars and eventually rule the world or he may have asked if all his fathers
150

Callisth., FGrH, 124 F14a (= Str., 17.1.43); Arr., An., 3.3.3-6; Diod., 17.49.3-6;
Curt., 4.7.6-15; Plu., Alex., 26.11-27.4; It. Alex., 50-51. Engels 1978, pp. 61-63;
Bosworth 1980, pp. 272-273; Hamilton 1999, pp. 68-71.

From Abydus to Alexandria

211

murderers had been punished. The alleged response to the latter question
stated that his father was Ammon-Zeus and that those responsible for
Philips death had suffered the consequences of their crime. Of course
these are merely assumptions saying more about the authors themselves
than about Alexander.151
Having had his divine affiliation confirmed, Alexander left Siwah and,
via the site where Alexandria was to be founded, returned to Memphis. It
was during his second stay at the Egyptian capital, most probably in April
331, that reinforcements sent by Antipater arrived: 400 Greek mercenaries
and 500 Thracian riders. Moreover, at this time Alexander received envoys
from Greek states. It was also probably then that he gave instructions
concerning the emission of coins by the Memphis mint, which struck
bronze coins bearing the kings portrait. The start of this particular
emission did not have to coincide with Alexanders stay in Egypt, it could
equally well have been started later by Cleomenes of Naucratis. The
decision to use the rulers image instead that of a god, though shocking to
contemporary Greeks need not have been a consequence of Alexanders
superhuman aspirations. It could equally well have resulted from the
traditions of the satrapy mint in Memphis. For modern historians these
small coins as well as contemporary coins from Naucratis are significant
in that they provide some of the earliest images of Alexander.152
Among the Greek envoys there were delegates from Erythrai bearing
positive news for the king from the Athenas oracle and delegates from
Miletus reporting miraculous events at Didyma, which belonged to
Miletus. When it was ruled by the clan of Branchidae Didyma used to
have a great temple and oracle to Apollo. Their pro-Persian stance during
the Ionian Uprising and Persian wars forced the Branchidae to leave
Didyma and find refuge in Central Asia. The Temple of Apollo was
damaged at the start of the 5th century while the oracle fell silent and the
sacred source ran dry. Then at the start of 331 the water began to flow
again a consequence of stones being removed as some historians
presume. The oracle was thus reactivated, this time not run by the now
151

Callisth., FGrH, 124 F14a (= Str., 17.1.43); Arr., An., 3.4.5; Curt., 4.7.16-32;
Diod., 17.51; Plu., Alex., 27; Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, FGrH, 151 F1.10; Just.,
11.11; Ps.-Callisth., 1.30; It. Alex., 53; Ephippus, FGrH, 126 F5 (= Ath., 12.53);
Syll.3 313. Wilcken 1967, pp. 124-127; Parke 1967, pp. 224-227; Bosworth 1977;
Bosworth 1988, pp. 281-284; Goukowsky 1978, pp. 23-25; Heisserer 1980, pp.
182-191; Kuhlmann 1988, pp. 141-142; Hammond 1996, pp. 127-129; Badian
1996, pp. 17-19; Hamilton 1999, pp. 68-70. Quran: 18.83-98.
152
Arr., An., 3.5.1. Borza 1967; Engels 1978, pp. 62-63; Price 1981; Touratsoglou
2000, pp. 62-63; Le Rider 2003, pp. 224-237.

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absent and probably forgotten Branchidae but by a city nominated official

called the prophetes. With a wonderful understanding of politics the first
prophesy to come from the oracle in over one and a half centuries was
addressed to Alexander, and it was with this message that the envoys from
Miletus came to Memphis. According to Callisthenes, Alexanders court
historian, Apollo was to state that Alexander was the son of Zeus as well
as foretell his victory at Gaugamela, Darius IIIs death and the revolt of
Agis III. The historically verifiable parts of this tale include the
reactivation of the Didyma oracle. The Milesians must have learned of
Alexanders aspirations to the divine origins even before he had left for
Siwah. It is quite possible that in bringing Alexander such good news the
envoys from Miletus were hoping the monarch would graciously offer to
finance the rebuilding of the Didymaion. But for this they would have to
wait another thirty years when the decision to fund this project was made
by the newly proclaimed descendent of Apollo, Seleucus I Nicator.153

153

Callisth., FGrH, 124 F14 (= Str., 17.1.43). Bosworth 1977, pp. 57-59, 74-75;
Bosworth 1988, p. 282; Parke 1985, p. 62; Fontenrose 1988, pp. 15-16.

CHAPTER V:
KING OF ASIA

1. From Memphis to Mesopotamia

In the late spring of 331 Alexander set off from Memphis to Asia for the
decisive battle against Darius III. Shortly before the Macedonian army left
Egypt an unfortunate accident occurred in Alexanders closest circle: an
overloaded boat sank and one of the passengers was, Hector, Parmenions
son. The young man managed to swim to the shore but died soon
afterwards. Alexander honoured Hector with a grand funeral in Egypt. The
month the Macedonian army set out was more probably May and not April,
as some have suggested. In April work was started on the building of
Alexandria and it would have taken some time to cover the almost 250 km
distance to Memphis, then Alexander received the envoys and performed
other duties required of a monarch before he left his domain. Late spring
was a particularly good time for large armies to march in Egypt and
Palestine for that was the harvest season when it was easy to supply
soldiers with their basic diet, grain. Moreover, after the winter rains the
streams and wells had enough water for their needs. The march was
carefully arranged. Even the entertainment and contests during the
stopover at Tyre had to be prepared in advance in order to bring over to
Phoenicia the best Greek performers. We know that engineers had
constructed bridges over the Nile and canals some time before the army set
off. Once the march started, the Macedonian fleet sailed to keep up with
the soldiers on the land. The Macedonian naval and land forces both
reached Tyre around mid June 331, after the army had interrupted its
march with a short campaign in Samaria (Chapter IV.5).1
The stay at Tyre did not last longer than a few weeks. Alexander once
again visited the Temple of Melqart-Heracles with a procession, sacrifices
and expensive votive offerings. For the army he arranged sports
competitions and artistic performances. A stage was specially prepared for
1
Arr., An., 3.6.1; Curt., 4.8.7-8. Engels 1978, pp. 63-64; Seibert 1985, p. 90;
Dbrowa 1988, pp. 64-65.

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dithyrambic and theatrical contests. The contestants included the finest

Athenian actors, Thettalus and Athenodorus, who in order to perform in
front of Alexanders soldiers cancelled a drama competition in Athens
during the festival of Dionysus. The cost of a fine that the Athenians had
as a consequence imposed on Athenodorus was covered by Alexander. In
the contest at Tyre the Macedonian king applauded Thettalus but his
highest ranking officers, who were appointed the official judges,
announced Athenodorus the victor. However, the Macedonian kings
treasury was not burdened with the overall costs of these expensive artistic
events with the very best performers. Alexander allowed or instructed the
kings of Cyprus to play the role of choregoi (rich Greek citizens who paid
for such theatrical performances). The most distinguished patrons were
Pasicrates of Soli and Nicocreon of Salamis. It also may have been on this
occasion that another famous actor, Lycon of Scarphe, included in a
comedy recital a verse requesting ten talents, which an amused Alexander
duly paid him.2
Among the kings more important obligations at Tyre was the
receiving of envoys from allied Greek states. Ambassadors from Athens
brought Alexander a gold crown and yet again congratulated him on his
victory at Issus. It was then that after successive pleas the Macedonian
king finally relented and released the captured Athenians who had fought
on the Persian side at Granicus when their state was officially a member of
the League of Corinth. Envoys from Rhodes and Chios also received
favourable responses to their complaints about the Macedonian garrisons
stationed on their islands, whereas Alexanders allies from Mytilene and
Cyprus were rewarded for opting for the right side in the maritime war.
Other matters Alexander dealt with at Tyre concerning Greece will be
discussed later on in this chapter. Alexander no doubt made many
administrative decisions before he left the city, the most important of
which would have been the re-employment in the kings service of
Harpalus, who had returned from Megara after his infamous flight from
Tarsus. No doubt out of appreciation for his financial and administrative
skills, Alexander persuaded Harpalus to come back and again appointed
him his treasurer. The collection of taxes in Phoenicia Alexander entrusted
to the Macedonian Koiranos and in Asia Minor to Philoxenus, whereas
Menander, who up until then had commanded the mercenaries, replaced
Asander as satrap of Lydia. The most important change occurred in Syria,
where the Iranian aristocrat Arimmas, whom Alexander had appointed at
the start of 332, was now replaced by the Macedonian Asclepiodorus. The
2

Arr., An., 3.6.1; Plu., Alex., 29.1-6; Plu., mor., 334d-e; Curt., 4.8.16. Hamilton
1999, pp. 75-76; Nawotka 2003, pp. 112-113.

King of Asia

215

reason for this change was Arimmass failure to solve the logistical
problems concerning the march of the Macedonian army. Not for the last
time in the history of Alexanders state administration it turned out that
Iranian satraps appointed in accordance with Achaemenid tradition by
right of birth proved themselves incapable of performing set tasks up to
the standards required by their new ruler. It may have been the case that
Arimmass incompetence forced the Macedonian army to remain in Tyre
for longer than originally planned in order to allow the new satrap to
complete the necessary logistic preparations. Having settled all the most
pressing administrative and political matters, at the start of July 331
Alexander and his soldiers set off from Tyre to the town of Thapsacus on
the Euphrates.3
The Macedonian army reached Thapsacus in the Athenian month of
Hekatombaion (July/August). Darius III had crossed the Euphrates at that
same place in December 333 during his escape after the Battle of Issus. It
was well known that the great river could be crossed at this point for the
towns Semitic name, Tiphsah, means passage or ford. The Euphrates
at Thapsacus became navigable for ancient river traffic. The towns exact
location is today unknown but of the numerous suggested sites two have
recently aroused the greatest interest: todays Dibse, which is situated by
Asad Lake, or Qalat Najim, which is some 80 km up river. Both these
sites are now in modern Syria on the west bank of the Euphrates.4 Taking
into account the route the Macedonian army took on the eastern side of the
Euphrates, the more northern location (Qalat Najim) seems more likely.
Initially, the army must have marched along the Phoenician coast from
Tyre to the place that later became known as Seleucia. Thence it would
have turned east, first through the Orontes Valley and then through Aleppo
towards the Euphrates. Along the coast the Macedonian forces could have
been kept supplied by their fleet and then by the fertile farmlands that
stretched all the way to Aleppo. This was a route that had been taken by
ancient armies before Alexander and would be taken by other armies after
him. The entire distance from Tyre to the Euphrates would have been
approximately 600 km, whereas the distance of the section from Seleucia
to Thapsacus would have been c. 240 km. Therefore Curtiuss statement
that the march lasted 11 days would probably only apply to this later
section. The army crossed the Euphrates using two pontoon bridges. There
were approximately 6,000 Persian soldiers in the area commanded by the
3

Arr., An., 3.6.2-7; Curt., 4.8.11-15; It. Alex., 53-54. Engels 1978, p. 64; Bosworth
1980, pp. 278-285; Dbrowa 1988, pp. 65-66; Hammond 1996, pp. 131-132.
4
Arr., An., 3.6.4. Honigmann 1934; Bosworth 1980, p. 222; Seibert 1985, p. 91;
Lendle 1988.

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Chapter V

experienced soldier and satrap Mazaeus, but instead of attacking

Alexanders army they observed its progress from a distance. The decision
not to fight at the Euphrates crossing and the kind treatment Mazaeus later
received from Alexander at Babylon has inclined some historians to
speculate as to whether the Persian may have earlier made a secret
agreement with the Macedonian king. However, there is nothing to suggest
this in the ancient sources and the sheer disproportion in military strength
may have dissuaded Mazaeus from engaging the enemy on the Euphrates.5
From Thapsacus Alexander could have next marched his army along
the Euphrates towards Babylon to face the Great Kings army. According
to Xenophon, the same route was taken 70 years earlier by Cyrus the
Younger, who intended to seize the Persian throne from his brother
Artaxerxes II. However, such a route posed serious logistical and physical
problems. If the Macedonians reached the Upper Euphrates sometime
around the end of July or beginning of August, their march to Babylon
would have been in the middle of the Mesopotamian summer, when
temperatures frequently rise above 40oC. Covering the distance between
Thapsacus and Babylon, 1,000 stades (180 km), would have been a
physically extremely demanding task for the soldiers. Most of the route
would have been to the south of the 250 mm isohyet where the lack of
water meant a shortage of grass and therefore also a shortage of fodder for
animals. By then a couple of months had passed since the harvest and all
the grain and straw would have been long ago transported to the towns.
Therefore the only way for the Macedonians to get hold of food for the
soldiers and fodder for the horses and pack animals would have been to
rob the granaries of fortified towns, which would have required even more
effort and time. It is therefore quite understandable why Alexander chose
to take a northerly route across the foothills of the Armenian highland,
most probably along an ancient Babylonian military road. It may not have
been an ideal route for soldiers but it was better than marching through
central Mesopotamia. In the summer the temperatures in the north of this
country are and were almost 10oC lower, the wells and what rivers there
were (the Balikh and the Khabur) provided enough water and the pastures
supplied enough food for the animals. According to Eratosthenes
referring to the notes of Macedonian surveyors (bematists) Alexander
selected the shortest route between Thapsacus and the Tigris. The army

Arr., An., 3.7.1-2; Curt., 4.9.12; It. Alex., 54. Engels 1978, pp. 65-66; Bosworth
1980, pp. 285-286; Atkinson 1980, p. 382; Dbrowa 1988, pp. 66-67. The alleged
secret dealings of Mazaeus: Lane Fox 1973, p. 227.

King of Asia

217

covered the 2,400 stades (430 km) to reach the other great Mesopotamian
river in the second half of September 331.6
In that time Darius III had managed to gather another army for the
decisive battle against the Macedonian invaders. For the first time in 200
years the king of Persia was cut off from the Mediterranean Sea and
therefore from the Greek mercenary recruitment market. Now there were
only around 4,000 left in his service, which was as many as had retreated
with him from Issus. In an attempt to compensate for the shortage of
hoplites the Persians provided their Asian infantry with better weapons
modelled on the Macedonian example, i.e. longer spears and swords.
However, if only because there had not been enough time to train, this
experiment did not prove to be successful and the infantry failed to have a
discernable impact on the battlefield. The fundamental force in the army
amassed by Darius III was, as usual, the Persian cavalry. The long time the
Great King had to prepare enabled him to bring over the best horsemen of
the empire from eastern Iran: the cavalry of Bactria and of Sogdiana as
well as allied Scythian detachments. With their excellent horses, good
training and flexible armour the east Iranian riders were of comparable
military value to the Macedonian hetairoi and Thessalian cavalry. On the
other hand, Dariuss 200 chariots with 2/3 m scythes to cut or terrify the
enemy were an exotic anachronism. Fifteen war elephants were brought
over from India. All the ancient authors cite huge numbers of soldiers in
the Persian army: 200,000 infantry and 45,000 cavalry according to
Curtius, 400,000 infantry and 100,000 cavalry Justin, 800,000 infantry
and 200,000 cavalry Diodorus, 1,000,000 soldiers Plutarch,
Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, or even 1,000,000 infantry and 400,000 cavalry
according to Arrian. Even the lowest of these figures given by Curtius is a
gross exaggeration but, despite this, Alexanders army was certainly
numerically inferior to that of the Persians. It has been estimated that he
had approximately 47,000 men. The weakness of Dariuss army was its
disparate ethnicity which hindered communication and effective command.7
The Persian army gathered at Babylon. The reason for this was no
doubt not only Mesopotamias agricultural potential, which was well able
to adequately feed such an army, but also strategic considerations. Darius
probably assumed that Alexander would follow the example of Cyrus the
Younger and march to Babylon directly from Thapsacus. That would have
6
Eratosthenes, ap. Str., 2.1.38; Arr., An., 3.7.3; Curt., 4.9.13-14; It. Alex., 54.
Engels 1978, pp. 67-70; Dbrowa 1988, pp. 68-69.
7
Arr., An., 3.8.3-6, 3.11.7, 3.12.5; Diod., 17.53.1-3; Curt., 4.9.2-4, 4.12.13; Plu.,
Alex., 31.1; Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, FGrH, 151 F1.12; Just., 11.12; It. Alex., 55.
Dbrowa 1988, pp. 75-90; Bosworth 1988, pp. 76-78.

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Chapter V

been why he moved the great Persian army out of Babylon north towards
Nineveh, so that this time he could make full advantage of his excellent
east Iranian cavalry on the extensive Mesopotamian Lowland plain. But of
course the two armies did not meet there for the Macedonians chose to
march across northern Mesopotamia to the Tigris. Darius therefore was
also forced to move his army east across the Tigris and find another
suitable site for the decisive battle.8
It was sometime during Alexander march from Tyre to Gaugamela that
messenger delivered to him a third letter from Darius with yet another
peace proposal. According to Curtius and Justin, despite the previous two
flat refusals (see Chapter IV.5), Darius was given the opportunity to yet
again turn to Alexander in a conciliatory tone without losing face on
account of the death of his wife Stateira. On receiving the sad news Darius
is said to have responded by thanking Alexander for the humane treatment
of his family and at the same time renewed his peace offer. Plutarch and
Diodorus, on the other hand, maintain that Dariuss wife died after he had
sent the last peace proposal. Then again Plutarch and Justin write that
Stateira died in childbirth. If the expected child was Darius IIIs, his wifes
death could not have been later than in the summer of 332. Many of the
sources mention the romantic tale of a loyal eunuch who fled back to
Darius and informed him of his wifes death but also of the noble way in
which Alexander treated his family. On receiving the news Darius was to
pray to the Persian gods for victory, so that he could have it in his power
to show equal magnanimity towards the Macedonian king; if, on the other
hand, he were to be defeated, he asked the gods to let no man other than
Alexander sit upon the throne of Cyrus, as he was his only worthy
successor.9
Regardless of when Stateira actually died, Alexander certainly received
the peace proposal some time before Gaugamela but when he was already
in Mesopotamia. Despite all his preparations and the Persian armys
numerical superiority, Darius must have been aware of the very grave
danger of losing another battle and for this reason he made a very
generous offer. In doing so he showed a great sense of responsibility for
the state, which did not allow his emotions to get the better of him after
Alexanders last very insulting letter. An offer to cede land, especially on
such a large scale, was virtually unheard of in the history of Achaemenid
diplomacy and Darius was resorting to this measure in exceptional
8

Diod., 17.53.1-3; Curt., 4.9.6-7. Marsden 1964, pp. 15-19; Badian 1985, p. 434;
Seibert 1985, pp. 93-95; Dbrowa 1988, pp. 67-69.
9
Plu., Alex., 30; Plu., mor., 338e; Curt., 4.10.18-11.22; Diod., 17.54.7; Just., 11.12;
It. Alex., 57; Arr., An., 4.20.1-3; Karystios, ap. Ath., 13.80.

King of Asia

219

circumstances: he was trying to avoid the invasion of Iran, the very

heartland of the Persian Empire, and Babylonia, its richest province. In
return for peace he was offering Alexander his daughters hand in
marriage, land right up to the Euphrates and the unbelievably high sum
30,000 talents. By accepting this offer Alexander would make a territorial
gain that was far greater than any of Philip IIs war aims. When Alexander
received the offer he only controlled part of the territories to the west of
the Euphrates and right up to his death the Macedonians failed to gain
absolute control of this vast area. The sky-high ransom would cover all the
kings imaginable expenses for many years. Therefore Dariuss offer
provoked a major debate in the Macedonian command over whether or not
to accept it. In reputedly saying that he would accept the offer if he were
Alexander, Parmenion was no doubt expressing the views of many
Macedonians. The rulers famous response was to say that would also
accept it if he were Parmenion. As usual, Alexander was determined to
seek a solution on the battlefield and therefore rejected the peace offer. By
then there could be no doubts that he was not after any concessions from
Darius but instead he wanted rule over the entire Achaemenid Empire.10

2. The revolt of Agis III

On several occasions during his campaign against Darius III Alexander
received news of disturbing events in Greece. The greatest source of
trouble was Sparta, in whose dual monarchy the more important role was
played by the ambitious Agis III of the Eurypontid dynasty. He became
king in 338, having previously ruled as regent during the absence of his
father, Archidamus III. He ascended the throne at a time when Sparta had
never been weaker. After its victory at Chaeronea Philip IIs army
triumphantly marched into the Peloponnesus, confiscated territory from
Sparta and gave it to her neighbours (see Chapter II. 3). That same year his
father Archidamus III had been killed at the Battle of Manduria in Apulia
in Italy. He had been there as the commander of a mercenary force
employed by the wealthy Spartan colony of Tarentum in its war against
the Lucanians. All this happened in the lifetime of a single Spartan
generation that had earlier experienced a catastrophic war against Thebes,
the collapse of hegemony in the whole of Greece but especially in the
Peloponnesus and the loss of Messenia after 300 years of Spartan rule.
10

Diod., 17.54; Curt., 4.11; Plu., Alex., 29.7-8; Just., 11.12; Constantinus
Porphyrogenitus, De sententiis, 195. Griffith 1968, p. 36; Bosworth 1988, pp. 7576; Bernhardt 1988, p. 196 ; Bloedow 1995, pp. 109-110; Briant 1996, pp. 855-859;
Stoneman 1997, pp. 37-38.

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Chapter V

Agis III devoted his entire reign in trying to restore Sparta to previous
position of power. During his regency and in his first years as king of
Sparta he steered clear of the main political disputes by not taking
anyones side in the 339-338 war, not participating in the League of
Corinth and not allying itself with either Thebes or Macedonia in 335. In
338 Spartas suffered at the hands of Philip but her intransigent attitude to
Macedonia earned her respect in Greece.11
Agis attempted to bring Sparta back into the main political arena in
333 when the Persian offensive in the Aegean was at its most successful.
He sent two diplomatic missions to Darius III, no doubt to offer an alliance
against Macedonia. The Spartan envoys from these missions were
subsequently captured together with Theban refugees, Athenian envoys
and the Persian baggage train outside Damascus. Agis himself learned of
the Macedonian victory at Issus when he was at Siphnos negotiating with
the Persian commanders Autophradates and Pharnabazus the terms and
conditions of financial and military support for his actions. Despite these
negotiations, which are recorded in the sources, they were not immediately
followed by any discernable cooperation between the Persians and the
Spartan king. In 333 he remained passive, which left the limited
Macedonian forces to concentrate on fighting the Persians in the Aegean
Sea. The fact that the Persian commanders gave Agis III a subsidy of no
more than thirty talents reflects the state of their finances after Issus. To
this Autophradates added ten ships. But even this made a difference, for
after receiving this help Agis sent mercenaries commanded by his brother
Agesilaus to wage war in Crete, which Arrian euphemistically calls
restoring order. When in 332 this Spartan expedition was joined by the
8,000 mercenaries that had survived Issus and by the remnants of the
Persian fleet, their success on the island was great enough to force
Alexander to respond in the spring of 331 by dispatching there a
Macedonian squadron commanded by Amphoterus. Nothing is known as
to how successful this Macedonian mission was, though it obviously failed
to stop mercenary detachments being subsequently shipped from Crete to
the Peloponnesus.12
War erupted on the Greek mainland in the spring of 331. Macedonia,
governed by Antipater, was simultaneously threatened by the revolt of
Memnon, the governor of Thrace, and by Agis IIIs insurrection. There is
no evidence in the sources that the two revolts were coordinated but we do
11

David 1981, pp. 110-113; Kulesza 2003, pp. 284-296.

Arr., An., 2.13.4, 2.15.2-5, 3.6.3; Diod., 17.48.1-2; Curt., 3.13-15, 4.1.39, 4.8.15.
Badian 1967, pp. 175-179; Bosworth 1988, pp. 187-200; Wirth 1993, pp. 212-213;
Blackwell 1999, pp. 53-54; Kulesza 2003, p. 296.
12

King of Asia

221

know that they occurred at a time when anti-Macedonian sentiments were

running high. For now Macedonian supremacy was even more feared in
association with the possibility of there no longer being an Achaemenid
monarchy to counterbalance it. Antipater personally took charge of dealing
with Memnons revolt, which also had the support of Thracian tribes, and
he sent most of his forces to confront these rebels. The ancient authors do
not provide us with any details concerning the military campaign but we
can assume that an agreement was eventually reached between the two
Macedonian leaders because Memnon held his position as governor for
some time. A few years later we know he sent Alexander some Thracian
reinforcements to India. In all probability Antipater acted as Philip II
would have done and made some concessions so as to be able to next
concentrate all his forces on whom he rightly considered to be the more
dangerous enemy. 13 That same spring in 331 Agis III started military
operations at the head of a large mercenary army, having managed to gain
the support of many Peloponnesian states, including Tegea, almost all the
poleis of Arcadia, Elis and Achaea except for Pellene. The only states not
to back him were those which had Macedonian garrisons or were
themselves bitter enemies of Sparta, such as Argos or Megalopolis. The
states of Aetolia provided Agis with non-military aid. The Athenians did
pass a resolution to send its fleet to help the Spartan king, but the proMacedonian politician Demades ensured that this resolution was never
realised. The coalition Agis managed to form posed the greatest threat to
Macedonian hegemony in Greece in Alexanders entire reign. The start of
the war augured well for Agis for in the Peloponnesus he defeated a
Macedonian corps commanded by Corrhagus. 14 News of what was
happening in the Peloponnesus reached Alexander during his second stay
in Tyre. One cannot doubt that the possibility of Antipater being defeated
would have led to the collapse of the Argead hegemony over Greece, next
the invasion of Macedonia and finally an end to the unfinished war in Asia,
for in such an eventuality even Alexander would not have been able to
stop his soldiers from returning home. Yet whether it was because he had
so much faith in Antipaters military talent or whether it because he was
eager not to delay his confrontation with Darius, Alexander did not decide
13

Aeschin., 3.133-134; Diod., 17.62; Curt., 9.3.21. Some scholars argue for
coordination between Memnon and Agis III: Badian 1967, pp. 179-180; Hamilton
1974, p. 78; Blackwell 1999, pp. 54-55. Contra: Heckel 1997, p. 202; Briant 2002,
p. 49.
14
Aeschin., 3.165; Din., 1.34; Diod., 17.62.6-8; Curt., 6.1.20; Plu., mor., 818e-f;
Just., 12.1. Bosworth 1988, p. 201; Badian 1994, pp. 268-271; Habicht 1999, pp.
20-21; Blackwell 1999, pp. 55-56, 58.

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Chapter V

to send back any of his land forces. Instead he despatched an allied

Phoenician and Cypriot fleet and by diplomatic means ensured that Athens
would remain neutral.15
At the time the insurrection was at its most successful. After most of
the Peloponnesian states had joined Spartan king, he had under his
command 20,000 foot soldiers and 2,000 cavalry as well as considerable
freedom to act as there were no immediate threats. The final outcome of
this war was resolved by the stance of the strongest Greek polis, Athens,
and by a serious strategic mistake made by Agis in not marching his army
north. If he had done so, he would have also gained not the just moral
support of states in central Greece but also their military backing. After its
defeat at Chaeronea Athens not only did not fall into decline but, having
entrusted its finances to the outstanding politician and economist Lycurgus,
experienced a period of rapid economic growth. State revenues gradually
rose to reach a record sum of 1,200 talents a year. This allowed for the
modernisation of the citys fortifications, the building of more ships and a
reform of the ephebia system, which ensured that new generations of
recruits received better army training. In 331 there was a very intensive
debate in Athens concerning the conflict between Agis and Macedonia.
The most explicit opinion in support of Athens joining the war against
Macedonia is speech No. 17 erroneously attributed to Demosthenes but
delivered possibly by Hypereides which accuses Alexander of arrogance
and breeching the resolutions of the universal peace. Arguing for peace
were not only the usual pro-Macedonian politicians but also Demosthenes,
known up until then as the greatest anti-Macedonian firebrand. These
politicians reminded the Athenians of the promise made at Corinth and of
the favours Alexander had bestowed upon Athens, if only, for example,
releasing their compatriots who had been captured at Granicus. It is easy
to calculate that if Agiss army had been joined by 8,000-10,000 Athenian
hoplites with additional detachments of mercenaries and cavalry, his
forces would have at least matched those of Antipater. Therefore the
decision of Athens to stay neutral proved a fatal blow to the Spartan kings
aspirations.16
Having defeated Corragus, Agis now turned against Megalopolis. The
siege of this large and well fortified city required a lot of time and
precluded simultaneously conducting an offensive against Macedonia.
From the political perspective this could not but raise the justified
15

Arr., An., 3.6.3. Borza 1972, p. 236; Briant 2002, pp. 49-50.
[D.], 17; Aeschin., 3.162, 164-165; Din., 1.34-35; Diod., 17.62.7; Plu., mor.,
818e-f. Badian 1967; Bosworth 1988, p. 202; Habicht 1999, pp. 20-25; Blackwell
1999, pp. 56-65; Faraguna 2003, p. 106; Poddighe 2009, p. 115.

16

King of Asia

223

suspicion that for Agis the freedom of other Greeks was at most of
secondary importance to his clearly first objective of imposing Spartas
hegemony over its neighbours. The precious moment when Macedonia
was weak and vulnerable was irretrievably lost. As the Spartans remained
idle beneath the walls of Megalopolis, Antipater mobilised an army of
Macedonians and allied Greeks numbering as many as 40,000 soldiers.
With this army he now marched against Agis and his army at Megalopolis,
which was half the size of his forces. The better quality and greater
experience of the Agiss mercenaries and Spartan soldiers meant that,
despite their numerical superiority, the Macedonians had a very hard fight
on their hands. Apart from their rhetorical style, the battles descriptions
by Diodorus and Curtius Rufus show that for a long time the final outcome
hung in the balance. It was only resolved once the Spartan side ran out of
strength to cope with the enemys greater numbers. Among the casualties
of the Battle of Megalopolis was the valiant but not very prudent King
Agis as well as 5,300 of his soldiers and 3,500 men on the Macedonian
side.17
Jealous of the fame of this victory, Alexander tried to depreciate its
importance by calling it the war of mice. Aware of this aspect of his
monarchs character and of the delicacy of Greek inter-state politics,
Antipater chose not to personally decide on how those responsible for the
war should be punished and deferred the matter to the synedrion of the
League of Corinth. After Agis IIIs death his younger brother, Eudamidas
I, became the new king of Sparta and it was with him that the post-war
peace negotiations were made. The debate, held once the delegates of the
League of Corinth had assembled, lasted a long time and eventually came
to no definite conclusion. It was as if everyone was trying to avoid being
held responsible for the passing of a harsh sentence. Spartas allies,
Achaea and Elis, which had together with the Spartan army besieged
Megalopolis, were made to pay a fine of 120 talents in compensation to
that city. The Tegeans were pardoned, except for those politicians who
were responsible for the citys alliance with Agis. However, the synedrion
failed to name a punishment for the main culprit in the breaking of the
universal peace Sparta. Perhaps that was because a punishment that was
too mild may have displeased the victor, Macedonia, whereas the League
of Corinth would have been too weak to impose a severer penalty. The
preceding months clearly showed how few states were ready to confront
Sparta in defence of the universal peace. Thus a decision was made to
simply demand 50 hostages from Sparta and leave the ultimate decision
17
Diod., 17.63; Curt., 6.1.1-16; Paus., 1.13.6, 3.10.5; Just., 12.1. Blackwell 1999,
pp. 66-69.

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Chapter V

regarding the punishment to Alexander, to whom Sparta could send its

own delegates. Negotiations regarding the hostages were conducted by
Antipater and apparently the ephor Eteocles arranged it in such a way that
instead of 50 boys the Spartans offered to hand over 100 women and
elderly people. The ancient sources do not agree as to whether or not the
hostages sent to Antipater were next passed on to Alexander. Nevertheless,
defeat in a war that was supposed to return Sparta to its former position of
a major power and the considerable losses at a time when its number of
citizens was already falling made that state politically passive for the rest
of the 4th century.18
The chronology of Agiss revolt and particularly the Battle of
Megalopolis are the subject of considerable controversies. Curtius states
that the war in the Peloponnesus ended before the Battle of Gaugamela,
therefore the Battle of Megalopolis could have taken place at the end of
September 331. In recent decades, however, historians have estimated that
the battle was actually fought in the spring of 330, and with speed with
which news travelled in those times Alexander would have learned of the
outcome no earlier than in May that year. Such a chronology of events has
been used as a basis for interpreting Alexanders actions over the seven
months from his victory at Gaugamela to the burning down of the palaces
at Persepolis. Awaiting news from the Peloponnese is used to explain his
long stay in Susa. Though the sources do not mention it, Alexander is also
said to have sent Antipater 3,000 talents to raise mercenaries. Finally the
destruction of Persepolis is supposed to be a gesture of Panhellenic
revenge calculated to win Greek public opinion over to the Macedonian
side.19 It is not hard to notice that this interpretation of Alexanders actions
and intentions is purely hypothetical. The only documentary evidence it is
based on comes from a passage in Aeschiness Against Ctesiphon, which
states that when in the summer of 330 he delivered this speech, the Spartan
hostages were still waiting to be sent to Alexander. But Aeschines does
not state when the Battle of Megalopolis actually took place and none of
the sources claim that the Spartan hostages were shipped east immediately
afterwards. Conversely, we know that the synedrion of the League of
Corinth was very slow in making any decisions and Aeschines allows us at
18

Plu., Ages., 15.4; Plu., Agis, 3.3; Plu., mor., 235b; Diod., 17.73.5-6; Curt.,
6.1.17-20; Paus., 3.10.5. Bosworth 1988, p. 203; Kulesza 2003, pp. 296-297.
19
Curt., 6.1.21. Late chronology of the battle of Megalopolis and its consequence:
Cawkwell 1969, pp. 170-173; Badian 1985, pp. 445-447; Hammond, Walbank
1988, pp. 72-83; Bosworth 1988, pp. 203-204; Badian 1994; Carlier 1995, p. 155;
Hammond 1996, pp. 159-161; Blackwell 1999, p. 54, n. 67; Faraguna 2003, p. 105.
But see: Nawotka 2003b, pp. 70-71.

King of Asia

225

most to speculate that Antipater was tardy with reintroducing Macedonian

hegemony to the Peloponnesus. Therefore there are no fundamental
reasons why we should reject the traditional chronology of Agiss Revolt
from the spring to the autumn of 331 as stated by Curtius. It was also most
probably only after the Battle of Megalopolis that Antipater sent
Alexander 15,000 soldiers to make up for the troops the king had lost
during the autumn campaign of 331.20

3. The battle of Gaugamela

Alexanders army marched from the Euphrates to the Tigris virtually
unhampered by the Persians. Mazaeuss forces, which were much weaker
than the Macedonian army, limited their actions to burning anything that
could be of use to the enemy, but this was not enough to stop the march.
Alexander learned from a captured Persian scout that Darius IIIs army
was already on the other side of the Tigris and this made it easier for him
to plan subsequent manoeuvres for his own army. Curtius remark that the
Macedonian armys march lasted only four days cannot be true for the
distance they covered was at least 430 km. It is very likely that this
erroneous information simply results from a mistake made by a medieval
copyist and that Curtius had actually stated the march lasted 40 days,
especially as we are told that Alexander crossed the Euphrates in the
month of Hekatombaion (July/August) and that he was on the eastern side
of the Tigris by 18th September. Therefore the march was fairly slow.
Plutarch cites after Eratosthenes an anecdote about how out of boredom
the Macedonian soldiers using clods of earth, fists and sticks fought a
mock battle between two groups, one side pretending to be the Persians.
On learning of this battle, the king instructed the leaders of the two groups
to fight each other as Alexander and Darius. The soldier representing
Alexander won and the rest of the Macedonian army interpreted this as a
good omen.21
Despite Darius IIIs order, Mazaeus did not try to stop the invading
army on the Tigris, apparently because he thought the river could not be
crossed. We do not know whether Darius really wished to prevent the
Macedonians from crossing the Tigris but failed or whether, conversely, it
20

Aeschin., 3.133. Borza 1972, p. 236; Schachermeyr 1973, p. 285; McQueen

1978; David 1981, p. 114; Wirth 1993, pp. 190, 219-221; Bloedow 1995a, pp. 2425; Heckel 1997, p. 202; Briant 2002, p. 18; Kulesza 2003, p. 296; Heckel 2006,
pp. 7-8, s.v. Agis.
21
Eratosthenes, ap. Plu., Alex., 31.2-5 (= FGrH, 241 F29); Curt., 4.9.14-15 ; Diod.,
17.55.1-2 ; Arr., An., 3.7.4; It. Alex., 55. Atkinson 1980, pp. 382-383.

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Chapter V

was always his intention fight Alexanders army in open territory to the
east of the Tigris. Either way, the only obstacle encountered by the
Macedonians was the strong current of the Tigris, though in September the
level of water after the hot summer months would have anyhow been low.
Modern historians have not been able to establish for certain the place
where Alexanders army crossed the Tigris. Taking into account the
topography of the territory covered by the Macedonians after they had
crossed the Tigris we can only assume that it was probably somewhere
near todays city of Mosul in Iraq or a bit further north. Once the army
reached the eastern bank, Alexander allowed his soldiers to rest for a
couple of days before they marched into battle. It was at this time
(according to Curtius) or a few days later (Arrian) that the allied Paionian
cavalry commanded by a member of that tribes royal family, Ariston,
defeated a squadron of Persian cavalry.22
The army of Darius III set up camp near Gaugamela, the place where
the last pitched battle between the two kings was fought. The ancient
sources, however, generally call this the battle of Arbela (today called
Irbil/Hawlir) after a large town some 90 km to the south east in modernday Iraqi Kurdistan. We know that Gaugamela was a large village on the
river Boumelos (today called Gomil stream), a western tributary of the
Khazir, which flows into the Greater Zab, which in turn flows into the
Tigris. The name Gaugamela is preserved in a modern-day village called
Gaumal but its actual site is todays Tell Gomel on the Nauqr plain to the
north of the Gebel Maqlub range and 35 km to the east of the Tigris.
Darius selected as a battlefield a broad plain where he could take full
advantage of the numerical superiority of his cavalry and most effectively
use his chariots. It because of the chariots that Persian soldiers levelled out
the field where they expected to fight the Macedonians. Darius made a
serious mistake in not fortifying his camp at Gaugamela. It was for this
reason that his army spent the night before the battle armed and on guard
in case the enemy suddenly attacked. The lack of sleep could not but have
had detrimental effect on Dariuss soldiers on the day of the battle.23 Apart
22

Curt., 4.9.15-10.1; Diod., 17.55.3-6; Arr., An., 3.7.5-8.2; It. Alex., 55. Atkinson
1980, pp. 384-385; Heckel 1992, pp. 354-355.
23
Arbela/Gaugamela: Diod., 17.62.1, 17.64.1; Arr., An., 3.11.5, 6.11.6; Str., 16.1.3,
16.1.4, 17.1.43; Marmor Parium, FGrH, 239 F106; Anonymi Chronicon Oxyrynchi,
FGrH, 255 F1.7; Lib., 18.260; Amp., 16.2.5; Curt., 4.9.9, 5.1.2, 6.1.21, 9.2.23;
Plin., Nat., 6.41; Polyaen., 4.3.6, 4.3.17; Fron., Str., 2.3.19; see Nawotka 2003, pp.
86-87. Topography: Marsden 1964, pp. 18-21; Schachermeyr 1973, p. 270, n. 311;
Seibert 1985, pp. 129-130; Dbrowa 1988, pp. 70-72; Bernard 1990, pp. 520-521;
Hamilton 1999, p. 80. Arr., An., 3.8.7; Plu., Alex., 31.8.

King of Asia

227

from that, morale in the Persian camp might not have been very high.
Fragments of tablets found at Babylon state that on 18th September
presumably in response to news of the Macedonians crossing the Tigris
panic erupting in the camp of the ruler of the world, Darius III. On the
other hand, Polyaenus also reports of soldiers panicking in Alexanders
camp on the Tigris. It appears that there was nervousness on both sides in
face of what they knew to be a momentous event that would decide their
fates.24
On the third day (20th September 331) after crossing the Tigris the
Macedonians saw a lunar eclipse. Sacrifices were immediately made to the
Sun, Moon and Earth. Egyptians seers as well as Alexanders personal
soothsayer, Aristander, interpreted this phenomenon as a bad omen for the
Persians. Indeed, astronomers in Babylon also regarded the eclipse as a
portent that their own side would be defeated. Alexanders soldiers, initially
disturbed by the eclipse, were much relieved by the seers interpretation. It
was with this new found optimism among the men that on the morning of
21st September the Macedonian king ordered his army to march.25 After a
slow and cautious march of four days, the Macedonians encountered the
enemy. This time Alexander personally led an attack on the enemys
cavalry. From the captives he learned that Dariuss camp was situated 150
stades (27 km) away. The Macedonians also managed to chase away
Mazaeuss riders, who were continuing their scorched earth tactics, and
thus Alexanders men got hold of some intact supplies of grain. With
logistical problems settled for the nearest future, the Macedonian army set
up a fortified camp and stayed there for four days. The Macedonian
baggage train and soldiers who were unfit because of wounds or disease
remained there for the battle as well. It was in that time that a letter from
Darius to the Greeks in Alexanders army was intercepted. In this letter
Darius urged the Greeks to hand the Macedonian king over to the Persians.
On the advice of the cautious Parmenion the message in this letter was not
disclosed to the soldiers so as not to put any ideas into their heads. 26
Meanwhile Mazaeus barred the Macedonians way to the Persian camp
with an elite squadron of 3,000 cavalry. Alexander sent an advance guard
of horsemen (most probably mercenaries) commanded by the Macedonian
Menidas, but they dared not attack Mazaeus. Mazaeus, on the other hand,
24

Sachs-Hunger 1988, no. 330, verso 14; Polyaen., 4.3.26. Bernard 1990, pp. 517521, 524; Briant 2003, p. 80.
25
Arr., An., 3.7.6; Curt., 4.10.1-7; Plu., Alex., 31.8; Plin. Nat., 2.180; SachsHunger 1988, no. 330, verso 3. Bosworth 1980, p. 287; van der Spek 2003, pp.
292-295.
26
Curt., 4.10.8-17; Arr., An., 3.9.1; Polyaen., 4.3.18.

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also did not engage the enemy and instead withdrew to Gebel Maqlub
(1,040 m), which overlooks the Nauqr plain. Fear of the mighty Persian
army almost verged on panic in Alexanders camp. Yet Mazaeus did not
make use of this opportunity to deliver a pre-emptive strike. Instead the
following day he withdrew from the mountain and returned to Dariuss
camp. Alexander not only managed to calm his soldiers down but also
took the opportunity and occupied the strategically important position in
the hills that the enemy had vacated. There he set up the last camp before
the battle and fortified it, so that his soldiers could rest and build up
strength in relative safety before the decisive clash.27
The exact date of the Battle of Gaugamela was for a long time the
subject of controversy among modern historians for it cannot be
unequivocally deduced from the information provided by the ancient
authors. Plutarch, for instance, states that it happened on the 26th day of
the month of Boedromion, which cannot be easily converted into a date in
our calendar system. Fortunately, thanks to the entry in an exceptionally
accurate Babylonian astronomical diary, we can now be certain that the
battle took place on 1st October 331.28 Already on the preceding day the
Macedonian army stood in battle formation ready to confront the Persians,
who were aligned for battle thirty stades (5.5 km) away. Alexanders highranking officers advised him to attack at once, but instead this time he
listened to Parmenions advice: he delayed the fight so as to first assess the
battlefield and seek out any traps the enemy might have prepared. In the
evening, however, it was Parmenion and other more senior officers who
were persuading Alexander to attack Dariuss army at night. They argued
that the element of surprise would even out the chances against a
numerically larger army. Perhaps behind Alexanders proud response that
he did not wish to steal a victory there was, as Arrian assumes, not only an
unwillingness to risk so much in a night-time battle but also a desire to
prove to Darius his inferiority as a warrior in the open field and the light of
day. Perhaps he wished to exclude all factors other than quality of
command and sheer fighting ability. The rest of the night Alexander and
his circle of companions spent on religious ceremonies. We know that
sacrifices were also made to Phobos, the god of fear, panic and flight from
the battlefield who accompanied Ares the god of war. They went to sleep
27

Curt., 4.12.1, 4.12.4-5, 4.12.14-19; Arr., An., 3.9.1-2. Bosworth 1988, p. 80;
Heckel 1992, pp. 362-363.
28
Plu., Alex., 31.8; Plu., Cam., 19.5; Sachs-Hunger 1988, no. 330, verso 15-16.
Questions pertaining to the date: Dbrowa 1988, p. 74; Hamilton 1999, p. 81.
Fixing the date: Grzybek 1990, pp. 42, 58-59; Bernard 1990, pp. 515-528; Hauben
1992, p. 149; Le Rider 2003, pp. 267-268.

King of Asia

229

just before dawn. The rest of the Macedonian army slept throughout the
night. The Persians, on the other hand, spent the entire night on watch for
fear of an attack on their very large but unfortified camp. The Persian
camp fires were said to have been visible on the plain right up to the
horizon.29
Thanks to information contained in the book of Aristobulus, who had
accompanied Alexander on that expedition, we know that after the battle
the Macedonians found in the Persian camp the Great Kings written
dispositions for the day including the positioning of his forces. Darius
personally commanded the centre. He was guarded by the melophori, the
elite aristocratic cavalry called the royal kinsmen as well as detachments
from India, Babylonia, Sittacene, the Uxians, Carians, Mardi and now a
not so numerous detachment of Greek mercenaries. The war elephants and
50 scythed chariots were also aligned in the centre. The right wing
included contingents from Syria, Armenia, Cappadocia and northern
Mesopotamia, Media, Parthia, Hyrcania as well as allies from Scythia and
another 50 scythed chariots. The arrangement of the Persian left wing
shows that a lesson from previous engagements had been learned. Here
Darius positioned his strongest units the excellent east Iranian cavalry
(Bactrians, Dahae and Arachosians), Scythian allies as well as Persians
and Susians for he realised they would most probably be facing
Alexander, who usually commanded his hetairoi on the Macedonian right
wing. Here too he positioned the remaining 100 scythe bearing chariots. It
is worth noting that Dariuss army included contingents from countries
that had already been conquered by Alexander. At least some of the
soldiers from these countries had obviously not given up hope of the Great
King and rightful ruler of the Persian Empire ultimately being victorious.
We even know of an Egyptian official called Samtutefnacht, who left an
account of his stay in Dariuss camp and of the subsequent crushing defeat
of the Persians.30
The Macedonian battle positions are well known because on this
subject the ancient authors agree. The right wing was held by the
Macedonian cavalry officially commanded by Parmenions son, Philotas,
but de facto command of this section of the Macedonian frontline
belonged to Alexander. Extended even farther to the right were
29

Arr., An., 3.9.3-11.2; Curt., 4.12.24-13.17; Plu., Alex., 31.8-32.1; Diod., 17.55.656.1; It. Alex., 57-58.
30
Aristobul., ap. Arr., An., 3.11.3-7 (= FGrH, 139 F17); Curt., 4.12.5-13. Treson
1931 (Samtutefnachts stele); Marsden 1964, p. 44; Seibert 1972, p. 131;
Schachermeyr 1973, p. 269; Bosworth 1980, pp. 297-299; Vogelsang 1992, pp.
222-223; Hammond 1996, pp. 141-143; Briant 2003, p. 78.

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detachments of Agrianians, slingers, Macedonian archers, Greek

mercenary cavalry and infantry, Paionian cavalry and Macedonian
prodromoi (scouts). The centre was, as usual, held by the Macedonian
phalanx with the hypaspist foot guard positioned between its right flank
and the whole armys right wing. The left wing was commanded by
Parmenion and included javelin throwers, Thracians, Cretan archers,
Achaean mercenary infantry as well as allied and mercenary Greek and
Thessalian cavalry. Auxiliary units were positioned at the extremities of
both wings at slanting angles to the rest of the front line so as to prevent
the army from being outflanked. Alexander positioned a second line
behind the front line of infantry. The Greek mercenaries, Thracians and
Illyrians in the second line were of less military value but they held an
important position in the eventuality of the numerically far superior enemy
surrounding the Macedonians. The positioning of the entire Macedonian
army took on a strange trapezoidal shape which was dictated by the danger
of being outflanked on one or both sides. Considering the large numerical
difference between the two armies and the flat terrain being attacked from
behind must have seemed inevitable to Alexander.31
The battle could not begin at dawn for the commander-in-chief of the
Macedonian forces, having spent almost the entire night preparing for the
fight, was fast asleep, and no one could or perhaps dared to wake him.
Parmenion ordered breakfast to be given to the soldiers and only after they
had consumed it did he venture to rouse Alexander, having to shake him
several times. Only then did the king deliver a speech of encouragement to
his soldiers and ordered the battle to commence. Alexanders seemingly
strange behaviour was no doubt based on the sober calculation that since
the enemy was to the east, by attacking too early the Macedonians would
have the sun in their eyes. In that respect the later in the day they attacked,
the better. Nevertheless contemporary Babylonian sources state that the
battle began in the morning, or at least before noon.32
At the start it became apparent that the Persian lines extended so far
beyond the Macedonian formations that Alexanders right wing found
itself directly opposite the Persian centre commanded by Darius.
Alexander therefore ordered his wing to move further right, in response to
which the Persians began a corresponding manoeuvre to their left.
However, the much more numerous and therefore slower moving Persian
31

Arr., An., 3.118-12.5; Diod., 17.57.1-5; Curt., 4.13.26-32; Fron., Str., 2.3.19-20.
Bosworth 1980, pp. 300-304; Bosworth 1988, p. 81; Dbrowa 1988, pp. 93-94;
Hammond 1996, pp. 143-145.
32
Curt., 4.13.17-25; Diod., 17.56; Plu., Alex., 32.1-4; Just., 11.13; Sachs-Hunger
1988, no. 330, verso 15. Atkinson 1980, p. 418.

King of Asia

231

detachments could not keep up with Alexanders smaller but faster units.
Worse still, by moving further left the Persians were leaving the terrain
specially prepared for the chariots, and Darius was clearly hoping that
these would play an important role in breaking through the enemys front
line. Moreover, the Macedonians were now moving away from the places
where the Persians had secretly dug ditches against their cavalry. For these
reasons the Great King ordered first the Scythian cavalry and next also the
Bactrian cavalry to attack the enemy and stop this manoeuvre. Alexander
sent a detachment of Greek mercenary cavalry to counter this attack and
soon afterwards other cavalry detachments were sent as well. The
excellently trained and armoured east Iranian and Scythian cavalry
inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, so, wishing to quickly resolve the
conflict, Darius now sent in his chariots. Although this archaic formation
did inflict some losses among the enemys frontline troops, it did not have
a very significant impact on the ultimate course of the battle since the
chariots operated unsupported by the Persian cavalry. As the chariots sped
towards them, the soldiers in the phalanx were ordered to stand apart and
let them through. At the same time javelins were hurled at the passing
chariot horses and immediately after that the slingers and Agrianians
finished off the charioteers with impunity.33
Gaugamela was the first recorded battle in history where a European
army encountered elephants. The Greeks had known about these animals
since the previous century but this knowledge was still very hazy
Aristotles research into the subject marked a breakthrough but that was
only made possible as a consequence of Alexanders expedition. The only
source to mention them being used in the Battle of Gaugamela is the
anonymous Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, whose author claims that the
Macedonians stopped the animals from advancing on them by scattering
sharp metal objects before them. Whether or not this unconfirmed story is
true, we can be certain at Gaugamela the military impact of the elephants
was even smaller than that of the scythed chariots.34
No doubt as he observed the situation develop on his right wing the
Great King also ordered his soldiers to attack the enemy on other sections
of the front. The Persians had the greatest success on their right wing.
Here too the scythed chariots acting in tandem with the Messagetae
cavalry were much more effective. The commander of this wing was the
satrap Mazaeus and he managed to get the Macedonians outflanked and
33

Arr., An., 3.13; Curt., 4.15.1-4, 4.15-17; Diod., 17.57.6-59.1; Polyaen., 4.3.17; It.
Alex., 59-61. Bosworth 1988, pp. 81-88; Dbrowa 1988, pp. 96-97; Hammond
1996, p. 145; Ashley 1998, p. 267.
34
Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, FGrH, 151, F1.13. Scullard 1974, pp. 37-52, 64.

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pinned down by his troops. Some of his cavalry now broke through a gap
that had appeared as a consequence of the Macedonia centre and right
wing shifting further right and now headed straight for Alexanders camp
rather than attacking the back of Macedonian phalanx. The Persian
captives joined the fight and the poorly armed Thracian detachment
guarding the camp was soon defeated. Legend would later have it that
Dariuss mother, Queen Sisigambis, chose to stay with Alexander instead
of making use of this opportunity to escape. It was at this critical moment
that the advantage of the unusual alignment of the Macedonian forces
became apparent: the second Macedonian phalanx positioned behind the
first turned around and attacked its own camp thus recapturing it.
Although some of the Bactrian cavalry was now confined to fighting
round the camp, the situation on the Macedonian left wing continued to be
dire. Parmenion sent successive messengers to Alexander with urgent
pleas for help, but none came for the battles outcome now hung in the
balance in the Macedonian centre and on the right wing.35 The sources are
very vague about what happened in the centre, saying only that
Macedonian phalanx advanced victoriously on the enemy. They focus
much more on what Alexander was doing. As at Issus, the Macedonian
kings objective was to reach Darius with his hetairoi and he was now
leading a charge in that direction. Macedonians who had fought in that
battle later claimed that an eagle was flying above their king, which was
obviously a sign of the impending victory. The fiercest fighting erupted
between the Companion cavalry and the royal kinsmen gathered around
the Great King. Although we can assume Arrians claim that Darius was
the first to flee is simply a product of Macedonian propaganda, there is no
way of knowing the veracity of the opposite claim that he wanted to die
but was forced to withdraw by his entourage. Regardless of which version
is closer to the truth, Darius did once again leave the battlefield at a time
when his army was still fighting in a still equal struggle with the invading
enemy. The Great Kings escape resulted in the collapse of resistance in
the section he had commanded.36
At first Alexander tried to chase Darius but he was hindered by the
general confusion and the clouds of dust that limited visibility. Indeed,
Darius made skilful use of these circumstances and under the cover of dust
clouds he led the detachments retreating with him in a quite unexpected
35
Curt., 4.15.2-3, 4.15.5-13; Diod., 17.59.5-8; Plu., Alex., 32.5-8; Arr., An., 3.14.56; Polyaen., 4.3.6. Bosworth 1988, pp. 82-84; Hammond 1996, pp. 146-147;
Ashley 1998, pp. 267-268.
36
Arr., An., 3.14.1-4; Diod., 17.60.1-3; Plu., Alex., 33.2-8; Curt., 4.15.19-33; Just.,
11.14; It. Alex., 62. Schachermeyr 1973, p. 237; Bosworth 1988, p. 83.

King of Asia

233

direction. According to Arrian and later quoting after him the Itinerarium
Alexandri, Alexander stopped the pursuit after yet another of Parmenions
messengers reported to him with urgent pleas for help. The Macedonian
king turned round and rushed to save the left flank of his army, which was
now on the verge of total defeat. However, it is possible that Arrians
account simply reflects the unsympathetic stance towards Parmenion
originally held by Alexanders court historian, Callisthenes, who had
every reason to present the old general as an incompetent commander who
panicked instead of facing the enemy himself. Historians point to the
physical difficulties a messenger sent by Parmenion would have had in
locating let alone reaching Alexander in the most intensive heat of the
battle. Anyhow, news of the Great Kings withdrawal now spread among
the Persian soldiers and particular national groups started withdrawing
from the battle in order to get back to their countries. In fact Alexander
encountered the heaviest fighting against detachments trying to escape
from the battlefield and head for their native lands of Parthia, Persis and
India. In this clash the Macedonians lost 60 men and many were wounded,
including at least three high-ranking officers: Hephaestion, Coenus and
Menidas. Once most of the Persian army was in retreat, the Macedonian
soldiers on the left flank managed to independently repulse the enemy
from their section before effective help from Alexander arrived, if indeed
any was sent. In this section the Thessalian cavalry once again played an
outstanding role. Meanwhile Alexander continued his pursuit of Darius but
the late time of day, the considerable distance that now separated him from
the Great King and the other Persian detachments fleeing from the battle
precluded any chance of success. The Macedonians pitched camp for the
night by the river Lycus (Greater Zab), some 32 km from Gaugamela.37
Darius escaped to Arbela and thence he hurriedly headed for safety in
Media to the east of the Zagros Mountains. The Persian capital there,
Ecbatana, became the Great Kings residence for the next half year. Darius
assumed, correctly as it turned out, that Alexander would not follow him
but go for the prizes resulting from the victory at Gaugamela, i.e. the
Achaemenid capitals to the west of the Zagros Mountains Babylon and
Susa. The Great King was accompanied by the remainder of the Greek
mercenaries, now only 2,000, as well as the Bactrian cavalry, which was
led virtually unscathed out Gaugamela by the satrap Bessus. At Ecbatana
Darius gathered soldiers who had escaped from Gaugamela and prepared
for another battle, hoping to get reinforcements from eastern Iran. The day
37

Arr., An., 3.15.1-5; Diod., 17.60.4-61.3; Curt., 4.16.1-6; Plu., Alex., 33.9-11; It.
Alex., 63; Sachs-Hunger 1988, no. 330, verso 16-18. Lane Fox 1973, pp. 240-241;
Devine 1975, p. 382; Bosworth 1980, pp. 309-312.

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Chapter V

after the battle Alexanders army advanced post-haste to Arbela, losing

many Macedonian horses in this murderous march. When they got there,
Darius was already gone but some of his treasures remained, 4,000 talents
and the royal insignia. Again there is no credible data regarding the losses
suffered by both sides at Gaugamela. The ancient authors especially the
greatest purveyor of Macedonian propaganda Arrian clearly exaggerate
in minimising the number Macedonian losses: from just 100 (according to
Arrian) to less than 300 (Curtius) or 500 (Diodorus). By contrast the
figures they give for the Persians killed or captured seem ridiculously high:
from 40,000 (Curtius) or 90,000 (Diodorus) to 300,000 (Arrian). Arrian
actually states that over 300,000 Persians were captured.38
However, an exact figure for how many were really killed or captured
is not of the greatest historical significance. One of the consequences of
this decisive battle of far greater historical importance was the access
Alexander now had to the central and richest provinces of the Achaemenid
Empire. Moreover, although Darius had not yet given up the fight, for the
rest of his stay in Iran Alexander would not have to fight any more major
battles that could have changed the course of events. The Macedonian
army did not spend much time on the Gaugamela battlefield, probably
only as long as it took to bury their dead. Before they set off an event
occurred that Plutarch mentions in one sentence and the other sources
simply ignore. Plutarch states that after the battle, and presumably before
the march, Alexander was proclaimed king of Asia. Although Plutarch
does not cite his source, there is no reason to doubt that this really
happened. Literary and epigraphic sources from Alexanders lifetime and
the end of the 4th century confirm that he used the title of king or ruler of
Asia. In Greek sources the word Asia had both political and purely
geographical meaning, in the later sense it signified the Asian continent. In
the political sense the word Asia meant the Kingdom of Persia. The
sources are unequivocal about this. One, On the Universe, attributed to
Aristotle, gives the following definition: All the Empire of Asia, bounded
on the west by the Hellespont and on the east by the Indus, was
apportioned according to races among under generals and satraps and
kings, slaves of the Great King; and there were the couriers and watchmen
and messengers and superintendents of signal fires. Therefore the Greeks
of Alexanders day would have understood the ruler of Asia to be someone
modern historians call the king of Persia. This understanding of the word
Asia, quite different to ours, is also confirmed in Egyptian hieroglyphic
sources of the 4th century. In clearly reflected the extent of geographic
38

Arr., An., 3.15.5-16.3; Diod., 17.60.4, 17.61, 17.64.1-2; Curt., 4.16.8-5.1.10; It.
Alex., 64-65. Bosworth 1980, pp. 312-313; Seibert 1985, pp.95-96.

King of Asia

235

knowledge in ancient times, where real Asia fitted within the bounds of
the Achaemenid Empire, whereas beyond lay only semi-mythical
territories such as India or the land of the Amazons. Among the Persian
kings titles there was xyaiya Prsaiy, which means king in Persia
rather than king of Persia and it was used above all to stress the
legitimacy of their rule over Parsa, meaning Persis or Fars, the homeland
of the Achaemenids. However the title most frequently used in
contemporary Greek and Persian sources was Great King. Alexander, on
the other hand, never used this title, at least not in Greek, perhaps because
of the bad associations it had to Greeks. Instead he chose the less popular
by no less unequivocal title of king of Asia.39
We have no details of how Alexander was proclaimed king of Asia.
Perhaps his army proclaimed him as such, which would have had
exclusively political significance, but it would not have been legally valid.
It is equally probable that Alexander had a herald proclaim him to be king
of Asia in front of his army. In both cases the proclamation would have
been in keeping with the universally practiced doctrine of the victor taking
over sovereignty, and Alexander was most certainly the victor at
Gaugamela. He had already made his claim to the entire Achaemenid
Empire in diplomatic correspondence with Darius. Therefore the
proclamation at Gaugamela was not unexpected but the victory had raised
it from the status of mere propaganda to a statement of fact. Perhaps this
was still a bit premature, considering that Darius still held power in Iran,
but it was very convincing in the light of what had happened in the most
recent days.40
After his victory Alexander made sacrifices to the gods befitting the
grandeur of the occasion. Those who had distinguished themselves in the
battle were now awarded gifts. The treasures captured from the Persians
allowed the king to be very generous to the Greeks and thus stress the
Panhellenic character of this anti-Persian war. That was why booty taken
from Darius was given to the Plataeans in compensation for the
destruction previously inflicted by Xerxes. Croton was awarded by
Alexander on account of the fact that in 480 its citizen Phayllus had sailed
in his own ship to aid the Greeks fighting the Persians at Salamis. A gift to
39
Plu., Alex., 34.1; Timachides, Chronicum Lindium, FGrH, 532 F1.38; FD
3.4.2.137; Arist., Mu., 398a (translation by J. Barnes). For the discussion of the
issue of Kingdom of Asia (with reference to all relevant sources) see Nawotka
2004.
40
Ritter 1965, p. 52; Wilcken 1967, pp. 137-138; Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 277-279;
Goukowsky 1978, p. 175; Bosworth 1988, p. 85; Wirth 1993, pp. 193-196;
Hamilton 1999, p. 9.

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Chapter V

the Temple of Athena in the city of Lindus served to nurture good

relations with the island of Rhodes. Marking this occasion there is also a
letter in which Alexander declares freedom to the Greeks and the abolition
of tyrannies. Unfortunately we do not know the exact addressee though
letter could only be referring to the situation in continental Greece, where
Antipater maintained control by continuing Philip IIs policy of supporting
pro-Macedonian oligarchies and tyrannies. The sources provide no
evidence that this policy changed after Alexanders letter. Therefore it
must have simply been a declaration of goodwill from a monarch who was
ever more distant from Greek affairs and also one who had ever less
understanding of the subtleties of politics in Macedonia and Greece.41

4. Babylon, Susa and Persepolis

Alexander limited the time spent on the battlefield at Gaugamela to the
bare minimum for fear of an epidemic breaking out in a place strewn with
thousands of Persian corpses. Like after Issus, he chose not to continue his
pursuit of the defeated Persian ruler because he did not wish to risk
leaving behind unoccupied Achaemenid provinces. Alexander ended the
chase at Arbela. There is no evidence that after that he returned to
Gaugamela. It is more likely that from Arbela the Macedonian army next
marched south towards Babylon, the capital of the richest Persian satrapy
called Babiru and one of the capitals of the entire empire. But Persian
troops who had escaped from Gaugamela had arrived there first. Their
commander was Mazaeus, previously the satrap of Cilicia and Ebirnari.
The Babiru satrapy had been governed by Bupares, whom Arrian names
as the commander of the Babylonian contingent at Gaugamela. The
sources make no mention of him after that event, which may mean that he
was killed in the battle and that Darius appointed Mazaeus, whom he
trusted, the new satrap of this province. Mazaeus certainly had good
relations with the local elites as his wife was Babylonian. But this fact
would have also made him vulnerable to pressure on important issues such
as whether or not to defend the city and whether to surrender or risk
destruction.42
Thanks to the ancient authors and the Babylonian Astronomical Diary
the chronology of events that occurred during the march to Babylon can be
41
Plu., Alex., 34.2-4; Timachides, Chronicum Lindium, FGrH, 532 F1.38.
Hamilton 1999, pp. 91-92; Blackwell 1999, pp. 109-110; Flower 2000, pp. 112113.
42
Arr., An., 3.8.5; Diod., 17.64.3. Berve 1926, no. 221; Frye 1984, p. 139; Jacobs
1994, p. 162; Briant 1996, p. 868; Heckel 1997, p. 204.

King of Asia

237

quite accurately traced. Already on 8th October 331, that is, barely a week
after the battle, someone from Gaugamela reached Babylon. The diary is
damaged in this place, so we do not know for sure who it was. It could
have been Mazaeus himself or a messenger with news of Darius IIIs
defeat. The distance of 580 km from Gaugamela to Babylon could be
swiftly covered thanks to the Persian system of stage posts which allowed
horses to be changed. Alternatively it could have been a messenger from
Alexander with the first offer to negotiate. Meanwhile the Macedonian
army marched, most probably down the Royal Road in the direction of
Susa but after a few dozens of kilometres turning towards the Tigris. After
four days they reached the town of Mennis, where the soldiers were
amazed to see for the first time in their lives perpetual flames emanating
from a grotto (burning natural gas) and a stream of petroleum oil spilling
out onto the surface. There are two places on the route between Arbela and
Babylon known in ancient times to have had oil flowing out onto the
surface and burning natural gas. One is Baba Gurgur near Kirkuk and
some 80 km from Arbela, but it is the more distant Tuz Khurmatu some
125 km from Arbela that seems more likely to have been the place where
the Macedonians saw this phenomenon. In four days Alexanders rapidly
moving army would have advanced at least 125 km. Having never seen
such a substance emerging from the ground before, the Macedonians
experimented with it. One of their experiments was to pour the oil over a
young volunteer called Stephanus and setting it alight. The fire then
proved very difficult to put out and the unfortunate volunteer suffered
serious burns. Not far from this place the Macedonians crossed over to the
western side of the Tigris. By 18th October they were in Sippar, 50 km to
the north of Babylon. From the above information we can estimate that the
army marched on average some 35 km a day. At Sippar they stayed for
two days. There can be no doubt that Alexander had started negotiations
with Mazaeus and the Babylonian elite already before the army reached
Sippar. In these negotiations he promised that his soldiers would not enter
the houses in Babylon by that he may have meant the houses of gods, in
other words temples. An entry for 20th October in the Astronomical Diary
states that the Macedonians were at the Gate of Esagila, and the following
day they sacrificed a bull, no doubt to Marduk. After that Alexander
entered Babylon and, using the official Babylonian nomenclature, took
over Dariuss position as ruler of the world.43
43

Curt., 5.1.11-16; Plu., Alex., 35; Str., 16.4.1, 15; Sachs-Hunger 1988, no. 330,
retro. Lane Fox 1973, pp. 244-245; Seibert 1985, p. 96; Bernard 1990, pp. 525-528;
Atkinson 1994, p. 33; Hamilton 1999, pp. 93-94; van der Spek 2003, pp. 298-299.

238

Chapter V

The ancient authors have preserved colourful descriptions of

Alexanders entry into Babylon. First Mazaeus with his children and the
royal treasurer (ganzabara) Bagophanes came out to greet him, surrender
the city and ask for mercy. They were accompanied by priests, magi
chanting religious songs, Chaldaean soothsayers as well as Babylonian
notables and cavalry in full, extravagant ceremonial dress, while crowds of
inhabitants looked on from the citys walls. The king was offered cattle,
horses as well as lions and panthers in cages. Mazaeus had flowers
specially strewn on the road into Babylon and incense was burned on
silver alters along the way. Alexander entered the city in a chariot
surrounded by his soldiers marching in battle formation. The first place he
headed for was the royal palace and then, having been instructed by the
priests, he laid an offering to Marduk. This festive entry, despite the
cheerfulness expressed by the Babylonians, was by no means a
spontaneous affair. The Astronomical Diary tells us that there were
negotiations before Alexander entered the city. Indeed, such triumphal
entries of monarchs who had defeated in war erstwhile rulers of Babylon
had a long tradition in Mesopotamia. Such a parade was made in honour of
the Assyrian king Sargon II after he had defeated the Babylonian ruler
Marduk-appal-iddin II in 710, and in 539 Cyrus the Great entered the city
in such a fashion after his victory over the Chaldaean Nabonidus. Not
every conqueror received such a welcome but only those like Sargon II,
Cyrus the Great and Alexander who managed to gain acceptance from
Babylons priestly elite. The publics expressions of joy at greeting the
new ruler were part of a ceremony rehearsed only for rightful monarchs.
And that was how the Babylonian elite perceived Alexander in October
331.44
The traditional picture of Alexander in Babylon presented in modern
historiography is based on a literal interpretation of classical sources.
Basically Alexander is perceived as the liberator of this great Middle
Eastern metropolis from a mindless and cruel Persian regime. The
Babylonians were supposed to hate the Persians for the quelling of their
rebellion by Xerxes in 479 and the destruction of their temples, including
the Temple of Esagila and the famous Etemenanki ziggurat (the Biblical
Tower of Babel), as well as the melting down of the gold statue of Marduk
into ingots. And that was why Alexander, who had defeated the Persians

44

Curt., 5.1.17-23; Arr., An., 3.16.3; Diod., 17.64.4. Kuhrt 1990, pp. 121-126;
Kuhrt, Sherwin-White 1993, pp. 139-140; Atkinson 1994, pp. 34-36; Briant 1996,
p. 881; Heckel 1997, p. 206.

King of Asia

239

and promised to rebuild the temple, was so enthusiastically greeted by the

inhabitants of Babylon.45
Such an explanation, however, casts more shade than light on
Alexanders stay in Babylon. Both Persian and Babylonian sources present
a far more complex picture of the Achaemenid rule. The regions
legendary affluence had for ages been derived from an agriculture utilising
rich soil as well as sophisticated irrigation and drainage systems. The
inhabitants of Babylonia were obliged to supply the royal court, which
frequently resided in Babylon, and the Great Kings army with food. The
cities, Babylon itself as well as Uruk, Sippar and Nippur, had efficient
banking houses and international trading companies. We know most about
how such institutions functioned from the cuneiform tablets of the
Murashu family from Nippur. The Persian era gave the Babylonian
merchants and bankers the benefit of a gradually developing monetary
economy. On the other hand, it also had the detrimental effects of obvious
incompetence, greed and corruption among the Achaemenid officials. The
paucity of historical sources from reign of Xerxes to that Darius III may be
the result of a slower than before rate of economic growth in Babylonia.
However, the Achaemenid period cannot be perceived as a time of
economic or cultural collapse. The Persians themselves regarded
Babylonia with a mixture admiration for its wealth and civilizational
achievements as well as contempt for its military weakness. That is why in
extant Achaemenid records of lands belonging to the Great King
Babylonia holds a prestigious third position of importance after Persis and
Media but in Persepolis friezes the inhabitants of Babylonia are presented
as the only ones not bearing arms.46
Though there were several rebellions, everyday life in Persian
occupied Babylonia was generally peaceful and the presence of many
Iranian inhabitants in this country is well attested. There were many
aristocratic Persian estates in Mesopotamia, whose owners frequently
married women belonging to the Babylonian social elites. Both
Babylonians and Iranians worked in the Achaemenid bureaucracy; the
Iranians only predominated in the higher offices. The region also had
military settlers. The Great King granted many allotments of land to his
horsemen, archers and charioteers. By the 4th century, however, this
system was no longer working properly for the descendants of military
45
Tarn 1948, i, pp. 51-52; Wilcken 1967, pp. 139-141; Schachermeyr 1973, pp.
280-283; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 247-249; Green 1974, pp. 302-304; Badian 1985, p.
437; Bosworth 1988, pp. 86-87.
46
Frye 1984, pp. 129-130; Oppenheim 1985, pp. 531, 577-586; Stolper 1994, pp.
241-245; Kuhrt, Sherwin-White 1994, pp. 311-312; Briant 1996, pp. 742-743.

240

Chapter V

settlers frequently sold off parts of their land so that larger allotments were
divided up and reduced in size. That may be why military settlers in
Mesopotamia did not make a significant contribution to the Persian war
effort at the end of the Achaemenid era.47
In Alexanders day Babylon, covering an area of 975 ha and
surrounded by 18 km of walls, regarded one of the Seven Wonders of the
World, was possibly the largest city on earth. We can assume that it had
approximately 200,000-300,000 inhabitants; the average population
density in contemporary cities ranged from 100-400 inhabitants per
hectare and the population of Antioch on the Orontes with area of 650 ha
has been estimated to include between 160,000 and 250,000 inhabitants.
How the Greeks imaged the sheer size of Babylon is expressed in
Aristotles anecdote stating that it took three days for all the inhabitants to
learn that their city had been captured by Alexander. The river Euphrates,
which flowed through Babylon, was spanned by a bridge built on stone
pillars and the two focal points within the metropolis were the royal palace
and the temple complex. The heavily fortified palace of Nebuchadnezzar,
still used in Persian times, was situated on a low hill today called Kasr,
right next to the citys wall. Because in the late Achaemenid period
Babylons status was raised to become one of the Persian capitals, during
Artaxerxes IIs reign an Apadana (throne hall) was added to the palace.
However, it is not true that stone foundations excavated in one of the
palaces corners once supported the so-called hanging gardens of
Semiramis (the hanging gardens of Babylon) for these were almost
certainly located in Nineveh. There was a 7-20 m wide procession route
running from the Ishtar Gate in the northern wall, alongside
Nebuchadnezzars palace up to the famous Marduk temple complex in the
city centre. There is controversy among historians as to the scale of
destruction inflicted by the Persians to the Etemenanki ziggurat and
Esagila temple or even whether such an event actually occurred. The
traditional view has been challenged by historians who unfortunately base
most of their arguments on the total lack of Babylonian records regarding
the Persian destruction of these edifices. Moreover, these historians argue
that the works carried out on Alexanders instructions which are indeed
confirmed in Babylonian tablets were merely symbolic as every good
king of Babylon was obliged to at least beautify the Temple of Marduk.48
47
Lane Fox 1973, p. 157-160; Frye 1984, p. 129; Oppenheim 1985, pp. 573-574;
Stolper 1994, pp. 245-247, 253-257; Kuhrt, Sherwin-White 1994, p. 313; Briant
1996, pp. 743-746.
48
Arist., Pol., 1276a. Oppenheim 1985, pp. 583-584; Kuhrt 1990, pp. 126-127;
Dalley 1994; Kuhrt, Sherwin-White 1994, pp. 313, 317; Stolper 1994, p. 259;

King of Asia

241

However, archaeological excavations carried out in 1962 have

confirmed that the Etemenanki ziggurat had been considerably damaged.
During the 479 siege of Babylon Xerxes had directed the flow of the
Euphrates into the city and thus washed away many sun dried clay bricks
out of which the ziggurat was built. As a result of this damage a section of
the Etemenanki collapsed so that when Alexander arrived he found it in a
state of partial ruin. Therefore, although damage around the temple had
not been intentionally caused by the Persians, it was serious enough to
require major rebuilding, especially as far as the ziggurat was concerned.
The mere removal of rubble was said to have involved 10,000 labourers
and lasted two months. Arrian mentions the rebuilding project in his
account of Alexanders entry into Babylon. However, other sources, both
Greek and Babylonian, mention construction work being carried out in
329 and 325. This would suggest that in October/November there was only
a royal proclamation that the Etemenanki would be rebuilt, whereas the
actual work started some years later and was continued up to Alexanders
death.49 Alexanders other building projects were of a much smaller scale.
The only attributed building of note and here too we cannot be entirely
certain was the Greek theatre. No doubt many buildings would have
been raised in that city had Alexander lived longer for he did plan to make
Babylon the permanent capital of his world empire.50
The significance of Babylon in the Near East of those days did not
only rest on the magnificence of its architecture and the economic might of
its bankers. Babylon was above all a religious metropolis for the priests of
Marduk had managed to secure for this once local god an exceptional
position in the Mesopotamian pantheon. A concept was established in
Babylon that Marduk was the driving force behind history and that he
realised his will through native or foreign rulers. The temple council was
in charge of the earthly aspects of running Marduks shrine as well as
representing the entire city in dealings with the state authorities. For
centuries the Babylonian Temple of Marduk (Esagila) also served as a
place for observing the movements of heavenly bodies. These motions
were recorded with unprecedented meticulousness in so-called
astronomical diaries, which also included entries regarding meteorological
Wiesehfer 1996, pp. 53-54; Kuhrt 1996, pp. 46-47; Briant 1996, pp. 561-562, 694;
Margueron 2000; Will 2000, pp. 482-491; Aperghis 2001, pp. 76-77.
49
Arr., An., 3.16.4, 7.17.2; Diod., 17.112.3; Str., 16.1.5; Babylonian clay tablets:
BM 36613 = Sachs 1977, pp. 144-147; Sachs-Hunger 1988, no. 324. Bosworth
1980, p. 314; Oppenheim 1985, pp. 565-567; Kuhrt, Sherwin-White 1994, pp. 315317; Schmidt 1995, pp. 92-94; Kuhrt 1996, p. 47; van der Spek 2003, pp. 300-301.
50
Van der Spek 1987, pp. 64-65.

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Chapter V

phenomena, price fluctuations and political events. Because of their

scrupulousness they are an exceptionally valuable though incomplete
source regarding the political and economic history of Babylonia. The
importance of these long series of astronomical observations was known to
4th-century Greeks and their findings were passed on to Aristotle by his
relative, Callisthenes, who accompanied Alexander on his expedition.
During his first and second stay at Babylon Alexander saw to affairs
concerning the rebuilding of temples and offered sacrifices in accordance
with the instructions of Chaldaean priests. The work he commissioned in
the temple area was not just a matter of building projects for according to
Babylonian culture each such undertaking had to be preceded by the
issuing of oracular responses, which were not granted to all rulers. The
fact that Alexander received them sanctioned his position as the rightful
ruler in the theological and political order of Babylonia. Like Cyrus the
Great before him, Alexander in this way gained the respect of the
Babylonian clerical establishment.51
Alexander made several important administrative decisions in Babylon.
Bagophanes was offered a place in the kings entourage, whereas Mazaeus
was appointed satrap of Babiru and granted the right to issue coins
bearing his name. The coins he issued were silver tetradrachms in the Attic
standard, which was the most popular in world in that period, but with
Aramaic letters and therefore intended for the local market. The success of
these coins (issued 6-7 times in Mazaeus lifetime) is testified by the fact
that after the satraps death in 328 they continued to be issued for another
half century. Mazaeus was essentially responsible for civilian side of the
administration, whereas the military matters were entrusted to the
Macedonians Apollodorus and Agathon. Apollodorus was put in charge of
the whole satrapy, whereas Agathon was given command of the garrison
in Babylon, which included 700 Macedonian troops and 300 mercenaries.
Another Macedonian, Asclepiodorus, was made responsible for the
collection of taxes. Despite these limitations to his power, which were
indeed as normal in the Achaemenid administrative tradition as in
Alexanders practice so far, the appointment of Mazaeus to such a high
position did mark a significant policy change. Mazaeus was the first
Persian official of such a calibre to defect to Alexanders side and be
appointed satrap, a position that was also due to him by right of birth and
social status under the Achaemenid system. It is worth remembering that
Mithrenes, who after Granicus surrendered Sardis, had to wait three years
51

Porphyrius, ap. Simp., In cael., 7 p. 506. Balcer 1978, pp. 124-125; Oppenhaim
1985, pp. 546-547; van der Spek 1987, pp. 60-63; Kuhrt 1990, pp. 127-128; Kuhrt,
Sherwin-White 1994, pp. 317-318.

King of Asia

243

to receive such a nomination. Indeed it was during this first stay at

Babylon that Alexander appointed him satrap of Armenia. Moreover,
Armenia had first to be conquered before Mithrenes could take up this
position; this conquest was most probably the purpose of the campaign
commanded by Menon, which according to Strabo began at this time. By
appointing satrap of Babiru a man trusted by Darius III and a commander
who had almost defeated the Macedonian left wing at Gaugamela
Alexander let other high-ranking Iranian officials know that their was an
interesting political alternative for them if they chose to defect to the new
king of Asia. Indeed, of the twelve satraps nominated by Alexander in the
years 331-327, i.e. in the time it took him to conquer and occupy Iran, only
one was a Macedonian. The remaining eleven satraps were members of the
Iranian aristocracy, whose loyalty the new king tried in this way to
ensure.52
Alexander did not stay long in Babylon. After 34 days, therefore on
24th or 25th November 331 the army set off for Susa. With his penchant for
moralising, Curtius Rufus suggests that Alexander feared a fall in
discipline and military value among the soldiers if they stayed much
longer in this city with a reputation for licentious excesses. His colourful
description of feasts with denuded girls and married women is not,
however, confirmed in any of the other sources. Moreover, it seems too
close to the general stereotype of eastern decadence and debauchery to be
entirely plausible.53 Whilst still in Babylon Alexander gave the soldiers
their premiums from the captured Persian booty: 600 drachms to each
hetairos, 500 drachms to each allied cavalryman, 200 to each Macedonian
infantryman and an extra three months pay to each mercenary foot soldier,
which was the equivalent of 60-90 drachms (the daily rate ranging from 4
obol to 1 drachm). On the sixth day of their march to Susa the
Macedonians reached the province of Sittacene, situated on the eastern
side of the Tigris and to the south of the river Diyala. This time the army
marched at a much more leisurely pace, taking as many as 20 days to
cover the 365 km distance from Babylon to Susa. The slow march through
a rich province frequently interrupted by stops was intended to allow the
soldiers to rest before their planned winter campaign in Iran. It was also
during this march that the reinforcements for which Amyntas had been
sent even before the occupation of Egypt finally arrived. Among the
52

Curt., 5.1.43-44; Arr., An., 3.16.4-5; Diod., 17.64.5-6; Str., 11.14.9, 11.14.15.
Bosworth 1980, pp. 314-316; Seibert 1985, p. 97; OBrien 1992, pp. 97-98; Kuhrt,
Sherwin-White 1993, pp. 191-192; Atkinson 1994, pp. 50-53; Briant 1996, pp. 8687, 93-95, 862-869; Le Rider 2003, pp. 273-279.
53
Curt., 5.1.36-39; Just., 11.14. Atkinson 1994, pp. 47-48.

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Chapter V

15,000 troops there were 500 cavalrymen and 6,000 infantrymen from
Macedonia as well as 50 Macedonian youths from noble families. The last
of these were to join the royal retinue of pages with the prospect of later
being promoted to high positions in the army or administration, but in the
meantime they also guaranteed the loyalty of their families to the king.
The arrival of these reinforcements increased the size of Alexanders army
to at least the number of men he had at the start of this campaign. The
allocation of new troops to the various detachments provided an
opportunity to conduct a general reorganisation and promotions. As well
as his heroic behaviour during battles Alexander also demonstrated a
shrewd understanding of his soldiers mentality by making sure they
received provisions, proper rest, rewards and praise. It was by these means
that now, and on earlier occasions, Alexander built a strong bond with his
army.54
Fourth-century Greeks regarded Susa (today Shush in the Iranian
province of Khuzestan) to be the main capital of the Achaemenid Empire
for that was where the Great King usually received their numerous
delegations more often than not requesting him to resolve disputes
between individual Greek states. Alexander made sure this city would be
occupied immediately after the Battle of Gaugamela by dispatching there
his officer Philoxenus, no doubt with a large detachment of cavalry. There
are no records of fighting and it is much more likely that after some
negotiations the satrap, Abulites, peacefully surrendered the city. The
Macedonian army reached Susa in mid December 331. The sources record
a ceremony similar to those performed with the surrender of Sardis,
Memphis and Babylon. Alexander was first met by Abulitess son, while
the satrap himself waited to greet him at the bank of the river Choaspes
with gifts including camels and 12 elephants. Of even greater importance
than the prestige of capturing another capital of the Achaemenid state was
the Susa treasury, containing: property of the Great King, whose value the
sources do not quantify, precious metals worth 40,000 talents and another
9,000 talents in coins. Although this was only a foretaste of the booty
Alexander would later capture on the other side of the Zagros Mountains,
the Susa treasures (1,285 tons of silver) were over ten times the value of
all the treasures captured in the Greek world in the well documented and
militarily eventful period from 490 to 336 (116 tons of silver). For the first
time Alexander had unlimited financial resources, 3,000 talents of which
he sent to Antipater in Macedonia. Although small in comparison to
54

Diod., 17.64.6-65.4; Arr., An., 3.16.10-11; Curt., 5.1.39-2.7. Bosworth 1980, pp.
319-321; Krasilnikoff 1992; Krasilnikoff 1993, pp. 88-95; Atkinson 1994, pp. 4862; Keegan 1999, pp. 88-89.

King of Asia

245

Alexanders newfound wealth, this was the equivalent of three years of

royal revenue in his fathers time and it was no doubt intended to let
Antipater pay off debts incurred during the war against Agis III as well as
enhance Macedonian control over Greece. The transporting of this large
sum to the coast and beyond was entrusted to one of Alexanders
bodyguards, Menes, whom he also for a time granted governorship the
entire Syrian and Cilician coast. Among the other things at Susa that fell
into Alexanders hands by right of victory was the house of Bagoas, the
infamous Persian courtier to the last three Achaemenid rulers, two of
whom Greek tradition maintains he murdered. This house together with
the treasures it contained, said to be worth 1,000 talents and therefore as
much as it cost to build the Parthenon in Athens, was offered by the king
as gift to Parmenion.55
The palace treasury also contained items Xerxes had taken from
Athens in 480 including the bronze statues of the tyrannicides Harmodius
and Aristogeiton. Alexander, always willing to please Athens, certainly
promised to return these statues, but the sources are not clear as to whether
he ever managed to fulfil this promise. It is equally probable that it was
Seleucus I and Antioch I who eventually realised this pledge. When
Alexander was shown around the royal palace in Susa, he sat on Darius
IIIs throne, no doubt with this gesture trying to show the Persian
dignitaries that he was the legal successor of the defeated Achaemenid.
Unfortunately, on account on the differences in stature between the two
men, the throne was too high for Alexander and his feet were dangling in
the air. In order to avoid any uncalled for hilarity a page brought a table on
which he could rest his feet. On seeing this one of the Great Kings
eunuchs burst into tears, explaining that this was the table at which his
monarch had taken meals. Realising this unintended indiscretion,
Alexander was somewhat troubled, but Philotas and the other
Macedonians were immensely pleased. A Greek friend of Philip II,
Demaratus of Corinth, was also crying, but with tears of joy at seeing
Alexander occupying the Persian throne and thus symbolically avenging
the crimes committed against Greece. The cultural differences between
Macedonians and Persians also came to the fore on another occasion in
Susa when Alexander, wishing to show sympathy and kindness with a
simple gift, offered the female members of Dariuss family a supply of
captured purple yarn for them to weave whatever they wished. This was a
normal occupation for women in Greece and Macedonia even in royal
55

Arr., An., 3.16.6-10; Diod., 17.65.5-66.2; Curt., 5.1.43, 5.2.8-12; Plu., Alex.,
39.10; Just., 11.14. Andreotti 1957, p. 127; Seibert 1985, pp. 97-98; Heckel 1992,
pp. 262-263; Atkinson 1994, pp. 51-53; Holt 1999, p. 30; Heckel 2006, p. 164.

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Chapter V

families; in Persia, on the other hand, wellborn women always left such
work to the servants. The feelings of the royal captives were hurt to the
extent that Alexander considered it important to apologise to Queen
Sisigambis for this misunderstanding. Before leaving Susa, Alexander had
to make some essential administrative decisions. He reappointed Abulites
satrap of Susiana but, as in Babylon, other important posts in the satrapy
were entrusted to Macedonians. Archelaus was made commander of 3,000
troops stationed there, whereas Xenophilus, perhaps identical with
Philoxenus who had negotiated the surrender of Susa, was made
commandant of the Susa fortress, i.e. royal palace, and a garrison of 1,000
Macedonian veterans. Such a large garrison in the city and satrapy of Susa
was no doubt thought necessary on account of the treasures kept there.
Alexander appointed as treasurer a man called Callicrates, who may have
been a Greek rather than a Macedonian.56
The eventful stay in Susa probably did not last long. The next
destination was Fars the Achaemenid homeland. On the fourth day after
leaving Susa the Macedonian army crossed the river Pasitigris (the Karun
today), most probably at the site of todays city of Shushtar in the Iranian
province of Khuzestan. The land beyond the Pasitigris was inhabited by
the Uxian tribe. The Uxians living between the left bank of the Pasitigris
and the fertile Mesopotamian Lowland surrendered without a fight.
However, their compatriots living in the Zagros Mountains decided to
resist and defend the main road leading to Fars. The highland Uxians were
shepherds and in Achaemenid times belonged to those tribes not obliged to
pay tributes. Conversely, it was customary for the Great King to provide
them with gifts in return for the right to pass through their territory. Now
the Uxian highlanders were demanding such gifts from Alexander, who
naturally refused and this led to war. We do not know whether the actions
of the Uxians were in anyway coordinated with the satrap Ariobarzanes,
who was amassing forces on last line of defence at the Persian Gate.
Instead we know that the attack on Alexanders forces was not
spontaneous and was commanded by the satrap Madates, a relative of the
royal family. H. Speck has estimated on the basis of extensive field survey
that most of the fighting took place in an area between Shushtar and
Masjed-i Soleiman and reached its climax in a place to the northeast of
todays Batvand. In the struggle against the stubborn highlanders
Alexander selected elite soldiers usually used in difficult terrain:
56

Curt., 5.2.12-22; Diod., 17.66.3-7; Arr., An., 3.16.7-10; Plu., Alex., 36.1, 37.7,
56.2; Plu., mor., 329d; Plu., Ages., 15.3; Plin., Nat., 34.70; Paus., 1.8.5; V. Max.,
2.10, ext. 1. Bosworth 1980, pp. 317-320; Atkinson 1994, pp. 65-69; Heckel 2006,
pp. 75, 272.

King of Asia

247

hypaspists, Agrianians, Thracians supported by archers, 3,000 Greek

mercenaries and other foot soldiers. At the time the rest of the army
probably remained in the Uxian lowland. In the highlands the
Macedonians plundering several Uxian villages and then fought a battle
with the enemys main forces, after a local guide had escorted Alexanders
men along mountain paths around the Uxian positions. Next they besieged
a large Uxian settlement, which eventually surrendered. Thanks to
Sisigambis, her relative Madates was pardoned, whereas the Uxians now
became the subjects of the satrap of Susa and were obliged to pay tributes
in kind. We do not know whether the Uxians paid this tribute more than
once for they started regaining their independence already in Alexanders
lifetime. Nonetheless, after a short campaign and most probably before the
end of December 331 the Macedonian army was free to move on.57
The distance between Susa and Persepolis (500 km as the crow flies)
could be covered along two routes through the Zagros Mountains: the
shorter so-called summer route through higher passes and therefore not
used in the winter, and the longer so-called winter route. The Macedonian
army split up and used both routes. Leading through what is now the
wilderness of the Zagros Mountains, these two routes have been only
recently discovered thanks to the painstaking research of H. Speck. Along
the winter route, traversed by caravans for centuries in ancient times and
later, one can still find the ruins of bridges and caravanserais. This was the
road taken by Parmenion with the baggage train, Thessalian cavalry,
mercenaries and allied contingents. Alexander, on the other hand, chose to
take his Companion cavalry, mounted scouts, Macedonian infantry,
archers and Agrianians along the summer route and thus reach the
heartland of the Achaemenid state. The two armies most probably parted
not far to the north east of Haftgel. Parmenions route was probably 450
km long and ran through Bulfaris, Tashan, Bahbahan, the river Fahlian
valley, Tang-i Laleh, Tang-i Khollar and thence across the c. 1,700-metre
high Marvdasht Plain to Persepolis. Alexanders corps marched east
passing nearby todays Band Shavar, thence via the Dishmuk valley to
Abadeh, which is not far from the Susian Gate (today Tang-i Tamoradi).
Through this pass the Macedonians marched southeast to the Beshar river
valley and thence through the Persian Gate (not far from todays Yasuj),

57

Arr., An., 3.17; Arr., Ind., 40.1; Curt., 5.3.1-16; Diod., 17.67, 19.17.3; Str.,
11.13.6, 15.3.4; It. Alex., 66. Seibert 1985, pp. 101-103; Badian 1985, pp. 441-442;
Atkinson 1994, pp. 69-72; MacDermont, Schippmann 1999, pp. 304-305; Speck
2002, pp. 23-36, 157; Heckel 2006, p. 156.

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Chapter V

which gave them access to the northern part of the Marvdasht Plain and
Persepolis.58
Waiting for Alexanders army at the Persian Gate were Persian forces
commanded by Ariobarzanes, who had clearly been informed by his
reconnaissance units that Alexander would be taking the summer route.
Though differing from one another in details, all the ancient authors
generally describe the conflict that followed in a way that presents the
Persian Gate as an Iranian Thermopylae, the last line of defence which
Alexander now overcame similarly to how Xerxes had succeeded in 480.
Ariobarzaness army more realistically estimated to be 25,000 troops by
Curtius than 40,700 according to Arrian and Itinerarium Alexandri was
not short of men, but the quality of the Asian infantry, who made up most
of the satraps army, was much inferior to that of the Macedonian army.
On the other hand, the Persians took up an excellent defensive position.
They pitched their camp at 1,980 m, i.e. 150 m above the Macedonians,
and they also built a wall to close off the end of the valley. The first
Macedonian assault ended with a complete fiasco because the Persians
bravely defended the wall, rolled boulders down the sides of the valley and
also caused many loses with fired missiles. Alexander had to order a
retreat and had a camp pitched at a safe distance from the Persians.
Fortunately, among the Persian captives there was a Lycian shepherd who
undertook to lead the Macedonians along a route bypassing the enemy.
Later in Persepolis Alexander would reward this Lycian shepherd with 30
talents. That night Alexander followed the Lycian guide taking his best
detachments of Macedonians and Agrianians. So as not to arouse the
enemys suspicion, Alexander instructed the Macedonian camps
commander, Craterus, to light as many fires as if the entire army was there.
After a long and arduous march Alexanders detachments encircled the
Persians. Before launching the attack, Alexander subdivided his group into
two so as the make the assault more effective. At the same time Craterus
on his side also attacked. Ariobarzaness soldiers were completely taken
by surprise. The Persians fought desperately to defend the road into their
heartland but their brave resistance was futile. Only Ariobarzanes and a
handful of cavalry managed to escape the slaughter, to perish soon in
another battle near the Araxes river. Now nothing stood in the way
between Alexander and Persepolis.59
58

Arr., An., 3.18.1-2; Diod., 17.68.1; Curt., 5.3.16-17; Str., 15.3.6 (Curtius and
Diodorus confuse the Persian and the Susian Gates). Speck 2002, pp. 100-165,
with reference to earlier works.
59
Arr., An., 3.18.2-9; Curt., 5.3.17-4.34, 5.7.12; Diod., 17.68; Plu., Alex., 37.1-3;
Polyaen., 4.3.27; Fron., Str., 2.5.17; It. Alex., 67. Heckel 1980; Bosworth 1988, pp.

King of Asia

249

From the Persian Gate Alexanders corps entered the Marvdasht Plain
and after marching c. 100 km in a south-easterly direction they reached the
river Araxes (today the Kor in Fars), most probably somewhere near
todays Dorudzan, where there are the remains of a road from the
Achaemenid era. Macedonian engineers had to build a bridge over that
river for Alexanders army to cross to the eastern side. This was just some
50 km from Persepolis. Before the river was crossed a messenger had
arrived with a letter from Tiridates, the treasurer (ganzabara) in Persepolis,
informing the new ruler of the danger of the citys inhabitants looting the
treasury. On receiving this news Alexander took command of the cavalry
and headed for Persepolis post-haste, leaving the slower infantry to follow
on behind. Before they reached the capital, the Macedonians encountered a
crowd of Greek captives numbering more probably 800 (according to
Diodorus and Justin) rather than 4,000 (Curtius) people who the Persians
had branded or amputated body parts not essential for performing work.
Alexander offered these unfortunates money and means to return to
Greece. After consulting the matter, however, the captives declined this
offer for fear of being rejected by Greek society, which worshiped the
beauty of the human body. Instead they preferred to remain in the East
with their Asiatic families. Therefore Alexander instructed that each Greek
captive should receive a pair of oxen, 50 sheep as well as grain, clothes
and 3,000 drachms, which was the equivalent of an average ten years of
income in Greece.60
Persepolis comprised a complex of palaces on a terrace measuring 12.5
hectares as well as a city inhabited among others by courtiers. The city is
only known from the works of ancient authors but the palaces were
rediscovered by Europeans in 1620 and archaeologically examined in the
years 1931-1939. Today the palace complex and the graves of
Achaemenid monarchs located just a few kilometres away are Irans
greatest tourist attractions. Unlike other Achaemenid capitals which were
built of sun dried clay bricks, the Persepolis palaces were predominantly
built of stone, which was found locally and also imported from distant
parts of the empire. Another distinguishing feature of this palace complex
is the extraordinarily high artistic quality of the architecture and reliefs as
well as a unique and deeply thought out iconography that indicates the
exceptional role it played in the Persian state. Like no other place it
reflected the Achaemenid ideology and that dynastys position in the
90-91; Atkinson 1994, pp. 98-102; Ashley 1998, pp. 274-277; Speck 2002, pp. 4446, 169-170; Heckel 2006, p. 45, s.v. Ariobarzanes [2].
60
Arr., An., 3.18.10; Diod., 17.69; Curt., 5.5.2-24; Just., 11.14; Ps.-Callisth., 2.18.
Atkinson 1994, pp. 104-105; Speck 2002, pp. 162-164.

250

Chapter V

cosmic order of a world created by Ahura Mazda.61 Moreover, this was the
Achaemenid capital of Fars, the dynastys homeland and therefore a
privileged province in their empire. Alexanders corps most probably
reached Persepolis in mid January 330. The Macedonian baggage train and
troops commanded by Parmenion joined Alexanders forces
approximately a week later. Soon after his arrival at Persepolis Alexander
allowed his soldiers, tired and angry after the fighting at the Persian Gate,
to sack the city. The terrible slaughter of inhabitants, the rapes, the looting
and the destruction of homes should not be confused with the burning
down of the palaces, which occurred several months later. In January the
palaces were still intact.62
The palace treasury at Persepolis, which Tiridates handed over to
Alexander untouched, contained the Achaemenids basic reserves of
bullion and other treasures they had accumulated for over more than 200
years. The total value was 120,000 talents, therefore much more than the
treasure at Susa. With time this vast amount of bullion, which had so far
only been thesaurized by the Achaemenids, was converted into coins to
cover the costs of war as well as allow Alexander to demonstrate his
largess towards artists, philosophers, soldiers and courtiers. The kings
expenditure during his entire expedition east is estimated to have been on
average 7,500 talents a year. The economic effect of putting into
circulation such a massive amount of bullion has frequently been
compared to the effect of the influx of South American silver and gold in
the 16th and 17th centuries, and more often than not the Persian bullion
effect has been estimated to have been greater. Alexander decided to
concentrate all the treasure captured from the Persians in Susa. Some of
the sources mention captured treasure being transported from Persis to
Ecbatana though that could have only happened after the city was taken,
i.e. only after June 330. It is possible that these seemingly contradictory
accounts are due to the fact that some of the treasure was transported to
Susa while the rest was left to cover the costs of ongoing and future
campaigns in Iran. And it would have been that the second batch of
treasure was ultimately transported to Ecbatana. No doubt the decision to
shift the treasure resulted from knowledge that the palaces of Persepolis
would be burned down and therefore could no longer serve as the empires
main treasury. The exceptionally responsible mission of transporting the
bullion and other precious items was entrusted to Parmenion. This was a
61

Diod., 17.71.3-8. Schmidt 1953-1970; Walser 1966; Wiesehfer 1996, pp. 24-26;
Cuyler Young 1988, pp. 108-110; Briant 1996, pp. 183-228.
62
Diod., 17.70, 17.71.3; Curt., 5.6.1-9. Badian 1985, pp. 440, 443; Atkinson 1994,
pp. 110-115; Bloedow, Loube 1997, p. 349; Nawotka 2003b, p. 68.

King of Asia

251

major logistical undertaking requiring 20,000 mules and 3,000-5,000

camels. Some of the pack animals and fodder had to be brought over from
Babylonia and Elam. That is why the transporting lasted two months and
was probably completed shortly before the end of Alexanders four-month
stay in Fars.63 Persepolis was stripped of all its valuables so thoroughly
that in levels that could not have been subsequently robbed archaeologists
have found no more than twenty-one coins and small amounts of cheap
jewellery. The fact that the Macedonians must have spent so much time
and trouble to remove everything of value from the palaces indicates that
there was already a plan to burn them down.64
In lands he had previously occupied Alexander had always strived to
win the support of the local elites and thus legitimise his authority. This
policy had proved to be successful in Asia Minor, Egypt and Babylonia.
The same was to happen in Iran. After the Battle of Gaugamela Alexander
was proclaimed king of Asia and a similar proclamation could have been
made in April 330, 65 therefore during his stay in Fars. As the rightful
successor of the Achaemenids Alexander not only appointed Persian
aristocrats as satraps but also adopted the key elements of Persian attire.
The equivocal nature of this latter issue has been the subject of
controversy among modern historians. The way the king dressed was not a
matter of fashion but of politics. Both the Iranians and the Greeks were
aware that the Great King was surrounded by a complex courtly system of
ceremonies which also included attire worn exclusively by him. By putting
on elements of this royal dress Alexander showed his intention to take
over Darius IIIs legacy; this way he demonstrated to the Iranian
aristocracy the legitimacy of the authority he had gained through military
victories. Alexander most probably never wore the entire Persia costume.
However, the major historical sources (Arrian and Vulgate authors)
mention situations in the royal court when Alexander appeared with its
most important items including a tiara, which was generally regarded to be
an emblem of the Persian monarchy.66 It was also then that he founded a
unit of bodyguards modelled on the Persian melophori.67
63

Diod., 17.71.1-3; Str., 15.3.9; Plu., Alex., 37.4. Keynes 1930, ii, pp. 150-152,
291; Bosworth 1988, pp. 92-93; Callata 1989, p. 263; Bloedow, Loube 1997, pp.
347-352; Le Rider 2003, pp. 310-316; Holt 2003, p. 13.
64
Schmidt 1953-1970, i, pp. 16-78; Borza 1972, p. 235; Sancisi-Weerdenburg
1993, pp. 181-182; Bloedow, Loube 1997, pp. 344-346; Nawotka 2003b, p. 73;
Shabazi 2003, pp. 19-20 and n. 71.
65
Ael., VH, 2.25. Date: Grzybek 1990, pp. 43-44.
66
Goukowsky 1975; Badian 1985, pp. 450-452; Wiesehfer 1996, pp. 105-107;
Wirth 1993, p. 223; Briant 1996, pp. 90-94. Alexanders Persian costume: Duris,

252

Chapter V

Symbolic gestures were important to Alexander in Fars as a means of

acquiring acceptance among the Persians and that is why, for instance, he
visited Pasargadae. Located 43 km from Persepolis, this city was founded
by Cyrus after his victory over the Medes as the capital of the land of the
Pasargadae tribe, to which he himself belonged. A palace complex was
built there together a royal garden (paradeisos). After Darius I had
transferred the capital to Persepolis, Pasargadae remained a place of
investiture for Persian monarchs; the most important edifice there was the
grave of Cyrus the Great. The commandant of Pasargadae, Gobares,
surrendered the city without resistance and Alexander captured another
6,000 talents from that citys treasury. But the main objective of
Alexanders mission was to visit Cyruss gave and pay his respects. This
visit was described by Aristobulus who accompanied the king on this
expedition.68
However, neither the satrap nominations nor the symbolic gestures
made the intended impression on the Persians. Already Ariobarzaness
fierce resistance at the Persian Gate gave a foretaste of the problems that
would be encountered in Fars. The ancient authors report hostilities
between Alexander and the Persian populace and that he had to take
fortified towns by force. The most serious fighting was against the
belligerent tribe of the Mardi, who were closely affiliated to the
Achaemenid dynasty. Alexander led a 30-day campaign against them in
the winter of 330. Traces of these events are found in the Iranian
Zoroastrian tradition, which is the only one to show Alexander in a
decidedly negative light. It alone blames Alexander for Dariuss death, of
trying to destroy the true religion, of extinguishing sacred fires, of burning
the Avesta, of stealing and translating sacred books, of destroying cities, of
murdering aristocrats and magi and of carving up rnahr (Iran). Though
not all these accusations are equally valid, for instance the Avesta had not
yet been written in Alexanders time, they do reflect what the ancient
authors also describe as a campaign of terror to break the sprit of

ap. Ath., 12.50; Arr., An., 4.7.4; Diod., 17.17.5; Curt., 6.6.4; Luc., DMort., 12.4;
ME, 2; Just., 12.3.8; Plu., Alex., 45.2; Plu., mor., 329f-330a. Nawotka 2003, pp.
100-101; Olbrycht 2004, pp. 286-293.
67
ME, 2.
68
Aristobul., ap. Str., 15.3.7-8; Arr., An., 3.18.10; Curt., 5.6.10; Ps.-Callisth.,
2.18.1. Bosworth 1980, pp. 329-330; Briant 1980, pp. 65-72; Stronach 1985, pp.
838-849; Mallowan 1985, p. 418; Wiesehfer 1996, pp. 26, 32; Tuplin 1996, pp.
88-89.

King of Asia

253

resistance among the Persians in Fars. 69 Yet the desire to acquire

legitimacy in Fars was probably doomed to fail from the start, especially
while Darius III was still alive. The Persians considered themselves to be a
chosen people and therefore their king could only be a Persian, an Aryan
and a member of the Achaemenid dynasty. For the Persians, who viewed
the world largely from a religious perspective, Alexander could only be an
anti-monarch, a rebel against Ahura-Mazda.70
Despite successive defeats Darius was still considered the legitimate
ruler not only in Fars but also in at least some of the countries Alexander
had already conquered. Thanks to extant local sources we know the mood
among some Babylonians. Recorded after the Battle of Gaugamela, the
Dynastic Prophecy reports Dariuss defeat (at Gaugamela) and the
occupation of Babylon by Han (Alexander) but it predicts that the
rightful king would be victorious in the next battle, Babylon would be
liberated and peace and prosperity would return. 71 Nevertheless, for
Alexander the situation was nowhere worse than in Fars. In that regions
tradition recorded in Ard Wrz-Nmag book the Macedonians are
remembered as a tribe of dishevelled demons from the land of wrath. Their
king is nicknamed Guzastag (the Accursed) just like the god of evil,
deceit and darkness, Angra Mainyu. The doggedness of Persian resistance
in the winter of 330 probably explains why in a letter from Aristotle to
Alexander in the summer of 330 there is a suggestion that the Persians,
exceptionally among other Asian nations, should be deported to Europe
and Africa.72
At that time Darius III was some 600 km from Persepolis in Ecbatana
and trying to gather forces for the next battle. The formidable east Iranian
cavalry had retreated from Gaugamela relatively unscathed and Darius
was also counting on the arrival of allied forces from Scythia, so his army
could not be ignored and it would not have been prudent to leave behind a
province that was not fully subjugated and inhabited by a population still
69

Curt., 5.6.11-19; Diod., 17.73.1. Green 1974, pp. 314-320; Atkinson 1994, pp.
118-120; Wiesehfer 1994, pp. 363-364, 395-397; Briant 2002, pp. 90-92; Shabazi
2003.
70
Eddy 1961, pp. 58-62; Balcer 1978, pp. 126-127.
71
Sachs-Hunger 1988, no. 328, col. v. Grayson 1975, pp. 24-37; Marasco 1985;
Kuhrt 1987, pp. 154-156; Briant 1996, p. 803; Mehl 1999, p. 34; Brosius 2003, pp.
171-172; Shabazi 2003, pp. 15-19. But some see in the Dynastic Prophecy Darius
III as an usurper justly punished: van der Spek 2003, pp. 324-342.
72
Eddy 1961, pp. 12-41; Green 1974, pp. 314-315; Boyce 1982, pp. 12-15, 290;
Plezia, Bielawski 1970, chapter 7 of Aristotles letter; Carlier 1995, p. 156;
Faraguna 2003, pp. 116-117; Shabazi 2003.

254

Chapter V

loyal to the Persian king. Once his efforts to appease proved unsuccessful,
Alexander embarked on a campaign of terror which culminated in the
burning of Persepolis. The destruction of the palaces with fire, a sacred
element in the Zoroastrian religion, was supposed break the spirit of
resistance among Persians. The destruction happened towards the end of
Alexanders stay in Fars, i.e. in May 330.73 That the Macedonians were
conducting an ideological war is confirmed by archaeological findings.
Inside the Persepolis treasury approximately 300 fragments of deliberately
smashed stone mortar were found. Such mortars were used to produce
haoma a potion used in the Zoroastrian cult. 74 In all probability
Macedonian soldiers destroyed the mortars as an action against the magi
who had been stirring up religious and nationalistic feelings among the
native Persians.
The burning of the Persepolis palaces has been recorded in all the main
historical sources concerning Alexander. The blaze is also confirmed by
archaeological findings. In three edifices the Apadana, the Hundred
Column Hall and the Treasury the charred remains of cedar wood were
found in a 0.3-1 m thick layer of ashes, and we know that cedar wood was
used as a building material in Persepolis. The ancient authors give diverse
accounts of the course of events and Alexanders motives behind the
destruction. According to Arrian, Strabo and the anonymous author of
Itinerarium Alexandri, this was an act of revenge for the burning of Greek
temples by Xerxes in 480, and such was no doubt the official version of
Macedonian propaganda. Diodorus, Curtius and Plutarch give, after
Cleitarchus, a colourful description of how during a drinking party an
Athenian hetaera (courtesan) Thais persuaded a drunken Alexander to do
it. Arrian does not mention this incident as his chief source, the work of
King Ptolemy I also failed to mention it; Thais had been Ptolemys
mistress for many years and he would not have wished her to be associated
with this unprecedented act of vandalism. Three buildings were burnt, but
the distances between them and the materials they were built from (brick
walls and clay roofs) precluded the possibility of the blaze spreading
naturally after just one of the buildings had been set alight by drunken
revellers. All three edifices must have been set on fire after some
preparation, which is also confirmed by the lack of valuables found on site.

73

Schwartz 1985, p. 678; Nawotka 2003b.

Schmidt 1953-1970, ii, pp. 53-55; Balcer 1978, p. 31; Schwartz 1985, pp. 676677.
74

King of Asia

255

The first torch may have indeed been cast by Thais, but in doing so she
would have been doing exactly what Alexander intended.75
A couple of months later it became apparent that Darius III posed a
significantly smaller threat than had originally been supposed in May 330.
That is why the destruction of the Persepolis palaces the symbol of
Achaemenid might turned out to be so costly, not only because of the
obvious material loss but above all because it alienated Alexander from
Persian elites and ordinary Persians alike. In their eyes the Macedonian
was to remain an invader and not the rightful king of Iran.76

5. The death of Darius III

Towards the end of May 330 the Macedonian army set off for Ecbatana,
where Alexander knew Darius III to be. This city (today Hamadan in
western Iran) was the former capital of Media and on account of its
relatively cool climate, being located 1,880 m above sea level in the
Zagros Mountains, it later served as the summer residence of the Persian
kings. Waiting until May before starting the 600-km trek to Ecbatana was
logistically advantageous for much of the route led through the mountains
and it was only in late spring that they were entirely free of snow.
Moreover, the Median harvest began in June, which made it easier to
acquire essential provisions. The Macedonians certainly advanced along
the Royal Road, which ran through the province of Paraitacene in the
upper reaches of the river Araxes. Alexander conquered this province and
appointed as satrap Oxathres (Oxyathres?), the son of Abulites the satrap
of Susa. Next the Macedonian army marched into neighbouring Media. It
was there that they were joined by reinforcements raised in Cilicia,
numbering 5,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry. These forces had most
probably crossed Mesopotamia directly into Media and not taken the long
route through Persis as Alexander had done a few months earlier. It was in
Media that rumours reached Alexander that Darius had now received
Scythian and Cadusian reinforcements and was preparing for battle.
Therefore, leaving behind his baggage train (including some of the
Persepolis treasure) to be guarded by a large escort, he proceeded with
most of his forces on a forced march to Ecbatana.77
75

Clitarch., ap. Ath., 13.37; Arr., An., 3.18.10-12; Diod., 17.70-72; Str., 15.3.6;
Curt., 5.7.2-11; Plu., Alex., 38; It. Alex., 67. Nawotka 2003b.
76
Nawotka 2003b, pp. 75-76; Brosius 2003, pp. 181-185; Brosius 2003a, pp. 227228; Heckel 2009, p. 40.
77
Str., 15.3.6; Arr., An., 3.19.1-3; Curt., 5.7.12; Ps.-Callisth., 2.19. Engels 1978, pp.
73-79; Seibert 1985, pp. 108-109; Heckel 2006, pp. 186-187.

256

Chapter V

However, the rumours turned out to be only partly true. Darius was
indeed counting on the support of his allies and east Iranian vassals.
Moreover, he was planning to draw Alexander deeper into the country and
weaken his forces through scorched earth tactics. But none of the expected
reinforcements came. In Ecbatana Darius was left with merely 3,000
cavalry and 30,000 infantry, of which only some 2,000 Greek mercenaries
were of substantial military value. This was much too little to fight another
battle against such a formidable enemy. Darius therefore dispatched his
baggage train towards the so-called Caspian Gate, usually associated with
todays Sar-i Darreh pass in the southern part of the Elburz Mountain
Range. He himself remained at Ecbatana for a while but then also began a
retreat. It was during this retreat that a dispute began which the ancient
authors call a conspiracy. The disagreement was between Darius and three
of the highest Persian officials in his camp: Bessus, the satrap of Bactria
and Sogdiana, Barsaentes, the satrap of Arachosia (Haruvati) and
Drangiana, and the chiliarch Nabarzanes. These officials interpreted
Dariuss successive defeats as a sign that he no longer had the support of
the gods. They therefore suggested that he should temporarily hand over
his authority to someone else, a substitute king, and thus remove the bad
omens that were currently imposed on the Great King. Darius flatly
rejected this idea. The conspirators therefore decided to isolate their king
from his loyal Greek mercenaries and effectively took over control of the
army. Patron, the commander of the Greek mercenaries, contacted Darius
and offered to have his men guard him. But the Great King rejected this
offer for he did not wish his subjects to think he did not trust them.
Therefore the mercenaries and Persians who, like the loyal Artabazus, did
not wish to side with the conspirators now just tried to save themselves. At
a village called Thara Bessus, Nabarzanes and Barsaentes arrested Darius
and, bound in chains of gold for this was after all still the Great King,
transported him in a carriage towards the eastern satrapies. Bessus, who
was most probably a member of the Achaemenid dynasty, symbolically
donned the tiara and proclaimed himself king assuming the dynastic name
of Artaxerxes (V).78
Meanwhile the Macedonian army was still marching to Ecbatana. On
the 12th day a Persian aristocrat called Bisthanes apparently the son of
Artaxerxes III surrendered to Alexander and informed him that Darius
had left Ecbatana five days earlier. Finally realising that Darius was
78

Curt., 5.8.1-12.20; Arr., An., 3.19.2, 3.21.1, 3.25.3; Diod., 17.73.2; Plu., Alex.,
42.5; Just., 11.15.1; Ps.-Callisth., 2.20; ME, 3; It. Alex., 68-69. Bosworth 1980, pp.
333-334, 340-342; Seibert 1985, p. 112; Holt 1988, pp. 45-46; Nylander 1993, pp.
151-153.

King of Asia

257

militarily weak, Alexander changed his plans. He decided that continuing

the march to Ecbatana was no longer necessary, so he entrusted the
capture of that city to Parmenion. As the Great King had left the last
capital of his empire, Alexander considered the Panhellenic war ended. It
was then or after Dariuss death that he relieved the Greek allies and
Thessalians of military duty. Apart from the normal soldiers pay they
were given bonus, the sum total of which amounted to 12,000 talents. At
same time it was declared that any soldier who wished to continue serving
Alexander could do so as a mercenary. Many took up that offer.
Parmenion duly captured Ecbatana and deposited there the transported
treasure, which was now put under the charge of Harpalus and a powerful
garrison of 6,000 Macedonian soldiers and mercenaries. Next Parmenion
was to subjugate Hyrcania by the Caspian Sea, but these instructions were
changed as Alexander and two other Macedonian commanders had already
conquered that land.79
Alexander set himself the task of capturing Darius. The objective was
to force the Great King to hand over the crown to the Macedonian
conqueror and thus legitimise his rule in Persian eyes. So began the
wildest chase in Alexanders career, especially as the Persian conspirators
were also aware of the political dangers they faced if Darius were captured
by the Macedonians. The difficulties were compounded by the time of
year, the start of a scorching summer, and the terrain, mountains and arid
desert. The ancient authors relate an anecdote about how one hot day when
everyone was suffering from thirst the soldiers, out of concern for the
kings health and therefore also their own safety, brought Alexander a
helmet full of water. But the king, as always eager to demonstrate his
heroic character, of course refused because there was not enough water to
be shared with the other soldiers. Alexander was able to keep track of
where his quarry was heading on account of Persian desertions: dignitaries
and ordinary soldiers who disapproved of Dariuss arrest successively
abandoned Bessus and Nabarzaness camp. The best detachments had
been selected for this mission: hetairoi, mounted scouts, mercenary
cavalry, Agrianians, archers and some phalangites. On the 11th day of a
murderous march the Macedonians reached Rhagae (today Rey, in the
Greater Teheran metropolitan area), some 80 km from the Caspian Gate,
which the Persians had already crossed. Once the Macedonians reached
the Caspian Gate, Alexander had to allow his men to rest for five days
according to Arrian. It was at this time that Alexander nominated
Oxydates satrap of Media. Previously Darius had imprisoned this Persian
79

Arr., An., 3.19.2-8; Diod., 17.74.2-5; Curt., 5.13.1, 6.2.17; Plu., Alex., 42.5.
Bosworth 1976, pp. 132-136; Bosworth 1980, pp. 334-338; Heckel 2006, p. 72.

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in Susa for some disloyalty and that made him seem more trustworthy in
the eyes of the new ruler. Beyond the Caspian Gate Alexander received a
Babylonian called Bagistanes and Mazaeuss son, Antibelos (Ardu-Bel?),
who informed him of Dariuss arrest. After two nights of forced marching
the Macedonians reached yet another abandoned Persian campsite.
Alexander learned that the Greek mercenaries had also left the Persians
and that was when he decided to change his tactic. He continued the
pursuit with only 300-500 of his best foot soldiers, who were now
mounted on horses for the sake of speed. The success of this improvisation
incidentally led Alexander to later create a new military formation called
the dimachae, who were trained to fight both on foot and on horseback.
But instead of following their tracks Alexander chose to intercept the
fleeing Persians by taking a shortcut across the Great Salt Desert (Dasht-e
Kavir). Most of the horses failed to complete the arduous trek, which
according to our sources covered a distance of 400 stades (72 km), so that
Alexander was eventually left with only 60 soldiers. This detachment
finally managed to intercept the Persian column not far from the town of
Hecatompylos (today Shahr-i Qumis). Though numerically superior, the
Persians panicked when they saw the Macedonians personally commanded
by Alexander. Bessus tried to persuade Darius to leave the carriage, mount
a horse and flee with the rest of them. But when Darius refused,
Barsaentes and the satrap of Areia Satibarzanes stabbed him with their
spears and fled, leaving the Great King to suffer his fate. Though legend
would have us believe that Alexander found Darius while he was still alive,
it is almost certain that the Great King was dead by the time the victor
reached him. All the new king of Asia could do was to cover his body with
his cloak.80 According to Arrian, Darius died in the Athenian month of
Hekatombaion, i.e. in July 330. This date is confirmed by the Paros
Chronicle, where Dariuss death is the first recorded event in the Athenian
year 330/329, which began in July. During the spring-summer campaign
Alexanders army covered the over 900-km distance from Persepolis to
Hecatompylos in just two months, as usual surprising his enemy with
sheer speed.81

80
Arr., An., 3.20-21; Curt., 5.12.18-13.25; Plu., Alex., 42.6-43.5; Plu., mor., 332f;
Diod., 17.73.2-4; Just., 11.15; Polyaen., 4.3.25; Ael., NA, 6.25; Ps.-Callisth., 2.20;
It. Alex., 69; Poll., 1.132. Green 1974, pp. 321-322, 325-329; Bosworth 1980, pp.
338-345; Bosworth 1988, pp. 95-96; Badian 1985, pp. 448-449; Badian 1996, pp.
20-21; Nylander 1993, p. 151; Hammond 1996, pp. 171-173; Heckel 2006, pp. 30,
188.
81
Arr., An., 3.22; Marmor Parium: FGrH, 239 F107. Bosworth 1980, p. 346.

King of Asia

259

The treasure that had been taken from Ecbatana by Darius was duly
found by Alexanders men in Persian camp Arrians figure of 7,000
talents is probably closer to the truth that Curtiuss 26,000. The new king
of Asia ordered the body of Darius to be taken to Persepolis. It was buried
in one of the royal graves at Naqsh-e Rustam presumably not the one
with unfinished sculptures that Darius had started having built in his
lifetime. Concern over providing a royal burial for Darius and the later
pursuit of the Great Kings murderer, Bessus, shows that Alexander was
clearly taking his role as successor to the Achaemenids on the Asian
throne seriously. At Hecatompylos Alexander had to wait for the rest of
his detachments to catch up and it is probably there that he made further
official nominations. He appointed Amminapes, a member of his retinue,
satrap of the as yet unconquered Parthia and Hyrcania. One of Alexanders
hetairoi, Tlepolemus, was appointed commander of a garrison of
mercenaries. Of greater importance was the inclusion of Dariuss younger
brother, Oxyathres, among Alexanders hetairoi. This was the only
instance recorded in the sources of an Iranian being bestowed such an
honour at this time. Dariuss death, the stay at Hecatompylos and the
release from service of the Greek allies were all interpreted by the
Macedonian troops as signs the campaign was drawing to a close and that
soon they would be heading home, especially as they had recently crossed
the Caspian Gate, which the Greeks considered the end of the inhabited
world. In this instance Alexander easily managed to persuade his soldiers
of the necessity to continue the war by stressing that Bessus was still
putting up resistance, which could eventually lead to a counteroffensive or
even another invasion of Europe. But this was nonetheless the first clear
signal of diverging views between Alexander and his men regarding the
war. It was no doubt as consequence of this experience that during his stay
in Hyrcania Alexander imposed a censorship policy regarding the
correspondence of Macedonian and mercenary soldiers, whose letters were
now secretly opened in search of politically incorrect opinions.82
The king did not immediately start the expedition against Bessus but as
usual first made sure the territories behind him were secure. His army
turned back from the road to Bactria and instead invaded the fertile
agricultural land of Hyrcania by the Caspian Sea. There it divided into
three groups commanded by Alexander, Craterus and Erigyios.
Alexanders corps occupied the satrapys capital, Zadracarta, and there he
82

Aeschin., 3.165; Arr., An., 3.22.1, 3.22.6; Diod., 17.73.3; Curt., 6.2.1-4.1; Plin.,
Nat., 36.132; Plu., Alex., 43.7; Polyaen., 4.3.19; Just., 11.15. Wilcken 1967, pp.
149-151; Bosworth 1980, p. 345; Stoneman 1994, p. 95; Briant 2003, pp. 45-52;
Heckel 2006, p. 188.

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Chapter V

received Persian officials successively surrendering to him after Dariuss

demise: the satrap of Hyrcania, Phrataphernes, the chiliarch Nabarzanes
and the satrap of the Tapuri, Autophradates (or Phradates), alone among
them allowed to keep his position. Artabazus and his sons were accepted
into the kings entourage partly as reward for the fathers loyalty to Darius
even in the hardest of times and partly because his daughter Barsine had
been Alexanders lover for two and a half years (see Chapter IV.5).
Alexander initially refused to make any deals with the Greek mercenaries
who had served Darius but eventually he relented and promised to forgive
them on condition that they now entered his service. Also some
ambassadors from Greek states were taken into Macedonian captivity.
Alexander, however, released Sinopes envoys as that state had not been
included in the universal peace and therefore had had a right to collaborate
with Darius. The subjugation of Hyrcania was ended with a short, five-day
campaign against the Mardi, who inhabited the south west part of that
country. Alexanders ire was raised when this tribe audaciously captured
his favourite steed Bucephalus. Threatened with total annihilation, the
Mardi returned the horse, submitted hostages and promised obedience to
the satrap Autophradates. In Hyrcania Alexander was also reportedly met
by the Queen of the Amazons, Thalestris, who came to Macedonian camp
for the express purpose of having the greatest war leader father a child by
her and it was for this reason that she remained in the camp for thirteen
days. If she gave birth to a girl, she intended to keep her, but if she gave
birth to a boy, she would have the child sent to Alexander. This tale set in
the most distant of imaginable lands was already controversial in ancient
times and rejected by more sober minded authors. Plutarch even cites an
anecdote about how Onesicritus read the tale of Alexander and Thalestris
to Lysimachus and his companions. The kings former bodyguard who had
always been at hand suddenly interrupted Onesicritus and sarcastically
asked: And where was I at that time?83 Some modern historians believe
that the historic part of this tale refers to a genuine encounter with a
princess of an Iranian nomadic people called the Dahae.84
A less sensational but much more important development that would
influence Alexanders future policies regarding conquered nations was the
mass capitulation of Iranian aristocrats, who now formed a sizable group
in his entourage. Alexander received them willingly for by then he was
83
Arr., An., 3.23.1-24.1; Curt., 6.4.1-5.32; Diod., 17.75.1-77.3; Str., 11.5.4 (after
Cleitarchus); Plu., Alex., 44-46; Just., 12.3; It. Alex., 70-72. Plutarch (Alex., 46)
lists now lost sources to the alleged encounter between Alexander and Thalestris.
Engels 1978, pp. 83-84; Atkinson 1994, pp. 192-200; Bosworth 1995, pp. 121-122.
84
Lane Fox 1973, p. 276; Bosworth 1995, pp. 102-103.

King of Asia

261

well aware of the essential role played by aristocrats in the running of this
vast empire. This also probably explains why the king was usually
merciful to those who had previously held important positions in the
Achaemenid state, including the conspirators Nabarzanes and Satibarzanes
who had been involved in overthrowing Darius. Their high status and the
speed with which they surrendered saved them from the punishment that
would eventually be imposed on Bessus. Such a large presence of wellborn Persians in Alexanders circle naturally enhanced the process of
orientalization in his policies, which began soon after his first victories in
Asia. This was given even greater impetus after news of Bessuss
usurpation, for now Alexander very much wanted to show the Iranian
aristocrats that he was the real Great King by adhering to the traditions of
the Achaemenid court. A turning point in the orientalization of
Alexanders policies occurred during his stay in Zadracarta from August to
September 330. Apart from the Persian dress he himself had been wearing
for some time when in court, Alexander now persuaded some of his
hetairoi to wear certain elements of this attire as well. Henceforth he had
two chancelleries: one for documents concerning European affairs, which
Alexander sealed with his original signet and a chancellery for royal
Persian affairs where Alexander used a signet captured from Darius. At the
time Alexander also at least partly adopted the Achaemenid courts
hierarchical system and gave Macedonians and Greeks in his retinue
Persian court titles. People wishing to speak to Alexander were now
ushered in by his chamberlain (eisangeleus), Chares, in command of a
team of rabdouchoi (rod-bearers); the Macedonians, who were used to
having direct contact with the king, found this procedure particularly
objectionable. In these matters Alexander was always walking on thin ice
as the two court tradition differed in a fundamental way: the Macedonian
adhering to the principle of accessibility of the king, the Iranian built on
restriction of access, rituals, hierarchy. A certain Ptolemaios, probably not
the later king of Egypt, was appointed the royal food taster (edeatros). The
kings closest friend, Hephaestion, received the highest court distinction
by being appointed hazarapati (court chiliarch), but he was also
appointed chiliarch of Companion cavalry. The combination of these two
posts gave him a higher position than was normally held by a Persian
hazarapati. It was also then that Alexander formed a Persian guard of
melophori and an aristocratic mounted guard. Other adopted Achaemenid
institutions included court eunuchs and 365 concubines the most
beautiful women in Asia. The first recorded use of the Achaemenids
transportable palace was also in Hyrcania. This was a massive tent
supported by 50 gilded columns where Alexander granted audiences and

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Chapter V

presided over court hearings. The entrance to this tent was guarded by 500
melophori, 500 Persian archers and 500 Macedonian guardsmen bearing
silver shields (argyraspides), and beyond them was a group of war
elephants. This orientalization of the court and its rituals displeased the
Macedonians and to most of the ancient authors (probably following on
after Agatharchides) this is simply an exemplum of Alexanders moral
downfall. Plutarch is an exception to this rule in that he sees this as an
element of Alexanders broader political outlook in which he was trying
win over Asian nations by adopting the external aspects of their cherished
native cultures.85
The Macedonian armys next objective was Bactria the satrapy of
Bessus, who was now a pretender to the Achaemenid throne. Setting off
from Hyrcania, the Macedonian crossed Parthia and on its eastern border
entered Areia. It was in the border town of Susia (today Tus, to the north
of Meshed in the Iranian province of Khorasan) that the satrap of Areia,
Satibarzanes, immediately surrendered. Despite his involvement in
Dariuss murder, Satibarzanes was forgiven and re-nominated satrap of
Areia. Alexander was eager to defeat Bessus before the latter managed to
raise a large army and secure his position as Great King. That is why he
had a booty laden baggage train that was holding back his army burnt.
However, at this stage the elimination of Bessus was not Alexanders sole
military objective. The long list of contingents at Gaugamela from Bactria,
Sogdiana, Areia, Drangiana and Arachosia as well as clay tablets
discovered by archaeologists at Persepolis and recently published Aramaic
documents from Bactria both indicate that in the 5th and 4th centuries these
were prosperous and densely populated satrapies important centres of
power in the Achaemenid state. Therefore their occupation was an
important goal for any claimant to the Persian throne. But as the next three
years would show consolidating power there was not an easy task. Before
Alexanders army, now freed from the baggage train, reached the Bactrian
capital, news arrived that Satibarzanes had revolted and the surprisingly
tiny contingent of Macedonian 40 horsemen in Areia had been slaughtered.
Alexander immediately turned back with the cavalry and two taxeis of
85

Phylarch., ap. Ath., 12.55 (= FGrH, 81 F41); Chares, ap. Ath., (= FGrH, 125 F1);
Arr., An., FGrH, 156 F1.3; Diod., 17.77.4-7, 18.48.5; Liv., 9.19.1-5; Curt., 6.6,
7.5.40; Plu., Alex., 51.1-2; Plu., mor., 329f-330e; Polyaen, 4.3.24; Ael., VH, 9.3;
ME, 1-2. Goukowsky 1975, pp. 276-277; Goukowsky 1978, pp. 30-34; Badian
1985, p. 450; Bosworth 1988, pp. 98-100; OBrien 1992, pp. 111-113; Heckel
1992, p. 226, n. 54; Atkinson 1994, pp. 200-204; Briant 1994, pp. 297-298; Briant
2002, p. 101; Carlier 1995, p. 155; Hammond 1996, pp. 180-181; Collins 2001;
Spawforth 2007, pp. 87, 93-97, 101-102; Weber 2009.

King of Asia

263

phalanx, leaving the rest of his army under Craterus command. His
detachment reached the Areian capital Artacoana (near todays Herat in
Afghanistan) within two days covering, according to Arian, an amazing
distance of 600 stades (110 km). A terrified Satibarzanes with 2,000
cavalry escaped to join Bessus. When the rest of his army caught up,
Alexander instructed Craterus to besiege Artacoana, while he and a part of
the army set out against Areians, who had sought shelter in a natural
mountain fortress. Modern historians believe this fortress to have been
located most probably at Qaleh-ye Dukhtar, c. 20 km to the north of Herat,
rather than Qalat-i Nadiri, c. 70 km to the north of Tus. Here an
inadvertently started fire helped the Macedonians win. Meanwhile at
Artacoana the mere sight of siege towers persuaded the defenders to
surrender, and thus also be pardoned. Now Alexander simply nominated a
new satrap, a Persian called Arsaces. It was after the capitulation of
Artacoana that Alexanders army was joined by 6,500 soldiers recruited
from Illyria, Greece and Lydia. Satibarzaness revolt forced Alexander to
change his up until now lenient policy of pardoning all Persian aristocrats
who surrender even including those who had overthrown Darius III. That
is why after quelling the revolt of Areia he started a campaign in
Drangiana and Arachosia. The regions satrap and Dariuss murderer
Barsaentes fled all the way to India, but he was eventually handed over to
Alexander and killed.86

6. Philotas affair and the fall of Parmenion

It was while the Macedonian army was at the capital of Drangiana,
Phrada (today Farah in western Afghanistan) after the end of the 330
autumn campaign that the most serious scandal concerning Alexanders
closest circle occurred, known as the Philotas affair. Philotas, the son of
Parmenion, had already been among Alexanders closest companions in
the days when he was still an heir to the throne, but he was never a close
friend of his. Thanks to his fathers position and to his own courage and
talent he quickly rose through the ranks to become commander of the key
formation of the Macedonian army the Companion cavalry. As a talented
and effective commander Philotas was respected by Macedonian soldiers
but not necessarily liked. People disapproved of his fondness for luxury,
86
Diod., 17.78; Curt., 6.613-36; Str., 15.2.10; Arr., An., 3.25; It. Alex., 72-74.
Engels 1978, pp. 86-89; Bosworth 1980, p. 354-359; Bosworth 1988, p. 100;
Seibert 1985, pp. 118-120; Vogelsang 1992, p. 221; Atkinson 1994, pp. 206-212;
Hammond 1996, pp. 182-183; Heckel 2006, p. 53, s.v. Arsaces [1]; Briant 2009,
pp. 148-151.

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Chapter V

aloofness and exaggerated Hellenisation he was reluctant to speak

Macedonian. He was particularly despised by officers closest to Alexander,
who envied his position. In 332 Craterus persuaded Philotass mistress,
Antigone, to report what her lover told her. Thus Alexander was informed
of Philotass boastful claims that the king owed all his achievements to
Parmenion and his son and of how Philotas had laughed at Alexanders
supposed affiliation with Ammon of Siwah.87
This was not enough to accuse Philotas of treason but it was certainly
valuable information regarding the opinions of the third most important
person in the army after the king and Parmenion. It was Parmenion along
with his sons and other relatives who formed the core of the old guard
that Alexander had inherited from his father and who advised the young
king in nominations to offices of state. Alexander gradually freed himself
from their influence by gaining the support of those who owed their
privileged positions of power and prestige primarily to him and not solely
to their aristocratic connections. Another source of conflict was the
growing dissatisfaction among the soldiers with a campaigns new
objectives and the resented policy of orientalization. Both Philotas and
Parmenion, who was the most important representative of Philip IIs
generation, were known to have sceptical views on these subjects and
therefore they could be the potential leaders of any internal opposition
group. If Alexander intended to rid himself of this latent threat, the autumn
of 330 provided him with the best possible opportunity. Philotass position
was weakened by the recent death of his last brother, Nicanor, who had
commanded the hypaspists, while his father Parmenion was away in
Ecbatana guarding the Persian treasure and therefore unable to influence
events in Phrada.88
In Phrada a genuine or merely invented conspiracy against Alexander
was uncovered. It allegedly involved one of the kings bodyguards called
Demetrius and other Macedonian soldiers not previously mentioned in the
sources. Among these other soldiers was a certain Dimnus who also tried
to recruit his lover, Nicomachus. Nicomachus was supposed to pass this
secret on to his brother, Cebalinus, who in turn reported it to Philotas. Two
days went by and Philotas did nothing, so Cebalinus resolved to inform
Alexander, which immediately resulted in an inquiry. Philotas could be
accused of inactivity in face of information about the conspiracy but there
was no evidence he himself was a traitor too. Before he could be arrested,
87

Curt., 6.8.2-4, 6.11.1-5; Plu., Alex., 40.1, 48; Plu., mor., 339d-f. Lane Fox 1980,
pp. 274-275; Heckel 1992, pp. 23-33; Hamilton 1999, pp. 132-133.
88
Badian 1960, pp. 326-329; Badian 1964, pp. 194-196; Green 1974, pp. 348-349;
Goukowsky 1978, p. 38; Bosworth 1988, pp. 99-100; Heckel 2009, pp. 44-45.

King of Asia

265

Dimnus conveniently committed suicide or was killed by soldiers.

Questioned by the king, Philotas admitted that he had heard of the plot but
did not take any action, presuming it to be merely a false aspersion caste
as the result of a spat between two homosexual lovers. Alexander initially
promised Parmenions son that no harm would come to him but that same
evening he called together a council of friends (Hephaestion, Craterus,
Coenus, Erigyios, Ptolemy and Leonnatus), during which Craterus
denounced Philotas and the rest agreed with this motion. W. Heckel has
even formulated a theory according to which the whole affair was actually
a plot hatched against Philotas by a group of childhood friends of
Alexander, now officers who hated Philotas. Even if they had not initiated
the attack on Philotas, this group strongly supported any actions taken by
Alexander against Parmenion and his son, for these two were detested by
Macedonians for their arrogance and overbearing influence on the army.
All the exits from Phrada were now closed so that no news could
prematurely reach Parmenion, whose fate was by then probably sealed.
That same night a unit of 300 soldiers commanded by the trusted officer
Atarrhias arrested Philotas.89
The following day he was brought before an assembly of Greek and
Macedonian soldiers and personally accused of treason by the king.
Alexander accused both Philotas and his father Parmenion of conspiring
against him and charges were also made by Craterus. The king ordered
Philotas to answer these accusations in Macedonian, knowing that his first
language was Greek and that speaking with difficulty he would not be able
to gain the sympathy of the assembled soldiers. It was for this purpose that
Philotas was also exposed to vehement attacks by a certain Bolon, who
accused him of adopting non-Macedonian customs. The trial was
continued in keeping with the customs of the time, that is, with the
application of torture. This was supervised by the kings friends, among
whom Philotass personal enemy Craterus showed the greatest zeal.
Philotas broke, like almost anyone else would have done in such
circumstances, and agreed to confess to everything; with bitter irony he
asked Craterus to only tell him which secrets he was to reveal. Such
confessions exacted through torture were accepted in Antiquity as valid
court evidence and thus sentences could be passed on Philotas and others

89

Curt., 6.7.1-8.22; Diod., 17.79; Str., 15.2.10; Plu., Alex., 49.1-10; Just., 12.4-5.
Badian 1960; Green 1974, p. 348; Heckel 1977; Heckel 1986, p. 299; Bosworth
1988, pp. 101-102; Atkinson 1994, pp. 212-214, 218-219, 224-225; Hamilton 1999,
pp. 154-156; Heckel 2006, p. 60.

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Chapter V

accused of being party to this conspiracy. They were all executed either by
stoning (Curtius) or with spears (Arrian).90
The skilfully evoked atmosphere of hysteria and fear provided the ideal
conditions for carrying out a purge in the armys ranks which began
immediately after Philotass execution. The next trial was a mere formality:
Alexander of Lyncestis, who had been held in prison for three years, was
now sentenced to death. Three brothers and friends of Philotas Amyntas,
Simmias and Polemon were also implicated in the conspiracy, but
Amyntas ably disproved the absurd charges pressed against them and so
the king spared them their lives. Ordinary soldiers suspected of political
incorrectness by sympathising with the accused were isolated from the rest
of the army and put in a penal company.91
While these investigations or perhaps just formalised executions were
being carried out in the Macedonian camp at Phrada, Alexander issued
instructions regarding Parmenion. The old general enjoyed great prestige
among the Macedonians. Moreover, he had at his disposal considerable
forces in Ecbatana employed to guard the vast Persian treasures. With his
last son sentenced to death after a mock trial, this dangerously powerful
man could not be allowed to live. The officer entrusted with the mission of
murdering Parmenion was called Polydamas; his loyalty was further
guaranteed by the taking of his younger brothers into armed custody.
Polydamas and two accompanying nomads (Arabs according to Curtius)
crossed the Dasht-e Lut Desert on camels in eleven days and reached
Ecbatana before news of the purges in Phrada had arrived. There
Polydamas met up with Cleander, the commander of the mercenaries, and
the two officers next went to Parmenion to deliver him letters from
Alexander and Philotas. As Parmenion started to read the forged letter
from his son, Cleander ran him through with his sword. After the murder,
the two officers presented to the soldiers the letter form their king, in
which Alexander described the old generals alleged crimes. To ease
tensions in the camp the Cleander allowed the soldiers bury Parmenions
body but first he severed his head, which was sent to Alexander as
evidence that his order had been carried out.92
The sources do not question the existence of a conspiracy in the army
against the king. Yet, apart from what had been extracted through torture,
90

Arr., An., 3.26.1-3; Curt., 6.8.23-11.40; Diod., 17.80.1; Plu., Alex., 49.9-12.
Curt., 7.1.1-2.10, 7.2.35-38; Arr., An., 3.27.1-2; Diod., 17.80.2-4; Just., 12.5.
Heckel 2006, pp. 24-25, s.v. Amyntas [4].
92
Curt., 7.2.11-34; Diod., 17.80.3; Str., 15.2.10; Arr., An., 3.26.3; Plu., Alex.,
49.13; Just., 12.5. Atkinson 1994, pp. 257-259; Heckel 2006, pp. 85-86, 225-226.
Arabs in the meaning of nomads: Briant 1996, p. 373.
91

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267

Alexander himself had difficulties in producing any evidence which

seriously implicated Philotas let alone his father, Parmenion. Conversely,
the executions of Parmenion and Philotas were the consequence of a
conspiracy directed against them not so much with Alexanders reluctant
approval as on his express orders. The removal of these two generals as
well as the potential pretender to the Macedonian throne, Alexander of
Lyncestis, freed Alexander from opponents to his increasingly autocratic
rule and also the highest-ranking challengers of his policy of garnering the
support of Iranian aristocrats and adopting the traditions of the
Achaemenid monarchy. On top of that there may have also been a
personally grudge that Alexander had felt towards Philotas ever since the
later had spoken out against him in the Pixodarus affair (Chapter II.4). In
this attack on Philotas Alexander skilfully used the personal animosity felt
towards him by other high-ranking officers. In the near future some of
these officers would also fall victim to a similar game that was played
against Philotas in Phrada. These were successive steps taken by
Alexander on the road to achieving absolute power. The price to be paid
by Alexander was, as E. Badian put it, the loneliness of power. But for
the time being the current victors collected the spoils: Philotass command
of the hetairoi was divided between two hipparchs, Cleitus and
Hephaestion, while Ptolemy replaced the executed Demetrius as
commander of the kings bodyguards. Alexander commemorated the
whole incident by having Phrada renamed Prophthasia, i.e. Anticipation
naturally in reference to the conspiracy. 93 In order to sanction the
overthrowing of two commanders as important as Parmenion and Philotas
Alexander shrewdly employed an assembly of soldiers to counterbalance
the Macedonian nobility. Though very successful on this occasion, this
tactic would with time help convince the ordinary Macedonian rank and
file that they were an important and independent political force able to
make decisions regarding matters of state. This was something Alexander
would learn for himself in India.94

93

Plu., Alex., 49.1; Plu., mor., 328f; Arr., An., 3.27.5; Just., 12.5; Charax, ap. St.
Byz., s.v. Frda. Badian 1960; Badian 1964; Badian 2000, pp. 64-69; Lane Fox
1973, pp. 286-291; Goukowsky 1978, pp. 39-40; Bosworth 1980, pp. 366-367;
Bosworth 1988, pp. 102-104; Wirth 1993, p. 179; Fraser 1996, pp. 124-131; Briant
2002, pp. 101-102; Nawotka 2003, p. 97.
94
Errington 1978, p. 114.

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Chapter V

7. The conquest of eastern Iran

Before leaving Prophthasia (Phrada), Alexander made Arsaces satrap of
Areia responsible for Drangiana too. Now the army headed south and after
five days of brisk marching it covered a distance of c.160 km to reach
Ariaspa. In Antiquity this was a prosperous and densely populated
territory, one in which archaeologist have identified the remains of over a
hundred urban settlements. Situated by the lower reaches of the river
Helmand and the Hamun-e Helmand lakes (in todays south-eastern
Afghanistan and Iranian Sistan), the region owed its agricultural prosperity
to an extensive irrigation system. Ariaspaa legendary wealth and the
renowned hospitality of its inhabitants had once saved the army of Cyrus
the Great from starvation; now in the winter of 330/329 it supported the
Macedonian army for 60 days. Alexanders granting of gifts to the
Ariaspians was the first recorded incident where he openly claimed to be
acting in tradition of the founder of the Persian Empire Cyrus the Great.95
While Alexander was in Ariaspa the province of Gedrosia by the
Arabian Sea (today Baluchistan in Iran and Pakistan) also surrendered to
him. The new satrap of Ariaspa and Gedrosia became either Amedines
(Curtius) or Tiridates (Diodorus). This was an important step in the
subjugation of south-eastern Iran, which Alexander thought to be
strategically necessary before launching his campaign against Bessus
beyond the Hindu Kush Mountains. It was more or less at this time that he
received news of more trouble in Areia: Satibarzanes had started another
revolt with 2,000 horsemen provided for him by Bessus. This time
Alexander did not have to intervene personally for the revolt could be
quelled by the army he had left behind in Ecbatana in the summer of 330,
now commanded by Erigyios and Caranus. They were assisted in this task
by Artabazus and the satrap of Parthia Phrataphernes. In the spring of 329
a force of 6,000 Greek infantry and 600 cavalry as well as unspecified
detachments of Phratapherness Iranian troops entered Areia. After some
minor skirmishes the fighting was resolved in the late spring or early
summer of 329 in a battle, during which Erigyios killed Satibarzanes in a
single combat. The Persians head was then sent, in mid summer, to
Alexander as evidence. However, Areia continued to be a troubled
province under the rule of the reputedly unreliable satrap Arsaces.
Therefore in the autumn of 329 Alexander dispatched one of his hetairoi,
95

Curt., 7.3.1-3; Arr., An., 3.27.4-5; Diod., 17.81.1-2; Str., 15.2.10; Just., 12.5; ME,
4. Engels 1978, pp. 91-93; Bosworth 1980, pp. 365-366; Seibert 1985, p. 122;
Jacobs 1994, p. 85; Fraser 1996, pp. 130-131; Heckel 2006, p. 53, s.v. Arsaces
[1].

King of Asia

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the Greek Stasanor of Soli in Cyprus, with instructions to arrest Arsaces

and take over his office as satrap. It took Stasanor and Phrataphernes over
another year to impose full control over Areia and Parthia, which were
finally subjugated in the winter of 328/327.96
Alexander and his army set off from Ariaspa on the campaign against
Bessus before the winter had ended in the mountains, therefore probably in
February 329. They most probably took a route through the valley of the
Arghandab river up to Kandahar and thence north east towards Kabul
through a land which in ancient times was called Paropamisus a name
that was incidentally also applied to the Hindu Kush mountains. During
this march Alexander changed the status of an Achaemenid fortress on the
site of old Kandahar into that of a city, called by the ancient authors
Alexandria in Arachosia. In the early Hellenistic period this became the
most important centre of Greek civilization in this region. A damaged
inscription that has been found there may have once borne the name of the
cities founder. Unfortunately, all that is left of what A.N. Oikonomides has
interpreted to be the name Alexander is the letter A. According to
Strabo, Curtius and Arrian, the 500-kilometre march from Kandahar to the
Kabul valley lasted from March to April and in that time the Macedonians
were hampered by snow and a lack of provisions. A short stay in the
Kabul valley allowed the stragglers to catch up and the whole army to
gather strength before crossing the Hindu Kush.97 It was during this stay
that Alexander founded another city which he named Alexandria in the
Caucasus (alternatively Alexandria in Paropamisadai). The Caucasus was
frequently a name also applied to the Hindu Kush for in Antiquity the two
mountain ranges were believed to be parts of a single group. The citys
exact site has not yet been established. Current knowledge allows us to
presume that the most likely location would have been todays Bagram (c.
40 km to the north of Kabul), which is strategically situated where the
roads north to the Hindu Kush divide. This is also the likely site of the
Achaemenid fortress Kapisa and therefore Alexander may well have again
chosen the site of an already existing community to found a city. Unlike in
the case of Alexandria of Arachosia, however, this time the sources also
96

Curt., 7.3.2, 7.4.32-40; Diod., 17.81.3, 17.83.4-6, 18.3.3; Arr., An., 3.28.2-3,
3.29.5; Str., 14.6.3. Bosworth 1980, p. 374; Bosworth 1988, pp. 104-105; Seibert
1985, pp. 123-124; Harmatta 1999, p. 129; Heckel 2006, pp. 21-22, 235.
97
Arr., An., 3.28.1; Str., 15.2.10; Curt., 7.3.5-18; Isid. Char., FGrH, 781 F2.19;
Ptol., Geog., 6.20.4; Amm. Marc., 23.6.72; St. Byz., s.v. Alexndreiai (12).
Engels 1978, pp. 93-94; Bosworth 1980, pp. 368-369; Oikonomides 1984; Seibert
1985, p. 125; Fraser 1996, pp. 132-140; Karttunen 1997, p. 47; Hamilton 1999, pp.
98-99.

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record the settlement in this new city of 7,000 natives and 3,000 so-called
volunteers from among Alexanders mercenaries and camp followers.
Before moving on, the king nominated a Persian called Proexes as satrap
of Paropamisus and left behind a Macedonian garrison under the command
of the hetairos Neiloxenus.98
There are seven valleys and high mountain passes that lead from the
Kabul river valley (1,800 m above sea level) to Bactria todays northern
Afghanistan and southern Turkmenistan. The accounts of the ancient
authors do not allow us to know for certain which route was taken by the
Macedonian army. Most historians assume Alexander chose the
easternmost Khawak Pass, but that might not necessarily be true. Such a
route is not only very long but it would also have led the Macedonians
much further east beyond the Hindu Kush than where their subsequent
operations took place. It is therefore plausible that Alexander instead
chose a lower route through the Salang Pass; incidentally the main road
from Kabul to Mazar-e Sharif, which forks out, via Kunduz, to Tajikistan
today runs through this very pass.99 Having offered prescribed sacrifices to
the gods, Alexander resumed the march most probably in May 329. The
over 100-km distance over the Hindu Kush from Alexandria in the
Caucasus to the city of Drapsaka took the Macedonian army 17 days. Such
a slow pace was dictated by the difficult terrain, in places the men and
animals were forced to proceed in single file. Shortcomings in Alexanders
logistic planning once again resulted in a serious deficiency of provisions,
so much so that some of the pack animals had to be slaughtered for meat.
After crossing the Hindu Kush the problem with provisions deteriorated
further still for Bessus resorted to scorched earth tactics.100
However, this was not enough to stop the Macedonians. With only
7,000 cavalry, Bessus did not dare to confront a numerically superior
enemy, though a determined attack on the tired and malnourished troops
slowly descending from the mountains could have been successful. Instead
the Persian pretender to the throne retreated to Sogdiana on the northern
side of the river Oxus (Amu Darya), which was ruled by his ally,
Spitamenes. The fortress of Aornos (today Khulm) and the oasis capital of
98

Arr., An., 3.28.4, 4.22.5; Diod., 17.83.2; Curt., 7.3.23; Plu., mor., 328d-f; Str.,
15.2.10; Plin., Nat., 6.62; It. Alex., 74. Lane Fox 1973, pp. 294-295; Bosworth
1980, pp. 369-370; Stoneman 1994, pp. 99-102; Fraser 1996, pp. 140-151;
Klinkott 2000, pp. 90, 109; Heckel 2006, pp. 174, 232.
99
Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 336-337, 678-681; Engels 1978, pp. 94-95; Seibert
1985, p. 126; Fraser 1996, pp. 157-158 and n. 103.
100
Arr., An., 3.28.4-8; Curt., 7.4.22-25; It. Alex., 75-76. Engels 1978, pp. 95-97;
Holt 1993, pp. 595-598.

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Bactra (today Balkh in northern Afghanistan) were captured without much

resistance and Artabazus was appointed satrap of this province. The fact
that the fortified towns as well as the rural population in Bactria failed to
put up resistance, perhaps as a consequence of his scorched earth tactics,
marked Bessuss undoing. The only thing holding the Macedonians back
from his capture were 400 stades (72 km) between Bactra and the river
Oxus of arid desert where temperatures in those summer months
frequently reached above 40o C. Alexander ordered his troops to march at
night, when it was much cooler. But that still did not solve the problem
with water. The soldiers were instructed to take wine with them so that
they could mix it with any local water. Unfortunately, some quenched
their thirst by drinking the wine undiluted. This usually resulted in violent
vomiting, in consequence of which their bodies were further dehydrated,
and more often than not this resulted in their deaths. Many other soldiers
in turn died as a result of drinking water too greedily once they reached the
Oxus.101
Before her waters were wasted on pointless irrigation projects in the
Soviet era, Amu Darya was a great fast flowing river which was at its
broadest in the summer months. And indeed it was in the summer that the
Macedonian army reached its shore. Although circumstantial evidence has
been gathered to support the hypothesis that the crossing point was in the
place called Kampyrtepe102, it is still a hypothesis only. We are told by
ancient sources that at that point it was six stades (c. 1,100 m) wide, that it
was too deep to wade across and that Bessus had burnt all the boats.
Alexander therefore resorted to the method he had applied in 335 when
crossing the Danube (Chapter III.2) he ordered the soldiers to construct
rafts out of leather tents stuffed with hay and on these they crossed the
river. Before the actual crossing, Alexander had relieved Macedonian
soldiers who were too old or otherwise unfit for battle as well as any allied
Thessalian soldiers who wished to return home, 900 men in all. It is
possible that this way Alexander wanted to rid himself of soldiers who had
been closest to Parmenion and therefore those who were the most bitter
about the fate of the old general. Each demobilised foot soldier received
the astounding some of half a talent (the equivalent of ten years pay),
whereas each cavalryman received two talents. Thus Alexander achieved
another advantage in turning potential troublemakers into propagators of
101

Arr., An., 3.28.8-29.1; Curt., 7.4.31, 7.5.1-16; Diod., 17.iq. Lane Fox 1973, pp.
297-299; Engels 1978, pp. 98-102; Bosworth 1980, p. 372; Bosworth 1988, p. 107;
Holt 1988, pp. 47-49; Holt 1993, pp. 588-589. Geography of Bactria: Holt 1988,
pp. 11-32.
102
Rtveladze 2002, pp. 28-66.

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Chapter V

the success of the Persian campaign. It took the entire Macedonian army
five days to cross the river and immediately after that it hastily marched to
the place where the scouts had located Bessus. But again the battle was
averted, though this time because the Bactrian usurper had been arrested
by his erstwhile allies Spitamenes and Dataphernes, who next sent a
messenger to Alexander with the offer of handing Bessus over. Alexander
dispatched Ptolemy, who brought Bessus over naked and in chains.
Bessuss chief crime was usurpation of the Achaemenid throne, which was
in fact what the Macedonian Alexander had also done. However, the
Bactrian satraps involvement in Dariuss murder gave Alexander an
excellent pretext to punish him for regicide. Bessus was whipped and then
sent to Bactria. Eventually Alexander had Bessus handed over to Darius
IIIs brother, Oxyathres, to select an appropriate Persian punishment for
traitors of the state. The execution was carried out before a gathering of
Medes and Persians (presumably influential Iranians) in Ecbatana in 328.
First he was shamefully mutilated by having his nose and ears cut off.
Next he was most probably nailed to a cross. Although both Plutarch and
to a certain extent Diodorus suggest that Bessus was tied to two specially
bound together trees and next ripped apart when the binding was cut, it is
much more likely that the Persians crucified him as this was their
traditional form of execution for rebels and murderers. Applying the type
of execution that had also been used by Darius III would have been
important to Alexander for the sake of legitimising his claim as the rightful
successor of the Achaemenids in the eyes of the Iranians, particularly their
social elites. Unfortunately, we have no record of how the Persians
responded to the way Bessus had been put to death. W. Heckel suggests
that the ruthlessness with which Bessus was punished actually prolonged
resistance in eastern Iran as it dissuaded other Persian rebel leaders from
surrendering.103 It was in 329 that new coins were issued by Alexander:
now instead of just bearing his name Alexandrou they bore the title
basileos Alexandrou, meaning a coin of King Alexander. We can assume
that after eliminating the last of the pretenders with a legal claim to the
Achaemenid throne, Alexander decided to make absolutely official his
claim as the only rightful king of the Persian Empire.104

103

Arr., An., 3.29.2-30.4, 4.7; Curt., 7.5.13-28, 7.5.36-43; Diod., 17.83.7-9; Plu.,
Alex., 43.6; Just., 12.5; Ps.-Callisth., 2.21; It. Alex., 76-78; ME, 5-6. Lane Fox 1973,
pp. 299-300; Green 1974, pp. 353-355; Goukowsky1978, pp. 219-221; Bosworth
1980, pp. 372-377; Bosworth 1988, pp. 107-108; Briant 1994, pp. 286-291; Heckel
1997, p. 209; Hamilton 1999, pp. 114-115.
104
Morawiecki 1975, pp. 108-111.

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273

At more or less the same time that Spitamenes handed over the arrested
Bessus to Ptolemy, the slowly advancing Macedonian army made an
astonishing discovery. They encountered a Greek town situated, from their
Mediterranean point of view, at the very edge of the world. It turned out
that these were the descendents of the Branchidae the caste that up until
the start of the Ionian Revolt in the 5th century had administered the Great
Temple and oracle of Apollo at the Milesian Didyma. During the Ionian
Revolt the Branchidae first refused to use the temples funds to finance the
war against Persia but then handed all their money over to Xerxes.
Subsequently, after a momentous Greek victory, Greeks who had
supported the Persians in 480-479 war now had every reason to fear their
compatriots would seek revenge. That is why they took up Xerxes offer to
evacuate collaborators deep into Asia. Indeed on many occasions
throughout the Achaemenid period settlers, including Greeks, had been
sent east Bactria and Sogdiana. This time the descendants of the proPersian Branchidae willingly surrendered their town and greeted
Alexander with joy. Their surrender was accepted but among Macedonian
commanders there was consternation as to what to do with the successors
of those who had betrayed the Panhellenic cause. Alexander asked the
Milesians in his camp, but here too opinions were divided. The following
day the king granted his soldiers permission to slaughter the unfortunate
Branchidae with instructions to raze their town to the ground and even cut
down their forests. The truth behind this atrocity, which the court
historiography reflected in Arrians account has completely ignored, has
moreover been challenged by some modern historians. The original source,
however, is Callisthenes, a member of Alexanders expedition who was
favourably disposed to his monarch and would hardly invent a story
casting him in such a bad light. Besides, this was not the only massacre of
civilians in Alexanders career. The slaughter of the Branchidae in
Sogdiana really happened, only the circumstances seem doubtful for the
sources do not give any convincing motives as to why Alexander made
such a terrible decision. Perhaps as H.W. Parke and A.B. Bosworth
presume the slaughter resulted from a lack of moral discipline among the
Macedonian soldiers after long months of campaigning and enduring
extreme conditions raging form the snow capped Hindu Kush to the
unbearable heat of Bactria. 105 Archaeologists have discovered in
105
Curt., 7.5.28-35; Diod., 17.k; Str., 11.11.4; Plu., mor., 557b; Suda, s.v.
Bragcdai. Tarn 1948, ii, pp. 272-275; Parke 1985; Bernard 1985, pp. 123-125;
Bosworth 1988, pp. 108-109; Holt 1988, pp. 73-75; Kulesza 1994, pp. 227-245;
Briant 1996, pp. 771-772; Karttunen 1997, pp. 21-22; Panchenko 2002, pp. 245248; Rtveladze 2002, pp. 69-70.

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Chapter V

Afghanistan Greek graffiti dated approximately 500 years after the

massacre including the words bronchidai and bronchees. If these words
are variants of the name Branchidai,106 this would mean that not all the
Branchidae had been killed in 329 and that their community survived for
at least another 500 years.
The next objective of the Macedonian army was the capital of
Sogdiana, Maracanda (today Samarcand in Uzbekistan), where Alexander
left a strong garrison of 1,000 soldiers. Next the army marched to the river
Jaxartes (Syr Darya), which marked the northern boundary of the
Achaemenid Empire. The sources do not record any major battles but the
Macedonians did encounter some resistance from the local population. We
know that they devastated villages around Maracanda and that during a
skirmish with a mountain tribe Alexander had an arrow shot through his
calf into his shinbone. The Jaxartes was also called in ancient times the
Tanais. In Alexanders time it was frequently confused with a river of the
same name flowing into the Azov Sea, todays river Don. In those days
that other Tanais (todays Don) was considered a border between Europe
and Asia.107
However, the Tanais or Jaxartes Alexanders army reached did not
mark a boundary between ethnic cultures as both sides were inhabited by
Scythian nomads. On the other hand, unlike their southern relatives, the
Scythians living to the north of the river did not belong to the Achaemenid
state though they were usually allies of the Persians. Now they sent envoys
to the Macedonian king. Alexander responded by sending ambassadors to
the Scythians north of the river. These envoys the king selected from
among his hetairoi and also secretly instructed them to carry out some
reconnaissance work. Of course in the diplomatic exchange both sides
declared mutual friendship. Regardless of how sincere his declaration was,
Alexander could not take any action to the north of the Jaxartes. This was
because a revolt had broken out in newly conquered Sogdiana. The rebel
leader was Spitamenes, perhaps the most able and tough Iranian to
confront Alexander, and he had the support of some of the Bactrians. The
ancient authors do not present the reasons for this revolt presumably
because they themselves did not know what they were. Perhaps it was, as
F.L. Holt argues, that the Sogdian leaders were willing to accept
Alexanders nominal suzerainty but would not tolerate any permanent
changes to their social hierarchy. Up to the arrival of the Macedonians,
Sogdiana had been a country that recognised the rule of the Great King but
106

Bernard 1985, p. 125; Kulesza 1994, pp. 245-246.

Arr., An., 3.30.6-11; Curt., 7.6.1-10; Plu., mor., 327a; It. Alex., 79-80; ME, 7-8.
Seibert 1985, pp. 129-131; Bosworth 1988, pp. 109-110.

107

King of Asia

275

was in fact governed quite independently by the local nobles. Now this
state of affairs appeared to be threatened by a plan to build the city of
Alexandria Eschate and the installation of Macedonian garrisons. These
measures were to ensure a permanent Greek and Macedonian military
presence as well as replace in rural areas the traditional lord and peasant
hierarchy with the population being controlled at various levels by cities
based on the Greek polis system. The conflict was most probably also
caused by cultural differences. The sources record that Alexander tried to
stamp out the local practice of leaving the corpses of their dead out in the
open to be devoured by animals, which was something the Greeks and
Macedonians found quite unacceptable. Whatever the true reason, the
smaller Macedonian garrisons were massacred. Meanwhile the Sogdian
nobles refused to attend a conference Alexander had summoned in Bactra.
They probably did not come out fear for their own safety but this was still
an act of disobedience. Now there was no alternative to war.108
As usual, Alexanders response was fast and ruthless. He instructed the
best of his officers, Craterus, to besiege the largest of the cities, Cyropolis
(Kuru-kaqa?), which may have been located somewhere near todays
Kurkat, 40 km to the west of Khojent (Tajikistan). This gave time for
Alexander himself to attack the smaller cities. Their primitive fortifications
constructed out of sun dried bricks were no defence against Macedonian
siege engines. The defenders were treated with exceptional cruelty: the
men were killed while the women and children were sold into slavery.
Within two days three cities were successfully stormed and captured,
while the fleeing populations from another two were slaughtered by the
Macedonian cavalry. Alexander personally commanded the storming of
Cyropolis, during which he was struck with a stone. But this city was also
quickly captured. At that stage it may have seemed that in Sogdiana the
only remaining problem was to relieve the Macedonian garrison at
Maracanda, which was besieged by forces commanded by Spitamenes. For
this task Alexander dispatched 1,400 Macedonian and mercenary cavalry
as well as 1,500 mercenary infantry commanded by the Iranian
Pharnuches.109

108

Onesicritus, ap. Str., 11.11.3 (= FGrH, 134 F5); Arr., An., 4.1; Curt., 7.6.11-15;
Plu., mor., 328c; It. Alex., 81; ME, 8. Bickermann 1966, pp. 89-90; Holt 1988, pp.
52-60; Vogelsang 1992, p. 230; Bosworth 1995, pp. 13-19; Karttunen 1997, p. 21;
Ashley 1998, p. 298; Harmatta 1999, pp. 130-132; Holt 1999, pp. 122-123;
Nawotka 2003, p. 94.
109
Arr., An., 4.2-3; Curt., 7.6.16-24; Plu., Alex., 45.5; It. Alex., 82-83; ME, 9.
Engels 1978, p. 103; Bosworth 1995, pp. 19-25.

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Chapter V

The king and the rest of the army now returned to the river Jaxartes, on
the other side of which a Scythian army had gathered ready to support
Spitamenes. The Scythians were worried by Alexanders plans to found a
town by the river and feared that these would hinder their nomadic
freedom and barter trade. The ancient authors claim that the walls of this
newest town, Alexandria Eschate (Alexandria the Furthest), were raised
within as little as twenty (Arrian) or seventeen (Curtius) days. Medieval
Arab sources suggest that it could be associated with todays city of
Khojent on the western edge of the Fergana Valley. There had already
been a fortified town on the Jaxartes in Achaemenid times but, unless the
accounts of Curtius and Arrian are completely untrue, Alexandria Eschate
was probably not built on its foundations. However, the new town could
have been built next to the old. It was populated by Greek mercenaries
from Alexanders army, Macedonian veterans as well as resettled natives
and its original purpose was to guarantee Macedonian military supremacy
in the region. Although Curtius and Arrian write about the raising of the
Alexandria Eschates fortifications during events that occurred in 329, the
process must have lasted longer for we know from the Paros Chronicle
that the town was officially founded a year later in 328/327 (Athenian
years began in July). Of the many towns Alexander is said to have founded
in Bactria and Sogdiana this is the only one whose existence has been
incontrovertibly confirmed.110
The Scythians tried to attack and provoke the soldiers raising the
fortifications of Alexandria. Alexander naturally took up the challenge.
The crossing was delayed for some time because sacrifices did not augur a
favourable outcome. However, Alexanders impetuousness eventually
proved too strong and he ordered the operation to start. Protected by the
missiles fired from boat-mounted catapults that the barbarians had never
seen before, the soldiers were able to get across the river. The Scythians
repulsed the first attack of phalanx and mercenary cavalry. In a second
attack, however, Alexanders skilful use of cavalry, archers and light
infantry prevented the Scythians from deploying their traditional tactic of
encirclement. After that the Macedonians were able to defeat the enemy in
open battle. The routed Scythians were allegedly chased for 150 stades (27
km) to a place where Curtius Rufus and Pliny state Dionysus had left
border signs; an alternative version is that Dionysius and Heracles had
erected some altars there; these presumably were burial mounds. The
110

Marmor Parium, FGrH 239 B7; Arr., An., 4.1.3-4, 4.4.1; Curt., 7.6.13, 7.6-2527; Plin., Nat., 6.49; Ptol., Geog., 6.12.6, 8.23.14; It. Alex., 81; ME, 7. Bosworth
1995, pp. 25-27; Briant 1996, p. 767; Briant 2002, pp. 71-72; Fraser 1996, pp. 151156.

King of Asia

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Macedonians ended the pursuit only once Alexander could go no further

on account of the injuries he had received during the storming of
Cyropolis; at the time he was also suffering from diarrhoea, after having
drunk some contaminated water. 160 Macedonians were killed and another
1,000 were wounded in this clash. The Scythians lost 1,000 men and 1,800
of their horses were captured. The Scythian king immediately sent envoys
to apologise for the provocative attack, which he claimed had been carried
out without his knowledge. Alexander did not raise the conditions for
peace because he now had to quickly return to Sogdiana, where the
situation had again turned for the worse.111
Already at the start of the sally north of the Jaxartes the fate of the
corps sent to relieve the beleaguered Maracanda was known. Although in
Arrians book details in the accounts of the expeditions participants,
Ptolemy and Aristobulus, differ from one another significantly, the is no
doubt that with the help of Dahae nomads Spitamenes annihilated the
3,000-strong detachment of Macedonian troops that had been sent to
relieve Maracanda. Moreover, the citys defenders, who had imprudently
sallied from their fortress, were also slaughtered. On returning from his
expedition against the Scythians Alexander divided his army into two.
Craterus was put in charge of the phalanx and instructed to march not
faster than normal. Alexander himself took command of the cavalry,
hypaspists, Agrianians, archers as well as light infantry and proceeded to
Maracanda with considerably greater speed. With some exaggeration
Arrian reports that Alexanders corps covered the 1,500 stades (270 km) to
the city within three days. But before this larger army arrived, Spitamenes
had escaped into the steppe and there was nothing left Alexanders men to
do other than bury the dead from Pharnuchess corps. After a fruitless
pursuit of Spitamenes the Macedonians vented their fury by massacring
the inhabitants of the Polytimetus (Zeravshan) river valley, devastating the
villages and destroying local fortresses. A Macedonian garrison of 3,000
soldiers commanded by Peucolaus was installed in Sogdiana, probably in
Maracanda. By late autumn Alexander withdrew with the rest of the army
to the capital of Bactria, where they spent the winter of 329/328.112
In the spring of 328 reinforcements raised by Antipater and provincial
governors reached Alexander in Bactria. The number of new recruits was
111

Arr., An., 4.4.1-5.1; Curt., 7.7.1, 7.7.5-9.19; Plu., Alex., 45.6; Plu., mor., 341c;
Plin., Nat., 6.49; It. Alex., 85; ME, 8-12. Engels 1978, pp. 101-102; Seibert 1985, p.
132, n. 26; Bosworth 1995, pp. 27-32; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 146-148; Hammond
1996, pp. 194-195.
112
Arr., An., 4.5.2-7.1; Curt., 7.6.24, 7.7.30-39, 7.9.20-10.10; It. Alex., 86-88; ME,
13-14. Bosworth 1995, pp. 29-37.

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Chapter V

vast as many as 22,000, including 2,600 cavalry. On the other hand, the
sources only mention mercenaries. The most likely explanation for this is
that ever since the defeat of the imperial Persian forces at Gaugamela
Alexander was deliberately relying on mercenaries in order to spare
compatriots.113 That spring there was yet another wave of disturbances in
Sogdiana. It turned out that the previous years bloody repressions had
failed to pacify the situation and may have even exacerbated it. Fearing for
the old social order and their place in it, the Sogdian lords were now siding
more with Spitamenes and Scythians. Alexander decided to impose his
will on the Sogdians by force and marched his army from Bactria to the
rebel province. Among those he left in charge of Bactria were Meleager
and Polyperchon, both of whom would later play important roles in the
diadochi period. Alexander must have assumed Bactria would be a safe
province as many of the troops he left there were in convalescence. Once
Alexander started operations in Sogdiana, Spitamenes launched an
audacious attack on Bactria destroying one of the smaller Macedonian
garrisons on the way. The slender forces of the main garrison made an
initially successful sortie but in a subsequent clash Spitameness Scythians
defeated them. Those killed included seven hetairoi, 60 mercenary
horsemen and the courageous kitharode Aristonicus of Olynthus, whom
Alexander later honoured with a bronze statue at Delphi.114 However, what
eventually worked against Spitamenes was the enemys large numerical
superiority. Despite engaging most of his troops in Sogdiana, Alexander
still had at his disposal Craterus corp, which was able to catch up with
Spitamenes and defeat his forces in battle. 150 Scythians were killed, and
although the rest managed to escape into the desert, this was major blow to
Spitameness reputation.115
After four days marching the Macedonian army crossed the Oxus, on
whose shore the soldiers inadvertently discovered a source of petroleum
crude oil. Beyond the river Alexander divided his army into five columns,
which were commanded by his high-ranking officers Hephaestion,
Ptolemy, Perdiccas, Coenus and himself. Alexander was accompanied by
Artabazus, no doubt to serve as an interpreter between the Macedonian
Great King and his rebellious subjects. An example of Macedonian
ruthlessness during this march to Maracanda were the actions of
113

Arr., An., 4.7.2; Curt., 7.10.10-13. Milns 1976, pp. 109-110; Bosworth 1995, pp.
39-40.
114
Arr., An., 4.16.1, 4.16.4-7; Curt., 7.10.13, 8.1.3-5, 8.1.6; Plu., mor., 334e-f; It.
Alex., 98. Holt 1988, pp. 60-61; Heckel 1992, pp. 165-170, 188-204; Bosworth
1995, pp. 108-116.
115
Arr., An., 4.17.1-2; Curt., 8.1.6. Bosworth 1995, p. 117.

King of Asia

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Alexanders column when it encountered a mountain fortress (Sogdian

Rock) commanded by a certain Ariamazes, with reputedly 30,000 soldiers
at his disposal. With such an excellent defensive position, large supplies of
food and water available from a source within the fortresss premises, the
rebel commander had good reason to feel confident. Thus to the demand to
capitulate he replied by mockingly enquiring whether Alexanders soldiers
could fly. Alexander therefore resolved to terrify the defenders by having
his soldiers appear above their heads on a mountain ridge believed to be
only accessible to birds. He offered 10 talents (the equivalent of 200 years
of a foot soldiers pay) to the first of 300 volunteers to make it to the top.
The next ten who got there were promised 9 talents each. During the
ascent 32 soldiers fell to their deaths but the rest could eventually be seen
by both Alexander and the enemy on the ridge. On seeing these winged
soldiers, Ariamazes capitulated. On Alexanders orders, Ariamazes
together with members of his family as well as other prominent Sogdians
from the fortress were all whipped and next crucified. The remaining
defenders were sold into slavery, probably to the inhabitants of newly
founded Greek towns in Sogdiana. It soon became apparent that this
exceptional act of terror failed to serve its purpose and did not incline
other Sogdians to surrender.116
Once he had reached Maracanda, Alexander instructed Hephaestion to
build allegedly as many as twelve Greek towns or fortresses to control the
country. The sites of none of these towns have been located with any
degree of reasonable certainty; currently we can only be confident that the
famous A Khanum, which was discovered by French archaeologists, was
founded at the start of the Hellenistic period but not during Alexanders
reign.117 Another leader, Coenus, was sent to the land of the Scythians in
search of Spitamenes. Alexander was still in Maracanda in the summer of
328 when he received envoys from peoples beyond the Jaxartes, the
Chorasmians and Scythians (called European Scythians by Arrian). The
Scythian king offered Alexander his daughter in marriage as well as brides
for other Macedonian notables. These offers were politely declined. The
Kingdom of Chorasmia, situated by Lake Aral at the mouth of the Amu
Darya, had under the first Achaemenids been part of the Persian Empire.
By Alexanders time, unlike the Scythians, the Chorasmians were
predominantly settled. In the 4th century the country experienced rapid
economic growth so that by the time of Alexanders expedition it was
116

Str., 11.11.4; Curt., 7.10.13-15, 7.11; Polyaen., 4.3.29; It. Alex., 97; ME, 15-18;
Holt 1988, p. 61.
117
Arr., An., 4.16.3; Just., 12.5. Holt 1986; Fraser 1996, pp. 154-156; Karttunen
1997, p. 47.

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undoubtedly the most powerful state to the north of the Achaemenid

Empire. That is why the visit of the ruler of this state, Pharasmenes, with a
mounted escort of 1,500 horsemen should be considered a significant
event reflecting the respect the Macedonian conqueror had among peoples
beyond the Persian kingdoms borders. Alexander once again politely
turned down an offer, though this time it did not concern marriage so
much as a campaign against Pharasmeness enemies. The Macedonian
king did, however, promise to resolve the matter after his return from India.
In the meantime he made a treaty of friendship with the Chorasmians and
hoped this way to isolate Spitamenes from potential allies.118
The armys long stay in Maracanda was interrupted by an excursion
into one of the Great Kings animal and forest reserves in Bactria where
reputedly no human had set foot for four generations. During the hunting,
which was organised with beaters, 4,000 animals were killed. Alexander
personally killed a great lion in the Near East those animals were the
traditional quarry of kings.119 The army next returned to Maracanda, for
Alexander resolved to spend the winter in Sogdiana and thus prevent
Spitamenes from starting another revolt in this country. How serious this
situation was is testified in the fact that in the autumn of 328 Alexander
removed from the office of satrap the elderly Artabazus, who probably
lacked energy, and replaced him first with Cleitus, and after his death that
same year, with Amyntas the son of Nicolaus. The new satrap had to
command a large Greco-Macedonian army. Therefore he had to be
someone the king could fully trust and whose orders the Greek and
Macedonian soldiers would obey without reservations. These were the
reasons why he had to be a Macedonian.120 In Maracanda Coenus was left
in charge of a strong detachment of Companion cavalry as well as other
cavalry units including not only Macedonians but also for the first time
mentioned in the sources ones from Bactria and Sogdiana. This shows
that as the war in eastern Iran continued Alexander increasingly recruited
native soldiers. Bearing in mind the regions social structure, we may
assume that the cavalry comprised local aristocrats and their subordinates.
This may therefore have been the first sign of a change in Alexanders
policy of conquest from one that was solely military to one that was also
political and sought to win over the traditional elites of Bactria and

118

Curt., 8.1.7-9; Arr., An., 4.15.1-6; Plu., Alex., 46.3; It. Alex., 95-96. Kraft 1971,
pp. 127-128; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 306-307; Bosworth 1995, pp. 101-107.
119
Curt., 8.1.11-19. Tuplin 1996, pp. 100-1-2.
120
Arr., An., 4.17.3; Curt., 8.1.19. Bosworth 1995, p. 118; Klinkott 2000, p. 22, n.
36.

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Sogdiana.121 The most important incident during the Macedonian armys

two- or three-week stay at Maracanda was the tragic death of Cleitus (see
Chapter V.7). Ten days after this death Alexander retired to winter
quarters in a today unknown place called Xenippa, situated somewhere in
the fertile lands bordering Scythia.122
The billeting of Alexanders troops around Xenippa caused
consternation among the local inhabitants, who had actively or at least
passively supported Spitameness revolt. 2,500 Bactrian rebels who had
been stationed there were forced to flee but on the way encountered one of
Coenuss detachments commanded by Amyntas and after some heavy
fighting were defeated. After this defeat Spitameness Sogdian and
Bactrian allies surrendered to Coenus. Now the rebel leader was left at the
mercy of the Scythians, who, in response to news of Alexanders
approaching forces, killed him and sent his severed head to the victor.
According to Callistheness version recorded by Curtius Rufus and the
more romantic Metz Epitome, which inspired the literary tale of Judith and
Holophernes, Spitameness head was cut off by his wife.123 Neither the
one and a half year terror campaign nor Spitameness death brought the
Sogdian revolt to a conclusive end, though it was of course considerably
weakened, especially in face of Macedonian numerical superiority and an
increasingly more secure system of towns and fortresses. The centres of
resistance were the mountain fortresses of rebel lords. Having spent the
harshest part of the winter of 328/327 in the land of Nautaca, which Arab
and Iranian sources locate c. 100 km to the north of Termez (now in
Uzbekistan), the now united armies of Alexander and Coenus set about
capturing these mountain fortresses.124 On the march back to its winter
quarters the Macedonian army was caught in a violent storm of snow and
hail in freezing temperatures. Some of the soldiers found shelter in the
villages, while others lit huge fires and thus tried to keep warm throughout
the night. Nonetheless 2,000 soldiers as well as some camp followers
perished.125
In the time between military operations Alexander had time to make
administrative decisions concerning other parts of the state. In place of the
now deceased satrap of Babylonia, Mazaeus, Alexander appointed a
121

Arr., An., 4.17.3. Schachermeyr 1973, p. 351; Bosworth 1995, pp. 118-119.
Curt., 8.2.13-14; ME, 19. Seibert 1985, p. 140.
123
Arr., An., 4.17.4-7; Curt., 8.2.15-18, 8.3.1-16; ME, 20-25. Holt 1988, p. 65;
Bosworth 1995, pp. 119-121; Burstein 1999.
124
Arr., An., 4.18.1; Curt., 8.2.19; Diod., 17.kq; ME, 19. Holt 1988, pp. 66-67;
Harmatta 1999, pp. 132-134.
125
Curt., 8.4.3-20; ME, 24-27.
122

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certain Stamenes, a man we know virtually nothing about apart from the
fact that he may have been an Iranian. It also turned out that at least three
of Alexanders satraps did not fulfil his requirements. One of them, the
satrap Autophradates (Phradates) of Tapuria, refused to appear before the
king, which was tantamount to rejection of his suzerainty. The mission
entrusted to remove this disobedient satrap was entrusted to the faithful
satrap of Parthia, Phrataphernes. The satrap of Media, Oxydates, was
replaced by another Iranian, Atropates, who had already been a satrap of
that province under Darius IIIs and would become one of Alexanders
most successful Iranian nominations. Finally, Arsaces was replaced as
satrap of Drangiana by Stasanor, who had just finished his mission of
subjugating Areia presumably he now governed both satrapies. It was
also then that for the first time after three years Alexander ordered the
raising of Macedonian troops instead of mercenary reinforcements. The
sources, however, do not tell us anything about the three officers who were
delegated to raise these troops or about their mission in the winter of
328/327.126
The episode with the most far-reaching consequences during the last
campaign in Sogdiana in the early spring of 327 was the siege another
mountain fortress. The campaign was hampered by masses of snow that
still lay in the mountains. Not much can be said about the siege itself as
the details too closely resemble the siege of Ariamazess Sogdian Rock to
be plausible. This time, however, the lord of the stronghold, Sisimithres,
was pardoned when he surrendered. Alexander also captured the family of
the Bactrian aristocrat and Bessus former ally, Oxyartes. Respect for the
dignity of his daughters also eventually persuaded Oxyartes to
capitulate.127 Some time later, in the land of Paraitacene, Alexander laid
siege to yet another mountain fortress, this one belonging to a certain
Chorienes. With the help of Oxyartess mediation Alexander negotiated
the strongholds capitulation. This time the vanquished enemy did not only
have his life spared but kept his original position and even had his domain
expanded. Chorieness loyalty was to be guaranteed by that fact that his
sons were became members of Alexanders entourage. The striking
difference between the ways Alexander treated the families of Sisimithres,
Oxyartes and Chorienes and the way he had treated Ariamazes shows how
ever more clearly Alexander was changing his policies in order to find a
solution to the conflict. Chorienes accepted Alexanders entire army with
126

Arr., An., 4.18.2-3; Curt., 8.3.16-17. Bosworth 1995, pp. 120-124; Heckel 2006,
p. 255.
127
Arr., An., 4.18.4-19.4, 4.20.4; Str., 11.11.4. Holt 1988, p. 66; Bosworth 1995, p.
134; Carney 2000, pp. 106-107.

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283

great generosity, giving each soldier a two-month ration of bread, salted

meat and wine.128
It was probably during a feast given by Chorienes in the victors
honour that to Alexander was introduced the Oxyartes daughter, Rhoxane
according to all the extant sources the most beautiful woman in Asia
beside Darius IIIs wife. The sources almost all maintain that Alexander
instantly fell in love with the beautiful Bactrian woman and asked
Oxyartes for her hand in marriage. The Macedonian ceremony involved
the bride and bridegroom sharing and consuming a loaf of bread between
them. At the time Alexander was also said to have encouraged other
Macedonians to wed Iranian women, though probably without much
success.129 The sources tell us nothing about the level of affection between
Alexander and his Bactrian wife. In all probability he did not even leave
his earlier lover Barsine, who indeed in 327 bore him a son, Heracles.
Although Heracles was never officially recognised as his son and heir,
Alexander did have strong emotional ties with Barsine and he did show
her great respect to the end of his life. Modern historians have indeed
noted that Alexander was generally more attracted to women older than
him, and such was Barsine.130
It is therefore not surprising that modern historians generally agree
with Curtius and Plutarch in questioning the purely romantic setting for
this marriage. In that era marriage out of love was something abnormal
rather than normal, as, for example, Philip IIs unfortunate marriage to
Cleopatra showed (see: Chapter II.5). One of the obvious objectives of a
royal marriage was to produce an heir. And this cannot be ignored even if
some modern scholars claim that Alexander had no interest in sex or
matters concerning his states future or that he was a homosexual who
could never have a relationship with a woman. It is almost certain that
Rhoxane accompanied Alexander on his expedition to India and there bore
him a son, who died in infancy.131

128

Curt., 8.4.1-22; Arr., An., 4.21; ME, 19, 29; It. Alex., 102. Holt 1988, p. 66;
Bosworth 1995, pp. 124-125, 135-139.
129
Arr., An., 4.19.5; Curt., 8.4.22-30; Diod., 17.l; Plu., Alex., 47.7; Plu., mor.,
338d; ME, 28-31; It. Alex., 101. Bosworth 1995, p. 131; Ogden 1999, pp. 43-44;
Carney 2000, p. 106.
130
Lyc., 801-804 (see Scholia, ad 801); Diod., 20.20.1; Curt., 10.6.11; Plu., Alex.,
21.7-11; Plu., Eum., 1.7; Paus., 9.7.2; Just., 13.2. Baynham 1995a, pp. 68-69;
Carney 2000, pp. 102-105; Ogden 2009, p. 206.
131
ME, 70. Heckel 1997a, pp. 290-292; Carney 2000, pp. 106-107; Ogden 2009, p.
206. For homosexual position in scholarship see: Reames-Zimmerman 1999.

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Alexanders marriage to Rhoxane also had political motives which

summed up the gradual change in his policy towards the Sogdian and
Bactrian elites. Alexander had been progressively moving away from a
ruthless terror campaign with which he tried to break resistance in northeastern Iran to one in which he fully pardoned all aristocrats (and their
subjects) who defected to his side or surrendered. In return for their loyalty
he rewarded them by confirming their rights to inherited territories. By
marrying the daughter of one of these lords, Alexander showed that he
accepted that aristocrats social group and at the same time this wedding
showed that this group also now accepted him.132 Suffice to say that right
up to the end of Alexanders reign the sources record no further
disturbance in that part of Iran. This could not have been solely due to the
presence of a very large garrison of 13,500 mainly mercenary soldiers
commanded by the satrap Amyntas. Military force could not have been the
only factor for peace in Bactria and Sogdiana as Alexanders much larger
army had had to continually struggle to quell rebellions in these provinces
for two years. Only the policy of adapting to local customs and accepting
local social structures made possible the establishment of long-lasting
peace in north-eastern Iran. 133 A recently published Aramaic document
found in Afghanistan bears the date in the 7th year of king Alexander (9
June 324). It together with a few, harder to date documents, show the
administration working in Bactria along the lines typical of the
Achaemenid empire, thus pointing to continuity under Alexander rather
than a radical change134.
Appreciation of the military value of the inhabitants of these provinces
is evidenced by the drafting of 30,000 Iranian youths who were not only to
be taught the Macedonian methods of fighting but also the language and
elements of Greek culture. This was Alexanders successive step, after the
recruiting of Bactrian and Sogdian horsemen, in reforming his army so as
not have to rely so much on Greeks and Macedonians.135 The last mopping
up operation after the Sogdian revolt was Craterus crushing defeat of the
most diehard rebels commanded by Catanes and Austanes in the spring of
327. Craterus corps, comprising the very best Macedonian troops,
132

Curt., 8.4.25; Plu., Alex., 47.7. Wilcken 1967, pp. 162-163; Schachermeyr 1973,
p. 355; Holt 1988, pp. 67-68; OBrien 1992, pp. 140-141; Hamilton 1999, pp. 129130; Ogden 1999, p. 44; Carney 2000, pp. 106-107.
133
Arr., An., 4.22.3. Badian 1985, p. 456; Holt 1988, pp. 68-70; Bosworth 1995, pp.
142-143; Hammond 1996, p. 202.
134
Allen 2005, p. 152.
135
Curt., 8.5.1; Plu., Alex., 47.6. Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 360-361; Hamilton 1999,
pp. 128-129.

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285

slaughtered 1,600 of the enemy on the battlefield. Polyperchon,Craterus

subordinate, also pacified a land Curtius calls Bubacene. Next Craterus
corps joined Alexanders main forces which were stationed at the time in
Bactria.136

8. Time of intrigues and anxiety

The Macedonian armys long stay in Bactria and Sogdiana was marked
not only as a time of gritty struggles against local rebels but also of an
unprecedented level of tension and unease within Alexanders officer
corps and court. A contributing factor or perhaps even the main cause was
Alexanders policy of orientalization. This was something even
Alexanders closest companions found difficult to accept. The first clash
occurred during a feast held in Maracanda in the autumn of 328.
Alexanders court inherited the Macedonian tradition of feasting, which
thanks to Persian booty became even more lavish. Another incentive for
sumptuous banquets was the generally accepted notion in the East that a
monarchs feast symbolised his happiness, wealth and providence (the
extent to which the gods favoured him). Alexanders feasts could have
included up to 200 guests, though a more common number would have
been from 60 to 70. The guests would have included artists and
philosophers as well as the most trusted of Alexanders hetairoi. One can
assume that Alexanders guests formed an elite circle of authority from
where generals and satraps were appointed. The king could also sound his
Companions over the drinks in matters likely to create rifts among the
court elite and army. Macedonian feasts had a set routine which was
similar to that of Greek feasts, though with some significant differences.
Like in Greece, the guests lay on couches in a semi reclined position,
propping themselves up with the left elbow. Like in Greece, the feast was
composed of two parts. During the first part the meal was consumed, but
we know virtually nothing about what would have been served. The
second part involved the consumption of wine. A major difference
between a Macedonian royal feast and ones organised by Greek elites is
that the former lasted much longer, from early evening till dawn. The other
difference, eagerly stressed by Greek authors, was the drinking of
undiluted wine, whereas the Greeks always mixed their wine with water.
This is partly confirmed by archaeological finds. Apart from weapons, the
items most commonly found in the graves of Macedonian warriors are
136

Arr., An., 4.22.1-2 ; Curt., 8.5.2. Seibert 1985, p. 144; Bosworth 1995, pp. 139141.

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Chapter V

vessels for drinking wine. On the other hand, we very rarely find vessels
for mixing wine, which were very common in Greece. Among the
Macedonians excessive consumption of alcohol was not considered a fault
but a virtue. Drinking to get drunk was considered normal and the sources
record cases of people losing their lives in competitions to see who could
drink the greatest quantity of wine. Philip II was known for his alcoholic
excesses therefore, as in everything, Alexander tried to outdo his father in
this respect also. There is no evidence in the sources to suggest that
Alexander suffered from alcoholism as a disease but it is difficult not to
associate his occasional outbursts of extremely violent behaviour and his
eruptions of destructive anger with his systematic and excessive
consumption of alcohol.137
The feast at Maracanda took place towards the end of the second year
of the toughest campaigns the Macedonian army had fought so far. The
countless battles, skirmishes and acts of terror committed against the
civilian population did not seem to have brought the Macedonians any
closer to solving the situation. No doubt many in the army would have
agreed with Plutarch in comparing the campaign to fighting the
mythological hydra, whose severed heads continually grew back. The
tense atmosphere among the soldiers must have been further exasperated
by the long time they had now spent in a quite alien environment where
communication with the locals was only possible with the help of one or
several interpreters. The general tiredness, stress, and combat fatigue also
affected the banqueters at Maracanda. In such circumstances the very
negative emotions some of the hetairoi had so far kept suppressed could
be released with an abrupt outburst by the excessive consumption of
alcohol. One of the most distinguished and loyal of Alexanders highranking officers, Cleitus, was enraged by Alexanders courtiers who at the
feast were claiming the king was greater than his father, Philip, the
Dioscuri, whose festival they were that day celebrating, and even the hero
Heracles. To a man of pure convictions, one who treated religious matters
seriously, the latter comments seemed to sound too much like sacrilege.
But what proved to be the last straw was a song sung by some third-rate
poet by the name of Pranichus or Pierion which mocked those
Macedonians who had recently been defeated by the Sogdians. Many felt
outrage but only Cleitus openly protested. The king responded by claiming
that what Cleitus had called a misfortune that had befallen the vanquished
Macedonians was in reality cowardice. Cleitus immediately hit back by
137

Ephippus, ap. Ath., 3.91, 10.44; Ael., VH, 12.26. Tomlinson 1970, p. 309;
Borza 1983; OBrien 1992, pp. 6-8; Flower 1994, pp. 107-111; Murray 1996; Rice
1997, pp. 92-93; Spawforth 2007, pp. 85-86.

King of Asia

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reminding Alexander of how he had saved his life at Granicus as well as

how he would have never got so far without those Macedonians who had
spilled their blood for him, and in these arguments he did not fail to
include a spiteful comment regarding the Alexanders supposed godly
father. On top of that, Cleitus now also angrily accused Alexander of
increasingly absolutist tendencies, the orientalization of his court and of
surrounding himself by barbarians because, as Cleitus claimed, he could
no longer stand to be among free men. Incensed by these biting remarks
and the open questioning of his policies, Alexander threw an apple at the
speaker and next reached out for his blade, but one of his bodyguards,
Aristonous, managed to hide it from him in time. With considerable
civilian courage and alertness Aristonous as well as other Macedonian
officers and soldiers present at the feast endeavoured to keep the two
drunken antagonists apart. They begged Alexander to calm down. But the
king rose to his feet and in Macedonian which was a sign of great
emotion summoned the hypaspists guarding the doors. Next he ordered
the trumpeter to give the signal summoning the army. When the trumpeter,
fearing the grave consequences of such an action, ignored this order, the
king punched him in the face and, being instantly held back by his friends,
in an attack of hysteria cried out that he had been betrayed as Darius
before him. At the same time Cleitus was escorted by force out of the
banqueting hall. However, he soon returned and as provocatively as he
could, cited Euripidess Andromache: Oh, how perverse customs are in
Greece. Riled by this, Alexander grabbed a spear from one of the
guardsmen and ran it through Cleitus. Next, with a genuine or affected
pang of guilt, he tried to use the same spear to kill himself but was of
course instantly restrained by his friends.138
Experiencing deep grief after murdering his friend, Alexander spent
the next three days lamenting in total seclusion in his tent, refusing to
accept food or drink. His friends, wishing to pull him out of this state of
depression, brought him the soothsayer Aristander, who reminded the king
that there had been signs preceding Cleituss death and he tried to
convince him that this was the will of the gods. They also brought him the
peripatetic philosopher Callisthenes to try and cheer him up, but also to no
138

Plu., Alex., 50-51 (the best source, perhaps after Chares); Plu., mor., 71c, 341f;
Arr., An., 4.8.1-9.2; Curt., 8.1.19-2.4; Diod., 17.kz; Cic., Tusc., 4.79; Sen., Ep.,
83.19; Luc., DMort., 12.3-4; Just., 12.6; It. Alex., 90-91; Suda, s.v. metax.
Quotation from Euripides is after Kovacs (Loeb). Wilcken 1967, pp. 166-167;
Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 364-369; Green 1974, pp. 360-364; Goukowsky 1978, pp.
44-45; Badian 1985, pp. 456-457; Heckel 1992, p. 275; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 98103; Hamilton 1999, pp. 139, 143-144; Trittle 2003.

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Chapter V

avail. The Democritic philosopher Anaxarchus of Abdera, however, had

more success by comparing Alexander to Zeus, all of whose deeds were
by definition lawful and just. Anaxarchus was in a sense alluding to a
theoretical concept present in Greek thought regarding the ideal ruler,
which flatterers could associate with Alexander. On the other hand,
although the arguments were presented in a traditional form referring to
Zeus, the philosophers thoughts were also not devoid of Iranian concepts
regarding absolutist monarchy, something that was quite new to the Greek
world. That such arguments proved successful says a great deal about the
atmosphere of unrestrained flattery that must have surrounded Alexander
at the time. Worse still, this incident indicates that Alexander considered
himself to be someone quite exceptional who could not be subjected to
open criticism.139 Prophets found the reason for Alexanders fury in his
mind being obscured by Dionysus. The king had failed to make the god a
sacrifice that year and thus, they explained, Cleitus was murdered. There is
no reason to doubt that most Macedonians would have quite willingly
accepted this explanation. Now there was only the formality of trying
Cleitus in absentia before an assembly of soldiers and officially sentencing
him to death for treason. For the ordinary soldier a dispute between the
king and one of the aristocratic commanders was undoubtedly of much
less importance than Alexanders health and safety, on which their own
fate and eventual return home depended.140 Alexander in turn, for all the
no doubt genuine regret shown after the death of such a loyal companion,
was not inclined to change in any way the policy so much criticised by
Cleitus and for which the general ultimately paid with his life. It is
possible that the whole incident, which actually strengthened the position
of the king with regard to his hetairoi, inclined Alexander to rely all the
more on his Iranian subjects.141
In the spring of 327 this stance led to another conflict between
Alexander and his Macedonian companions. At the time, after another
wave of capitulations among the eastern Iranian lords and Alexanders
marriage to the Bactrian princess Rhoxane, the kings entourage must have
included an unprecedented number of Iranian aristocrats and courtiers.
Alexander made a serious effort to adapt his court to the customs practiced
by the now prevailing majority of his subjects. No doubt he realised that
139

Plu., Alex., 52.1-7; Plu., mor., 449e; Arr., An., 4.9.3-9; Curt., 8.2.1-11.
Goukowsky 1978, p. 46; Bosworth 1988, p. 115; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 103-106;
Hamilton 1999, pp. 145-146.
140
Arr., An., 4.8.1-2, 4.9.5; Curt., 8.2.12; Diod., 17.kz. Badian 1964, pp. 197-198;
Goukowsky 1978, pp. 45-46; Bosworth 1996a, p. 104.
141
Arr., An., 4.9.9. Wilcken 1967, pp. 167-168.

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he could not be the Great King to some and merely the first among equals
to others for long. Already in Hyrcania he had given his hetairoi Persian
robes, which they most probably used on certain ceremonial occasions. A
groundbreaking measure was Alexanders attempt to extend the
proskynesis ceremony to all his subjects. The Iranians had naturally
greeted him in such a way since at least Issus; among the first to do so
were the captured members of Darius IIIs family (see: Chapter IV.5).142
Proskynesis was a ceremonial bow which everyone standing before the
majesty of the king had to take. Reliefs at Persepolis show aristocrats
bowed their heads and kissed their own hands, whereas people from the
lower orders were expected to fall to their knees and bow their heads to the
ground. To the Great Kings subjects and indeed throughout the Near East
proskynesis was the universally accepted way of paying respects to the
majesty of the monarch. Unfortunately in the Greek world such gestures
were reserved for the cults of deities. Many sources show that for a Greek
the paying of respect in such a way to a Persian king would have been
tantamount to the sacrilege of treating an ordinary mortal as a god.143 No
doubt of all the courtly customs proskynesis was the one that marked the
greatest difference between the Greeks and Macedonians on the one hand
and Alexanders Asian subjects on the other. Regardless of this, if
Alexander wished to unite his entire court and his ruling elites according
to the same principles, then the introduction of proskynesis was hard to
avoid.144
The matter was naturally of an extremely delicate nature and it was
feared that it could become the cause of serious tensions. That is why the
introduction of proskynesis to Greeks and Macedonians was begun in the
spring of 327 when Alexanders army was most probably staying in Bactra
and some of the most traditionalist military leaders, including the very
much respected Craterus, were absent. It was preceded by debates among
Greek court intellectuals (Anaxarchus, Agis of Argos and Cleon of Sicily)
who reached the conclusion that, as humanitys benefactor, Alexander was
no less worthy of his own cult than the Dioscuri, Dionysus or Heracles.145
The next step was for the act of proskynesis to be performed by a small
circle of courtiers and close friends during a small feast. So as not to be
overly offensive to the Macedonians and Greeks, its traditional Persian
form was specially modified in that the banqueters at first did not face
142

Balsdon 1950, pp. 376-377; Bosworth 1996a, p. 110; Heckel 2009, p. 46.
Frye 1972; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 320-322; Bosworth 1988, pp. 284-285; Briant
1996, pp. 234-235; Chosky 2002; Spawforth 2007, pp. 102-104.
144
Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 373-374.
145
Arr., An., 4.10.6-7; Curt., 8.5.5-9. Bosworth 1996a, pp. 109-111.
143

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Chapter V

their king but the house altar. They were to drink wine from a cup,
perform proskynesis and next exchange kisses with Alexander. Even this
modified version proved unacceptable to the strong convictions of
Callisthenes. He did not react ostentatiously but instead he simply
endeavoured to exchange kisses with his king without performing the
obsequious bow. When one of the courtiers commented on this out loud,
Alexander refused to accept the kiss. Not put off, the philosopher simply
walked away, commenting that he was merely poorer by one kiss.146
Such passive resistance did not deter Alexander and his closest circle
from continuing the experiment of propagating among Europeans,
especially as in this semi-private party almost all those present did comply
with the kings wishes. The next step was to repeat this experiment at a
larger event with also the participation of Asians, who naturally bowed to
Alexander in the prescribed way. This time, however, resistance was much
more visible. Perhaps whilst taking part in a debate with other Greek
intellectuals, Callisthenes spoke out openly in defence of traditional
religious beliefs that forbade the boundary between man and god to be
crossed. The philosopher even claimed that by introducing proskynesis
Alexander was breaking a unwritten law or custom (nomos) of the
Macedonian monarchy which was, according to his idealised theory now
being approved by many of those listening, to never make such decisions
without previously obtaining the assent of his subjects. Knowing that
Callistheness arguments were expressing the views of the silent majority
among the Macedonians, who in this unpopular philosopher had found an
unexpected champion, Alexander desisted from further efforts regarding
the introduction of proskynesis and would never return to this issue. To
make matters worse, one of the hetairoi had laughed out loud at the sight
of an Asian performing the obeisance with exaggerated zeal. Alexander
was angered at the man who had laughed but, seeing the attitude of the
majority of those present, he did not force his European subjects to
perform proskynesis.147 The epilogue to this whole affair came after the
great Macedonians death. Then for many the deification of Alexander
seemed no less controversial than the divine status of Heracles, who after
all had also once been a mortal. It was then that some of the officers
recognised their deceased ruler as a god and performed proskynesis facing
his vacant throne.148
146

Plu., Alex., 54.3-6 (after Chares); Arr., An., 4.12.3-5. Bosworth 1988, p. 285;
Bosworth 1995, pp. 87-88.
147
Arr., An., 4.10.5-12.2; Curt., 8.5.9-24; Just., 12.7. Bosworth 1996a, pp. 110-112;
Briant 2002, pp. 105-106.
148
Diod., 18.61.1; Polyaen., 4.8.2. Bosworth 1996a, p. 112.

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291

It was during that same stay in Bactra that a plot against the king was
discovered. The danger lay in the fact that it was hatched by people who
had constant access to the king, even at times when he was at his most
vulnerable, that is, at night. For the conspirators were royal boys,
alternatively called by modern historians pages. These were boys from
good Macedonian homes who performed services around the king
normally carried out by servants. Moreover, they guarded his bedroom
door at night. The pages guaranteed the loyalty of their families to the king
while at the same time they familiarised themselves with the functioning
of the court and state in preparation for important careers in adult life. The
leader of the conspirators was a page called Hermolaus, who, as so
frequently happens in such cases, was driven to plotting for personal
reasons. During a hunt Hermolaus killed a boar that had been marked out
for the king to slay. This angered Alexander greatly. He ordered the boy to
be flogged and had his horse confiscated. 149 The significance of this
seemingly minor incident became more important in the context of
Alexanders adoption of Achaemenid customs. Hunting played an
important role in Persian royal ideology, which in turn owed a great deal
to the neo-Assyrian tradition. Of course the beast the monarch most
willingly hunted was the lion. The Great King frequently hunted in special
reserves. One of these was Bazeira, and that was where Alexander took
part in a great hunt. It was a Greek and Macedonian custom to hunt on foot
but in Asia Alexander followed the Persian example and hunted on
horseback. The killing of an animal designated for the king was considered
a very serious offence, punishable even by death. It was only permissible
(and moreover obligatory) when such an animal posed an immediate
danger to the monarch. It was in such a situation that Craterus once killed
a lion, a scene immortalised in a relief and inscription at Delphi by his son.
On the other hand, legend has it that for killing the kings beast
Alexanders bodyguard Lysimachus was cast into a lions den.150
In such a context the whipping of Hermolaus was not an exceptionally
harsh punishment. Nevertheless the page evidently did feel that his system
of values had been dishonoured to an extent that required revenge. Much
more interesting, however, is the fact that in his plot Hermolaus was not
only helped by his homosexual lover but also by several other pages who
would have been quite unaffected by the wrong committed against the
149

Arr., An., 4.13.1-2; Curt., 8.6.2-7. Heckel 1992, pp. 237-244; Bosworth 1995,
pp. 90-94.
150
Curt., 8.1.14-18; Sen., Dial., 5.17.2; Plin., Nat., 8.54; Paus., 9.1.5; Just., 15.3; V.
Max., 9.3 ext. 1. Heckel 1992, pp. 268-271; Briant 1993a; Pelagia 2000, pp. 177184.

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ringleader. The sources do not provide us with a straightforward answer as

to why this was so. When asked why he had started a conspiracy,
Hermolaus gave a whole set of arguments that had already been
expounded by Cleitus and Callisthenes, that is, including a protest against
orientalization, growing absolutism and the murder of distinguished
Macedonian officers. The words in this supposed speech actually belong
to Curtius Rufus and to his version of events but the arguments too closely
reflect the genuine feelings of Macedonians known from other incidents
for them to be dismissed as meaningless rhetoric. A pages career was
short, for it ended once he reached the age of maturity and entered military
service presumably more often than not in the Companion cavalry. The
conspirators of 327 would have had been pages for just two or three years
and therefore were in all probability part of the group of 50 boys from
good Macedonian homes who had joined Alexanders army at the end of
331 (Chapter V.4). At a young age people are frequently idealistic. For
some of the boys Alexanders absolutism, which had been developing over
the years, as well as the willing adoption of Persian customs, would have
been shocking enough to drive them into secret opposition. It is also
possible that some of the boys may have disliked Alexander for not
appointing their fathers to high positions, though that alone would not
have been a sufficient reason to join a conspiracy.151
The conspirators plan was to murder Alexander in his sleep. What
saved the king was his fondness for alcohol. That fateful night Alexander
attended a banquet that lasted till morning. It is said he did initially intend
to retire early but was urged by a Syrian female soothsayer to stay. Thus
the plan was foiled and the conspirators had to wait another seven days
before it was their turn again to guard the kings chamber at night. But
before that happened one of the conspirators lost his nerve and together
with his brother reported the entire conspiracy to Alexander. For this
information the conspirator was pardoned and his brother was rewarded
with 50 talents, which in those times was equivalent to 1,000 years of
average pay. The remaining conspirators were immediately arrested and
under torture they all confessed. For such a serious offence they were
stoned to death.152
The uncovering of this plot also led to the arrest of Callisthenes. He
owed his position as court historian at Alexanders side thanks to the
recommendation of his relative, Aristotle. Already at the start of the
151

Curt., 8.7; Arr., An., 4.14.2. Schachermeyr 1973, p. 388; Lane Fox 1973, pp.
327-328; Hamilton 1974, p. 107; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 112-113; Badian 2000, p.
70; Heckel 2009a, p. 79.
152
Arr., An., 4.13.5-14.3; Curt., 8.6.10-8.20.

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293

expedition Callisthenes was a well-known historian, the author of a book

on the Sacred War.153 A gifted writer, he glorified his king with great skill
and in that respect for some time he fulfilled Alexanders expectations.
Among other things he had formulated daring concepts of the sea bowing
before Alexander at Pamphylia and the kings divine father. Successive
books from Callistheness history were first read by the king himself and
then sent on to Greece, thus helping to create Alexanders legend in his
lifetime. It is for these reasons that the king tolerated this philosopher for
so long, even though with his very serious and stern manner as well as
strongly independent views he did not have the makings of a courtier.154
The line Callisthenes refused to cross was to treat a living mortal, even one
as exceptional as Alexander, as a god. In this philosophers strict
interpretation of principles such a boundary would be crossed by
performing proskynesis. It was during Alexanders painfully unsuccessful
attempt to introduce this custom at court that Callistheness opposition
became open. Henceforth the philosophers days were numbered. The king
now only waited for an appropriate opportunity to rid himself of this
intellectual with too many principles for a royal court.155
Alexander had the foresight and patience to plan and prepare his
revenge long in advance of dealing the decisive blow. In the Callistheness
case the first step was to deprive him of support among the Macedonian
military elite, whose champion he had become after effectively protesting
against proskynesis. During a banquet Alexander asked Callisthenes to
deliver a eulogy of Macedonians. The philosophers speech was rewarded
by those attending with applause and a garland of flowers. But then
Alexander quoted a verse from Euripidess The Bacchantes: When a wise
man has a good cause to argue, eloquence is easy and asked the
philosopher if he could speak equally convincingly about Macedonian
vices. Being, like most intellectuals, vain, Callisthenes could not but take
up the challenge. He delivered a second speech displaying no less
oratorical skill than in the first. The delivering of such palinodes was a
typical rhetorical exercise but there was no reason why Macedonian
officers should have known that. Therefore they easily believed the
malicious rumours spread by Alexander about Callisthenes really
despising the Macedonians. Besides, for the simple minded soldier such

153

D.L., 5.5; Just., 12.6.17; Suda, s.v. Kallisqnhj. Brown 1966, pp. 225-227;
Rubinsohn 1993, pp. 1312-1314.
154
Brown 1949, pp. 227-236; Rubinsohn 1993, pp. 1315, 1319.
155
Plu., Alex., 54.3; Arr., An., 4.14.1.

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Chapter V

accusations were all the more plausible on account of the philosophers

aloof behaviour.156
Even under torture none of the pages implicated Callisthenes as a
fellow conspirator. Moreover, Alexander himself was fully aware of the
philosophers innocence as is clear from what Plutarch states to be his
letters written to Attalus, Craterus and Alcetas. Nonetheless, the general
hysteria after uncovering of a conspiracy to kill the king was so strong that
it was very easy to include Callisthenes on the list of suspects. He was
accused of indirectly inspiring Hermolaus, if only by teaching that fame
was most easily obtained by killing the greatest of men. It was also
remembered that the philosopher had once delivered a speech before
Philotas praising the tyrannicides. Thus Callisthenes was arrested soon
after the execution of the pages, subjected to torture and nailed to a
cross.157 A contributing factor to his downfall was the scheming of another
philosopher, Anaxarchus of Abdera, who was competing against him for
Alexanders favour.158
The imprisonment and execution of Callisthenes unfortunately also had
a negative effect felt by modern historians. He had been an invaluable
eyewitness to Alexanders expedition. His no longer existing work was the
primary historical source regarding Alexander used by the majority of later
ancient authors. The loss of this observer of Alexanders expedition could
not be replaced by other participants such as Ptolemy and Aristobulus,
whose accounts were limited to recording only the courts official version
of events written decades after they had occurred. Callisthenes account
was written immediately as events unfolded when neither the lapsing of
time nor political considerations (as in Ptolemys case) could distort the
picture. 159 Just as Callistheness writing had promoted the image of
Alexander the great leader who spread Greek civilization to the East, so
too Callistheness death to a large extent contributed to the birth of
Alexanders darker legend, the one of Alexander the tyrant, drunkard and
violent hothead.160

156

Plu., Alex., 53; Philostr., VA, 7.2; E., Ba., 267, after Kovacs (Loeb). Brown
1949, p. 245; Balsdon 1950, p. 372; Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 390-392; Green 1974,
pp. 377-378; Hamilton 1999, pp. 147-148.
157
Plu., Alex., 55.3-9; Arr., An., 4.14.3; Curt., 8.8.21; D.L., 5.5. Bosworth 1995, p.
100; Hamilton 1999, p. 156; Badian 2000, pp. 71-72.
158
Borza 1981.
159
Brunt 1995, pp. 16-18; Bosworth 1996, pp. 62-77.
160
Tarn 1948, ii, pp. 297-298; Brown 1949, pp. 225-226, 245-247; Wardman 1955,
p. 96; Schachermeyr 1973, p. 609.

CHAPTER VI:
EXPEDITION TO INDIA

1. From Sogdiana to the Indus

Alexanders initial plans for an expedition to India have been dated no
later than in summer of 328. To the 4th-century Western (Greek) world
India was not only a country about which very little was know but even
one whose inhabitants were frequently idealised as noble barbarians on a
par with the Scythians and Ethiopians. Persian perceptions, however, were
different. The Indus Valley had for a time, probably during Darius Is
reign, been part of the Achaemenid Empire. According to Herodotus it
was its 20th tax district. The name Hindu appears in the monumental
Achaemenid inscriptions listed among other countries (bumi) of the
empire and its inhabitants are presented on reliefs as subjects of the Great
King. These facts, however, say more about persistence of themes in
Persian monumental art than about how long India was part of the
Achaemenid Empire. Persian conquests in India did not turn out to be
permanent and by the 4th century the Persian administrative system of
satrapies had ceased to function there if indeed it had ever been installed.
On the other hand, the presence of Indian troops at the Battle of
Gaugamela indicates that ties between Indian rulers and the Great King
persisted right up to the end of the Achaemenid Empire. A more durable
Persian presence in India or in the territory of todays Pakistan to be
more precise was its cultural influence on the local population from the
development of the Kharoshti script, which originated from the
Achaemenid Empires official Aramaic alphabet, to the Persian monetary
standard as well as to the political customs that the Macedonian
conquerors would encounter.1 In the 4th century northern India was divided
up into a large number of kingdoms, principalities, oligarchic republics
1

Hdt., 3.94, 4.44; Arr., An., 3.8.4, 3.8.6; Curt., 4.9.2; Plin., Nat., 6.98. Tarn 1948, I,
pp. 85-86; Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 413-416; Dani 1986, pp. 43-44; Vogelsang
1992, p. 227; Briant 1996, pp. 152-153, 185-188, 774-778; Karttunen 1997, pp. 19,
26-30, 37-38; Badian 1998, p. 221; Hahn 2000, pp. 11-13.

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Chapter VI

and tribal territories. The largest of these states, the Kingdom of Magadha,
situated on middle reaches of the Ganges and at the time ruled by the
Nanda dynasty, did not come into contact with Alexanders army, but
many much smaller states in north-western India did. Quintus Curtius
Rufus does mention that at least some of these states had paid tribute to the
satrap of Arachosia and in this sense declared their fealty to the Great
King.2
As usual, all the extant sources fail to provide the reasons for what was
to be Alexanders successive military expedition. Moreover, no convincing
strategic reasons can be found. Modern historians have come up with a
large number of theories to make up for the lack of explanations in the
sources. By and large these explanations chiefly reflect how individual
modern historians perceive Alexander. Some argue, for example, that it
was hoped the shared experiences and victories of a successive war would
rebuild the bonds between the Macedonians and their leader as they had
been weakened by a series of internal conflicts over preceding winter and
spring. Similarly, ties were supposed to be strengthened this way between
Alexander and the Iranian cavalry. The legendary wealth of India has also
been stressed as a lure for prospective conquerors. Moreover, it has been
noted that such a campaign could earn Alexander respect among Iranians
as the successor of the Achaemenids. It is claimed that Alexander was
striving to extend the Persian Empire to the borders it had had at its
greatest moment in history under Darius I. This would not only bring
political gains but increase royal revenues many times over. The
Achaemenid theme in Alexanders plans is the most popular theory in
modern historiography but it has one weakness in that the sources clearly
show Alexanders plan was to conquer territories extending beyond the
empires most far-flung borders as had existed during the reign of Darius I.
We know that Alexander intended to continue marching east way past the
borders of Darius I empire and it was only the passive but resolute
opposition of his army that stopped him from doing so. It is therefore not
improbable that Alexander wanted to conquer the whole of India perhaps
as part of his plan to rule over the entire known world. It is possible that
non-economic or non-strategic factors began to predominate in these plans
as the campaign proceeded or were indeed present from the start. Modern
man would call such factors irrational but that is not how they were
perceived in Antiquity. Alexander had always attached great importance to
religion and the heroic tradition. Hence he could have wished to match the
achievements of Dionysus and his mythological ancestor, Heracles, as
2

Curt., 9.7.14. Vogelsang 1992, p. 227; Briant 1996, pp. 777-778.

Expedition to India

297

well as historic figures of the Near East such as Semiramis or Cyrus the
Great, all of whom fate had at one time or another sent to India. On top of
that there were other obvious aspects of Alexanders character, his natural
curiosity and the urge to take up new challenges, which for the greatest
military leader of ancient times meant new wars. We will most probably
never know exactly why Alexander chose to invade India; quite probably
Alexander himself did not really know either.3
While Alexander was still in Sogdiana he received envoys from
Mophis/Omphis (Ambhi), the ruler of the Kingdom of Taxila. The
kingdoms capital, also called Taxila, i.e. Takail (Takshasila) in
Gandhara, was both a centre of foreign trade and also one of academic
learning with numerous schools for Brahmans, the sons of princes and rich
merchants. The city was the home of, among others, the famous author of
Sanskrit grammar Panini. It also had an Iranian colony, probably from
where interpreters were later to join the Macedonian camp. We have
reason to assume this, as the Indian names recorded in Greek in works of
Alexanders companions appear to have been translated indirectly from
Sanskrit through Persian. The Taxilan envoys asked Alexander to help
Omphis in a war against his enemies. At the time a former Indian ally of
Bessus called Sisicottus (Sasigupta) was also present in Alexanders
camp. Thus the grounds for starting an invasion were prepared and
political unrest in Northwest India provided a convenient pretext to
intervene.4
In the early summer of 327 the Macedonian army set off from Bactria
and crossed the Hindu Kush, most probably using either the shortest route
through the Salang Pass or the somewhat longer but easier route through
the Bamiyan valley and Shibar Pass, to reach the Kabul valley within ten
days. There two years earlier Alexander had founded Alexandria in the
Caucasus. Now he added more settlers, nominated one of his hetairoi,
Nicanor, commandant of the garrison and perhaps a Persian called

Str., 15.1.5-7. Tarn 1948, i, pp. 86-87; Badian 1964, pp. 199-200; Narain 1965,
pp. 161-162; Brunt 1965, pp. 207-209; Wilcken 1967, pp. 173-174; Schachermeyr
1973, pp. 407-413; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 331-334; Green 1974, p. 380; Goukowsky
1981, pp. 11-14; Bosworth 1988, p. 119; Carlier 1995, p. 160; Hahn 2000, pp. 1519; Briant 2002, p. 35.
4
Curt., 8.12.5; Diod., 17.86.4; Arr., An., 4.30.4; Plin., Nat., 6.78; ME, 49. Wheeler
1968, pp. 103-106; Dani 1986, pp. 1, 12, 42-43; Bosworth 1995, pp. 192-193;
Stoneman 1995, p. 107; Karttunen 1997, pp. 31-33, 61.

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Chapter VI

Tyriespis/Terioltes as satrap of Paropamisus. 5 From there the army

marched to Nicaea, a town somewhere near Kabul but whose exact
location is now unknown. After offering sacrifices to the goddess Athena,
the army reached the river Cophen (Kabul) and thence proceeded
eastwards along this watercourse. In keeping with customs established in
the days of the Achaemenid monarchy the rulers of Taxila and of some
smaller states situated on the western side of the Indus met Alexander on
the border and presented him with gifts, including 25 elephants.6
It was there that the Macedonian army was divided into two units. One
of them, comprising half of the Macedonian troops and all of the Greek
mercenaries, was commanded by Hephaestion and Perdiccas. This corps
headed along the southern road through the Khyber Pass (in south-western
Afghanistan) towards the Indus, conquering the lands it passed. Its mission
was to prepare a passage for the entire Macedonian army across the Indus.
Hephaestions corps was joined by Indian vassals, no doubt with their own
armies. The only military operation of note was the conquest of the land of
Peucelaotis together with its capital, also called Peucelaotis
(Pukalvat/Pukarvat or Pushkaravati, the Lotus City in Gandhara
some 5 km from todays Charsadda in western Pakistan). After a 30-day
siege the city was captured, the king, Astis, was killed and a certain
Sangaius was installed in his place by the Macedonians. After that the
Macedonian army only had to build a bridge over the Indus and wait for
Alexanders troops to arrive.7
The kings corps comprised the very best units, including hypaspists,
Agrianians and hetairoi, who were all selected on account of the far more
difficult task they had to face. The first operations were directed against
the tribes of Aspasians, Guraeans and Assacenians, who inhabited the
fertile highland and mountain regions to the north of the river Cophen and
east of the river Choes. Most scholars believe the latter river to be what is
now called the river Kunar, a northern tributary of the Kabul (Cophen),
though some reckon it is another Kabul tributary located further west and
called Alingar. Alexander led the vanguard, comprising cavalry and 800
mounted infantry, while the rest of the army, commanded by Craterus,
followed on foot. The first battle was fought outside a city called Silex.
5
Arr., An., 4.22.3-5; Curt., 9.8.9; It. Alex., 104. Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 676-681;
Engels 1978, p. 107; Jacobs 1994, pp. 76-77; Bosworth 1995, pp. 141-146; Heckel
2006, p. 269.
6
Arr., An., 4.22.6; Curt., 8.10.1-2. Bosworth 1995, pp. 146-149; Fraser 1996, p.
146, n. 79; Briant 1996, p. 777.
7
Arr., An., 4.22.7-8, 4.30.9; It. Alex., 104. Seibert 1985, pp. 147-150; Bosworth
1995, pp. 149-154; Karttunen 1997, p. 50.

Expedition to India

299

According to the Metz Epitome, which is the only source that gives it a
name, this city was located to the east of the river Choes. The natives were
defeated but Alexander was wounded in the fighting. The following day
the Macedonians took over the city and, in revenge for their kings injury,
slaughtered all the inhabitants who had failed to escape into the mountains.
Terrified by this atrocity, the next town the Macedonian army approached,
Andaka, surrendered without putting up resistance.8
After these initial successes Craterus was entrusted with capturing
other towns in the region, while Alexander commanded the best soldiers
against the Aspasians. Once Craterus corps had completed their mission,
they rejoined Alexanders army. The Aspasians burnt their settlements and
retreated into the mountains. That is why the campaign mainly involved
chasing the enemy and fighting them in the mountains. The region was to
be controlled from a town inhabited by natives and veterans of
Alexanders army. The founding of this town was left to Craterus.
According to Arrian, who is quoting after Ptolemy, the Macedonians
captured 230,000 head of cattle and 40,000 prisoners. These figures must
be grossly exaggerated, for a British survey conducted in 1908 states that
the regions entire population at the dawn of the industrial age was
approximately 100,000 and therefore in Antiquity it must have been
decidedly smaller.9
On completing these operations the Macedonians marched through the
land of the Guraeans (Gauri) and having crossed the river Guraion (today
Panjkora) attacked the Assacenians (Avakayana), who inhabited
territories further east on the river Swat. Though supported by 7,000
mercenaries recruited from beyond the Indus, the Assaceni did not choose
to confront Alexanders in open field and instead decided to defend
themselves in fortified towns. The Macedonians faced the biggest problem
in capturing the regions capital, Massaga. For four days the city resisted
persistent assaults, during which Alexander himself was hit by an arrow.
On seeing this, the pancratiast Dioxippus compared Alexanders wound to
that Diomedes inflicted on Aphrodite at Troy and cited a verse from the
Iliad (5.340): The ichor, such as flows in blessed gods. Suffering from
this wound but still having a sober mind, Alexander rebuked the shameless
flatterer by telling him this was normal blood, not ichor, and added that
although he was considered the son of Zeus, he felt physical pain
reminding him that he was a mortal. The defenders of Massaga only
decided to start negotiations after their leader was killed by a missile fired
8

Arr., An., 4.23; Curt., 8.10.4-6; Str., 15.1.26; ME, 35; It. Alex., 105. Wheeler
1968, pp. 95-97; Seibert 1985, pp. 146-147, 150-151; Bosworth 1995, pp. 154-158.
9
Arr., An., 4.24.1-25.4. Bosworth 1995, pp. 158-167.

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from a catapult. The mercenaries from beyond the Indus were encouraged
to surrender with an offer to serve in the Macedonian army. However, on
leaving the city both they and their families were surrounded and, using
the pretext of a supposed attempt to escape, slaughtered. On the other hand,
Alexander accepted the surrender of Massaga and confirmed Cleophis, the
mother of the deceased ruler, as Queen of the Assacenians. In some of the
sources there is a (spurious) story that Alexander and Cleophis had an
affair after which she bore him a son.10
At a stage in the campaign that is difficult to pinpoint, though most
probably before the operations against the Aspasians and Assacenians, the
Macedonians reached a city the sources call Nysa. According to the Metz
Epitome it was some 230 stades (41 km) from Andaka. Nysa had an
aristocratic system of government in which power was held by 300 of the
best families. This so much appealed to Alexander that he even withdrew
his original demand for aristocratic hostages for fear of weakening the
ruling elite. Instead he took from Nysa an auxiliary detachment of cavalry
which accompanied him right up to his return to the Hydaspes in the
autumn 326. The local ruler, King Acuphis, surrendered to Alexander and
it was on this occasion that the soldiers heard the story of how Nysa had
been founded by the god Dionysus and that its inhabitants are the
descendants of the Bacchants. The credibility of this story was confirmed
by the fact that ivy grew on a neighbouring mountain called Merus (Meru
in Sanskrit; perhaps the mountain called today Koh-i-Mor to the west of
the middle course of the Panjkora). This plant was associated with the cult
of Dionysus and Alexanders soldiers had not seen it since they left the
Mediterranean area. Grapevines were grown there as well and the
inhabitants produced wine. The Macedonians offered sacrifices to
Dionysus, wove garlands out of ivy and against a backdrop of laurel trees,
boxwood and myrtle they celebrated their bacchanalia for ten days. This
story seems like the pure fantasy of ancient authors and doubt was already
cast upon it by Eratosthenes, but it actually fits very well into the
landscape of northeast Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan (Nuristan and
Chitral). The region has the same vegetation as described by the sources,
whereas the locals have produced wine since time immemorial. Moreover,
they bury their dead in wooden coffins kept above the ground. According
10

Arr., An., 4.25.5-27.4; Arr., Ind., 1.8; Str., 15.1.27; Diod., 17.84; Curt., 8.10.2236; Plu., Alex., 59.6-7; Polyaen., 4.3.20; ME, 39-45; It. Alex., 106. Alexanders
wound: Aristobul., ap. Ath., 6.57; Arr., An., 4.26.4; Curt., 8.10.28-29; Plu., Alex.,
28.2; Plu., mor., 341b; Sen., Ep., 59.12; D.Chr., 64.21; ME, 40; Zonar., 4.10.
Quotation from The Illiad after Murray (Loeb). Goukowsky 1981, p. 90; Bosworth
1995, pp. 169-172; Karttunen 1997, p. 33; Heckel 2009, pp. 47-48.

Expedition to India

301

to Curtius Rufus, Alexanders soldiers had used such coffins for firewood.
The local highlanders, called Kafirs, distinguish themselves from
neighbouring peoples with pale complexions, blue eyes and fair hair.
Moreover, they use of an archaic Indoeuropean language which indicates
that their ancestors originated from the West. It was only towards the end
of the 19th century that the Kafirs of Afghanistan were forcefully
converted to Islam, whereas those in what is now Pakistan are currently
fighting a losing battle for the remnants of their ancient culture against the
influences of Islamic fundamentalism promoted by Pakistani regime. To
this day they have worshipped the god Indra in his most ancient form. Like
the Greek Dionysus, Indra was an originator of the growing of grapevines
and the production of wine and so when his tale was translated into Greek
he was easily associated with the former. It is therefore hardly surprising
that their stay with the Kafirs evoked reminiscences among Alexanders
soldiers of their Balkan homeland. The stay at Nysa contributed to the
propagation if not actual creation of the myth regarding Dionysuss
invasion of India. In turn today the inhabitants of Nuristan and Chitral
willingly claim to be the descendants of Alexanders soldiers.11
After the taking of Massaga, in the winter of 327/326, Alexander sent
his commanders against other Assacenian towns in the hope that news of
what had happened at the capital would induce them to quickly surrender.
This, however, did not happen and Alexander himself had to supervise the
capture of the town of Ora (today Udegram) on the Swat. Meanwhile the
defenders of Bazira (Bir-Kot on the Swat) and other towns escaped to a
fortress perched on a steep rock called Aornos (Avarana in Sanskrit, which
simply means Fortress). By analysing areas to the north of the Indus and
the rocks characteristic shape Sir Aurel Stein identified Aornos to be
todays Pir-Sar, a 2,670-m mountain 40 km to the east of Udegram. Recent
attempts to revise this and associate Aornos with Mount Ilam, situated to
the south of Bir-Kot and Udegram, are not compatible with the
information provided by ancient sources. Aornos Mountain is
approximately 3 km long, 100-200 m wide with precipices on three sides
and connected to a neighbouring plateau by the Bumar ravine, which was
the only route the Macedonians could have used to attack. The army
camped at the foot of the plateau, while Alexander sent an elite
detachment of Agrianians, light infantry and hypaspists under the
11

Thphr., HP, 4.4.1; Curt., 8.10.7-18; Str., 15.1.7-9 (reference to Eratosthenes);

Arr., An., 5.1.1-3.4, 6.2.3; Plu., Alex., 58.6-9; Plu., mor., 332a-b; ME, 36-38; Just.,
12.7. Green 1974, p. 384; Lane Fox 1980, pp. 313-317; Goukowsky 1981, pp. 2138; Bosworth 1995, pp. 218-219; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 121-122; Bosworth 1996b,
pp. 149-154; Hahn 2000, pp. 81, n. 51, 86, n. 52.

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command of Ptolemy to ascend a mountain path and take up defensive

positions on top of the plateau. The Indians tried to destroy Ptolemys
detachments but had to give way when the main Macedonian forces
advanced. The next day the Macedonians set about building a bridge
between the plateau and mount Aornos, keeping the Indian defenders at
bay by firing arrows and catapult missiles. By the fourth day a small group
of Macedonian soldiers managed to reach a protrusion of the Aornos rock
and from there it was possible to access to the fort itself. It was at this
stage that the Indians declared that their willingness to negotiate
capitulation. Alexander agreed to parlay but once he managed to bring
over his bodyguards and 700 hypaspists he launched a surprise attack. The
massacre of the defenders that followed was of a comparable scale to the
slaughter of the Indian mercenaries and their families outside Massaga.
The fortress and surrounding territory were next handed over to Sisicottus.
Before the battle, Alexander had learned that Heracles had once also tried
to capture the fortress, though in his case unsuccessfully. What was meant
by local people was probably the Indian god Shiva, who is described in a
similar way to the Greek hero and was particularly worshiped in this
region. The urge to measure up against the achievements of his
mythological ancestor was most probably one of the major reasons why
Alexander decided to undertake this difficult military task.12
The capture of the Aornos rock was the last important episode in the
Assacenian campaign. Aphrikes, the brother of the king of Assacenians,
did intend to stop Alexanders army with 20,000 troops and 15 elephants
but he was murdered by his own subjects, who thus saved themselves from
defeat and death. Now two detachments commanded by Nearchus and
Antiochus were sent out to reconnoitre the area while Alexander and most
of the army marched towards the Indus. The winter march through the
wilderness took the Macedonians 16 days. In that time, before they
reached the river, Alexander ordered a hunt for elephants that the fleeing
Indians had left in pasture. On the Indus his soldiers built boats and they
sailed down river to the place where they arranged to meet up with the
units commanded by Hephaestion and Perdiccas. This did not happen until
the start of the spring of 326 and then the reunited army rested for thirty
days. Before it moved on, magnificent sacrifices were made to the gods.
12

Megasth., fr. 21.10; Arr., An., 4.27.5-30.4; Diod., 17.85; Curt., 8.11; Str., 15.1.8;
Plu., mor., 327c, 332a; Luc., DMort., 12.6; Philostr., VA, 2.10; ME, 46-47; Just.,
12.7; It. Alex., 107-108. Stein 1929, pp. 46-48, 53-61, 113-154; Goukowsky 1981,
pp. 36-40; Seibert 1985, pp. 152-154; Bosworth 1995, pp. 176-182; Bosworth
1996a, pp. 47-53; Hammond 1996, pp. 204-206; Karttunen 1997, p. 49; Huttner
1997, pp. 106-109.

Expedition to India

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Security in the regions to the west of the Indus was entrusted to the
hetairos Nicanor, who had been nominated satrap shortly before the
Aornos siege.13

2. Taxila and Porus

The kingdom of Taxila, which was ruled by Omphis, stretched from the
eastern bank of the Indus to the river Hydaspes (modern Jhelum). In other
words it was in the centre of modern Pakistan and its capital was some 30
km from todays Islamabad. On the edge of his kingdom, at the point
where the Macedonian crossed the Indus, Omphis presented his new
sovereign with 200 talents of silver, cattle, sheep and 30 elephants.
Omphis was de facto an independent ruler but his behaviour towards
Alexander (the paying of homage and presenting of gifts at the border)
was discernibly similar to the customs practiced in Persia and suggests that
the Achaemenid tradition of feudal allegiance had survived in India to that
day. He also sent Alexander 700 horsemen and ceded him rule over the
kingdoms capital. The Macedonian army crossed the Indus over a
pontoon bridge and marched from there 65 km to the city of Taxila. 14
Omphis had become king when Alexander was still in Sogdiana planning
his India campaign and had tried to reach an understanding with the
Macedonian ruler from the outset. More recently he had supplied the
armies of Hephaestion and Perdiccas with provisions. With such actions
the young ruler saved his kingdom from destruction and the massacres that
had characterised Alexanders campaigns in eastern Iran and India over
the last three years. But it seems that Omphis also had other strategic
considerations behind his actions. Taxila had powerful enemies in that part
of India whom the Western sources called Abisares and Porus. The arrival
of such a powerful and as yet unbeatable Macedonian army gave hope that
Taxilas enemies could be disposed of. Obviously Omphis had quickly
realised the Greek scope of geographical knowledge regarding India, or
rather lack thereof. The Westerners believed the Indus to be the largest
river in world and the Indian subcontinent was narrow enough for them
reach the Outer Ocean within just a few days. Aristotle thought that the
ocean could already be seen from the Paropamisus (Hindu Kush)
13

Arr., An., 4.28.6, 4.30.5-9; Diod., 17.86.2-3; Curt., 8.12.1-5; ME, 48; It. Alex.,
109. Bosworth 1983, p. 37; Bosworth 1995, pp. 193-196; Seibert 1985, pp. 153154; Hammond 1996, pp. 206-207; Klinkott 2000, p. 92, n. 288.
14
Ar., An., 5.3.5-6, 5.7.1-8.2; Diod., 17.86.3-4; Curt., 8.12.5-6; ME, 49.
Eggermont 1975, pp. 187-188; Badian 1985, p. 463; Bosworth 1995, pp. 219-222,
254-255.

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mountains. However, because the kingdom of Omphiss enemy Porus lay

to the east it was in the Taxilan rulers interest not to enlighten Alexander
too much about geography and instead encourage his army to proceed in
that very direction.15
Omphis came out with his army, including elephants, to greet
Alexander 40 stades (7 km) from the city of Taxila. On seeing the
approaching Indian army and fearing a surprise attack, Alexander ordered
his troops to take up battle positions. Therefore, leaving his army behind,
Omphis approached with only a small retinue and thus surrendered his
kingdom to Alexander. The Macedonian confirmed Omphis as king and it
was only then that the latter, in keeping with an Indian custom, was
supposed to take the dynastic title Taxiles, derived from the name of his
people. Omphis-Taxiles offered Alexander another 56 elephants, cattle and
80 talents in coined silver as well as provisions and quarters for the
Macedonian army. According to a tradition recorded in the works of
Plutarch and Curtius Rufus Alexander reciprocated by giving OmphisTaxiles as many as 1,000 talents.16 Soon envoys arrived at Taxila from
Omphiss enemy Abisares, ruler of the Abisaroi (Abhisras), who
inhabited mountains to the north of Taxila, and from a certain Doxares, the
prince of a today unidentified territory in India. Alexander accepted their
surrender. It was then that he also founded a new satrapy to be governed
by his hetairos Philip and left in Taxila a garrison of troops who were
unfit for battle due to ill health.17
The stay at Taxila, the first major Indian city Alexanders army had
encountered, gave the Greeks and Macedonians their first contact with
exotic Indian culture. In his description of Taxila, Aristobulus relates the
shocking custom of daughters being sold in the marketplace by people too
poor to be able to provide them with a dowry. Before purchase, to the
sound of trumpets and drums, potential buyers were allowed to examine
the young womens bodies, always starting off with the back. Aristobulus
also records the already then existing custom of widows burnt on a pyre
together with their deceased husband (suttee). Finally he relates
Alexanders first meeting with ascetic Brahman sages who taught in that

15
Arist., Mete., 350a; Arr., An., 5.18.7; Diod., 17.89.4-5; Curt., 8.12.6; Plu., mor.,
332a; ME, 63; Just., 12.7. Wilcken 1967, pp. 174-175; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 78-80;
Briant 2002, p. 36.
16
Arr., An., 5.8.2-3; Diod., 17.86.4-7; Curt., 8.12.5-18; Str., 15.1.28; Plu., Alex.,
59.1-5; ME, 49-54.
17
Arr., An., 5.8.3; Diod., 17.87.2; Curt., 8.13.1; ME, 55. Bosworth 1995, pp. 260261; Karttunen 1997, p. 33.

Expedition to India

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city. 18 The cynic philosopher Onesicritus, who also accompanied

Alexander on this expedition, recalls a whole colony of ascetics living
some 20 stades (4 km) from Taxila. They were said to spend whole days
sitting or lying quite naked and motionless in the scorching sun,
meditating. Only at night did they return to the town but they never
accepted invitations to other peoples houses and remained uninterested in
the outside world. Unlike many of the other accounts of India this report
does not seem to contain any information that is blatantly untrue though
instead of being completely naked the ascetics would have for decencys
sake worn loincloths. On account of this virtual if not complete lack of
attire the Greeks called them gymnosophists (naked philosophers).19
The tale of Alexanders meeting and conversation with the Indian
sages is one of the most frequently repeated anecdotes regarding the great
Macedonian. There is no reason to doubt the historicity of this meeting as
such ascetics were very much a part of the Indian social landscape and
Alexanders natural curiosity would not have allowed him to forego
meeting such exotic people. The ancient accounts differ as to where
Alexander actually met the gymnosophists but it seems most likely that it
occurred in or near Taxila. Onesicritus writes that he himself was first
delegated to meet the Indian sages and only after that did Alexander
personally meet them. The ancient authors give two somewhat different
versions of Alexanders conversation with the gymnosophists but both
relate nine or ten questions asked by the Macedonian king and answered
by the Indian sages. The king was also supposed to have said that whoever
gave a wrong answer would be killed. According to Plutarch, Alexander
asked the first sage whether there were more of fewer dead people than
living ones to which he received the reply that the living were more
numerous as the dead no longer existed. The next sage was asked whether
the earth or the sea produced the largest animals, to which he responded
that it was the earth as the sea was only its part. The third sage was asked
which was the most cunning of animals, to which the reply came that it
was the one that had not yet been discovered. The fourth was asked why
he had incited a certain Sabbas to rebel, to which he responded that he
wished him to have neither a noble life nor death. The fifth was told to
state whether day or night came first. The reply was supposed to be that
day was older than night by one day, though in the Alexander Romance the
sage explains that a child first experiences darkness in a mothers womb
and therefore night comes first. The sixth gymnosophist was asked which
18

Aristobul., ap. Str., 15.1.61-62.

Onesicritus, ap. Str., 15.1.63. Bosworth 1998, p. 188; Karttunen 1997, pp. 56-60;
Hamilton 1999, pp. 178-180.
19

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man was the most loved and he replied that it would be the most powerful
ruler on condition that he did not arouse fear. The seventh was to say how
a man could become a god and the reply was that he would have to
achieve things that are impossible for a man to achieve. The eighth was
asked whether life was stronger than death or death stronger than life. The
gymnosophist replied that life was stronger as it could put up with so
much evil. Finally the ninth was asked how long one should live, to which
answered that up to moment when death seemed better than life.20
Bearing in mind the exceptional circumstances of this encounter
between Indian sages and a pupil of the greatest of Western philosophers
one cannot but fail to be disappointed by the level of a debate that
basically resembles a brain teasing parlour game. The questions asked
were popular themes in Greek philosophy, especially in Cynic diatribes.
The subject of Alexanders conversation with the sages, though not the
fact that such a conversation took place, was most probably invented by
the Cynic philosopher Onesicritus, who put into the mouths of these exotic
Indian naked philosophers the doctrines of his mentor, Diogenes, to thus
give him even greater prestige. The Greek authors had information
regarding various religious and philosophical trends in India but they were
unable to fully distinguish between them. Therefore even if the
gymnosophists Alexander conversed with may have been called by the
Greek authors Brahmans that does not mean that they belonged to that
particular varna. Their description suggests that they more probably
belonged to the Jinist sect. The method of arriving at the truth through
questions and answers known in the Greek world as Socratic Dialogues
was also practiced in ancient India. Therefore the idea of such a dialogue
with Alexander was not alien to Indian culture. However, the language
barrier between the Indians and Europeans would have been very difficult
to overcome as it would have probably involved at least two if not even
three interpreters. In such circumstances, with the meanings of words
being inevitably lost in translation like in a game of Chinese whispers,
conducting an intercultural philosophical debate would have been
extremely difficult if not impossible.21
The sources mention two sages from Taxila Dandamis and Calanus.
Calanus real name was Sphines, but when the Greeks asked him his name
they heard him say Kale. The word kale stems from the Sanskrit word
kalynam, which is a form of greeting. Sphines-Calanus simply thought
20

Plu., Alex., 64. Other accounts: P.Berol., 13044; ME, 79-84; Ps.-Callisth., 3.5-6.
Hamilton 1999, pp. 178-179.
21
Wilcken 1967, pp. 180-181; Stoneman 1995, pp. 108-114; Karttunen 1997, pp.
60-62; Bosworth 1998, p. 173; Pushkas 2001.

Expedition to India

307

the foreigners were greeting him in their language and so he greeted them
in his language. Thus the Europeans misinterpreted his greeting to mean
his name. Onesicritus was the first to speak with Dandamis and Calanus. It
is reported that Calanus, who had recently completed many years of study
in aesthetics, laughed at Onesicrituss Macedonian attire as he felt it was
quite inappropriate for someone wishing to converse with sages.
Eventually, however, it was Calanus who joined Alexanders court and
followed the king for two years. There were also other Indian sages who
joined Alexander, for it was indeed part of the local tradition for rulers to
have Brahman advisers. Using a dried up animal hide, Calanus is said to
have demonstrated to Alexander how a state should be governed. He
placed the hide on the ground and trod upon its edges. As he did so the
other edges rose up, but when he stood in the middle of the hide, it stayed
flat around all the edges. The meaning of this demonstration was that
Alexander should desist from travelling around the edges of his empire
and concentrate on governing from the centre. Alas, this story may well
have also been made up for the fortune teller Oibares is said to have given
the same advice in the same way to Cyrus the Great.22
The Macedonians stayed in Taxila for most of the spring of 326. This
was not so much because of a desire to admire the exotic surroundings or
to converse with naked philosophers as on account of an attempt, by
diplomatic means, to establish at least formal control over the rajahs of the
Punjab. Unfortunately, not all of these rulers were as willing to concede as
Abisares, Doxares and Porus the king of the land between the rivers
Acesines (Chenab) and Hydraotes (Ravi). Another, much more famous
Porus (Paurava), whose kingdom, bearing the same name, stretched from
the river Hydaspes (Jhelum) to the Acesines, flatly refused to cooperate.
The ancient authors exaggerate the significance of the Macedonian defeat
of this other Porus. In the sources he is presented as a powerful rajah
ruling over 300 towns and having at his disposal an army comprising
20,000-50,000 infantry, 2,000-3,000 cavalry, 300-1,000 chariots and 85200 elephants. Historical estimates, however, suggest that he ruled over a
territory measuring merely 15,000 km2. In 1901, at the dawn of the
industrial age, this area was inhabited by c. 1.5 m people and therefore its
population would have been much smaller in ancient times. Moreover,
Porus was now politically isolated, as most of the other rulers had taken
the invaders side, and he had a considerably smaller army than Alexander.
It was for these reasons that he hoped to stop the invaders when they were
22

Onesicritus, ap. Str., 15.1.63-64 (= FGrH, 134 F17a); Nearchus, ap. Str., 15.1.66;
Arr., An., 7.1.5-2.4, 7.3.3-4; Plu., Alex., 65. Bosworth 1998, pp. 186-196. The
advice of Oibares: Aristid, p. 202-203 (Jebb), after Ctesias. Hamilton 1999, p. 181.

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crossing the Hydaspes. Working in his favour was the start of the monsoon
season, in May-June 326, which took the unacquainted Europeans quite by
surprise. On top of that the snow in the mountains had started melting, so
the Hydaspes swelled and was now very difficult to cross.23
Alexanders army, burdened with a baggage train including boats,
most probably took the easiest route from Taxila to the vicinity of todays
Jhelum. By the time it reached the Hydaspes, possibly near modern
Haranpur, it was reinforced by 5,000 troops from Taxila and boats that had
been brought over from the Indus. However, the river at that point and at
that time measured 800 m. Moreover at the opposite end the army would
have had to confront Porus forces, which included elephants terrifying
Macedonian horses. Alexander therefore decided to trick the enemy so as
to catch them off their guard. He ordered large amounts of provisions to be
stocked in the Macedonian camp. This was supposed to give the
impression that his army was intending to remain there until autumn, when
the water level fell and the river could be waded across. But next, making
use of his armys numerical superiority, he had his men carry out short
manoeuvres, each time as if they were trying to cross at a particular point
along the river. These actions forced Porus troops to continually prepare
themselves for battle. Moreover, the Macedonians also harassed the enemy
at night by giving out loud war cries, to which Porus initially reacted by
leading his troops out of the camp. After a time the rajah assumed that the
Macedonians were merely trying to provoke him and so ordered his troops
simply not to respond to enemy actions. His confidence may have also
been raised by a small Indian victory over the Macedonians in a skirmish
on one of the river islands.24
The Indians were gradually lulled into a false sense of security. And
then a storm broke out which further reduced their watchfulness, for an
attacked seemed highly improbably in such unfavourable conditions. But
this was the moment Alexander launched his manoeuvre against Porus.
The sources state that the Macedonian army marched and crossed the river
within a single night. However, the distance the Macedonians are said to
have covered and the difficulties they must have encountered when
crossing the wide river indicate that the manoeuvre must have taken them
an entire day and night before the two sides clashed. Craterus was left in
charge of the main camp, where the soldiers ostentatiously prepared to
23

Str., 15.1.29; Diod., 17.87.2; Curt., 8.13.2, 8.13.5-11; Arr., An., 5.8.4, 5.94,
5.15.4, 5.21.4; It. Alex., 111. Bosworth 1995, p. 320; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 8-11.
24
Arr., An., 5.8.4-10.4; Curt., 8.13.11-16; Plu., Alex., 60.1-2; Polyaen., 4.3.9; Fron.,
Str., 1.4.9; ME, 53-58. Seibert 1985, p. 156; Bosworth 1995, pp. 262-272;
Hammond 1996, pp. 208-210; Heckel 1997, p. 212; Heckel 2009, p. 48.

Expedition to India

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cross the river. Meanwhile Ptolemy commanded a diversionary group that

was sent downstream, whereas Alexander personally led 6,000 of the best
infantry and 5,000 cavalry 150 stades (27 km) to a camp upstream where
the flow of the Hydaspes turned and the army could not be seen from the
other side on account of river islands in between. The detachments
included hypaspists, two taxeis of phalanx, Agrianians, archers,
Companion and east Iranian cavalry. At a prearranged place the boats
hauled over from the Indus were already waiting for them. The army
crossed the river at night in torrential rain. There was no shortage of drama
as the Macedonians mistakenly landed on a large island separated from the
other side by a tributary of the Hydaspes. They were forced to wade across
this other river with the water almost up to their necks. By the morning,
however, the whole corps was on the eastern shore and only then was it
spotted by Porus scouts.25
Informed of this landing, Porus still had no certainty whether this was
the main force or perhaps just another diversion. To confront the enemy he
therefore sent his son (or brother) in command of a unit that may have
included 60 (Aristobulus), 100 (Curtius Rufus) or 120 (Ptolemy) chariots
as well as 1,000-4,000 cavalry. These slender forces were instantly
defeated by Alexanders cavalry, especially as the chariots were all but
immobilised in the mud and rendered virtually useless. Among those who
perished were Porus son and 400 horsemen. The survivors fled back to
their camp.26 Porus now knew that Alexander had crossed the Hydaspes.
The rajahs main force comprised elephants and now, apart from the few
left to defend the camp against an eventual attack by Craterus soldiers,
these proceeded to confront the invader, accompanied by the remaining
chariots and cavalry as well as elite infantry units which Arrian quite
implausibly claims numbered as many 30,000 men. Alexander
undoubtedly had a qualitatively and numerically superior cavalry, whereas
Porus would have had more infantry. The two armies clashed on mud-free
sandy terrain which allowed for the use of cavalry and chariots. The
elephants were positioned at equal intervals in front of the Indians with the
purpose of crushing the enemy infantry. But by then the Macedonians
were aware of what these animals could do in battle and had therefore
prepared a tactic to combat them. Fearing the losses the elephants would
inevitably inflict, Alexander ordered his infantry to hold back until the
25

Arr., An., 5.11-13; Curt., 8.13.17-27.2; Plu., Alex., 60.3-7; Polyaen., 4.3.9; Fron.
Str., 1.4.9; ME, 58-59. Devine 1987, pp. 96-99; Bosworth 1995, pp. 273-281;
Bosworth 1996a, pp. 12-15; Holt 2003, pp. 49-50.
26
Arr., An., 5.14.1-15.2 (after Aristobulus and Ptolemy), Curt., 8.14.1-8; Plu.,
Alex., 60.7-8.

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enemys cavalry were defeated. As usual he personally took command of

his cavalry on the right wing, while Coenus commanded the cavalry on the
left wing and Seleucus as well as some subordinate offices took charge of
the phalanx in the centre. The battle was begun by mounted east Iranian
archers, who attacked the Indians from the Macedonian right wing. Next
the cavalry units commanded by Alexander and Coenus entered the fray.
In face of these attacks Porus tried to regroup his cavalry but there ensued
confusion in the ranks and the Indian horsemen were eventually forced to
retreat behind the infantry and elephants. Now the foot soldiers clashed.
After an unsuccessful counterattack by the Indian cavalry, Porus army
found itself surrounded. At first the elephants inflicted heavy losses on the
phalanx but as the Macedonian noose round the Indian army tightened it
got increasingly easier to get at the pachyderm animals and their drivers
with arrows, javelins and sarissae. Wounded elephants or ones deprived of
their mahouts panicked and trampled the soldiers around them, mainly the
encircled Indians for the Macedonians on the outside were free to move
out of the frightened elephants way. The battle ended with the slaughter
of Porus troops for Alexander as by then frequently in India strove to
eliminate his enemies physically. Among those killed were two of Porus
sons and all his commanders as well as a very large part of his army.
According to Diodorus, the Macedonian side lost 280 horsemen and 700
foot soldiers, whereas Arrian gives a court propaganda version in which
230 horsemen and only 80 infantry were supposed to have died. Porus
engagement with Alexanders forces allowed Craterus to get his men
across the Hydaspes and join in the slaughter.27
Porus stood out from the other Indians on account of his good looks,
his height (reputedly over 2 m tall) and the fact that he fought mounted on
the largest of his elephants. He had been wounded several times in the
clash but not leave the battlefield while his men were still fighting.
Alexander most probably spared him his life not only because he had
fought courageously and with dignity, but also because of his good looks.
Porus physical attractiveness may well have been an important factor
when we bear in mind the tragic fate the Gaza commander, Batis, who
distinguished himself with valour but was, unfortunately, far from the
perceived ideal of male beauty (see Chapter IV.5). According to the most
popular version of events given by the ancient authors, the wounded Porus
was persuaded to get off his elephant and surrender to Alexander. The
Macedonian is said to have asked the captive what he wanted, to which
27

Arr., An., 5.15.5-18.3; Diod., 17.87.4-89.3; Curt., 8.14.9-30; Plu., Alex., 60.9-11;
Polyaen., 4.3.22; ME, 60-62. Scullard 1974, pp. 65-70; Devine 1987, p. 91, 100113; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 16-20; Strauss 2003, pp. 140-142.

Expedition to India

311

Porus reputedly gave the famous reply basilikos, which may be interpreted
that he wished to be treated as a king or that he wished Alexander to
behave like a king. Either way, Alexander was so impressed with this
attitude that he allowed Porus to continue ruling his kingdom of course
now as his vassal and even extended its borders. Consciously or
unconsciously, Alexander thus acted in accordance with the Indian code of
conduct, showing that he was Dharmavijayi, a conqueror through
righteousness.28
After the battle Alexander had the bodies of the fallen buried and the
survivors rewarded. Sacrifices were also made and games were organised.
One of the victims of the battle of the Hydaspes was Alexanders favourite
horse Bucephalus, which died of exhaustion and old age before the
fighting was finished. A more dramatic version (originating from Chares,
Alexanders court-marshal) states that Bucephalus died as a result of
wounds incurred during the battle. Alexander commemorated his horse by
naming one of two towns he founded on the Hydaspes Bucephala. The
town was most probably founded on the western bank of the river,
whereas a town called Nicaea (Victory City) was founded on the eastern
bank, on the site of the battle. Tracing their exact location is no longer
possible but we know that at least Bucephala still existed in the first
centuries of A.D./C.E.29
Victory over Porus was also commemorated with the issuing of large
silver coins weighing approximately 40g. These were more probably
somewhat inexact dekadrachms (10 drachma pieces) rather than 5-shekel
pieces. The reverse presents a horseman wearing a Phrygian helmet with a
crest and plume. In one hand he is holding a spear and in the other an
object that has been interpreted to represent lightning. Such a Phrygian
helmet has been found in tomb II at Vergina. Some historians believe that
the helmet at Vergina had belonged to Alexander and this is one of the
reasons why numismatists assume the warrior on the coin to represent
Alexander. The lightning held in the horsemans hand resembles Apelles
most famous depiction of Alexander and in both cases this may well be an
allusion to the kings ancestor, Zeus. It may well also be a suggestion of
equivalence between Alexander and Zeus. The obverse of the coin
28

Arr., An., 5.18.4-19.3; Plu., Alex., 60-12-16; Plu., mor., 181e, 332e, 458b; ME,
60-61; Them., 7.88d. Without basilikos answer: Diod., 17.88.4-89.6; Curt.,
8.14.31-46; Just., 12.8. Narain 1965, p. 163; Bosworth 1995, pp. 305-311.
29
Chares, ap. Gel., 5.2.1-5 (= FGrH, 125 F18); Str., 15.1.29; Arr., An., 5.19.4-20.1;
Curt., 9.1.6, 9.3.23; Diod., 17.89.6, 17.95.5; Plin. Nat., 6.77, 8.154; Plu., Alex., 61;
ME, 62; Ps.-Callisth., 3.3.6; Just., 12.8. Bosworth 1995, pp. 311-316; Fraser 1996,
pp. 161-162.

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portrays a horseman armed with a long spear fighting a warrior mounted

on an elephant. In all probability this is a depiction of Alexanders clash
with Porus at the battle of the Hydaspes at the moment when the defeated
rajah was retreating but still fighting. Only 24 such coins have been found,
most of them in a treasure discovered in Iraq in 1973, which has led some
historians to believe that they had been struck in nearby Susa after
Alexanders return from India or in Babylon in the year of his death. The
high artistic quality of the images on both sides of the coin suggests the
work of experienced Greek engravers. However, the careless manner in
which the coins were struck indicates that they may have been struck
elsewhere. F. Holt therefore argues that the coins were most probably
struck in Alexanders camp in India by inexperienced Indian minters. If
this was the case, they were most probably commemorative coins
produced and issued to Alexanders men soon after the battle of the
Hydaspes.30
After the victory, Alexanders army was allowed to rest for 30 days. In
that time Craterus supervised the fortifying of the newly founded towns of
Bucephala and Nicaea though these fortifications eventually failed to
withstand the weathering caused by the monsoon. Meanwhile Alexander
led a campaign against mountain tribes living somewhere to the north of
the Hydaspes battlefield. The most probable objective of this campaign
was to ensure the area was safe for the logging of timber necessary for the
construction of ships that would take the army down river to conquer the
valleys of the lower Indus. The sources mention exotic beasts that
inhabited these forests: giant snakes and rhinoceroses. The giant snakes
were most probably large Indian pythons, which had been quite unknown
to the Greeks and are frequently mentioned in accounts of Alexanders
expedition. One of the most fantastic tales is the account of Maximus of
Tyre, in which the author describes a snake 5 plethra (150 m) long. Taxiles
reputedly personally showed Alexander this snake inside a cave.
Onesicritus describes the same snake as being 70 cubits (c. 35 m) long and
having eyes like Macedonian shields or, in different versions, 80 and 140
cubits long. Heeding the request of the Indians, Alexander prudently
refrained from disturbing the creature.31

30

Holt 2003, especially pp. 118-130, 139-161.

Arr., An., 5.20.1-4; Str., 15.1.29; Diod., 17.89.4-90.3; Curt., 9.1.4-5, 9.1.8-13;
Max. Tyr., 2.6.d-e; Onesicritus, ap. Str., 15.1.28 and ap. Ael., NA, 15.21. Bosworth
1995, pp. 316-319; Karttunen 1997, pp. 184-186, 221-225; Malinowski 2003, pp.
197-198.
31

Expedition to India

313

3. Hyphasis the end of the expedition

The Macedonian defeat of Porus did not escape the notice of the
neighbouring rajahs. Taxiles must have been somewhat disappointed with
the way things turned out: it was quite paradoxical that Porus had received
greater rewards than he. However, Alexander persuaded the two rajahs to
make peace. Granted extra territories and the victors trust, Porus soon
became Alexanders chief ally in the Punjab. The changeable Abisares,
who had already formally surrendered to Alexander once before but
apparently intended to come to Porus assistance, now sent gifts to his
brothers victor, including 40 elephants. Tributes also came from Punjabi
tribes that were subjects of none of the Indian monarchs.32 However, the
other Porus whose domain lay to the east of Acesines and who had before
the battle supported Alexander against his western neighbour and
namesake now feared this recently vanquished namesake on account of the
favours Alexander had bestowed upon him and so fled from his own
kingdom. This action gave Alexander a convenient pretext to wage war.
He personally commanded his fastest units and led it across the Acesines,
which during the rainy season was up to 3 km wide, to its eastern bank.
Alexander instructed the Porus who was now his ally to muster his army
and elephants, while Coenus was to lead the rest of the Macedonian army
across the Acesines. Alexander marched post-haste across the other Porus
kingdom reaching the river Hydraotes, while his generals Craterus and
Coenus foraged the land for food and fodder. Hephaestion completed the
conquest of this land, which was subsequently attached to the realm of the
Porus who was Alexanders ally.33 It was in this land that the Macedonians
saw one of the most amazing trees in India: the Indian fig tree called the
banyan. The Western world learned of this peculiar tree thanks to
information gathered during the expedition and related by Theophrastus.
The feature that surprised the Western observers most were its branches,
which sprang roots; new trunks grew from these branch roots and thus an
entire forest could spread from a single tree. The largest banyan known to
modern science covers an area of 1.5 ha and has c. 300 trunks. The

32
Arr., An., 5.20.4-6; Diod., 17.90.4; Curt., 9.1.7-8; ME, 65. Bosworth 1995, pp.
319-320.
33
Str., 15.1.8 (quoting Nearchus = FGrH, 133 F18 and Aristobulus = FGrH, 139
F35); Arr., An., 5.20.8-21.6; Diod., 17.91.1-2; Curt., 9.1.35. Seibert 1985, p. 158;
Bosworth 1995, pp. 322-327.

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somewhat exaggerated descriptions of Alexanders expedition state that as

many as 10,000 people could hide beneath this tree.34
The people living beyond the Hydraotes did not surrender to Alexander.
By that time he considered himself to be the lord of this part of India and
therefore those who did not surrender were branded rebels. A tribe the
sources call the Cathaeans had great faith in their fortified capital, Sangala,
which was located somewhere three days march from the Hydraotes. It
was from behind this citys fortifications that they decided to resist
Alexander. They arranged three rows of wagons in front of their town and
it was from behind these wagons that they decided to face the enemy.
Naturally such primitive obstacles were easily overcome by Alexanders
soldiers. The barbarians soon became disheartened and at night tried to
escape from their city. They were stopped from doing so by the
Macedonian cavalry and so a regular siege began. The Cathaeans once
more tried to break out of the city but were again driven back. Once Porus
army had arrived and the Macedonian engineers set up the siege engines,
the storming of the city began. Sangala was captured. The sources claim
that 17,000 Indians were slain, whereas on the Macedonian side only 100
soldiers were killed and 1,200 wounded. This example of Macedonian
military efficiency and ruthlessness impressed the regions remaining
inhabitants, who now prudently volunteered to submit to Alexander. The
greatest beneficiary of this war was Porus, to whom Alexander granted the
conquered territories. Such an exceptional success in terms of territorial
expansion suggests that Porus not only accompanied Alexander during the
summer of 326, but also encouraged him to march on towards the
southeast.35 The land of the Cathaeans lay next to the kingdom of a ruler
the Greeks called Sopeithes. The rivers Acesines and Hydraotes cut
through this realm, which stretched all the way to the Hydaspes and may
have also included territories to the west of this river bordering Porus
kingdom from the south. According to one of the participants of the
expedition, Onesicritus, this state practiced an extreme form of eugenics.
Physically impaired or just not beautiful enough infants were killed for the
sake of creating a nation of people with exceptional physical qualities.
Sopeithes, who was naturally also of exceptional physical beauty, accepted
Alexanders suzerainty without putting up any resistance. He also hosted
the Macedonian army for seven days. The ancient authors mention that
34
Thphr., HP, 1.7.3, 4.4.4; Str., 15.1.21 (quoting Onesicritus = FGrH, 134 F22 and
Aristobulus = FGrH, 139 F36); Nearchus, ap. Arr., Ind., 11.7 (= FGrH, 133 F6);
Diod., 17.90.5; Plin., Nat., 12.22-23. Karttunen 1997, pp. 131-132.
35
Arr., An., 5.22-24; Diod., 17.91.2-4; Str., 15.1.30; Curt., 9.1.14-23; Polyaen.,
4.3.30; Just., 12.8. Goukowsky 1975, p. 297; Bosworth 1995, pp. 327-337.

Expedition to India

315

Sopeithes gave Alexander extremely fierce and vicious hunting dogs used
in show fights with lions.36
Now, on the way to Hyphasis (today Beas), which was the penultimate
river in eastern Punjab, the Macedonian army only had to cross the
kingdom of a king the Greeks called Phegeus. This rajah immediately
presented Alexander with gifts and acknowledged him as his suzerain. The
army stayed in this kingdom for two days. Then at dawn they marched off
for the Hyphasis, which they reached within a days march. Beyond that
river they were convinced they would reach the Ocean. It was only then
that Phegeus disclosed to Alexander and his men the truth about this part
of India. This revelation was confirmed by the trusted Porus. The sources
state that the next great river, the Ganges, was a twelve days march away.
This seems plausible, as the Hyphasis at the point which Macedonians are
said to have reached is 250 km from the Yamuna, only a tributary of the
Ganges but one generally not distinguished from Ganges in Antiquity.
Other information which the Macedonians now learned was less close to
the truth, namely, that they would have to cross a desert to reach the
Ganges. Alexander also learned that the Ganges region was occupied by a
powerful state (the Nanda Empire) which allegedly had at its disposal
200,000 foot soldiers, 20,000 horsemen, 2,000 chariots and 4,000
elephants. These figures are without doubt exaggerated, but such rumours
may well have been heard in the Punjab at the time. According to Western
sources the basic plausibility of Phegeus revelation regarding the military
strength of the Nanda state was additional information regarding the low
origins of the Nandas, which was also confirmed by independent Indian
sources. Even Porus, the greatest beneficiary of Alexanders expedition
further east, supposedly expressed the opinion that the army should
proceed no further and instead consolidate its control over territories
already conquered.37
For Alexander, who wanted to continue the march, all this news came
as a great shock. But the soldiers were even more disappointed. For more
than four of the preceding months (from May to September 326) they had
fought a difficult campaign and the most difficult of conditions, including
70 days of continual monsoon rain. Moreover, so far they had covered on
horse or on foot 18,000 km and the prospect of a further march seemed
36

Str., 15.1.30-31 (quoting Onesicritus); Diod., 17.91.4-92.3; Curt., 9.1.24-35;

Plin., Nat., 8.148-149; Ael., NA, 4.19, 8.1; ME, 66-68. Eggermont 1993, pp. 14-20;
Karttunen 1997, pp. 52-53, 174-175.
37
Diod., 17.93; Curt., 9.1.36-2.7; Plu., Alex., 62.2-5; Plin., Nat., 6.68; ME, 68-69;
Just., 12.8. Bosworth 1996a, pp. 74-80; Karttunen 1997, pp. 35-37; Hamilton 1999,
pp. 170-174.

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quite unbearable. Alexander was aware of murmured complaints in the

ranks and so tried to appease the soldiers by allowing them to plunder the
surrounding areas. But this failed to noticeably improve the mood. The
king therefore summoned his officers hoping to get them to convince the
soldiers that continuing the expedition until they reached the ocean was
essential. Alexanders speech presented in the works of Arrian and Curtius
Rufus is (as is usual in the works of ancient authors) obviously fiction.
The officers are said to have listened to their monarch in silence and only
after some time did he manage to persuade anyone to speak out. The first
to pluck up the courage was Coenus one of the most senior officers in
both age and rank who was greatly trusted by Alexander. Although the
actual words recorded by the same two authors were also the work of their
imaginations, the arguments Coenus is said to have put forward are in all
probability the ones the soldiers really used. He drew the kings attention
to how tired his army was, to the feeling that marching on was pointless
and the longing to return home. Coenus speech was met with a loud
chorus of approval among those gathered. Alexander could therefore
clearly see who represented the views of the officers and soldiers. He
broke up the conference but the following day he announced that he would
go on regardless and whoever wished to follow him could choose to do so.
Alexander, convinced that his soldiers would never desert him, retired to
his tent and for three days waited for his armys spontaneous declaration
of solidarity. But it did not happen. Alexander lost this battle of wills and
ordered a retreat. This was probably the most painful decision in his life.38
The court historiography presented by Ptolemy states that Alexander
had sacrifices offered for a successful expedition but, despite several
attempts, none was accepted by the gods. This was no doubt intended as
an explanation for posterity of why the great conqueror on this one
occasion decided to turn back. Yet already Arrian relates this account with
evident incredulity. In Arrians narrative it was at most an excuse the
heavens conveniently provided for Alexander to save face. Whatever the
case, the change of plan was eventually announced to the soldiers, who
greeted it with an explosion of joy; many were said to have tears in their
38

Arr., An., 5.25-28; Diod., 17.94; Curt., 9.2.8-3.19; Plu., Alex., 62.6-7; Just., 12.8.
Tarn 1948, i, pp. 98-100; Wilcken 1967, pp. 185-187; Schachermeyr 1973, pp.
433-442; Hamilton 1973, pp. 116-118; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 367-371; Green 1974,
pp. 407-411; Bosworth 1988, p. 133; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 186-200; Hammond
1996, pp. 218-219; Hahn 2000, p. 19; Worthington 2004, pp. 159-160.
Disregarding ancient sources some scholars deny that Alexander really wanted to
continue with his expedition: Badian 1985, pp. 46-467; Spann 1999; Heckel 2007,
pp. 120-125; Heckel 2009a, pp. 80-81.

Expedition to India

317

eyes.39 Before the return march began Alexander ordered twelve alters to
be erected. No doubt these twelve altars were erected to the twelve gods of
Olympus to thank them for the victories won so far. But they also marked
the eastern perimeter of Alexanders expedition into Asia, just as the altars
to the north of the Jaxartes marked the northern border of his conquests. In
marking out the extremities of his domain Alexander was imitating his
mythological ancestor Heracles, who had also left monumental Pillars of
Heralces (Gibraltar) at the western end of the known world. Plutarch
relates what is perhaps just a legend that kings of the Maurya dynasty
sacrificed on these altars and among those who did so was the dynastys
founder, Chandragupta, who had allegedly met Alexander in India and
honoured his memory. We do not know how long Alexanders altars
survived but the claim Neros contemporary Apollonius of Tyana offered
sacrifices there is generally considered to be entirely made up by the
wandering philosophers biographer, Flavius Philostratus. The Vulgate
narrative of these altars as much as 50 cubits (25 m) high appears in the
context of a bogus fortified camp established on Alexanders orders. Beds
measuring 5 cubits (2.5 m) and oversize stables were put inside this camp
to give the impression to potential enemies that the Hyphasis was reached
by an army of super-humans. If this story is true, the supposed objective
would have been to secure a safe retreat for the Macedonian army. 40
Before setting off, Alexander offered sacrifices on the giant altars and
ordered gymnastic contests. He also decided to grant the territories
conquered up to the Hyphasis to Porus. According to Plutarch, the Indian
received the title of satrap.41

4. Towards the Ocean

The march began in the early autumn of 326, most probably in September.
The army next set up camp somewhere on the Acesines. There
Hephaestion was instructed to found a town and populate it with natives
and mercenaries, but, apart from this snippet of information from Arrian,
nothing is known about this settlement. It was there that envoys arrived
39

Arr., An., 5.28.4-29.1 (quoting Ptolemy = FGrH, 138 F23); Str., 15.1.27.
Bosworth 1995, pp. 355-356.
40
Arr., An., 5.29.1; Diod., 17.95.1-2; Str., 3.5.5; Curt., 9.3.19; Plin., Nat., 6.62;
Plu., Alex., 62.6-9; Plu., mor., 542d; ME, 69; Philostr., VA, 2.43; Orosius, 1.2.5.
Tarn 1940, pp. 91-92; Eggermont 1975, pp. 26-27; Oikonomides 1988, pp. 31-32;
Bosworth 1995, pp. 356-357; Karttunen 1997, pp. 53-54, 257-258; Huttner 1997,
pp. 102-106; Hamilton 1999, pp. 174-175; Pushkas 2001.
41
Arr., An., 5.29.2, 6.2.1; Plu., Alex., 60.15.

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with gifts from Abisares. Among them was a prince called Arsaces.
Abisares was again confirmed in his position as monarch and Alexander
also acknowledged his rule over Arsaces statelet. Alexander left northern
Punjab under the de facto control of tribute paying rajahs and the only
considerable Macedonian military presence left in Taxila. To a degree, this
resembles the policy practiced later by the Romans of relying on client
states in the East in non-Hellenised areas not imbued with urban culture.42
By the time the Macedonian army reached the Hydaspes the monsoon
rains had ended. The now weathered fortifications of Nicaea and
Bucephala were repaired and ships were built from timber collected earlier
to sail down the Hydaspes. Certain similarities between the Punjab and
Egypt, particularly the appearance of crocodiles (though the Nile crocodile
was decidedly larger) led Alexanders companions to for believe that the
Indus was an upper part of the Nile. By the autumn of 326, however, the
Macedonians were informed by the natives that the Indus flowed into the
Ocean. To reach the Indus they had to travel down successive Punjabi
rivers.43
Exhausted by a long campaign and the continual dampness after
months of monsoon rain, many Macedonian soldiers succumbed to
diseases, others suffered from snake bites. Therefore it must have been
with a considerable sense of relief that the army received a shipment of
medicines that had no doubt been ordered before the Indian campaign and
now arrived from Greece. The medicines, 300 talents in weight, were
immediately distributed among the ailing. The sources remain silent as to
the effectiveness of these medicines. They had been sent by Harpalus
together with a detachment of 5,000 Thracian horsemen and 7,000 infantry.
This detachment also delivered 25,000 panoplias for the foot soldiers; the
rainy season had rotted and rusted their original armour to such an extent
that it was rendered useless. It was also on the banks of the Hydaspes that
Coenus passed away. The sources unanimously state that he died of a
disease, but that has not stopped modern historians from speculating that
Alexander may have somehow caused this death. There is no evidence to
suggest this but Curtius does mention a spiteful remark reputedly made by
the king, who remembered how Coenus had humiliated him on the
Hyphasis. Alexander is supposed to have said: Coenus for the sake of a
42

Arr., An., 5.29.3-5. Badian 1985, p. 469; Bosworth 1983, p. 38; Bosworth 1988,
p. 134; Bosworth 1995, pp. 358-359; Hammond 1996, pp. 221-222; Fraser 1996, p.
70.
43
Arr., An., 6.1; Arr., Ind., 6.7-9 (quoting Onesicritus); Str., 15.1.19 (quoting
Aristobulus), 15.1.25 (quoting Nearchus); Diod., 17.95.3. Schachermeyr 1973, pp.
443-451; Karttunen 1997, pp. 109-111; Malinowski 2003, p. 205.

Expedition to India

319

few days had begun a long harangue, as if he alone were destined to see
Macedonia again.44
Alexanders army had reached the Hydaspes at the end of September
326 and stayed there for somewhat over a month, building ships and
generally preparing for its expedition to the southern Punjab. The sources
give conflicting information concerning the number of river vessels they
eventually had at their disposal. Diodorus claims there were 1,000,
whereas Arrian states that there were either 800 or 2,000. Only the lowest
of these figures is plausible as we are told that the ships took only 8,000
soldiers and a number of horses. Among those selected to board the
vessels were elite units that usually accompanied Alexander: the
hypaspists, Agrianians, archers, Companion cavalry and horse guards
(agema). The rest of the army split in two and marched along both banks
of the Hydaspes. This measure was probably dictated by the need to
acquire enough provisions. The infantry and cavalry were commanded by
Craterus on the left bank, while Hephaestion was put in charge of all the
rest, including 200 elephants, marching on the right bank. Nearchus was
put in command of the fleet and Onesicritus was made steersman of the
flagship. The land forces were to march to Sopeithes kingdom, where
they were to meet up with the army of the satrap Philip. Alexander and his
fleet, however, did not set sail until a libation had been celebrated in
honour of Heracles, Ammon, Poseidon, Amphitrite, Nereus, Oceanus and
the river gods. This happened shortly before the Pleiades (the first decade
of November 326).45
The objected was not only to reach the Ocean but also conquer
southern Punjab. The fleet sailed at a rate of 40 or 60 stades (7-11 km) a
day and thus it was easily overtaken by the marching armies. However, it
kept in touch with various army units and all the forces were together
again after three days. Another two days later they were joined the satrap
Philips army. The next leg of their voyage, up to the confluence of the
Hydaspes and Acesines, lasted five days. On this leg powerful river
currents damaged some of the vessels but the Macedonians eventually
managed to land on the right bank. Next they crossed the river to conduct
a short and victorious campaign in the land of the Agalassi and Sibians,
44

Arr., An., 6.2.1; Diod., 17.95.4; Curt., 9.3.20-22. Hamilton 1973, p. 118; Lane
Fox 1973, p. 371; Seibert 1985, pp. 160-161; Heckel 1992, pp. 63-64; Holt 2000.
Speculations about Alexanders involvement in the death of Coenus: Badian 1961,
pp. 20, 22; Green 1974, pp. 416; Bosworth 1988, pp. 133-134; Worthington 1999.
45
Arr., An., 6.2.2-3.3; Arr., Ind., 18-19; Aristobul, ap. Str., 15.1.17; Diod., 17.95.596.1; Curt., 9.3.24; ME, 70; Plu., Alex., 63.1. Seibert 1985, pp. 161-162; Hamilton
1999, p. 176.

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which modern historians assume to have been near the town of Shorkot in
Pakistan. Ancient sources state that the Sibians had descended from
soldiers that Heracles reputedly brought over to India. This suggests that
the Macedonian staff made great efforts to find or invent traces of the stay
of Alexanders ancestor at various points on their route. 46 An anecdote
recorded by Lucian states that during their voyage down the Hydaspes
Aristobulus presented Alexander a part of his historical book concerning
the kings struggle against Porus. Unfortunately, the stupendous example
of sycophancy in written form was lost to posterity when Alexander
responded by casting the manuscript into the river.47
Once the Sibians were defeated, the Macedonians marched some 130
km to the confluence of the Hydraotes and Acesines. There the greatest
challenge turned out to be a clash with the belligerent tribes the Malli
(Malava) and the Oxydracae (Ksudraka). The Malli most probably
inhabited the land between the Acesines and the Hydraotes, whereas the
Oxydracae occupied territories to the south of the Hydraotes, somewhere
to the northeast of todays town of Multan in Pakistan. Alexander started
by dealing with the Malli first. The Macedonian army was divided into
five corps. Nearchus took the fleet down to the land inhabited by the Malli.
Craterus commanded a corps including elephants, an additional phalanx
taxis, the satrap Philips soldiers and mounted archers down the west
bank of the Acesines, while the corps of Hephaestion and Ptolemy
proceeded down the left bank. Each corps set out at a different time so that
if the Malli escaped one corps, they would next encounter another.
Craterus was probably entrusted with the additional task of stopping the
Oxydracae from aiding the Malli. Alexander took command of elite
detachments of hypaspists, Agrianians, mounted archers, half the hetairoi
and a single taxis of phalanx. With this corps he set off east across the
Sandar-Bar Desert. Alexanders usual tactic of employing the elements of
speed and surprise as well as the ability to get across the most difficult of
terrains was once again successful. Allegedly within a single day the
Macedonians covered as many as 500 stades (90 km), so that the following
dawn the cavalry launched a surprise attack on the quite unprepared Malli
outside a town whose name the sources do not mention. The unarmed
enemy was slaughtered, after which Alexander had the town surrounded
and next stormed. In the meantime Perdiccas was despatched with the

46

Arr., An., 6.4-5; Arr., Ind., 5.12; Diod., 17.96.2-97.3; Curt., 9.4.1-14; Str.,
15.1.33; Plin., Nat., 6.59; Just., 12.9. Seibert 1985, pp. 162-163; Eggermont 1993,
pp. 22-26; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 117-119; Karttunen 1997, pp. 39-40.
47
Luc., Hist. Conscr., 12.

Expedition to India

321

cavalry and the Agrianians to the next town. There the inhabitants fled but
only those who reached marshes escaped the massacre.48
Alexander allowed his troops to have a short respite before continuing
his pursuit of the Malli. These had meanwhile crossed to the other side of
the Hydraotes and found shelter in Brahman town. The Macedonians
followed them and stormed the town and its citadel. Both were captured
and the number of slaughtered Indians reached 5,000. Alexander had
already encountered Brahmans in Taxila, but in all probability he had not
shown enough interest in the social structure of India to understand its
caste system and the exceptional position held by the Brahmans. His flying
column was operating in the land of the Malli detached from the main
Macedonian forces and therefore he could not have consulted Calanus
about the social status of the Brahmans, which the Greeks associated with
the sophists. He therefore could not have foreseen the irreparable damage
this particular massacre would do to the Macedonian armys reputation
and to what extent it would stiffen resistance in the southern Punjab. For
the time being, however, the inhabitants of other Indian towns fled from
their homes and sought refuge in the desert. On Alexanders instructions
the Macedonians organised actual man hunt against the Malli hiding in the
forests next to the Hydraotes; the obvious objective of this campaign was
to exterminate defiant Indians.49 The Malli crossed the Hydraotes in the
hope being able to resist the Macedonians from the steep eastern bank.
Nevertheless, this was no serious obstacle for Alexanders veterans. There
were allegedly as many as 50,000 Malli on the bank. When the
Macedonian cavalry arrived, it immediately forded the river. The Malli
then retreated but they did not flee. While waiting for the slower
Macedonian infantry to catch up with the cavalry, Alexander only
launched sorties against the Indians. However, when the infantry finally
arrived he ordered an all out attack. It was only then that the Indians
started to flee. Those whom the Macedonians had failed to catch up with
and slaughter found refuge in a fortified town, probably near modern
Multan. Alexander ordered the town to be immediately surrounded,
though he prudently allowed his soldiers to rest for the night before
storming it.50
The siege of this Mallian town erroneously called by some sources a
town of Oxydracae is the best recorded episode of Alexanders entire
48
Arr., An., 6.5.4-6.6; Diod., 17.98.1-2; Curt., 9.4.15; Str., 15.1.8; Just., 12.9.
Wilcken 1967, p. 180; Seibert 1985, pp. 163-165; Bosworth 1988, p. 135;
Eggermont 1993, pp. 33-34; Hammond 1996, pp. 224-225.
49
Arr., An., 6.7.1-8.4. Bosworth 1996a, pp. 94-97; Bosworth 1998, p. 196.
50
Arr., An., 6.8.4-8. Wood 1997, pp. 199-200; Heckel 2009, p. 50.

322

Chapter VI

Indian campaign and that is solely because the mortal danger he

encountered on this occasion. The following day the Macedonians
launched their assault and easily captured the town as defenders instantly
sought shelter in the citadel. The taking of the citadel, on the other hand,
seemed to drag on. This may have been due to the lack of ladders or
perhaps on account of a lack of appropriate enthusiasm among the soldiers.
Alexander clearly thought it was the latter reason for suddenly he himself
proceeded to climb a ladder propped up against the citadel wall.
Unfortunately, too many hypaspists followed him up that ladder so that
after a while it broke leaving Alexander and just a few companions
stranded on top of the battlements. Arrows and javelins immediately flew
in their direction but Alexander refused to lose face by retreating to
beyond the citadel. Instead he took the crazy decision of jumping off the
wall into the fort, into Mallis midst. Three Macedonians hurried after him,
one of whom was instantly killed. Before the other two managed to reach
their king, Alexander had to single-handedly ward off an attacking throng
of Malli. Several, who were audacious enough to come up within striking
distance, he slew with his sword. Alexander was himself soon struck so
hard with an Indian sword that his helmet broke, though fortunately his
head was not badly injured. Much more serious damage was caused by an
arrow that pierced his armour, penetrated his chest and stuck itself deep
into a bone. This resulted in a heavy lose of blood which of course equally
rapidly sapped his strength. The kings life was saved by his bodyguard
Leonnatus and by the hypaspist Peucestas, both of whom protected him
with their shields as he lay unconscious on the ground. In the meantime,
inspired by Alexanders example and fearing the mortal danger he was
now in, the remaining Macedonians launched a violent assault on the
citadel. Some scrambled over the battlements while others managed to
force open a gate and destroy part of the wall. They carried out their
unconscious king on their shields, while others mercilessly slaughtered the
Malli to the last man. Fortunately, the Indian arrow had failed to pierce
Alexanders lung, for against such wounds Greek medicine was helpless.
Nevertheless, there was still great reluctance to treat the wound surgically
for fear it would kill the monarch. Alexander, however, ordered the
physician Critobulus to remove the arrow. To do this Critobulus had to
make incisions enlarging the wound and thus cause a greater lose of blood.
As a result the king relapsed into a state of unconsciousness. Alexanders
life, however, was saved.51
51

Arr., An., 6.9-11; Diod., 17.98.2-99.4; Curt., 9.4.26-5.29; Plu., Alex., 63.2-12;
Plu., mor., 343e-345b; App., BC, 2.152; ME, 75-78; Just., 12.9. Lammert 1953;

Expedition to India

323

The operation was successful but many days passed before Alexander
had enough strength to rise from bed. The incident in the Mallian citadel
came as a major shock to everyone in the Macedonian camp. The
possibility of their leader dying terrified the soldiers for they assumed in
all probability correctly that such an eventuality would render their
return home to Macedonia unfeasible. For a long time Alexander was too
weak to appear in public and armed guards constantly ensured his privacy.
This led to the spread of rumours among the soldiers about his imminent
death and even a letter he wrote to them did not allay their fears; they even
believed that it was forged. Alexander was eventually conveyed in a litter
to the rivers edge and thence by ship to the Macedonian camp at the
confluence of the Hydraotes and Acesines. But it was only when he
appeared mounted on a horse or standing on his own feet that the mood
among the men changed. Curtius Rufus relates a conversation between
Alexander and Craterus, delegated by the officers to complain about the
needless way in which he was endangering his life. The details of this
conversation are the fantasy of the Roman historian but that such
conversation took place should not be doubted; this is highly plausible on
account of the psychological situation that must have prevailed at the time
and by Nearchus account which has been cited by Arrian. Besides,
Alexander would never again show such bravado or take such risks with
his own life for any other reason. 52 Meanwhile news of Alexanders
serious wound or even his death had reached Greek settlers in Bactria and
Sogdiana, who were none too satisfied with their forced stay so far from
their homeland. Some so much wanted to return to Greece that they
rebelled. The sources provide contradictory information regarding the fate
of this rebellion. We can only assume that although it was local and lasted
a short time, it did illustrate that Macedonian control of eastern Iran rested
precariously on colonies of Europeans who were settled there not entirely
in accordance with their own will.53
The time of Alexanders convalescence and the long stay on the
Acesines and Hydraotes gave the soldiers time to repair old ships as well
as build new ones for the next leg of their voyage to the ocean. The
campaign of exterminations in the land of the Malli and no doubt fear that
it could be resumed resulted in the arrival of a large party of Mallian and
Oxydracaean envoys at Alexanders camp. They now surrendered their
people, submitted hostages as required and also provided 2,500 horsemen.
Bosworth 1988, pp. 136-137; Prag 1990, p. 240; Heckel 1992, pp. 100-101, 264265.
52
Arr., An., 6.12-13; Curt., 9.5.30-6.26; Plu., Alex., 63.13.
53
Diod., 17.99.5-6; Curt., 9.7.1-11. Eggermont 1993, pp. 70-73.

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Chapter VI

The lands of the Malli and the Oxydracae became part of Philips satrapy,
which ultimately stretched from the mouth of the Acesines up to the river
Indus.54
It was during a banquet held in honour of the ambassadors from the
two Indian tribes that Curtius Rufus as well as Diodorus provide an
account of a challenge to a gladiator duel though of course such a
concept was quite unknown to the Greeks in 325. This challenge was
made by a drunken Macedonian soldier called Corrhagus to the pankratiast
Dioxippus of Athens. The fight took place the following day before a vast
crowd of Macedonians and Greeks, each group backing their compatriot in
the contest. Corrhagus appeared armed with a shield, a sword, a sarissa
and a javelin, while Dioxippus came with just a club the weapon of
Heracles. Yet with sheer speed and agility the Greek athlete was able to
dodge the javelin hurled at him, break the sarissa, which anyhow would
have been too cumbersome for single combat, and fell his opponent to the
ground. Only Alexanders intervention prevented Dioxippus from killing
Corrhagus with a single fatal blow of his club. The king was furious that
his compatriot had been so easily humiliated in a fight, all the more so
because it had happened in the presence of Indians. Alexander got his
revenge on Dioxippus some time later, when during a banquet he had a
gold cup planted close to the Athenian and next accused him of theft. The
disgraced athlete subsequently committed suicide.55
The march to the ocean was resumed in February 325. The fleet and
the land army were to meet up again at the point where the Acesines
flowed into the Indus. On the way there the column commanded by
Perdiccas forced the surrender of the Abastanians (alternatively called
Sambastai), who inhabited lands on both sides of the river Zadrus (today
known as the Sutlej) and were one of the so-called independent tribes
over whom no monarch ruled. Ancient authors concur that yet another
Alexandria was founded at the confluence of the Acesines and Indus,
which according to Diodorus was to have a population of 10,000
inhabitants. However, since no traces of this settlement have been found to
date, some scholars are questioning its historical authenticity. As happened
so frequently during the Indian expedition, here too traces of the presence
of Dionysus were found, in whose footsteps the king always eagerly
followed.56

54

Arr., An., 6.14.1-4; Curt., 9.7.12-14, 9.8.1-2. Bosworth 1988, p. 137.

Curt., 9.7.15-26; Diod., 17.100-101; Ael., VH, 10.22.
56
Arr., An., 6.14.4-15.2; Diod., 17.102.1-4; Curt., 9.8.3-8. Eggermont 1993, p. 101;
Fraser 1996, pp. 70-71.
55

Expedition to India

325

The stopover at the confluence of the two rivers gave Alexander time
to settle the administrative matters of his empire. He appointed his fatherin-law Oxyartes the new satrap of Paropamisus in place of the now
dismissed Tyriespis, while the province of southern Punjab, which was
still being conquered, was entrusted to a Macedonian by the name of
Peithon. However, Peithon could not have been satrap there for long as by
the time of Alexanders death Porus was also governing that region and
Peithon had been moved to a western part of India.57
On the next leg of their journey the Macedonians entered the land of
King Musicanus to the east of the Indus. In the account of Onesicritus this
kingdom had less in common with India than with a conventionally
idolized image of an aristocratic country similar to Sparta or Crete.
Apparently people there ate their meals together, youths performed tasks
that were in other places normally given to slaves and the use silver or
gold coins was quite unknown. Instead, the inhabitants enjoyed living long
lives in prosperity and equality thanks to the natural abundance of their
land. Unfortunately, these fantastic images conjured up by the cynic
philosopher obscure rather than shed light on what the Kingdom of
Musicanus was really like. The only feature that seems genuine was the
lack of slaves in the Punjab of those days. Instead there was serfdom.
Musicanus failed to turn up at the border to greet Alexander, which could
have been interpreted as a declaration of war. However, the rajah was soon
terrified by the swiftness of Alexanders army as it proceeded to invade his
territory and hurried to greet the Macedonian to pay tribute and present
him with gifts. The surrender was accepted but Craterus occupied the
kingdoms capital all the same. There he left a garrison in the citadel: just
to make sure the barbarians stayed loyal.58 The capital is most frequently
associated with todays city of Alor on the eastern bank of the Indus in the
Pakistani province of Sind. Next Alexander launched a lightning campaign
against Oxicanus or Porticanus, whose land lay further south and who had
failed to provide the tribute required from all those whom Alexander
encountered. Detachments of cavalry, Agrianians and archers were
transported down the Indus by ship. Within two days the Macedonians
managed to storm two cities and kill the disobedient rajah, who had
decided to negotiate a bit too late. The sources give contradictory accounts
57

Arr., An., 6.15.3-4; Arr., Succ., ap. Phot., fr. 1.36; Curt., 9.8.9-10. Bosworth
1983, pp. 38-44.
58
Onesicritus, ap. Str., 15.1.34 (= FGrH, 134 F24); Arr., An., 6.15.4-7; Curt.,
9.8.8-10; It. Alex., 112. Pearson 1960, pp. 100-106; Eggermont 1975, pp. 7-9, 25;
Seibert 1985, p. 167; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 85-87; Karttunen 1997, p. 79; Hahn
2000, p. 205, n. 200.

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Chapter VI

regarding the fate of the remaining subjects of Oxicanus/Porticanus.59 The

ruler of the next kingdom, Sambus/Sabbas/Sabus (perhaps Smba),
preferred to immediately flee, leaving his capital, Sindimana to capitulate.
However, there is also a tradition, originating from Cleitarchus work,
which states that the people were incited by the Brahmans to resist and as
a consequence 80,000 were allegedly killed.60
Either way, the Macedonians encountered far more resistance in the
Brahman town of Harmatelia located in or close to Sambus kingdom at a
distance of four days sailing down river from Sindimana. On this
occasion the sources do not present the Brahmans as Indian sages but as an
Indian tribe, a caste that farmed the land, were warriors and performed
other tasks. This description is probably closer to the truth about the India
of those times. They allegedly smeared their swords and arrowheads with
poison so as to make them more lethal. Consequently many Macedonians
died after receiving wounds from such weapons. One of those said to have
been affected by this poison, though not fatally, was Ptolemy, the later
king of Egypt. A story that appears in the Vulgate histories and no doubt
originated from Ptolemy himself states Alexander, who was concerned
about Ptolemys wound, dreamed of herb that could serve as an antidote to
the poison. This herb was supposed to have saved Ptolemy and other
wounded Macedonians from death. The Brahmans were defeated outside
their citys walls and surrendered.61
It was at this time that the Musicanus decided to rebel. According to
Arrian, the rajah was persuaded by the Brahmans to make such a desperate
and, in face of the invading armys vast superiority, quite hopeless
decision. The Brahmans in turn had most probably decided to resist not
only out of solidarity to fellow Brahmans in the lands of Sambus and
Harmatelia but also out of the outrage and deep hatred felt also by other
Indians towards the Macedonians for the crimes they had committed
against the countrys highest caste. Another reason for their enmity may
have been the presence of the Brahman traitor Calanus in the camp of the
sacrilegious and hostile invader. Worse still, from the Sind Brahmans
point of view though not so shocking to the Brahmans of northwest India,
Calanus was participating in drunken orgies. The revolt was easily crushed
by Peithon. This time no mercy could be shown to the rebellious
59

Arr., An., 6.16.1-2; Diod., 17.102.5; Curt., 9.8.11-13; Str., 15.1.33. Seibert 1985,
p. 167; Karttunen 1997, p. 35.
60
Arr., An., 6.16.3-4; Diod., 17.102.6; Curt., 9.8.13-15; Plu., Alex., 64.1; Str.,
15.1.33. Bosworth 1988, pp. 137-138; Karttunen 1997, p. 35.
61
Cic., Div., 2.135; Arr., An., 6.16.5; Diod., 17.103; Curt., 9.8.17-28; Str., 15.2.7;
Just., 12.10. Eggermont 1975, pp. 128-129; Bosworth 1998, p. 197.

Expedition to India

327

Musicanus; both he and his Brahman advisors were crucified. The

exceptional scale of slaughter and cruelty perpetrated during the southern
Punjab campaign may have resulted from frustration and the loosening of
moral restraints among psychologically exhausted Macedonian soldiers,
who were fighting a war they no longer believed in, on quite foreign soil
and in a difficult climate. On the other hand, it could have also resulted
from Alexanders deliberate decision. In this part of India he was unable to
find rajahs who, like Taxiles and Porus, were willing to loyally cooperate
with the invader. Therefore he may have felt he had no choice but to break
the natives will to resist through the application of terror, particularly
against scheming Brahmans.62
The unprecedented wave of terror in southern Sind suppressed the will
to fight among Indians up until the Macedonians left. The ruler of the
Pataloi, who inhabited the Indus Delta, surrendered to Alexander even
before his troops had reached his land. The Macedonian king told him to
return home and prepare to greet the army. The rajah, however, felt he
could no long bear the tension and fled together with many of the
inhabitants of the regions capital and surrounding areas; only some of
them could be persuaded to come back. On the way to Patala Alexander
had some of the phalangites and less physically fit veterans march together
with the elephants under the command of his best officer, Craterus. This
corps was to proceed along an inland route through Multan Pass to todays
Quetta (the capital of the Pakistani province of Baluchistan), thence west
through the river Helmand valley and next on to Carmania. Craterus
fulfilled his mission and met up with his monarch in Carmania at the start
of 324.63 The rest of the army reached Patala approximately in mid June
325. There Hephaestion was instructed to set up a fortress; ships were built
in an improvised shipyard in preparation for the armys return to the centre
of Alexanders empire. In the meantime Alexander spent his time
exploring the Indus delta. His squadron sailed up to the point where Indus
flowed into the sea and there for the first time they experienced the
oceans huge tides, unknown in the Mediterranean. At low tide the ships
were grounded, and then as the sea rose again they were smashed against
the shore. During this expedition Alexander offered sacrifices to Poseidon
and other gods specified by the Ammon oracle. The sacrifices included
slaughtered bulls thrown into the ocean, a libation and the offering of gold
vessels. On one of the islands in the delta Alexander had an altar built for
62

Arr., An., 6.17.1-2; Curt., 9.8.16; Diod., 17.102.4. Green 1974, p. 425; Badian
1985, pp. 469-470; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 95-96; Bosworth 1998, pp. 180, 196-199.
63
Arr., An., 6.17.2-3, 6.17.5; Curt., 9.8.28-29; Str., 15.2.4. Goukowsky 1981, pp.
105-107; Seibert 1986, p. 169; Bosworth 1988, pp. 138-139.

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Chapter VI

Oceanus and Thetis. This way he marked the southernmost boundary of

his expedition, just as he had earlier marked the northernmost and
easternmost boundaries. In other words, Alexander was stating that his
Indian expedition had reached its limit.64
The Indian campaign with the exceptionally difficult climate and the
quite alien peoples the Macedonians encountered and did not understand
had had a demoralising effect on Alexander and his subjects, which was
expressed in outbursts of open dissatisfaction and conflicts. At some stage
a dispute erupted between Alexanders two top commanders Craterus
and Hephaestion. It got so bad that they even reached for their swords and
as both had their ardent supporters it could have well led to civil war if
Alexander had not intervened. The king publicly rebuked Hephaestion,
whereas with Craterus he had words in private, thus showing that he
valued his military talent and respected his personal sense of dignity. On
this occasion the ancient authors recall that Hephaestion was regarded to
be Alexanders friend, whereas Craterus, with his traditionalistic loyalty to
the Argead dynasty, was a friend of the king.65
From Alexanders point of view his expedition to India was at best
only partly successful. In modern historiography it is almost exclusively
known from Western documentary sources and to a much lesser extent
from the occasional archaeological find in Pakistan. The expedition does
not seem to have had any impact on Indian literature and there is also no
other mention of Alexander as a historic figure. Like the Greeks of those
times, Indians were certain about the value and supremacy of their culture.
Contacts between the two civilizations continued to be only sporadic in the
early Hellenistic period; both sides limited relations to occasional
diplomatic exchanges and searches for exotic goods. The first individual
from the Greek world to make an impact on the Indian written tradition
was the ruler of the Greco-Bactrian Kingdom Menander I (known as
Milinda in Buddhist literature), who himself adopted Indian customs,
culture and religion. However, it is generally believed that the most
important consequence of the 327-325 expedition was the break up of the
status quo in northern India, which indirectly led to the collapse of the
Nanda Empire and the emergence of the state of Chandragupta Maurya.
Another indirect consequence of Alexanders expedition was an increased
influx of Persian artists and craftsmen, who were now deprived of
64

Aristobul., ap. Str., 15.1.17 (= FGrH, 139 F35); Arr., An., 6.17.4, 6.18-19; Diod.,
17.104.1-2; Curt., 9.9; Plu., Alex., 66.1-2; Just., 12.10; It. Alex., 114. Oikonomides
1988, pp. 31-32; Hamilton 1999, pp. 181-182; Worthington 2004, p. 165.
65
Plu., Alex., 47.9-12; Plu., mor., 181d, 337b; Diod., 17.114.1-2. Heckel 1992, p.
85.

Expedition to India

329

Achaemenid patronage. Thanks to this increased immigration the

Zoroastrian religion spread throughout India and an Iranian influence
became apparent in Indian arts and crafts.66

66
Narain 1965, pp. 165-167; Wheeler 1968, pp. 106, 121, 128-145, 153-156; Holt
1993a.

CHAPTER VII:
THE LAST YEARS

1. In the footsteps of Cyrus and Semiramis

After a difficult but for the time being victorious campaign in India the
Macedonian army returned to the central provinces of the Achaemenid
Empire in three groups. The easiest and most obvious of routes was taken
by Craterus corps (see Chapter VI.4). Another group, commanded by
Nearchus, travelled across the Arabian Sea, whereas Alexander took the
rest of the army along the coast. The latter two routes were more
dangerous. The Greeks had already sailed in the Indus region as well as
the southern seas on their way back to Egypt, but that was the 6th-century
voyage of the sailor Scylax of Caryanda in Darius service and his account
was not widely known among Greeks in the late 4th century. Nearchus
therefore was to sail across a quite unfamiliar ocean whose great forces
weakly constructed Greek vessels were ill-prepared to withstand. However,
it was Alexanders corps who faced the greatest challenge. It included the
basic land forces, most of the baggage train, the soldiers families and
other camp followers. They were to march through Makran, a desert and
semi desert land deprived of rain except during the summer monsoon and
the winter season. The ancient authors state that Alexander was aware of
the potential difficulties and dangers that could face them. They provide
only one explanation for his decision, one originally passed on to them
from Nearchus: the desire to outdo Semiramis and Cyrus the Great. Both
were supposed to have used this route through Makran to try and invade
India. Both almost lost their entire armies in attempting to do so; allegedly
only 20 of Semiramis soldiers survived and as few as seven in Cyrus
case. Regardless of how historically true these accounts of previous
expeditions are, such a reason for Alexanders decision to take this route is
hardly surprising when we bear in mind how willingly he followed in
Heracles and Dionysus footsteps in India. Alexander was known to have
admired Cyrus the Great for a long time and just as previously he had
captured Aornos Rock to outdo Heracles, so too he could now have
wished to beat that other hero. We cannot tell whether, as M. Brosius

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Chapter VII

assumes, behind this imitation of Cyrus the Great there also lay a political
plan of winning over the Persian aristocracy. Rationalising modern
historians attribute to Alexander motives that are nowhere recorded in the
sources. They say he wanted to punish the soldiers for their rebellion on
the Hyphasis or that he wished to make up for his humiliation there and
restore his image of a man for whom nothing was impossible. Another
modern hypothesis is that he wished to explore the possibilities of
establishing a direct sea route between India and Mesopotamia and/or
conquer the coast of Gedrosia, even though this territory has neither
strategic nor economic value.1
The maximum number of troops in Alexanders army as stated in the
sources is 120,000 135,000 men. Even if this was the case though the
number seems exaggerated then a large part of the army would have
comprised the Indian contingents which would have returned home at the
end of the Indian campaign. The only likely exception would have been
the Indian mahouts in the Craterus corps; their special skills, knowledge
and experience regarding Indian elephants made them indispensable.
Craterus corps also included Iranian and some of the European soldiers.
Nearchus fleet comprised 34 triremes, 80 triconters and some 400
transport vessels with a crew of some 12,000 sailors and 7,000-8,000
soldiers. Taking all these figures into account, scholars assume that at least
30,000 soldiers and probably a much larger number of camp followers
marched with Alexander across the desert.2 This army set out from Patala
at the end of summer (in late August or early September) 325 to take
advantage of the relative abundance of water after the monsoon season. It
should be stressed that regardless of whether he was trying to rival the
feats of the mythical Semiramis or Cyrus the Great, who had already been
dead for two centuries, Alexander did take logistics into consideration.
The stay at Patala was used to gather a four-month supply of provisions.
Moreover, wells were specially dug and food stocks were left along the
coast. At a time when land transport was limited to pack animals an army
could march for no longer than nine days before the food and fodder ran
out. For this reason a theory has been formulated according to which the
1

Str., 11.11.4, 15.1, 15.2.5; Arr., An., 6.24.2-3 (both after Nearchus: FGrH, 133
F3a, b). Wilcken 1967, pp. 194-195, 197-198; Hamilton 1973, p. 126; Green 1974,
p. 430-431; OBrien 1992, pp. 181-184; Bosworth 1996, pp. 180-183; Hahn 2000,
p. 231; Allen 2005, p. 154. Attempts to rationalize Alexander: Badian 1961, p. 21;
Lane Fox 1973, pp. 387-390; Scheppens 1989; Bosworth 2000, p. 34; Brosius
2003, pp. 174-175.
2
Arr., Ind., 19.5; Plu., Alex., 66.5. Engels 1978, pp. 111-112; Bosworth 1988, p.
142; Sick 2000, pp. 131-133.

The Last Years

333

original plan was for the fleet to synchronize its progress with the land
army; the fleet was to keep the army supplied with provisions while the
army would dig wells to provide the fleet with water. If this theory
formulated by Macedonian army logistics expert D. Engels is true, bad
coordination rendered the plan useless. Above all, the fleet waited for the
start of the monsoon at the end of October and thus set sail over a month
after the land army had started marching. Moreover, the land army
marched at a distance so far from the coast that at no point were Nearchus
and Alexander close enough to communicate with one another even via
informants from among the local populations.3
Alexanders army marched off from Patala in a south-westerly
direction to reach the river Arabius (today either the Hab or the Porali,
both of which flow into Somiani Bay to the west of Karachi) after nine
days. Next the army turned to the coast and swiftly marched across the
arid land beyond that river. When they reached the land of todays Las
Bela, Alexander together with some elite units broke off from the rest of
the army, now left under the command of Hephaestion, and conducted a
lightning campaign against the Oreitans. This was an independent tribe
most probably belonging to the pre-Aryan population of India. The
invaders broke up into three columns commanded by Alexander, Ptolemy
and Leonnatus. Like the Arabitae just before them, after some short
resistance, the Oreitans surrendered. Alexander had their largest settlement,
Rhambaceia, converted into a city and most probably named Alexandria.
Its exact location has so far not been established with any degree of
certainty. It was around then that Alexander also appointed Apollophanes
satrap of Gedrosia, whereas Leonnatus was made commander of this new
satrapys garrison. After main Macedonian forces had left, the Oreitans
rebelled and killed the newly appointed satrap Apollophanes, but
Leonnatus was able to quell the rebellion. He also established contact with
Nearchus fleet and provided it with supplies. Next he led the men under
his command west to eventually rejoin Alexanders forces in Carmania or
Susa. The satrapy of Gedrosia most probably did not survive its first
governor and merged with the satrapy of Arachosia.4
3

Str., 15.2.3; Arr., An., 6.20.5-21.1, 6.23.1; Arr., Ind., 26.1; Curt., 9.10.2. Engels
1978, pp. 112-114; contra Scheppens 1989, pp. 43-50. Seibert 1985, p. 171;
Bosworth 1988, p. 144.
4
Arr., An., 6.21.3-22.3, 6.27.1; Arr., Ind., 23.5; Diod., 17.104.4-105.2; Curt.,
9.10.4-7, 9.10.19; Plin., Nat., 6.97; Plu., Alex., 66.4; St. Byz., s.v. Alexndreiai (4).
Eggermont 1975, pp. 89-93; Goukowsky 1981, pp. 92-100; Seibert 1985, pp. 172175; Bosworth 1988, pp. 142-143; Heckel 1992, pp. 102-103; Fraser 1996, pp.
164-166; Klinkott 2000, pp. 92-93.

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Although Alexander must have wanted to keep to the coastline and

continue preparing wells and improvised ports for the fleet, ironically
logistic considerations forced him to take a route more to the north. This
was because cavalry patrols informed him that drinking water and food
were very hard to come by along the desert coast, whereas the primitive
peoples inhabiting this region and living off fishing had nothing worth
plundering. Unable to transport provisions for the entire 60-day journey
from the land of the Oreitans to Pura in western Gedrosia (probably
modern-day Iranshahr in south-eastern Iran), the army had no choice but
rely on plunder. Alexander presumably chose the most frequently used
route leading through the Kolwa and Kech valleys between the Makran
mountain passes running some way off but parallel to the sea. In this part
of the world which is heavily reliant on monsoon rains the harvest season
occurs in late autumn, so the Macedonian army marched there at a
relatively good time as far as food was concerned. However, this was still
not enough to feed so many soldiers and civilian followers especially
when they were heading west and ever further from the monsoon region.
The sources report a great shortage of food, provisions and water. Pack
animals died of exhaustion or were killed and eaten by the soldiers. The
lack of beasts meant that the baggage had to be abandoned, including tents
and valuables the soldiers had plundered for themselves. No doubt the sick
and weak were also abandoned on the way. Many died as result of
drinking water too greedily in the rare places where it was found. There
were also cases of drowning as people were washed away in flash floods
caused by intensive downpours of rain. In such conditions the sources also
report a breakdown in discipline. Alexander ordered some grain, probably
requisitioned at Turbat Oasis, to be transported to the coast so that it could
be picked up by the fleet. However, the soldiers disobeyed their kings
order and divided this food among themselves. In this time of extreme
hardship Alexander as usual tried to keep up morale by setting an example
through self-denial; when presented with a helmet full of precious water
he would not drink it but in front of his men ostentatious poured the much
desired liquid onto the ground so as not to benefit from something that
could not be shared with the others. Nevertheless, it must be remembered
that this information in the sources about the hardships endured are to
some extent exaggerated and ultimately originates from Nearchus account,
who was not actually there. From Turbat Oasis the army turned south
towards the Arabian Sea, probably somewhere in the region of todays
port of Pasni in western Pakistan, where at least it was easy to extract
water from the wells the soldiers dug. Thence the army marched for seven
days along the coast until the guides found the right road leading north.

The Last Years

335

After another dozen or so days at the end of November or beginning of

December 325 the Macedonians reached Pura. There provisions from
Drangiana and Areia were already waiting for them, for while they were
still crossing the Makran range Alexander had sent messengers on fast
camels with instructions to the satraps of those regions.5
The sixty-day march through the Makran passes must have subjected
the Macedonians to unspeakable hardships but the losses stated by the
ancient authors should be treated with considerable caution, especially
when Plutarch claims Alexanders army was reduced to less than a quarter
of what it had been in India. Of course Craterus and Nearchus
detachments accounted for much more than a quarter of these forces, so
Plutarch or his source here clearly paid more attention to rhetoric than to
historical truth. The losses in Alexanders corps must have been great but,
on evidence of Arrian, the casualties were largely among the civilian
followers, especially the women and children. Most of the soldiers who
had marched with him across the Makran Mountains most probably
reached Pura, though greatly weakened and without their booty.6
Now the time of celebrations began. Within seven days the Macedonians
covered the 280 km distance from Pura to the Persian royal residence at
Salmus (probably todays Kahnuj in the Iranian province of Kerman),
riding carriages with platforms bearing special tents. They wore garlands
of ivy and, on Alexanders instructions, the towns they passed on the way
greeted them with flowers. Everywhere they were also offered wine and
were accompanied by the sound of music. In other words, to celebrate the
crossing of the Makran Mountains Alexander had arranged a Bacchic
procession in which his entire army took part. This procession is
mentioned by neither Aristobulus nor Ptolemy, for which reason Arrian
and some modern scholars after him believe the story to be historically
untrue and a mere invention of the historian Cleitarchus, who was
allegedly a source for the works of Plutarch, Diodorus and Curtius Rufus.
However, this cannot be the case as the tale of the Macedonian
Bacchanalia in Carmania were known to the contemporary Theophrastus
and they was also mentioned in a no longer extant source used by the

Arr., An., 6.23.1-27.1; Arr., Ind., 26.1; Diod., 17.105.3-106.1; Curt., 9.10.8-18;
Str., 15.2.3, 15.2.5-7; Plu., Alex., 66.4-7; Just., 12.10. Goukowsky 1981, p. 49;
Seibert 1985, pp. 174-177; Bosworth 1988, pp. 143-145; Bosworth 1996a, pp. 166180; Hamilton 1999, pp. 183-185.
6
Plu., Alex., 66.4; Arr., An., 6.25.5. Bosworth 1988, pp. 145-146; Bosworth 2000,
pp. 34-35; Hammond 1996, p. 238; Heckel 1997, p. 215.

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Hellenistic historian Carystius. Therefore we can assume that the general

facts regarding the procession in Carmania are basically true.7
It was only once Alexander reached Carmania that official thanksgiving
sacrifices were made for the armys return from India. It was also here that
artistic and sports competitions were held. Plutarch and Dicaearchus relate
an anecdote about how Alexanders homosexual favourite Bagoas
received a prize in a music competition. Alexander, under the influence of
wine and egged on by calls from the audience was to publicly embrace and
kiss his male lover.8 It was in Salmus in December 325 or January 324 that
Nearchus and his men, having covered a distance of approximately 150
km from the shore of the Strait of Hormuz in five days, rejoined the army
of their king. Alexander had not had contact with the fleet since his army
left Patala and therefore expected the worst. That is why the arrival of
Nearchus, who informed him that the fleet had reached the Carmanian
coast virtually unscathed, came as a very pleasant surprise. As it turned out,
the fleet had had to leave Patala more or less a month earlier than planned
on account of the hostility of local inhabitants, who felt free to
demonstrate their true feelings towards the invaders once their fear of
Alexander had waned. Nearchus sailed his ships down a western
distributary and out into the ocean, but then they had to wait twenty four
days at an offshore island for the wind to change direction. Basically
sailing was only possible once the monsoon winds stopped at the start of
November 325. That same month the fleet established contact with
Leonnatus in the land of the Oreitans. There provisions for the next ten
days were taken aboard, whereas those sailors who had demonstrated a
lack of discipline were left marooned on the shore. In the next leg of the
voyage provisions were obtained from supplies left earlier near the shore
on Alexanders instructions or seized from the native inhabitants. However,
the natives had very little food to offer regardless of how much force was
used. Most of the coast was inhabited by primitive hunter gatherers whom
Nearchus called Ichthyophagi (Fish-eaters). The entire voyage generally
7
Thphr., HP, 4.4.1; Caryst., ap. Ath., 10.45; Diod., 17.106.1; Curt., 9.10.24-27;
Plu., Alex., 67.1-6; Plin., Nat., 16.144; Arr., An., 6.28.2-4. Historicity of
Bacchanalia denied: Tarn 1948, i, p. 109; Wilcken 1967, p. 201; Hammond 1996,
p. 236; Hamilton 1999, p. 185. Historicity accepted: Lane Fox 1973, pp. 399-400;
Green 1974, p. 438; Goukowsky 1981, pp. 47-64; Bosworth 1988, p. 147;
Worthington 2004, p. 172. Salmus: Goukowsky 1981, pp. 53-60; Seibert 1985, p.
177.
8
Dicaearch. Hist., ap. Ath., 13.80; Plu., Alex., 67.7; Diod., 17.106.4; Arr., An.,
6.28.3; Curt., 6.5.22-23. Badian 1958; Hamilton 1999, pp. 186-187; Ogden 2009,
pp. 213-217.

The Last Years

337

abounded in exotic rather than dangerous encounters, such as schools of

whales creatures that the Greek sailors had never before seen. Eventually
the fleet reached the coast of Carmania, where the sailors were surprised to
spot Macedonian soldiers on the shore. From these they learned of
Alexanders whereabouts. Nearchus ordered his men to build a fortified
camp at the mouth of the river Anamis, while he hurried to meet his king.
Alexander celebrated the safe arrival of his fleet by offering sacrifices to
the gods who saved those in need Zeus Soter (the saviour), Apollo,
Heracles, Poseidon and other sea gods. He next instructed Nearchus to sail
his fleet to the coast of Susiana and up the river Pasitigris towards Susa.9

2. Empire in Crisis
Five years had passed since Alexander left the central provinces of his
Asian empire and almost ten since the army marched out of Macedonia. In
that time Alexander did not appoint a regent to govern his entire vast
domain during his absence. Macedonia and the entire Balkan Peninsula
were put under the charge of Antipater. However, his authority was in
various ways undermined by Olympias, who as the kings mother was
quite free to do as she pleased and therefore she constantly wrote letters to
her son accusing Antipater of all sorts of things. The various Asian
provinces were put under the charge of satraps, military commanders and
treasurers personally appointed by Alexander; the treasurers were also
answerable to Harpalus. Contemporary means of transport and
communication meant that all these prefects became de facto independent
rulers during their monarchs absence. In that time way the satrapies were
governed was left to their personal strengths of character and foresight.
The conduct of some of these Macedonian and Iranian nobles suggests that
they were indeed counting on Alexander never returning from India alive.
The Macedonians, who had been raised in relative austerity though with
more than a healthy appetite for wealth and power, made full use of the
Persian treasuries and plunder at their disposal to live a life of pleasure,
with a greater accent put on ostentation rather than refinement. The ancient
authors present a colourful description of how the Macedonian elites in
Asia brazenly revelled in this newly acquired wealth. Their account is
derived from the early Hellenistic historian Phylarchus whose source
was most probably the book of Alexanders court chamberlain Chares
9

Arr., Ind., 21-36; Arr., An., 6.28.5-6; Str., 15.1.5, 15.1.12-13; Diod., 17.106.4-7;
Curt., 10.1.10-16; Plu., Alex., 68.1, 68.6. Hgemann 1985, p. 72; Bosworth 1988, p.
140; Hammond 1996, pp. 236-239; Ashley 1998, pp. 99-102; Hamilton 1999, p.
190.

338

Chapter VII

and Agatharchides of Cnidus. Phylarchus in the twenty-third book of his

Histories and Agatharchides of Cnidus in the tenth book of his work On
Asia say that Alexanders courtiers also indulged in extravagant luxury.
One of these was Agnon, who wore gold studs in his military boots.
Whenever Cleitus, who was called the White, had business to transact, he
walked about on purple cloths while conversing with those who had
audience with him. Likewise Perdiccas and Craterus, who were lovers of
gymnastic sports, always had in their train piles of goatskin that would fill
a stadium, under cover of which, after appropriating a place in the
encampments, they would carry on their exercise; they were also followed
by a long train of animals carrying sand to be used in the wrestling-school.
Again Leonnatus and Menelaus, who were fond of hunting, had in their
luggage curtains measuring a hundred stadia, with which they surrounded
the hunting-grounds and pursue the quarry. Similar anecdotes are also
told about other Macedonian officers. 10 The greatest financial resources
were at the disposal of Alexanders childhood friend, Harpalus, who was
in charge of the royal treasury. Either out of conviction that Alexander
would never return from India alive or simply because of his carefree
nature the extravagance of Harpalus lifestyle was quite outrageous. To his
table he had fish brought over at great expense all the way from the Red
Sea. He founded exotic gardens. At Tarsus he set up what resembled a
royal court and there made his life even more enjoyable in the successive
company of two exceptionally expensive Athenian courtesans Pythonice
and later Glycera. After Pythonice died, he honoured her memory with the
construction of a cenotaph at Athens and a temple. He had Glycera live in
a palace where people were to greet her like royalty, which also meant
performing the Persian ceremonial bow of proskynesis.11
There were also more worrying signals concerning the gross
incompetence or even rebellion of Alexanders Macedonian and Asian
subjects. The king received the first news of disturbances in Arachosia and
Drangiana from his father-in-law, Oxyartes. Craterus quelled the rebellion
as his army marched through these countries. He had the rebel leaders
called by our sources Ordanes, Ozines and Zariaspes arrested and
delivered to Alexander, who had them executed.12 These, however, were
not Alexanders first executions since his return from India. While the
Bacchic festivities were still underway in Carmania he had the regions
10

Ath., 12.55; also: Plu., Alex., 40.1; Ael., VH, 9.3. Hamilton 1999, pp. 105-106.
Ath., 13.50 (after Theopompus, FGrH, 115 F253); Python, TrGF, 1 F1; Diod.,
17.108.4-6; Curt., 10.1.45; Plu., Phoc., 22; Paus., 1.37.5. Berve 1926, nos. 231 and
676; Parker 1996, p. 258.
12
Arr., An., 6.27.3; Curt., 9.10.19, 10.1.9. Heckel 1992, pp. 124-125.
11

The Last Years

339

satrap, Astaspes, arrested and put to death. The first accusations

concerning this satraps betrayal had reached the king while he was still in
India but a swift investigation leading to the execution was carried out
only once it was too late for Astaspes to escape or start a revolt. 13
Alexander also summoned from Media to Carmania the Macedonian
commanders Cleander, Agathon, Heracon and Sitalces together with 6,000
troops. Asian subjects and Macedonian soldiers had accused these
commanders of robbing temples and graves, rapes, and other crimes.
Bearing in mind the considerable distance between Media and Carmania
one can assume that the officers were summoned to Carmania long before
Alexanders return from India; therefore the accusations must have been
known to Alexander for some time. They too were put death, together with
600 of their soldiers. This severity was to serve as an example to deter
others.14 The repressions against high-ranking Macedonians and Iranians
that began then and were continued later have been interpreted by some
modern historians as part of a general political scheme. E. Badian even
goes so far as to write of a reign of terror and a great purge in an obvious
allusion to the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century. According to this
interpretation of events the series of dismissals and executions resulted
from a search for scapegoats for the (exaggerated) fiasco of the march
across the Makran range. 15 However, despite the vivid appeal of this
explanation, one cannot forget that it is merely a modern interpretation not
corroborated by any of the ancient sources. These instead state that the
king wished to restore order that had been disrupted by some of his
dignitaries through thoughtlessness or out of a sense of impunity caused
by his long absence.16
It was towards the end of his stay in Carmania, probably towards the
end of 325, that Alexander had all his satraps disband their mercenary
armies, supported by the vast financial resources of the conquered lands.
One of the reasons for this radical decision was the will to deprive the
satraps of forces that were solely answerable to them. However, we also
know from Pausanias that Alexander wished to settle the mercenaries in
Asia, which would also provide the central authorities with potential
recruits for important garrisons. This plan was never fully realised because
Greek soldiers were unwilling to serve in countries thousands of
13

Curt., 9.10.29.
Arr., An., 6.27.3-4; Curt., 10.1.1-9. Bosworth 1988, pp. 147, 241.
15
Badian 1961; Badian 1964; OBrien 1992, pp. 185-187; Hanson 1999, pp. 179,
196.
16
Higgins 1980, pp. 140-152; Heckel 2009, p. 51 and Heckel 2009a, pp. 76-77 on
futility of drawing analogy between Alexander and 20th c. dictators.
14

340

Chapter VII

kilometres from their homeland. The implementing of this plan lasted

form 324 to 323 and in that time Asia Minor and Greece were full of
unemployed soldiers. Paradoxically, after Alexanders death this made it
easier for its enemies to wage a dangerous war against Macedonia known
as the Lamian War.17
But that was to happen later. In the meantime the atmosphere of
uncertainty and fear among those suspected of abusing power persisted. In
these circumstances Harpalus was once again unable to withstand the
tension. At the start of 324 he fled from Babylon taking with him 5,000
talents from the royal treasury; if this money was taken in gold rather than
silver, it would not have exceeded the weight of 14 tons. By March 324
Harpalus and his stolen fortune had reached the coast and in the summer
of that year he crossed the Mediterranean Sea with 6,000 mercenaries to
Attica in the expectation of being greeted with open arms by Athens as he
was himself an Athenian citizen. This started the greatest crisis to
Macedonian rule in mainland Greece since the rebellion of Agis III.18
At first the Harpalus was denied entry into Athens. He therefore left
his mercenaries on the Tainaron Peninsula in the Peloponnesus and
entered the port of Athens with three ships bearing 700 talents. Only then
was he welcomed into the city and his or rather Alexanders money
deposited for safekeeping in the Acropolis. Soon envoys sent by the
governor of Ionia, Philoxenus, by Antipater and by Olympias appeared in
Athens demanding the handing over of Harpalus. This started a great
debate in Athens which involved not only political arguments but also
bribes handed out by Harpalus to whoever was willing to take them. In
Alexanders absence the Athenians did not consider the Macedonian
officials, not even Olympias, a powerful enough threat to force them into
surrendering Harpalus, the self-portrayed refugee and Athenian citizen.
They did, however, feel it was necessary to proceed with caution so as not
to worsen relations with Alexander while negotiations concerning the
decree for the return of exiles were underway (see Chapter VII.5).
Eventually Harpalus was allowed to escape from the city. And it was only
then that a real scandal broke out in Athens, for it turned out that half of
the 700 talents had vanished. Investigations revealed that Demosthenes
was among those who had taken bribes and thus helped drain this fortune;
as a result he was forced to flee from the city.19
17

Diod., 17.106.3, 17.111.1-2; Paus., 1.25.5, 8.52.5. Lane Fox 1973, p. 407;
Bosworth 1999, pp. 148-149; Blackwell 1999, pp. 119-121, 124-129.
18
Diod., 17.108.6; Curt., 10.2.1; Ath., 13.50; Plu., mor., 846a. Blackwell 1999, pp.
13-15.
19
Blackwell 1999, especially pp. 13-31, 133-144; Faraguna 2003, pp. 127-128.

The Last Years

341

Harpalus escape with royal treasure brought chaos to Alexanders

state finances, for with the kings arrival the treasury was now forced to
raise expenditure for his ongoing and pending projects. A new treasurer
was nominated, Antimenes of Rhodes, who is recorded to have held this
position up to the last months of Alexanders life. As treasurer he created
new sources of state revenue by reintroducing the by then forgotten tithe
on goods imported into Babylonia and also imposing a tax on the assessed
value of slaves. The sources also inform us of a rationalisation in the
management of provisions magazines along the Royal Road. No doubt
most of the ongoing expenditure of the royal court and the army was
covered by tax revenues, whereas the Persian treasures were now reserved
for future military expeditions. Production of coins at the Babylonian mint
was also now greatly increased. In the last two years of Alexanders life
several million silver tetradrachms were produced among other things,
these coins were essential for pay of European soldiers.20
Before all these events occurred, in the winter of 325/324 the
Macedonian army proceeded in two columns from Carmania to Fars. Most
of the troops, the baggage train and the elephants were led by Hephaestion
along a longer but easier route through regions abounding in food and
fodder. Arrian states that this route ran close to the sea but today we are
not able to trace it exactly. Alexander, on the other hand, together with
some light infantry, archers and Companion cavalry took a direct route to
Fars, no doubt via Baft and Sirjan.21 In Fars it turned out that after the
death of Phrasaortes the position of satrap had been usurped by Orxines,
reportedly a member of the Achaemenid dynasty. Orxines greeted the king
with generous gifts; according the Curtius Rufus, 3,000 talents in the form
of coins. For the time being Alexander accepted Orxines as his vassal, but
he had from the outset quite different plans with regard to this extremely
important satrapy where there was no room for a usurper. Therefore the
discovery of the desecration of Cyrus tomb provided a convenient pretext
to have Orxines executed. The Persian satrapy was now put under the
charge of Peucestas, a trusted kings bodyguard. Thanks to his command
of the Persian language, the donning of local attire and the respect he
showed towards local traditions, Peucestas was able to gain the trust of the
aristocracy in the homeland of the Achaemenids. This would pay off
during the Diadochi Wars when in his satrapy he was able to muster a
formidable army of 20,000 men, including excellent horsemen, archers
and slingers. Another usurper to be put to death was Baryaxes, who had
20
21

Arist., Oec., 1352b-1353b. Le Rider 2003, pp. 299-319.

Arr., An., 6.28.7-29.1. Goukowsky 1981, pp. 60-62; Seibert 1985, pp. 178-179.

342

Chapter VII

tried to seize royal power in Media. He was arrested by the satrap

Atropates and brought to Alexander, who had him executed.22
In Pasargadae Alexander discovered that someone had broken into
Cyrus the Greats tomb, robbed it and in doing so removed the mummified
remains of the founder of the Persian Empire from his gold sarcophagus
and cast them on the floor. The robbery was not only shocking but also
mysterious for the tomb had been constantly guarded by magi who even
under torture the ruthless cruelty of which in ancient times virtually no
one could withstand said nothing about how the robbery had happened.
We cannot accept Plutarchs claim that a certain Polymachus of Pella was
the culprit as Aristobulus, whom Alexander had put in charge of the
tombs restoration, unequivocally contradicts such an interpretation of
events. The desecration of Cyrus place of eternal rest greatly angered
Alexander, who ever since his return to Fars had wished to stress the
legitimacy of his claim to be the successor of the Achaemenids. In their
homeland he tried to respect Persian customs by nominating as satrap the
pro-Persian Peucestas and granting each woman a gold coin in accordance
with Achaemenid tradition. The robbery of Cyrus tomb during
Macedonian rule no less than compromised this policy in the eyes of
Alexanders Persian subjects. It is also possible as E. Badian assumes
that during his second stay in Fars Alexander had intended to have an
official Persian coronation; the ideal location would have been Pasargadae,
perhaps even at the tomb of the founder of the Achaemenid dynasty. Now
that Cyrus body had been cast onto the floor this holy site was desecrated
and no longer fit for such a ceremony. Alexander was therefore deprived
of an opportunity to symbolically become the new Great King as reward
for the many years of his orientalising policy.23
The last significant event during Alexanders second stay in Fars
occurred in Persepolis. Calanus, the Brahman ascetic who had
accompanied Alexander all the way from Taxila, for the first time in his
life fell ill and therefore resolved to part with his current incarnation. He
chose a form of death that was widely practiced and greatly respected in
India: self-immolation. This spectacular episode is described or mentioned
by numerous ancient authors for such a form of suicide was worthy of
interest if only because it was so exotic. The primary sources for all these
22

Arr., An., 6.28.3, 6.29.2-3, 6.30; Curt., 10.1.22-39; Diod., 19.14.5, 19.48.5.
Bosworth 1988, pp. 153-155; Billows 1990, pp. 95, 103-106; Heckel 1992, pp.
263-267.
23
Arr., An., 6.29.4-11; Str., 15.3.7 (quoting Aristobulus); Curt., 10.1.30-34; Plu.,
Alex., 69.1-3. Bosworth 1988, p. 154; Badian 1996, pp. 22-24; Hamilton 1999, pp.
191-192.

The Last Years

343

authors were the accounts of Chares and Nearchus. The latter was not
present to see the self-immolation and relied on another source. Therefore
his account is not as trustworthy as that of the court chamberlain Chares,
who was an eyewitness. The king had tried to dissuade Calanus from
killing himself but when he saw that the Indian was adamant he ordered
his soldiers to construct a giant pyre. Next he and his entire army looked
on as the suicide procedure was performed. When the pyre burst into
flames, Calanus threw himself onto it and thus perished. But first he had
been ceremonially accompanied to the fire by other Indian sages from
Alexanders court. The entire army honoured the moment of Calanus
demise with a loud war cry and the elephants also gave out terrifying
cries.24 Chares relates that Alexander also had Calanus death celebrated in
the form of sports and music contests as well as a drinking contest to mark
the late Brahmans fondness of wine. The winner of this last competition
was to receive a crown worth one talent (the equivalent of twenty years
pay for a foot soldier), the second prize was half a talent and third, one
sixth of a talent. Seeing as in this competition each contestant could drink
as much of alcohol as they could at the kings expense, one can assume
that many soldiers chose to contend. The winner, a certain Promachus,
drank as many as four choes (11 litres!) of wine. But he did not enjoy his
prize for long: he died four days after his incredible feat. The competition
was held in mid winter, which in Fars was particularly cold. That is how
another 35 Macedonian drunkards froze to death by lying comatose on the
snow. Another six managed to crawl to their tents but died soon
afterwards. 25 Therefore, according to Aristobulus, on this occasion the
Macedonian army suffered greater losses than at the battle of Granicus.

3. The weddings at Susa

Winter was not yet over when Alexanders army set off down the Royal
Road to Susa, which, according to Onesicritus, they reached in March 324,
seven months after their departure from Patala. Shortly before getting
there the army crossed the Pasitigris on a pontoon bridge. Here
Alexanders land army and Nearchus fleet, which had sailed up that river,
were finally reunited. This was a symbolic end to the Indian expedition
celebrated with sacrifices to the gods and games. The officers who had
24
Chares, ap. Ath., 10.49; V. Max., 1.8. ext. 10; Str., 15.1.68; Arr., An., 7.3; Diod.,
17.107; Plu., Alex., 69.6-7; Luc., Peregr., 25; Ael., VH, 5.6. Bosworth 1998, pp.
174-183.
25
Chares, ap. Ath., 10.49 (= FGrH, 125 F19); Plu., Alex., 70.1-2 (also after
Chares); Ael., VH, 2.41.

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distinguished themselves the most in the last phase of the expedition

received gold crowns from their monarch. Nearchus was awarded such a
crown for bringing the fleet to port without losses and Leonnatus got his
for the victory over the Oreitans. No doubt it was also on this occasion that
other officers were given wreaths mentioned by the ancient authors in the
later context of covering the debts of the rank and file soldiers. Among
them were Hephaestion, Peucestas, Onesicritus as well as members of the
royal bodyguards. 26 The political end to the Indian venture came
somewhat later in 324 as more news of the disintegration of Macedonian
control over that country started reaching Alexander. Rebellions among
the native peoples, especially in southern Punjab, meant that maintaining
the political state of affairs as they had been in 325 would require another
armed expedition; on account of his experiences from the first expedition
and the plans he now had to conquer Arabia, this was something
Alexander was not prepared to do. Instead he decided to transfer the satrap
Peithon as well as his European soldiers and settlers to northwest India.
Nominal authority over the southern Punjab was granted to Alexanders
loyal ally Porus thus allowing for the king to have the pretence of
maintaining control and not giving in to the rebels.27
The spring of 324 spent by Alexander in Susa abounded in important
events revealing the intentions, plans and ambitions of the ruler of
virtually the entire civilized world in the final phase of his life. Shortly
after reaching Susa one of the most famous wedding celebrations of
ancient times was held. It was a ceremony that would also become the
subject of an extraordinary debate in modern historical literature. In the
spring of 324 Alexander arranged the marriages of Macedonian and Greek
dignitaries from his circle with Iranian aristocratic women in a wedding
celebration that lasted five days. He himself set an example by marrying
Parisatis and Stateira, the daughters of Artaxerxes III and Darius III
respectively. At the same time he was still married to Rhoxane,
maintaining both the Macedonian and Persian traditions of the royal
polygamy. By marrying members of the two lines of the Achaemenid
dynasty Alexander no doubt intended to strengthen his claim to authority
in Iran. The eventual sons of these two wives would be the grandsons of
Great Kings and therefore they would be able to fully rely on the loyalty of
the Iranian aristocracy. The ancient authors give various figures as to the
26
Onesicritus, ap. Plin., Nat., 6.100; Str., 15.3.5 ; Arr., Ind., 42.7-10; Arr., An.,
7.5.4-6. Hamilton 1973, p. 133; Seibert 1985, pp. 186-187; Bosworth 1988, pp.
155-156.
27
Dexipp., ap. Phot., 82 (= FGrH, 100 F8.6); Arr., Succ., ap. Phot., fr. 1.36; Curt.,
9.8.9-10. Bosworth 1983, pp. 38-44.

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number of marriages that were made during wedding ceremony: 80 or 87

(Arrian), 90 (Aelian), 92 (Chares) or 100 (Plutarch). Aelian and Plutarch
may have rounded off the number given by Chares, who, having been the
marshal at Alexanders court and therefore in all probability personally
taken part in the wedding preparations, is naturally the most reliable source.
Hephaestion had the special distinction of marrying Drypetis, the sister of
the wife of Alexander, who wished his children to be the cousins of the
children of his closest friend. Craterus was also married to a member of
the Achaemenid dynasty, Amastris, a niece of Darius III. The mass
wedding was conducted according to Persian ritual. Alexander paid for the
dowries of all the brides and he also paid ordinary soldiers who married
Asian women. Allegedly as many as 10,000 such marriages were made
and naturally, whatever the actual number, some of these would have up to
that moment already been informal partnerships. An insight into how
much was spent by Alexander on the dowries is the information we have
on the fortune of Amastris. After her divorce from Craterus she married
Dionysius, the tyrant of Heraclea, and by her own means she was able to
buy all the furnishings that had once belonged to the exceptionally wealthy
tyrants of Syracuse. The wedding celebrations lasted five days and inside
the giant royal tent the newly weds were provided with richly decorated
couches. The tent itself had a circumference of four stades (720 m). The
canopy was propped up by gilded and jewel encrusted columns 20 cubits
(c. 10 m) high. The wedding guests included numerous ambassadors, other
foreign guests and officers. The envoys and other foreign guests are said to
have offered on this occasion gold crowns worth the sum value of 15,000
talents. Chares also provides a long list of artists employed to entertain the
banqueters. Knowing Alexanders generosity we can be certain that the
very best artists of the day performed.28
This ceremony and later events, especially Alexanders prayer on the
Opis (see Chapter VII.4), as well as Plutarchs reflection on the subject (in
the words: He himself, crowned with garlands, was the first to raise the
marriage hymn as though he were singing a song of truest friendship over
the union of the two greatest and most mighty peoples; for he, of one maid
the bridegroom, and at the same time of all the brides the escort, as a
father and sponsor united them in the bonds of wedlock.) all gave grounds
for the formulation of a controversial academic theory on Alexander
striving to unite the various peoples of his vast empire. Alexander did not
28

Chares, ap. Ath., 12.54; Diod., 17.107.6; Arr., An., 7.4.4-8; Plu., Alex., 70.3; Plu.,
mor., 329d-f; Ael., VH, 8.7; Just., 12.10; Memn., FGrH, 434 F4.5-6. Lane Fox
1973, p. 417; Heckel 1992, pp. 86-87, 125; Hamilton 1973, pp. 133-134; Hamilton
1999, p. 195; Ogden 2009, pp. 206-207.

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Chapter VII

live long enough to see his great plan fulfilled but it allegedly did come
closest to realisation in the Hellenistic kingdom in Bactria.29
Other scholars are right to criticise this theory for the Susa weddings
only concerned Macedonians, Greeks and Iranians, whereas more recent
studies regarding Central Asia in Hellenistic period give a far less
optimistic account of Bactria as a place of supposed union between diverse
peoples. Another theory argues that the intention was to fuse together
just two nations, the Macedonians and the Persians or at least just their
social elites.30 But this theory has also been attacked by the minimalists
scholars who have reduced the significance of Alexander to an episode in
military history. These historians stress that Macedonians and Iranians
were never treated as equals and point out that at meetings the
Macedonians were always given more privileged positions closer to the
king. Currently there is a prevailing tendency to interpret the Susa
weddings as a means for the Macedonians to take over from the Iranian
elites their dominant position in Persian society. After all, merely a few
Iranians were co-opted into government. Moreover, all the marriages
followed the same pattern: the brides were Iranians, which in ancient times
always meant the weaker side. There are even interpretations that the Susa
weddings were merely the realisation of the right of conquest, the victors
took the women of the vanquished to stress their victory over them.31
In terms of historical criticism of Tarns idealistic interpretation of
events the pendulum has probably swung too far in the opposite direction
for the ancient sources do not allow us to assume that marriage was forced
upon the Iranian princesses. Likewise the commonly held view that almost
all arranged marriages broke up soon after Alexanders death is only a
modern-day assumption. In reality we do not know anything about the fate
of the vast majority of marriages; what is certain is that some ended in
divorce and two this between Alexanders secretary Eumenes and
Artonis, the daughter of Artabazus and that between Seleucus and Apame,
the daughter of Spitamenes, the eastern Iranian leader of resistance against
Alexander lasted many years. The son of Seleucus and Apame was
Antioch, the second ruler of the Seleucid dynasty. Marriage of the kings

29

Plu., mor., 329e. Tarn 1948, ii, pp. 399-499; Hammond 1996, pp. 264-265.
Berve 1938; Wilcken 1967, pp. 207-209; Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 479-487;
Lane Fox 1973, p. 418. Critics of Tarn: Badian 1958a; Wilcken 1967, p. 208;
Bosworth 1980a. On Bactria: Holt 1988, p. 9.
31
Bosworth 1980a; Bosworth 1988, pp. 156-157; Stewart 1993, pp. 90-92; Billows
1994, pp. 30-33; Brosius 2003, pp. 176-178.
30

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347

secretary Eumenes with Artonis ended only with Eumenes death.32 The
marriages in Susa were not a departure from Alexanders general policy
towards Iran but a continuation of a series of events intended to establish
ties between the new monarch and the Persian aristocracy. This was a
policy that had been practiced since almost the very beginning of the
campaign and now at Susa it would also included accepting Iranian elites
into the army (which will be dealt with later in this chapter). Now his
Greek and Macedonian companions were to marry into the inherited
privilege and status of Iranian aristocratic families. Even if it was
impossible for the Macedonian and Iranian elites to merge completely, it is
clear that Alexander arranged the marriages in Susa to establish blood ties
between the two most important nations in his empire.33
It was also during Alexanders second stay in Susa that he promised to
settle the individual debts of all soldiers who recorded them on a list.
Some of the sources mention a similar episode occurring on the Opis but
they are most probably referring to the same event, only moved forward in
time. Although this was almost certainly intended to be a gesture of
friendship and solidarity with brothers in arms, its reception was mixed,
which illustrated the atmosphere of mistrust that had loomed over the
Macedonian army ever since the Hyphasis incident. The soldiers were
reluctant to put their names on the list, fearing that the king simply wanted
to find out which individuals were living beyond their means. Alexander
therefore allowed the soldiers to put in claims without having their names
entered on a list. As a consequence of this decision the treasury was
inundated with claimants; according to the sources the total sum of money
paid to the soldiers creditors was from 9,870 to 20,000 talents. There can
be no doubt that normal army pay was not enough to cover the financial
needs of many soldiers who gambled or spent money on other pleasures,
but one can doubt that these soldiers could have incurred a debt amounting
to 20,000 talents, which was the equivalent of three years pay for an army
of 100,000 men. As there was no effective means of verifying the soldiers
claims or the authenticity of those presenting themselves as their creditors
there must have been many cases of abuse and blatant cheating. Plutarch
writes about a certain Atarrhias, who was actually caught cheating.
Atarrhias bore the scars of the many battles he had fought, so Alexander

32

Plu., Eum., 1.7, 19.2; Nep., Eum., 13.4. Olbrycht 2004, pp. 47-48; Meeus 2009,
pp. 236-237.
33
Allen 2005, p. 150; Ogden 2009, p. 207.

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Chapter VII

took this opportunity to show magnanimity and pardoned the veteran for
his misdemeanour.34
After his return from India the process of orientalization at Alexanders
court intensified, which contemporaries interpreted to be a symptom of the
kings increasing fondness for excessive luxury. The contemporary
historian Ephippus of Olynthus wrote Alexander would hold audiences in
a formal Persian garden (paradeisos) seated on a gold throne. Another
Alexanders contemporary Polycleitus maintains the king slept in a golden
bed. Ephippus also mentions couches with silver legs, which were, no
doubt, intended for the hetairoi. At banquets Alexander was dressed in
purple robes and wore special slippers as well as Ammons horns. In
keeping with Persian custom he travelled in a chariot, dressed in Persian
attire and used the Great Kings insignia the sceptre, the bow and the
spear. To the Greek observer these were the garments and insignia of the
gods Ammon, Artemis and Hermes. Moreover Alexander would also wear
a lion skin in imitation of his ancestor, Heracles. In the chambers where he
resided myrrh and other incense was burnt.35
The royal court was not the only institution to be orientalized. There
was also a major revolution in the army and it started in its most elite
formation. The Companion (hetairoi) cavalry, the traditional preserve of
the Macedonian aristocracy, suffered serious losses during the march
across the Makran Mountains. These losses were now made up by
horsemen from the Iranian elites, including Rhoxanes brother, Itanes, as
well as the sons of the satraps Artabazus, Mazaeus and Phrataphernes. The
Iranian levy must have been quite considerable as a fifth hipparchy was
formed (previously the number of hipparchies had been reduced from
eight to four) and put under the command of the Bactrian Hystaspes. To
many Macedonians these changes came as major shock. R. Lane Fox
rightly compares this situation to what the Victorian elites would have felt
if Indian Sepoy had been accepted into Grenadier Guards. The
Macedonian infantry was also to receive bad news. At more or less the
same time 30,000 Iranian youths arrived at Susa. They had been recruited
in 327 and for three years underwent training in how to fight the
Macedonian way. Now they pitched camp outside the city and demonstrated
their ability and discipline in using Macedonian arms. Alexander greeted
them graciously and, what is worse, called them epigonoi, in the sense
that they were the successors to the current phalanx. Worse still, he
34

Arr., An., 7.5.1-3; Diod., 17.109.2; Curt., 10.2.9-11; Plu., Alex., 70.3-6; Plu.,
mor., 339b-c; Just., 12.11. Bosworth 1988, p. 158; Hamilton 1999, pp. 195-196;
Nawotka 2003, p. 125.
35
Ephippus, ap. Ath., 12.53; Polycleitus, ap. Ath., 12.55.

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349

described them as a counterbalance to his Macedonian veterans. No doubt

at this early stage this was just an expression of future intentions rather
than a statement of military fact for there are no records of the epigonoi
participating in any battles. Nevertheless, this development touched a raw
nerve among the Macedonian soldiers, whose pride had been deeply
injured. If the creation of this new army unit had been intended as a
political ploy to discipline the Macedonian troops by showing them that
they could be replaced by other soldiers, it failed completely. For the time
being the Macedonian veterans merely cast scorn on the young Iranian
phalangites by calling them dancers, but soon their pent-up negative
emotions would explode.36

4. The mutiny at Opis

Towards the end of spring 324 Alexander together with the hypaspists and
some of the Companion cavalry sailed down the Pasitigris into the Persian
Gulf and thence up the Tigris to the town of Opis situated to the north of
Babylon. There Alexander and his men met up with the rest of the army,
which had marched from Susa under Hephaestions command. On their
voyage up the Tigris the Macedonians encountered some weirs that had
been built during Achaemenid rule. They were most probably used for
irrigation purposes but at the time the Macedonians believed them to be
deliberately constructed defences against attacks from the sea. Therefore,
for the sake freeing river traffic, Alexander had the weirs dismantled.37
Alexanders voyage was probably associated with his current plans of
conquering Arabia, for which the free access of his fleet to all the great
rivers of Mesopotamia was considered essential. One may assume that the
inspiration for this project came from the Persians inscriptions and reliefs
Alexander had seen in Susa and Persepolis which included Arabia as part
of the Achaemenid Empire. Arabia was never a Persian satrapy but some
of its territories had acknowledged Persian suzerainty and it had been
considered a fief of the Achaemenid Empire. Although Arabia had
probably broken its ties with the Persian state by the end of the 5th century
monumental art continued to present the Persian Empire as it had been
during the time of its greatest territorial expansion. The successor of the
Achaemenids may have therefore seen the conquest of this land as a
36

Arr., An., 7.6; Diod., 17.108.1-2; Plu., Alex., 71.1-3, 71.6. Lane Fox 1973, pp.
422-423; Hamilton 1973, pp. 134-135; Hamilton 1999, pp. 128-129; Green 1974,
pp. 446-447.
37
Arr., An., 7.7; Str., 16.1.9.

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Chapter VII

fulfilment of that empires political ideology.38 On the other hand, Nearchus

voyage had actually rediscovered the Arabian Peninsula. Although
Scylax had already discovered this peninsula two centuries earlier, there is
no evidence that his voyage was well remembered in the years 325-323.
At a time which is now difficult to pinpoint but before Nearchus return
Alexander dispatched a reconnaissance expedition from Egypt to discover
whether circumnavigation of the Arabian Peninsula was possible. This
expedition was not successful. After receiving information regarding the
Arabian Peninsula in the winter of 325/324, Alexander called for another
expedition. This time a fleet, making use of the monsoon winds, set out
from Heroonpolis in Egypt in the late summer of 324 with the intention of
sailing all the way to Susa. The fleet got as far as Qana in southern Arabia
and then turned back on account of tales of dry land that blocked further
progress. Such stories were invented by local merchants who jealously
guarded the Peninsulas secrets from the Europeans to protect their
monopoly in the trading of incense and spices. 39 The next steps in the
conquest of Arabia were supposed to be made in the spring of 323.
Meantime in mid summer 324 at Opis Alexander summoned together
the entire Macedonian army. He announced to the assembled soldiers that
all those who were no longer fit for military service due to old age or
wounds would be discharged from the army but he would grant them such
rewards that they would become the objects of general envy back home.
Alexanders intention was to satisfy the Macedonian veterans expectations
for they had for a long time been longing to return home. Yet in the
atmosphere of growing tension between the army and their commander-inchief, instead of gratitude, the soldiers felt offended, so much so that the
offer released an outburst of complaints. The soldiers, who still held the
Macedonian traditional views of simplicity and contempt for foreigners,
were outraged by the orientalization of Alexanders court and by the
inclusion of Iranians in positions of privilege and power, positions which
should have been reserved for the victor only. Alexanders words
provoked uproar, the gravely offended soldiers started demanding to be all
relieved of further military service; one even sarcastically suggested that
Alexander should continue fighting wars together with his father Ammon.
Now Alexander was enraged. He ordered his hypaspists to arrest thirteen
of the most outspoken critics and have them immediately executed. This
had a sobering effect on the rest of the army, which now fell silent, and it

38

Hgemann 1985, pp. 12-17, 124; Badian 1998, p. 220.

Thphr., HP, 9.4.1-9; Arr., Ind., 32.7, 43.9; Str., 16.3.2, 16.3.4, 16.4.4; Plin., Nat.,
6.98. Hgemann 1985, pp. 73-87.
39

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351

was then that Alexander delivered another speech.40 The words related to
us by Arrian and Curtius are merely a display of the historians own
rhetorical skills but that such a speech was actually delivered cannot be
doubted. Nor should we doubt the basic arguments later related by the
authors for modern research has shown that they clearly fit the late 4thcentury cultural context. In a direct response to the ridicule of his having a
divine father in Ammon, Alexander started by reciting the achievements of
his earthly father Philip II, who had raised Macedonia from a very humble
level of civilization to become the greatest power in the Balkans. He went
on to recount his own military achievements, recalling the countries he had
conquered and their riches that were now Macedonian property. To those
who complained of the wounds and toil they had had to endure he recalled
the wounds he himself had suffered. He also reminded the soldiers of all
the booty and other benefits they have received, including the settlement
of the debts they had wantonly incurred. Finally he bade them all to depart
as they wished, for he himself desired to be left under the protection of the
barbarians he had conquered: to desert ones king in a foreign land was
virtually the most indelible military dishonour to a Macedonian.41
Having delivered this speech, Alexander retired to his quarters and saw
no one for two days. On the third day he ostentatiously distributed army
commands among Persians, some of whom he also advanced to the court
distinction of royal kinsmen. What is worse, the Iranian detachments
now received the distinguished names that had previously only been held
by Macedonian army units. All this was part of Alexanders arsenal in the
psychological war he was conducting against his defiant soldiers; at Opis
the final outcome was different to what eventually happened at Hyphasis.
This time the Macedonians concluded that their king could really do
without them by relying on mercenary and Iranian detachments. This time
on the third day the kings residence was thronged with soldiers begging
for forgiveness and promising to surrender the instigators. Alexander
relented and when Callines, one of the veterans of the Companion cavalry,
said how it grieved the Macedonians that their king called Persians his
kinsmen, Alexander immediately declared that henceforth all Macedonian
soldiers were his kinsmen. The soldiers could hardly conceal their joy as
they returned to the camp and thus the mutiny ended.42
40

Arr., An., 7.8; Diod., 17.109.2; Curt., 10.2.8, 10.2.12-14, 10.2.30; Plu., Alex.,
71.2-3; Just., 12.11.
41
Arr., An., 7.9-10; Curt., 10.2.15-29; cf. Plu., mor., 327a-b. Tarn 1948, ii, pp.
290-296; Errington 1990, pp. 107-112; Hammond 1996, pp. 248-249; Nagle 1996.
42
Arr., An., 7.11.1-8; Diod., 17.108.3; Curt., 10.3.1-4.3; Plu., Alex., 71.4-8; Just.,
12.12. Heckel 2006, p. 76.

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Chapter VII

Confrontations between mass gatherings of the Macedonian army and

their monarch such as occurred on the Hyphasis or at Opis never happened
in Philip IIs time. The events on the Hyphasis and at Opis were the result
of very specific circumstances but in both cases they were also the
outcome of events that had happened earlier: Alexander had previously
summoned his army ad hoc to use it as an element in the internal politics
of the Macedonian elites. This is what happened during the Philotas affair
and when Alexander wished to justify his murder of Cleitus. These gave
the soldiers a sense of power and the ability to play a role in the decision
making process normally reserved for the king and his aristocratic advisers.
With his exceptional charisma and political talent, Alexander was nearly
always able to control the crowd into which the army in such situations
changed. However, this tradition of soldiers participating in the making of
political decisions which developed during his reign was to have great
significance in the diadochi period, when there was no one able to
command the authority that had been previously held by the last of the
great Argeads.43
The reconciliation between Alexander and his soldiers was celebrated
with a great banquet for 9,000 people. Of those invited the Macedonians
sat closest to the king and a bit further away the Persians and other guests.
The feast was preceded by the offering of sacrifices by Greek priests and
Iranian magi as well as a prayer for the harmony and unity of the
Macedonian and Persian state. This statement, recorded by Arrian in his
work, probably reveals Alexanders intention of creating an empire that
was cosmopolitan but where the Macedonians, whom he had earlier called
his kinsmen and were now seated closest to him, would hold a privileged
position.44
Despite the reconciliation, the plan to discharge veterans went ahead.
10,000 foot soldiers and 1,500 horsemen were sent back. This does not
mean that so many soldiers were genuinely unfit. Plutarch mentions a
soldier being caught simulating disability to avoid further military service
and we can assume that there were many more similar cases that were
never discovered. Alexander made sure that the discharged veterans had a
really good send off: they were to receive army pay for their journey home
and an additional one talent (the equivalent of 20 years of army pay) each.
Alexander also advised them to leave behind their Asian concubines and
any children they might have with them, promising that they would be
raised as Macedonians at his expense. This way Alexander wanted to
make the veterans feel even more grateful to him and also ensure that in a
43
44

Errington 1978, pp. 110-113; Anson 1991; McKechnie 1999, p. 56.

Arr., An., 7.11.9. Badian 1958a, pp. 429-439; Bosworth 1988, pp. 160-161.

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353

dozen or so years time he could have reputedly as many as 10,000

soldiers for whom the only homeland would be the army camp and the
only authority their commander-in-chief. As another mark of respect to his
Macedonians, the king also decided he would also pay the orphans of
deceased soldiers. In a letter to Antipater Alexander wrote that the
veterans were to receive an honourable homecoming welcome and the
right occupy the best seats in theatres, which was the customary way of
distinguishing those who had done the kingdom a particularly great service.
The veterans were also to feel greater security during the homeward
journey as their appointed commander was Craterus, the best and the most
respected of the Macedonian generals, known for his conservative views.45
Craterus mission was not only to lead the veterans back to Macedonia
but, above all, to replace Antipater, who had very bad relations with the
women of the royal house, as the kings proxy in the Balkans. Antipater
was to hand authority over to Craterus and personally bring to Alexanders
court new Macedonian reinforcements to make up for the old soldiers now
being sent home. The contingent of veterans proceeded at such a slow
pace that they were still in Cilicia when they received news of Alexanders
death in the summer of 323. There Craterus was supervising preparations
for a naval campaign in the Mediterranean.46 As a trusted representative of
the king in this region he was also in touch with Greece and Macedonia. It
was on Alexanders instructions that he contacted the Athenian politician
and general Phocion. This was a man the king held in great esteem as is
evidenced by the fact that after the Battle of Gaugamela Phocion and
Antipater were the only correspondents Alexander continued to greet in
the traditional Greek fashion. At a time not specified by the sources
Alexander offered Phocion 100 talents as a gift. Although this was not a
bribe but as an expression of generosity and sincere friendship, the
Athenian statesman, who was proud of his independence and also liked to
show off his material self-denial, turned the offer down. Now Craterus was
to make Phocion a new offer in the kings name: the revenues of a town in
Asia Minor which had not been officially liberated in 334 and which
therefore was the personal property of the king. Naturally, this offer was
also rejected, in response to which Alexander simply commented that he
could not consider his friend those who did not want anything from him.
Both Alexanders offers, and in particular the one concerning the towns
revenues, were typical of the Achaemenid system of government, in which
45

Arr., An., 7.12.1-3; Diod., 17.110.3, 18.4.1; Curt., 10.4; Plu., Alex., 41.9-10,
71.8-8; Plu., mor., 181a, 339c-d; Just., 12.12.
46
Arr., An., 7.12.4-7; Diod., 18.4.1, 18.12.1. Bosworth 1988, p. 161; Bosworth
1988a, pp. 209-210; Bosworth 2002, p. 31; Blackwell 1999, pp. 155-157.

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the monarch offered presents to the most powerful men in circle as a mark
of distinction. Different than in Greece where gifts were granted by peers
to help cement a ritualised friendship (xenia), in Persia presents given by
the monarch could not be rejected. Both the offer of granting a towns
revenues as well as the kings reaction to Phocions rejection show that
Alexander thought and acted as the successor to the Achaemenids and he
no longer attached enough importance to winning over members of the
Greek ruling elites in a way that was for them natural and easy to accept.
The ability to establish bonds with the Greek ruling elites was one of the
secrets of Philip IIs might. His son did not feel it necessary to devote so
much effort, care and attention to such matters and this was an indirect
cause of the political crisis in Greece and Macedonia after his death.47
Though summoned to do so, Antipater did not appear before
Alexander, nor did he raise let alone personally deliver the reinforcements
his king expected to replace the veterans he had sent home. Instead
Antipater sent his oldest son, Cassander, whose presence at Babylon is
recorded in the late spring of 323. In Justins account, widely accepted in
modern historiography, Antipater feared for his life on account of what
had happened to those Alexander had considered to be his rivals, for
example, Parmenion, who was of Antipaters generation. Justin uses this
information to explain the role Antipater was supposed to have played in
the alleged poisoning of Alexander. However, we can be fairly certain that
Alexander died of natural causes (see Chapter VIII.1) and this makes the
version that Antipater feared for his life less plausible. One cannot speak
of any enmity between Alexander and his regent in the Balkans as the king
continued to consider Antipaters youngest son, Iolaus, to be one of his
most trusted courtiers, responsible for what the monarch drank. Cassander
appeared in Babylon in the late spring of 323, which would mean that he
had probably left Pella a couple of months earlier, i.e. after Antipater had
received written summons from the king. If Antipater had genuine reasons
to fear Alexanders true intentions he would probably not have sent
another son to him. The purpose of Cassanders mission was therefore
probably to explain a misunderstanding between Alexander and Antipater
and to negotiate maintaining the regency in Pella on slightly different
conditions. If the anecdotes recorded by Plutarch are to be believed,
Cassander, who had been raised in a traditionalistic Macedonian
environment, turned out to be a bad diplomat. He is said to have laughed at
the eastern courtiers greeting their ruler with the traditional proskynesis.
For this Alexander immediately punished him by catching him by the hair
47

Plu., Phoc., 17-18; Ael., VH, 1.25. Nawotka 2005.

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355

and beating his head against the wall. After such an introduction it is
hardly surprising that the subsequent negotiations failed. When Cassander
tried to disprove allegations made against his father by certain emissaries,
Alexander accused him of applying Aristotelian sophisms rather than
genuine arguments.48

5. Greece in 324: the exiles and a new god

Still in March 324, Alexander dispatched an emissary to Greece by the
name of Nicanor with a letter to be read out by a herald during the panHellenic Olympic Games, which that year culminated on 4th August. The
content of this letter, recorded by Diodorus, had probably been passed
down by a contemporary of these events, the historian Hieronymus of
Cardia. It reads as follows: King Alexander to the exiles from the Greek
cities. We have not been the cause of your exile, but, save for those of you
who are under a curse, we shall be the cause of your return to your own
native cities. We have written to Antipater about this to the end that if any
cities are not willing to restore you, he may constrain them.49 Among the
crowds assembled at Olympia there were allegedly 20,000 exiles on
account of rumours regarding this letter circulating throughout Greece
since at least the early summer. Exile was a punishment frequently applied
by Greek states for particularly serious crimes (but Alexander was not
interested in the fate of those exiles) and imposed on political opponents,
especially if they posed a threat to the system of government. In a
predominantly agricultural economy and a legal system that limited
landownership rights to the citizens of a given polis, apart from the
emotional hardship of being away from home, exile more often than not
also meant economic marginalisation. Therefore for most exiles the
prospect of being able to return was the thing they most desired in their
lives. For the poleis, on the other hand, the return of exiles posed serious
economic, legal and political problems. Among those who could now
return there were many restless souls who for years had served in
mercenary armies and later, after Alexander had ordered the satraps to
disband such armies, many became unemployed and desperate.50
48

Plu., Alex., 74; Plu., mor., 180f; Just., 12.14; Ps.-Callisth., 3.31. Griffith 1965;
Baynham 1994, pp. 343-344; Hamilton 1999, pp. 205-207; Blackwell 1999, pp.
156-158.
49
Diod., 18.8.4. Sealey 1960; Bosworth 1988, pp. 202-221; Blackwell 1999, pp.
14, 145.
50
Diod., 17.109.1; Curt., 10.4-8; Just., 13.5. Bosworth 1988, p. 224. Exile in
Greece: Seibert 1979.

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Chapter VII

The Charter of the League of Corinth, which Alexander had sworn to,
explicitly forbade the return of exiles and the redistribution of land for that
purpose. Some scholars try to justify his decision by the fact that it
excluded murderers or those who were under a curse, which was supposed
to satisfy the Greek sense of justice. Attempts are also made to prove that
Alexander did not actually break the League of Corinth Charter
regulations because his proclamation was not an order directed to member
states as such but a mere invitation to negotiations.51 This is not, however,
how the sources show the situation. The above cited extract from the letter
contains an open threat to use force against those Greek states which
refused to accept exiles and that can hardly be seen as an invitation to
negotiate. In this sense it was a breach of the Charter of the League of
Corinth, which had clearly ceased to have any meaning for its hegemon.
After conquering the Persian Empire and ascending the Achaemenid
throne, Alexander no longer cared for the polis particularism which was so
cherished by the Greeks and which he himself had used so effectively in
the first years of his reign. Alexanders letter arbitrarily interfered in the
internal affairs of the poleis and showed that he was seeking to apply a
universal solution for all the Greek states, treating their citizens as his de
facto if not de jure subjects.52
The problem with the exiles did not affect all the poleis in equal
measure; there can be little doubt that most of them complied obediently.
Thanks to an inscription found at Delphi, we know the detailed regulations
concerning the return of the exiles to Tegea in the Peloponnesus. The
repatriates were guaranteed the return of landed property in kind, whereas
those who had in the meantime inhabited their houses were refunded by
the state. There were separate regulations concerning financial
commitments towards the repatriates themselves as well as the property
rights of their wives and daughters who had accompanied them in
banishment or had remained in Tegea. Paradoxically, the exiles now
benefiting from Alexanders decree also included those who in 331 had
brought Tegea over to Agis IIIs side in his war against Macedonia and
who had been exiled after that kings defeat at the Battle of Megalopolis.53
The prospect of exiles returning home was most painful to the citizens
of Aetolia and Athens. In 330 the Aetolians had destroyed the city of
Oiniadai in Acarnania and expelled its inhabitants, who now, thanks to the
decree, were to return. The situation for the Athenians was even worse for
51

Hammond 1996, pp. 256-257; ONeil 2000, pp. 425, 430.

Wilcken 1967, pp. 214-215; Goukowsky 1975, p. 303; Bosworth 1988, pp. 220221; Errington 1990, pp. 95-96; Carlier 1995, p. 163; Blackwell 1999, pp. 146-147.
53
Syll.3 306. Heisserer 1980, pp. 205-229.
52

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357

in 365 the Athenian general Timotheos had repelled the Persian garrison
from Samos and claimed the island for Athens. We do not know if all but
certainly very many of the Samians were expelled, especially the known
enemies of Athens as well as those who were simply very rich. And on the
land of the exiles the Athenians next founded a cleruchy. A recently
discovered inscription has revealed a list of this cleruchys council
members which allows us to estimate that in 324 there were approximately
12,000 Athenian citizens living in Samos, whereas only 21,000 more lived
in Attica. Therefore maintaining the status quo in Samos was a matter of
prime importance for the Athenian polis.54
Alexander was not only aware of these circumstances but it could even
be said that his decision to demand the return of the exiles was to a large
extent made on account of the Samians. Some of them had served in his
mercenary armies. All of them, but especially those who had settled on his
land in Asia Minor, had a very powerful protector in Gorgus of Iasus, the
supervisor of the kings armoury. A couple of years after these events
Gorgus was honoured with a honorific inscription in Samos. Working in
the Samians interest, Gorgus incited Alexander against Athens. He
offered Alexander a gold crown, calling him on that occasion the son of
Ammon, and promised to provide 10,000 complete sets of hoplite armour
for his eventual siege of Athens. The decision to order the return of the
exiles was probably announced in the Macedonian camp already in March
324 before Nicanors departure for Greece and soon it was followed by
another Alexanders expressly order granting exiled Samians right to
return to their island. 55 It was by this time at the latest that the
indefatigable Gorgus obtained for Iasus rights to the little sea as stated
in the inscription and no doubt referring to a gulf that abounded with
fishes and fruits of the sea. This acquisition was commemorated at Iasus in
the years 324-323 with the issuing of coins depicting sea creatures.56
News of the decision regarding the exiles reached Greece at the end of
the Athenian year, i.e. before July 324. Samian exiles, assisted by various
Greek poleis and private citizens resentful of injustice once done to them
by Athens, started returning home of their own accord and fighting over
land with the Athenian settlers. The situation was becoming so dangerous
54

Oiniadai: Plu., Alex., 49.14-15; Diod., 18.8.6-7. Blackwell 1999, pp. 114-115.
Samos: Shipley 1987, pp. 12-15, 141; Hallof, Habicht 1995 (= SEG 45.1162 = IG
12.6.1.262); Habicht 1996; Debord 1999, pp. 292-294.
55
Syll.3 312 = IG 12.6.1.17; Ephippus, ap. Ath., 12.53; Just., 13.5. Wilcken 1967, p.
214; Heisserer 1980, pp. 182-193; Shipley 1987, pp. 165-166; Bosworth 1988, p.
221.
56
Syll.3 307. Heisserer 1980, pp. 171-179; Delrieux 1999.

358

Chapter VII

that a special mission headed by Demosthenes was sent to Olympia in

hope of getting Samos excluded from the exile decree. However, all
Demosthenes managed to achieve was a postponement of the official
announcement until an Athenian diplomatic mission appeared before
Alexander. In the meantime the Athenians prepared to defend their most
pressing interests. The efficient management of revenues by Lycurgus,
who had been put in charge of the city-states finances after Chaeronea,
meant that the coffers in Athenss treasury were now full. With the
fortifications now extended, a formidable fleet and the reformed ephebia
now turning out 1,000 militarily well trained young men a year, Athens
was once again a great power, though, unfortunately, only on the polis
level. As general the Athenians selected the talented Leosthenes, who
began secret negotiations with the Aetolians regarding an alliance against
Macedonia. The city also gave him 50 talents to unofficially start raising
mercenaries at the international recruiting centre on the Tainaron
promontory in the Peloponnesus. The Athenians knew that the diplomatic
mission to Alexanders court could at most delay the outbreak of war if the
Macedonian king turned out to be unyielding.57
The stances of Athens and the Aetolian League show how easily
Alexanders exile decree could lead to war and the destruction of the
Macedonian order that had been imposed on the Balkans by his father
Philip II. Despite this Alexander resolved to take that risk and Gorgus
lobbying efforts were not the only reason for it. Some modern scholars
assume that Alexander wished to be known as a great benefactor by
helping the exiles and thus righting Greeces huge social wrong. At the
same time he would solve the problem of unemployed mercenaries, who
out of poverty frequently resorted to robbery.58 However, apart from the
desire for fame, which is obvious here as in many of his other
undertakings, there is no clear evidence that the welfare of the exiles was a
clearly defined objective. Diodorus states that with grateful repatriates
Alexander wished to gain allies in every Greek polis. That is, indeed, what
actually happened, but at the cost of also losing many erstwhile allies who
had to share power with the repatriates and cover the cost of returning to
them their property, as was most apparent in the case of Tegea. Alexander
was also imposing his will on Antipater, on whom all the odium would fall
57

Din., 1.81-82; Hyp., Dem., 19; Diod., 17.111.1-3, 17.113.3, 18.9.1-3; IG

12.6.1.42. Habicht 1957, pp. 156-169 (nos 1-2); Heisserer 1980, pp. 189-190;
Shipley 1987, pp. 166-168; Bosworth 1988, pp. 224-227; Habicht 1999, pp. 31-35;
Faraguna 2003, pp. 126-130.
58
Wilcken 1967, p. 214; Hammond 1996, pp. 256-257; Worthington 2004, pp.
177-178.

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359

for any eventual failures concerning the return of exiles, and that was
bound to happen in face of Athenian and Aetolian determination. It is
possible that weakening the position of the Macedonian regent was in fact
one of the Alexanders objectives. In 324 Antipater was the only important
Macedonian official who did not owe his position to Alexanders
patronage. Alexander did not live long enough to see how the situation
concerning the exiles developed, while among the Macedonian elite there
were not many men who strongly believed in realising their kings
decision in this matter. That would be why after his death the generals
gathered in Babylon sent a letter to the Greek states that promised a return
to the situation that had been imposed by Philip II. Unfortunately, it was
by then too late to prevent the outbreak of war in Greece, which was
largely a consequence of the destabilisation caused by the exiles
decree.59
Parallel to the exiles issue was the debate of extending divine cult to
Alexander in Greece. This time none of the major sources provides us with
a full account concerning the question of Alexanders divinity, known
only from disjointed remarks in the speeches of Athenian orators and
anecdotes related by later authors. However, there can be no doubt that
Alexanders divinity was discussed by both Athenian and Spartan
assemblies and the Athenians did eventually decide to acknowledge
Alexander as a god. Such a motion was put forward by Demades, who for
a long time had been closely associated with the Macedonian establishment.
During a debate he was supposed to have uttered the significant words: be
careful not to lose the earth while guarding the heavens. This is though to
be a cynical argument to buy Alexanders favour regarding the island of
Samos in return for concessions in heavenly matters. And that is indeed
how the Athenians saw it, for in this instance they agreed with Demades
despite the opinions of politicians who treated such imponderables more
seriously. Among them was Lycurgus, who asked: what kind of god if on
leaving his temple one would have to be cleansed? With these words
Lycurgus was obviously implying that a cult to Alexander would be
sacrilegious. Aelian provides us with an anecdote according to which
Demades even proposed that Alexander should become the thirteenth
Olympian god.60 The Spartans also established a divine cult to Alexander.
At Megalopolis there was a temple to Alexander and in Athens a statue of
59

Diod., 18.8.2. Bosworth 1988, pp. 227-228; Blackwell 1999, pp. 148-151.
Din., 1.94; Hyp., Dem., 31; Plb., 12.12b.3; Plu., mor., 187e, 804b, 842d; DL,
6.63; Ael., VH, 5.12; V. Max., 7.2 ext. 13. Goukowsky 1978, pp. 60-61; Cawkwell
1994, pp. 301-302; Parker 1996, pp. 257-258; Blackwell 1999, pp. 151-154; Brun
2000, pp. 97-107; Troisi 2005; Dreyer 2009, pp. 229-234.
60

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Chapter VII

Alexander called aniketos theos (invincible god). Other poleis must have
followed suit as the delegations arriving at Babylon in 323 bore names
reserved for embassies dispatched to temples and oracles.61 Probable in
this time a well-recorded wave of cults to Alexander began in the cities of
Asia Minor, including: Apollonia Mordiaion, Troy, Ephesus, Priene,
Erythrai, Theos, Bargylia, Magnesia on the Maeander, in the Ionian
League as well as on the islands of Rhodes and Thasos. After the kings
death and during the Lamian War in continental Greece statutes officially
acknowledging Alexanders divinity were either revoked or simply forgotten.
Antipater, the victor of that war, personally considered the adoration of a
mortal as a god sacrilegious and was the only diadochus not to worship
Alexander in this way. The Greeks in Asia Minor and the Aegean islands,
on the other hand, would continue to worship Alexander as a god for
centuries in memory of how he had liberated them from Persian rule.62
A subject of controversy that persists to this day concerns how this
seemingly unprecedented decision in Greek history of deifying a mortal
came about. One hypothesis holds that Alexander himself demanded
divine honours. It is based on anecdotes found in the works of Aelian and
Plutarch which apparently originate from a single earlier source. However,
one cannot ignore the fact that other sources, both the speeches of
contemporary Greek orators and Alexander historians, are silent on this
issue. The same sources provide extensive information on the exile decree
and there is no reason why they should fail to mention Alexanders whish
or demand to be worshiped as a god. On the basis of all the evidence found
in extant sources it is equally probable that the idea of deifying Alexander
originated in fact from the Greeks wishing to win the powerful king over
in the time when they had much to gain in the exiles debate. Alexanders
invincibility on the battlefield was a convenient reason to declare him a
god. However, the statue in Athens of Alexander the invincible god did
not have a cult status, probably to deliberately weaken the charge that this
was sacrilegious deification of a living mortal.63
61

Hyp., 6.21; Ael., VH, 2.19; Plu., mor., 219e; Paus., 8.32.1; Arr., An., 7.23.2.
Suda., s.v. Antpatroj. Blackwell 1999, p. 155. Alexanders cult in Asia Minor
and in islands: Habicht 1970, pp. 17-22, 26-28; Stewart 1993, pp. 98-102, 419-420;
Badian 1996, pp. 24-25; Nawotka 2003a, p. 33; Dreyer 2009, pp. 222-228.
63
Ael., VH, 2.19; Plu., mor., 219e. Tarn 1948, ii, pp. 370-373; Wilcken 1967, p.
210; Habicht 1970, pp. 17-36; Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 525-431; Hamilton 1973,
pp. 138-139; Goukowsky 1978, p. 61; Bosworth 1988, p. 288; Stewart 1993, pp.
100-101; Hammond 1996, pp. 257-258; Fredricksmeyer 2003, p. 276. Contra:
Balsdon 1950; Blackwell 1999, pp. 152-153; Brun 2000, p. 101; Worthington 2004,
pp. 192-193.
62

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361

Naturally modern scholars would wish to know Alexanders own

thoughts on the controversial subject of his reputed divinity. Unfortunately,
the sources do not refer to this issue directly, whereas the conduct and
opinions of Alexander that they cite leave us with an equivocal impression
of what he really thought. He certainly allowed flatterers to make positive
comparisons between him and Dionysus or Heracles. At Opis Alexander
clearly demonstrated how seriously he treated the stories about the god
Ammon being his father. In the years 324-323 he appeared in public with
the insignia of that god and allowed or even encouraged those around him
to behave as if he had divine status; wherever he went incense was burned
and a pious silence was maintained. On the other hand, in more sober
moments, such as at the Battle of Massaga, he could berate a sycophant for
calling his blood ichor, the liquid Homer claims flowed through the veins
of the Olympian gods. Moreover, throughout his life he was exceptionally
scrupulous in paying respect to the Greek gods, to Ammon at Siwah as
well as the gods of whatever region he happened to be in. It is hard not to
notice in such behaviour very traditional piety and fear of committing
hubris the offence of transgressing the boundary between mortals and
gods.64

6. The death of Hephaestion

In the late summer of 324, having dispatched Craterus and the veterans,
Alexander and the rest of the army set out for Media. The reason for this
was probably to distribute between more than one satrapy the burden of
feeding Alexanders troops and royal court. The army marched slowly. On
the fourth day it crossed the Tigris and reached a place called Sambana,
where it stayed for seven days. After another three days of resumed
marching the Macedonians arrived at Kelonai a place inhabited by the
descendants of Boeotian collaborators, whom Xerxes had evacuated from
Greece and settled there after the 480-479 war. Here the march was once
again halted and then the army left the main route to reconnoitre
surrounding areas. Thus the Macedonians reached Bagastana (today
Bahistun) Place of the Gods, where amid magnificent orchards and
gardens there was Darius Is famous monumental inscription as well as a
sanctuary that the Greeks associated with Heracles. It was during the
stopover at Bagastana that an angry dispute erupted between the royal
secretary Eumenes and an arrogant Hephaestion, who had just expelled
64
Bosworth 1988, pp. 281-288; OBrien 1992, pp. 202-203; Stewart 1993, pp. 9699; Fredricksmeyer 2003, pp. 227-278.

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Chapter VII

Eumenes men from their living quarters. King had to personally intervene
and force the two officials to reconcile their differences. The next stopover
was on the Nesaian Plain in Media, where a herd of magnificent horses
grazed. Reports stated there were as many as 150,000 of them, but in
reality it turned out there were only 50,000 to 60,000 at the most. The
herders claimed that thieves had stolen the rest during the times of war and
civil disorder when such crimes could be committed with impunity. Some
modern scholars believe the robbers were Cossaeans from the Zagros
Mountains. However, there is not enough evidence in the sources to
confirm this and it is equally probable that the earlier reports of 150,000
horses were merely a joyful invention of creative Achaemenid bureaucrats.65
After 30 days spent on the Nesaian Plain the army resumed the march
to the Median capital, Ecbatana, which it reached seven days later in the
autumn of 324. Alexander would usually mark an accomplished mission
with sports and artistic competitions and this is what indeed happened at
Ecbatana; 3,000 performers from Greece were said to have taken part in
the celebrations. An inseparable part of all Macedonian festivities were
banquets involving heavy drinking. I was most probably as a result of such
alcoholic overindulgence that in November that year Hephaestion fell ill.
His physician, a man called Glaucus or Glaucias, instructed him to follow
a very strict diet. Unfortunately, the young warrior proved incapable of
putting up with such a regime for long. On the seventh day of his illness,
during the physicians absence, he consumed an entire hen, washed it
down with a pitcher (c. 2 litres capacity) of wine and subsequently passed
away.66 The death of his very closest friend was a deeply profound shock
to Alexander. The first thing he did was to have the hapless physician
executed, in keeping with Persian custom, by crucifixion. He himself is
said to have hugged Hephaestions body for two days. Then, once he
overcame the first shock of bereavement, Alexander ordered official
mourning throughout the his empire on a scale befitting the death of a
monarch or at least an heir to the throne. Among other things, he ordered
the Persians to quench their sacred fires. This was something that
normally only happened after the kings death and therefore to be told to
do it on account of the death of an ordinary man was for the Iranians quite
incomprehensible and even insulting. According to Diodorus (or rather
Ephippus, who was most probably his source) the quenching of the sacred
fires was interpreted at time as an omen of Alexanders own imminent
65

Diod., 17.110.3-6; Arr., An., 7.13.1; Plu., Eum., 2.1-2. Bosworth 1988, p. 163.
Ephippus, FGrH, 126; Arr., An., 7.14.1; Diod., 17.110.8; Plu., Alex., 72.1-2.
Heckel 1992, pp. 87-88; Hammond 1998; Hamilton 1999, p. 199; Heckel 2006, p.
126, s.v. Glaucias [3].
66

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363

death, though this interpretation may have only appeared after Alexanders
death. In the meantime Alexander had his hair cut in honour of his
deceased companion. He also had the mains and tails of horses and mules
cut for the same reason. Even more dramatically, he had the defensive
walls of neighbouring towns demolished and a temple of Asclepius or
some local deity identified with Asclepius by the Greeks razed to the
ground. Wishing to institute a divine cult for Hephaestion, Alexander sent
a special delegation with such a request to the oracle he trusted the most,
at Siwah. Up until its return he forbade his soldiers to play musical
instruments, especially not the aulos. Ultimately the Ammon of Siwah
permitted Hephaestion to have only a heroic cult. The sources relate that
such a cult was introduced in Athens and Pella. Those who wished to gain
Alexanders favour, such as Perdiccas, made vows to all the gods and
Hephaestion.67 A letter was sent to Cleomenes of Naucratis to construct a
magnificent heroon to Hephaestion at Alexandria and another one on
Pharos Island. A measure of the importance Alexander attached to
establishing a heroic cult for his companion is the reward Alexander was
offering Cleomenes for completing these tasks: forgiveness for what was
in all probability very considerable financial abuses committed during the
kings absence.68
The warrior also honoured the death of another warrior with war, thus,
in a way both offering up the bodies of those slaughtered as sacrifice for
the companions spirit as well as finding a way of occupying his mind in
the psychologically most difficult phase of his bereavement. Sometime in
mid winter, probably January-February 323, Alexander launched a
campaign against the Cossaeans, one of the mountain tribes who, like their
neighbours the Uxians, had held on to independence under Achaemenid
rule on account of greater expenditure for the total conquest than the
tribute might bring the king. This time, however, the best army in the
world of those days conducted a 40-day manhunt of the hapless Cossaeans
merely to amuse its commander. Those who survived the slaughter
acknowledged Alexanders suzerainty and agreed to adopt a settled
lifestyle. But by the diadochi period the Cossaeans regained their
independence and again posed a threat to travellers on the road from Susa

67

Hyp., Epit., 20-21; Arr., An., 7.14.2-7; Diod., 17.114.4-5, 17.115.6; Plu., Alex.,
72.3; Plu., Pel., 34.2; Ael., VH, 7.8; Luc., Cal., 17; Just., 12.12. Heckel 1992, pp.
89-90; Hammond 1995; Briant 1996, pp. 260-262; Badian 1996, p. 25; Hamilton
1999, pp. 200-201; Pelagia 2000, p. 168; Reames-Zimmerman 2001; Brosius 2003,
p. 181.
68
Arr., An., 7.23.7-8.

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Chapter VII

to Ecbatana. Therefore the conquest of their land was not permanent. But,
then again, that was not Alexanders real objective.69
After the campaign Alexander returned to the matter of organizing a
funeral ceremony. He instructed Perdiccas to transport Hephaestions body
to Babylon; for a time the king himself held the reins at the head of the
procession. It is possible that the still extant stone Lion of Hamadan was
commissioned to mark the place where Hephaestion died. In Babylon
Alexander ordered the construction of a giant pyre that reportedly cost
between 10,000 and 12,000 talents. Some scholars have considered the
extraordinary structure described by Diodorus as an ecphrasis of
something that may have been planned but was never realised. It has also
been frequently confused with the tomb which Alexander had planned to
build for Hephaestion but died before work on its construction work
actually began.70 Yet we now know that a pyre was actually raised for the
remnants of a 7.5-metre high platform were discovered by archaeologists
in Babylon. This was an enormous rectangular pyre a stade (180 m) long
and over 130 cubits (65 m) high, and comprising a skeleton structure of
bricks from a demolished fragment of the citys wall. This skeleton
structure was filled with the trunks of palm trees, which were used as the
fuel; in the intense heat of the subsequent conflagration they left an
impression on the thus deformed bricks. The walls of the pyre were
adorned with the gilded prows of ships alluding to Hephaestions military
commands, the attributes of the gods (the eagles of Zeus, the snakes of
Ammon and the torches of Dionysus), a relief depicting a hunting scene
and another one presenting a Centauromachy (a traditional allegory to the
Greek-Persian wars), depictions of Persian and Macedonian armour as
well as the images of Babylonian gods and their symbols. The
Macedonians cast their weapons and other valuables onto the pyre,
presumably more in order to ingratiate Alexander than to express genuine
sorrow for the departure of the generally disliked Hephaestion. The
cremation of his corpse was accompanied by the sacrifice of 10,000
animals.71
Hephaestions funeral pyre and all the other aspects of mourning his
death were already considered excessive by contemporaries. Modern
69
Arr., An., 7.15.1-3; Arr., Ind., 40.7-10; Diod., 17.111.5-6; Str., 11.13.6; Plu.,
Alex., 72.4. Bosworth 1988, p. 165; Hamilton 1999, p. 201.
70
Diod., 17.115.1-5; Plu., Alex., 72.5. Lane Fox 1980, pp. 384-385; Bosworth
1988, p. 164; Hammond 1995; McKechnie 1995; McKechnie 2001; Pelagia 2000,
pp. 167-168.
71
Diod., 17.115; Arr., An., 7.14.9; Ael., VH, 7.8. Heckel 1992, p. 89; Pelagia 2000,
pp. 167-173.

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365

studies have now also stressed a progressive irrationality in Alexanders

behaviour and some have even applied quasi-psychological methods to
diagnose such conduct as a symptom of paranoia or alcoholism. Yet it is
generally accepted that for up to a year after the death of someone
particularly close people very frequently behave irrationally. An analysis
made by J. Reames-Zimmerman has revealed that certain seemingly
unusual aspects Alexanders behaviour were typical of the ancient Greek
and Macedonian way of mourning. What made Alexander stand out was
the ability to express his grief on a grand scale befitting a great monarch.
Particularly in the last phase of his life Alexander had many grand designs,
of which Hephaestions extravagant funeral was just one. On top of this,
there was Alexanders characteristic tendency to model his life on those of
mythological heroes; here Achilles sorrow after Patroclus death as
presented in the Iliad was an obvious point of reference.72 Most scholars
nowadays have also interpreted Alexanders ostentatious sorrow as an
expression of his homosexual relationship with Hephaestion. Bearing in
mind Greek and Macedonian sexual behaviour, it is likely although far
from proven given the fuzzy account of our sources which allude to it in a
veiled fashion. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that Hephaestion
was by far the closest of Alexanders friends; in psychology relationship
as close as these are labelled twinship. Therefore Hephaestions
premature death had a devastating effect on Alexander in the last months
of his life.73

7. Return to Babylon
After ending his campaign against the Cossaeans, Alexander led his army
back to Babylon. The march was again very slow and included many
breaks. Even before he reached Babylon, Alexander granted audiences to
numerous embassies arriving from various parts of the world and such
diplomatic meetings continued in Babylon as well. The sources mention
embassies from Libya, from Italy (including the Bruttians, Lucanians,
Etruscans and Romans), from Ethiopians, Carthage, European Scythians,
72

Arr., An., 7.14; Plu., Alex., 72. Alcoholism: OBrien 1992. Paranoia: Badian
1961; Worthington 1999a. But see: Bosworth 1988, pp. 164-165; ReamesZimmerman 2001.
73
Ael., VH., 12.7; Epictetus, Dissertationes ab Arriano digestae, 2.22.17-18; Luc.,
DM, 297; Diogenis Sinopensis Epistulae, 24.1. Homosexuality: Heckel 1992, pp.
65-66; Hamilton 1999, p. 130; Reames-Zimmerman 1999. Contra: Konstan 1997,
p. 108. For a balanced view see Ogden 2009, pp. 210-212. Twinship: Kets de
Vries 2004, pp. 72-73, 80-82.

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Celts from the Balkans and Gaul, Iberians as well as numerous Greek
poleis (all trying to gain some concessions regarding the return of the
exiles). The embassies were accepted according to a fairly frequently used
formula in the Classical era. The first issues to be broached were religious
and next gifts were accepted, then more earthly issues were considered:
disputes with neighbouring states, internal conflicts as well as the matter
of returning exiles. The arrival of so many embassies to the then most
powerful ruler in the world is not surprising, especially as Alexander had
ambitious though not yet fully defined plans for future conquests.
Therefore the accounts in the sources can be generally regarded a plausible.
On the other hand, this sudden flurry of diplomatic activity in the spring of
323 shows a certain tendency in the sources, stemming from Cleitarchus,
to stress the role of Alexander as a universal ruler. It is for this purpose
that the sources mention the embassies of peoples too exotic and too
remote to have any interest at the Macedonian kings court. As such we
should consider the Iberians, the Celts from Gaul, the Ethiopians or the
Scythians all of whom had a quasi-mythological status in Greek
tradition.74 Alexander did grant audiences to the Greek embassies but he
failed to give any of them significant concessions regarding the return of
the exiles. Instead he expressed good will by receiving such envoys with
kindness and sending them back with valuable items that had been looted
by the Persian during the 5th-century wars. It was then that the decision
was made to return to Athens the statues of the tyrannicides that had been
robbed by Xerxes in 480 and would eventually be brought back to Athens
in the diadochi period.75
The subject of greatest controversy is the alleged embassy from Rome.
Neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus mention it for Arrian cites later authors
(Ariston and Asclepiades) as his source and this fact has led some scholars
to doubt the veracity of the reported event. Some modern historians
consider it to be an apocryphal tale invented by rhetorical schools at the
time of the late Roman Republic and early Roman Empire to compare
their states achievements with those of Alexander the Great. Such
intellectual exercises among Romans are of course well known,
particularly as far as the virtues of manliness, morality and happiness are
concerned and in this context Alexander was considered a figure
particularly favoured by fortune. The author of the most famous of such
comparisons was Livy, who tried to prove with touching naivety and
74

Diod., 17.112.1, 17.113.2-4; Arr., An., 7.15.4-6; Clitarch., ap. Plin., Nat., 3.57 (=
FGrH, 137 F31); Memn., FGrH, 434 F1(18); Just., 12.13. Bosworth 1988, pp.
165-167; Alessandri 1997, pp. 148-154; Alessandri 1997a.
75
Arr., An., 7.19.1-2.

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367

patriotic fervour that in a hypothetical confrontation between Alexanders

army and that of the Romans the latter would win thanks to the quality of
the troops and greater talents of the long forgotten generals. Nevertheless,
the presence of Alexander as a theme in the deliberations of rhetoricians
and historians at the turn of the Christian era cannot be used as an
argument to determine whether or not an embassy from Rome arrived at
his court. In the 330s and 320s many conflicts in Italy raged between
native tribes and Greek cities supported by mainland Greek powers. It was
in such a war in 331 that Alexander the Greats relative, Alexander of
Epirus, was killed by the Lucanians. Another problem was Etruscan piracy
in the Adriatic, which threatened Greek trade. At the start of his Persian
campaign Alexander had portrayed himself as champion of Hellenism,
now he may have wanted to play the same role with regard to Italy and
Sicily. Strabo informs us that Alexanders envoys did intervene
diplomatically in Rome regarding the matter of Etruscan piracy. The
Roman embassy at his court could have well been a response to this
demarche. Perhaps the Romans did not wish to give Alexander the pretext
for launching an attack. The historical veracity of such a diplomatic
mission is confirmed in the account of the contemporary Cleitarchus,
whereas Ptolemy and Aristobulus silence is hardly surprising. Although
by then it was already the most powerful state in central Italy, Rome was
still a third-rate power in the world politics; amid so many barbarian
ambassadors converging on Babylon envoys from a provincial town on the
Tiber could have easily been overlooked by other contemporaries not
directly involved in royal diplomacy.76
Another controversial issue is the role played by Alexanders half
brother Arrhidaeus at this time. In Bosworths reading of clay tablets of
the Babylonian Chronicle, the first year of the reign of Arrhidaeus in our
terms would be the year 324/323. Since the Babylonian year began in
April (1 Nisan), Arrhidaeus must have been installed as king of Babylon
before April 323, i.e. before Alexanders death and naturally according to
his will. The entry on the clay tablets is the first piece of information we
have about Arrhidaeus ever since the Pixodarus affair. Arrhidaeus was
mentally retarded and therefore considered unfit to rule. He had remained
in Macedonia most probably under the care of Antipater but in 324, when
relations between the king and his regent had become strained, Alexander
decided to summon his half-brother to Babylon. Apart from Alexander,
Arrhidaeus was the only other male member of the Argead dynasty and
76

Arr., An., 7.15 (after Aristos and Asclepiades); Clitarch., ap. Plin., Nat., 3.57-58
(= FGrh, 137 F31); Str., 5.3.5; Liv., 9.17-19. Hypercritical: Walbank 1986; contra:
Bosworth 1988, p. 167; Flower 2000, pp. 132-135.

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therefore his presence in Babylon naturally precluded the possibility of

him being used as a pawn in any political game or open conflict between
Alexander and Antipater. Having remained for such a long time in
Macedonia, Arrhidaeus was quite unknown to Macedonian soldiers; that is
why after Alexanders death no one at first considered the possibility of
him becoming the official successor. In the spring of 324 Arrhidaeus was
possibly crowned king of Babylon, which was in keeping with a tradition
already practiced in the time of the Neo-Assyrian and Persian empires
when members of ruling dynasties frequently received this honorary title.
It was merely a symbolic monarchy used to satisfy the aspirations of
Babylonian elites. The king of Babylon only dealt with religious and
ceremonial matters, tasks Arrhidaeus was capable of performing. This
interpretation would elucidate a passage in Curtius showing Alexander and
Arrhidaeus co-hosting religious ceremonies, perhaps of the Babylonian
New Year in April 323.77
After Alexanders return to Babylon preparations for the conquest of
Arabia were stepped up. The pretext to invade was the countrys failure to
pay homage to Alexander when all the other nations had already done so.
In the winter of 324/323 another reconnaissance expedition was launched
commanded by three captains: Androsthenes of Thasos, Archias of Pella
and Hieron of Soli. Again the mission failed to sail all the way around the
Arabian Peninsula, whose size contemporaries compared with some
exaggeration to the Indian Peninsula. The captains did, however, explore
the Arabian coast. They discovered the islands of Icarus (today Failaka in
Kuwait) and Tylos (today Bahrain) as well as the mainland city of Gerrha
(opposite the island of Tylos), which was the most important settlement
and trading port the sailors encountered on this expedition. Preparations to
build a fleet also continued apace. In Babylon a great river harbour was
excavated reputedly capable of holding as many as a thousand ships. 47
ships were built in Phoenician shipyards and next transported in parts over
land and by river to Babylon, where they were reassembled. 500 talents
were also spent on recruiting Phoenician crews. 78 In March 323 major
earthworks were begun to control the flow of the Euphrates. In three
months 10,000 labourers constructed dams and floodgates between the
Euphrates and the great Pallocotas (Pallukatu) Canal, so that the latter
could level out the water during spring floods. Thanks to this engineering
feat the lower reaches of the Euphrates could remain navigable and in
77

Grayson 1975a, pp. 115-119; Curt., 10.7.2. Bosworth 1992; Pelagia 2000, p. 196;
Carney 2001, pp. 73-79. Contra: Boiy 2007, pp. 114-115.
78
Arr., An., 7.19.3-20.10; Str., 16.3.2-4. Hgemann 1985, pp. 80-94; Bosworth
1988, pp. 168-170.

The Last Years

369

addition Alexander, as any good king of Babylon, showed his interest in

improving the irrigation system. Another element of the preparations to
invade Arabia was the building of a city on the Persian Gulf coast to be
inhabited by Greek mercenary veterans.79
It was also at this time that land army reinforcements reached Babylon:
Peucestas brought 20,000 troops from Iran; Philoxenus brought
detachments (probably mercenary) from Caria, Menander brought soldiers
from Lydia and Menidas some cavalry, whose origin we do not know. It
was also then that Alexander introduced the greatest change to the infantry
battle formation in his entire reign. Instead of the old uniform phalanx he
now introduced a new formation that was 16 ranks deep: the first three
ranks and the last rank comprised Macedonians traditionally armed with
sarissai, whereas the 12 ranks in between included Persians archers and
javelin throwers. Despite the now greater volume of men, this new
formation would have certainly had a weaker force of impact than the old
phalanx. Bearing in mind the language and culture differences between the
soldiers, we may also assume that this formation was also much less
cohesive. However, it was never put to the test in battle because the
Arabian campaign failed to get underway before the fateful June of 323.80

79

Arr., An., 7.21; Str., 16.1.11; App., BC, 2.153. Hgemann 1985, pp. 144-189;
Fraser 1996, pp. 168-170; van der Spek 2000.
80
Arr., An., 7.23.1-5. Green 1974, p. 471; Hammond 1996, pp. 244-245; Sekunda
2007, p. 333.

CHAPTER VIII:
DEATH, LAST PLANS, TOMB

1. The King Died

The death of a ruler as important as Alexander could not have been
presented by the ancient authors as something that happened unexpectedly.
According to them, already at Persepolis when Calanus was about to
mount his pyre he told Alexander that he would soon meet and embrace
him in Babylon. During the purges that followed Alexanders return from
India Apollodorus, the army commander in Babylon, fearing for his own
life, consulted his brother, who was a soothsayer, and told him that
Hephaestion and Alexander were the people who terrified him the most.
The answer he eventually received was that Hephaestion would
imminently die and that a great misfortune would also befall the king; this
information reportedly came to him the day before Hephaestions death.1
Such tales are a frequently used literary creation where portends are more
often than not recalled only after the event they were supposed to have
prophesied actually happened. During the diadochi period stories of such
omens were used for political purposes. Plutarch lists colourful anecdotes
of obvious signs that probably originate from those times: of ravens
fighting in the sky as a result of which a dead bird falls at Alexanders feet
or of the favourite lion in the royal menagerie which is killed when an ass
kicks it. Another tale has Alexander taking a boat trip in a lake near
Babylon when a gust of wind suddenly blows away his diadem and carries
it off into the rushes. The diadem is saved from sinking by a sailor who
lifts it off the rushes, which happen to be growing on the tomb of an
Assyrian king. The sailor places diadem on his head so that it does not get
wet and wades back to the shore. This is not only an omen of Alexanders
death but also a foretelling that he would be succeeded by a stranger who
was not his son. The legend even has the diadem being saved by Seleucus,

Arr., An., 7.18; Plu., Alex., 69.6; Cic., Div., 1.47; V. Max., 1.8, ext. 10. Baynham
2000, p. 254.

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the founder of the most important Hellenistic dynasty and for whom
wearing Alexanders crown was to predict a truly great future.2
On the other hand, in the ancient world belief in signs, miracles,
portends and the significance of dreams was universal. Therefore it was
natural that all sorts of soothsayers, diviners, magi, theurgists and
astrologers converged on the court of a pious and famously extravagant
monarch. It has been historically well documented that Alexander
surrounded himself which such specialists from both Greece and the
Orient. One can well imagine that in this very competitive market of sorts
everyone of them tried to achieve fame by accurately predicting good or
bad events, for accurate predictions could ensure the author the position of
power and wealth Aristander had enjoyed ever since the start of
Alexanders Asian campaign. Therefore the king would have for certain
been constantly receiving prophesies and interpretations of signs. That is
why the historical truth of prophesises concerning Alexanders death
should not be dismissed out of hand, particularly when classical authors
report events they themselves did not understand while modern scholars
have found them to be consistent with the beliefs and customs of ancient
Babylon.
Chaldaean astrologers, who were universally respected for their
knowledge and antiquity of discipline they practiced, had warned
Alexander long before his return to Babylon to avoid the city, or at least
not enter it from the east, thus facing the west, i.e. the land of the dead.
Arrian tries to rationalise the stance of the Babylonian priests by
explaining that they wanted to dissuade Alexander from returning so that
he would not discover their financial abuses and how little had been done
in the rebuilding of the Etemenanki ziggurat. He also maintains that
Alexander was already suspicious of them. This interpretation, however, is
not corroborated by facts known from other Greek or Babylonian sources.
During Alexanders absence the reconstruction of the Etemenanki ziggurat
was actually proceeding more or less according to plan. Moreover, the
king did try to heed the Chaldaean warnings. At first he did not enter
Babylon and headed for Borsippa instead. Next he tried very hard to find a
way of not entering the capital from the east. Unfortunately marshes
precluded the possibility of entering Babylon from any other side.3

LDM and early Hellenistic sources of Ps.-Callisth., 3.30; Plu., Alex., 73.2-7.
Diadem: Arr., An., 7.22; Diod., 17.116.5-7; App., Syr., 288-291. Smelik 1978-1979,
pp. 98-100; Heckel 1992, pp. 255-256; Bosworth 2000a; Baynham 2000.
3
Arr., An., 7.16.5-17.6; Diod., 17.116.4; Plu., Alex., 73.1-2; Just., 12.13. Smelik
1978-1979, pp. 93-96.

Death, Last Plans, Tomb

373

It is therefore almost certain that there were some natural phenomena

interpreted as bad omens. It could be a deformed baby born at that time
known from the Alexander Romance. Or whilst routinely observing the
heavens the Babylonian priests noticed something they interpreted to be an
omen of a particularly great danger to the king, which they duly reported
to him. Alexander tried to heed their warning, but eventually he entered
Babylon from the east. It was at this stage that the Greek sources report a
strange and in their interpretation inexplicable episode: an ordinary man,
according to some versions a convict who had just been freed from chains,
ascended and sat on Alexanders throne. None of the sources provide a
convincing explanation of how that man had found himself on the throne.
The eunuchs guarding the throne did not attempt to remove this
sacrilegious commoner; instead they tore their garments and lamented
loudly. The man was eventually arrested but even under torture he could
not explain why he had behaved in such a way. Following the advice of
soothsayers, Alexander next had the unfortunate put to death. If we reject
Plutarchs version in which the god Sarapis had personally freed the man
from his chains and ordered him to ascend Alexanders throne wearing
royal robes and a diadem, then the only way the situation could have come
about was with the help of other mortals, and those could have only been
people normally close to the king. If we consider the fact that the
Chaldaean priests had just failed to help the king avoid the possibility of a
very bad omen sighted in the heavens being fulfilled, we may also
consider them to have been the most likely authors of the incident in the
throne room. For centuries a ritual had been known in Babylonia as
elsewhere in the Middle East in which a substitute king was installed
whenever omens revealed that grave danger threatened the real king. In
such situations an ordinary, humble man was dressed in royal robes, he
was given a virgin as a wife and then the bad omen concerning the real
ruler was read out to him, so that the bad luck would also pass on to him.
If a substitute king was sitting on Alexanders throne, that would explain
why the eunuchs did not remove him and only lamented. This would have
been done on the instructions of the Chaldaean priests, who next advised
Alexander to have the hapless substitute king executed. This episode
happened in May 323 and was the last desperate attempt to save a
monarch who did not heed the warnings of Chaldaean priests with
sufficient scrupulousness. Neither Alexander nor the later Greek authors
fully understood the significance of these Babylonian rituals.4
4
Arr., An., 7.24.1-3; Diod., 17.116.2-4; Plu., Alex., 73.7-74.1; Ps.-Callisth., 3.30.
Smelik 1978-1979, pp. 100-109; Briant 1996a, pp. 746-747; Ambos 2005.

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Preparations for the start of the Arabian campaign were now drawing
to a close. Shortly before the army was due to set off, an envoy returned
from Siwah with news that the oracle of Ammon had permitted for the
founding of a heroic cult for Hephaestion. This joyous news naturally had
to be celebrated with a lavish and, in keeping with Macedonian custom,
very alcoholic banquet. After the revelry Alexander had a bath and was
intending to retire to his quarters. However, on his way there he was
stopped by one the hetairoi called Medius of Larissa, who invited him to
another drinking party. Regardless of how much wine he had drunk earlier,
Alexander now toasted all twenty four present and consumed in one go the
entire contents of the cup of Heracles a chalice capable of holding two
choes (5.5-6 litres) of wine. It is said that he also took part in yet another
drinking session reputedly at the house of the eunuch Bagoas.5
We know the subsequent course of events with, by ancient standards,
exceptional accuracy thanks to the Royal Journal (Ephemerides), in which
the royal secretary Eumenes recorded what happened next on a day-by-day
basis or as a single entry shortly after the kings death. This information
has been passed on to us by the authors of our main ancient sources:
Arrian and Plutarch. On the 18th day of the Macedonian month of Daisios
Alexander developed a fever and spent the night in the bathhouse, where it
was cooler. In the days that followed his condition very gradually
deteriorated but he was still able to perform the daily routine of offering
sacrifices and spend time with his friends, Nearchus and Medius. On 21st
Daisios his fever become more troublesome and the following day it
deteriorated further still. Alexander continued to spend the nights in the
relatively cool bathhouse but in the daytime he did not desist from his
duties as monarch and commander-in-chief; we know he consulted his
advisors on the matter of filling vacant posts. On 24th Daisios he was no
longer able to walk and had to be carried to the place where he offered
sacrifices. It was then that he instructed his officers to gather near his
chamber. The following day he was carried back to Nebuchadnezzars
palace on the eastern bank of the Euphrates. On 25th and 26th Daisios
Alexander lost the ability to speak though he was still able to recognise the
officers at his bedside. Now rumours that he was already dead spread
throughout the army and soldiers thronged around the royal palace. Extra
doors to Alexanders chamber were added to let these men pass by the bed
of their dying king, who could now only signal with his eyes that he
recognised them and was saying goodbye. In their fear for the kings life,
Alexanders officers asked a god the sources say it was Sarapis, though
5

Arr., An., 7.25.1; Diod., 17.117.1; Plu., Alex., 75; Nicobule, ap. Ath., 10.44;
Ephippus, ap. Ath., 10.44; Just., 12.13; Ael., VH, 3.23.

Death, Last Plans, Tomb

375

it may have actually been that gods predecessor Osorapis if they could
carry the king to his temple so that this deity could cure him, but through
the priests the god told them to leave the king where he was. When
Alexander was asked who should inherit the throne, he replied that it
would be the one who was the strongest and gave his ring to Perdiccas,
one of his seven bodyguards as well as the commander of the Companion
cavalry. In his last words he expressed the conviction that there should be
great games after his death.6 Plutarch, citing the Ephemeredes, states that
Alexander died in the afternoon on 28th Daisios. For the Babylonians this
was the last (29th) day of the month of Aiaru; the entry in the Babylonian
Astronomical Diary for that day reads: The king died, clouds. Unlike in
our culture, the Babylonian calendar day lasted from sunset to sunset;
therefore 29th Aiaru lasted from the sunset of 10th June to the sunset of 11th
June. However, the correlation of meteorological information, a
Babylonian date and the kings death with information from other sources
allows us to pinpoint the event with total accuracy in our calendar as well.
If we interpret Plutarchs words as referring to the time in the
afternoon rather than after sunset (and this seems the most likely
translation), then according to eyewitnesses Alexander died on 11th June
323.7
In antiquity rumours had it that Alexander had actually been poisoned,
for at less than 33 of age he was, after all, still a young man. He was to
experience severe convulsions after draining the cup of Heracles,
naturally on account of the poison that was added to the wine. The direct
perpetrator of this assassination allegedly was Iolaus, Alexanders
cupbearer. Legend has it that Hypereides argued for the Athenian
assembly to honour Iolaus for this deed. Among those who genuinely
believed in Iolaus guilt was Olympias, who took her revenge in 317 by
desecrating his grave. Of course the poisoning was inspired by Iolaus
father, Antipater, and the toxic substance was supposedly prepared by
Aristotle. It was claimed that he used water from the Styx, the river of the
Underworld, to make the poison and had it transported to Babylon in the
bored out hoof of a donkey as that was the only vessel in which it would

Principal sources: Arr., An., 7.25-26; Plu., Alex., 76. Other sources: Diod.,
17.117.2-4; Curt., 10.5.1-6; Plu., Eum., 2.1; Just., 12.15; Epitome Heidelbergensis
(FGrH, 155) F1(2). Hammond 1988; Bosworth 1988, pp. 172-173; Bosworth
1988a, p. 158; Heckel 1992, pp. 142-144; Anson 1996; Baynham 2003a, pp. 5-6.
7
Plu., Alex., 76.9; Sachs, Hunger 1988, no. 322. Hauben 1992, p. 146; Depuydt
1997; Briant 2002, p. 23.

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Chapter VIII

not lose its potency.8 Although (excluding these most fantastic elements)
some modern scholars also support the theory that Alexander had been
poisoned, such a stance requires a monumental revision of how we treat
our major sources. The claim was known to and rejected by ancient
authors who were as well-informed as Arrian and even more so, Plutarch.
The latter actually states that the rumours first appeared as late as five
years after the kings death. This naturally makes such a story much less
plausible for it is difficult to assume that in Babylon in May and June 323
no one noticed anything untoward happening. Accepting the version with
the poisoning also means a priori rejection of the evidence found in
contemporary sources, particularly the Royal Journal, which record quite
different symptoms of Alexanders illness in the last 11 days of his life.
Therefore if we weigh the more reliable sources against the less reliable
ones, we should reject the theory that Alexander was poisoned.9
It is almost certain that Alexander died of natural causes. Modern
historians have considered the following possible culprits: malaria,
complications associated with the wound he had received during the siege
of the city of the Malli, alcohol poisoning and West Nile virus encephalitis.
In each case one can stress factors that would have contributed to the
development of the illness and diminished the bodys natural immunity to
a given disease: numerous injuries and wounds suffered over very many
years of war as well as the damage to general health caused by constant
alcoholic abuse.10 A breakthrough in research was declared by physicians
and ancient history scholars at the University of Maryland Clinical
Pathologic Conference in 1996. This team of experts in both ancient
history and modern medicine was able to produce the best analysis of the
mysterious disease to date and their verdict was typhoid fever. One of the
consequences of the final stages of this particular disease can be ascending
paralysis with considerably slowed down breathing and heartbeat, which
can create the impression of death long before it actually occurs. This
allows us to explain a strange phenomenon recorded in the ancient sources
and normally dismissed as hagiography by modern historians. The ancient
authors report that for a few days after his death (though the gossip
Aelians claim that for 30 days can be rejected out of hand) Alexanders
8

LDM, 88-89, 96; Arr., An., 7.27; Curt., 10.10.14-19; Diod., 17.117.2; Plu., Alex.,
77.2-4; Plu., mor., 849f; Plin., Nat., 30.149; Just., 12,13-14; Ps.-Callisth., 3.31.
9
Plu., Alex., 77.1-4; Arr., An., 7.27.3. Lane Fox 1973, pp. 470-471; Heckel 1988, p.
2; Bosworth 1988, pp. 172-173; OBrien 1992, pp. 224-225; Hamilton 1999, pp.
213-215; Borza, Reames-Zimmerman 2000, p. 25.
10
Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 561-563; OBrien 1992, pp. 225-228; Marr, Calisher
2003. Alcohol: Ael., VH, 12.26.

Death, Last Plans, Tomb

377

body showed no signs of decay despite the great heat and humidity in
Babylon at that time of year. It is therefore possible that if Alexander was
suffering from typhoid fever, he actually died a few days after the official
date of 11th June 323.11

2. Alexanders legacy
Then, immediately after Alexander's decease, Leosthenes said that his
forces, as they wandered here and there and fell foul of their own efforts,
were like the Cyclops after his blinding, groping about everywhere with
his hands, which were directed at no certain goal; even thus did that vast
throng roam about with no safe footing, blundering through want of a
leader. Or rather, in the manner of dead bodies, after the soul departs,
when they are no longer held together by natural forces, but undergo
dispersion and dissolution, and finally are dissipated and disappear
altogether; even so Alexander's forces, having lost him, maintained a
gasping, agitated, and fevered existence through men like Perdiccas,
Meleager, Seleucus, and Antigonus, who, as it were, provided the still a
warm breath of life and blood that still pulsed and circulated. But at length
the host wasted away and perished, generating about itself maggots, as it
were, of ignoble born kings and rulers in their last pant death-struggle.12
This rhetorical image form Plutarchs On the Fortune or the Virtue of
Alexander best sums up the colossal blow that shook the Western world in
the summer of 323. Alexanders death, symbolically marking the end of an
era, evoked an eruption of sorrow among Macedonians and Persians alike.
In their grief the latter cut their hair and extinguished the royal fires. It
must have been clear to all those then present in Babylon that no one
would be able to fill the vacuum left behind by a man who had towered so
high above all his contemporaries and who through sheer will power was
able to steer the course of history. As a consequence of his premature and
quite unexpected death Macedonia found itself for the first time in its
recorded history in a situation not only without a successor to the throne
but also without a universally accepted centre where decisions could be
made. When there was no king, the choice of his successor was left to the
leading Macedonian nobles. Out of necessity the burden of making this
decision now rested with the generals (and soldiers) in Babylon. However,
notably absent were most of the army, staying at the time in Macedonia or
11

Plu., Alex., 77.5; Curt., 10.10.9-12; Ael., VH, 12.64. Oldach, Borza, Benitez
1998; Borza, Reames-Zimmerman 2000.
12
Plu., mor., 336e-337a.

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Cilicia, as well as the two most senior, powerful and universally respected
commanders, Antipater and Craterus. Perdiccas, to whom Alexander had
granted his ring, was a man of sufficient calibre to win the struggle for
power among middle-ranking Macedonian leaders gathered in Babylon in
June 323 but then again he was far too weak to maintain control over
Alexanders vast empire.13
The monarchy was an institution that defined Macedonian society.
That is why the first and, indeed, most important matter to be settled was
finding a successor to the throne, one who was a descendant of the late
king. Nearchus argued that Alexander did actually have a son with Barsine,
Heracles. However, the other commanders rejected this nomination as
Barsine was an Iranian and had not even been the kings wife but only a
concubine. Instead, the generals decided to wait for the birth of the child
of Alexander and Rhoxane, which was expected to happen in three
months time. If the child turned out to be a boy, he would be recognised
as king. Rhoxane herself made sure that there would be no rival infant
pretenders by murdering all of Alexanders remaining widows. However,
the soldiers also felt they had their say. They were bound to tradition, to
the Argead dynasty, to Macedonian nationalism and to the memory of
Philip II, but under Alexander they had also gotten used to on special
occasions expressing their will. And that is why they gave their support to
the nominee of a middle-ranking infantry commander, Meleager. He had
managed to convince the troops that the son of a barbarian woman was
unworthy of becoming a king of the Macedonians, and instead Meleager
nominated Alexanders mentally retarded brother, Arrhidaeus, whose
greatest advantage was the fact that he was Philip IIs son. Under pressure
from the army, the other commanders accepted this nomination, but with
considerable reluctance for apart from Argead blood the Macedonian elites
also valued kingly virtues which they could hardly expect from Arrhidaeus.
For these high-ranking officers the situation was all the more worrying as
ordinary soldiers had now considered themselves entitled to participate in
the decision of who was to be the next king; so far only members of the
Argead dynasty and Macedonian nobles had had this right. Therefore
Meleager was briskly isolated from his troops and, on Perdiccas orders,
removed from the world of the living along 300 of his supporters. For a
short while Arrhidaeus, now called Philip III, was the only Macedonian
king. When Rhoxane gave birth to a son, he was named Alexander IV and
became co-ruler with Philip III. Representing the Macedonian elites,
Perdiccas was the appointed guardian of the kings and as such he held or
13

Errington 1990, pp. 114-117; Heckel 1992, pp. 134-163; Bosworth 2002, pp. 2937.

Death, Last Plans, Tomb

379

at least tried to hold real power. But by 321 Perdiccas was dead and so was
Craterus, whereas Antipater was to die in 319. Attachment to the Argead
dynasty and respect to its members ensured that the infant and the retard
officially remained kings, but now they were pawns in a struggle between
the diadochi for control of Alexanders empire and they themselves were
quite unable to hold this empire together. Their demise as well as that of
Heracles marked the end of the Argead dynasty, but by then it was a mere
episode in the period of diadochi struggles.14
Apart from the distribution of state offices and satrapies among
themselves, another aspect of Alexanders legacy that the commanders and
soldiers in Babylon had to resolve were his so-called last plans. Citing
information from Hieronymus of Cardia, who was a reliable contemporary
historian of that period, Diodorus states that Perdiccas found a document
(hypomnemata) in Alexanders chancellery containing a list of
undertakings the king had been planning to realise over the subsequent
few years. The tasks included: the erection of an expensive mausoleum for
Hephaestion; the building of a thousand warships larger than triremes in
the ports of Phoenicia, Cilicia, Syria and Cyprus; the conquest of
territories in the West up to the Pillars of Heracles; the construction of a
road with ports and shipyards along the Mediterranean coast of Africa for
the purpose of this campaign; the erection of six temples in Delos, Delphi,
Dodona, Dion, Amphipolis and Cyrnus each costing 1,500 talents; the
construction of a tomb for Philip that would be greater than the pyramids
of Egypt as well as the mutual relocation of Europeans to Asia and Asians
to Europe. Perdiccas presented these instructions found in Alexanders
notes to the assembled Macedonian soldiers, who voted to reject them.
The authenticity of these last plans has been debated by modern historians
and there are opinions that Perdiccas had actually forged them to distract
the armys attention from the late kings real orders, which were very
awkward for his successor.15
However, there is nothing in Alexanders last plans as presented by
Diodorus that seems implausible, especially if we put them in the context
of the kings conduct in the final year of his life. We can hardly call the
sum total of 9,000 talents intended to be spent on the construction of six
temples excessively high if Alexander had spent 10,000-12,000 talents on
Hephaestions funeral pyre and no less on repaying the debts of
spendthrifts in the Macedonian army. Alexander was barely 33 in 323 and
14

Habicht 1972; Anson 1991, pp. 236-239; Heckel 1992, pp. 165-170; Carney
2001, pp. 82-84; Bosworth 2002, pp. 37-63.
15
Diod., 18.4; Plu., mor., 343d. Authenticity rejected by Tarn 1948, ii, pp. 378-398;
Pearson 1960, pp. 261-262.

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Chapter VIII

he could have expected many more years of rule, which so far had meant
wars and conquests. Up until his death he had been preparing to invade
Arabia, whereas certain steps that had been taken in 324 indicate an
interest in the West as the next theatre of war. Embassies from nations
living around the west Mediterranean basin were arriving at Alexanders
court, while his best general Craterus was in Cilicia supervising
preparations for a major campaign. This was to be a war against major sea
powers, Carthage as well as Athens, which had refused to accept its exiles,
and therefore it required the building of a fleet. The logistic designs (the
road and ports) can be easily explained if only by what the army had
experienced in Makran. Therefore Diodorus prcis of the document read
out by Perdiccas does not provide enough evidence to question the
authenticity of such plans.16
Likewise, the rejection of Alexanders last plans by the Macedonian
soldiers at Babylon does not constitute convincing evidence that these
plans were forged. From the Macedonian veterans point of view the most
objectionable parts of the Alexanders last plans were the military ones.
They certainly would not have had much against the construction of
temples (including three in their homeland) or the construction of the tomb
of the very popular Philip II. However, the Macedonian soldiers had
already questioned the continuation of war after Darius IIIs death. New,
difficult and distant campaigns could have only had a chance of being
realised under the charismatic leadership of Alexander. With Alexander
gone, Macedonian veterans questioning the sense of further campaigns
was quite to be expected. It is fair to assume that presenting Alexanders
last plans to be accepted or rejected by the Macedonian army was a move
that made Perdiccas popular not only with the soldiers in Babylon but also
those commanded by Craterus in Cilicia for it was they who, against their
will, would have had to make the greatest contribution to the war in the
West. Moreover, although the decision of the assembled army in Babylon
might not have had legal significance, it certainly resolved the problem of
Alexanders last plans in the political sense. It forced Craterus to lead his
army back to Europe and thus leave Asia in the hands of Perdiccas and his
allies.17
Therefore Alexanders last military plans were never implemented. On
the other hand, his political plan to permanently include Asia elites,
particularly the Iranians, in the government of a state that was to a large
16

Wilcken 1937; Wilcken 1967, pp. 224-229; Schachermeyr 1954; Badian 1968;
Bosworth 1988a, pp. 207-211; OBrien 1992, pp. 217-218; Hammond 1996, pp.
281-285.
17
Shipley 2000, p. 39; Bosworth 2002, pp. 58-63.

Death, Last Plans, Tomb

381

extent a continuation of the Achaemenid monarchy was more successful

than modern historiography is generally inclined to concede. The most
striking example of someone who shared Alexanders views on this matter
was Peucestas, the satrap of Persis. But Antigonus Monophtalmus
overthrew Peucestas in 316 and it was actually Antigonus who made the
final nominations of Iranians to highest offices. Greek sources claim that
only 11% of the highest officials under Antigonus were Asians. Moreover,
the same ancient authors also claim that of high-ranking state officials and
army commanders of the Seleucid monarchy barely 2.5% were Asians.
Yet such sources are overvalued as evidence of the extent to which this
was a Greco-Macedonian state. The fact that they concentrate mainly on
matters concerning the royal court, the western satrapies and exclusively
Greek affairs shows that they do not give the full picture and cannot be
considered as reliable evidence regarding Asian matters. More recent
studies have shown the Seleucid state to have not only been a continuator
of Alexanders system of government but also of earlier Near Eastern, in
particular of the Persian Empire.18
After Alexander a return to the world as it had been before 336 was
impossible. His conquests had created a new system of monarchic rule and,
at the same time, monarchy acquired legitimacy in the Greek world, where
previously kingship had only existed in semi-barbarian states such as
Macedonia or Epirus or in Sparta, which always stood out with its
penchant for archaic eccentricities. Alexanders style of monarchic rule
was to be imitated with varying degrees of success by subsequent
Hellenistic kings, commanders and even Roman emperors. Hellenistic
rulers, from the Attalids of the Kingdom of Pergamon to the rulers of the
Greek state in Bactria, claimed genuine or fictitious ties of blood with
Alexander to legitimise their rule. Similarly, the free and proudly
independent Greek polis of Rhodes legitimised its neutrality in armed
conflicts on the basis of cleverly doctored documents claiming special ties
with Alexander these documents would later, for instance, also serve as a
source for the popular Alexander Romance. After Alexander, the polis,
which had previously been the dominant form of Greek government,
ceased to be a major player in world politics. On the other hand, it not
only survived but also flourished as never before. What is more, this type
of state could now be found in places far beyond the Mediterranean. A few
were established by Alexander himself, a great many more were founded
by Hellenistic rulers, so that polis appeared in places as far off as todays
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although it was probably not Alexanders
18

Billows 1990, pp. 306-308; Billows 1994, pp. 33-40; Kuhrt, Sherwin-White
1993.

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Chapter VIII

express intention, his liberation of the Greek cities in Asia Minor

contributed to the ultimate triumph of democracy in the world of the polis.
At last, for the first time in history there was a common culture that united
Greeks and the Hellenising elites of barbarian peoples from Pillars of
Heracles to the Hindu Kush and Punjab.

3. Alexanders tomb
Once the Macedonian commanders and soldiers in Babylon settled the
most pressing political matters, attention was focused on arranging a
funeral befitting the great king. First of all his body was handed over to
Egyptian and Chaldaean embalmers, who must have done their work very
well for Alexanders mummified body could still be viewed at least six
hundred years later. Next his corpse was placed in a gold anthropomorphic
sarcophagus that was filled with perfumes and incense. Although
Alexander had wanted to be buried in the Siwah Oasis, Perdiccas decided
that his body should be laid to rest at the royal Argead necropolis in Aegae.
His hearse took two years to build and was said to have been the most
remarkable vehicle of ancient times.19 Its description, originally recorded
by Hieronymus of Cardia, has been passed on to us by Diodorus: In this
year Arrhidaeus, who had been placed in charge of bringing home the
body of Alexander, having completed the vehicle on which the royal body
was to be carried, was making preparations for the journey. Since the
structure that had been made ready, not only surpassed all others in cost
it had been constructed at the expense of many talents but was also
famous for excellence of its workmanship, I believe that it well to describe
it.
First they prepared a coffin of the proper size for the body, made of
hammered gold, and the space about the body they filled with spices such
as could make the body sweet smelling and incorruptible. Upon this chest
there had been placed a cover of gold, matching it to a nicety, and fitting
about its upper rim. Over this was laid a magnificent purple embroidered
with gold, beside which they placed the arms of the deceased, wishing the
design of the whole to be in harmony with his accomplishments. Then
they set up next to it the covered carriage that was to carry it. At the top of
the carriage was built a vault of gold, eight cubits wide and twelve long,
covered with overlapping scales set with precious stones. Beneath the roof
all along the work was a rectangular cornice of gold, from which projected
heads of goat-stags in high relief. Gold rings two palms broad were
19

Curt., 10.10.13; Diod., 18.3.5, 18.18.2; Paus., 1.6.3; Just., 13.4.

Death, Last Plans, Tomb

383

suspended from these, and through the rings there ran a festive garland
beautifully decorated in bright colours of all kinds. At the ends there were
tassels of network suspending large bells, so that any who were
approaching heard the sound from a great distance. On each corner of the
vault on each side was a golden figure of Victory holding a trophy. The
colonnade that supported the vault was of gold with Ionic capitals. Within
the colonnade was a golden net, made of cords the thickness of a finger,
which carried four painted tablets, their ends adjoining, each equal in
lengths to a side of the colonnade.
On the first of these tablets was a chariot ornamented with work in
relief, and sitting in it was Alexander holding a very splendid sceptre in his
hands. About the king were groups of armed attendants, one of
Macedonians, a second of Persians of the bodyguard, and armed soldiers
in front of them. The second tablet showed the elephants arrayed for war
who followed the bodyguard. They carried Indian mahouts in front with
Macedonians fully armed in their regular equipment behind them. The
third tablet showed troops of cavalry as if in formation for battle; and the
fourth, ships made ready for naval combat. Beside the entrance to the
chamber there were golden lions with eyes turned toward those who would
enter. There was a golden acanthus stretching little by little up the centre
of each column from below to the capital. Above the chamber in the
middle of the top under the open sky there was a purple banner blazoned
with a golden olive wreath of great size, and when the sun cast upon it its
rays, it sent forth such a bright and vibrant gleam that from a great
distance it appeared like a flash of lightning.
The body of the chariot beneath the covered chamber had two axles
upon which turned four Persian wheels, the naves and spokes of which
were gilded, but the part that bore upon the ground was of iron. The
projecting parts of the axle were made of gold in the form of lion heads,
each holding a spear in its teeth. Along the middle of their length the axles
had a bearing ingeniously fitted to the middle of the chamber in such a
way that, thanks to it, the chamber could remain undisturbed by shocks
from rough places. There were four poles, and to each of them were
fastened four teams with four mules harnessed in each team, so that in all
there were sixty-four mules, selected for their strength and size. Each of
them was crowned with a gilded crown, each had a golden bell hanging by
either cheek, and about their necks were collars set with precious stones.
In this way the carriage was constructed and ornamented, and it
appeared more magnificent when seen than when described. Because of its
widespread fame it drew together many spectators; for from every city into
which it came the whole people went forth to meet it and again escorted it

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Chapter VIII

on its way out, not becoming sated with the pleasure of beholding it. To
correspond to this magnificence, it was accompanied by a crowd of
roadmenders and mechanics, and also by soldiers sent to escort it.20
The convoy with the catafalque led by Arrhidaeus proceeded slowly on
the road leading through Damascus. In Syria it was met by the satrap of
Egypt Ptolemy and his army. Ptolemy managed to persuade Arrhidaeus to
disobey Perdiccas instructions and instead escort the catafalque to Egypt.
For this act of betrayal Macedonian commanders who were Perdiccas
enemies somewhat later rewarded Arrhidaeus by granting him the satrapy
of Hellespontine Phrygia.21 Ptolemy was fully aware of how symbolically
important Alexanders body was for legitimising political authority and
therefore he too ignored the late kings wish to be buried at Siwah, which
was too remote to be of any practical use. The sensational archaeological
discovery of Alexanders tomb at Siwah Oasis remains nothing more than
sensational, for now only the Greek archaeologist who discovered the
tomb, L. Souvaltzi, still believes it to be that of the Macedonian king.
Alexanders final resting place was in Alexandria in Egypt. Some sources
state that his body was immediately taken there, yet in 321 Alexandria was
only just being built and Memphis was still Egypts capital. Therefore the
version that Alexanders body was first buried in Memphis should be
considered true, especially as this is confirmed in the early Hellenistic
chronicle Marmor Parium. The ancient sources do not provide an exact
location of where Alexander was first buried. Modern historians assume it
was in the Sarapeum, in todays Saqqara, the site of a special religious
importance, associated with the last native pharaohs Nectanebo I and
Nectanebo II, and in his lifetime Alexander had claimed to be their rightful
successor.22
It was most probably Ptolemy Is successor Ptolemy II Philadelphus
who transported Alexanders body to a mausoleum in Alexandria. Then in
215 Ptolemy IV raised a new mausoleum. 23 This second mausoleum,
called Soma (Body), was in all likelihood situated in the Ptolemaic
necropolis within the extensive palace compound in the city centre and not
20

Diod., 18.26.1-28.2; Ath., 5.40.

Diod., 18.28.3; Str., 17.1.8; Arr., Succ., 1.25, 24.1-8; Paus., 1.6.3; Ael., VH,
12.64. Heckel 2006, p. 53, s.v. Arrhidaeus [2].
22
Alexander buried in Alexandria at once: Diod., 18.28.3; Str., 17.1.8; Ael., VH,
12.64; Epitome Heidelbergensis, FGrH, 155 F2. Alexander buried first in
Memphis: Marmor Parium, FGrH, 239 B11; Curt., 10.10.20; Paus., 1.6.3; Ps.Callisth., 3.34. Fraser 1972, i, pp. 15-16 and n. 79 (ii, pp. 31-32); Pietrzykowski
1976; Erskine 2002; Chugg 2002.
23
Paus., 1.7.1. Habicht 1988; Schlange-Schningen 1996.
21

Death, Last Plans, Tomb

385

far from the sea. That much can be deduced from what is written in the
ancient sources alone. However, modern historians trying to find its exact
location have come up with various sites most frequently on the western
or eastern slope of Kom-ed-Dik. A tempting hypothesis has emerged
which sees the vestibule of the Soma in the so-called Alabaster Tomb in
the Latin Cemetery of Alexandria. Our current state of knowledge simply
does not allow us to formulate any convincing theses about the exact
location of Alexanders tomb. Worse still, inevitable changes in the
coastline since ancient times make possible the eventuality that the part of
the Ptolemaic palace complex including the Soma is now under the sea.24
Alexanders tomb was venerated for centuries and regularly visited by
very distinguished guests from afar, including the Roman emperors
Augustus, Septimus Severus and Caracalla. It is last mentioned as still
existing in the work of Herodian describing events of 215 AD. Most
scholars therefore assume that it was destroyed in that same century,
perhaps during fighting over Alexandria between the Palmyrean and
Emperor Aurelian forces in 272 AD. The writings of 5th-century Christian
authors St John Chrysostom and Theodoretus of Cyrrhus have been put
forward as evidence of the disappearance or even erasing of Alexander
from peoples memories. Yet this is exceptionally weak evidence.
Theodoretus only states how the tombs of even the most famous pagans
are now forgotten to contrast it with how the graves of the Christian
martyrs are now venerated and thus emphasise the power of the Lord. The
writer mentions the lost tombs of Cyrus, Darius, Xerxes, Augustus,
Vespasian, Hadrian and Alexander. Yet most of these tombs have survived
to this day and they were also known in the 5th century. Therefore the
evidence provided by these Christian authors is merely rhetorical and we
can only conclude that we cannot know for certain when Alexanders
tomb disappeared. It is possible that it was still in existence in 361 AD if
we accept that it is the splendid temple of the Genius (speciosum Genii
templum) mentioned by Ammianus Marcellinus, for on some Alexandrian
coins Alexander was presented as a Genius (Agathos Daimon). 25 It is
totally unknown what the connection was between Alexanders tomb and
an Alexanders cenotaph which appears in the medieval Muslim records of
Alexandria. It is also worth mentioning that Alexander is mentioned in the
24

Fraser 1972, ii, pp. 31-39; Fiaccadori 1992; Schlange-Schningen 1996.

Alabaster Tomb hypothesis: Adriani 2000.
25
Hdn., 4.8.9; Amm. Marc., 22.11.7; Ioannes Chrysostomus, Or., 26.12 (PG, 61, p.
581); Theodoretos Kyrrou, Hellenikon therapeutike pathematon, 8.60-61.
Disappearance of Alexanders tomb in the 3rd c. A.D.: Fraser 1972, ii, pp. 35-36;
contra: Chugg 2002, Erskine 2002.

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Chapter VIII

Koran as Dl-Karnain (the two-horned) and that that was also the name
of one of the mosques in medieval Alexandria.26
Finally it was Arab tradition which identified an object believed to be
Alexanders sarcophagus. In 1798 it was robbed from Atarine mosque in
Alexandria by Napoleons soldiers. After the French armys capitulation
the sarcophagus ended up in the British Museum in London. It was
examined by E.D. Clarke, who also maintained that it was Alexanders
coffin, but when the hieroglyphs were deciphered, it the turned out that it
had actually been created for Nectanebo II. Nevertheless, today the theory
that this was Alexanders sarcophagus has been revived. Already A.J.
Wace noted that although the sarcophagus may have been made for
Nectanebo II, his body could not have been placed there as the pharaoh
had died beyond Egypt. Moreover, it would have been considered
sacrilege to lay the body of a mere mortal in such a coffin, so in 321 it
would almost certainly have still been unused. If the association between
Alexander and Nectanebo II (i.e. in Egyptian public opinion rather than
reality) as related in the Alexander Romance was true, laying the body of
the Macedonian king in this sarcophagus would have seemed the most
natural and proper thing to do. The official tradition associating this
sarcophagus with Alexander goes back at least the 16th century and there is
circumstantial evidence that it already existed as early as the 9th century. It
is therefore possible that the British Museum has the only surviving relic
of Alexanders tomb.27

26
27

Quran, 18.83-98. Fraser 1972, ii, pp. 36-39.

Clarke 1805; Wace 1948; Chugg 2002. Contra: Fraser 1972, ii, pp. 39-40.

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INDEX

Note: Some entries, like Alexander the Great, Macedonia, Greece, Persia
are too common throughout the book, to be listed in the index.
Abadeh 247
Abastanians 324
Abdalonymus 184
Abdashtart III 183, 184
Abdera 13, 288, 294
Abhisras 304
Abisares 303, 304, 307, 313, 318
Abisaroi 304
Abistamenes 156
Abulites 244, 246, 255
Abydos (Asia Minor) 73, 109, 112,
114
Abydos (Egypt) 199
Acarnania 37, 93, 157, 158, 356
Acesines 307, 313, 314, 317, 319,
320, 323, 324
Achaea 51, 221, 223, 230
Achaemenids 38, 56-63, 66, 69, 71,
109, 110, 120, 125-128, 132,
140, 149, 155, 174-176, 179,
181-183, 193, 194, 198, 205,
215, 218, 220, 234-236, 239,
240, 242, 244-246, 249-253,
255, 256, 259, 261, 262, 267,
269, 272-274, 280, 284, 291,
295, 296, 298, 303, 329, 331,
341, 342, 344, 345, 349, 353,
354, 356, 362, 363, 381
Achilles 20, 37, 45, 109, 115, 116,
171, 198, 365
Acropolis 125, 340
Acuphis 300
Ada (I) 73, 139, 140
Ada (II) 73, 139
Adea-Euridice 91, 92
Adriatic 41, 46, 98, 367

Aegae 4, 8, 13, 14, 18, 79, 80, 83,

89, 93
Aegean Sea 21, 47, 58, 62, 127,
148, 151-153, 155, 178, 179,
186, 208, 220, 360
Aelian 44, 345, 359, 360, 376
Aeolis 73, 130-133, 138, 146
Aeropus 86, 144, 145
Aeschines 48, 52, 101, 105, 224
Aetolia 93, 101, 107, 205, 221, 356,
358, 359
Afghanistan 263, 268, 270, 271,
274, 284, 298, 300, 301, 381
Africa 253, 379
Agalassi 319
Agamemnon 114
Agatarchides 262, 338
Agathon (officer in Babylon) 242
Agathon (officer in Media) 339
Agathon (poet) 15
Agenorion 192
Agesilaus (II, king of Sparta) 61, 63,
64, 114, 151
Agesilaus (brother of Agis III) 220
Agis III177, 212, 219-223, 225,
245, 340, 356
Agis of Argos 289
Agnon 338
Agrianians88, 96, 98, 99, 103, 111,
170, 187, 188, 207, 230, 231,
247, 248, 257, 277, 298, 301,
309, 319-321, 325
Ahura Mazda 58, 59, 126, 161, 250,
253
Aiacid dynasty 20
A Khanum 279

420
Ainel 183, 188
Ajax 116
Akraiphia 105
Alcetas 294
Alcibiades 20
Alcimachus 52, 53, 130
Alcmene 1
Aleian Plain 162
Aleppo 215
Aleuads 15
Alexander (Paris) 116
Alexander I (of Macedonia) 2, 13,
14
Alexander (I, of Epirus) 20, 46, 76,
79, 367
Alexander II 15
Alexander IV 90, 203, 378
Alexander of Lyncestis 83, 88, 102,
127, 144, 145, 266, 267
Alexandria ad Latmum 139
Alexandria Eschate 275, 276
Alexandria in Arachosia 269
Alexandria in Caucasus (in
Paropamisadai) 269, 270, 297
Alexandria (in Egypt)109, 206-208,
211, 213, 384-386
Alexandria (on the Acesines) 324
Alexandria (Rhambaceia) 333
Alexandropolis 48
Alinda 139, 140
Alingar 298
Alor 325
Amanic Gates 165
Amanus 158, 162, 163, 165, 158,
181
Amastris 345
Amathus 188, 191
Amazons 44, 235, 260
Ambhi 297
Ambracia 46, 52, 93, 94
Ambracian Gulf 46
Amedines 268
Amik Plain 176
Ammianus Marcellinus385
Amminapes 259

Index
Ammon 1, 198, 202, 203, 209-211,
264, 319, 327, 348, 350, 351,
357, 361, 363, 364, 374
Amphipolis 18, 21, 27, 35, 96, 113,
379
Amphissa 49
Amphitrite319
Amphoterus 152, 178, 220
Amrit 181
Amu Darya 270, 271, 279
Amyntas III 16, 40
Amyntas IV 16, 17, 75, 86-88
Amyntas son of Andromenes 127,
243, 264
Amyntas son of Antioch 129, 144,
164, 177, 200, 201
Amyntas son of Arrhabaeus 71, 122
Amyntas son of Nicolaus 280, 281,
284
Amyzon 128
Anahita 126
Anamis337
Anatolia 157
Anaxarchus 288, 289, 294
Anaximenes111
Anchialos 159
Ancyra 156
Andaka 299, 300
Androcles 188, 191
Andromachus 180, 196
Andromenes 127
Andros 154
Androsthenes 368
Angra Mainyu 59, 253
Antakya 176
Antalya 145
Antibelos 258
Antigone 264
Antigonus Gonatas 89
Antigonus Monophthalmus 54, 69,
147, 148, 178, 377, 381
Antilebanon 187
Antimenes 341
Antioch I 245, 346
Antioch on the Orontes 176, 240
Antiochus (ambassador) 65

Alexander the Great

Antiochus (officer) 302
Antipater 30, 42, 48, 52, 53, 83, 88,
102-104, 107, 108, 111, 152,
211, 220-225, 236, 244, 245,
277, 337, 340, 352, 354, 355,
358-360, 367, 368, 375, 378,
379
Antissa 151
Aornos (Avarana) 301-303, 330
Aornos (Khulm) 270
Apadana 240, 254
Apame 346
Apelles 43, 311
Aphikes 302
Aphrodite 299
Apis 199, 202, 204
Apollo 1, 22, 81, 105, 154, 211,
212, 273, 337
Apollodorus242, 371
Apollonia Mordiaion 360
Apollonides 178, 179
Apollonius 317
Apollophanes 333
Apulia 45, 219
Arabia 344, 349, 350, 368, 369,
374, 380
Arabian Sea 268, 331, 334
Arabitae 333
Arabius 333
Arabs 41, 109, 197, 206, 266, 276,
281
Arachosia 229, 256, 262, 263, 269,
296, 333, 338
Aradus 181, 183, 188
Aral Lake 279
Aramaic 242, 262, 284, 295
Araxes 248, 249, 255
Arbela 226, 233, 234, 236, 237
Arcadia 53, 65, 93, 101, 102, 107,
221
Archelaus (king) 7, 8, 14, 15
Archelaus (pretender) 18
Archelaus (officer) 246
Archias368
Archidamus III 219
Ardu-Bel 258

421

Areia 258, 262, 263, 268, 269, 282,

335
Ares 228
Argaios 18
Argeads (Argead dynasty) 3, 4, 13,
15, 17, 20, 29, 48, 67, 75-78, 81,
84, 87, 89, 92, 107, 149, 163,
221, 328, 352, 367, 378, 379
Arghandab 269
Argos 13, 53, 93, 101, 127, 163,
221, 289
Ariamazes 279, 282
Ariarathes 156
Ariaspa 268, 269
Arimmas 180, 214, 215
Ariobarzanes (satrap of Phrygia) 72
Ariobarzanes (satrap in Persis) 246,
248, 252
Arisbe 117
Aristander 227, 287, 372
Aristobulus 110, 124, 150, 157,
209, 229, 252, 277, 294, 304,
309, 313, 318, 320, 335, 342,
343, 366, 367
aristocracy8-11, 13, 15, 19, 20, 37,
40-42, 59, 62, 63, 65, 69-71, 74,
75, 77, 78, 87, 119, 123, 124,
127, 129, 133, 152, 171, 174,
175, 243, 251, 256, 260, 261,
263, 264, 267, 280, 282, 284,
289, 300, 325, 332, 341, 342,
344, 347, 348, 352
Aristogeiton245
Aristomedes 177
Ariston (officer) 226
Ariston (historian) 366
Aristonicus 278
Aristonous287
Aristotle 39-42, 46, 48, 64, 67, 77,
82, 207, 231, 234, 240, 242,
253, 292, 303, 355, 375
Aristoxenus 44
Armenia 127, 216, 229, 243
Arrhabaeus 88, 122

422
Arrhidaeus (Philip III) 18, 38, 73,
75, 77, 90-92, 139, 367, 368,
378
Arrhidaeus (pretender) 18
Arrhidaeus (officer) 382, 384
Arrian 75, 83, 85, 96, 97, 99, 103,
109, 111, 115, 117, 118, 120122, 124, 129, 132, 133, 135,
140-145, 147-150, 155-157,
160, 163, 164, 166-168, 170173, 176, 180-184, 191, 192,
194, 197, 201, 205, 217, 220,
226, 228, 232-234, 241, 248,
251, 254, 257-259, 263, 266,
269, 273, 276, 277, 279, 299,
309, 310, 316, 317, 319, 323,
325, 335, 341, 345, 351, 352,
366, 372, 374, 376
Ar-Ruad 181
Arsaces (satrap) 263, 268, 269, 282
Arsaces (Indian prince)318
Arsamenes (Arsames) 122
Arsames 156, 157, 171
Arses 60
Arsites 117, 119, 122
Artabazus 60, 179, 256, 260, 268,
271, 278, 280, 346, 348
Artacoana 263
Artashata 60
Artaxerxes II 57, 60, 63, 216, 240
Artaxerxes III40, 47, 52, 60, 61, 63,
68, 71, 74, 117, 134, 139, 181,
184, 199, 200, 256, 344
Artaxerxes IV 60, 63, 71
Artaxerxes V 256
Artemis 2, 128, 129, 348
Artemisium 2, 72, 129
Artonis 346, 347
Arwad 181
Aryan59, 253, 333
Arybbas 20, 21, 79
Asad Lake 215
Asander 127, 128, 160, 214
Ascania 147
Asclepiades 366
Asclepiodorus (satrap) 214

Index
Asclepiodorus (tax collector) 242
Asclepius 363
Asi 181
Asia 2, 3, 30, 38, 56, 65-67, 76, 86,
88, 91, 96, 105-107, 111, 113116, 125, 127, 137, 149, 166,
172, 175, 176, 182, 184, 199,
211, 213, 217, 221, 234, 235,
243, 248, 249, 251, 253, 258,
259, 261, 262, 273, 274, 283,
289-291, 317, 337-339, 345,
352, 372, 379-381
Asia Minor 23, 41, 47, 52, 58, 6264, 66, 67, 69-75, 79, 80, 87, 88,
94, 111, 114, 118, 125, 126,
128, 130, 132-135, 137, 138,
143, 145, 147-153, 155, 156,
158, 160, 166, 177, 178, 183,
214, 251, 340, 353, 357, 360,
382
Aspasians 298-300
Aspendus 133, 145, 146
Assacenians 298-300, 302
Assos 40
Assurbanipal 159
Assyria 126, 159, 238, 291, 368, 371
Astaspes 339
Astis 298
Astyages 174
Avakayana 299
Atarneus 40, 68, 71
Atarrhias (officer) 265
Atarrhias (soldier) 347
Atheas 49
Athena 114, 116, 117, 124, 130,
162, 211, 236
Athenaeus 46, 78, 179
Athenagoras 178
Athenodorus 214
Athens 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 14, 17, 18, 2022, 35, 46-54, 57, 63, 66, 71, 91,
93, 94, 101, 102, 105-107, 113,
117, 124, 125, 131, 135-137,
148, 153-155, 180, 199, 214,
220-222, 245, 254, 258, 324,

Alexander the Great

338, 340, 353, 356-360, 363,
366, 375, 380
Athos 208
Atizyes 143, 144, 171
Atropates 282, 342
Attalids 381
Attalus (father in law of Philip II)
71, 75-78, 80, 87, 88
Attalus (bodyguard of Philip II) 80,
294
Attica 5, 6, 8, 52, 53, 101, 242, 340,
357
Audata 18
Augustus 385
Aulis 114
Aurelian 385
Austanes 284
Autariatae 99
Autophradates (admiral) 152-154,
181, 183, 184, 187, 220
Autophradates (satrap) 260, 282
Avarana 301
Avesta 252
Axios 3, 8
Azemilcus 184, 187, 192, 193
Azov Sea 98, 274
Baal 176, 184, 185
Baba Gurgur 237
Babiru236, 242, 243
Babylon 58, 64, 86, 115, 126, 155,
160, 161, 164, 166, 176, 180,
207, 216-218, 227, 228, 230,
233, 236-244, 246, 253, 258,
312, 340, 341, 349, 354, 359,
360, 364, 365, 367-369, 371373, 375-380, 382
Babylonia 126, 219, 229, 239, 242,
251, 281, 341
Bacchants 300
Bacchiads 3
Bactra 271, 289, 291
Bactria 58, 217, 229, 231-233, 256,
259, 262, 270-278, 280, 281,
283-285, 288, 297, 323, 346,
348, 381
Baft 341

423

Bagastana 361
Bagistanes 258
Bagoas (Persian courtier) 60, 63,
200, 245, 374
Bagoas (Alexanders lover) 336
Bagophanes 238, 242
Bagram 269
Bahbahan 247
Bahe165
Bahrain 368
Balacrus (satrap) 159, 176
Balacrus (officer in Egypt) 206
Balikh 216
Balkans 3, 5, 7, 10, 14, 19, 24, 79,
96, 98, 101, 104, 110, 301, 337,
351, 353, 354, 358, 366
Balkh 271
Baluchistan 268, 327
Bamiyan 297
Band Shavar 247
banquet 57, 75, 76, 80, 107, 159,
243, 283, 285-287, 289, 293,
324, 326, 345, 348, 352, 362,
374
Bardylis 15-18, 98
Bargylia 360
Barsaentes 256, 258, 263
Barsine 179, 260, 283, 378
Baryaxes 341
Batis 197, 198, 310
Batvand 246
Bazeira 291
Bazira 301
Beas 315
Behistun 56, 361
Bekaa188
Belen 159
Belus 161
Berber 209
Beshar 247
Bessus 233, 256-259, 261-263, 268273, 282, 297
Bianor 177
Biga ay120
Bir-Kot301
Bisthanes 256

424
Black Sea 46, 47, 49, 52, 64, 70, 97,
98, 153, 156, 166
Boedromion228
Boeotia15-17, 23, 34, 49-52, 101,
102, 104, 105, 361
Bolon 265
Borsippa 372
Bottia 96
Boumelos 226
Brahmans 297, 304, 306, 307, 321,
326, 327, 342, 343
Branchidae 211, 212, 273, 274
Bruttians 365
Bubacene 285
Bubaces 171
Bubares 14
Bucephala 311, 312, 318
Bucephalus 39, 260, 311
Buchis 204
Bulfaris 247
Bulgaria 5, 7
Bumar 301
Bupares 236
Burdur Gl 147
Byblos 183, 188
Byzantium35, 47, 48, 97
Cabiri20
Cadmea 51, 100, 101, 103-105
Cadusians 255
Cairo 201
Calanus 306, 307, 321, 326, 342,
343, 371
Calas 73, 125, 127, 156, 178
Calindoea 112
Callicrates 245
Callines 351
Callisthenes 30, 67, 84, 85, 111,
121, 160, 167-169, 172, 174,
207, 212, 233, 242, 254, 273,
281, 287, 290, 292-294
Callixeina 46
Calycadnus 157
Cambyses 198, 199, 201
Camp of Cyrus 157
Cappadocia 69, 122, 156, 177, 229
Caracalla 385

Index
Caranus (alleged son of Philip II)
77
Caranus (officer) 268
Cardia 47, 355, 379, 382
Caria 69, 71, 73, 74, 126, 128, 130133, 135, 138-140, 143, 146148, 153, 160, 162, 199, 229,
369
Carmania 327, 333, 335-339, 341
Carthage 35, 54, 186, 192, 365, 380
Caryanda 331
Carystius 336
Caspian Gate 256-258
Caspian Sea 257, 259
Cassander 43, 81, 92, 105, 171, 354,
355
Cassopia 46
Castabalum 163
Catanes 284
Cathaeans 314
Caucasus 269
Caunus 160
Cebalinus 264
Celaenae 70, 146-148
Celts 89, 98, 366
Ceramic Gulf 160
Cerdimmas 180
Cersobleptes 21, 46
Ceyhan 162
Chabrias 63
Chaeronea 12, 33, 49-53, 68, 100,
102, 104, 106, 219, 222, 358
Chairon 95
Chalcidian League8, 21
Chalcidice 21-23, 112
Chalcis 52, 153
Chaldaeans 238, 242, 372, 373, 382
Chandragupta 317, 328
Chares (Athenian general) 39, 63,
110, 117, 178
Chares (Alexanders chamberlain)
110, 171, 172, 185, 189, 261,
287, 290, 311, 337, 343, 345
Charidemus 63, 106, 107, 155, 164
Charsadda 298
Chenab 307

Alexander the Great

China 306
Chios 47, 54, 71, 120, 134, 135,
151, 152, 178, 179, 214
Chitral 300, 301
Choaspes 57, 244
Choes298, 299
chora 8, 128
Chorasmia 279, 280
Chorienes 282, 283
Cicero 167
Cilicia 69, 70, 118, 122, 138, 156167, 176, 177, 236, 245, 255,
353, 378-380
Cilician Gates 156, 157
Cimmerians 149
Citium 188
Cleander 143, 147, 188, 266, 339
Clearchus 155
Cleitarchus 150, 260, 326, 335,
366, 367
Cleitus (Illyrian king) 98-100
Cleitus the Black36, 42, 123, 267,
280, 281, 286-288, 292, 352
Cleitus the White 338
Cleomenes 206, 207, 211, 363
Cleon 289
Cleopatra (Alexanders sister) 18,
36, 79
Cleopatra (wife of Philip II) 74, 75,
77, 78, 80, 81, 87, 88, 91-93,
283
Cleophis 300
Climax Mount 145
Cnidus 60, 338
Codomannus 60
Coele-Syria 180
Coenus 192, 233, 265, 278, 279,
281, 310, 313, 316, 318
Colonae 117
Colossae 70
Companion cavalry see: hetairoi
Conon 63
Cophen298
Corinth 3, 39, 52-55, 62, 75, 95,
101, 103, 131, 135, 222
Corrhagus (general) 95, 221, 222

425

Corrhagus (soldier) 324

Cossaeans 362, 363, 365
Cothelas 18
Cotys (I) 18
Craterus 152, 188, 190, 196, 248,
259, 262, 264, 265, 275, 277,
278, 284, 285, 289, 291, 294,
298, 299, 308-310, 312, 313,
319, 320, 323, 325, 327, 328,
331, 332, 335, 338, 345, 353,
361, 378-380
Crenides 21, 46
Crete 177, 220, 230, 325
Critobulus 322
Crna 99
Crocus Field 19, 23
Croton 235
Ctesias 60, 61, 64, 307
Ctesiphon 224
Curium 188
Curtius Rufus, Q. 43, 54, 59, 127,
150, 154-157, 160, 161, 163,
164, 167, 172, 173, 176, 179182, 184, 185, 188, 189, 192,
194, 198, 208, 215, 217, 218,
223-226, 234, 243, 248, 249,
254, 259, 266, 268, 269, 276,
281, 283, 285, 292, 296, 301,
304, 309, 316, 318, 323, 324,
335, 341, 351, 368
Cyclades 151, 153, 154
Cyclops 377
Cydnus 157
Cyme 64, 105
Cynane 18, 87, 88
cynics 95, 305, 306, 325
Cynoscephalae 29
Cyprus 135, 177, 178, 188, 190192, 214, 222, 269, 379
Cypselus 3
Cyrene 208, 209
Cyrnus 379
Cyropolis 275, 277
Cyrrhus 385

426
Cyrus the Great 91, 127, 149, 174,
218, 238, 242, 252, 268, 297,
307, 331, 332, 341, 342, 385
Cyrus the Younger 60, 64, 216, 217
Cyzicus 72, 73
Dacians 98
Dahae 229, 260, 277
Daisios 374, 375
Damascus 162, 165, 174, 179, 220,
384
Dandamis 306, 307
Daniel 193
Danube 96-98, 271
Darius I 14, 56, 199, 252, 295, 296,
331, 361, 385
Darius II 60
Darius III 44, 59-61, 63, 69, 72, 74,
80, 101, 107, 115, 118, 120,
123, 127, 133, 138, 139, 144,
151, 152, 155, 157-167, 171177, 179-183, 186, 194, 195,
200, 205, 212, 213, 215, 217221, 225-237, 239, 243, 245,
251-253, 255-261, 263, 272,
282, 283, 287, 289, 344, 345,
380
Dasht-e Kavir258
Dasht-e Lut 266
Daskyleion 70, 71, 117, 125
Datames 153
Dataphernes272
Deinocrates 208
Deli ay 168
Delios 66, 111
Delos 379
Delphi 1, 22, 23, 79, 94, 95, 125,
278, 291, 356, 379
Delphic Amphictiony 22, 23, 94
Demades 52, 53, 106, 221, 359
Demaratus (king of Sparta) 70
Demaratus (Philips friend) 39, 78,
123, 245
Demetrius Poliorcetes 54
Demetrius (Alexanders bodyguard)
264, 267

Index
democracy9, 71, 72, 86, 95, 129132, 135, 155, 162, 382
Demosthenes 8, 23, 32, 47, 49, 52,
62, 68, 87, 88, 93, 94, 100, 101,
106, 222, 340, 358
Derdas 18
Derveni 91
Diades 140
Dibse 215
Dicaearchus 336
Didyma 211, 212, 273
Dimnus 264, 265
Dinarchus 101
Dinaric Alps 3
Diodorus 12, 16, 24, 30, 47, 64, 79,
80, 89, 98, 103, 104, 107, 111,
114, 118, 120, 121, 124, 140,
141, 145, 155, 167, 170, 173,
183, 184, 186, 192, 194, 208,
217, 218, 223, 234, 249, 254256, 268, 272, 310, 319, 324,
335, 355, 358, 362, 364, 379,
380, 382
Diogenes 95
Diomedes (Homeric hero) 19, 299
Diomedes (Thracian) 39
Dion 8, 9, 15, 107, 124, 379
Dionysius the Elder 35, 187
Dionysius (tyrant of Heraclea) 155,
345
Dionysus 214, 276, 288, 289, 296,
300, 301, 324, 331, 361, 364
Diopeithes 46
Dioscuri 286, 289
Dioxippus 299, 324
Dishmuk 247
divinity of Alexander 44, 210, 211,
290, 293, 348, 359-361
Diyala
Dobruja 49
Dodona 379
Dokimos 30
Doloaspis 205
Don 274
Drtyol163
Dorudzan 249

Alexander the Great

Doxares 304, 307
Drangiana 256, 262, 263, 268, 282,
335, 338
Drapsaka 270
Drypetis 174, 345
Dl-Karnain 210, 386
Duris 110
Ebirnari 180, 181, 195, 236
Ecbatana 58, 210, 233, 250, 253,
255-257, 259, 264, 266, 268,
272, 362, 364
Ece Gl 117
Edessa 8, 9
Egypt 12, 52, 58, 63, 64, 89, 90,
115, 134, 171, 177, 179-181,
186, 196-211, 213, 227, 229,
234, 243, 251, 261, 318, 326,
331, 350, 379, 382, 384, 386
Elaius114
Elburz 256
Elam 57, 61, 251
Elatea49
Elephantine 179, 199
elephants 217, 229, 231, 244, 298,
302-304, 307-310, 313, 315,
319, 320, 327, 332, 341, 343,
383
Eleutherus 181
Elimeia 3, 13, 18, 30, 102, 158
Elis93, 101, 102, 107, 150, 221, 223
Emathia 3, 4
Enylus 183
Eordaia 3, 102
Eordaicus 99
Epaminondas 16, 22, 32, 34
Ephesus 2, 66, 72, 111, 128-130,
132, 134, 135, 153, 360
Ephialtes 141, 142
Ephippus 76, 139, 210, 348, 362,
374
Ephorus 24, 47, 64
Epidamnus 99
Epirus 1, 3, 20, 37, 46, 56, 76, 77,
79, 87, 367, 381
rnahr 252
Eratosthenes 216, 225, 300, 302

427

Eresus 54, 72, 151

Eretria 47, 171
Erigon 99
Erigyios 74, 259, 265, 268
Erythrai 40, 71, 72, 211, 260
Esagila 237, 238, 240
Esdraelon 197
Etemenanki 238, 240, 241, 372
Eteocles 224
Ethiopia 207, 295, 365, 366
ethne 9
Etruscans 365, 367
Euboea 47, 52, 151-153
Eubulos 40
Eudamidas I 223
Eumenes 346, 347, 361, 362, 374
Euphrates 161, 176, 180, 194, 215,
216, 219, 225, 240, 241, 368,
374
Euridice (mother of Philip II) 16
Euridice (Cleopatra) 75
Euripides 7, 15, 37, 287, 293
Europa 87
Europe 6, 14, 76, 91, 113-116,
119, 150, 151, 249, 253, 259,
261, 274, 279, 290, 306-308,
323, 331, 341, 344, 350, 365,
379, 380
Eurymedon 146
Eurypontids 219
Fahlian 247
Failaka 368
Faiyum 199
Farah 263
Fars 61, 235, 246, 249-254, 341,
342, 343
Fergana 276
Flavius Josephus 195, 196
Flavius Philostratus 317
Frederic Barbarossa 157
FYROM 2
Gallipoli 113
Gallikos 4
Gandhara 297, 298
Ganges 296, 315

428
Gaugamela 20, 170, 212, 218, 224226, 228, 231, 233-237, 243,
244, 251, 253, 262, 278, 295,
353
Gaul 366
Gaumal 226
Gauri 299
Gaza 37, 140, 196-198, 201, 310
Gebel Maqlub 226, 228
Gedrosia 268, 332-334
Gerizim 195, 197
Gerostratus 181, 188
Gerrha 368
Getae 97, 98
Gibraltar 317
Glaucias (king) 99
Glaucias (physician) 362
Glaucippus 136
Glaucus (hero) 19
Glaucus (physician) 362
Glycera 338
Gobares 252
Gksu 157
Gomil 226
Gordias 149
Gordium 148-150, 152, 155, 156
Gorgias 66
Gorgus 139, 210, 357, 358
Granicus 36, 109, 117-126, 132,
134-136, 143, 148, 170, 175,
214, 222, 242, 287, 343
Great King 12, 38, 40, 47, 56, 57,
59-63, 65, 66, 69, 70, 74, 87,
102, 103, 105, 118, 120, 123,
126, 127, 134, 135, 138, 145,
148, 152, 155, 161, 164-166,
169, 171-175, 177, 179-183,
186, 194, 197, 198, 215, 217,
229, 231-235, 239, 244-246,
251, 256-259, 261, 262, 274,
278, 280, 289, 291, 295, 296,
342, 344, 348
Greco-Bactrian Kingdom 328
Gryneion 73
Gubal 183
Glek Bogazi 156

Index
Glk146
Guraeans 298, 299
Guraion 299
Gygaia 14
gymnosophists 305
Haemus 46, 96
Hab 333
Hadrian 385
Haftgel 247
Haliakmon 3, 4
Halicarnassus 135, 138-143, 160
Halonnesos 47
Halys 156, 194
Hamadan 255, 364
Hamun-e Helmand 268
Hannibal 115
Han 253
Haranpur 308
Harbour of Achaeans 115
Harmatelia 326
Harmodius 245
Harpalus 74, 158, 214, 257, 318,
337, 338, 340, 341
Haruvati 256
Hasanbeyli 165
Hawlir 226
Hebros 113
Hecataeus 88
Hecatomnids 69, 71, 73, 132, 139
Hecatomnus69
Hecatompylos 258, 259
Hector (hero) 198
Hector (Parmenions son) 213
Hegelochus 152, 153, 178, 179
Hegesias 197, 198
Hegesistratus 135
Hekatombaion 2, 192, 215, 225,
258
Heliopolis 201
Hellenion 202
Hellenisation 6, 7, 8, 13, 15, 41, 70,
71, 126, 194, 264, 318, 382
Hellenomemphitai 202
Hellespont 47, 49, 72, 73, 100, 113115, 117, 121, 149, 151-154,
194, 234

Alexander the Great

Hellespontine Phrygia 69-71, 117,
119, 125, 148, 156, 384
Helmand 268, 327
Hephaestion42, 116, 175, 184, 197,
201, 233, 261, 265, 267, 278,
279, 298, 302, 303, 313, 317,
319, 320, 327, 328, 333, 341,
344, 345, 349, 361-365, 371,
374, 379
Hephaestus 202
Heraclea Pontica 70, 155, 345
Heracles (hero) 1, 13, 39, 55, 67, 94,
109, 114, 116, 149, 163, 176,
184-186, 193, 202, 209, 213,
276, 286, 289, 290, 296, 302,
317, 319, 320, 324, 331, 337,
348, 361, 374, 375
Heracles (Alexanders son) 179,
283, 378, 379
Heraclids 13
Heracon 339
Herat 263
Hermes 348
Hermias 40, 41, 68, 71
Hermocrates 80
Hermolaus291, 292, 294
Hermopolis Magna 203, 205
Hermotus 117
Hermus 125
Herodian 385
Herodotus 2, 13, 60-62, 64, 113,
115, 160, 199, 295
Heromenes 88
Heroonpolis 350
Heropythus 72
Herostratus 2
hetairoi (Companions) 9, 10, 22,
32-34, 42, 51, 78, 109, 123, 124,
127, 130, 158, 174, 184, 206,
207, 217, 229, 232, 247, 257,
259, 261, 263, 267, 268, 270,
274, 278, 280, 285, 286, 288290, 297, 298, 303, 304, 309,
319, 320, 341, 348, 349, 351,
374, 375
Hierokome 126

429

Hieron 368
Hieronymus 355, 379, 382
Hindu Kush 41, 268-270, 273, 297,
303, 382
Hindu 295
Hippocrates 64
Histria 49
Hittites 149
Holophernes 281
Homer 37, 41, 109, 116, 208, 361
hoplites 11, 12, 14, 15, 24, 26-28,
31, 50, 51, 62, 65, 102-104, 112,
134, 142, 146, 147, 160, 169,
170, 172, 357
Hormuz Strait 336
Horus 202
Hydarnes 148
Hydaspes 303, 307-312, 314, 318320
Hydraotes 307, 313, 314, 320, 321,
323
Hyparna 144
hypaspists 32, 96, 99, 187, 188, 190,
192, 207, 230, 247, 264, 277,
287, 298, 301, 302, 309, 319,
320, 322, 349, 350
Hypereides 52, 106, 222, 375
Hyphasis 84, 85, 313, 315, 317, 318,
332, 347, 351, 352
Hyrcania 118, 229, 257, 259-262,
289
Hystaspes 348
Iasus 132, 139, 210, 357
Iberians 366
Icarus 368
Ichthyophagi 336
Ida (Mount) 72
Idrieus 69
Idumea 58, 195
Iel120
Ilam 301
Illyria 2, 4, 6, 15, 17, 18, 20, 32, 49,
54, 76, 78, 98-100, 102, 106,
110, 111, 230, 263
Imbros 178

430
India 39, 42, 217, 221, 229, 233,
263, 267, 280, 283, 295-298,
301-312, 314, 315, 317, 320322, 324-329, 331-333, 335339, 342-344, 348, 368
Indra 301
Indus 234, 295, 298-300, 302, 303,
308, 309, 312, 318, 324, 325,
327, 331
Iolaus 354, 375
Ionia 40, 58, 115, 122, 126, 128133, 135, 136, 138, 146, 153,
273, 340, 360
Iphicrates 63
Iran 2, 58-60, 62, 63, 65, 69-71, 90,
109, 118, 120, 127, 128, 133,
139, 143, 156, 160, 164, 169,
171, 172, 175, 177, 180, 199,
205, 215, 217-218, 229, 231,
233-235, 239, 243, 244, 248,
250-252, 255, 256, 260-262,
267, 268, 272, 275, 281-284,
288, 289, 296, 297, 303, 309,
310, 323, 331, 334, 335, 337,
339, 344, 346-348, 350, 351,
369, 378, 380
Iranshahr 334
Iraq 226, 312
Irbil 226
Iron Gate 97
Ishtar 240
Iskenderun 163, 168
Iskenderun Bay 166, 168
Islamabad 303
Isocrates 40, 48, 64, 66-69
Isparta 147
Issus 30, 101, 122, 127, 145, 154,
158, 159, 162, 163, 165, 168,
169, 171-173, 176, 177, 179,
182, 184, 214, 215, 220, 232,
236, 289
Istros 49
Itanes 348
Italy 115, 365, 367
Itureans 188-190
Jaddua II 195

Index
Jason 19
Jaxartes 274, 276, 277, 279, 317
Jbeil 183
Jerusalem 195, 196
Jews 195, 196, 199
Jezreel 197
Jhelum (city) 308
Jhelum (river) 303, 307
Jinists306
Johannan 195
John Chrysostom 385
Judah 195, 196
Judith 281
Jupiter 161
Justin 49, 60, 76, 77, 80, 89, 111,
118, 124, 145, 150, 157, 160,
167, 173, 217, 218, 249, 354
Kabul (city) 298
Kabul (river) 269, 270, 297, 298
Kafirs301
Kahnuj 335
Kalabak-Tepe 136
Kampytrepe 271
Kandahar 269
Kapisa 269
Karachi 333
Karasu 165
Karata 162
Karun246
Kasr 240
Kech 334
Kelonai 361
Kephissos 50
Kerkini Lake 113
Kerman 335
Khababash 64, 115, 200
Kharoshti 295
Khabur 216
Khawak Pass 270
Khazir 226
Khojent 275, 276
Khorasan 262
Khulum 270
Khuzestan 244, 246
Khyber Pass 298
Kimolos 55

Alexander the Great

Kinet Hyk 163
Kirkuk 237
Kithairon 106
Kocaba ay 120
Koa ayi 120
Koh-i-Mor300
Koiranos 214
Kolwa 334
Kor249
Kos 47, 71, 143, 151, 152, 178
Ksudraka 320
Kunar298
Kunduz 270
Kurdistan 226
Kurkat 275
Kuru ay 168
Kuwait 368
Lacedaemonians 124
Laconia 53
Lade 135
Lamian War 340, 360
Lampsacus 111, 117
Langarus 88, 98, 99
Lanice 36
Larissa 15, 18, 374
Las Bela 333
Latin 6
League of Corinth 54-56, 67, 71, 72,
94, 95, 104, 106, 111, 112, 124,
130, 133-135, 143, 151, 158,
193, 214, 220, 223, 224, 356
Lebadeia 17
Lebanon (country) 177, 183
Lebanon (mountains) 181, 184, 187189, 196
Leonidas 37
Leonnatus 80, 174, 264, 322, 333,
336, 338, 344
Leontini 66
Leosthenes 358, 377
Lesbos 54, 72, 151-153, 178
Libya 208, 365
Libyan Desert 1, 208, 209
Lindus 236
Livy 366
Locris 22, 49

431

Loos 2
Lucanians 219, 365, 367
Lucian 320
Ludias 4, 8, 14
Luxor 204
Lycaonia 178
Lycia 69, 70, 73, 74, 144, 146, 148,
153, 188, 248
Lycidas 206
Lycomedes 153
Lycon 214
Lycurgus 52, 106, 222, 358, 359
Lycus 233
Lydia 57, 69, 122, 125-128, 177,
214, 263, 369
Lyginos 96
Lyncestis 3, 13, 16-18, 30, 81, 83,
86, 88, 99, 127, 144, 145, 266,
267
Lysias 66
Lysicles 52
Lysimachus (Alexanders
companion) 117, 260, 291
Lysimachus of Acarnania 37, 189
Lysippus 43, 44, 124
Maat 205
Macartatus 204
Macestus 125
Machatas 18
Madates 246, 247
Maeander 136, 146
Maedi 48, 98
Magadha 296
Magarsus 162
magi 2, 63, 342, 352
Magnesia on the Maeander 72, 130,
360
Magnesia ad Sipylum 72
Makran331, 334, 335, 339, 348, 380
Malava 320
Malli 320-324, 376
Mallus 162, 163, 188
Manduria 219
Mantinea 22
Maracanda 274, 275, 277-281, 285,
286

432
Marathus 181-183, 194
Mardi 229, 252, 260
Marduk 237, 238, 240, 241
Marduk-appal-iddin II 238
Mareotis 208
Maritza 113
Marmara Sea 47, 48, 117
Maroneia 113
Marsa Matruh 208
Marvdasht 247-249
Masjed-i Soleiman 246
Massaga 299-302, 361
Massagetae 231
Maurya317, 328
Mausoleum 143
Maussolus 69, 138, 139
Maximus 312
Mazaca 156
Mazaces 177, 201, 202
Mazaeus 176, 216, 225, 227, 228,
231, 236-238, 242, 281, 348
Mazar-e Sharif 270
Medea 19
Media 10, 56, 115, 174, 229, 233,
239, 252, 255, 257, 272, 282,
339, 342, 361, 362
Mediterranean Sea 6, 69, 162, 168,
181, 197, 199-201, 208, 217,
273, 340, 353, 379-381
Medius 374
Megalopolis221-225, 356, 359
Megara 157, 214
Melas 113
Meleager 278, 377, 378
Melos55
Melqart 184-186, 192, 193, 202,
213
Memnon of Rhodes 60, 63, 72, 73,
88, 118-120, 127, 134, 135, 138,
141-144, 151-156, 160, 179,
221
Memnon (governor of Thrace) 220,
221
Memphis 177, 199-202, 205-207,
211-213, 244, 384
Menander I 328

Index
Menander (officer) 214, 369
Menander (poet) 145
Menelaus (pretender) 18
Menelaus (officer) 338
Menes 245
Menidas 227, 233, 369
Mennis 237
Menon (satrap) 180
Menon (officer) 243
Mentor 40, 63, 72, 120, 179
mercenaries 12, 23, 27, 31, 46, 49,
60, 63, 65, 66, 72, 86, 104, 111,
112, 117-119, 123, 128, 130,
134-136, 138, 141, 142, 147,
151, 153, 155, 158, 164, 166,
169, 170, 172, 173, 176, 178,
199, 201, 211, 214, 217, 220224, 227, 229-231, 233, 247,
256-260, 266, 270, 275, 276,
278, 282, 284, 298-300, 302,
317, 339, 340, 351, 357, 358,
369
Merkes Su 159
Meroe 207
Meru 300
Merus 300
Meshed 262
Mesopotamia 161, 162, 213, 216218, 229, 238, 240, 246, 255,
332, 349
Messenia 53, 93, 219
Metageitnion 50
Methone 8, 21, 90
Methymna 151, 178
Midas149
Mieza39, 41-43, 46, 48
Miletus 36, 38, 71, 126, 128, 133138, 140, 152, 154, 185, 188,
211, 212, 273
Milinda 328
Mithra 161
Mithrenes 126, 127, 174, 242, 243
Mithridates 123
Mithrobuzanes 122, 123
Mithropastes 148
Molossians 3, 18, 20, 56

Alexander the Great

Mophis 297
Mosul 226
Motya 35, 187
Multan 320, 321, 327
Murashu 239
Musicanus 325-327
Mycale 135
Mylasa 69, 138, 139
Myndus 139, 160
Myriandrus 163, 166
Myrtale 20
Mysia40
Mytilene 120, 151-153, 178, 214
Nabarzanes 177, 256, 257, 260, 261
Nabonidus 238
Nabuchadnezzar (II) 240, 374
Nanda 296, 315, 328
Napoleon (I) 201, 386
Naqsh-e Rustam 259
Naucratis 206-208, 211, 363
Nauqr 226, 228
Nautaca 281
Nearchus 74, 146, 302, 313, 314,
318, 319, 320, 323, 331-337,
343, 344, 350, 374, 378
Nectanebo I 384
Nectanebo II 200, 204, 384, 386
Neiloxenus 270
Nemesis 128
Neon 23
Neoptolemus (son of Achilles) 20,
116
Neoptolemus (I, king) 20
Neoptolemus (officer) 198
Nereids115, 155
Nereus 166, 319
Nero 317
Nesaian horses 10, 362
Nesaian Plane 362
Nicaea (near Kabul) 298
Nicaea (on the Hydaspes) 311, 312,
318
Nicanor (admiral) 135
Nicanor (envoy) 355, 357
Nicanor (officer) 297, 303
Nicanor (son of Parmenion) 264

433

Nicesipolis 18, 19
Nicias 127
Nicobule 274
Nicocreon 214
Nicolaus 280
Nicomachus (Aristotles father) 40
Nicomachus (Macedonian soldier)
264
Nicopolis 176
Nile 177, 199, 201, 202, 206, 207,
213, 318
Nineveh 240
Ninus 161
Nippur 239
Nuristan 300, 301
Nymphs 39, 115
Nysa 300, 301
Oceanus 319, 328
Ochos 174
Odrysians 18, 21, 98, 111
Oibares307
Oiniadai 356
Olveni 17
Olympia 38, 355, 358
Olympias 1, 2, 18, 20, 36, 37, 46,
73-79, 81, 87, 90, 92, 113, 129,
145, 337, 340, 375
Olympic Games
2, 38,
355
Olympus 4, 107, 317, 359, 361
Olynthus 22, 26, 35, 106, 278, 348
Omares 119
Omphis 297, 303, 304
n 201
Onchai 176
Onchestus 102
Onesicritus 84, 95, 110, 260, 305307, 312, 314, 315, 318, 319,
325, 343, 344
Onomarchus 19, 22, 23
Opis 84, 85, 210, 345, 347, 349352, 361
Ora 301
Orchomenos 102, 105
Ordanes 338
Oreitans 333, 334, 336, 344

434
Oreos 47
Orestis 3, 30, 80
Orontes 176, 181, 215
Orontobates 74, 139, 142, 148, 153,
160
Oropus 52, 53
Orxines 341
Osiris 202
Osorapis 375
Ossa 94
Ottoman Empire 5
Oxathres 255
Oxicanus 325, 326
Oxus 270, 271, 278
Oxyartes 282, 283, 325, 338
Oxyathres 171, 259, 272
Oxydates 257, 282
Oxydracae 320, 321, 323, 324
Oxyrynchus 89, 173
Ozines 338
Pactya 113
Pagasae 19
pages 42, 244, 291, 292, 294
Paiko 4
Paionia 17, 18, 33, 99, 111, 122,
226, 230
Pakistan 268, 295, 298, 300, 301,
303, 320, 325, 327, 328, 334,
381
Palestine 176, 180, 195-197, 200,
213
Pallocotas 368
Pallukatu 368
Palmyra 385
Pammenes 23, 32, 63
Pamphylia 144, 145, 148, 293
Pancaste 46
Pangaion 46, 113
Panini 297
Pnajkora 299, 300
Pantaleon 205
Paphlagonia 70, 118, 156, 177, 178
Paphos 184
Paraitacene 255, 282
Paraitonion 208, 209
Paris (Alexander) 116

Index
Parisatis 344
Parmenion 2, 71, 73-75, 87-89, 107,
108, 114, 121, 122, 125, 130,
134, 135, 143-145, 147, 148,
157-159, 162, 163, 165, 167,
169, 170,179, 180, 193, 194,
201, 213, 219, 227-230, 232,
233, 245, 247, 250, 257, 263267, 271, 354
Paropamisus 269, 270, 298, 303,
325
Paros 258, 276
Parsa 61
Parthenon 57, 245
Parthia 229, 233, 259, 262, 268,
269, 282
Pasargadae 61, 91, 252, 342
Pasicrates 188, 214
Pasitigris 246, 343, 349
Pasni 334
Patala 327, 332, 333, 336, 343
Pataloi 327
Patara144
Patroclus 116, 365
Patron 256
Paurava 307
Pausanias (pretender) 18
Pausanias (Philips assassin) 79-81,
86
Pausanias (Philips lover) 80
Pausanias (hetairos) 127
Pausanias (writer) 87, 128, 339
Payas 168
Peithon 325, 326, 344
Pelagon 129
Pelagonia 3
Peleus 37
Pella 4, 6, 8, 9, 14, 15, 40, 60, 76,
342, 354, 363, 368
Pellene 95, 221
Pellion 99, 100
Pelopidas 32, 34
Peloponnesian War 14, 15, 20, 27,
35, 66, 105

Alexander the Great

Peloponnesus 52-54, 94, 102, 127,
143, 145, 152, 219, 221, 222,
224, 340, 356, 358
Pelusium 177, 201, 205
Percote 117
Perdiccas III 15-17, 19
Perdiccas 42, 80, 104, 188, 278,
298, 302, 303, 320, 324, 338,
363, 364, 375, 377-380, 382,
384
Perge 145, 146
Pericles 35
Perinthus 35, 47, 68
Peristeri 3
Perrhaebia 15
Persepolis 58-61, 224, 236, 239,
247-252, 254, 255, 259, 262,
289, 342, 349, 371
Perseus 209
Persian Gates 246-250, 252
Persian Gulf 349, 369
Persis 233, 235, 239, 255, 381
Petisis 205, 207
Petosiris 203
Peucelaotis 298
Peucestas son of Macartatus 204,
206
Peucestas (satrap) 322, 341, 342,
344, 369, 381
Peucolaus 277
Peuke 96, 97
Phalaikos 23
phalanx 11, 12, 24-32, 50, 96, 99,
103, 104, 121, 142, 167, 169172, 192, 230-232, 257, 263,
276, 277, 309, 310, 320, 327,
348, 349, 369
Pharasmenes 280
Pharnabazus (satrap) 61
Pharnabazus (admiral) 152-154,
160, 178, 220
Pharnaces 123
Pharnuches 275, 277
Phaselis 144
Phayllus 235
Phegeus 315

435

Pherae 18, 19
Phila 18
Philinna 18
Philip II 1-5, 8-10, 12, 13, 15-24,
26-28, 30-36, 38-40, 42, 46-56,
60, 62, 66-69, 71-84, 86-94, 96,
98, 106, 110, 111, 124, 134,
139, 140, 151, 158, 182, 194,
210, 219, 221, 236, 245, 264,
283, 286, 351, 352, 354, 358,
359, 378-380
Philip III see: Arrhidaeus
Philip V 27
Philip of Acarnania 157, 158
Philip son of Menelaus 145
Philip (satrap) 304, 319, 320, 324
Philippi 21
Philippopolis 46, 48, 96
Philistine 197
Philistus 37
Philocrates 23, 46
Philomelus 22
Philoneicus 39
Philotas (son of Parmenion) 74, 84,
85, 87, 103, 144, 162, 229, 245,
263-267, 294, 352
Philotas (father of Asander) 127
Philotas (commander of Tyre) 193
Philoxenus (officer in Asia Minor)
127, 214, 340, 369
Philoxenus (officer in Susa) 244,
246
Philoxenus (poet) 37
Philoxenus (painter)171
Phobos 228
Phocion 47, 52, 93, 106, 353, 354
Phocis 19, 22, 23, 49, 102, 104, 105
Phoenicia 58, 63, 65, 135, 153, 176,
178, 180, 181, 183, 184, 186188, 190-193, 198, 213-215,
222, 368, 379
Phoenix 37
Phrada 263-268
Phrasaortes 341
Phrataphernes 260, 268, 282, 348
Phrygia69, 70, 143, 146-150, 311

436
Phylarchus 110, 337, 338
Pieria 4, 13
Pierion 286
Pillars of Heracles 317, 379, 382
Pillars of Jonah 159
Pinara 144
Pinarus 166, 168-170
Pindar 41, 105
Pindos 3
Pir-Sar 301
Pisidia 144, 146-148
Pitane73
Pixodarus 69, 73, 74, 139, 158, 267,
367
Plataea 14, 35, 102, 105, 235
Plato 40, 64, 66, 111
Pleiades 319
Pliny the Elder 171, 276
Plutarch 1, 2, 7, 20, 36, 38-40, 43,
44, 50, 64, 66, 73, 74, 76, 78,
103, 104, 111, 112, 115, 121,
124, 140, 150, 159, 160, 164,
174, 179, 194, 208, 217, 218,
225, 228, 234, 254, 260, 262,
272, 283, 286, 294, 304, 305,
317, 335, 336, 342, 345, 347,
352, 354, 360, 371, 373-377
Pnytagoras 188, 190, 191
Polemon (officer in Pelusium) 205
Polemon (admiral in Egypt) 206
Polemon son of Andromenes 266
polis 5, 9, 11, 12, 20, 22, 25, 34,
41, 51, 53, 54, 56, 62, 65, 66,
70-72, 94, 95, 105, 112, 126,
128, 130-135, 146, 151, 154,
178, 222, 275, 355-358, 360,
366, 381, 382
Polyaenus 27, 30, 45, 104, 227
Polybius 25, 28, 29, 105, 111, 167,
169
Polycleitus 348
Polydamas266
Polyeidus 36, 140
Polyeuctus106
Polymachus 342
Polyperchon 278, 285

Index
Polytimetus 277
Polyxena 20
Pompeii 171
Pompeius Trogus 64, 77
Porali 333
Porphyrius242
Porticanus 325, 326
Porus (king of Paurava) 303, 304,
307-315, 317, 320, 325, 327,
344
Porus (cousin of Porus of Paurava)
307, 313
Poseidon 115, 166, 319, 327, 337
Potidaea 2, 21, 47
Pozanti 157
Practius 117
Pranichus 286
Priam 116
Priapus 117
Priene 130, 132, 133, 360
Proexes 270
Promachus 343
Prophthasia 267, 268
Proteas 152, 153
Protesilaos114
Ptah 202, 205
Ptolemaios (officer) 140, 143, 160
Ptolemaios (edeatros) 261
Ptolemaios son of Seleucus 143
Ptolemy (I, later king of Egypt) 74,
96, 103, 111, 145, 209, 254,
264, 267, 272, 273, 277, 278,
294, 299, 302, 309, 316, 317,
320, 326, 333, 335, 366, 367,
384
Ptolemy II 384
Punjab 307, 313, 315, 318, 319,
321, 325, 327, 344, 382
Pura 334, 335
Pushkaravati 298
Pydna8, 21
Pymathion 188
Pyramus 162
Pyrgoteles 43
Pyrrha 151
Pyrrhus89

Alexander the Great

Pythia 79, 95
Pythias 40
Pythonice 338
Qalat Najim 215
Qaleh-ye Dukhtar263
Qalat-i Nadiri 263
Qana 350
Quetta 327
Quran210, 211, 386
Ra 202
Ravi 307
Red Sea 199, 338
Rey 257
Rhambaceia 333
Rhacotis 208
Rhagae 257
Rheomitres 171
Rhodes 47, 63, 71, 72, 118, 153,
188, 208, 214, 236, 341, 360,
381
Rhoesaces 123
Rhoeteium73
Rhoxane 90, 283, 284, 288, 344,
348, 378
Rome (Roman Empire)7, 8, 9, 71,
76, 98, 109, 128, 184, 189, 318,
323, 365-367, 381, 385
Rositsa 96
Saida 183
Sabaces 171
Sabbas 305, 326
Sabictas 156
Sabus 326
Sacred Band 31, 32, 50, 51, 104
Sacred War 22, 23, 49, 293
Sagalassus 146, 147
Salamis (Athenian island) 14, 70,
235
Salamis (Cyprus) 188, 190, 181,
214
Salang Pass 270, 297
Saleph 157
Salmakis 138, 143
Salmus 335, 336
Samarcand 274
Samaria 195-197, 213

437

Smba 326
Sambana 361
Sambastai 324
Sambus 326
Samos 35, 136, 357, 359
Sancherib 159
Samothrace 20, 153
Samtutefnacht 229
Sanballat III 195
Sandar-Bar 320
Sangaius 298
Sangala 314
Sangarius 148
Sanskrit 297
Saqqara 204, 384
Sarapeum 384
Sarapis 373, 374
Sardanapalus 159
Sardis101, 125-127, 143, 177, 242,
244
Sargon II238
Sar-i Darreh 256
sarissa 25-29, 33, 34, 51, 123, 310,
324
Sarmatians 33
Sasigupta 297
Sassanids 161
Satibarzanes 258, 261-263, 268
satrap (satrapy) 12, 21, 38, 47, 52,
58, 60-63, 68-71, 73, 118-120,
122, 125, 127, 128, 139, 140,
143, 144, 146-149, 156, 160,
171, 176-181, 195, 201, 202,
205, 206, 214-216, 234, 236,
242-244, 246, 247, 251, 256,
259, 260, 262, 263, 268-270,
280, 281, 282, 284, 285, 295,
296, 303, 304, 317, 319, 320,
324, 325, 333, 335, 337, 339,
341, 342, 344, 348, 349, 361,
379, 381, 384
Satyrus 17, 18, 76-78
Scarphe 214
Schechem 197
Scylax 331, 350

438
Scythia 6, 34, 43, 49, 115, 217, 229,
231, 253, 255, 274, 276-279,
281, 295, 365, 366
Selge 146
Seleucia 215
Seleucids 128, 346, 381
Seleucus I Nicator 212, 245, 310,
346, 371, 377
Semiramis 240, 297, 331, 332
Septimius Severus 385
Sestus 113, 114
Shahr-i Qumis 258
Shibar Pass 297
Shipka Pass 96
Shiva 302
Shorkot 320
Shush 244
Shushtar 246
Sibians 319, 320
Sicily 35, 54, 187, 289, 367
Side 145
Sidon 181, 183, 184, 187-192, 197
Sigeion 117
Silex 298
Sinai 197, 201
Sind 325-327
Sindimana 326
Sinope 69, 95, 148, 260
Siphnos 153, 154, 220
Sippar 237, 239
Sirjan 341
Sisicottus 297, 302
Sisigambis174, 175, 232, 246, 247
Sisimithres 282
Sisines 144, 145
Sistan 268
Sitalces339
Sittacene 229, 243
Siwah1, 205, 207-212, 264, 362,
363, 374, 382, 384
Smyrna128
Sochoi 162-165
Socrates 306
Sogdiana 217, 256, 262, 273-282,
284, 285, 295, 297, 303, 323
Sogdian Rock279, 282

Index
Soli 159, 162, 163, 188, 214, 269,
368
Somiani Bay 333
Sopeithes 314, 315, 319
South America 250
Sparda 126
Sparta
15, 22, 53, 54, 56,
61, 70, 101, 105, 114, 131, 177,
180, 196, 219-224, 325, 359,
381
Sphines 306
Spitamenes 270, 272-278, 280, 281,
346
Spithridates 122
Stamenes 282
Stara Planina 46, 96
Stasanor 269, 282
Stasicrates 208
Stateira (wife of Darius III) 174,
218
Stateira (daughter of Darius III)
174, 344
Stephanus of Byzantium 48
Stephanus 237
Strabo 64, 117, 129, 146, 243, 254,
269, 367
Straton 181, 183
Strymon 21, 48, 113
Styx 375
Suez Canal 199
Susa 58, 61, 126, 224, 229, 233,
236, 237, 243-247, 250, 255,
258, 312, 333, 337, 343, 344,
346-350, 363
Susia 262
Susiana337
Susian Gates 247, 248
Sutlej 324
Svishtov 97
Swat 301
Syracuse 35, 187, 345
Syr Darya 274
Syria 57, 158, 159, 165, 166, 176,
180, 196, 200, 201, 214, 215,
229, 245, 292, 379, 384

Alexander the Great

Syrian Gates 159, 163, 167-169,
181
Syrphax 72, 129
Tabnit 181
Tachos 206
Tainaron 143, 340, 358
Tajikistan 270, 275
Takshasila 297
Tanais 274
Tang-i Tamoradi 247
Tang-i Khollar 247
Tang-i Laleh 247
Tapuri 260, 282
Tarentum 30, 219
Tarsus 156-160, 162, 176, 214, 338
Tartus 181
Tashan 247
Taulanti 99, 100
Tauriscus 158
Taurus 156, 159
Taxila 297, 298, 303-305, 308,
318, 321, 342
Taxiles 304, 312, 313, 327
Tegea 221, 223, 356, 358
Teheran 257
Telestes 37
Tell el-Farama 201
Tell Gomel 226
Telmessus 144
Temenid dynasty 13
Temenos 13
Tempe 93
Tenedos 178
Tennes 181
Teres 115
Termessus 146, 147
Termez 281
Thais 254, 255
Thalestris 43, 260
Thapsacus 176, 215-217
Thara 256
Thasos 360, 368
Theagenes 104
Thebes (Greece) 15, 16, 22, 23, 31,
32, 35, 41, 49-54, 63, 93, 100-

439

106, 110, 114, 131, 137, 180,

219, 220
Thebes (Egypt) 199, 207
Themistocles 70
Theodoretus385
Theophrastus 25, 46, 313, 335
Theopompus 9, 19, 32, 64
Theos 360
Thermaic Gulf 3, 4, 21
Thermopylae 102, 248
Thespiae 102
Thessalonice 18, 92
Thessaly 2, 9, 10, 12, 15, 18-20, 23,
33, 35, 39, 46, 49, 93, 102, 111,
113, 122, 140, 143-145, 150,
158, 170, 179, 217, 230, 233,
247, 257, 271
Thetis166, 328
Thettalus 73, 214
Thoth 203, 205
Thrace 3, 6, 9, 13, 17, 18, 21-23,
33, 34, 46-49, 96, 98, 104, 110,
111, 135, 145, 158, 211, 220,
221, 230, 232, 247, 318
Thracian Chersonese 46, 52, 113,
114
Thrasybulus 141
Thucydides 13, 14, 53
Thutmose III 203
Thyateira 125
Thymondas 153, 177
Tiber 367
Tiberius 128
Tigris 216, 218, 225-227, 237, 243,
349, 361
Timachides 235, 236
Timoclea 104
Timoleon 54
Timotheos (general)63, 357
Timotheos (artist) 15
Tiphsah 215
Tiridates (treasurer) 249, 250
Tiridates (satrap) 268
Tissaphernes 128
Tlepolemus 259
Tralles 130

440
Triballi 49, 96-98, 101, 106, 111
Tripoli 177
Troad 72, 73, 117, 120, 153
Trojan Pass 96
Troy 19, 113-117, 198, 360
Turbat 334
Turkey 176
Turkmenistan 270
Tus 262, 263
Tuz Khurmatu 237
Tyana156, 317
Tybi 207
Tyche184
Tylos 368
Tymphaea 3, 30
Tyre 133, 140, 178, 184-197, 202,
213-215, 218, 221, 312
Tyriespis 298, 325
Tyrioltes 298
Udegram 301
Urartu 56
Uruk 239
Urumbey 117
Uxians 229, 246, 247, 363
Uzbekistan 274, 281
Valerius Maximus 194
Vardar 3
Vergina 4, 10, 13, 26, 89, 91, 92,
311
Vermion 3, 4, 39
Vespasian 385
Via Egnatia 8
Vitsi 3
Vourinos 3
Vulgate 251, 317, 326

Index
Xanthus 144
xenia 19, 20, 105, 354
Xenippa 281
Xenophilus 246
Xenophon 14, 61, 64, 65, 163, 166,
216
Xerxes I 14, 53, 54, 62, 67, 113116, 125, 137, 160, 235, 238,
239, 241, 245, 248, 254, 273,
361, 366, 385
Yahweh 196
Jamuna 315
Yasuj 247
Yehizqiyyah 195
Yemen 197
Zab Greater 226, 233
Zachariah 193
Zadracarta 259, 261
Zadrus 324
Zagros 60, 61, 233, 244, 246, 247,
255, 362
Zarathustra (Zoroaster) 58, 59, 128,
172, 252, 254, 329
Zaraispes 338
Zeleia118, 125, 151
Zephyros 138, 143
Zeravshan 277
Zeus 1, 107, 114, 116, 127, 149,
150, 176, 202, 209, 211, 212,
288, 299, 311, 337, 364
Zeuxis 15
Zimnicea 97
Zopyrion 49
Zoroaster see : Zarathustra