Victory Briefs Philosophers Guide

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Philosophers
Guide
Introduction (Stephen Babb) .......................................................................................1
Moral
St. Thomas Aquinas (Paul Strait) ................................................................................4
Immanuel Kant (Reed Winegar) .................................................................................9
John Stuart Mill (Anthony Berryhill) ........................................................................ 14
Virtue Ethics: Aristotle to MacIntyre (Stephen Babb) ................................................. 19
Peter Singer (Alan Lawn) ......................................................................................... 26
T.M. Scanlon (Reed Winegar) .................................................................................. 34
Political
Plato & Aristotle (Paul Strait) ................................................................................... 39
Thomas Hobbes & John Locke (Stephen Babb) ......................................................... 44
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Peter Clericuzio) ................................................................. 50
James Madison (Sumon Dantiki) .............................................................................. 57
Democracy (Stephen Babb) ...................................................................................... 63
John Rawls (Stephen Babb) ...................................................................................... 69
Robert Nozick (Stephen Babb) ................................................................................. 74
Amitai Etzioni (Jonathan Helfgott) ........................................................................... 80
Noam Chomsky (Jonathan Helfgott) ......................................................................... 86
Int. Relations Betty Reardon (David Vivero) .................................................................................. 92
Michael Walzer (Amy Moffett) ................................................................................ 97
Hannah Arendt (Andrew Rothschild) ...................................................................... 102
Realism (Sumon Dantiki) ....................................................................................... 109
Post-Modern Friedrich Nietzsche (Reed Winegar) ....................................................................... 116
Martin Heidegger (Andrew Rothschild) ................................................................... 119
Karl Jaspers (Andrew Rothschild) ........................................................................... 125
Jean-Paul Sartre (Andrew Rothschild) ..................................................................... 131
Albert Camus (Andrew Rothschild) ........................................................................ 137
Jacques Derrida (Dheeraj Chand) ............................................................................ 144
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (Mahrad Almotahari) ............................................. 151
Written by Mahrad Almotahari, Stephen Babb, Anthony Berryhill, Dheeraj

Chand, Peter Clericuzio, Sumon Dantiki, Jonathan Helfgott, Alan Lawn, Amy
Moffett, Andrew Rothschild, Paul Strait, David Vivero, Reed Winegar
Copyright 2002, Victory Briefs. Unauthorized duplication of this material is a breach of copyright laws.
www.victorybriefs.com
THE PHILOSOPHERS GUIDE

Introduction (Stephen Babb)
INTRODUCTION
by Stephen Babb
It's 11:30 on Thursday night, and you still haven't written cases. Soon it will be the early, early morning
of the tournament, and you still won't have cases. It may not be until late Friday afternoon sometime
just before round one that those cases actually reach completion, and even then they're "complete" only in
the most technical sense of the word. That "you" could easily be anyone who's ever participated in
Lincoln-Douglas debate, and on a few too many occasions to recall, it's been me as well. If you haven't
experienced the stressful last minute rush from being unprepared for a tournament, then chances are you
will at some point. High school throws far too many obstacles in one's way to plan around them all. And
when you haven't done enough, you come to know the almost sickening sensation of walking into a round
and feeling wholly and entirely unprepared. It almost seems as if the world has conspired against you,
and you feel vulnerable to just about every argument your opponent has to offer (even the bad ones) and
every look of skepticism the judge sends your way.
The surest preventative measure is not only to prepare yourself thoroughly before rounds, but to prepare
yourself even for that which you don't expect. This means more than just having cases done, and it means
more than having researched the topic. True preparation in debate means having a comprehensive
understanding of the issues debaters tend to encounter, issues that more often than not have something to
do with philosophy. Not only does increasing your knowledge of philosophy make the case-writing and
researching qualitatively easier; it offers you a foundation for and an insight into arguments you might not
otherwise explore, opposing positions you might not otherwise expect, and a grasp of the resolution you
might not otherwise find. Philosophy is a wide world of thought and discussion, ranging from
metaphysics to epistemology to political theory to ethics and beyond. Philosophers are the minds that
give life to these topics, wondering abstractly while often commenting quite practically on what good
government means or how to live life more virtuously or how we as a nation should act toward other
nations. When confronted with propositions of what ought to happen (as every debater is), who better to
turn to than these minds that have likely pondered the very same proposition or one much like it? The
Philosopher's Guide is an attempt to introduce anyone involved in the debate community to Classic,
Enlightenment, and contemporary views on a wide range of philosophical subjects, including moral,
political, economic, and international relations theory as well as perspectives from Existential, Feminist,
and Post-Modern perspectives.
Notice that it is indeed an introduction. Think of this book as a springboard into those philosophical
disciplines that are most relevant to Lincoln-Douglas debate. In other words, it is not alone sufficient
reading, especially if one's goal is to excel at philosophical aspects of debate. It should be used as a guide
that fosters further reading, helping you to understand terms, concepts, references, and a great deal of
general content that ensues in your search for more understanding. It can be a daunting task to approach a
philosophical work with no clue as to its context, what it's really about, what others have said about it, etc.
Even as an experienced reader of philosophy, it remains daunting to read philosophy first-hand. The
added commentary by those who have read the philosophers already and read others' comments can be an
invaluable asset for debaters no matter what grade or skill level they're at. And even more importantly,
this guide comes to you from people who have walked in your footsteps and actually had to debate about
philosophy. You can get an overview on Kant anywhere, but knowing how to talk about him in a debate
round is what makes the difference. Each overview in the Philosopher's Guide contains a section
explaining just how a philosopher or philosophy can be used in debate. From case writing to research to
rebuttals, this book is an advantage both competitively and educationally and it makes that whole
preparation thing a lot easier.
2001, Victory Briefs

Keep two things in mind. First of all, even though the Philosopher's Guide isn't a short cut to reading the
actual thing, it has not sacrificed depth, accuracy, or clarity. The overviews are cogent and avoid a
superficial approach-- this isn't fast-food philosophy. Each overview reveals a meaningful consideration
of the philosopher's actual literature, and the analysis reflects a great amount of time spent in research,
careful thought, and expert writing. In short, this book is built on quality and gives the whole story.
Second of all, while introductory in nature, the Philosopher's Guide appeals to all levels of debater. Even
for those who have strong foundations in LD related philosophy, this approach presents an experienced
perspective from those who have competed, coached, instructed, and judged in the event lending a
unique angle worth reading. Additionally, the comprehensive nature of the book provides exposure to
philosophers and aspects of philosophy that may have been previously unexplored. One book can only
cover so much, but this one attempts to create a cross-section from which the reader can develop a
cohesive and broad appreciation for the pertinent philosophies.
Finally, a few words on how to read the overviews and their applications to debate. Each overview
focuses on either a philosopher or a narrow discipline with reference to several philosophers. The
overviews are not biographical, nor are they even a complete discussion of that philosopher's work. For
that matter, the placement of a philosopher is not suggestive of his or her life's work. For instance, John
Stuart Mill wrote extensively on politically relevant topics like liberty and government, but has been
included in the moral theory section of this book in an effort to explore his utilitarian views. Likewise,
Kant made significant contribution to the field of metaphysics, but for the Philosopher's Guide, we were
primarily concerned with his thoughts on ethics. The placement or choice of emphasis is not an
indication of what the author's "best" work is or even what's most important for you to know so much as it
is a reflection of what's most relevant given the constraints of space. It is also worth noting that the
authors selected to represent a particular philosophical genre (e.g. "Moral Theory") are not to be
considered the sole or foremost thinkers within their category. There are countless minds to make
meaningful contributions in each category, and it would be impossible to represent them all or even to
select the most "important" ones. Nevertheless, an effort is made to provides selections that illustrate the
differing views on each genre and thus give a fuller understanding of the topic in general. For example,
as opposed to presenting the views of 5 political theorists all of whom are egalitarians, this guide attempts
to show an egalitarian perspective along with a libertarian one, one primarily interested in the idea of
community, and so on. Insofar as debate demands a consideration of various viewpoints, the place of
philosophy in a debate round must likewise reflect an appreciation for the diverse plurality of opinions.
In each overview, generally one or two books from the philosopher at hand will receive focus. This may
be their most recent work, that which is most relevant to debate, or simply the one that has the most
philosophical significance. You will find a good amount of evidence in the overviews that is taken either
directly from the philosopher's text or from other philosophers and critics who have made important
comments on the philosopher. They may be selected on the basis of their usefulness in a debate round
along with any particular clarity that the actual rhetoric may bring to the discussion. Sometimes the most
revealing words are the ones originally chosen by the author. These selections are also the foundation for
further analysis and explanation in the overview. This is a guide that takes special care to remain
textually accurate and consistent with the author's original meaning. You will also notice aspects of the
overview that give tips on how to use the philosopher or philosophy in a debate round, and in general
there will be an indication of other books or authors you should check out to read more on the subject.
Finally, you will note that in many cases certain words are in bold. These words are essential vocabulary
in philosophy and LD, and they are a great way to become more familiar with the basics.

If you should come across a word or concept that you don't understand, don't fret. Keep reading, and use
the problem as an excuse to read from other sources as well. Philosophy builds upon itself. Each book of
philosophy is generally a response to someone else's or one that attempts to further an already developed
field of philosophy. The terms, ideas, personalities, and elements to each work are passed on. When first
diving in to it all, you may feel in too deep and just plain confused. Take your time and be patient. We
hope the Philosopher's Guide is a tool that newcomers and experts alike can use to further their
proficiency in the philosophical spheres of debate. A complete educational experience and a successful
competitive experience depend on your ability to incorporate a long tradition of philosophy and thought
into your arguments. Not only will the arguments benefit from added depth and clarity, but they take
advantage of entire lifetimes worth of thought that High School just doesn't allow for.
We are confident that the Philosopher's Guide, while not a complete solution to one's grasp of
philosophy, is an invaluable aid both for the beginner and the seasoned debater. Read it through once,
and return to it often when the need arises. And remember, whether turning to this book, other
philosophy, or still other research the preparation is where good debating begins. Best of luck in
wherever debate may take you!

Aquinas (Paul Strait)
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

by Paul Strait
Students of medieval philosophy recognize Thomas Aquinas as perhaps the greatest thinker of his time.
In the thirteenth century, Europe was at the cusp of a new erathe dark ages were over, and, with the
discovery of many long forgotten texts, Scholasticism emerged. The great conflict between faith and
reason set the tone for much of the debate from this period, and in a relatively brief career (He was
declared a Master of Theology in 1256, and died in 1274 at the age of 49), he developed a complex
philosophical system that sought to reconcile the teachings of Aristotle with a uniquely Christian
understanding of the universe. Armed with an understanding of the Thomistic system, debaters will be
able to write unique cases that will be sure to win them many rounds.
The Basics
Central to Aquinas moral philosophy is an analysis of human action. He is pragmatic, favoring moral
action over moral theory. Human actors are conscious of what they are doing and why they are doing it,
and because of this, they are morally responsible rational animals. All human actions (actus humani
actions done by humans insofar as they are human) are moral acts. Reason and free will are the source of
human actions, and the reason that humans must take responsibility for their actions.
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IaIIae.I.I
Human beings differ from irrational creatures in this, that they have dominion
over their actions. That is why only those actions over which a human being has
dominion are called human. But it is thanks to reason and will that human beings have
control over their acts: free will (liberum arbitrium) is said to be the faculty of reason
and will.
If humans are responsible for their acts, then it is very important to figure out which actions are
acceptable and which are not. All actions, Aquinas argues, are directed at an end (?????????It is merely a
useless semantic distinction to say that a person has freedom if there is no purpose for that freedomif
people did whatever they pleased for no reason at all, they would not be free; rather, they would be ruled
by chaos. Similar to Aristotle, Aquinas posits that the end for which all humans act is happiness. This is
his value premise.
Aquinas was not, however, a utilitarian. This is not the overly vague and frightening greatest good for
the greatest number philosophy in drag. Aquinas has something very particular in mind when he talks
about happiness. First, a discussion of Aquinas understanding of the moral quality of human acts is in
order. An act is individuated by its intention. If Person A chops down a tree for the sake of damaging the
forest, and Person B chops down the same tree for the sake of gathering needed firewood, they are clearly
engaging in different actions. Acts are classified by the end at which they aim. It seems that there are
many admirable endshealth, success, friendship, etc. All of these ends are merely intermediaries to
happiness. For example, no one wants to be healthy merely for the sake of being healthygood health
makes many people happy. Happiness, therefore, is humanitys ultimate goals, and actions should be
judged based on their intention to reach happiness.
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IaIIae.I.I
Whatever a human being seeks, it seeks under the aspect of the good (sub
ratione boni), and if it does not seek it as its perfect good, which is its ultimate end, it
must seek it as tending to that perfect good, since any beginning is ordered to its
culmination.

It does seem a bit easy and cute to say that all people desire happiness. That seems to beg the question,
and indeed, a discussion of happiness is in order. Aquinas operates under two basic assumptions about
human nature: first, he believes that no person can authentically desire evilby definition, evil is the
opposite of desirable. Second, he sees a difference between the partic ular thing aimed at and the reason it
is aimed at. (Recall the discussion above about chopping down a tree). Like everything in the universe,
humans are oriented toward an endwhat is good for someone, therefore, is what fulfills and completes
them. Any object of human action should aim at this overarching, comprehensive good.
Aquinas is not foolishly utopian, thinking that all people desire that which is best for them. Clearly,
human experience negates this. Yet, it makes sense to suppose that no rational being would act in a way
contrary to its own best interest. All humans, therefore, act to meet their perceived goals, even if in fact
those goals are contrary to their true end. How are people to determine in what true happiness consists?
In a word: Virtue.
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IaIIae.58.3
A human virtue is any habit perfecting a human being so that it acts well. There
are two principles of human action, namely intellect or reason and appetite Hence any
human virtue must be perfective of one or the other of these principles. If it is perfective
of speculative or practical intellect so that a person acts well, it is an intellectual virtue; if
it is perfective of the appetitive part, it is a moral virtue.
The test of whether or not something is good lies in its functionif it fulfills its function, it is good. For
example, an ear is good if it can hear properly. Using this test, it seems difficult to say that all human
actions are moral actions. One can analyze many human actions in a non-moral way. Good debate skills
help win debatesdoes that mean that good debaters are more moral than their less successful peers?
This misses the distinction, Aquinas would argue, between a technical and a moral appraisal of action.
One can say that someone gave a good speech, because that speech satisfied its purpose of winning the
debate round. One could also examine that action morally, asking if that speech helped enhance and
fulfill the life of the debater. If so, it is a morally good speech.
The human good, then, consists of many virtues, both intellectual and moral. Intellectual virtues help one
understand the good, and moral virtues help one put this understanding into practice. Practical wisdom is
the ultimate moral virtue. As Aquinas writes, Prudence (practical wisdom) gives not only the capacity
for a good work but also use, for it looks to appetite, indeed presupposes rectification of the appetite
(Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IaIIae.57.4)
Since humans must know what is good in order to practice it, they must be able to formulate maxims.
Many cases often reflect such a maxim. Debaters argue that society should support the greatest good for
the greatest number, that people should act in such a way that if their action was made universal, it
would be good (the well known categorical imperative of Kant), that one should never harm innocents,
that one should defend ones country from attackers, etc. All of these are rules of action formulated by
humans designed to promote the human good. This brings up an interesting problem: often, people
know moral rules, yet they fail to follow them. This suggests that knowledge of moral rules is useless.
In fact, Aquinas argues, people often do not really know the rules that they claim to know. It is possible
to propose a certain rule as best, yet, because of habituation toward some other goal, not really understand
the proposed moral reality. For example, a man might claim to be a Kantian deontologist. This man,
when placed in a situation where lying offers what he perceives as a short term gain, might desire the
short term benefit of lying, despite claiming adherence to a philosophy that asserts lying is never
desirable.

The ends-based nature of Aquinass moral doctrine is not unique to the human mind. Nature itself has a
particular order to it, and so all things have a natural purpose. This order is codified in what Aquinas calls
Natural Law. A basic premise of this law is that there are basic truths that are accessible to all people.
This is true for both moral and metaphysical principles. For example, Aquinas believes that our minds
begin tabula rasa, or as a blank slate. Yet, all reasonable people will accept the Principle of NonContradiction, that a thing and its opposite cannot both be true at the same time and in the same way. It is
either true or false that North Carolina is south of Virginia it can never be both true and false. When
humans are born, this truth is not innately in their minds, yet they know it to be true by their basic
experience of the world. Likewise, basic moral truths are known through observation of the natural
world.
Aquinas defines Natural Law as the participation in the Eternal Law by natural creatures. This requires
a few more definitions. Aquinas defines Law as an ordination of reason for the common good
promulgated by the one who is in charge of the community (Summa Theologiae IaIIae.90.4). This
ordination of reason, of course, is teleological, i.e., it commands what is done to reach a desired end.
Aquinas understands the Eternal Law as the rational governance of everything on the part of God as the
ruler of the universe (Summa Theologiae IaIIae.91.1). Therefore, the Natural Law dictates that people,
recognizing what is good and bad in the universe by natural inclination, act upon that which is good.
These natural inclinations include self-preservation, family life, and proper societal living. All of these
inclinations are obligatory for rational people.
Recall that virtue lies in the perfection of human behavior. It can be appropriately understood as the
perfection of the natural inclinations rooted in natural law, so that people desire to do what is right. Just
as the Principle of Non-Contradiction is self-apparent to the intellect, there is a basic principle of Natural
Law that is self-apparent to the will.
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IaIIae.58.3
Good should be pursued and done, and evil avoided. This is the foundation of
all other precepts of natures law, such that whatever things practical reason naturally
grasps to be human goods pertain to natural laws precepts as to what is to be done or
avoided Since good has the character of an end and evil the contrary character, all
those things to which a man has a natural inclination reason naturally grasps as goods,
and consequently as things to be pursued, and it grasps their contraries as things to be
avoided
Following this most general moral maxim, less general ones can be developed, until concrete, particular
rules can be made for different ethical questions. While most reasonable people would agree that people
should do good and avoid evil, articulating how that general rule applies in specific instances can be
difficult at times. What is important is to keep in mind in what Goodness consists in, what virtue is, and
how the natural law functions. Then, by an operation of practical wisdom and right reason, ethical
questions can be answered.
Strategy
How is one to apply these ethical concepts to a debate round? There are a few ways in which this can be
done. Depending on the resolution, you could use Virtue or even more generally Happiness as your
value premise. Then, utilizing a specific Thomistic understanding of what those words mean, you could
effectively capture your opponents value premise. Almost every value premise used in debate is a subset
of Happiness or Virtue. The examples people use to justify their value premises will ultimately boil down
to this. For example, suppose someones value premise is Justice, defined as giving people their due.

Ultimately, the reason why that value is important is because it leads to a good society, which is only
good because it leads to human flourishing and happiness (?????????? is the term Aristotle uses for
this).
If a more specific value premise seems exceptionally appropriate given the resolution and the way you
want to write your case, you could use the philosophy of Aquinas as your criteria. Your value is best
precisely because it most effectively cultivates virtue or leads to happiness, when applied in the way you
suggest it ought to be applied. These are the types of arguments that happen in debates anyway, and with
a Thomistic understanding of ethics, you can articulate this very effectively and succinctly.
Some resolutions demand debates about how governments should carry out public policy. The
January/February 2002 topic, for instance, questioned whether an oppressive government is more
desirable than no government. In 1994, one of the resolutions posited, When called upon by ones
government, individuals are morally obligated to risk their lives for their country. In 1998, one
resolution asked if civil disobedience is justified in a democracy, while another questioned if a just
social order ought to place the principle of equality above that of liberty. This type of resolution is
common, and seems to come up at least once a year. For these types of resolutions, you can use your
superior knowledge of natural law to best your opponents. All laws place restraints of some sort on
freedom for the sake of the common good. Aquinas argues that an action isnt good or bad because it is
prescribed or proscribed by lawsrather, the laws exist because certain actions are good or bad. Civil
laws only have force, he maintains, if they are consistent with natural laws. If the government mandated
murder of Canadians, for instance, that civil law would be a perversion of the natural law, and so does not
oblige people to follow it. When a resolution asks debaters to defend one value over another in the realm
of public policy, people on either side can argue that their value is consistent with the natural law. Since
the only valid civil laws are those that are consistent with the natural law, if you win that your value is
higher in the natural law, you should win that public policy ought to be based on your value.
Another consideration in these types of resolutions is that, for Aquinas, law is based on the community.
He argues, Making law belongs either to the whole people or to the public personage who has the
responsibility for the whole people (Summa Theologiae, IaIIae.90.2). Thus, you can argue that laws that
are directed at some private good rather than the public good are invalid.
Often, with these types of resolutions, your opponent will argue for some form of Deontology (Immanuel
Kant) or Utilitarianism (John Stuart Mill). With Aquinas, you have the best of both worlds. The system
is teleological in that it looks at ends, yet it has a deontological character because certain means are
prohibited because they frustrate the purpose of humanity, disenabling people to achieve happiness. For
example, Aquinas would argue that adultery, homosexual practic es, lying, murder, suicide, usury,
gluttony, the breaking of promises, drunkenness, etc. are all opposed to nature and so are forbidden by the
natural law. You can use this synergy of utilitarianism and deontology to your advantage by capturing the
strong points of your opponents case, while pointing out extreme examples that their reasoning leads to
but that Aquinass system avoids. Incidentally, these teachings of Aquinas have guided the Catholic
Churchs understanding of political ethics for eight hundred years; if you are curious how to apply this
system to a specific resolution, simply look up that Churchs position on the resolution.
No discussion of the moral philosophy of Aquinas would be complete without mentioning the Just War
Theory. While not applicable often, some resolutions are especially well suited to arguments based on
what is and what is not a just war. For example, in 1998, one resolution called into question the United
States foreign policy with Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Cuba, and several other countries: The use of
economic sanctions to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals is moral. In 1995, the resolution in use at the
Bronx tournament also was relevant: Americas national security should be of greater importance than
Chinas human rights practices in formulating American foreign policy toward China.

Aquinas did not originate the concept that some wars are just while others are notAugustine and Cicero
both discuss certain wars in this context. Aquinas, however, systematized this theory. The Just War
Theory is based on two basic principles: ius ad bellum (justice to war) and ius in bello (justice in war).
In order to satisfy the first principle, a war must be declared by proper authority (someone who has the
responsibility to defend the people and who is not a tyrant), it must have a just cause (for instance, self
defense, or the defense of an ally), it must have a reasonable chance of success, and finally, the end of the
war must be proportional to the means used (if someone attacks the United States conventionally, the
United States has the right to defend itself, but does not have the right to respond with nuclear weapons).
The second principle, ius in bello, requires that a justly established war be carried out justly. This
involves two things: discrimination and proportionality. The principle of discrimination requires that
soldiers distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, and refrain from hurting the latter. The
principle of proportionality is concerned with the amount of force one may use. If an army attacks, for
example, with clubs, it would not be just to answer that attack with bazookas.
The Just War Theory is not limited to foreign engagements explicitly called wars. Many people
argue, for example, that economic sanctions violate the Just War Theory because they do not
discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. In Iraq, the United States government wants to
punish Saddam Hussein, but its sanctions, which disrupt the entire economy of Iraq, and arguably cause
millions of deaths, fail to discriminate. Aquinas felt that the Just War Theory was part of the natural
law. As such, if applicable to the resolution, debaters could use it to write very clever cases.
It is my hope that debaters will employ the ethical teachings of Aquinas more often in debate rounds.
Aquinass ethical discourse of practical wisdom is applicable to almost every resolution in one way or
another. Do some reading, think strategically, and win some rounds!
For more information:
?? Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologia.
?? Donagan, A. The Theory of Mortality.
?? Donagan, A. Thomas Aquinas on Human Action. In The Cambridge History of Later
Medieval Philosophy, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg.
?? Geach, P. Good and Evil Analysis, 17.
?? Williams, B. Morality: An Introduction to Ethics.

Kant (Reed Winegar)
IMMANUEL KANT
by Reed Winegar
Immanuel Kant revolutionized philosophy. His influence on modern philosophy is as large as Albert
Einsteins influence on modern physics. Just as no modern physicist can ignore Einsteins work, no
modern philosopher can ignore Kants philosophy.
In the way of biographical information, Kant was born in Konigsberg, East Prussia on April 22, 1724 and
died on February 12, 1804. Kant remained in Konigsberg until his death. The best Kant biography is
probably Manfred Keuhns Kant: A Biography. Kant was a pious and meticulous man who devoted his
life to intellectual pursuits. He did not lead a colorful life, but his books completely changed Western
philosophy.
But what did Kant say that makes him so important? We will limit our discussion to Kants moral and
political philosophy. However, this still represents a large body of work. Kant grouped his ethics,
morality, and political philosophy under the heading of practical philosophy. By practical philosophy
Kant means philosophy that tells us how to behave. Kants earliest ethical theories can be found in his
Lectures on Ethics (1775-1780). These lectures are different from Kants later theories, but they do
discuss a wide range of topics from suicide to friendship. Kants later practical philosophy can be found
largely in three books: Critique of Practical Reason (1787), Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals
(1785), and Metaphysic of Morals (1797). The Critique of Practical Reason shows the origins and worth
of moral reasoning. The Groundwork provides a criterion for knowing when an action is immoral. This
standard is the much discussed Categorical Imperative. And the Metaphysic of Morals gives a more indepth discussion of the idea in the Groundwork. It applies the Categorical Imperative to various questions
in moral and political philosophy. These three books comprise the bulk of Kants practical philosophy,
but he also wrote smaller works. Perpetual Peace tells how to maintain peace between nations. And in
A Letter on the Supposed Right to Lie for Philanthropic Reasons Kant, as the title says, examines
whether it is permissible to lie in order to help others. The majority of Kants practical philosophy can be
found well-translate in the Practical Philosophy volume of the Cambridge edition of Kants works.
All of Kants philosophical works are superb, but they are also all very dense and very dry. Many students
are daunted by the supposed difficulty of Kant, but they should not be. As long as you read slowly and
carefully you should be fine. But what are the most important books to read? You should read the first
and second chapters of the Groundwork (a total of about 50 pages) and at least be familiar with Kants
positions on issues like capital punishment and civil disobedience in the Metaphysic of Morals since
issues like these have a tendency to become LD resolutions.
I will now provide an outline of the Groundworks argument in order to characterize Kants moral
philosophy. However, just like all philosophical literature you use or encounter in debate rounds, you
should actually read this book.
Kants over-arching claim in the Groundwork is that there is a moral rule which we are never allowed to
break. This rule is the Categorical Imperative. In the Groundwork Kant says that there is only a single
categorical imperative and it is this: Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will
that it should become a universal law. ( 88)i This is the highest moral law, and we are never allowed to
break it. We have a duty to always follow it. But what on earth does this law mean? And why should we
follow it? And I thought the Categorical Imperative was about not using people as a means? I will answer
these three questions in exactly this order.

Kant (Reed Winegar)
What does Kants statement of the Categorical Imperative mean? What does it mean to Act only on that
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law? Kant means
that every time we act we act on a principle. If I give money to an orphanage I act on the principle that
People who have enough money should give some money to those who need it. According to the
Categorical Imperative a principle, or maxim as Kant calls it, on which we act ought to be one on which
all people could always act without creating any contradictions. It is important to notice that the
Categorical Imperative only tells us what we are not allowed to do. It does not tell us what acts we ought
to perform; it only establishes which acts are off limits.
In order to illustrate his theory, Kant gives the example of breaking a promise to repay a loan. If I break a
promise to repay a loan then, according to Kant, I act on a maxim that says Whenever I believe myself
short of money, I will borrow money and promise to pay it back, though I know that this will never be
done (90). Kant argues that acting on this maxim violates the Categorical Imperative, and therefore it is
immoral to break my promise to repay a loan. Kant writes, For the universality of a law that every one
believing himself to be in need can make any promise he pleases with the intention not to keep it would
make promising, and the very purpose of promising, itself impossible, since no one would believe he was
being promised anything, but would laugh at utterances of this kind as empty shams (90). A common
misinterpretation of quotations like this one is to think that Kant says breaking a promise violates the
Categorical Imperative because if everyone always broke promises there would be mass chaos and thus a
decrease in social welfare. But this is not what Kant means. Kant does not say that we should always
follow the Categorical Imperative because it is a good rule for maximizing welfare. He is not a rule utilitarian. Welfare calculations do not figure into Kants philosophy at all. Instead, what Kant means is
that if everyone always broke promises then there would be no point in making a promise. The intent of
breaking a promise contradicts the words of a promise. Maybe we can imagine a world where if everyone
broke promises this would actually increase the social welfare (obviously we do not live in such an
imaginary world). However, even if we did live in this imaginary world we would still, according to Kant,
have a duty to not break promises. We would still have this duty because the contradiction that if
everyone always broke promises then the idea of making a promise would have no meaning is not
eradicated just because the social welfare has been increased. A maxim to break a promise always
contradicts itself, and it is important to show a contradiction, not a decrease in welfare.
And why should we follow the Categorical Imperative? Kants claim about our duty to follow the
Categorical Imperative is very strong. We always have to follow the Categorical Imperative, and we can
never violate it. But why? Kants justification for why we have to follow the Categorical Imperative is
reasonably lengthy and is dependent on seeing morality in a certain way. It is dependent on seeing
morality as not being about the particular world in which we live but rather being about any possible
world. Therefore, the Categorical Imperative is based on an abstract philosophical system that does not
pay attention to things like happiness which may only exist for us. Rational aliens might have no concept
of happiness, but morality would still apply to them.
Kant begins his justification of the Categorical Imperative by saying that the only thing in the world
which is absolutely good is a good will. He writes, It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the
world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will (61). Not
even happiness is always good because it can produce boldness, and as a consequence often overboldness as well, unless a good will is present (61). A good will is the only absolutely good thing.
But what makes a will a good will? What makes a good will good is not that it accomplishes anything. It
is good in itself. Kant writes, A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes
because of its fitness for attaining some proposed end: it is good through its willing alonethat is, good
in itself (62). But how do know that we are acting on a good will? First we have to know we are acting
on will and not on instinct. To act on will we have to use reason to formulate intent and then act on that
10

Kant (Reed Winegar)
intent. Therefore, reason is fundamental to morality because it is necessary in order to have a good will.
But why should we not use our reason to just pursue happiness and welfare? Kants answer is that we do
not need reason in order to pursue welfare. Instinct works well enough. So when I apply reason to my
actions I am doing more than just pursuing welfare. I am producing a will that has moral content.
To make sure that our actions are good actions we have to consciously decide to obey our duties, despite
temptations to neglect duty. When we follow duty because we recognize our obligation to be moral we
are acting on a good will. Kant writes, An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose
to be attained by it, but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon: it depends therefore,
not on the realization of the object of the action, but solely on the principle of volition in accordance with
which, irrespective of all objects of the faculty of desire, the action has been performed (68). This means
that the worth of an action does not come from the effects of the action but from the intent that inspired
the action. But what should that intent be? Kant says that Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for
the law (68). Therefore, reverence for the law should be our motivation for following the moral law. If
the reason we act morally is out of reverence for the moral law, then we are acting with the right kind of
intent. When we act out of reverence for the law, instead of acting to increase our welfare, then we are
acting in the right kind of way.
But doesnt Kant talk about imperatives? What are imperatives in contrast to duties? For our
purposes, an imperative is similar to a duty. They are both things that we ought to do regardless of the
consequences. There are two types of imperatives. There are hypothetical imperatives and there are
categorical imperatives. Kant distinguishes between these two types of imperatives, all imperatives
are formulae for determining an action which is necessary in accordance with the principle of a will in
some sense good. If the action would be good solely as a means to something else, the imperative is
hypothetical; if the action is represented as good in itself and therefore as necessary, in virtue of its
principle, for a will which of itself accords with reason, then the imperative is categorical (82). What
Kant is saying is that an imperative is hypothetical if the reason the imperative is good is because it leads
to something else which is good. An imperative is categorical if it is good in itself. Kant says that we
cannot totally ignore hypothetical imperatives and never perform them, but we do not have to fulfill all
hypothetical imperatives all the time. For instance, I should often give money to charity, but I do not have
to give money to every down-and-out person I see. That is because giving money to charity is a
hypothetical imperative. However, we do have to always follow a categorical imperative. We are never
allowed to disregard a categorical imperative. It always applies.
But how do we know what the moral law is? How do we know what are our imperatives and duties? Kant
answers these questions by formulating the Categorical Imperative. The Categorical Imperative is the
duty that we all have to follow at all times. As mentioned before, there is only one Categorical
Imperative. But why is the Categorical Imperative to act only on a maxim through which you can will
that it become a universal law? The reason it is not clear why this statement is the categorical imperative
is that we know that we have a duty to act out of reverence for the law, but we do not know what that law
is. However, Kant says that we do not have to know what the moral law is in order to formulate the
Categorical Imperative. We formulate the Categorical Imperative based on a simple syllogism. First, the
principles we act on should conform to the moral law. Second, the moral law contains no condition to
limit it, meaning that it is universal and applies to all rational beings at all times. Therefore, we can tell if
our principle conforms to the moral law by seeing if our principle could apply universally like the moral
law does. If the principle we act on conforms with the moral law then it can be universalized. But if the
principle could not apply to all rational beings at all times without contradiction, then the principles does
not conform with the moral law because the moral law does apply to all rational beings at all times. Kant
writes, For since besides the law this imperative contains only the necessity that our maxim should
conform to this law, while the law, as we have seen, contains no condition to limit it, there remains
nothing over to which the maxim has to conform except the universality of a law as such; and it is this
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Kant (Reed Winegar)
conformity alone that the imperative properly asserts to be necessary (88). Therefore, Kant has given us
a standard for knowing when our action does not equate with the moral law. If the principle behind my
action could not be universalized without contradiction then it does not conform with the universal moral
law.
Once again it is important to notice that the Categorical Imperative only tells us if something is not moral.
Just because something passes the Categorical Imperatives test does not mean that it necessarily is moral.
There may very well be maxims that can be universalized but which still are not moral. Therefore, the
Categorical Imperative is a necessary but not sufficient test for morality. You can use the Categorical
Imperative to weed out immoral things, but you cannot use it to definitively state if something is moral.
But I thought that the Categorical Imperative just said to not use people as a means? Kant gives several
different ways to state the Categorical Imperative. These are all different ways of saying the same thing.
The most important one of them is the command to treat people as though they are members of a
Kingdom of Ends. But what does it mean to treat someone as though she were a member of a Kingdom of
Ends? It means that we should treat people as ends in themselves, and not use them as means. In other
words, all people are of inherent value and should be respected as such, rather than used for our purposes.
However, there is a subtle point to bring out. It is ok to use people as a means as long as we do not use
them merely as a means. This means that if the person is included in the ends of an action then it is ok to
use them. However, there is a distinction that needs to be drawn about what it means to be included as an
ends. To illustrate this distinction take the case of random searches. If we constantly randomly searched
peoples homes we would all be safer from terrorists and murderers. However, I know that I am not a
murderer. Searching my home, when I know that I have nothing illegal in it, does not in any way benefit
me. Maybe I benefit from a general policy of searching homes, but I do not benefit from my home being
searched. Therefore, I am not being treated as an ends when my home is randomly searched. If the police
randomly search my house I am being used merely as a means to other peoples safety.
There is a common concern that many people have with Kants philosophy. They claim that it is too
abstract and strict. It does not pay enough attention to the way the world is, and it makes unrealistic
demands on us. The classic example is a scenario where you are harboring a Jewish family in your attic in
Germany during World War II. Suddenly, an SS officer knocks on your door and asks if you know if
there are any Jews in the house. Intuitively almost everyone would say to lie to the Nazi. The harm of
telling a lie in order to save the lives of an entire innocent family seems a minor harm. However, the
Categorical Imperative says that we are never allowed to lie! Does this mean that the Categorical
Imperative is a ridiculous theory? Maybe. Maybe not. Maybe the Categorical Imperative is right and our
intuition is wrong, but I personally would place my faith in intuition and lie to the Nazi. Kants own
answer to this dilemma comes in the Letter Concerning the Right to Lie for Philanthropic Reasons.
Kant recognizes the moral need to save the family, and he agrees that this seems like a much more
important goal than avoiding lying. Kants way around the problem is to claim that it is ok to mislead as
long as you do not explicitly lie. The Jewish family is in the attic and not in your field of vision. So, when
the Nazi asks Do you know if there are any Jewish people here? you can truthfully say No because
you do not know in a strict sense if the Jewish family is still in the attic or if they have escaped from the
house through a window. Many people are not satisfied by this answer. They feel like it is a cop out that
does not really answer the question, or they disagree with the arguments logic. Read Kants letter and
evaluate the argument yourself.
Of course, we are still left with the question Why does any of this matter? Why is it important to know
about Kant for Lincoln-Douglas debate? Well, there is no way to avoid Kant in debate. You will hear him
explicitly quoted. You hear people use Kantian ideas without actually citing Kant. You will hear other
philosophers quoted whose theories are indebted to Kant. And maybe you will even use some of Kants
ideas yourself. A strong grasp of Kant will give you an arsenal of arguments against opponents who run
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Kant (Reed Winegar)
utilitarian or consequentialist cases. Moreover, the Categorical Imperative can serve as an excellent
criterion for showing that something is immoral (but remember that just because something passes the
Categorical Imperatives test does not mean it is moral). In fact, many criteria you see out there today
which deal with autonomy or not using people as a means are just offshoots of the Categorical Imperative.
But if you are going to use the Categorical Imperative make sure you use it correctly. Kant thought the
Categorical Imperative was clear and easy to use, but few people since have agreed with him. Often it is
not clear how the Categorical Imperative tells us to act in certain cases. However, Kant treats many of
these ambiguous cases explicitly in the Metaphysic of Morals. For instance, Kant explicitly says that
Capital Punishment is moral. In fact he says that we have an obligation to execute murderers. He also
condones war in some cases, says that we should always obey the government even if it is unjust, and he
says that we have an obligation to live under a government instead of in even peaceful anarchy. While it
may not appear like it on the surface, all of these opinions are drawn directly out of the Categorical
Imperative. Finally, you can use Perpetual Peace in order to set up conditions that must be met for
global peace to be possible. Therefore, Kant has a wide range of applications to LD debate which
probably explains why he is so often used by debaters. Therefore, I strongly encourage you to read Kant
and to use him in debate rounds.
13

Mill (Anthony Berryhill)
JOHN STUART MILL

by Anthony Berryhill
Marketplace of ideas! The three words that any debater from the past two seasons knows all too well.
When we have discussed issues like cultural sensitivity and hate speech, these three words come up and in
many cases, we all know whats being talked about. My purpose in this section is to not only tell you the
common arguments about Mill and to familiarize yourself with his key concepts---it is also to give you
some tools from Mill that people never use.
The very basics: definitions
Two words describe John Stuart Mill: utilitarian, liberty. Utilitarian applies because Mill believes in the
common phrase the greatest happiness of the greatest number. We ought to do that action that allows us
to maximize goodness, or happiness. Mill elaborates his theory in his book (surprise!) Utilitarianism.
More about this theory later.
The word liberty describes him because Mill is very concerned about preserving individual freedom,
and the conditions in which we choose to restrict personal autonomy. When you hear about Mills about
liberty you will hear the following terms:
harm principle: you cannot violate someones freedom unless they have caused harm to another person
paternalism: one person restricting someones freedom in a parent role, for their own good
marketplace of ideas: shorthand for Mills idea that we need a diversity of opinions/ideas in order to
form the best conclusion possible
the truth: the ultimate goal of our behaviors, find out what is valid
utility: do what maximizes the greatest good for the greatest number
So now, for the rest of this article, I shall give you quotes and arguments that we can derive from Mills
works, giving helpful advice as we go along.
Considering Mills utility
As stated before, utility is giving the greatest happiness of the greatest number but what does this
mean? This is a term you will hear a lot (except they will replace happiness with good) so it merits
official definition:
(Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations on Representative Government,
London: Everyman, 1993. page 7) <this is the utilitarianism section>
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility , or the Greatest
Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote
happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness
is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation
of pleasure.
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(mill, 7)
But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this
theory of morality is foundednames, that pleasure, and freedom from pain,
are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous
in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent
in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.
Ok, so this definition of utility is important because it defines the background in which Mill makes all of
his other arguments about marketplace of ideas, etc. He values things like free speech not for some
means-based reason (like dignity, etc.) but instead because they lead to GOOD CONSEQUENCES. One
helpful hint then, is when you hear Mill in a round, think about the issue you are dealing with specifically.
If you are talking about hate speech, and you have to respond to why censorship is bad, you can very
easily argue that we value the marketplace because it gives us good consequences, things like hate speech
lead to lots of pain/suffering, which is a reason to censor. Mill himself would not say that, but it would be
a correct response in terms of Mills philosophical basis.
Another seldom discussed idea from Mill is that we have to be careful about we define as pleasure. Mill
himself is very very big on letting experience define our judgments. In terms of understanding utility, we
fall back on those people who have the most experiences when they are weighing what is the greatest
pleasure for the greatest number.
(Mill, 11)
On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures, or which of two modes
of existence is the most grateful to the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and from
its consequences, the judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge or both, or, if
they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final.
(Mill, 11)
What means are there of determining whic h is the acutest of two pains, or the intensest
of two pleasurable sensations, except the general suffrage of those who are familiar with
both?
You can use this argument as a lens for understanding other ideas. How can we judge something better
than other people who have first hand experience? Take for example the November/December 01 topic
on lesser developed nations having the right to hurt the environment. A possible application of this idea is
to say, how can rich nations have the right to speak for the unique situation of poor countries? Shouldnt
we have empathy for their point of view?
Overall, if you want to go deeply into Mills utility theory, read his book Utilitarianism. He goes into
detail about the relationship between rights and morality, justice, etc. Most likely, you will not need to
read this book, (you will however need to look at On Liberty. but like most of the ideas in Mill, they
can give you concepts (like the ones mentioned above) that you wont hear many debaters talking about.
The popular stuff: marketplace of ideas
So, understanding that Mill is a utilitarian, we know that his goal is not simply about some Kantian dutybased theory, or strict rights protection (in a Lockean sense) he wants to maximize WELFARE.
15

To that end, he argues against things like censorship, and instead pushes for an individuals right to
liberty because he feels that things like coercion (imposition of will by others concerning one persons
freedom) is worse than lettering someone make their own choices.
In particular, Mill is very skeptical about society or any group of people dictating what others ought to
think.
(On Liberty, section page 84)
Let us suppose, therefore, that the government is entirely at one with the people,
and never things of exerting any power of coercion unless in agreement with what it
conceives to be their voice. But I deny the right of the people to exercise such coercion,
either by themselves or by their government. The power itself is illegitimate.
(On Liberty, page 85)
If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the
contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than
he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.
This passage tells us what debaters say in Mill, some will use the term coercion to say that it is evil,
immoral, etc. for an outside person to encourage a particular point of view or idea upon another person.
This term should definitely receive some attention in your blocks because it is one that someone out there
will talk about. They will usually say how your side requires that you violate someones freedom to think,
choose, etc. For example, on any topic that talks about government censorship, someone could say that
censorship coerces minorities about certain issues (ie civil rights) into thinking a particular popular way.
Another possible example is to say that in cases like monopolies, big businesses can make people make
choices they dont like because of pressure of litigation.
As you can see, Mills concept of coercion is another tool you can use to look at topics and its one that
you can defend by making blocks showing how your position is consistent with preserving individual
choice.
The following is probably THE most common Mill card you will hear.
(On Liberty, 85)
But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion, is, that it is
robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent
from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are
deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: it wrong, they lose, what is
almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth,
produced by its collision with error.
What this card tells us is that Mill believes that ALL ideas must be heard regardless of how we measure
their truth. By not listening to the idea, even if it is untrue, we can still benefit by exposure to new
concepts, debate, discussion, etc. Think about it in terms of science. By forwarding new hypotheses or
possible treatments for a disease, we may unintentionally find a procedure to correct another illness, or to
get a step in the right direction. If we were to reject new ideas/theories by assuming they are
automatically wrong, then we have no chance whatsoever to benefit from the idea.
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This is how free speech advocates use Mill, they say that all ideas need to be heard no matter how
controversial they are. We cannot assume one person is correct because we can 1. benefit from dialogue
and debate and 2. we ourselves may be wrong. It is this fear that we cannot totally trust our own
assumptions that is a utilitarian aspect of Mill: for fear of the consequences of trusting our own
biased opinions, we have to be cautious before we shut out controversial ideas.
(On Liberty 85)
To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to
assume that their certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty. All silencing of
discussion is an assumption of infallibility. Its condemnation may be allowed to rest on
this common argument, not the worse for being common.
Mill gives examples such as the Roman Catholic Church listening to a devils advocate or Newtonian
physicsby listening to an opposing point of view we can be more sure that our decision is the right
decision. Therefore, we ought to entertain all ideas.
Why do we care about such discussion? Because we value truth. And truth, Mill says is important
because truth is part of utility.
(On Liberty, page 90)
The usefulness of an opinion is itself a matter of opinion: as disputable, as open
to discussion, and requiring discussion as much, as the opinion itself. There is the same
need of an infallible judge of opinions to decide an opinion to be noxious, as to decide it
is false, ,unless the opinion condemned has full opportunity of defending itself.
The truth of an opinion is part of its utility. If we would know whether or not it
is desirable that a proposition should be believed, is it possible to exclude the
consideration of what it is true?
Therefore, Mills logic is as follows:
discussion of ideas -> truth -> utility (pleasure) -> morality!
One final idea I shall talk about is Mills idea of paternalism, which is one person acting on the behalf of
another. (which implies coercion).
Mill thinks there are only a few scenarios when paternalism is justifiable.
The first is what is normally called the harm principle. First, Mill claims that society cannot violate a
persons freedom even if it thinks that it is in their best interest. Society can have jurisdiction to step in
once a person causes harm to others.
(On Liberty, 143)
As soon as any part of a persons conduct affects prejudically the interests of
others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question, whether the general welfare will
or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion.
Therefore, you should be ready to argue about how people do have rights/liberty, but when they hurt
others, the right should be limited. Therefore, to apply this idea to a topic ask yourself, when can
affirming or negating allow one person to have freedom at the expense of harming someone else?
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As a parting comment, consider an aspect of Mills paternalism that is rarely known. Mill has exceptions
to his position against paternalism: people who are young, the mentally ill, and people from other
countries. (think imperialism) Take the example of children:
(On liberty, 150-151)
But I cannot consent to argue the points as if society had no means of bringing
its weaker members up to ordinary standard of rational conduct, except waiting till they
do something irrational, and then punishing them, legally or morally for it. Society has
had absolute power over them during all the early portion of their existence: it has had the
whole period of childhood and nonage in which to try whether it could make them
capable of rational conduct in life.
For example, Mill believes in ageism, so you would NOT want to defend juvenile civil rights while
talking about the marketplace of ideasthose two conflict. I hope you find this helpful on any topic about
child welfare or mental illness that you may discuss in the future.
Othe r things to consider
If you debate any topic about womens rights, read A subjection of women. It is a book that is seldom
discussed, but which offers a scathing critique of patriarchy, or male centeredness in society.
Also if you want to further explore Mills utilitarianism, also read philosophers such as Bentham and
Smart. If you want to look into Mills liberty theory, consider reading Hegel (in terms of his view about
opposing opinions).
This has not even begun to fully analyze the intriacies of Mills theory. I highly suggest reading
Utilitarianism and On Liberty in order to find other ideas that you can apply to a variety of LD topics.
I hope this has helped, good luck in your future rounds!
18

Virtue (Stephen Babb)
VIRTUE ETHICS:
FROM ARISTOTLE TO MACINTYRE
by Stephen Babb
An ethical system that revolves around the essence of virtue is in no way, shape, or form a new idea; and
yet, there is in recent years a renewed interest in the studies often termed "virtue ethics." This is no
coincidence. The 20th Century marked a philosophical age in which along with God's passing came the
death of morality--even, if not especially, secular morality. That is, the Enlightenment project to define
and understand an objective morality apart from that which grew out of religion came under rather
successful attack from Nietzsche and the existential wave that would follow. Thinkers from Kant to
Hume to Mill were seemingly turned on their head by the philosophical revolution that followed, and it is
no accident that the current disarray of moral thought and discussion has ensued. In an age that so
skeptically questions the possibility of an objective morality (if not rejecting it outright), it is no wonder
that extensions of Kant's deontology (W.D. Ross or G.E. Moore) are rarely taken seriously. And how
much less appealing are the utilitarian positions of Mill and Bentham, which have been heavily attacked
by ethicists, contemporary political philosophers, and post-modern critics alike? To take paradigms that
remain so indefensible despite years worth of work in the support thereof, and then defend them in a
forty-five minute scope of an LD round may seem like intellectual and competitive suicide. In debate
rounds when an opponent denies the existence of an objective morality, what are you left to do?
In fact, there are a number of options, but the one to be discussed here similarly entails a rejection of the
Enlightenment project to define a system of ethics. To be sure, this is certainly not a proposal that rejects
a system of ethics. It is instead a reconceptualization of how we think about ethics, such that the
objections raised against the Enlightenment theorists (Kant, Mill, etc) need not apply. Before getting to
heart of this solution, it reasons that we first take an introductory look at the premise and origin of virtue
ethics. Throughout, you will notice a discussion of how this philosophy applies to and can be used
meaningfully in the context of an LD round. In other words YES, there's a point to it all!
Virtue ethics is as old as Aristotle, and that is pretty old since Aristotle is pretty old. Indeed, the idea of
a virtue is even older than Aristotle. So far, none of this sounds too progressive or groundbreaking. The
notion of virtue (or a virtue) is inextricably linked to the idea of character. But in many ways, what
resembles strong character in present-day cultural norms is not at all the ideal image originally painted
throughout Greek tradition. Whereas today (in a context heavily influenced by the Judeo-Christian
tradition, Medieval ethics, and the Enlightenment) we place heavy emphasis on virtues like charity,
beneficence, and even hope, virtues of Greek concern primarily include things like courage and
temperance. It wouldn't appear that today's emphasized virtues are mutually exclusive of classic ones (or
vice-versa). If anything, the focus of "virtue ethics" isn't on one specific virtue as opposed to another, or
even one set versus another set. Such considerations aren't unimportant, but are easily debatable within
the sphere of virtue ethics. What ultimately defines this ethical system uniquely isn't a particular virtue,
but the emphasis on considerations like virtue that is, matters that focus upon the agent rather than an
agent's action. That isn't to say virtue ethics is interested in something entirely immeasurable like intent
or the content of one's heart. Virtue ethics indeed asks that we pay very close attention to a person's
actions; in fact, we are to pay such close attention that we consider habits, behavior, and other modes of
conduct in such a way as to truly evaluate character. Whereas other systems of ethics seek to evaluate an
instance of conduct or action, determining it good or bad according to some kind of rule, this system
evaluates the agent herself based upon a comprehensive analysis of something like character. Even so,
the important part isn't that some analysis takes place, but that the agent try to develop habits and a
lifestyle that are indeed virtuous. One way to fully understand the delineation is in the moral question
agents ask themselves in efforts to be moral. The question asked throughout the Enlightenment project is:
Ought a person perform this or that particular hypothetical action? Kant asks this question in the context
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of what actions are legitimate according to the categorical imperative, thus appealing deontologically to a
universal rule. Mill asks his question in terms of what actions emerge legitimate after utilitarian
considerations, appealing to a far more flexible rule, but one that nonetheless considers actions to be the
most morally relevant aspect of the answer. The question that a virtue based ethical system might instead
ask is: What qualities ought a person inculcate in oneself in efforts to define oneself through behavioral
patterns? Put simply: do I live a virtuous life or one plagued with vices? How can I make myself what I
ought to be?
Contemporary virtue ethics are best explained by Alasdair MacIntyre, who in 1981 wrote an argument for
a return to virtue based ethics in After Virtue. He explains how Aristotle began to answer this question:
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 1981, p. 148
"What then does the good for man turn out to be? Aristotle has cogent arguments
against identifying that good with money, with honor or with pleasure. He gives to it the
name of eudaimonia--as so often there is difficulty in translation: blessedness, happiness,
prosperity. It is the state of being well and doing well in being well, of a man's being
well-favored himself and in relation to the divine. But when Aristotle first gives this
name to the good for man, he leaves the question of the content of eudaimonia largely
open."
In each of the initial questions, the inevitable answer is that certain virtuous behaviors lead to well,
what exactly do they lead to? Aristotle suggests that the virtues are integral components of the good
life a life in which the end of eudaimonia (happiness or prosperity) is adequately fulfilled. Two
important notes should follow, both of which MacIntyre makes clear. First of all, the virtues should not
be considered as means to the end of happiness. They are central and ongoing aspects of the good life.
They cannot be substituted with some other kind of mechanism, and they at no point cease being of
importance. While happiness is the "end" or telos in many senses, the importance of virtues as
cornerstones to the good life should never be underestimated, and they should not be thought of as mere
mechanisms. They are essential, inextricable parts of the good life (and indeed, parts of happiness)
continuously sustaining and forming it into a meaningful experience. Second of all, "happiness" as
Aristotle means it is not entirely what you may be thinking of as you read it. It does not refer merely to
pleasure or enjoyment. Instead, this meaning implies a much more general and indeed ambiguous sense,
one having to do with the general fulfillment of one's life how successful a person is in being a person.
Clearly, no one act or privation of an act can (it would appear) "make or break" a person's effort at being
virtuous. The personal project of being virtuous may indeed require meaningful and life-altering choices
to be made from time to time, but these are simply foundations upon which virtuous habits and tendencies
are to continue directing one's life.
To be clear, though, this unique meaning for happiness is explicitly in contrast with the hedonist position,
which was itself one of the prominent competitive ideologies in Aristotle's time. Jonathan Barnes, a
Professor of Philosophy as Oxford, elaborates on the difference (one you should be aware of in debate
rounds):
Jonathan Barnes, Introduction to the Ethics of Aristotle , 1976
"it is worth noting that happiness is not the same thing as pleasure: the man
who follows the advice of the Ethics will, according to Aristotle, live an enjoyable life,
but he will not live a life of pleasure, in the common sense of that phrase. Aristotle
brusquely rejects the view that happiness consists in a constant succession of pleasures-such a view advocates a 'life suitable for cattle'. If Aristotle is a eudaimonist, he is
certainly not a hedonist."
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Finally, then, we come to the matter of how one is to lead a virtuous life and why this in actuality is a
preferable ethical theory. We can begin with Aristotle's definition of virtue. Now keep in mind that
Aristotle is not the first person or even thinker to discuss virtue. There is a tradition that precedes
Aristotle (albeit in less cogent and developed form) in which virtues are considered indispensable to the
good life. Nevertheless, here is what Aristotle had to say:
Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle (Penguin Books), 1976, p.94
"So Virtue is a purposive disposition, lying in a mean that is relative to us and
determined by rational principle, and by that which a prudent man would use to
determine it. It is a mean between two kinds of vice, one of excess and the other of
deficiency; and also for this reason, that whereas these vices fall short of or exceed the
right measure in both feelings and actions, virtue discovers the mean and chooses it.
Thus from the point of view of its essence and the definition of its real nature, virtue is a
mean; but in respect of what is right and best, it is an extreme."
In other words, with virtue there is a demand for appropriate, expected, behavior conduct that is at the
same time moderate and satisfactory. It seems that some measure of intuition is left in this definition.
After all, how do we find this "mean" that Aristotle describes? Some sense of rationality is expected to
locate this mean in one's own personal pursuit, but don't rational people have differing ideas about what
constitutes virtue? How on earth could we ever develop an objective and categorical rule for virtuous
action? And of course therein lies the value of virtue theory-- we need not think of describing such a rule,
because it is irrelevant to the virtuous pursuit of excellence.
MacIntyre contends that life takes place in narrative forms, as a story constantly unfolding. The virtues
(and a person's character) must be thought of within such a context. MacIntyre explains:
" 'What is character but the determination of incident?' wrote Henry James.
'What is incident but the illustration of character?' But in heroic society character of the
relevant kind can only exhibited in a succession of incidents and the succession itself
must exemplify certain patterns. Where heroic society agrees with James is that character
and incident cannot be characterized independently of each other. So to understand
courage as a virtue is not just to understand how it may be exhibited in character, but also
what place it can have in a certain kind of enacted story. For courage in heroic society is
a capacity not just to face particular harms and dangers but to face a particular kind of
pattern of harms and dangers, a pattern in which individual lives find their place and
which such lives in turn exemplify."
When speaking of heroic society, MacIntyre is referring to something like Homeric Greece. In this
society, there was no separate conception of morality, no normative system apart from the reality of one's
social and personal obligations. A person's status or role within his given sphere of society generated for
him a given set of "duties and privileges." There was not an objective system of ethics, only a
consideration of how virtuous persons were in the satisfaction of their roles. For each person, a pursuit of
the good life and excellence takes place within the bounds of this role, such that the role constantly
defines and flavors what exactly excellence may mean in any particular case. This is a naturalistic
approach to ethics, not one that attempts to decipher some metaphysically independent morality.
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James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, Aristotle's Ethics: Issues and Interpretations, 1967,
p. 1-2
"Aristotle is fundamentally a 'naturalist; because he treats man as a natural
creature--the most highly developed of the animals but still an animal rather than a
supernatural soul temporarily sojourning here below. Although Aristotle invites man to
become godlike, his appeal is to reason and experience--not to divine commands or
sanctions. The rule s which the good man obeys stem from his own reason, not from
religious revelation or a vision of transcendental ideals; and the satisfactions of the good
life are natural elements of the situation, not divinely bestowed rewards. Consequently,
man, like other animals, can act only through the activation of appetites; moral
motivation thus cannot be reduced to the struggle of reason as such against appetites as
such. Similarly, since pleasure naturally accompanies the successful completion of
characteristic animal and human activities, asceticism is ruled out.
Keep in mind several things about the pursuit: it is a long-term project, it is agent centered, and it is
directed towards an end that must by definition be somewhat unique for each person. On face, this
promises to cause a number of moral problems apparently ignoring atrocious actions that are
anomalous rather than characteristic of one's behavior and introducing a degree of subjectivity that denies
that value of morality in the first place. But, such an on face judgment ignores something crucial about
virtue and the effective pursuit of excellence. Such pursuits are most successful when practiced as a
group project. In fact, Aristotle includes "friendship" as one of the most fundamental virtues, implying
that a community relationship is absolutely necessary for attaining the good life. So develops a kind of
public virtue-- an individual's pursuit of excellence is inseparable from the communally shared pursuit. In
one sense, an interest in the shared project is itself a tenet of good character a virtuous habit to be
cultivated. But for the virtuous person, whose habit of "friendship" develops successfully, the bond of
community is one in which criminal or impermissible activity is undesirable. Consider MacIntyre's
explanation of the virtue of friendship:
"Friendship of course, on Aristotle's view, involves affection. But that affection
arises within a relationship defined in terms of a common allegiance to and a common
pursuit of goods. The affection is secondary, which is not in the least to say unimportant.
In a modern perspective affection is often the central issue; our friends are said to be
those whom we like, perhaps whom we like very much. 'Friendship' has become for the
most part the name of a type of emotional state rather than a type of social and political
relationship. E.M. Forster once remarked that if it came to a choice between betraying
his country and betraying his friend, he hoped that he would have the courage to betray
his country. In an Aristotelian perspective anyone who can formulate such a contrast has
no country, has no polis; he is a citizen of nowhere, an internal exile wherever he lives.
Indeed from an Aristotelian point of view a modern liberal political society can appear
only as a collection of citizens of nowhere who have banded together for their common
protection. They possess at best that inferior form of friendship that is founded on mutual
advantage. That they lack the bond of friendship is of course bound up with the selfavowed moral pluralism of such liberal societies. They have abandoned the moral unity
of Aristotelianism, whether in its ancient or medieval forms"
You now may notice a political incorporation of communitarian (or at the very least republican) themes
into the sphere of virtue theory. A virtue ethics without the community appears to be rather
impracticable. Along with the idea of a shared pursuit, however, comes (a) a framework for moral
education that is grounded in the virtues, (b) an incentive for virtuous behavior since ultimate "happiness"
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cannot be found apart from the approval of the community, (c) additional incentive because such
happiness is possible and only possible in coordination with the shared project, and (d) the most important
element: the implicit virtue of friendship engenders a willingness to contribute to the shared project. Why
is all this so important? It demonstrates why even certain actions not explicitly addressed through virtue
theory are avoidable. Apart for the virtue-based agenda a community might agree upon, certain actions
will undoubtedly be considered impermissible. There may be no developed moral code that says as
much, but the functionality of this shared project (to pursue excellence and prosperity) would obviously
be complicated by an absence of a few general rules--against taking innocent life, the illegitimate
possession of property, etc. While "virtue ethics" as a system has nothing to say explicitly about the rules
of moral action, the practical effect of pursuing virtue ethics (especially in the sense of a community) is
that such rules emerge. If they emerge out of necessity or political arrangement rather than morally
calculated systems of ethics, they are no less effective or significant. They remain rules that guide
specific actions, rather than behavior-oriented virtues that remain at least hypothetically indifferent.
An important question to ask, however, is just how legitimate such rules can be. After all, if they are the
product of necessity and arrangement, what factors contribute to their legitimacy other than convenience
and power? For instance, if some group of officials were discussing a potential law, what morally
relevant factors would enter into the discourse? Insofar as a law applies to action, the only ethical
material (thought, rhetoric, system, etc) that the community has in its intellectual resource gives very little
direction. In the case of abortion for instance, no clear rule immediately presents itself, and it seems that
some kind of moral deliberation must take place some kind of rule -based system must give guidance.
Robert Louden makes this criticism and others in 1984's On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics. In response to
MacIntyre's attempt (one made similarly by others) to return to virtue ethics in the midst of so much
ethical confusion, Louden responds with a number of arguments that do little more than reaffirm the
initial state of philosophical disorder. Nevertheless, they are suggestions that deserve consideration both
from the debater contemplating using virtue theory and from the debater looking for ways to combat it.
In addition to his argument about practical problems in applied ethics (abortion), Louden contends that
there is likewise practical difficulty in allowing an ethical system to revolve around something like
character. Character changes, is dependent upon an untold number of natural and experiential factors, is
difficult to decipher either reflexively or externally, and so on. Finally, one worries that a system based
on virtue is inevitably too lenient in the face of highly problematic actions. Because the scope of a
lifetime is so long, truly reprehensible actions are apparently excused or ignored so long as they are rare
or intermittent enough as long as they are not part of one's habit. Louden raises other objections and of
course goes into much greater depth. For our current purposes, responses to each of these positions
cannot be detailed--for this reason among others, further reading is of course encouraged.
We can explore some response and in the process return to the question of why virtue theory is a
preferable mode for thinking about ethics. Louden's criticisms, among others, seem to miss the point of
virtue theory. It need not be a comprehensive formulation of moral rules--it is a systematic shift in
emphasis that precludes the necessity for such a formulation. It doesn't pretend to answer all the
questions, but if pursued adequately most of those questions need not be asked. It is not that the ethical
person is not faced with ethical dilemmas, but that the virtuous path becomes the primary system a person
need worry about--with communally agreed upon "rules" (or law) to fill in the gaps. The precise reason,
however, why virtue theory is so valuable (and perhaps preferable to the Enlightenment project) is that it
enables agents to have guidance even in situations in which rules may seem useless, or as is so often the
case, when there is no clear moral consensus as to what the rule should be. MacIntyre explains
23


"For every virtue therefore there are two corresponding vices. And what it is to
fall into a vice cannot be adequately specified independently of circumstances: the very
same action which would in one situation be liberality could in another be prodigality and
in a third meanness. Hence judgment has an indispensable role in the life of the virtuous
man which it does not and could not have in, for example, the life of the merely lawabiding or rule-abiding man."
Herein lies the argument for why virtue ethics as an emphasis (not necessarily to the complete exclusion
of other ethical pursuits) is preferable. It enables situational rationality to replace obedience to rules, but
in making this allowance also grants the agent moral tools when utilizing this rationality. We are not
simply depending on the rationality of individuals; we are depending upon their cultured rationality that
grows out of a shared project to pursue excellence. When rules do not present adequate answers because
of situational specificity or lacking consensus as to the rule's formulation, persons can simply do their best
to follow their narrative pathways as virtue would lead them.
Finally, a few words about using virtue ethics in a debate round. Initially, you should think about topics
or particular instances in which such a position would be (a) relevant and (b) uniquely valuable or
strategic for you. Most topics that pose some kind of ethical question are appropriate subjects for a
virtue-based position. However, it may become more difficult to use such a position if the agent of action
is a government or organization of some kind. Also, some topics specifically question the moral
legitimacy of an action, seeming to automatically preclude a virtue ethics angle. Take, for instance, the
topic: Human genetic engineering is morally justified. Both of the aforementioned difficulties apply in
this case. First of all, the implied agent of action is either a government, the medical community, or
perhaps a separate organization interested in cloning. Whatever the case may be, it is at least on face
difficult to incorporate a virtue ethics position, since organizations do not have "virtues" in the same way
as persons. And even when we speak of a community's shared project in the pursuit of excellence or the
good, it can be complicated to address the collective character of such an entity. The endeavor is
possible, but a great deal of further reading into virtue theory would be required before attempting the
task. Second of all, and more importantly, "human genetic engineering" is an action and a very
particular one at that. It has little to do, apparently, with behavior or virtue or anything like that. The
topic at hand seems to demand that the answer derive from some discussion of moral rules that are
designed to differentiate legitimate action from illegitimate action. Demanding that the medical
community behave virtuously is of little help or is it? Remember, particular virtues (and the process of
their prioritization and evaluation that ensues) are largely defined contextually. Courage is demanded as a
mean between rashness and cowardice, but courage as such can mean a number of different things (not
always referring to a warrior going off into battle). And perhaps more telling is the contrast of what
courage is not: rashness or cowardice. As an example, if one could successfully argue that human genetic
engineering was as a behavior "rash" due to potential retroviruses, genetic mutations, harms to test
subjects, etc then the medical community would fail in its pursuit of excellence. Surely labeling the
community "rash" is a qualitatively less severe condemnation that arguing for the categorically moral
illegitimacy of the act, but such is the strategic advantage implicit in these kinds of positions. You are, as
they say here in beef-jerky country, biting off more than you can chew when you attempt to categorically
define the legitimacy of an action. A far more manageable position would indeed be to argue that on the
whole, while we cannot conclusively determine the moral legitimacy of the action, we can say that the
behavior in uncharacteristic of a virtuous medical community (or vice-versa depending on what your
warrants say). Sure, the position isn't as firm, but it is a great deal more defensible so long as you
successfully link moral justifiability with the consideration of virtue.
24

Of course, there are resolutions that much more directly lend themselves to a virtue ethics position
one's where there is no stretch required. As an example, the resolution: Inaction in the face of injustice
makes the individual morally culpable. In this case, we explore the philosophical question underlying
everything from "Good Samaritan laws" to one's charitableness. A number of factors in the wording of
this topic contribute to its relevance to virtue. First, there is no quantifier that implies the duration or
number of instances implied by "inaction." If anything, the lack of such a quantifier could argue for a
behavioral interpretation (rather than one considering a single action). In other words, perhaps the
resolution considers agents who are characteristically uncharitable, selfish, and indifferent to injustices
they encounter. Does such behavior throw guilt upon the agent? Or are we all entitled to live selfcentered lives that are dedicated solely to the furtherance of our own interests and are indifferent to the
interests of others? Second, this resolution asks us to evaluate the behavioral trait with specific reference
to the agent. The link to virtue ethics is so obvious in this case that we need not explain it further. Once
again, approaching the topic from a virtue perspective is strategically advantageous when contemplating
burdens. An affirmative debater may have a difficult time demonstrating while inaction as a single act
makes a person culpable --one is almost tempted to argue that it depends of upon the severity of the
injustice at hand or the extent of the inaction. Considering inaction as behavior precludes any such
bickering. The affirmative could argue that insofar as behaviors that attempt to rectify injustices are
virtuous whereas those that fail to do so are not, inaction as a behavior makes the agent morally culpable.
Regardless of the specific topic or argumentative context involved, keep several things in mind before
running virtue ethics in a round. Because LD tends to be so dominated by Enlightenment thought (be it
Locke or Kant or Mill), virtue based ethics are not the preferred mode in which to consider ethical
questions. There is an expectation amongst many in the debate community to answer questions of
morality through either deontological rules or utilitarian premises. Just as post-Modern or Continental
philosophers find little acceptance, so too do non-traditional ways of thinking about ethics. This does not
mean you should avoid the approach. It does mean you should read thoroughly before using, include in
your case a number of warrants for use, and make sure your style of argumentation demonstrates that the
idea has a valid philosophical tradition and is not simply something you have thought up during Study
Hall. Many judges will know what you're talking about, especially if they have remotely decent
grounding in philosophy. If they appear to "kind of" know where you're going but remain somewhat
confused, dont be afraid to instruct the room for a bit and explain your position with clarity (once again,
this requires reading and preparation on your part). And of course, if the judge has no clue what you're
talking about just pretend the argument came from divine revelation--sometimes that works.
If you're interested in reading more about classical Virtue Theory, go straight to Aristotle and read The
Ethics. Your best bets in terms of contemporary virtue thought include MacIntyre or Elizabeth
Anscombe. If you like MacIntyre in general, you may also like Richard Rorty or Charles Taylor.
Best wishes on your debating endeavors and all else.
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Singer (Alan Lawn)
PETER SINGER
by Alan Lawn
Born in Melbourne, Australia in 1946, Peter Singer has been working in the field of practical ethics for
over thirty years. His 1999 appointment as DeCamp Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University
turned into what The New York Times called the biggest academic commotion since City College tried to
hire atheist and advocate of free love, Bertrand Russell, in 1940. Why the controversy? Rejecting
traditional moral absolutes the basis of the Judeo-Christian tradition and most American laws Singer
argues that no conclusions about what we ought to do can validly be drawn from a description of what
most people in our society think we ought to do. This notion is logically obvious; after all, treating
descriptive claims as normative ones is known as the naturalistic fallacy. However, Singer contends that
most people, in blindly accepting socio-cultural norms such as eating meat and banning euthanasia, are
guilty of this fallacy. In his writings, he objectively questions such practices, often reaching provocative
conclusions. Love him or hate him, Peter Singers influence and ingenuity are undeniable.
The Nature of Ethics
Before going into the details of his ethical system, Singer refutes four misconceptions of ethics. LincolnDouglas debaters would probably laugh at the first three ([ethics] is not a set of prohibitions particularly
concerned with sex, ethics is not an ideal system that is noble in theory but no good in practice, ethics
is not something intelligible only in the context of religion), but the fourth, relativism, merits
consideration. Relativism is the notion that ethics is subjective that it is impossible to prove that one
system of ethics is superior to another or that any ethical claim is true.
One form of relativism is socio-cultural; such relativists argue that all moral judgments can do are reflect
the customs of the society in which they are made. For example, if a society condemns premarital sex
and another doesnt, what authority does one society have to assert that only its moral code is correct?
Singer illustrates the implausibility of this view,
Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2nd ed. Reprinted in Writings on an Ethical Life, pp 10-11
On a relativist analysis there is really no conflict when I say slavery is wrong
I am really saying only that my society disapproves of slavery, and when the slave
owners from the other society say that slavery is right, they are saying only that their
society approves of it. Why argue? Obviously we could both be speaking the truth.
He goes on to note that relativism cannot even account for the nonconformist. He writes,
Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2nd ed. Reprinted in Writings on an Ethical Life, pp. 11
If slavery is wrong means my society disapproves of slavery, then someone
who lives in a society that does not disapprove of slavery is, in claiming that slavery is
wrong, making a simple factual error. An opinion poll could demonstrate the error of an
ethical judgment. Would-be reformers are therefore in a parlous situation: when they set
out to change the ethical views of their fellow-citizens, they are necessarily mistaken; it
is only when they succeed in winning most of the society over to their own views that
those views become right.
Singer observes that the inability to account for ethical disagreement also applies to a crude form of
ethical subjectivism. What for relativists was true of disagreement between people from different
societies is for such subjectivists true of disagreement between any two people.
26

Singer (Alan Lawn)
He then deals with the subjectivist theory that ethical judgments are neither true nor false because they do
not describe anything neither moral facts nor even ones own subjective states of mind. One version of
this theory holds that ethical judgments merely express attitudes, so people disagree about ethics because
they try to convince others to adopt their attitudes. Another claims that ethical judgments, since they are
prescriptive, are really commands directed at people in general. According to this view, people have
ethical disputes because they want to change each others behavior. Singer accepts that these are
plausible views of ethics, but he notes that they do not deny that one can logically determine the truth or
falsehood of ethical judgments. However, he concedes, logic needs a framework to be applied to ethics in
the same way that it needs a framework to be applied to mathematics. Geometry, for example, rests on
axioms concerning points, lines, and planes. What are the first principles of ethics? Toward what type of
ethical system (e.g., utilitarian, deontological) do they lead? Singer attempts to answer these timeless
questions in a few pages. His answers, like all human ones, involve improvable assumptions grounded
only in intuition. Thus, in a sense, ethics is subjective. One can never prove that torturing innocents is
wrong in the same way that Pythagoras proved his Theorem. However, according to Singer (and every
other non-relativist and non-subjectivist), after accepting underlying assumptions about ethics, one can
logically evaluate ethical judgments in the context of these assumptions. Thus, in a sense, ethics is
objective.
When outlining his view of ethics, Singer first observes that acting according to ethical standards entails
that one believes, for any reason, that it is right to do as he or she is doing. He then explains what
constitutes an ethical justification. Self-interest alone will not do, because the notion of ethics carries
with it the idea of something bigger than the individual. Ethical justifications must be based upon
universal principles (e.g., the Golden Rule). Virtually all philosophers, from deontologists to
utilitarians, agree; an ethical theory would get nowhere without taking into account peoples basic
equality.
The agreement, however, ends there. Many ethical theories, including irreconcilable ones, are compatible
with the notion of universality. One can use logic to disprove certain theories (i.e., by pointing out
contradictions), but logic alone cannot prove, for example, that deontology is true and utilitarianism is
false. So Singer simply proposes that universality provides a compelling, but not conclusive, reason for
taking a fundamentally utilitarian position. First, he reestablishes that universality dictates that
everyones interests are given equal consideration. Thus, ones initial obligation is to take a course of
action most likely to maximize the interests of everyone affected. But because of universality, one must
also consider whether or not this course of action is the best general principle for everyone to adopt.
Singer explains,
Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2nd ed. Reprinted in Writings on an Ethical Life, pp. 16-17
At first glance one might think it obvious that sharing the fruits I have gathered
has better consequences for all affected than not sharing them. This may in the end also
be the best general principle for us all to adopt, but before we can have grounds for
believing this to be the case, we must also consider whether the effect of a general
practice of sharing fruits will benefit all those affected, by brining about a more equal
distribution, or whether it will reduce the amount of food gathered, because some will
cease to gather anything if they know that they will get sufficient from their share of what
others gather.
Of course, furthering the interests of everyone involved is no less ambiguous than increasing pleasure
and reducing pain. Singer also acknowledges that other universal ethical ideals, such as individual
rights, will inevitably conflict with utilitarianism. Nevertheless, Singer sets up a utilitaria n foundation for
27

Singer (Alan Lawn)
ethics a necessary first step after accepting universality. To him, the onus of proof is on those who seek
to go beyond it.
How Ought We Treat Nonhuman Animals?
Singers most influential work concerns the treatment of nonhuman animals. He argues that it is immoral
to arbitrarily restrict the basic moral principle of equal consideration of interests to members of our own
species. He points out that this discrimination is habitual, considered natural and beneficial to humans,
and remains unquestioned by the vast majority in the same way that racial and sexual discrimination
were widely accepted for many years. This discrimination is even evident in our language:
Peter Singer, Animal Liberation. Reprinted in Writings on an Ethical Life, pp 26
In the popular mind the term animal lumps together beings as different as
oysters and chimpanzees, while placing a gulf between chimpanzees and humans,
although our relationship to those apes is much closer than the oysters.
Singer begins his case with an explanation of the ethical principle on which human equality rests:
Peter Singer, Animal Liberation. Reprinted in Writings on an Ethical Life, pp 29
The extension of the basic principle of equality from one group to another does
not imply that we must treat both groups in exactly the same way or grant exactly the
same rights to both groups. Whether we should do so will depend on the nature of the
members of the two groups. The basic principle of equality does not require equal or
identical treatment; it requires equal consideration. Equal consideration for different
beings may lead to different treatment and different rights.
Hence, despite variations in intelligence, physical strength, sex, race, sexual orientation, and a host of
other factors, the interests of humans ought to be given equal consideration. Singers point is that
equality is a moral idea, not an assertion of fact. For instance, even if members of one race were really
genetically more intelligent than those of another, it would still be wrong to discount the interests of the
less intelligent. Their intelligence may affect what their interests are, but not whether or not their interests
deserve consideration. Black feminist Sojourner Truth made this point in more robust terms, They talk
about this thing in the head; what do they call it? [Intellect, whispered someone nearby.] Thats it.
Whats that got to do with womens rights or Negroes rights? If my cup wont hold but a pint and yours
holds a quart, wouldnt you be mean not to let me have my little half-measure full? Singer sees no
reason not to extend this principle to nonhumans; those who do not, he labels speciesists, putting them
on the same moral plane as sexists and racists. They routinely discount the fundamental interests of
nonhumans in order to satisfy their own often comparatively trivial interests, such as good-tasting meat
and the excitement of a hunt. If possessing a higher degree of intelligence does not entitle one human to
use another for his own ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit nonhumans? Singer asks. Philosopher
Jeremy Bentham realized the morally relevant characteristic centuries ago when he wrote, The question
is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk ? but, Can they suffer? This is so, according to Singer,
because the capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests at all. That is why
it is acceptable to kick a stone for fun but not a dog.
Regarding animal testing and medical procedures, Singer realizes that some practices have the potential to
alleviate the suffering, and/or prevent the deaths, of many people. However, he contends that scientists
readiness to experiment upon healthy adult apes, for example, but not severely brain-damaged human
infants, is speciesist. In such a case, the apes would possess greater intelligence, awareness, and at least
an equal capacity for suffering. Thus, Singer proposes that experiments that harm animals are justified
only if they would be justified if they involved brain-damaged humans instead of more sentient animals.
28

Singer (Alan Lawn)
Through this perspective, one is inclined to reconsider the justification of experiments, for example, one
that painfully blinds animals by dripping cosmetics into their eyes. Only experiments with overriding
potential benefits, such as curing diseases, seem justified. Of course, there is no clear-cut test to
determine when potential benefits outweigh test-subjects suffering; they must be assessed on a case-bycase basis. What Singer does establish is that most experiments fail his initial test experimenters
unwillingness to substitute brain-damaged humans for more sentient animals reveals their speciesism.
The Value of Nature
Singer also applies the principle of equal consideration of interests regardless of species to environmental
issues. First, he recounts the development of generally held Western attitudes toward nature. These
attitudes, he observes, are grounded in biblical and ancient Greek conceptions of humans as the only
morally significant features of the universe. According to the Bible, God made man in His image and
gave him dominion over the environment. The ancient Greek influence was entrenched in Christian
philosophy by Thomas Aquinas, who adopted Aristotles idea of nature as a hierarchy in which those with
less reasoning ability exist for the sake of those with more. According to this reasoning, only humans
have intrinsic value, so harming nature is only immoral if doing so does humanity more harm than good.
Singer points out that this standard, albeit flawed, can be used to support a limited form of
environmentalism. One can argue, for example, that it is wrong to produce chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)
because they harm the ozone layer, which protects humans from ultraviolet radiation. Furthermore,
because the ozone layer is irreplaceable, future generations will also suffer. The economic gain and
pleasure derived from products with CFCs are outweighed by their harms to humanity. Singer also
emphasizes policymakers difficulty in recognizing long-term values. He notes that unadulterated
wilderness is a scarce and nonrenewable commodity, one whose benefits to humanity alone beauty,
scientific resources, etc. are extensive. To him, aesthetics are morally relevant because they provide
enjoyment. It is difficult to imagine any economic gain that we would be prepared to accept as adequate
compensation for the destruction of the paintings in the Louvre, he writes. Although he admits that we
cannot know what kind of value future generations will place on wilderness, he argues that they should
have the opportunity to experience it.
Of course, despite providing a foundation for a strong case for environmental values, an anthropocentric
standard is speciesist to Singer. Remember, he considers all suffering and enjoyment, regardless of
factors such as nationality and species, morally relevant. Thus, the effects of environmental decisions on
all sentient beings ought to come into play. While Singer grants that the deaths of nonhumans are
morally less significant than the deaths of humans (because humans have rational interests in their futures
beyond the survival instinct, and because people close to them would feel a profound sense of loss if they
died), the deaths of nonhumans still matter.
Finally, Singer refutes the position that all living things deserve moral consideration. He notes that nonsentient life trees, grass, etc. has no conscious interests, and, therefore, no capacity for suffering and
enjoyment, his prerequisite for intrinsic value. Moreover, he writes,
29

Singer (Alan Lawn)
Peter Singer, The Environmental Challenge. Reprinted in Writings on an Ethical Life, pp

98
Without conscious interests to guide us, we have no way of assessing the
relative weights to be given to the flourishing of different forms of life. Is a twothousand-year-old Huon pine more worthy of preservation that a tussock of grass? Most
people will say that it is, but such a judgment seems to have more to do with our feeling
of awe for the age, size, and beauty of the tree, or with the length of time it would take to
replace it, than with our perception of some intrinsic value in the flourishing of an old
tree that is not possessed by a young grass tussock.
Ecologists who speak of a will-to-livewhether it can express itself or whether it remains unvoiced
(Albert Schweitzer) or that every living thing is pursuing its own good in its own unique way (Paul
Taylor) are, according to Singer, treating metaphorical language literally. Non-sentient life is incapable
of intentional behavior. Purely physical processes govern both bacteria and stalactites; why is only the
former intrinsically valuable?
Positive Obligations
Singers underlying assumption is that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening,
without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.
Accepting this principle means one ought to save a drowning child even if ones clothes get soaked.
Singer points out that this principle takes no account of proximity; there is no moral distinction between
helping a next-door neighbor or someone across the globe. Also, it is morally irrelevant whether one is
the only person who can help or whether one is among many in the same position. There may be a
psychological difference one may feel less guilty about inaction if one can point a finger at others but
not a moral one. If a crowd of people lets a child drown, they are all individually culpable.
Responsibility is not diffused. However, a group can share an obligation; for instance, if everyone
above a certain income level donated to famine relief (and they were aware of the amount of each others
donations, as well as how much total money was needed for the starving to have a reasonable quality of
life), individual obligations to contribute would be lessened.
Singer puts his money where his mouth is; he contributes one-fifth of his income to charity. But to him, it
is not generosity; it is a moral duty. He illustrates,
Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality from Philosophy and Public Affairs,
vol. 1, 1972. Reprinted in Writings on an Ethical Life, p. 110.
When we buy new clothes not to keep ourselves warm but to look well-dressed,
we are not providing for any important need. We would not be sacrificing anything
significant if we were to continue to wear our old clothes and give the money to famine
relief. By doing so, we would be preventing another person from starving. It follows
from what I have said earlier that we ought to give the money away
He then deals with two philosophical objections. One is that facets of a basic moral code should not be
too far beyond the capacities of ordinary people, or else compliance with the code overall will break
down. Bluntly stated, this argument suggests that mandating donations to famine relief something
perceived as too far beyond the capacities of ordinary people will incite opposition to the government
itself. Singers response is that this argument takes a grim view of human nature; he claims that
advancing a moral standard, even a controversial one, will at least cause some of its opponents to
reconsider their views. Some will be persuaded to change their lifestyles. The other objection is that
Singers utilitarianism demands that everyone ought to be working full time to increase the balance of
30

Singer (Alan Lawn)
happiness over misery. However, Singer notes that this duty ends when it would require sacrificing
anything of comparable moral importance. Of course, determining what is of comparable moral
importance is a subjective case-by-case assessment, like countless other moral judgments.
A practical objection is that private charities enable the government to escape its responsibility to provide
foreign aid. Singer points out that this argument assumes that governmental and private contributions are
inversely proportional. To him, a more plausible view is that a lack of private donations will suggest to
the government that its citizens are not concerned with alleviating suffering abroad. So the government
will allocate fewer resources to that end. Singers point is that one partys refusal to fulfill a moral
obligation does not justify anothers. A second practical objection is that famine relief funds merely
postpone starvation because effective population control is nonexistent. However, this argument doesnt
deny the moral obligation to relieve present starvation. It only implies the additional duty to work toward
successful population control. Finally, opponents note that Singer never satisfactorily indicates how
much money one ought to give away. His standard of preventing something bad unless doing so would
require sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance would require reducing oneself to the level
of marginal utility the level at which, by giving more, one would cause as much suffering to oneself or
ones dependents as one would relieve with ones gift. Seems harsh, but Singer stands by his words. He
does, however, also propose a more moderate version of his assumption that one should prevent bad
occurrences unless, to do so, one had to sacrifice something morally significant in order to put the
selfishness of the consumer culture in perspective.
The Quality of Life
Singer proposes that human life has special value not simply because it is human the speciesist sanctity
of life view but because only humans can possess morally relevant qualities such as rationality and
self-consciousness. The implication is that some human lives are more valuable than others because of
the nature of those lives. He claims that only self-aware beings can have desires about their futures
desires (unless themselves immoral) that it is immoral to thwart. In this respect, snails and human
newborns are equivalent (although, of course, other factors render the newborns lives more valuable)
because both are incapable of such morally relevant desires. A classical utilitarian justification for why
these desires matter is the fear of death. If one thinks that he or she is likely to be murdered at any
moment (because of an astronomical murder rate), one would be in a world of trouble. Reducing this
likelihood (e.g., with laws) would reduce peoples anxiety. This is one reason why it is especially wrong
to murder a rational, self-aware person. However, it is problematic to Singer because it is indirect it is
dependent on people being aware of every murder. For instance, if the residents of a neighborhood do not
know a murder took place there, would that murder be worse than the killing of a pig if no one was
scared? So Singer proposes another reason, one based on preference utilitarianism judging actions by
the extent to which they accord with the preferences of any beings affected by the action or its
consequences. According to this standard, the preference to continue living in order to fulfill future
goals (as opposed to the mere survival instinct of nonhuman animals) is morally relevant in itself. This
preference is grounded in autonomy; only someone who can grasp the difference between dying and
continuing to live can autonomously choose to live (and killing someone against his or her will utterly
disrespects that persons autonomy).
What about the right to life? It is important to first note that Singer is not convinced that the notion of
a moral right is a helpful or meaningful one, except when it is used as a shorthand way of referring to
more fundamental moral considerations. Nevertheless, Singer accepts the notion of rights for the sake of
argument. He quotes contemporary American philosopher Michael Tooley on the nature of rights, The
basic intuition is that a right is something that can be violated and that, in general, to violate an
individuals right to something is to frustrate the corresponding desire. Suppose, for example, that you
own a car. Then I am under a prima facie obligation not to take it from you. However, the obligation is
31

Singer (Alan Lawn)
not unconditional: it depends in part upon the existence of a corresponding desire in you. If you do not
care whether I take your car, then I generally do not violate your right by doing so. Tooley admits that it
is difficult to precisely formulate the connection between rights and desires, because there are problem
cases such as people who are temporarily unconscious. So his position became that one cannot have a
right to continued existence unless it can now be in ones interest that one continue to exist. In order to
have the capacity for this interest, Singer observes, one must be capable of conceiving of oneself as a
distinct entity existing over time something that nonhuman animals and some humans cannot do.
Since it is impossible to definitively discount any of the above reasons why murdering a rational, selfconscious being is particularly wrong, Singer relates them all to his discussions of abortion, infanticide,
and voluntary euthanasia. The first two of these issues are generally regarded as too controversial for
Lincoln-Douglas Debate, but the third merits consideration.
Singer begins by citing the modern definition of death and the reasoning behind it. The Ad Hoc
Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, in 1968, wrote,
Our primary purpose is to define irreversible coma as a new criterion for death. There are two reasons
why there is a need for a definition: (1) Improvements in resuscitative and supportive measures have led
to increased efforts to save those who are desperately injured. Sometimes these efforts have only a partial
success so that the result is an individual whose heart continues to beat but whose brain is irreversibly
damaged. The burden is great on patients who suffer permanent loss of intellect, on their families, on the
hospitals, and on those in need of hospital beds already occupied by these comatose patients. (2)
Obsolete criteria for the definition of death can lead to controversy in obtaining organs for
transplantation. Singer argues that the Committee did not go far enough. He notes that irreversible
coma does not include a persistent vegetative state, a condition in which the brain stem and the central
nervous system continue to function, but consciousness has been irreversibly lost. Why are resources
being squandered to keep such people alive when their organs and hospital beds can be used to save
others? Singer blames blind adherence to the sanctity of life ethic. People in a persistent vegetative state
may continue to breathe without mechanical assistance; surely they cant be dead? Singer writes,
Peter Singer, Bioethics, vol. 9, no. 3, 4, 1995. Reprinted in Writings on an Ethical Life,
p. 176.
If it is life with consciousness, rather than life itself, that we value, then
brining medical practice into line with the definition of death does not seem a good idea.
It would be better to bring the definition of brain death into line with current medical
practice.Which functions of the brain will we take as marking the difference between
life and death and why? The most plausible answer is that the brain functions that really
matter are those related to consciousness. On this view, what we really care about and
ought to care about is the person rather than the body.
This reasoning has led governments to permit the withdrawal of all means of life-prolonging medical
treatment, including food and water, from such patients. To Singer, this transcends the problematic issue
of defining death. If it is morally permissible for doctors to intentionally end the life of a patient when the
patients continued life is of no benefit to him or her, and if that is the case when the patient is irreversibly
unconscious, then irreversible unconsciousness is a morally acceptable state for removing organs for
transplantation (with the proper consent). The traditional conception of death as the irreversible cessation
of blood circulation could then be accepted without impeding the procurement of organs or the
withdrawal of life support (and consequent freeing-up of resources). The qualms with declaring an
irreversibly unconscious, but breathing, person dead could be avoided. In light of these realizations,
active euthanasia and voluntary euthanasia are still widely declared immoral. That makes no sense to
Singer.
32

Singer (Alan Lawn)
He points out that the aforementioned reasons why killing a rational and self-conscious being is normally
worse than killing any other kind of being actually support voluntary euthanasia. No one would fear for
their life just because others were being killed with their consent (classical utilitarianism), the rational
desire to die is a preference grounded in autonomy (preference utilitarianism / respect for autonomy), and
one can waive ones rights (right to life). Singer admits that there are technical difficulties (many of
which can be accounted for in a well-written law) with a policy of voluntary euthanasia (e.g., irrational
decisions, pressure to die, misdiagnoses), but not moral ones:
Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2nd ed. Reprinted in Writings on an Ethical Life, p. 198
Against a very small number of unnecessary deaths that might occur if euthanasia
is legalized we must place the very large amount of pain and distress that will be suffered
if euthanasia is not legalized, but patients who are really terminally ill. Longer life is not
such a supreme good that it outweighs all other considerations.
Using Singer in Lincoln-Douglas Debate
Singers arguments and their applications are quite straightforward. If you run them, be prepared for
common objections to utilitarianism and leftist thought (which he addresses).
Suggested Reading
??
??
??
??
??
Animal Liberation, 1975

Practical Ethics, 2nd ed., 1993
Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Values, 1995
How Are We to Live?: Ethics in an Age of Self-Interest, 1995
Writings on an Ethical Life, 2000
Other Authors
?? Gary L. Francione and Alan Watson, Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?,
2000
?? Dale Jamieson (editor), Singer and His Critics (Philosophers and Their Critics, 8), 1999
?? Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, Bioethics: An Anthology, 1999
?? Mary Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter, 1998
?? Peter K. Unger, Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence, 1996
33

Scanlon (Reed Winegar)
T. M. SCANLON
by Reed Winegar
Ethical thought in America and the United Kingdom has recently witnessed a major shift. Many
philosophers have turned away from traditional ethical theories like Utilitarianism and natural rights
theories because they feel that morality cannot be defined by old terms like consequentialism and
deontology. One of these philosophers is T.M. Scanlon. Scanlon, a professor of philosophy at Harvard
University, does not say that an action is moral because it protects natural rights, obeys abstract duties, or
mathematically maximizes the social good. Instead, Scanlon argues that an action is moral if it can be
justified to other people and those other people could not reasonably reject this justification.
Admittedly, on the surface Scanlons moral theory may not look like much of one. We immediately want
to ask Scanlon what makes a rejection reasonable? And Scanlons answer to this question might
initially strike many people as unsatisfactory. We feel that the priority of some values, like the value of
life, are beyond question, but the priority of other values might differ from culture to culture. This leaves
us asking how on earth we are supposed to apply Scanlons theory to complicated moral questions.
However, Scanlons theory is not as vacuous as it may at first appear. His answer to What constitutes a
reasonable rejection seems weak because Scanlon is not thinking about morality in the same way that
authors traditionally have thought about morality. First I will try to give an indication of Scanlons vision
of morality, and then I will give suggestions for how to use Scanlons ideas in Lincoln-Douglas debate.
As already mentioned, Scanlons over-arching claim is that an action is moral if it can be justified to
others and if those others could not reasonably reject this justification. Scanlon writes, It holds that an
act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for
the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced
general agreement.ii Scanlon calls this theory contractualism. Do not confuse Scanlons contractualism
with the social contract theories of John Locke or Jean-Jacque Rousseau. Those are theories about the
formation of legitimate governments. Scanlons theory is not overtly a theory of politic al philosophy. It is
a theory about everyday morality. I will now present Scanlons argument as he presents it in his book
What We Owe to Each Other.
Scanlon begins by saying that any moral theory must explain why we feel that judgments about right and
wrong are worthwhile. Scanlon writes, A satisfactory moral theory needs to explain the reason-giving
and motivating force of judgments of right and wrong. This is commonly referred to as the problem of
explaining moral motivation (147). Scanlon is concerned with the reasons behind morality. Why is
morality binding? And what is morality? If Scanlons theory can provide answers to these questions, then
it is a foundational theory. It describes the foundation of moral thought. To clarify what I mean by
calling Scanlons theory a foundational theory take the examples of Utilitarianism and Kantian ethics.
Utilitarianism says that morality is about pleasure and pain. In this sense, utilitarianism is a foundational
theory. Kantian ethics says that morality is about obeying duties. This is Kants foundational theory. But
utilitarianism also says that we ought to maximize pleasure and minimize pain, and Kant says that we
ought to follow the Categorical Imperative. When Utilitarianism and Kantian ethics move from saying
what morality is about to giving us an actual set of rules and procedures to follow, they move from
being merely foundational theories into being normative theories. A normative theory outlines
specifically how we need to behave in order to be moral. It gives explicit rules, guidelines, and procedures
for determining our actions. Scanlon says that any good normative theory must have a strong foundational
theory backing it. He says that Kants foundational theory that we ought to follow duties is too abstract. It
leaves open the question Why should we follow duties? and it does not give this question a strong
enough answer. Utilitarianism succeeds as a foundational theory by being less abstract and more
substantive. We do not doubt that happiness is good and that pain is bad. Scanlon thinks that a
34

foundational theory should be substantive like Utilitarianism. It should not drift into abstraction. It should
pay attention to what people actually do value in their daily lives.
However, Utilitarianism, according to Scanlon, is not a sufficient foundational theory even though it is
more substantive than Kantian ethics. Utilitariansim is not an adequate foundational theory because it
leaves out an important part of our moral intuitions. To make this point, Scanlon references an article by
the Australian Utilitarian Peter Singer, who now works at Princeton. The article says that we should give
many of our resources to starving people in other countries in order to maximize the good. But Scanlon
writes, Moreover, even where happiness, or at least individual well-being, is clearly at stake, its appeal
alone does not seem to account for the motivation we feel to do what is right and to avoid what is wrong.
When, for example, I first Peter Singers famous article on famine and felt the condemning force of his
arguments, what I was moved by was not just the sense of how bad it was that people were starving in
Bangladesh. What I felt, overwhelmingly, was the quite different sense that it was wrong for me not to aid
them, given how easily I could do so. It is the particular reason-giving force of this idea of moral
wrongness that we need to account for (152). What strikes Scanlon about Singers argument is not just
that people are starving and that this is morally wrong. What strikes Scanlon about Singers argument is
that helping out starving people in Bangladesh would not be especially difficult for Scanlon to do. It is not
an extreme burden upon Scanlon to mail a check to a hunger relief organization, given the good a check
would render to starving people. (If this distinction is not immediately clear, think about it for awhile).
Scanlon agrees that Utilitarianism captures our moral intuition that people starving is bad. But
Utilitarianism does not explain our moral intuition that part of what makes us feel like we are wrong to
not help out starving people in Bangladesh is that helping out those people would not be a huge burden on
us. Therefore, part of morality is about justifying our actions to others by showing the importance of
something for our needs or by showing the excessiveness of a burden placed on us. And Utilitarianism
ignores this idea. Therefore, Scanlon favors his contractualist theory because he believes that it, unlike
Utilitarianism, accommodates this intuition that morality is partly about justifying our actions to other
people.
Why should we accept Scanlons contractualism as the best account of moral motivation? Why should we
think about morality in terms of principles that a reasonable person could not reject instead of in terms of
welfare or duties? Scanlon gives three answers. First, he claims that his theory is phenomenologically
accurate (155). This just means that his theory seems to accord with what we feel we mean when we say
that something is right or wrong. When we think about what is right and wrong we think about what other
people need and the burdens these needs imposes on us. Second, Scanlons theory offers the right sort of
response to answering why we should be moral. Like Utilitariainism, it is substantive rather than totally
abstract like Kants theory. Under contractualism, if my welfare is tremendously harmed by another, then
they I reasonably reject this harm and say that the other person acted immorally. In this sense,
contractualism pays attention to my actual values and needs. Third, contractualism accounts for the
complexities of moral motivation. It does not operate on absolutes, and it does not reduce everything to
units of pleasure. Instead, it pays attention to the plurality of values. This provides it a flexibility that
more rigid theories like Utilitarianism and Kantian ethics lack.
Because contractualism seems to better explain our basic idea of what morality means than other
ethical theories, Scanlon argues that we should accept it as a foundational theory for morality. When we
talk about morality we should see ourselves as talking about trying to justify principles that no one could
reasonably reject. However, Scanlon does not stop here. I mentioned before that Utilitarianism and
Kantian ethics are not just foundational theories. They do more than say what morality is about. They
provide actual rules and procedures that we ought to follow. They are not just foundational theories; they
are also normative theories. Scanlon thinks that his contractualism can serve as a normative theory. Since
it is based on a stronger foundational theory than either Utilitarianism or Kantian ethics, we should prefer
it as a normative theory as well.
35

However, Scanlons actual leap from seeing his theory as a foundational theory to also seeing it as a
normative theory might be perplexing. When Utilitarians tells us to maximize the good or Kantians tells
us to follow the Categorical Imperative, we know exactly what we are supposed to do. But Scanlons
theory says that we ought to only do things that other people could not reasonably reject. This is not as
clear because we do not know what should count as a reasonable reason to reject a principle. What is
reasonable? Scanlon begins answering this question by distinguishing between reasonability and
rationality. If something is rational then it will maximize ones objectives. It may be rational for me to
cheat, swindle, and lie, assuming I can be sure that no one will discover my foul play. However, we do
not think in most cases that cheating, swindling, and lying are reasonable actions. We could reasonably
reject principles that suggested it is ok to cheat, swindle, and lie for personal gain. The intuitive difference
between rationality and reasonability is evident from this example, and Scanlon feels that this intuitive
idea of what is reasonable is all we need.
But how do we decide if a principle should be rejected? As I have said before, Scanlon says that a
principle should be rejected if the weightiness of the burdens it places on some people seems larger than
the value of the benefits it gives to other people. Scanlon writes, in considering whether a principle
could reasonably be rejected we should consider the weightiness of the burdens it involves, for those on
whom they fall, and the importance of benefits it offers, for those who enjoy them, leaving aside the
likelihood of ones actually falling in either of these two classes (208). If I can do something for
someone else that would greatly help that person at little cost to myself, then I should do that.
There is one last relevant point to make. Scanlons theory does not require that other people accept your
justifications. It just requires that they could not reasonably reject them. They do not necessarily have to
fully agree with your justifications and adopt them for themselves. As long as they cannot think of a
reasonable reason to reject your principle, then your principle is safe and you can act on it.
Let us now use an example to illustrate how to employ Scanlons theory. If I feel my friend has an
obligation to give me her delicious Baby Ruth candy bar, then I must offer my friend a justification for
taking her candy bar that she could not reasonably reject. For instance, if I was literally starving after
being lost in the desert my friend, unless she was starving too, could not reasonably reject my claim to her
delicious Baby Ruth and therefore she should give it to me. She could not reasonably reje ct my claim to
the candy bar because the candy bars importance to me far outweighs the burden she would face in
buying another candy bar. She may not want to give me her candy bar. And she may not enthusiastically
give it to me when I ask for it. In this since she does not fully accept that she should give me the candy
bar. However, she cannot think of any reason to reject my claim to her candy bar, and therefore she ought
to give it to me.
However, we need to make sure that the distinction between contractualism and Utilitarianism is clear.
Utilitarianism would say to always maximize the aggregate good. Therefore, it would allow for a policy
where one person became totally impoverished or die if that persons misery was numerically outweighed
by the happiness the policy brings to other people in society. Scanlons theory would not allow this. Some
one could reasonably reject a situation that leaves her destitute in order to increase the total welfare of
society.
How good is Scanlons theory? As a foundational theory Scanlons claim is convincing. I at least feel like
an important part of morality deals with justifying my actions to others and other reasonable people not
being able to reject my justifications. But how easily can we employ Scanlons theory in a normative
sense? This question is difficult because, as I mentioned near the beginning of this essay, Scanlon does
not give an explicit definition of what makes a rejection reasonable. He says that if the burdens
outweigh the benefits, then rejecting a principle is reasonable. But he does not tell us what types of
burdens outweigh which benefits or why. Undoubtedly, different people and different cultures have
36

different ideas of what is a significant enough burden to reasonably reject a principle. In fact, Scanlon
readily grants this point. He says that different people in different cultures both applying his principle
may very well come to different conclusions about how to behave. This seems odd to us because we are
used to thinking about morality giving us The Right Answer, instead of just a right answer. Scanlon
argues against this intuition, favoring the plurality of values. Moral questions do not have definite
answers outside of the things that different people and different cultures actually value.
I hope this adequately characterizes the dual aspect of Scanlons theory. His over-arching claim provides
a theory of the nature of morality, and it extends this to also give a procedure for determining whether or
not a specific action is moral or not. You might think that Scanlons theory is a convincing foundational
theory. And you might think that Scanlons theory is also a convincing normative theory. If you think
this, then maybe you should consider using Scanlon in a debate round. Of course, you could also be
someone who likes Scanlons theory in a foundational sense but do not think it provides an adequate
procedure for moral decision-making, or you could think that Scanlons theory fails as a foundational
theory but he provides a good standard for deciding if a particular action is moral, or you could think that
Scanlons theory is nonsense and hogwash on both counts and wonder why I am wasting your time
talking about it. All of these are valid positions to hold, and the only way for you to really decide which
position you think is most accurate is by reading Scanlon.
But what does any of this have to do with Lincoln-Douglas debate? The clearest application of Scanlons
theory to LD is to use it in order to provide a mechanism for deciding whether or not something is moral
or immoral. In other words, to use Scanlons theory as a normative theory. This may appear tricky at
first. After all, debaters and judges are used to hearing about rights, obligations, and social welfare. They
are not used to hearing about providing a justification that no reasonable person could reject. But just
because Scanlons theory is not common in LD does not mean it cannot be successfully employed.
Scanlons theory could serve as a criterion in a case for deciding if something is ethical. The cases
contentions would then give justifications for affirming or negating the resolution and show why those
justifications could not be reasonably rejected. However, using Scanlon on some resolutions could be
difficult. Judges are used to hearing about rights, obligations, and social welfare because theories like
Utilitarianism, the Social Contract, or Kantian ethics. Debaters use these theories because they provide
definitive answers all of the time. They are not subject to different cultural values. According to the
Utilitarian, Social Contract theorists, or Kantian there is one right way to behave, although each of these
theories disagrees about what that right way to behave is. But according to Scanlon there might be several
equally right ways to behave. This lack of definitive answers may prove troublesome for using Scanlon
on some resolutions or in front of some judges.
But even if you do not like the idea of using Scanlon to decide particular cases, you can still use
Scanlons theory as a guide for constructing arguments. If an argument seems to line up with Scanlons
theory, then it probably equates pretty strongly with our moral intuition. Therefore, an argument that
would be supported by Scanlons theory (even if a different warrant than Scanlons theory is provided for
the argument) might have a rhetorical advantage over other arguments. The judge will think that sounds
like the more moral option and then will look more closely at your actual arguments and logic to see if
you are right. So, even if you never explicitly quote Scanlon in a debate round being familiar with his
theory could be helpful in writing cases.
37

So what has Scanlon written that is worth reading? Scanlon has a book entitled What We Owe to Each
Other which gives a full discussion of his theory. The book, like all of Scanlons writing, is clear and
lucid and (as far as philosophy books are concerned) engaging. Of course, it is duller than a mystery
novel, thriller, Maxim or Cosmo. What We Owe to Each Other is probably the best place to look to learn
Scanlons theory. However, Scanlon has also published articles. You might consider reading
Contractualism and Utilitarianism in Contractualism and Beyond edited by Amyarta Sen. This article
argues that Scanlons theory is better than Utilitarianism as a foundational moral theory. It then
suggests that because Scanlons theory is a better foundational theory it is also a better normative theory.
As I said before, Scanlon belongs to a new class of philosophers who work outside the bounds of
Utilitarianism and deontology. Therefore, Scanlon offers a fresh perspective on morality. I encourage you
to read Scanlon and to give him, along with other contemporary philosophers, a more prominent role in
Lincoln-Douglas debate.
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Plato & Aristotle (Paul Strait)
PLATO & ARISTOTLE

by Paul Strait
Western Philosophical thought began in Greece, in the sixth century before Christ. The first philosophers
were called "Presocratics," as they came before Socrates. Socrates (469-399 BC) became famous for his
philosophical method: he created the dialectic. He artfully cross-examined people to demonstrate their
ignorance, and was so well known for it that people commonly use the phrase "Socratic Method" to
describe teaching by questioning. If Socrates wrote anything, they have not survived the test of time, but
his student, Plato (428-348 BC), was a very prolific writer, and in many of his dialogues, Socrates is the
main character. Many scholars believe that much of what Plato wrote merely echoed Socrates beliefs. In
his later writings, however, it his generally held that the character Socrates is just a mouthpiece for Plato
himself.
Aristotle (384-322 BC) was a student of Plato, and was an incredibly prolific writer. He discussed a
plethora of subjects, from physics to biology, from rhetoric to logic, from ethics to poetry. This article
focuses on his political philosophy, and the political philosophy of Plato. Their views of the world
shaped philosophical discussions for more than two thousand years, and it is my hope that through this
article, more debaters will utilize the classical philosophy of these two great minds to advance their
arguments.
Plato divides philosophy into dialectic, ethics, and physics; the unifying point is his theory of forms.
Plato wanted to answer the problem of the One and the Many. If everything that exists is fundamentally
the same, i.e., all existent things exist, are there differences among things? Parmenides, one of the afore
mentioned Presocratics, answers with a definitive "No," arguing that difference and change (including the
passage of time) are impossible. Plato, on the other hand, posits the existence of a series of Forms, from
which the material world emanates. Every kind of thing one can think of has a form: whiteness, human,
dog, justice, etc. An individual object participates in its form. Likewise, some forms participate in other,
higher forms. The highest form, Plato argues, is 'Being.' In this way, he accounts for multiplicity in
existence.
In some of his texts, Plato refers to this highest form as 'Goodness.' Knowledge of the forms, Plato
contends, is not available through sense perception. Rather, inner contemplation alone can yield
understanding of the forms. Dialectic, the exercise of reason, can lead to knowledge of basic forms, and,
contemplating on those, can lead to knowledge of the Good. Most people are incapable of dialectic, so
they can never understand goodness. Through physics, Plato argues that the natural world can be
understood as a multitude of diverse forms united by their relationship with the Good. His ethics are also
related to the Good-- since the Good can be accessed only through cognition, knowledge is the highest
virtue.
Plato avers there are three parts to the soul: cognitive, spirited, and appetitive. From this, he suggests
three corresponding virtues: Wisdom, Courage, and Continence. Justice unites these virtues, dictating
that each portion of the soul carry out its function as best as possible, i.e., in a way most in-line with the
Good.
What then, is virtue? Virtue is the state of excellence for a given role in society. In the good city, Plato
describes three basic roles--the artisan/merchant, who propels the economy, the soldier/police, who
defends the state, and the philosopher/king, who rules. The merchant is most in tune with the appetitive
element in his or her soul, and so continence is the most desirable virtue. The soldier carries out his or
her duties through an act of the spirited element of the soul, and so courage is the soldierly virtue. The
Philosopher-king rules the city with his or her mental faculties, and must therefore be extremely wise.
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Each virtue is a function of justice applied to the specific activities of the different parts of the tripartite
soul.
Plato sees the city as a natural result of human nature. Humans seem fit for particular jobs, and all
humans are unique, with different things to offer. Yet, all humans have basic needs-- indeed, all three
parts of the soul have basic needs. Only in the good city can these needs be met. Plato argues that the
good city is natural, yet difficult to achieve. In a good city, all people need to be achieving excellence in
whatever capacity they can. The city is much like a human body. For a body to be in perfect working
order, all of its component parts must be doing their parts-- eyes must see properly, the brain must think
properly, etc. For Plato, the unifying theme of the good city is justice, which brings all citizens to
harmony: "each man, practicing his own, which is one, will not become many but one; and thus, you see,
the whole city will naturally grow to be one" (Republic, 423d).
As natural as this good city is, it is very difficult to achieve. Why is this case? To answer this question,
Plato offers the allegory of the cave. He posits a cave in which many people are chained to the ground.
The people are chained in a way such that they can only face the inside of the cave. Behind them, there
are shadow puppets, signs, and other objects that vaguely resemble things in the world above, and at the
mouth of the cave there is a bonfire. The only thing the chained people can see are the shadows of the
signs and puppets, all distorted due to the dancing flames. The people think they are seeing reality, yet
they are only seeing a shadow of a shadow. This, Plato argues, is the state of most people.
Some people try to leave the cave. Some of them might turn around and directly look at the puppets and
signs. Others might go even farther and actually walk out of the cave and see actual shadows made by the
sun and trees. Only a very select few, after years and years of effort, will ever stare directly at objects
illuminated by the sun. Those people who can do that are the philosophers. The sun is analogous to
Truth. Most people, in their sad ignorance, go throughout life never knowing the truth, but rather a
simple but distorting version of the truth, and even then, they won't know it directly, but through its
reflections on fake things. Indeed, "So hard is the condition suffered by the most decent men with respect
to the cities that there is no single other condition like it" (Republic 488a)." In this horrible state, how
could a city ever approach goodness?
To fully bring about goodness, one must understand goodness. Goodness is reflected in all natural things,
but most people only get a glimpse of this. These people are clearly not fit to rule. Democracy would be
abhorrent to Plato. One must be able to think in the abstract, to deal with the concept of the Good in his
or her mind, in order to be capable of effecting the Good throughout the world. For this reason, rulers
ought to be philosophers, capable of knowing the Good. "The idea of the good is the greatest study"
(Republic 505a).
When Justice is your value premise, the applications of Plato's political theory become obvious. Justice
unites all other virtues, and indeed those virtues are only valuable insofar as they promote justice. In
1996, one resolution suggested, "When they are in conflict, a business responsibility to itself ought to be
valued above its responsibility to society." Negatives on this resolution could have a field day with
Platonic principles, arguing that a business only has value when supporting society. A business's goal
should be to support the economy of the state, and, being run by merchants rather than philosophers,
should be subservient to the needs and will of the society it exists in. A 1993 resolution suggested,
"When called upon by ones government, individuals are morally obligated to risk their lives for their
country." Plato would argue that once called by the government into a position of defense, one must be
courageous. A soldier is not mentally capable of making decisions about whether or not he or she ought
to be fighting-- the wisdom to make that decision lies with the philosopher-king, and a soldier must listen
and defer to that wisdom.
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Aristotle's political views borrow extensively from Platonic concepts, but are definitively distinct. His
political views are very closely entwined with his moral views. His major moral treatise the
Nicomachean Ethics discusses moral goodness. He argues that the ultimate end of man, happiness, is
achievable only through an operation of practical wisdom. He describes the process of becoming good,
and necessarily becoming happy, as one of habituation. One doesnt simply become moral-- one has to
develop sound habits.
What is the best way for this to occur? Aristotle asks which science is the most powerful. He determines
that politics is the most authoritative science:
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (I.2.1094b7-10)
"Even if the end is the same for an individual and for a city-state, that of the citystate seems at any rate greater and more complete to attain and preserve. For although it
is worthy to attain it for only an individual, it is nobler and more divine to do so for a
nation or city-state."
"Man is a political animal." But what is the political unit? Aristotle's definition is based on his four
causes--material, or that out of which a thing comes to be, and which persists; e.g., bronze, silver, and
the genus of these are causes of a statue or a bowl (Physics 194b24); formal, or the form . . . the account
of the essence (194b27); efficient, or the primary source of change or rest (194b30); final, or the end
(?????) that for which a thing is done (194b33). Aristotle compares the politician to a craftsman, who,
using the general principles of the science of politics, builds an artifactthe polis. Aristotle describes the
polis as a community (???????? ), or a unified synergy of similar parts. These parts are hierarchical
there are individual citizens, the heart of the polis, and they form into family units, which are the smallest
political unit, and into other political categories, like economic class and local government.
These sub-political units, and ultimately these individual citizens, are the material cause of the polis. The
constitution (???????? ), a certain ordering of the inhabitants of the city-state (Politics III.1.1274b3240) is the formal cause of the polis, and Aristotle maintains that it is the distinguishing mark of a unified
polis. For Aristotle, a polis is only as old as its constitution. The value Aristotle places on the
constitution is especially high given that he feels the soul is the formal cause of a human person. Hence,
the constitution is more than just a collection of lawsit is the lifeblood of a nation, describing all that is
stable and unified in that nation.
The ruler is the efficient cause of a polis. The constitution defines who rules and how that ruler can wield
his or her power. Beyond the ruler, the founder of a polis is an efficient cause, as the person who first
established the city sate is the cause of very great benefits (Politics I.2.1253a30-1). This can be
important in debates where you can prove your value was supported by the founding fathers, as Aristotle
would argue that their vision of the United States takes precedence over others views.
The polis exists naturally, since humans are sociable and rational, but its ultimate purpose is to support
the good life among its citizenry.
Aristotle, Politics (I.1.1252a1-7)
Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established
with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain that which they
think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community,
which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater
degree than any other, and at the highest good.
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Thus, since Aristotle feels that human fulfillment lies in the good life, or true happiness, and since the
state is a very natural outpouring of humanitys social nature, the state is the best method of achieving
human fulfillment. This is important for debate because many resolutions ask you to decide between two
competing values in the political sphere. Using an Aristotelian value premise, like ?????? ???? ?
(eudaimonia) you could capture your opponents value in its good instances, and reject it in its bad, for the
good life, by its very nature, is the goal of mankind, and so the state has a right to trump certain other
private rights if necessary to achieve the good life for its citizenry.
I will use two examples to illustrate this. The first is not very controversialall reasonable people agree
that murder ought to be illegal. Everyone would agree that even if people value liberty or Social
Darwinism or libertarianism, that does not justify murder. Aristotles system would clearly not allow
murder, because it is contrary to achieving the good life. Now, consider something like pornography. On
the one hand, it is an expression of free speech, and to limit its use is an affront to absolute liberty.
Aristotle rejects absolute principles like free speech and liberty, however. To resolve this question, he
would ask one question: Is this good for the people? After considering things like exploitation of
women and the corrupting influence of pornography, not to mention that it is not productive for society,
he would certainly reject it, and argue that it had no place in the good life. In an ideal state, pornography
would be banned.
What then is the best form of government? In the Statesman, Plato discusses six possible forms of
government. In the Politics, Aristotle discusses these six forms and contemplates which is best. There
are three basic types of government, they argue, and each type can be good or corrupt. A government can
be ruled by one person, ruled by a few people, or ruled by many. A government is good if it attempts to
promote the good life among its people, and corrupt if it simply seeks advantage for its leadership. As he
states, The conclusion is evident: that governments which have a regard to the common interest are
constituted in accordance with strict principles of justice, and are therefore true forms; but those which
regard only the interest of the rulers are all defective and perverted forms, for they are despotic, whereas a
state is a community of freemen (Politics 1279a17-21). Aristotle judges a government by its mastery of
distributive justice. Everyone can agree that justice requires one to treat equal people equally and unequal
people unequally, but the rub lies in how to determine whether one person is equal to another. He argues,
All men agree that what is just must be according to merit in some sense, though they do not all
specify the same sort of merit, but democrats identify it with the status of freeman, supports of oligarchy
with wealth (or with noble birth), and supporters of aristocracy with excellence (Nicomachean Ethics
V.3.1131a24-30)
If one person rules the polis, the government is either a monarchy (good) or a dictatorship (corrupt). If a
few people rule the polis, the government is either an aristocracy (good) or an oligarchy (bad). If many
people rule the polis, the government is either a polity (good) or a democracy (bad). Dictators make
decisions based entirely on their personal gain. Likewise, in an oligarchy, generally the rule is by the
rich. In that case, governmental decisions are made as if the government were a huge corporation, and the
goal of the government would be to generate and protect wealth. In a democracy, the decisions are made
by the masses, who arbitrarily support principles like equality for all, which are fundamentally wrong
because they equate the worst people with the best people. Clearly, some people are better than others, as
demonstrated by their virtue and by their happiness (for a more complete investigation of the Aristotelian
concepts of virtue and happiness, please see my chapter on Aquinas, who adopts the same principles and
applies them to his ethical theory).
A polity, Aristotle avers, is comprised of many people from different groups, both rich and poor, and who
desire to promote the good life in all people, rather than seek gains for themselves. This is only possible
for them since their personal desires conflict, and so as a group they cannot directly seek gain for one
group over another. This is a decent form of government, but not possible in a strict democracy, because
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generally one group will outnumber another group, and in that case, they will always get their way. A
much more superior constitution, Aristotle maintains, is an aristocracy. From the root ? ? ???????an
Aristocracy is rule by the best. This is a government where the most meritorious and virtuous people
have control. Since they live the good life, they know best how to promote it. A monarchy is similar, but
not quite as good, since it only has one virtuous person at the helm. Since virtuous people are each
others equals, they should lead the polis together.
This principle of government could be applied in various ways in a case. The Jan/Feb 2002 topic, for
example, stated, An oppressive government is more desirable than no government. A tricky affirmative
could discuss how an aristocracy might seem oppressive, but was actually the best form of government.
A tricky negative could argue that under an oppressive government (dictatorship, oligarchy, or
democracy), the good life can never be achieved, and that even no government would be better, because
as political animals, humanity would still form sub-political units like families, and then there would at
least be the chance that the good life might be achieved by some. The March/April 1995 topic is an even
better example: Laws that protect citizens from themselves are justified. While negatives on this topic
ought to find someone besides Aristotle to support their case, Affirmatives could have a field day with
Aristotle, arguing that the entire purpose of laws are to protect citizens from themselves. For Aristotle,
laws that protect people from themselves are as important if not more important than laws that protect
people from each other.
The Jan/Feb 1998 resolution asked if "a just social order ought to place the principle of equality above
that of liberty." A very interesting application of Aristotelian principles could ensue in those debates.
Affirmatives could define equality in an Aristotelian sense, and argue that when liberty conflicted with
that form of equality, it was always detrimental to the good life. Likewise, negatives could define
equality in a purely egalitarian sense, and argue that liberty to pursue the good life is more important than
giving all people the exact same rights, regardless of merit.
For more information:
?? Aristotle, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon. 1941
?? Bodeus, Richard. The Political Dimensions of Aristotle's Ethics, 1993
?? Kraut, Richard. The Cambridge Companion to Plato. 1992
?? Lord, Carnes and O'Connor, David, eds., Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political
Science, 1991.
?? Plato, The Republic. Translated by Desmond Lee. 1979.
?? Yack, Bernard The Problems of a Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in
Aristotelian Political Thought.
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Hobbes & Locke (Stephen Babb)
THOMAS HOBBES AND JOHN LOCKE

by Stephen Babb
Reading is sometimes not all that fun. It is even less fun when it involves Thomas Hobbes. To be fair, he
is an extremely influential figure in the history of philosophy, and deserves respect as such. More
importantly, he helps to contextualize writers who are even more influential to our beliefs, and especially
our political tradition. Thinkers like Hobbes gave philosophers like John Locke something to respond to.
Thus, their views (with specific focus on how they contrast with one another and how they influenced
later philosophy) must be acknowledged in just about any philosophical survey, especially one that pays
close attention to political philosophy.
Who came first? Thomas Hobbes wrote in the 17th Century and was one of the first to truly grapple with
the notion of a social contract. Hobbes is important for LD debate primarily because of his discussion
concerning how the government should function and behave. He also has a lot to say about human nature
thats rather cynical and pessimistic. When it comes to metaphysics, Hobbes is considered a materialist;
that is, he believed the only thing that really exists is matterthe universe being made of tangible stuff,
not ideas and theory. Accordingly, his view of human nature is one grounded in cold, practical
understandings of the world. People are, like animals, driven by desire and instinct. Left to their own
devices, they forgo peace in favor of an anarchic catastrophe in which everyone is against one another, all
vying for property and other advantages even at the cost of violence. For Hobbes, the state of nature
(that theoretical realm in which man exists without government) is also a state of war, where life,
property, and other rights are in constant jeopardy. In contrast to other more idealized views of human
nature (Rousseaus for instance), Hobbes argues that humans are corrupt and savage from the beginning,
and so too is our interaction. This characterizes the premise from which Hobbes begins his political
philosophy (which, of course, tends to be most relevant to LD debate).
Hobbes accordingly makes the following conclusion:
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651
The final cause, end, or design of men (who naturally love liberty, and dominion over
others), in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves (in which we see them live in
commonwealths), is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life
thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war,
which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shown), to the natural passions of men,
when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment
to the performance of their covenants, and observation of those laws of nature
For the laws of nature (as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and [in sum] doing to others,
as would be done to), of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to
be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality pride, revenge,
and the like. And covenants without the sword are but words, and no strength to secure a
man at all.
Clearly, Hobbes is interested in demonstrating the necessity of force. Government, then, would be
valuable insofar as it is an agent of force, requiring that the laws of nature are respected despite the
natural human inclination to pursue selfish interests. Keep in mind that it isnt at all unusual to consider
this a fundamental role of government, but Hobbes claims it to be the foundational nature of government,
the reason it comes into existence in the first place. Whereas some might contend that government must
first be procedurally just or conducive to meaningful human relationships, Hobbes places sole primacy
upon the governments role as a security mechanism. Lest society be plagued by the combined effect of
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each individuals animalistic passions, such emphasis on security is necessary. And such security only
exists by virtue of a common powers governmental influence. Hobbes continues
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651
The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them from the
invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such
sort, as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the earth, they may nourish
themselves and live contentedly; is, to confer all their power and strength upon one man,
or upon one assembly of men, to bear their person; and every one to own, and
acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person, shall act,
or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace or safety; and
therein submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgments, to his judgment.
This is more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same
person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man
should say to every man, I authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this
man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and
authorize all his actions in like manner.
In case that was less than entirely clear Hobbes is stressing just how much power the sovereign is to
have. All individuals in the particular society are to uniformly consent to the will of the sovereign,
collectively forfeiting any final authority or autonomy they might otherwise have in the state of nature,
which is far too nasty of a place. Now, you already may be envisioning some problems with Hobbes,
especially in a current philosophical context which tends to be liberal, communitarian, and many other
thingsbut rarely fascist. Hobbes can, in theory, be used to defend rather oppressive regimes or
governments, all in the name of preserving security through a sovereign. It isnt often that a debater
wishes to present such a position, a large reason being the influence of a man named John Locke, who
presented a position quite contradictory to that of Hobbes.
To begin with, Locke proposes a different understanding of why government is formed in the first
place. Instead, of its purpose being one of security, Locke contends that governments first duty is to
the protection of rights, specifically to life, liberty, and property. Whereas Hobbes might defend some
governmental policy or structure that sacrificed rights for the preservation of national security, Locke
would be far more concerned with justice. Concerning the fundamental assumption of governmental
purpose, Locke says the following
John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, 1690
The great and chief end, therefore, of mens uniting into commonwealths, and putting
themselves under government, is the preservation of their property. To which in the state
of nature many things are lacking.
First, there wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common
consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all
controversies between them: for though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all
rational creatures; yet men being biased by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of
studying it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to
their particular cases.
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Secondly, in the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority
to determine all differences according to the established law: for everyone in that state
being both the judge and executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to
themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much
heat, in their own cases; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them to
remiss in other mens.
Thirdly, in the state of nature, there often wants power to back and support the sentence
when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injustice offend, will seldom
fail, where they are able, by force to make good their injustice; such resistance many
times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt
it.
Notice in each reason for governments necessity that Locke concerns himself at least partially with
matters of fairness. Much of the above analysis is intuitive. Human interaction without a contractually
based government, even were it considerably more kind than the depiction Hobbes provides, would
necessarily lack the kind of adjudicative and administrative entities that Locke deems essential to a
procedurally fair framework. The principles of an established and fair law, and like adjudicator, and a
reasonable enforcement mechanism could all potentially generate less security than could an overbearing
and tyrannical Big Brother; but, they are required for the protection of rights. For example, it might be
advantageous to the nations security for the government to have housed soldiers in citizens homes
during various points in history, but the infringement upon a persons property rights renders such a
proposal entirely unjust.
To frame Locke merely in terms of how he is different from Hobbes, however, would be to greatly distort
the real impact he has had on contemporary political thought. One key contribution is the emphasis
Locke grants to the notion of property rights (and the idea of rights in general for that matter). A
property right is not simply a right to plots of land; instead, it refers to anything that a person is said to
have ownership over. In current contexts, this often includes increasingly abstract concepts like
information, for instance. Some writers have even consider privacy to be a property right insofar as it
refers to information about ones self, personal image, etc. Even if a debater never wishes to use Lockes
philosophy explicitly, one should always understand current discussions of rights in the context of a
Lockean tradition, which itself has played an integral role in shaping liberalism for the last several
hundred years. Some thinkers in particular (Nozick, for instance) have used Lockes writing as a starting
point for their own philosophical proposals. Concerning property rights, Locke contends that individuals
come to own property by virtue of owning themselves and the labor they contribute to the natural world
around them. Why do people own themselves or their labor? Ultimately, Locke suggests this is how God
would have it. Of course, this is difficult to substantiate in a debate round (Perhaps instead argue the
functionality of self-ownership. What would society look right if we did not believe in such a thing?),
and if your opponent is running a Lockean property rights argument, question this assumption. If we
accept the assumption that human beings own themselves and have rights over their labor (which seems
pretty reasonable and is a large reason why he hold slavery to be unjust, after all), then how does the
argument for property rights follow? Locke explains the argument thoroughly.
Though the earth and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a
property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but himself. The labor of his
body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he
removes out of the state that nature has provided, and left it in, he has mixed his labour
with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.
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And then later

He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered
from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself. Nobody can deny
but the nourishment is his. I ask then, when did they begin to be his? When he digested?
Or When he eat? Or when he boiled? Or when he brought them home? Or when he
picked them up? And it is plain, if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else
could. That labour put a distinction between them and common: that added something to
them more than nature, the common mother of all, had done; and so they became his
private right.
There you have the Lockean justification for property rights. This has some crucial applic ations to LD
debate. On the one hand, you may have occasion to discourage some proposition because of its
infringement upon property rights or to advocate some kind of protection for such rights. On the other
hand, a number of your opponents positions may operate under the assumption that property rights exist.
It would certainly be to your advantage to understand the logic behind this assumption (even if your
opponent does not), so that you may question the syllogistic basis of the argument. It might be to your
advantage to think of a number of arguments or propositions (especially those you come across
frequently) that rest upon this assumption. A number of contemporary thinkers challenge the notion of
ownership in the first place. Having a grasp of their arguments as well as Lockes will equip you well in
any discussion either explicitly involving property rights or resting upon such assumptions.
Later in his book, Locke discusses how government should relate to the society that establishes it. Any
topic involving political philosophy (issues concerning what government ought to do, how government
should be structured, and notions of rights, liberty, equality, and so forth) will proceed along better if both
debaters have at least basic understandings of social contract theory and Lockes contention of how
political society best operates. Social contract theory, to be sure, is not at all unique to Locke. In fact,
Hobbes discusses a variation of a social contract when suggesting that human beings exchange individual
sovereignty for the governments provision of safety and security. In this kind of contract, though, there
is a tendency for the locus of power to become increasingly centralized (and oppressive) so as to
guarantee that security is fully preserved. For Locke, the contract arises out of a need to secure rights (as
has already been discussed). This contract, however, exists not to empower the sovereign leadership of
government, but to actualize the will of society itself. The government becomes an expression of the
communitys consent (or at least the majority of the consent). Each person gives up absolute individual
autonomy, deferring to the will of the majority. In return, however, each person has his or her property
secured through a fair system with the authority to properly arbitrate competing claims and punish the
guilty. Locke explains how such a scheme exists.
Men being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be
put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own
consent. The only way, whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts
on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a
community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a
secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that are not of
it When any number of men have so consented to make one community or
government, they are thereby presently incorporated and make one body politic, wherein
the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest.
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Locke makes a special point to stress the sovereignty of the majority when it comes to making decisions
of state. He contends that because this collective consent has in effect created a singular, common will,
that there must be some way to translate varying and divergent wills into the common one that ultimately
is actualized through government policy, behavior, and structure. After all, this is the sacrifice each
individual makes upon entering society. It would be impossible to allow each and every individual to
actualize his or her own particular will through the state. If the option is then between deferring to the
will of a minority and that of the majority, it reasons to satisfy as many desires as possible, as opposed to
indulging the will of some tyrannical minority for example. And of course, all of this presupposes the
impossibility of satisfying both the majority and the minority groups in any given decision.
Much like early American literature, Locke concerns himself with why it is so vital to avoid tyranny. So
that you understand what exactly we mean by tyranny, I have inserted Lockes introductory discussion of
the subject.
As usurpation is the exercise of power, which another hath a right to, so tyranny is the
exercise of power beyond right, which nobody can have a right to. And this is making
use of the power any one has in his hands, not for the good of those who are under it, but
for his own private separate advantage. When the governor, however entitled, makes not
the law, but his will, the rule; and his commands and actions are not directed to the
preservation of the properties of his people, but the satisfaction of his own ambition,
revenge, covetousness, or another irregular passion.
Tyranny is arguably evil for a great number of reasons, and contemporary authors probably deal with
those explanations better than Locke both in terms of the rhetoric that is used, the context within which
arguments are made, and the more secularized nature of the argumentation. Locke rejects something like
tyranny on grounds that, for instance, it is contrary to the natural law of things. Contemporary philosophy
leaves very little room for ideas like natural law. A Lockean reason for rejecting tyranny that does seem
to make sense even now is the suggestion that it undermines the consensual basis of government. If we
accept Lockes explanation of why and how government exists, then it follows that tyrannical power is
unjust. This argument was more important at the time Locke was writing it than here and now, where it is
commonly agreed upon that tyranny is bad.
An argument that continues to have significant relevance, however, involves what are and are not
appropriate responses to a tyrannical government. In other words, what is a justified response to
oppression? As you would probably expect, Locke takes a much more citizen-centered approach to the
question than Hobbes does, contending that the people have a right (when necessary) to rebel. I would go
into more depth here, but the subject matter will only be valuable to you for very few topics. And, you
know where to read if interested in more (Chapter XIX of The Second Treatise of Government).
Using any of Lockes (or Hobbess) philosophy in a debate round entails some advantages, but a good
deal of disadvantages as well. Because they are so commonly read and well known, they have also been
criticized a great deal. Many judges may have negative predispositions to these kind of philosophers,
meaning if you are to be successful when defending them in a round, it is absolutely imperative that you
are well-read and have prepared responses against common criticisms or attacks. Likewise, it would be
advantageous to have read modernized variations of both philosophers respective ideas. It is sometimes
difficult to apply Hobbes and Locke to current philosophical dilemmas when theyre rhetoric and
argumentation stem from a very different historical context. For example, we rarely refer to a nations
leader as the Sovereign (as Hobbes would). And more importantly, the world exists in a far different
political landscape than it once did. With internationally linked economies, the emergence of industrial
48

and information ages, and the creation of democracies and governmental schemes that neither Locke nor
Hobbes ever witnessed, some would argue that most of the arguments that applied then are presently
outdated. Even from a philosophical perspective, post-modernism and numerous re-conceptualizations of
the individual (from feminist and communitarian perspectives, for instance) call into question a number of
assumption that were taken for granted during the Enlightenment. To be clear, none of this is to say using
Locke or Hobbes is a mistakeit simply means you should use them only after carefully considering (a)
other options and (b) whether or not the philosophical argument in question applies in any kind of
meaningful way in the age within which we now live. The bottom line is that even should you choose
never to use either philosopher in a case or debate round, it is imperative to understand the arguments in
light of how often other debaters reference Hobbes and Locke. They will both likely remain fixtures in
the world of LD for some time to come.
A number of books are available if you are interested in reading more on either Hobbes or Locke
?? Bertman, Martin A. Body and Cause in Hobbes: Natural and Political. New Hampshire:
Logwood Academic, 1981
?? Erwin, R.E. Virtues and Rights: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1991
?? Goldsmith, M. M. Hobbess Science of Politics. New York: Columbia Univ Press, 1966
?? Green, Arnold W. Hobbes and Human Nature. New Brunswick, New Jersey:
Transaction Publishers, 1983.
?? Shelton, George. Morality and Sovereignty in the Philosophy of Hobbes. New York: St.
Martins Press, 1992
?? Tuck, Richard. Hobbes. Oxford: Oxford press, 1989
?? Watkins, J.W.N. Hobbes System of Ideas. London: Hutchinson, 1965
?? Bourne, H.R. Fox. The Life of John Locke. New York: Harper & Brothers; 1876
?? Franklin, Julian H. John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1978
?? Goldie, Mark. Locke: Political Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997
?? Kramer, Matthew H. John Locke and the Origins of Private Property. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997
?? Simmons, Alan John.
Press, 1992
The Lockean Theory of Rights. Princeton, Princeton University
?? Sreenivasan, Gopal.
The Limits of Lockean Rights in Property.
University Press, 1995
49
Oxford: Oxford

Rousseau (Peter Clericuzio)
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU
by Peter Clericuzio
The French-Swiss philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) is known primarily in the world of
Lincoln-Douglas debate for his work The Social Contract, which he published in 1762. His work on
social contract theory is mainly a response to earlier theories developed by Hobbes in Leviathan and
Locke in Second Treatise On Government in the seventeenth century. As such, Rousseaus theory
contains few similarities to those of Locke and Hobbes, and his break from the earlier philosophers is
readily apparent. His ideas are also the most sophisticated of the three social contract theories most
commonly found in Lincoln-Douglas debate rounds.
The State Of Nature
Like Locke and Hobbes, Rousseaus social contract begins with a discussion of the state of nature,
which is the original situation of individuals lacking any overarching governmental power to rule them.
To Rousseau, such a situation seems to clearly be a historical fiction, as he argues that people generally
seem to have one way or another banded together in tribes or basic social units like the family. In fact, he
compares the family to a political state:
Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book I, Chapter 2, pp. 50-51.
The family then may be called the first model of political societies: the ruler
corresponds to the father, and the people to the children; and all, being born free and
equal, alienate their liberty only for their own advantage. The whole difference is that, in
the family, the love of the father for his children repays him for the care he takes of them,
while, in the State, the pleasure of commanding takes the place of the love which the
chief cannot have for the peoples under him.
However, the state of nature, that Rousseau imagines will produce a social contract that ultimately
consolidates individuals together into ordered society, contains two main conditions. First, this state of
nature is one where people are said to be free; in the sense that no individual is said to be under anyone
elses control. That is, the freedom that Rousseau imagines in the state of nature is not quite as extensive
as, say, the freedom that we experience in a country like the United States (more on Rousseaus concept
of freedom later). Rousseau sounds a bit like Hobbes here, because in his mind, the state of nature is
characterized by mans coercive, primitive disposition. Maurice Cranston clearly emphasizes this point in
an introduction to his translation of Rousseaus work:
Cranston, Introduction to Rousseaus The Social Contract, pp. 28
In [an] earlier work Rousseau stresses both the freedom and innocence of man in
the state of nature. In The Social Contract he still says that men have freedom in the state
of nature, but he treats it as a freedom of a crude and lesser kind. Such freedom is no
more than indepen-dence. And while he does not accept Hobbess picture of man in the
state of nature as an aggressive an rapacious being, Rousseau (having read Hobbes)
speaks less of the innocence and more of the brutishness of man in a state of nature. Man
in the state of nature, as he is depicted in The Social Contract, is a stupid and
unimaginative ani-mal; it is only by coming into a political society that he becomes an
intelligent being and a man.
The second condition which is necessary for individuals to institute, or sign a social contract is if
everyone who agrees to the contract is rational and informed. Rousseau argues that this requirement is the
only way to assure the creation of a social contract that is fair to all parties involved.
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One reason points to why Rousseau specifically requires that individuals who agree to the social contract
be rational and well-informed, and that is because he wants to ensure that no one who signs the contract is
taken advantage of by anyone else. Specifically, it would be wrong to allow adults to enter into a contract
with children, as children are not considered mature enough to appreciate the consequences of their
actions. In such situations, adults, who are rational and informed to a higher degree than children are,
could easily take advantage of children. Therefore, such a contract would not be morally binding if there
existed a difference in maturity between the parties involved.
Similarly, a contract is not morally binding in Rousseaus eyes when one of the parties is misinformed
(but not necessarily immature). For example, if I was a car dealer and sold George W. Bush a new
Mercedes that was missing its gas tank (even if I didnt deliberately mislead George and he just never
thought to ask about it before the sale), the agreement between us would still be void, because, one way or
the other, he was led to believe something else than what was really true.
Forming Civil Society Through A Social Contract
Rousseaus idea of the process of the social contract--that is, what changes actually take place that
discern civil society from the state of nature--differs significantly from Locke and Hobbes. Rousseau does
not use rights, like Locke does, as the mechanism, or indicator, of the transition between the state of
nature and civil society, but instead refers to the change in terms of freedom, which he refers to as liberty.
According to Rousseau, people do not give up rights to get others, like in Lockes social contract, but
instead collectively decide to enter into civil society in order to increase their libertysomething that
individuals could not do in a dissociative state of nature where no governing body protects individuals
liberty. In the state of nature, people who are strong, for example, could take advantage of those who were
weak, thus decreasing the latters freedom. The reason that liberty is so important to Rousseau is because
liberty is essentially what distinguishes humans from animals. Therefore, people become less like animals
and more human when they enter into civil society via the social contract, because they gain liberty and
protect it with laws. Cranston explains:
Cranston, Introduction to The Social Contract, pp. 33-4
Rousseau does not think that men have in the state of nature the kind of natural
rights which Locke supposes....Nor does Rousseau think, like Locke, of liberty as one of
mens rights. Indeed he says, quite as emphatically as Locke, that men cannot alienate
their liberty....In truth, what Rousseau is saying is that instead of surrendering their
liberty by the social contract, they convert their liberty from independence into political
and moral freedom, and this is part of their transformation from creatures living brutishly
according to impulse into men living humanly according to reason and conscience.
Preserving Freedom In Civil Society (The General Will)
It is important to understand exactly what Rousseau means by his idea of freedom, or liberty, because it is
the foundation of why individuals enter into the social contract (and how they preserve it after joining
civil society). He specifically outlines the concept of liberty in his Lettres Ecrites de la Montagne, which
was published two years after The Social Contract (I have added the bracketed explanations):
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Rousseau, Lettres Ecrites de la Montagne, from the Introduction to The Social Contract,
pp. 32
Liberty consists less in doing ones own will than in not being subject to that of
another; it consists further in not subjecting the will of others to our own....In the
common liberty no one has a right to do what the liberty of another forbids him to do;
[that is, no one has a right to do something that limits anyone elses liberty] and true
liberty is never destructive of itself. [Freedom does not really exist if, due to outside
influences, one is denied the ability to act in ones own best interests.]
In the above quote, Rousseau notices that on the most basic level when individuals act freely, they act in
accordance with their own desires or with what they want. Foremost of what individuals want is to
preserve or improve their own well-being; so in Rousseaus mind, this is the desire that individuals most
want to satisfy.
However, people sometimes want to act in ways which are destructive to their own well-being. When this
happens, it may seem like people are acting freely, but they really are not because they are acting in ways
contrary to their primary desire--to act in their own well-being. According to Rousseau, in such cases
freedom, or liberty, does not truly exist; therefore, individuals who act in self-destructive ways are being
overcome by some outside force that curtails their ability to act in their own well-being. Probably the best
example of this scenario is a drug addict. A drug addicts desire for drugs is definitely not in accordance
with improving his/her well-being. Here, Rousseau would say that the drug addict is not acting freely but
is actually controlled by his/her addiction such that he/she is incapable of acting in his/her own true selfinterest.
Now, because people in the state of nature value their freedom (and thus whatever is in their best
interests) above all else, Rousseau theorizes that they will create a government which will always act in
their best interests, even if the people do not want it to. Thus, the government actually forces its citizens
to be free! As Rousseau himself declares:
Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book I, Chapter 8, pp. 64-65
The passing from the state of nature to civil society produces a remarkable
change in man; it puts justice as a rule of conduct in the place of instinct, and gives his
actions the moral quality they previously lacked. It is only then, when the voice of duty
has taken the place of physical impulse, and right that of desire, that man, who has
hitherto thought only of himself, finds himself compelled to act on other principles....We
might also add that man acquires with civil society moral freedom, which alone makes
man the master of him-self; for to be governed by appetite alone is slavery, while
obedience to a law one prescribes to oneself is freedom.
Rousseau thus names this collective desire of citizens to have their best interests be satisfied as general
will. Because the general will is a collection of everyones foremost desires (that is, to remain free),
Rousseau infers that people in such a society would form a government that would act in a way that is
consistent with the general will. And since the government is supposed to act in the citizens best
interests, Rousseau therefore concludes that the government will continue to allow its citizens (or
sometimes force them) to act freely. Furthermore, the government is legitimate only when it continues to
act in accordance with the the general will.
There are a few particular aspects about the general will that require further explanation. First, it is
important to remember that the general will is not the will of the majority. The general will takes into
account everyones well-being, and desires, which is much different from the will or the collective desire
52

of a majority of the citizens.

Furthermore, by the same token, the general will is not the will of everyone . Despite the possibility that
every member of society might want the government to pass a particular piece of legislation, the general
will might differ from that opinion and decree that the government, in the best interests of its citizens,
should not pass that piece of legislation. The idea that the general will could differ from the will of
everyone seems strange, but there is a reason behind it. As Rousseau explains this concept:
Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book II, Chapter 3, pp. 72
It follows from what I have argued that the general will is always rightful and
always tends to the public good; but it does not follow that the deliberations of the people
are always equally right....There is often a great difference between the will of everyone
and the general will; the general will studies only the common interest while the will of
all studies private interest, and indeed is no more than the sum of individual desires.
The difference is, according to Rousseau, that the will of everyone is a collection of private wills, or
simply the desires of everyone directed for their own self-interests, not necessarily others best interests;
on the other hand, the general will is simply whatever is in the best interest of every person in society
taken as a whole; no human being (who is fallible and can thus make the wrong decision about what is
best for everyone) can be the source of the general will, which, according to Rousseau, cannot err.
However, Rousseau argues that there is a slight possibility that the general will and the will of everyone
can coincide:
For indeed while it is not impossible for a private will to coincide with the
general will on some point or other, it is impossible for such a coincidence to be regular
and enduring; for the private will inclines by its very nature towards partiality, and the
general will towards equality. It is even more inconceivable that there could be a
guarantee of harmony between the private will and the general will, even if it were to
continue always, for such lasting harmony would be the result of chance and not of
design.
Yet, even here Rousseau tells us that the real possibility of the will of everyone and the general will
coinciding is very small, and would not happen on a regular basis. Even though ultimately what each
person desires is to individually be better off, or improve their standard of living, how each person
might want to improve his/her standard of living may (and often will) infringe upon another persons
well-being, either purposely or just inadvertently and unintentionally. For example, even if every person
in the United States believed that completely redistributing the wealth of U.S. citizens in favor of those
who are poor would solve the problems of poverty in this country, such a move would only fall under the
will of everyone because the wealth redistribution would not be in the best interests of those who
themselves are very wealthy--it would take away a decent bit of their wealth. Therefore, such
redistribution of wealth could not be considered the general will.
Interpreting Rousseaus Theory
It should be clear now that the general will is the central concept in Rousseaus theory; the theory simply
doesnt make sense without it. However, Rousseau leaves one critical question unanswered: since no
human being can be the source of the general will, what is the source of the general will, and how do we
decide or figure out what the general will tells us to do? There are three different ways of answering this
question.
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The first interpretation suggests that the general will is cultivated by the government via social
engineering/indoctrination programs that keep the citizens from being overly concerned about their
individuality, but rather dedicated much more to the common interest. Apparently, Rousseaus objective
here is to create a society where everyone is dedicated to and interested in the same ideas, which lacks
any real elements of individuality. To Rousseau, the laws are created to keep individuals focused on the
common interest and prevent them from straying from the general will:
Cranston, Introduction to The Social Contract, pp. 35
...He [Rousseau] says that a man may be forced to be free, and he is thinking here
of the occasional individual who, as a result of being enslaved by his passions, disobeys
the voice of the law, or of the general will, within him. The general will is something
inside each man, as well as society as a whole, so that the man who is coerced by the
community for a breach of the law is, in Rousseaus view of things, being brought back
to an awareness of his own true will. Thus, in penalizing a lawbreaker, society is literally
correcting him, teach-ing him a lesson for which, when he comes to his senses, the
offender should be grateful.
Furthermore, in order to avoid problems of social choice, Rousseau wants to keep discussion among the
citizens of the political issues at hand to a minimum, which seems very odd, given that he doesnt
otherwise explicitly tell us how to find out what the general will is.
...[T]he members of the body politic among themselves, or of each within the
entire body: their relations among themselves should be as limited, and their relations
with the entire body as extensive, as possible, in order that each citizen may be perfectly
independent of all his fellow citizens and excessively dependent on the republic...
Thus, if individuals dont discuss the issues to arrive at the general will and the government is supposed
to enforce what the general will says, it seems thus that governmental institutions like social engineering
programs tell individuals what the general will is. To most people, this inter-pretation, where everyone is
always concerned about the same things, sounds a lot like communist indoctrinations under leaders like
the former Soviet Unions Joseph Stalin, which will not appeal to many judges (unless they happen to be
die-hard Soviets). Unfortunately, this interpretation is probably how Rousseau thought individuals would
figure out the source and decrees of the general will.
The second interpretation, unfortunately, is probably not all that much better than the first, though it does
manage to avoid the formers pitfalls. This interpretation suggests that there is no real embodiment of the
general will, and therefore, no clear way to figure out its source or what it says we should do. It just
seems, in many ways, as merely a name Rousseau gives to the most brilliant thing a government could
possibly do for its citizens. Its like saying the government should always do what is just or moral, but no
one knows exactly what is the just or moral thing to do, nor does anyone have a foolproof way to figure it
out. In effect, the theory is meaningless, and Rousseaus theory often seems to be like this because we
really dont know how to figure out what the general will tells us to do.
The third interpretation of this answer to the questions about the general will is somewhat better than the
first two, and it is actually loosely outlined by Rousseau in The Social Contract. Basically, it involves
having well-informed members of society, under careful reflection, decide what the best interests of
society really are; the answers will probably be close to the general will. When their answers are
compared, we can probably discover what the general will says if we discard the differences between
their answers, and focus on the similarities that remain. In Rousseaus own words:
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From the deliberations of a people properly informed, and provided the members
do not have any communication among themselves, the great number of small differences
will always produce a general will always produce a general will and the decision will
always be good.
This system of attempting to figure out the general will seems feasible if the society is small enough.
Rousseau is often not a good model for large societies, just because of the unlikelihood of finding some
general will that is in the best interests of the entire population. Its just not convincing to think that there
exists a general will on every major political issue in the United States that is in the best interests of all
285 million people.
Using Rousseau In Debate Rounds
As one of the three main social contract theorists used in L-D, Rousseau can be used as a general-purpose
social contract philosopher like Locke or Hobbes. Debaters often use these philosophers to explain the
relationship between a government and its citizens, or how a legitimate government ought to act. Similar
to Locke and Hobbes, Rousseau is a decent source of information and evidence on how the governments
primary responsibility usually is to act in the best interests of its citizens. He is also a good social contract
philosopher to use if you want to explain individuals necessity of entering into civil society through a
social contract instead of remaining in the state of nature, as Rousseau clearly describes mans
shortcomings in the state of nature, and the advantages of entering into society.
From a purely philosophical standpoint, Rousseau can also be used to critique the theories of Locke and
Hobbes. For example, if your opponent is using Locke, there are noticeable problems with majority rule,
and how it doesnt necessarily take into account what really is in societys best interest, but is simply
what the majority wants to do (probably for their own benefit). Reading analysis by Rousseau, on the
other hand, deals with this potential problem by saying that the governments responsibility is to do what
is in accordance with every citizens best interests, not just a large portion of the population. This specific
responsibility guards against the majority from using its power to infringe upon the well-being of the
minority, which even though under neither Lockes nor Rousseaus theories it is supposed to do, only
Rousseaus government really is designed to prevent such abuses.
Rarely have I ever encountered Rousseau in a round, and usually when I have, someone has used his
theory or explained it incorrectly. I would avoid using Rousseaus theory as the flat out basis for a case,
as the problems with the general will inevitably will come up during a round if you are facing a debater of
reasonable merit.
Suggested Reading
If you want to actually read the text of Rousseaus The Social Contract, (which might be worthwhile,
since it is not all that long); the edition I used for this overview:
?? Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract. Trans. Maurice Cranston. New York: Penguin,
1968.
All of the quotations by Maurice Cranston used in this overvie w are from introduction to Rousseaus text,
found in the same book.
If you want further reading/criticism about Rousseaus theory (and for most other topics relevant to
Lincoln-Douglas debate), the following book should help:
55

?? Bowie, Norman E., and Robert L. Simon. The Individual & the Political Order: an Introduction
to Social and Political Philosophy. 3rd ed. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998. pp. 124-27.
Other relevant sources:
?? West, David. The Contribution of Continental Philosophy. A Companion to Contemporary
Political Philosophy. Ed. Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Blackwell, 1996.
?? Hampton, Jean. Contract and Consent. A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy.
Ed. Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1996.
?? Gauthier, David. The Social Contract As Ideology. Contemporary Political Philosophy. Ed.
Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1997.
Other Authors/Philosophers Worth Reading
If you like Rousseau, who is in many ways an early communitarian, you might want to read some of
Michael Sandel, who is, predictably, a modern communitarian. Immanuel Kant also has an excellent
defense of social contract theories, and in fact a social contract theory of his own, which in many ways
can be used as a defense of Rousseaus. If you simply want to read about social contract theories and
theorists, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and (against the idea of the social contract) David Hume are good
philosophers with which to begin.
56

Madison (Sumon Dantiki)
JAMES MADISON
by Sumon Dantiki
In recent years, Lincoln Douglas debate has increasingly focused on topics which have had strong
correlations to the principles of American government. A few examples include: The use of economic
sanctions to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals is moral. (Nov/Dec 99), In the United States, a
journalist's right to shield confidential sources ought to be protected by the First Amendment. (Jan/Feb
99), In the United States' justice system, due process ought to be valued above the pursuit of truth when
they are in conflict. (Nationals, 97-98).
This trend of resolutions that strongly relate to American political theory and practice is not likely to stop
anytime soon. In fact, as I write this article the topic is resolved: Decentralized governmental power
ought to be a fundamental goal of democratic society. (Sept/Oct 01) The topic focuses on a key concept,
federalism, debated by American leaders from James Madison to Ronald Reagan. Despite this, there is a
tendency, especially among better debaters, to avoid using American political theory as evidence and
focus on more traditional philosophersAristotle, Kant, Locke, Mill, etc...instead. Its as if the
prevailing attitude is: the older the philosopher, the better.
Asides from being unpatriotic, this can hurt a debaters potential to make an effective case with certain
resolutions. This piece is an effort to put more focus on the usage of Madison, and consequently other
founding fathers, as legitimate political philosophers and as evidence/arguments. In particular this piece
will focus on Federalism, the main political philosophy that Madison espoused during the ratifying
debates of the Constitution and largely shapes our government today.
It should be noted that this by no means encompasses an overview of all the political philosophies of the
various (influential) founding fathers. Ill leave that task to future VB staffers and debaters. It does,
however, provide a starting point to a philosophy that often comes up, to varying degrees, in many debate
resolutions.
I will try to focus on Madison and his theory on the role of the newly created American Constitution. I
will also, however, have to draw upon other works from his allies during the ratification debate and critics
to give the debater the full scope of arguments that were presented during these debates over the role of
the federal government.
When to use this
As with any argument, the philosophies outlined in this piece will not apply to every resolution. The best
time to use Madisonian, or other federalism, theories is for topics that 1) Apply specifically to the U.S.
and 2) Have a logical tie to the resolution or your specific case. Dont try to make the philosophy fit the
resolution, but if you see a new angle that involves federalism, use it. My point here is that debaters who
read this piece should apply it creatively, but not outrageously, in their cases.
For instance, this piece has obvious connections to the current resolution: Decentralized governmental
power ought to be a fundamental goal of democratic society. (Sept/Oct 01) However, a less obvious
link might be to a prior resolution: In the United States, a journalist's right to shield confidential sources
ought to be protected by the First Amendment. During debate of this topic, I witnessed a very successful
negative case (which the debater used to qualify for nationals) win the round with a strong states
rights/anti-federalist approachessentially saying that the First Amendment was an improper vehicle to
protect journalists, it should be done by state laws. This type of argument, which was uncommon, was
easily supported by anti-federalist evidence (outlined here later) and extremely effective, in part, because
57

it was novel. So think outside the box, itll make your cases unique and stronger if you can make a valid
argument that others dont anticipate.
Madisons Mission
To understand Madisons arguments for a strong, national government, its first important to understand
the historical context. After the U.S. won the Revolutionary War it went through a period of economic
weakness and domestic discontent which forced its leaders to recognize that the Articles of Confederation
were a flawed and ineffective system of governance. The Constitutional convention sought to remedy
that by creating a new system of government.
Madisons cause during the convention and the ensuing ratification debate was to validate the new
Constitutionand federal governmentto the other delegates and eventually to the people at large. His
most famous papers on the subject are a series of articles, the Federalist Papers, written in collaboration
with John Jay and Alexander Hamilton. His theories have carried enormous weight in American politics;
our nations history is full of examples of its application and continue to be disputed in the modern day,
most notably in the state vs. federal rights disputes.
Lets start with a few terms:
federalism: the distribution of political authority between the federal government and the government of
the states.
Federalists: supporters of the Constitution in the struggle to adopt it [note the difference to previous term]
Madison presented his arguments as justification of adopting a new strong federal government, and
consequently, became a simultaneous advocate of federalism and constitutional ratification. It should be
noted at this point that this met with strong opposition. Many statesmen in America were wary of
seceding power to a new national government in far-off New York or Philadelphia (D.C. hadnt been
planned) when they had just won a bloody revolution to secure their government from far-off London. In
fact, the prevailing political philosophy of the time, set forth by Frances Baron de Montesquie, had
argued that liberty was best secure in small republics. As Samuel Beer summarizes in The Rediscovery of
American Federalism:The great Montesquieu had warned that popular government was not suitable for
a large and diverse country. If attempted, he predicted, its counsels would be distracted by a thousand
private views and its extent would provide cover for ambitious men seeking despotic power. Many
Americans agreed with this idea and feared that a large national government would not adequately protect
liberty. Madison tried to dispel these beliefs through his analysis of political behavior.
Madison makes his case by examining the American system and drawing conclusions about the protection
of liberty. In Federalist 10, he identifies faction as the single greatest threat to democracy:
The friend of popular governments, never himself so much alarmed for their character
and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. [faction] It is
defined, in Federalist 10: By faction I understand a number of citizens, whether
amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
Why is faction so detrimental? Because it can lead to tyranny and a loss of liberty. Madison identifies
two ways to avert this calamitous fate: 1) Remove its causes or 2) Control it effects.
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So what exactly causes faction? Madison basically argues that faction occurs whenever free men freely
associate with each other, there are bound to be factions organized along the lines of passion or
interest between different groups of people. The only possible ways Madison sees to avoid this are to
either 1) Destroy liberty or 2) Give everyone the same interests, beliefs, opinions and existence.
Now these two solutions to faction might seem outrageous to any red-blooded 21st century American,
but governments throughout history have used them as cures for faction. The most notable examples of
recent times are the Red Scare of the 50s in which the U.S. government limited free speech and press (a
destruction of liberty) and tried to give people the same opinions and beliefs (i.e. democracy good,
communism bad) via the carrots of propaganda and the sticks of persecution. Another example is the
internment of Japanese Americans during World War II: a clear example of the U.S. government trying to
preempt a faction (real or imagined) by destroying the civil liberties of a segment of the American
populace. Of course, historical examples arent limited to the U.S. government; many others have used
them, especially during times of crisis or war.
Thus, when preparing for debate rounds, its important to judge whether the situation fits Madisons
cures to the causes of faction. If it does, then you can probably also apply Madisons conclusions to the
round.
Of the first cure to the cause of faction, removing liberty, Madison comments in Federalist 10, Liberty is
to faction, what air is to fire, an ailment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be a less folly
to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish
the annihilation of air, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
This comment has broad implications. It refutes any political system or philosophy which seeks to harm
liberty for the sake of eliminating faction (a.k.a. preserving order, national security, etc) You should be
able to apply it to a variety of resolutions dealing with liberty or security issues.
Of the second cure for the cause of faction, giving everyone the same opinions, Madison states: The
second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues
fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed.
Here Madison lays the foundation for his ultimate view of the nature of faction: it is an inevitable part of
society. It is not possible to control faction, because it is impossible to ever give members of society the
same opinions. Thus, trying to limit controversy or freedom of thought/expression simply wont work.
Again, the implications of the statement can apply to a variety of issues. For example, it negates ideas
like a ban on flag burning or mandatory community service which, could be argued, impose governmental
thought on individual citizens via a loss of their liberty.
Based upon this analysis, Madison concludes that it is not really possible to eliminate the causes of
faction, it is only reasonable to control its effects. Once again, there are multiple methods to do this,
depending on the problem. The first problem occurs when a faction, of less than a majority, tries to take
power. (Think back to the aristocracies of Europe, or possibly America, for historical examples) In this
case, the will of the majority, who are often the poorer classes is not being served. In this case, Madison
argues that the republican principle will save the day. By republican principle he means, a form of
democracy. Basically, the majority will simply outvote a ruling tyrannical minority, who can only,
clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its
violence under the forms of the Constitution.
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But what if there is a tyranny (faction) of the majority? Madison analyzes the difference in Federalist 10
between a pure democracy and a republic to solve this dilemma:
The two great points of difference between Democracy and a Republic are, first, the
delegation of the Government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the
rest; secondly, the greatest number of citizens, and the sphere of country, over which the
latter may be extended.
These two differences Madison argues, make Republics superior to pure Democracies that have ever
been spectacles of turbulence and contention. Essentially, a Republic uses a system of representation
(i.e. Congresspersons) to filter the views of the public. Secondly, as the size of the Republic is enlarged,
there will be more competing interests. This is Madisons great philosophy: limit a tyranny of the
majority through competing factions. The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their
particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States
It is this philosophy that causes Madison to urge for the new federal system, which consist of three
branches (executive, judicial, legislative) and three principal levels of government (federal, state, local).
The Anti-Federalists and history
It is not possible to speak of Madison and Federalism without addressing the points brought up by antifederalists. In Madisons day, the most vocal of these were Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry and Robert
Yates (Brutus). The main point that they stressed was the insecurity of liberty in the new constitutional
system. They feared national supremacy of federal law and pointed out the new constitution lacked
measures to specifically ensure the protection of individual liberties as had been done in the Magna Carta
of Britain and many individual colonial governments. As a result of their efforts the Bill of Rights was
passed shortly after Constitutional ratification.
But the story doesnt end there. About ten years after the ratification of the Constitution, the Federalists
(who were in political power) passed the Alien and Sedition acts to silence critics of the new government.
Jefferson responded with The Kentucky Resolve, outlining a new theory of federalism based on the idea
that states are in a compact with one another, giving states the right to nullify federal law and
advocating a strict constructionist attitude of constitutional interpretation:
Resolved, that the several States composing the United States of America, are not united
on the principle of unlimited submission to their general government; but that by compact
under the style and title of a Constitution for the United States and amendments thereto,
they constituted a general government for special purposes, delegated to that government
certain definite powersand that whensoever the general government assumes
undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void and of no force.
The issue of federalism, specifically concerning national supremacy, made history again less than thirty
years later. In the seminal Supreme Court case McCulloch v. The State of Maryland, Chief Justice John
Marshall refuted Jeffersons nullification theory and highlighted necessary and proper, clause in the
American constitution which became the standard for future use of federal power.
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From the opinion of the Court in McCulloch v. Maryland:

The court has bestowed on this subject its most deliberate consideration. The
result is a conviction that the states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard,
impede, burden, or in any manner control the operations of the constitutional laws
enacted by congress to carry out into execution the powers vested in the general
government. This is, we think, the unavoidable consequence of that supremacy which the
constitution has declared.
But lest you think that national supremacy, an idea that started with Madison, has triumphed over states
rights, lets look at a more recent example: Ronald Reagan. The most flagrant rhetorical example of
Reagans states rights view of federalism, redefined as New Federalism is seen in his inaugural
address:
It is my intention to curb the size and influence of the Federal establishment and to
demand recognition between the powers granted to the Federal Government and those
reserved to the states or to the people.
All of usall of us need to be reminded that the Federal Government did not create the
states, the states created the Federal Government.
Of course, this comment riled up the modern federalists of America. As Samuel Beer notes in his essay,
The Rediscovery of American Federalism: In response to President Reagans use of the compact theory,
eminent academic critics counterattacked in terms of national theory. Richard P. Morris of Columbia
University called the Presidents view of the historical facts a hoary myth about the origins of the
Union. And went on to summarize the evidence showing that the United States was created by people
in collectivity, not by the individual states.
At this point it should be emphasized that the debate over federalism is not simply a disagreement over
high-minded political science theory. The conclusions drawn by various American political and social
leadersespecially national policymakershas influenced a myriad of social programs and policy. A
key historical example is Theodore Roosevelt during the age of a New Nationalism. Franklin
Roosevelt revamped the interpretation of federal authority through his New Deal and other federal
programs which brought America into a new age of industrialism. President Johnson used his
interpretation of federalism to justify his own version of federal authority.
Federalism, as theory, touches nearly every practice of modern American government. The federalization
of criminal laws, or of welfare has had enormous legal and social implications. Quite simply, it is almost
impossible to discuss the proper role of American governmental authoritya frequent topic in debate
roundswithout considering federalism as a theory.
Hopefully, this piece has shed some light on the pro/con arguments thereof and the historical
underpinnings of Madisonian thought that gave rise to the current constitutional framework under which
our country operates. The information presented has broad applicability with a variety of resolutions,
good luck researching and debating!
61

Sources Used
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
From Principles and Practice of American Politics, Samuel Kernell & Steve Smith, ed.
Samuel Beer, The Rediscovery of American Federalism, p. 85-110
From Source Readings for American Government, William D. Young, ed.
James Madison. Federalist Papers, Nos: 10, 55. p. 14-20
John Marshall. Opinion of the Court in McCulloch v. Maryland, p. 30-36
Thomas Jefferson. The Kentucky Resolve, p. 27-30
Ronald Reagan. Inaugural Address, p. 47-51
Other Possible Sources

?? James M. Buchanan. Federalism as an Ideal Political Order and an Objective for Constitutional
Reform.
?? Theodore Roosevelt. A New Nationalism.
?? Robert Toombs. Justification of States Rights and Secession.
?? Daniel Webster. A Reply to Hayne.
62

Democracy (Stephen Babb)
DEMOCRACY
by Stephen Babb
It is not unusual for an LD resolution to specify democratic context or the pursuit of democratic values.
Understanding the philosophy that underlies democracy is more than likely necessary at some point
during a debater's career. But the even more crucial reason to think about democracy and those who have
already thought about it in some depth, is that democratic beliefs are a requisite element to complete
discussion about political philosophy. Our discussion of democracy will primarily (almost exclusively)
take into account contemporary perspectives from various philosophers who have made significant
contribution to the subject. This is by no means an accident or an oversight. Insofar as democratic
thinking is inextricably linked to the cultural, governmental, economic, and socio-political contexts within
which democracy might exist, contemporary views are not only of exceptional value, but are indeed
essential to meaningful dialogue on the subject. This is not to say that the contributions of those to come
before our philosophical age are useless, but that from the perspective of debaters who wish to discuss
which systems work and are more preferable or legitimate, a contemporary view may be more useful. It
is also quite possible that while you are somewhat familiar with older texts, you have not been exposed to
newer thought on the subject that has not yet had an opportunity to be considered "classic." That said,
you are encouraged to pursue democratic reading from all eras and all sources. Not only will it enhance
the following discussion a great deal, it will serve you well in all aspects of your debating endeavors.
The following discussion of democracy is not entirely comprehensive in at least two other ways worth
noting. First of all, it considers the theory aspect of democracy, not its technical components. The
approach is, for the sake of its debate applications, philosophical rather than socially or politically
scientific. Second of all, only a few key issues within the broad scope of "democracy" will receive
attention. It would be impossible to thoroughly address every debatable topic relevant to democracy in
such limited space, and so we will focus more narrowly on several significant topics for Lincoln-Douglas
debate.
Generally, when a resolution asks us to think about democracy, it is questioning the legitimacy or
desirability of a proposed variable within democratic context. In other words, such a topic would
consider whether or not the given variable moves a nation or political system closer to or further away
from the democratic ideal (whatever that is to be discussed later). This automatically demands the
question of why democracy is itself a preferable way to go about political procedure. The subject is
worth argument, and some debaters will inevitably challenge the initial legitimacy of democratic
government. Such a challenge is not at all new and yet not entirely out of style. However, most
resolutions will presume the legitimacy and superiority of democratic ideals. Notice, there is a
delineation to be made between "democratic government" and democratic ideals. The United States is not
factually a democratic government, and is more often considered a republic or some other more precise
definition. Yet, it is most certainly a nation that pursues democratic ideals. We will begin to consider
what exactly these ideals are, and how to pursue them optimally. In so doing, we will by necessity
presuppose the value and desirability of uniquely democratic ideals, leaving the debate about whether or
not democracy is itself legitimate for another time.
First, assuming the desirability of democracy, let us briefly understand why democratic process is so
valuable or significant in the first place. If a topic does not explicitly denote the importance of political
process, but you would like to make it an issue on behalf of your advocacy, the following is especially
helpful:
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Jon Elster, "The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory,"
Foundations of Social Choice Theory, p. 103-132
"I want to compare three views of politics generally, and of the democratic
system more specifically. I shall first look at social choice theory, as an instance of a
wider class of theories with certain common features. In particular, they share the
conception that the political process is instrumental rather than an end in itself, and the
view that the decisive political act is a private rather than a public action, viz. the
individual and secret vote. With these usually goes the idea that the goal of politics is the
optimal compromise between given, and irreducibly opposed, private interests. The other
two views arise when one denies, first, the private character of political behavior and
then, secondly, goes on also to deny the instrumental nature of politics. According to the
theory of Jrgen Habermas, the goal of politics should be rational agreement rather than
compromise, and the decisive political act is that of engaging in public debate with a
view to the emergence of consensus. According to the theorists of participatory
democracy, from John Stuart Mill to Carole Pateman, the goal of politics is the
transformation and education of the participants. Politics, on this view, is an end in itself-indeed many have argued that it represents the good life for man."
In other words, there are at least three possible theories for why the democratic political process is of
value, and to what end its design is significant. If your aim (in a debate round) is to illustrate how your
advocacy is more desirable in a democratic context, then the purpose of democracy may become quite
relevant. For both of theories that grant the public nature of the democratic process, there is a significant
emphasis placed on the discourse and deliberation that must necessarily take place. Jrgen Habermas,
who has written a great deal both on democracy and discourse, explains what is meant when
differentiating public political procedures from private ones:
Jrgen Habermas, "The Public Sphere," Jrgen Habermas on Society and Politics, 1989
"By 'public sphere' we mean first of all a domain of our social life in which such
a thing as public opinion can be formed. Access to the public sphere is open in principle
to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere is constituted in every conversation in
which private persons come together to form a public. They are then acting neither as
business nor professional people conducting their private affairs, nor as legal consociates
subject to the legal regulations of a state bureaucracy and obligated to obedience.
Citizens act as a public when they deal with matters of general interest without being
subject to coercion; thus with the guarantee that they assemble and unite freely, and
express and publicize their opinions freely."
Joshua Cohen likewise affirms the crucial importance of public discursive spheres, this time emphasizing
the importance of argument and the resolution of differing views. Remember, as in Habermas's view, the
key pursuit is that of agreement of rationally finding some kind of common ground.
Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," The Good Polity, p. 17-34
"The notion of deliberative democracy is rooted in the intuitive ideal of a
democratic association in which the justification of the terms and conditions of
association proceeds through public argument and reasoning among equal citizens.
Citizens in such an order share a commitment to the resolution of problems of collective
choice through public reasoning, and regard their basic institutions as legitimate in so far
as they establish the framework for free public deliberation."
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Clearly, any pursuit of the democratic ideal must then begin with a public sphere in which such
deliberation can take place in meaningful fashion. One can immediately imagine any number of practical
accommodations that would logically follow, everything from laws that protect free political speech to
avenues for effective public communication to a cultural willingness to engage in such deliberation.
Indeed, the concept of openness is a crucial one in such a sphere. Habermas begins to note this when he
rejects the presence of coercion in an effective public sphere. For members of society to engage in an
authentic discourse and deliberation, they must be free to present unique and challenging agendas. An
inseparable element of this kind of process is the liberal principle of pluralism. Indeed, pluralism is a
cornerstone to the contemporary liberal and democratic project. It holds that the good to which we all
strive cannot be narrowed or defined in any one way, cannot be constrained through a single kind of
pursuit. As Isaiah Berlin has explained extensively in his writings, pluralism (not to be confused with
relativism which categorically rejects the possibility of an objective value) is perhaps the most essential
tenet of liberalism. William Galston, in his just released work Liberal Pluralism, defines value pluralism
as, "a world in which fundamental values are plural, conflicting, incommensurable in theory, and
uncombinable in practice." Where one goes from there depends. Some move towards a relativist
position, suggesting that such a plurality must be thought of normatively as well, and granted primacy in
the scheme of liberalism. In other words, some contend that pluralism is of chief value, in a sense
structuring the way in which all other value are considered. This can sometimes pose problems for
liberalism, because there are of course a number of other values such as autonomy and human rights that
underlie the essence of liberalism. At one point does pluralism become a multiculturalist ideal that
potentially jeopardizes other liberal values (e.g. what are we to do about the treat of women under Islamic
Fundamentalism?). Others, for this very reason, consider pluralism a highly significant pursuit amongst
the many that constitute liberalism. After all, if pluralism itself has primacy, then isn't liberalism rejected
as being overly monistic? For these liberals pluralism does not lose its importance--it instead must be
reconciled with other values that "we" as liberals happen to believe in. So why all this talk about
pluralism? One reason why current liberals in academia (sometimes referred to as deliberative
democrats) are so concerned with democratic ideals and the procedures we use in their pursuit is that
these ideals and procedures are the avenues through which we acknowledge the value of things like
pluralism (or even autonomy or rights). Pluralism is an especially important component in defining the
importance of democracy, because autonomy and rights could theoretically be protected under nondemocratic premises. But pluralism requires an outlet that procedurally guards the multiplicity of values
and pursuits amongst communities and individuals. It requires a systematic structure that prevents a
corruption of this pluralist ideal. The only way to do this, presumably, is through democratic schemes
(and so might begin one's defense of democracy). The aforementioned importance of public spheres,
then, becomes crystal clear. Within a system that not only values but mightily defends the pluralist ideal,
there must be a fair way for these competing and conflicting values to reach agreement on a political
process that will continue to protect their unique pursuits. In other words, through discourse we reach a
kind of rational agreement or compromise (depending on whether we buy Habermas or not) that enables
government to govern without preference of one value system over another. It is perhaps through these
processes that we are able to reach certain particular values whose presence in the agenda of a liberal
state seems to paradoxically deny pluralism. For instance, through rational agreement we come to
consensus on the importance of various rights, liberties, laws, policies, and so forth. In so doing, the
democratic structures enables a procedurally pluralist dynamic while inevitably engendering a telos or
common good that inevitably simplifies the multiplicity of values to be found in the society. We then
come to perhaps the most significant concern regarding democracy: how are we to legitimately pursue
democratic ideals given the demand for procedural pluralism?
In general, there are certain requirements upon the process of deliberation itself. Joshua Cohen
summarizes what legitimate democratic procedures look like in theory:
Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," The Good Polity, p. 17-34
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"Turning then to the ideal procedure, there are three general aspects of
deliberation. There is a need to decide on an agenda, to propose alternative solutions to
the problems on an agenda, supporting those solutions with reasons, and to conclude by
settling on an alternative. A democratic conception can be represented in terms of the
requirements that it sets on such a procedure. In particular, outcomes are democratically
legitimate if and only if they could be the object of free and reasoned agreement among
equals. The ideal deliberative procedure is a procedure that captures this principle."
Cohen gives a cogent and rather simple explanation of a legitimate deliberative process, but what of the
democratic process in general? There is certainly more to it that the notion of deliberation itself. And
how are we to enter into this deliberation is legitimate fashion? Robert A. Dahl, who has written a great
deal on democracy, submits a more thorough account of the democratic pursuit in his article, "Procedural
Democracy." In it, he first discusses three criteria for legitimate procedure and then goes on to discuss
the problem of inclusion (who should be considered eligible to participate in the process). Members of
the demos (the citizens having legitimate membership in a group characterized by political relationship)
come together for deliberation (itself a fundamental aspect of democracy), but must do so in certain
procedurally democratic ways. You will notice that each of these criteria not only defines the pursuit of
democratic ideals, but does so in such a way as to acknowledge the demand for a pluralist dynamic. Here
are the criteria (and do not confuse these with use as "criteria" in a debate round):
Political Equality
Robert A. Dahl, "Procedural Democracy," Philosophy, Politics and Society, p. 97-133
"First, all proposed procedures for making binding decisions must be evaluated
according to the criterion of political equality. That is, the decision rule for determining
outcomes at the decisive stage must take into account, and take equally into account, the
expressed preferences of each member of the demos as to the outcome. The expression
of preferences as to the outcome at the decisive stage is, of course, what we usually mean
by 'voting' and 'a vote'; thus the criterion of political equality specifies that at the decisive
stage each citizen has an equal vote."
Effective Participation
"The second criterion according to which all proposed procedures must be
evaluated is the criterion of effective participation. According to this criterion,
throughout the process of making binding decisions, one must have an adequate
opportunity, and an equal opportunity, for expressing his or her preferences as to the final
outcome. Thus citizens must have adequate and equal opportunities for placing questions
on the agenda, and for expressing reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another.
For to deny any citizen adequate opportunities for effective participation means that their
preferences cannot be known, or cannot be correctly known, and hence cannot be taken
into account. And if some citizens have less opportunity than others, then their
preferences as to the final outcome are less likely to be taken equally into account. But
not to take their preferences as to the final outcome equally into account is to reject the
criterion of political equality, and thus to deny the condition of roughly equal
qualification, taken all around."
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Enlightened Understanding
"I propose therefore to amplify the doctrine of procedural democracy by adding a
third criterion. Unfortunately, I do not know how to formulate the criterion except in
words that are rich in meaning and correspondingly ambiguous. Let me, however, offer
this formulation for the criterion of enlightened understanding: In order to express his or
her preferences accurately, each citizen ought to have adequate and equal opportunities
for discovering and validating, in the time permitted by the need for a decision, what his
or her preferences are on the matter to be decided. This criterion implies, then, that
alternative procedures for making decisions ought to be evaluated according to the
opportunities they furnish citizens for acquiring an understanding of means and ends, and
of oneself and other relevant selves."
It should be rather clear how these criteria fit in with the agenda of liberalism. The notions of political
equality and effective participation are both grounded in a demand for pluralism and also autonomy.
Some argue that members of the demos have basic or natural rights to such participation. Whatever the
case may be, Dahl's criteria are consistent with and essential to pursuits of the good that are indeed
democratically confined. The reason for including the third criterion is somewhat more complicated. If it
is the purpose of democracy to enable a process of deliberation that allows (in pluralist fashion) the equal
expression of preferences as to values, law, policies, and so forth, then there must be adequate rational
resource for persons attempting to form these preferences. How can one truly prefer one option to
another when knowledge or understanding of the issues at hand is overly constricted? In a sense,
ignorance of relevant information handicaps the citizen's ability to participate meaningfully, sense they
cannot express preferences and their own value-based judgments within an informed context. The
implications of this criterion are fairly significant, leading to a discussion--which we unfortunately do not
have room for here--of whether or not certain persons ought not be granted membership for lack of
necessary understanding. The obvious example of children arises, and carries with it specula tion about
members of a demos whose political understanding is on par with below that of children. Nevertheless,
this kind of criterion can be quite valuable in a debate topic concerning what the public ought know.
Consider for instance the resolution: The public's right to know ought to be valued above the candidate's
conflicting right to privacy. If the public is unable to engage in procedurally legitimate deliberation
because information relevant to its various preferences is concealed, then members are unable participate
meaningfully. Or if the government in effect determines what information is or isn't relevant, then it has
denied the pluralist nature of legitimate democratic procedure.
In general, there are a number of matters to keep in mind when discussing democracy in debate or an
actual round. Be prepared to defend the notion that democracy is itself valuable or the most desirable
system of political ideals. This will likely not be the focus of most rounds in which democratic thought is
an issue, but it is one to be aware of nonetheless. In rounds where the essential conflict becomes a
question of which advocacy is more democratic, then it makes sense to pick one of the relevant criteria
mentioned by Dahl or even the need for deliberation and a public sphere conducive to these pursuit, and
explain the importance of such a thing in detail (relating this significance to democratic ideals, pluralism,
autonomy, etc). With some depth established, you then have an opportunity to demonstrate why your
advocacy better satisfies which criterion or condition you've chosen. You could always discuss a variety
of criteria or conditions, but do so at the cost of depth and argumentative clarity.
It is also popular in certain circumstances to use democracy as a value. This tendency is a curious one,
and should be avoided for fairly obvious reasons after having read through this discussion. Democratic
procedures are merely mechanisms for pursuing certain liberal values, or at the very least the capacity to
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support and protect a plurality of values as held by the demos. There are certain aspects of democratic
procedure that are undoubtedly valuable, and it might be said that the totality of these aspects suggest that
the procedures themselves are valuable. But these "values" are highly functional in nature, and are said to
be valuable only because they facilitate or lead to what we're really interested in. If there were a more
perfect way to pursue the pluralist ideal, or liberalism's justice as defined by rights protection and
autonomy, then certainly this method would be preferable. Thus, when arguing on behalf of democratic
procedures or ideals, it is crucial to remember that they are valued because they are effective mechanisms
in the pursuit of something else.
Finally, if you are interested in reading more about democracy there are a wide range of thinkers to look
for, both classic and contemporary. Look especially to Schumpeter, Locke, Rousseau, and Mill. To some
extent, the writing of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay in the Federalist Papers shed some light on democratic
thought, especially from this country's perspective. For contemporary argument, look to John Rawls,
Michael Sandel, Robert A. Dahl, Isaiah Berlin, Charles Taylor, Jrgen Habermas, Jon Elster, Joshua
Cohen, Cass R. Sunstein, and Anne Phillips. Most contemporary philosophers who involve themselves
with political thought will have something to say about democracy because of its prevalence and apparent
superiority in current Western thought and reality. So, when researching, keep and open mind and look
into a number of places, even ones in which the title of the book isn't "About Democracy".
Hope this has been helpful, and as always best wishes!
68

Rawls (Stephen Babb)
JOHN RAWLS
by Stephen Babb
John Rawls introduced some exceptionally new spins on how we seek to define political justice. Rawls
carries on a long liberalist tradition, believing strongly in the preeminence of justice as a social value and
the importance of rights in how we humans interact with one another. This is specifically in contrast with
philosophers more concerned with utilitarian outcomes or even the communitarians, who stress the social
nature of humankind. Rawls makes this pretty clear.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971, p.3.
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A
theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue;
likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be
reformed or abolished if they are unjust. Each person possesses an inviolability founded
on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole could not override.
This is certainly not to say that Rawls feels justice is the only virtue of social institutions. He makes this
very clear in an article written long before A Theory of Justice.
John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, Philosophical Review, 67, 1958, p.164.
Justice is to be understood in its customary sense as representing but one of the
many virtues of social institutions, for these may be antiquated, inefficient, degrading, or
any number of other things, without being unjust. Justice is not to be confused with an
all-inclusive vision of a good society; it is only one part of any such conception. It is
important, for example, to distinguish that sense of equality which is an aspect of the
concept of justice from that sense of equality which belongs to a more comprehensive
social ideal. There may well be inequalities which one concedes are just, or at least not
unjust, but which, nevertheless, one wishes, on other grounds, to do away with.
Now that we know what it is Rawls is discussing, we can further explore how he goes about discussing it,
and how he understands the concept of justice. Specifically, Rawls explains justice in the context of how
wealth ought to be distributed amongst people in society. On a more fundamental level, he even argues
how we are to determine these standards of justice in the first place. Why not just allow a commission of
really brilliant academics to meet and determine what political and economic arrangements the value of
justice entails (assuming they could ever come to a consensus!)? Or, why not just put the implications of
justice to a vote and allow the popula ce to decide who should have what? After all, democratic
procedures are always desirable, arent they? Well, Rawls would suggest that the problem with each of
these methodologies is that they necessarily take into account personal biases about what justice should
be. Wealthy bankers might prefer a more libertarian understanding of justice and how society ought be
arranged, while a homeless person would undoubtedly prefer a system that looks more favorably upon
practices of redistribution. In other words, once a person has found their place in society, that social
position will have an unreasonable influence on this persons conception of justice. How can we possibly
correct this? We cant very well take someones social positioning away from them and then ask them to
figure out what justice means. Rawls contends, however, that we can do something kind of like this
hypothetically. He proposes that we imagine a pre-social position, what he calls the original position.
Rawls doesnt bother with whether or not such a condition ever existed, as most tend to agree that people
have always in some way or another been part of society. Thus, the original position is for the purposes
of this thought experiment, a hypothetical one. Nevertheless, it is very essential to the development of a
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truly unbiased concept of justice. Rawls clearly feels that without this notion, any scheme of justice
would be biased and likely slanted to benefits one group or another.
If a knowledge of particulars is allowed, then the outcome is biased by arbitrary
contingencies. As already observed, to each according to this threat advantage is not a
principle of justice. If the original position is to yield agreements that are just, the parties
must be fairly situated and treated equally as moral persons.
The next step in developing this concept of justice is figuring out how those in the original position decide
upon the criteria of just arrangements and so forth. After all, because they do not have knowledge of their
social position, they must also lack awareness of their communal values and other factors like tradition
and those cultural contexts that in a very large way shape how we would view something like justice.
When in the original position, this inability to know about ones social context means that they are behind
what Rawls calls the veil of ignorance. Behind this veil, persons are to determine the principles of justice
through some kind of consensus.
The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures that
no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choices of principles by the outcome of
natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances. Since all are similarly situated
and no one is able to design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of
justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain.
This has been an important criticism of Rawls by communitarian thinkers who believe it a mistake to try
and separate our notions of justice from the context of community. Indeed, it is perhaps impossible to
understand any conception of justice absent the influence of community and values. If it is the
community that defines the self, and if the values we acquire in the process are a fundamental part of how
we determine justice, then it seems like the communitarians have a point. Michael Walzer (who does not
describe himself as a communitarian, incidentally) explains how we should look at justice and what it
really means. As a side note, the following is not specifically a response to Rawls but one can certainly
see the implications.
Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, 1983, p. 312-313.
Justice is relative to social meanings. Indeed, the relativity of justice follows
from the classic non-relative definition, giving rach person his due, as much as it does
from my own proposal, distributing goods for internal reasons. These are formal
definitions that require, as I have tried to show, historical completion. We cannot say
what is due to this person or that one until we know how these people relate to one
another through the things they make and distribute. There cannot be a just society until
there is a society; and the adjective just doesnt determine, it only modifies, the
substantive life of the societies it describes. There are an infinite number of possible
cultures, religions, political arrangements, geographical conditions, and so on. A given
society is just if its substantive life is lived in a certain way--that is, in a way faithful to
the shared understandings of the members. (When people disagree about the meanings of
social goods, when understandings are controversial, then justice requires that society be
faithful to the disagreements, providing institutional channels for their expression,
adjudicative mechanisms, and alternative distribution.).
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Walzer essentially suggests that all the many factors Rawls asks be disregarded from discussion about
justice are exactly the factors one must consider when thinking about justice, such that ones conception
of justice will differ according the community in which he or she lives. Keep all of this in mind should an
opponent use Rawlss understanding of justice in a round. A more communitarian approach make be the
way in which you wish to refute the premise of Rawlss implications. Let us continue to assume, though,
that the premise is valid. Where do we go from there? Those in the original position must decide upon a
scheme of justice, such that upon entering society, social, political, and economic arrangements will fit
this scheme. In other words, this pre-social original position decides what the standards of justice will
be for those in society. Without the aid of knowing his or her own social position ahead of time, each
individual decides these principles of justice based upon some kind of game theory Rawls suggests
persons would use. Everyone decides who will get what once in society without knowing who will be
whom when actually amidst a real social context. Rawls argues that nobody would wish to risk being the
poorest of the poor in an extremely unequal society, and so they would forgo seeking to be the richest of
the rich in this same, unequal distribution of wealth. Yet, in any society where the wealth is
disproportionately distributed such that a limited few are extremely wealthy, there is inevitably a group
that is very poor and disadvantaged. Thus, when behind the veil of ignorance, persons would seek to
maximize the possible minimum level of ownership rather than maximize the maximum level of
ownership. In other words, people seek the optimal worst case scenario, following what Rawls calls the
maximin rule (Notice, the word is not maximum). If I know I have to be the poorest person in society,
I would rather be poor with 5000$ than be poor with 500$. Likewise, if I wasnt sure who I would be in
society, but knew there was a good chance Id be the poorest, I would (according to Rawls) seek a similar
scheme of distribution, to be on the safe side in a sense. Before getting to the conclusion Rawls makes,
we should once again explore an objection made against the process by which Rawls makes this
conclusion. Before, we noted a possible flaw in the premise. There is also a possible flaw in the
extension of that premise. How do we know people would use the maximin rule when making this
decision behind the veil? What about other ways people would actually go about things if there were
such a place as behind the veil? After all, arent we willing to take large risks when we are unsure of
future outcomes in real life?
Alan Goldman, University of Miami, John Rawls Theory of Social Justice, 1980, p.454.
First, it can be pointed out that in ordinary life we normally do not act in a
maximin fashion even if we are uncertain about the probability of various situations
occurring. If it is a nice day and the chances of rain seem slight, we do not walk around
with a raincoat and umbrella on the grounds that the worst possible outcome would be to
get caught in the rain without them. Rather we play percentages to maximize expected
utility. It could be replied that the seriousness of the choices in the original position
make this example irrelevant; but, to take another case, how many of us risk catastrophe
by flying when we travel rather than taking the bus or train?
So maybe Rawls is wrong altogether; maybe not. The intricacies of this kind of game theory can get
rather complex and hypothetical, certainly more so that present discussion warrants. Either way, you can
now appreciate two procedural objections to how Rawls arrives at his conclusions about the principles of
justice. Oh, and what were those principles of justice, anyways? You should take not that so much
discussion and introduction to criticism has taken place before we even arrive at what it is Rawls
concludes.
Rawls says that this business behind the veil of ignorance would come up with two primary principles of
justice, two standards by which we can measure whether or not a scheme of distribution is just. These
principles are essentially criteria for distributive justice. Incidentally, this doesnt necessarily make them
appropriate criteria for an LD round. They can be a little bit difficult to fully explain in the span of an LD
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speech, especially amidst other arguments and so forth. That said, the concepts implicit in these criteria
are good for use in an LD round (and well discuss how later). The two principles have been summarized
a little bit differently by Rawls at different junctures of his writings.
The conception of justice which I want to develop may be stated in the form of
two principles as follows: first, each person participating in a practice, or affected by it,
has an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all; and
second, inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that they will work out
for everyones advantage, and provided the positions and offices to which they attach, or
from which they may be gained, are open to all. These principles express justice as a
complex of three ideas: liberty, equality, and reward for services contributing to the
common good.
-orJohn Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971, p.14-15.
I shall maintain instead that the persons in the initial situation would choose two
rather different principles: the first requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and
duties, while the second holds that social and economic inequalities, for example
inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits
for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society.
And so, how do we unpack these summaries? The first principle greatly reflects the liberal tradition in
which its born. The notion that we are entitled to as much liberty as possible while not exceeding a
threshold comparable to that of everyone else in society is one which seeks to reconcile the classic
(perceived, perhaps) conflict between the demands of liberty and the requirements of equality. Of course,
when we speak of equality we mean it in the prescriptive sense, in that people ought to be treated
similarly and receive equal liberties. The first principle is also fairly straightforward in that it simply calls
for equal treatment and entitlements. The basis of this is fairly self-explanatory in light of the maximin
principle, so I wont spend any further time with it.
The second principle is the one that seems to generate more discussion, and is often referred to as the
difference principle . The reason it is of such importance is that it attempts to essentially outline the only
instances in which the first principle is to be infringed. It qualifies those instances in which its
appropriate or justified not to grant equal liberties. Rawls further explains just what implications it
entails.
It should be noted that the second principle holds that an inequality is allowed
only if there is reason to believe that the practice with the inequality, or resulting in it,
will work for the advantage of every party engaging in it. Here it is important to stress
that every party must gain from the inequality. Since the principle applies to practices, it
implies that the representative man in every office or position defined by a practice, when
he views it as a going concern, must find it reasonable to prefer his condition and
prospects with the inequality to what they would be under the practice without it. The
principle excludes, therefore, the justification of inequalities on the grounds that the
disadvantages of those in one position are outweighed by the greater advantages of those
in another position.
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There is no doubt that the result of such a requirement is a strictly egalitarian scheme of distributive
justice. Obviously, herein lies a third objection to Rawls. Many think such a scheme is unrealistic and
would require procedural injustices to be created (see Nozick), and certainly these arguments must be
taken seriously. One significant aspect of this principle of justice (that we can especially detect in
Rawlss clarification above) is that it very clearly contradicts any kind of utilitarian calculus that would
result in inequalities. Rawls declares that benefits for most people, even qualitatively enormous benefits,
are still too little to justify such an inequality. The benefits must apply to all, and to the extent that each
would find their own situation preferable. Clearly, Rawls would have major troubles with utilitarian
method according to this standard.
Now that we have covered what he wrote (at least the parts most relevant to LD), we can discuss just how
Rawls might be applied to an LD round, how he might be used in cases, how he might be refuted, and so
on. First of all, as it may be obvious by now, Rawls is particularly applicable whenever a resolution
involves the question of who deserves what. This is always central to debates about what economic
systems are most just. For instance, Rawls would argue for an extensive welfare state, while a libertarian
or politically conservative thinker would have problem with the very process of taxation. In a resolution
that discusses the fairness of redistribution or compares capitalism to socialism, Rawls fits in nicely.
Keep in mind several things, though. One, Rawls deals with justice in a somewhat abstract manner. He
isnt necessarily the most pragmatic or realistic source when it comes to deciding how government should
work, for instance. He does give a compelling explanation that helps us know what ought to happen.
Two, though, remember that there are not only a lot of objections to Rawls, but a lot of objections from a
number of different angles (far more than were included in this discussion). That means that if you
decide to run Rawls, you need to be prepared to respond to a variety of attacks. Let that be a warning.
Another way Rawls can be used is as a thorough critique of utilitarianism. Remember, Rawls doesnt
approve of any kind of weighing of one persons interest over any others. Utilitarian ethics necessarily
requires for certain people to be prioritized over others, and thus certain inequalities are inevitable. This
violates Rawlss egalitarian principles of justice. Now, there are certainly a number of ways to argue
against utilitarianism, some of which carry with them less baggage than Rawls. But its certainly an
approach worth considering.
However you decide to use or not use Rawls in rounds, I would hope you do some reading beyond what
you find in this discussion. It is certainly important to know what Rawls says, even if you never pla n to
runs his arguments. Below are some books you might want to check out. You will of course want to read
what Rawls wrote, what some wrote about him, and what critics have to say. There is a little bit of
everything in the list below, which certainly does not cover all that is out there.
Books by Rawls or specifically addressing his position:
?? John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971
?? John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 1993
?? Alan Goldman, John Rawls Theory of Social Justice, 1980
?? Norman Daniels, Reading Rawls, 1989
?? Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls, 1989
Books that make a special point to discuss Rawls:
?? Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1974
?? Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 1978
?? Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 1982
?? Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 1990
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Nozick (Stephen Babb)
ROBERT NOZICK
by Stephen Babb
Robert Nozick is to political philosophy what third parties are to the political process. Much of their
value depends upon their ability to critique and reevaluate status quo beliefs, institutions, and all those
notions so often taken for granted. Their ability to introduce new and practical solutions is another story,
however. Nozicks most noteworthy work was Anarchy, State, and Utopia, a thorough discussion of how
the state should exist and not exist, how rights ought to function, and why John Rawls was dead wrong;
but, this was also Nozicks earliest work (mid 1970s), and it is certainly not a complete representation of
all his views-- which have changed somewhat and developed in two later books, Philosophical
Explanations and The Examined Life. In each case, Nozick makes persuasive and technical arguments
that can easily be used in Lincoln-Douglas debate, especially when debaters go on to read all he had to
say and not simply my poor attempt to do him justice.
The task Nozick sets upon himself in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (the work most relevant both to political
philosophy and LD debate) is to explain his position regarding political justice, specifically as it involves
distributive justice. As a concept, this involves many of the same concerns as economics, but with a
normative focus as opposed to simply a descriptive or scientific one. In other words, distributive justice
answers the question: How ought we (in socie ty) distribute wealth and other objects of value according to
the mandates of justice or fairness? This is essentially the same question Rawls tackles, but Nozicks
central premise is that it is unjust to generate patterns of distribution. Redistributing wealth, for instance,
is a patterned form of distribution because it allocates wealth according to some formula (who needs it,
who merits it, etc). Nozick suggests that this is a mistake for a number of reasons (which will be covered
below), and offers as an alternative the entitlement principle , a stance which regards a persons due as
that which he or she acquires through a just process or transaction. Nozick explains the principle, writing,
A distribution is just if it arises from another just distribution by legitimate means... Whatever arises
from a just situation by just steps is itself just (Nozick 151). Notice the shift in perspective here from a
Rawlsian perspective; as opposed to evaluating just distributions in terms of who has received what, or
even what pattern of distribution has been used, Nozick evaluates from a decidedly procedural
perspective. If I have worked for an agreed upon sum of money, and done nothing unjust in acquiring it,
why dont I deserve it? Nozick gives several reasons for why I do.
The first (and maybe most important) reason that people may deserve the fruits of their labor (to sound a
bit Lockean for a moment) is that they own themselves and accordingly, when the talents that their
selves possess are used to add value to some natural resource, that value in some part belongs to the
producer, worker, etc. This is more or less an extension of Lockes Theory of Acquisition, which Nozick
explicitly expounds upon in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. The specific discussion of how Nozick would
alter Lockes theory becomes rather complex for our purposes, but I recommend anyone interested read
over the section.
Second, though, Nozick argues that any practice of redistribution is in fact tantamount to slavery (to the
extent that a person is taxed for the purposes of transfer payments).
Nozick, Robert, Professor of Philosophy at Harvard, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1974,
p.169.
Taxation of earnings from labor is on par with forced labor. Some persons find
this claim obviously true: taking the earnings of n hours labor is like taking n hours from
the person; it is like forcing the person to work n hours for anothers purpose.
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One must always be careful when explaining this argument or using it in a round. Nozick is not saying
that having to pay taxes makes someone a slave; instead, there is a like procedural injustice that takes
place. In other words, for the same type of reasons slavery is wrong, so too is redistribution. We consider
slavery immoral for a number of ethical reasons, but we also view it as uniquely unjust in the same way
we might find exploitation unjust: it benefits from a persons labor without any sort of proportioned or
contractually fair reimbursement. Doing this, so says the libertarian tradition, treats a person as nothing
more than a social mechanism, thus denying any sense of personal dignity and human meaning. This is a
key argument not only in the context of Nozicks position, but in any position attempting to show
redistribution as unjust (note that redistributive practices can occur through more than just transfer
payments and other economically based propositions; affirmative action arguably redistributes positions
and jobs, for instance).
For some odd reason, this argument has not gained acceptance by the world, as is demonstrated by a
continued agreement with redistribution amongst most in America and even more in Europe. For the
same reason pop-belief rejects Nozick (and for the same reason Nozick seemingly later rejects Nozick),
there are indeed a few philosophical reasons to reject Nozick, in terms of this argument anyway. One
way is to outright deny Nozicks assumptions that people ought not become social mechanisms. This can
be unpopular, though, lest thou be labeled FASCIST. Another way to approach the argument is to agree
with many of the assumptions, but question the conclusion. After all, isnt it a bit presumptuous to note
something as a procedural injustice and end argument right there? Let us agree with Nozick that there is
indeed something procedurally wrong with taxing and redistributing wealth. Despite this, there are
certainly some weighty results or gains that occur from this practice (or that could occur in an efficient
system). Moreover, these gains, unlike those selfish and greedy gains rendered to slave owners, are of
some moral value... a socially meaningful and worthwhile value. Through redistributing wealth to the
needy, we as a society express certain cultural convictions and communal sympathies. And after all, it is
these value structures through which we express such convictions that hold community together. It would
be narrow minded, one might argue, to view society as nothing more than a collection of individual
people with individual lives. Yet, this is the premise upon which Nozick builds his conclusion.
Certainly, then, a communitarian critique of Nozick would go a long way in revealing the inadequacy of
his suppositions (such was the case with Rawls as well, if you recall).
Now that you should have a pretty clear idea of what the entitlement theory entails, and what some
criticism of it my be, let us finally look at just how Nozick discusses it.
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1974, p. 151.
If the world were wholly just, the following inductive definition would exhaustively
cover the subject of justice in holdings.
1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in
acquisition is entitled to that holding.
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in
transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding.
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 1.
The complete principle of distributive justice would say simply that a distribution is just
if everyone is entitled to the holdings they possess under the distribution.
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Some of you might be wondering what exactly constitutes a just acquisition or a just transfer. Otherwise,
the entitlement theory doesnt seem to say all that much. What it does establish (minus understanding of
just acquisitions and transfers) is an understanding of just distributions that is entirely procedural in nature
and pays no attention to how equal the arrangements end up being. Still, it would help to know what isnt
included under Nozicks scheme of just acquisitions and transfers.
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1974, p.152
Not all actual situations are generated in accordance with the two principles of
justice in holdings: the principle of justice in acquisition and the principle of justice in
transfer. Some people steal from others, or defraud them, or enslave them, seizing their
product and preventing them from living as they choose, or forcibly exclude others from
competing in exchanges. None of these are permissible modes of transition from one
situation to another.
Finally, it would help to clarify exactly how the understanding of just distributions differs from so many
others. This distinction will be especially valuable for debate, in that very often Nozicks theory will be
used to argue against and clash with an alternative understanding of just distributions (be it that of Rawls
or any other). Nozick explains that his scheme of just distributions is a historical one, in that it
determines who deserves what based upon past actions and situations. This is exceptionally different
from other schemes that rely on current considerations like the demands of equality or merit to determine
distribution.
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1974, p.155-157.
The entitlement principles of justice in holdings that we have sketched are
historical principles of justice. To better understand their precise character, we shall
distinguish them from another subclass of the historical principles. Consider, as an
example, the principle of distribution according to moral merit. This principle requires
that total distributive shares vary directly with moral merit; no person should have a
greater share than anyone whose moral merit is greater. (If moral merit could be not
merely ordered but measured on an interval or ration scale, stronger principles could be
formulated.) Or consider the principle that results by substituting usefulness to society
for moral merit in the previous principle. Or instead of distribute according to moral
merit, or distribute according to usefulness to society, we might consider distribute
according to the weighted sum of moral merit, usefulness to society, and need, with the
weights of the different dimensions equal. Let us call a principle of distribution
patterned if it specifies that a distribution is to vary along with some natural dimension,
weighted sum of natural dimensions, or lexicographic ordering of natural dimensions...
Almost every suggested principle of distributive justice is patterned: to each according to
his moral merit, or needs, or marginal product, or how hard he tries, or the weighted sum
of the forgoing, and so on. The principle of entitlement we have sketched is not
patterned.
The reason for including this entire passage (rather lengthy compared to other excerpts) is that it is one of
Nozicks primary distinguishing features, and should be understood clearly. The essence of Nozicks
entitlement theory is that it isnt patterned. And, it is crucial to understand how such a scheme is
qualitatively different from most other conceptions of distributive justice.
To shift gears a bit, we must also address Nozicks understanding of how the state should function. This
discussion is of particular importance for any resolution discussing governmental structure, power
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allocation, and so on. Nozick argues the moral legitimacy of what we call the minimal state (Nozick
actually begins to advocate an ultra-minimal state, but well deal with that later). A minimal state is one
that serves for one reason alone: protection of the people. While variations on this notion exist, its often
compared to the role of a night-watchman. Such an officer generally stays uninvolved with affairs and at
his or her post, only exercising force or coercion to protect the rights of those in a particular jurisdiction.
Likewise, the state should not interfere with persons, their rights, their families, and any other interest
(especially interests concerning liberty, property, and the like) unless this is done to protect a person from
some rights violation. The reason why the state must refrain from further initiatives (like redistributing
wealth and resources to the poor) is explained above when we considered distributive justice. Some of
you might find this kind of idea absurd, having viewed government for so long as an entity which not
only protects us, but provides for us (health care, education, welfare, social security, local infrastructure,
etc). And arent these provision necessary to secure rights (to life or a certain standard of living)? This is
why Nozick views rights as constraints rather than mechanisms of provision. To be sure, provision is a
good thing, and we should always strive for it along with any other goal that enhances utility. But,
because of the categorical nature rights (or side constraints) take on, there can be no such trade off. If
there were, wouldnt individuals become mechanisms for the government to use in some grand scheme?
Nozick explains why it is unacceptable for the state to use persons in such a way.
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1974, p.32-33.
Side constraints express the inviolability of other persons. But why may not one
violate persons for the greater social good? Individually, we each sometimes choose to
undergo some pain or sacrifice for a greater benefit or to avoid greater harm: we go to the
dentist to avoid worse suffering later; we do some unpleasant work for its results; some
persons diet to improve their health or looks; some save money to support themselves
when they are older. In each case, some cost is borne for the sake of the greater overall
good. Why not, similarly, hold that some persons have to bear some costs that benefits
other persons more, for the sake of the overall social good? But there is no social entity
with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good. There are only individual
people, different individual people, with their own individual lives. Using one of these
people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits others. Nothing more. What
happens is that something is done to him for the sake of others. Talk of an overall social
good covers this up. (Intentionally?) To use a person in this way does not sufficiently
respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he
has. He does not get some overbalancing good from his sacrifice, and no one is entitled
to force this upon him--least of all a state or government that claims his allegiance (as
other individuals do not) and that therefore scrupulously must be neutral between its
citizens.
To better understand Nozicks justification for a minimal state, we should also discuss his (for lack of a
better term) contract theory. Nozicks understanding of the relationship between state and citizen is a bit
more complex than the traditional social contract theory. In it, Nozick describes the relationship between
citizens and state as similar to that between a client and company. The state, Nozick argues, is essentially
a dominant protective agency. In his state of nature theorizing, Nozick suggests that people would hire
independent protective agencies to safeguard property and safety, etc. After all, personal enforcement
would be nearly impossible, so some means of private protection would be sought.
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Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1974, p. 12-13.

How might one deal with these troubles within a state of nature? Let us begin
with the last. In a state of nature an individual may himself enforce his rights, defend
himself, exact compensation, and punish (or at least try his best to do so). Others may
join with him in his defense at his call. They may join with him to repulse an attacker or
to go after an aggressor because they are public spirited, or because they are his friends,
or because he has helped them in the past, or because they wish him to help them in the
future, or in exchange for something. Groups of individuals may form mutual-protection
associations: all will answer the call of any member for defense or for the enforcement of
his rights. In union there is strength. Two inconveniences attend such simple mutualprotection associations: (1) everyone is always on call to serve a protective function (and
how shall it be decided who shall answer the call for those protective functions that do
not require the service of all members?); and (2) any member may call out his associates
by saying his rights are being, or have been, violated. Protective associations will not
want to be at the beck and call of their cantankerous or paranoid members, not to mention
those of their members who might attempt, under the guise of self-defense, to use the
association to violate the rights of others.
Now we have a fairly pragmatic understanding of why mutual-protection associations are unfeasible.
One imagines such a scenario as not only being rather tribal or gang-like, but in the long run highly
ineffective in securing rights (as most present-day gangs seem to be). So, people seek a common agency
to protect rights according to some geographic area; this results in some variation of the state (although
Locke again would suggest modern variations overstep the duties of the protective agency and indeed
become illegitimate).
Using Nozick in an LD round is fairly easy, and tends to require little more than basic explanation and
reliance on some measure of intuition. Nozick isnt developing any complex theory so much as he is
suggesting some alternative ways of viewing things when it comes to the protection of rights, the
distribution of wealth, and the function of the state. It is likewise in these three arenas that use of
Nozicks arguments make the most sense for debate purposes.
Nozicks view of rights protection is uncompromising and highly concerned with individual rights rather
than group rights or social interests. While he believes that people can consent to rights violation
provided some kind of compensation exists, he also views such situations as rare and difficult to generate.
Most of the time, an agent wishing to violate the rights of another doesnt know exactly whose rights he
might violate, is unable to contact this potential victim, or is faced with such a costly process of
negotiation that whatever marginal benefits might be gained from the infringement are no longer worth it.
In short, the few cases in which infringing on the rights of an individual may be appropriate, there is still
unlikely to be a sufficient opportunity for negotiation and legitimate consent. Because of the reasons
explained near the top of the section, then, rights are of an extremely categorical value for Nozick. They
are moral constraints on what we may do in our pursuit of the social good, utility, efficiency, or any other
group interest. In a debate round than questions some conflict between the group and the individual (as
so many topics seem to do), it could then make a good deal of sense to incorporate Nozick or at least
Nozickean views and rhetoric into ones stance.
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The discussion about wealth distribution might also be instrumental in an LD round. Whether the topic
discusses socialism, transfer payments (welfare, social security, etc), or any other redistributive practice
(even one that allocates social or political positions), Nozicks indictment of such patterned principles is
effective. It would be wise to read Nozick himself on these matters to become familiarized with what is
sometimes complicated explanation. Likewise, it would be helpful to read views similar to Nozicks and
those on the polar opposite. This is a subject drawing innumerable arguments, positions, and rhetoric;
understanding it contextually is crucial.
Finally, it is potentially advantageous to utilize Nozicks view of the state as a protective association.
Even if you do not spend a great deal of time extending the theory into its categorical limitation of state
jurisdiction (in terms of function), Nozick at least justifies a framework for prioritization. A more
contemporary and friendly position might hold that apart from the protective agencys explicit functions,
there are secondary communal interests it inevitably embodies and expresses. Perhaps there is a moral
sphere to the state, one that enables the actualization of communal values and wishes. More recent
writings from Nozick seem somewhat conducive to such a view, but that is where this discussion shall
end. Reading these other works is highly encouraged, especially (for debate related matters):
?? Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, 1981.
?? Robert Nozick, The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations, 1989.
79

Etzioni (Jonathan Helfgott)
AMITAI ETZIONI
by Jonathan Helfgott
Amitai Etzioni is one of the leading proponents of the social philosophy of Communitarianism, a
movement that arose in the early 1980s with the goal of re-establishing (or of contemplating the reestablishment of) a sense of moral cohesiveness to bind together the modern day community. The crux of
Communitarian philosophy lies in the idea of centrism; that, contrary to the claims of the civil libertarians
who rest on the opposite end of the political spectrum, our society can withstand a curtailing of certain
individual rights for the sake of the collective whole without degenerating into a tyrannical Puritan state,
and that we can allow a certain amount of moral suasion without immediately creating a schism between
the righteous and the decadent.
Etzioni was responsible for drafting the Responsive Communitarian Platform, which outlines the basic
tenets of this widely held school of thought. The mission statement of the movement is outlined in its
preamble.
Etzioni, Amitai The Spirit of Community 1993, p. 253
American men, women, and children are members of many communities
families; neighborhoods; innumerable social, religious, ethnic, workplace, and
professional associations; and the body politic itself. Neither human existence nor
individual liberty can be sustained for long outside the interdependent and overlapping
communities to which all of us belong. Nor can any community long survive unless its
members dedicate some of their attention, energy, and resources to shared projects. The
exclusive pursuit of private interest erodes the network of social environments on which
we all depend and is destructive to our shared experiment in democratic self-government.
For these reasons, we hold that the rights of individuals cannot long be preserved without
a Communitarian perspective.
Etzionis efforts examine the creation of his ideal of civil society, which is concerned primarily with the
interaction of individuals to create a better collective, rather than state-imposed maxims of what is correct
behavior for productive members of society. The crucial aspect of civil society is that the state is not
involved in its formation. The first problem with current-day society, Etzioni argues, is that individuals
within our society believe that they are entitled to certain rights, but are not willing to pay for those
rights by realizing the corresponding responsibilities that the rights entail. His favorite example (or at
least his most ubiquitous) of everyday American society gone awry in the area of the balance between
rights and responsibilities is that of jury duty. Etzioni finds it unacceptable that while the average citizen
expects to be tried in front of a jury of their peers should the condition arise for them to be put on trial, yet
are at the same time staunchly opposed to taking the time out of their lives to serve on such a jury. This
anecdote is used as evidence that individuals within society have a sense that their rights are absolutely
unfettered, when in fact, each individual right that one person exercises puts a charge on other people, the
charge of upholding that right by altering their actions. Communitarians in general are frightened by the
implications of a society where conflicts are quickly turned into rights disputes. This school of thought
puts them in diametric opposition to the civil libertarians of organizations such as the American Civil
Liberties Union; an organization that Etzioni criticizes often. Rights discourse, according to Etzioni,
polarizes all legitimate discussion, and makes problem solving in an ideal community impossible. This
idea has been termed Rights Talk.
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Etzioni, Amitai The Spirit of Community, 1993, p. 7.

Even if lawyers and judges realize among themselves that individual rights are
limited by the rights of others and the needs of the community, as the language of rights
penetrates into everyday discourse, the discourse becomes impoverished and
confrontational. It is one thing to claim that you and I have different interests and see if
we can work out a compromise; or, better yet, that we both recognize the merit or virtue
of a common cause, say, a cleaner environment. The moment, however, that I claim a
right to the same piece of land or property or public space as you, we start to view one
another like the Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland or the Palestinians and
Israelis in the Middle East.
A return to a language of social virtues, interests, and, above all, social responsibilities,
will reduce contentiousness and enhance social cooperation.
People treat rights-based arguments, unlike many others, as trump cards that
neutralize all other positions. Cass R. Sunstein, professor of jurisprudence at the
University of Chicago, put it well when he pointed out that rights can be conclusions
masquerading as reasons. For example, he writes, those who defend even the most
extreme kinds of what he labels violent pornography state that it is a form of free speech,
period. Sunstein suggests that perhaps a person is entitled to this particularly abusive
form of speech. But, he argues, an individuals entitlement should be established in
detailed argumentation that would weigh the right at issue against the rights of those who
are hurt by the given act, rather than simply asserting that it is a right, as if its evocation
closed off all debate.
Etzionis criticism of rights discourse in no way means that he is against the concept individual rights.
On the contrary, Etzioni believes that by cutting back on the amount of rights we claim, we avoid what
Communitarians have termed rights inflation. In a way, Etzioni argues, only by curbing the number of
rights, both negative and positive, that we must consider as part of our everyday action, can we retain a
respect for - and a knowledge of those rights that are truly valuable.
Etzioni, Amitai, The Spirit of Community 1993, p. 5.
We should, for a transition period of, say, the next decade, put a tight lid on the
manufacturing of new rights. The incessant issuance of new rights, like the wholesale
printing of currency, causes a massive inflation of rights that devalues their moral claims.
In the sphere of rights discourse and analysis, Communitarians adopt a paternalistic attitude. Etzionis
rights analysis notes that while most people wish their own individual rights to be maximized, they
require a community in which to actualize and benefit from those rights, as well as to protect against
severe infringement on those rights on the part of the state.
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Etzioni, Amitai, The Spirit of Community p. 15.

As Communitarians, we also recognized a need for a new social, philosophical,
and political map. The designation of political camps as liberals or conservatives, as
left or right, often no longer serves. We see at one extreme the Authoritarians (such as
the Moral Majority and Liberty Bell). They urge the imposition on all others of moral
positions they believe in, from prayer in schools to forcing women to stay in the
kitchen. At the other end we see Radical Individualists (libertarians such as the
intellectuals at the Cato Institute; civil libertarians, especially the American Civil
Liberties Union; and laissez-faire conservatives), who believe that if individuals are left
on their own to pursue their choices, rights, and self-interests, all will be well. We
suggest that free individuals require a community, which backs them up against
encroachment by the state and sustains morality by drawing on the gentle prodding or
kin, friends, neighbors, and other community members, rather than building on
government controls or fear of authorities.
As has already been seen from selections of Etzionis writings, he has a vested interest in minimizing the
role that the state plays in the lives of everyday people. While it cannot be said that he is against statist
authority (he is far too much of a centrist to make that claim), Etzioni shares the belief held by those on
both the far right and far left that the state is inherently an authoritarian institution. While he believes that
there is a time and place for a certain degree of authoritarianism, intervention by the state where it could
be avoided by stronger bonds within a community is always something that we must strive to minimize.
Etzioni, Amitai The Spirit of Community 1993, p. 44.
The best way to minimize the role of the state, especially its policing role, is to
enhance the community and its moral voice. If most of us, most of the time, observed
the speed limit, especially near schools and where children play, there would be much
less need for police. If we basically paid our share of the taxes due, there would be less
need for IRS agents and auditors. If divorced fathers paid agreed-upon amounts of
child support, there would be no need for the state to go after them. There are always
some who violate what is right, and hence the state is unlikely to wither away, at least
until very far-reaching and fundamental changes occur in human nature. However,
such limited use of the state, for a handful of miscreants, is not the issue. What we
must try to avoid is relying on the state to maintain social order, which can be achieved
more humanely and at less cost by the voluntary observance of those values we all hold
dear, such as driving without endangering others and paying our share of the
communities burdens. In short, the more people generally agree with one another
about what is to be done and encourage one another to live up to these agreements, the
smaller the role that coercive authority will play and the more civil the community.
One thing that it is important to note is that although Etzioni views civil society within a healthy
community as a paramount value, community is not an end in itself. Etzioni is fully willing to admit that
on an individual basis, communities can hold bad values, inspire negative thought, and exalt said thought
into dogmatic status, sometimes having quite negative consequences. A community based on civil
society is not enough in itself to make that community beneficial to society as a whole, or to the
individual within that community.
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Etzioni, Amitai The Spirit of Community 1993, p. 255

Communitarians do not exalt the group as such, nor do they hold that any set of
group values is ipso facto good merely because such values originate in a community.
Indeed, some communities (say, neo-Nazis) may foster reprehensible values. Moreover,
communities that glorify their own members by vilifying those who do not belong are at
best imperfect. Communitarians recognizeindeed, insistthat communal values must
be judged by external and overriding criteria, based on shared human experience.
A responsive community is one whose moral standards reflect the basic human needs of
all its members. To the extent that these needs compete with one another, the
communitys standards reflect the relative priority accorded by members to some needs
over others. Although individuals differ in their needs, human nature is not totally
malleable. Although individuals are deeply influenced by their communities, they have a
capacity for independent judgement.
For a community to be truly responsivenot only to an elite group, a minority, or even
the majority, but to all its members and all their basic human needsit will have to
develop moral values which meet the following criteria: they must be nondiscriminatory
and applied equally to all members; they must be generalizable, justified in terms that are
accessible and understandable: e.g., instead of claims based upon individual or group
desires, citizens would draw on a common definition of justice; and they must
incorporate the full range of legitimate needs and values rather than focusing on any one
category, be it individualism, autonomy, interpersonal caring, or social justice.
Etzionis application to Lincoln-Douglass debate
Etzioni is an incredibly prolific writer and a great source for cards, both on abstract philosophical issues
and specific political issues (many of his articles written on current issues can be found at
www.intellectualcapital.com). In terms of overall Communitarian theory, there are a few things that have
general application to a wide spectrum of topics.
Rights Talk
The theory of rights talk, and the critique of rights inflation, gives a good basis for a critique of the
concept of individual rights. Communitarian authors in general, and Etzioni in specific (along with
fellow Communiratian Mary Ann Glendon) are also a valuable source of analysis for any debate
resolution that has anything to do with the concept of individual rights versus the community. Obviously,
given the Communitarian stance on the importance of community and the relative unimportance of
trifling concerns masquerading as rights, their analysis will generally only be of use on one side of any
resolution.
The benefits of moral discourse
Etzionis treatise on the restructuring of the modern community includes a wealth of analysis concerning
the benefits of the moral voice and moral suasion. Many resolutions currently being debated are
often criticized as not being questions of morality. Sometimes, this question arises even if the question
posed by the resolution is a direct evaluation of the moral value of a certain concept or action. Etzioni is
helpful here in that his writings contain analysis as to why people ought not run from questions of moral
judgement.
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The Slippery Slope

In advocating a restriction on the number of individual rights to which we can lay claim, Etzioni has had
to defend his statements against attacks from the civil libertarians of organizations such as the American
Civil Liberties Union. One such attack has been the concern of the slippery slope of rights invasions. As
many of us know, the slippery slope in itself is a logical fallacy that proves absolutely nothing. However,
it is still used often in debate rounds as a rhetorical device to give impacts that are far greater in scope
than the immediate affects of one side of a resolution (Well, if we do x, than what stops us from doing
y?). Simply claiming that an argument that attempts to change the impacts in the round rests on the
fallacious premise of the slippery slope may work for a judge who is well-versed in logic. However, for
many judges, that claim may not be enough. This is where Etzioni is quite helpful:
Etzioni, Amitai The Spirit of Community, 1993, p. 176
The fear of slippery slopes is not wholly without foundation. Once taboos are
broken by a community tolerating a modification of its ethical code, it is not easy to stop.
Those who challenged the traditional vows of fidelity in marriage often found it difficult
to sustain their marital contracts and frequently ended up with no stable relationship at
all. And reform in Judaism was followed (although it may well have occurred anyhow)
by a massive flight from religious commitment. However, it is also evident that each
time we individually or as a community negotiate a step on the top of what are potentially
slippery slopes, we do not necessarily end up at the bottom.
Not every young woman who allows herself to be kissed before marriage ends up a
hooker, and not everyone who experiments with marijuana ends up a crackhead.
Similarly, sexual education, introduced in many schools, has not led, as Authoritarians
feared, to new heights of promiscuity, orgies, let alone to the destruction of American
society. That is, societies can reset their moral codes without necessarily losing their
grip. And, to reiterate, sliding down the slippery slope is not necessarily the result of an
avalanche set off by bad precedents; it may well be the consequence of not attending to
true needs of the community and thus in effect paving the way to Authoritarian voices
and leaders.
In addition to examining the weakness of the slippery slope as an intellectual attack on social reform,
Etzioni also constructs a formula to follow so that we may avoid the slippery slope altogether. Using the
three criteria he sets up, Etzioni says, slippery slopes cease to be a consideration. In terms of applicability
to debate, if someone can prove that an action meets all three of these criteria, slippery slopes will not
occur. The criteria are:
1) There must be a clear and present danger to society. In this way, the changes made are not capricious
and unimportant, and we only restructure our moral/social codes when it is absolutely imperative that
we do so.
2) There is no alternative way to proceed. If the old guard can take care of the problem on its own, there
is no reason to effect an arching social change.
3) Adjustments should be as limited as possible. This one is pretty self-explanatory.
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Suggested reading
Etzionis treatise, The Spirit of Community, is basically a Communitarian mission statement. It analyzes
all that is needed for a healthy community, and why a healthy community itself is needed. It includes the
Responsive Communitarian Platform, which outlines all of the basic tenets of communitarianism.
Mary Ann Glendons book Rights Talk gives a bit more in depth analysis of the theory of individual
rights inflation as it applies to political and social discourse.
Etzionis online writings, and a list of his work, can be found at
http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/etzioni/index.html
85

Chomsky (Jonathan Helfgott)
NOAM CHOMSKY
by Jonathan Helfgott
Noam Chomsky is a prominent intellectual in contemporary American society who has never aligned
himself with any particular political movement. His personal philosophy involves a rejection of the
concept of the corporate state and the formation of more functional, smaller scale communities that
govern based on the true will of the people. Chomsky teaches linguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, but as far as debate goes, his more relevant work is in biting social criticism, focusing his
efforts largely on the media, and on corporations.
Noam Chomsky and the Media: The Propaganda Model
Chomsky tends to center his attacks on the state around two fundamental institutions; the media, and
foreign policy, attacking both as corporate run mouthpieces for fundamentally flawed initiatives.
Chomskys problem with the media revolve around what he calls the filters that alter the objective
reporting of news to serve the corporate and governmental interests (which he would argue are one and
the same).
Chomsky, Noam and Herman, Edward S., Manufacturing Consent 1988, p. 1.
It is much more difficult to see a propaganda system at work where the media are
private and formal censorship is absent. This is especially true where the media actively
compete, periodically attack and expose corporate and governmental malfeasance, and
aggressively portray themselves as spokesmen for free speech and the general community
interest. What is not evident (and remains undiscussed in the media) is the limited nature
of such critiques, as well as the huge inequality in command of resources, and its effect
both on access to a private media system and on its behavior and performance.
A propaganda model focuses on this inequality of wealth and power and its multilevel
effects on mass-media interests and choices. It traces the routes by which money and
power are able to filter out the news fit to print, marginalize dissent, and allow the
government and dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public.
In the book, Manufacturing Consent, Chomsky and colleague Edward S. Herman outline five filters that
contribute to the corruption of all media.
Filter 1: The size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant
mass-media firms
Chomsky argues in Manufacturing Consent that the size that is required of media organizations
necessitates putting the responsibility of reporting objective information in the hands of the very people
who would wish to corrupt it. The trend of increasing the numbers and circulation necessary to the
survival of media outlets drives small publications out of business and create a power vacuum over the
information networks of the world.
The dominant media firms are quite large businesses; they are controlled by very
wealthy people or by managers who are subject to sharp constraints by owners and other
market-profit-oriented forces; and they are closely interlocked, and have important
common interests, with other major corporations, banks, and government. This is the
first powerful filter that will affect news choices.
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Filter 2: Advertising as the primary source of the mass media

Perhaps the greatest object of Chomskys attack is the advertisement-based media that dominate all
sources of information in contemporary society. Chomskys argument is that reliance on advertisements
makes all independent political (or a-political) agendas in media organizations absolutely impossible.
Those organizations that attempt to operate outside of corporate sponsorship are forced to drive up their
prices and are therefore put out of business due to lack of circulation. Media organizations begin to orient
their dissemination of news around the interests of the corporations that provide their means of existence,
and objectivity is lost from the organizations that are meant to be objective, and freedom of speech is
severely curtailed when it is too great a nuisance.
An advertising-based system will tend to drive out of existence or into
marginality the media companies and types that depend on revenue from sales alone.
With advertising, the free market does not yield a neutral system in which final buyer
choice decides. The advertisers choices influence media prosperity and survival. The
ad-based media receive an advertising subsidy that gives them a price-marketing-quality
edge, which allows them to encroach on and further weaken their ad-free (or addisadvantages) rivals. Even if ad-based media cater to an affluent (upscale) audience,
they easily pick up a large part of the downscale audience, and their rivals lose market
share and are eventually driven out or marginalized.
In effect, what happens in an advertisement-based media system, is that the consumer ceases to be those
buying the product, but rather the advertisers. The commodity also transfers from the goods the media
provide, to the audience itself. Corporate sponsored media is an exchange by which corporations use the
media as the middleman to purchase an audience for their advertisements. That the corporate interest
would serve to decide the programming of networks would appear to be implicit within this system. This
has a negative affect on working class and highly political media, to the point that their message is
squelched due to lack of corporate backing in a system that requires it for survival. The result is an
entirely corporate run media, where those who speak against corporate actions in any respect are punished
financially.
Working-class and radical media also suffer from the political discrimination of
advertisers. Political discrimination is structured into advertising allocations by the stress
on people with money to buy. But many firms will always refuse to patronize ideological
enemies and those whom they perceive as damaging their interests, and cases of overt
discrimination add to the force of the voting system weighted by income. Public television station WNET lost its corporate funding from Gulf + Western in 1985 after the
station showed the documentary Hungry for Profit, which contains material critical of
multinational corporate activities in the Third World. Even before the program was
shown, in anticipation of negative corporate reaction, station officials did all we could to
get the program sanitized (according to one station source). The chief executive of Gulf
+ Western complained to the station that the program was virulently anti-business if not
anti-American, and that the stations carrying the program was not the behavior of a
friend of the corporation. The London Economist says that Most people believe that
WNET would not make the same mistake again.
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Filter 3: The Reliance of the Media on information provided by government, business, and
experts.
Chomsky argues that unlike personal testimony, the press treats governmental testimony as fact,
unworthy of actual investigation. Chomsky derives this conclusion by stating that the media requires a
steady, reliable flow of the raw material of news. Because no institution can afford to have cameras and
news crews at the scene of every breaking news story, the media center around places where news occurs.
In the United States, this includes the Pentagon, the White House, and the State Department. This creates
an interdependence, or a symbiotic relationship as Chomsky puts it, between the media and
governmental agencies, that necessarily breeds complacency.
Filter 4: Flak as a means of disciplining the media
When Chomsky talks about flak he is referring to any negative response to anything put out by the
media. Chomsky argues that while much flak the media receives is a legitimate (and needed) expression
of an individuals freedom of speech, corporations, the government, and groups of individuals are able to
organize and systematically exploit flak to punish the media when they get out of line. For instance,
during the McCarthy period, people with strong anticommunist sentiment would coerce advertisers and
radio and television stations into either supporting or actively participating in blacklisting employees.
Through abusing flak, the media can be forced into a subservient role, subject to the whims of public
and/or corporate/governmental opinion.
Chomsky, Noam and Herman, Edward S. Manufacturing Consent. 1988, p. 14.
The ability to produce flak, and especially flak that is costly and threatening, is
related to power. Serious flak has increased in close parallel with businesss growing
resentment of media criticism and the corporate offensive of the 1970s and 1980s. Flak
from the powerful can be either direct or indirect. The direct would include letters or
phone calls from the White House to Dan Rather or William Paley, or from the FCC to
the television networks asking for documents used in putting together a program, or from
irate officials of ad agencies or corporate sponsors to media officials asking for reply time
or threatening retaliation. The powerful can also work on the media indirectly by
complaining to their own constituencies (stockholders, employees) about the media, by
generating institutional advertising that does the same, and by funding right-wing
monitoring or think-tank operations designed to attack the media. They may also fund
political campaigns and help put into power conservative politicians who will more
directly serve the interests of private power in curbing any deviationism in the media.
Filter 5: Anticommunism as a national religion and control mechanism.
The anticommunist card is used, according to Chomsky, to immediately attach a stigma to anything
remotely leftist or anti corporate that appears in the media. Strong anticommunist sentiment in the United
States has caused the media to constantly censor itself and has silenced nearly all voices from the left in
modern day society (with the exception of Chomsky, of course). By labeling the left, corporations are
able to subvert popular scrutiny and awareness of their actions. Unions have been labeled as communist
organizations, so corporations avoid scrutiny on that front as well. The fear of being labeled as a
communist, therefore, allows a corporation nation state to function with far less scrutiny than it would
otherwise.
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Chomsky, Noam and Herman, Edward S. Manufacturing Consent 1988, p. 16.

Liberals at home, often accused of being pro-Communist or insufficiently antiCommunist, are kept continuously on the defensive in a cultural milieu in which
anticommunism is the dominant religion. If they allow communism, or something that
can be labeled communism, to triumph in the provinces while they are in office, the
political costs are heavy. Most of them have fully internalized the religion anyways, but
they are all under great pressure to demonstrate their anti-Communist credentials. This
causes them to behave very much like reactionaries. Their occasional support of social
democrats often breaks down where the latter are insufficiently harsh on their own
indigenous radicals or on popular groups that are organizing among generally
marginalized sectors.
Chomsky and United States Foreign Policy
Chomskys attacks on United States foreign policy can be attributed largely to his mistrust of all statist
action. His analysis regarding U.S. foreign policy depicts a corporate-driven, hegemonic state that uses
buzzwords (supposedly encompassing our true goals) to gain the international credibility necessary to
pursue our profit-driven goals.
Chomskys first problem with the United States is that it is not truly a democracy.
Chomsky, Noam Secrets, Lies, and Democracy 1994, p. 12.
Modern democratic theory takes the view that the role of the public the
bewildered herd, in Lippmans wordsis to be spectators, not participants. Theyre
supposed to show up every couple of years to ratify decisions made elsewhere, or to
select among representatives of the dominant sectors in whats called an election.
Thats helpful, because it has a legitimizing effect.
To understand Chomskys attack of the U.S. as a corporate entity, one must first look at his evaluation of
our own domestic policy and his estimation of where our priorities lie. Here, Chomskys views are
consistent with the mainstream left, in that he believes that the governments function in our society is to
perpetuate the idea of a welfare state for the rich.
Huge industries were spawned, and are maintained, by massive government
intervention. Many corporations couldnt survive without it. (For some, its not a huge
part of their profits at the moment, but its a cushion.) The public also provides the basic
technologymetallurgy, avionics or whatevervia the public subsidy system.
The same is true just across the board. You can hardly find a functioning sector of the
US manufacturing or service economy which hasn't gotten that way and isnt sustained
by government intervention.
In supporting the governmental subsidy of corporate interest, Chomsky argues that the government has
inadvertently institutionalized the practice of dichotomizing rich and poor. His conclusion is that in
supporting the corporate welfare state, the government is actively widening the gap between rich and
poor, driving the poor to further subservience, or crime.
89


But until you ask why theres an increase in social disintegration, and why more
and more resources are being directed towards the wealthy and privileged sectors and
away from the general population, you cant have even a concept of why theres rising
crime or how you should deal with it. Over the past twenty or thirty years, theres been a
considerable increase in inequality. This trend accelerated during the Reagan years. The
society has been moving visibly towards a kind of Third World model. The result is an
increasing crime rate, as well as other signs of social disintegration. Most of the crime is
poor people attacking each other, but it spills over to more privileged sectors. People are
very worriedand quite properly, because society is becoming very dangerous.
Given his analysis of the United States on the domestic scale, it is no surprise that Chomsky views United
States hegemony as having purely monetary goals. What is surprising, however, is Chomskys analysis
of exactly what the United States will do to fulfill these goals. Here, Chomskys historical analysis of
United States involvement in Chile during Salvador Allendes presidency is indicative of his views on
U.S. foreign policy as a whole.
He (Allende) was basically a social democrat, very much of the European type.
He was calling for minor redistribution of wealth, to help the poor. (Chile was a very
inegalitarian society). Allende was a doctor, and one of the things he did was to institute
a free milk program for half a million very poor, malnourished children. He called for
nationalization of major industries like copper mining, and for a policy of international
independencemeaning that Chile wouldnt simply subordinate itself to the US, but
would take more of an independent path. Our government intervened massively to
prevent Allende from winning the preceding election, in 1964. In fact, when the Church
Committee investigated years later, they discovered that the US spent more money per
capita to get the candidate it favored elected in Chile in 1964 than was spent by both
candidates (Johnson and Goldwater) in the 1964 election in the US!
Similar measures were undertaken in 1970 to try to prevent a free and democratic
election. There was a huge amount of black propaganda about how if Allende won,
mothers would be sending their children off to Russia to become slavesstuff like that.
The US also threatened to destroy the economy, which it couldand diddo.
Chomsky uses a great deal of empirical information to warrant his disgust with U.S. procedures and
practices, and his foreign policy analysis is therefore of great value to any debater willing to critique the
state. Chomsky even indic ts the benevolent intervention on the part of the U.S. as a form of further
exerting its hegemonic control. His argument is that the U.S. selects the recipients of its financial aid on
the basis of how open they are to U.S. business initiatives. This often takes the form of backing
horrendously oppressive governments, since the alternatives to those governments would generate less
profit for U.S. corporations.
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Chomsky, Noam What Uncle Sam Really Wants 1986, p. 29.

Lets focus on Latin America, and begin by looking at human rights. A
study by Lars Schoultz, the leading academic specialist on human rights there,
shows that US aid has tended to flow disproportionately to Latin American
governments which torture their citizens. It has nothing to do with how much a
country needs aid, only with its willingness to serve the interests of wealth and
privilege. Broader studies by economist Edward Herman reveal a close
correlation worldwide between torture and US aid, and also provide the
explanation: both correlate independently with improving the climate for
business operations. In comparison with that guiding moral principle, such
matters as torture and butchery pale into insignificance.
CHOMSKYS APPLICATION TO DEBATE
The Media
As many will remember from recent years, many Lincoln-Douglass resolutions revolve around the
function of the media in a democratic society. Most recently, the resolution that a candidates right to
privacy ought to be valued above the publics right to know dealt with what privileges the media ought to
have. Those who have debated a bit longer may remember the resolution that a journalist's right to shield
confidential sources ought to be protected by the first amendment. Chomskys analysis of the function of
the media in our society is a helpful tool in evaluating how powers within the media are controlled (or
warped) and used, and therefore what powers they ought to have.
Critique of any and all U.S. Policy
Chomsky not only gives general outlines of his views of U.S. foreign policy initiatives, but in addition,
his current work with Z Magazine (www.zmag.org) includes many of his more recent articles concerning
specific U.S. actions. Chomsky is a prolific writer who is a great source of cards for anyone looking to
evaluate the drives behind governmental action on either the domestic or the international scale.
Anarchy
Though it pertains more to his personal beliefs derived from his theory of linguistics (an entirely different
essay altogether), Chomsky writes frequently about the social theories behind anarchism. Specifically for
resolutions questioning the state (such as the potential topic RT: oppressive government is preferable to
no government), his defense of anarchism can be useful.
SUGGESTED READING
??
??
??
??
??
Chomsky, Noam and Herman, Edward S. Manufacturing Consent 1988.

Chomsky, Noam What Uncle Sam Really Wants 1986
Chomsky, Noam Secrets, Lies, and Democracy 1994
Chomsky, Noam The Prosperous Few and the Restless Many 1994
The Noam Chomsky Archive, available at www.zmag.org
91

Reardon (David Vivero)
BETTY REARDON
by David A. Vivero
Introduction
Violence against women, and the everyday petty harassment and humiliation they suffer are not
womens issues separable from the violence of war, and the structural violence of racism, poverty and
exploitation. Male sexual dominance and female submission at home and on the streets is the childs
early experience of power relations.1
--Penny Strange
An overlooked and sometimes ignored study of international relations concerns the relationship of
patriarchy and the view of international relations as a power struggle. As a response to seemingly
prevalent dependence on realism as the dominant presumption of state interaction, feminist theory seeks
to criticize the fundamental assumptions that accompany realism: competition, exclusionary
language/action and reliance on and races in technology. Lastly, feminismin the context I describe
herecriticizes the historical record of realist goals as pursued in international treaties.
This philosophy is very useful in a debate concerning international politics. Our discussions are
processes of socialization and they have meaning. Both traditionalist debate supporters and the most
progressive set of judges agree that Lincoln-Douglas debate is a debate about values and attitudes. Which
attitude do I promote when I vote affirmative or negative? If I were to extend the precedent I set through
my decision, what is the implication? Feminism is philosophy about attitudes, ideals and the horrors that
we incur when we prefer any type of policy to ideology.
As a preface, it is important to remember that the type of feminism I present is merely one of many
schools of feminist thought. Many feminists disagree with each other, and the bibliography I provide at
the end of this chapter is only a gateway to the innumerable texts that you should consult to get a full
grasp of feminism. Additionally, it is not merely an interstate theory but an intrastate theory in that there
are also feminist criticisms of domestic governmental policies among other things. But you already knew
that; so lets get to the substance.
To what extent does patriarchy affect IR?
The feminist criticism of international relations starts from the premise that interaction between states is a
competitive process; a state makes decisions based on a self-help paradigm in which every motive
should be to increase both the welfare and particularly the power of ones state. As Strange indic ates in
the opening quotation, the theme of competitiveness is rife with patriarchy because of the process of
socialization that throws racecars, army games, and competitive video games in the direction of
impressionable young male minds. Similarly, females are socialized using dolls and playhouses to
produce other more nurture-based habits.
Historically, Betty Reardon, the Coordinator of Peace Education Program at Teachers College, Columbia
University, argues females have (a) been neglected in the practical processes of international diplomacy,
(b) been threatened by the structural exclusion of both females and feminine values, and (c) had to
conform to the negative masculine characteristics in order to move ahead in foreign policy. These seem
In Itll Make a Man of You: A Feminist View of the Arms Race, Exposing Nuclear Phallacies, edited
by Diana E.H. Russell, 1983, p. 116.
92

to be the cornerstone assumptions of Reardons argument and may serve as links to a feminist criticism in
a debate.
Reardon, Betty, Sexism and the War System, 1985, pp. 25
Another form of negative feminism is, in my opinion, that which accedes to the
masculinization of women largely in attempts to prove that women can perform most
tasks society reserves for men. Often doing the job as well as a man means accepting
masculine standards and thus reinforcing the dominant masculine values. This, I assert,
offers new support for the war system.
Strange, Penny, Itll Make a Man of You: A Feminist View of the Arms Race,
Exposing Nuclear Phallacies, edited by Diana E.H. Russell, 1983, pp. 116
The male cult of toughness has deep psychic roots, but the problem is not a
question of personal power lust. These masculine values are built into the system
economic, political, social and even moraland those who reach positions of authority
are those who have best played the male game.
Beyond the exclusionary and patriarchal structure, the agents within said structure (diplomats, military
leaders and theorists2 ) use a language that is inconsistent with the feminine view of the world. The
patriarchy uses terms concerning massive warfaretargets, numbers, hits, etc.that seem to minimize
the real human impact on innocent families. The language exemplifies the dichotomy between males and
females in ways of thinking; it sometimes even uses language that dehumanizes women directly. Carol
Cohn, quite explicitly, explains:
Cohn, Carol, Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals, Exposing
Nuclear Phallacies, edited by Diana E.H. Russell, 1987, pp. 131
In this early stage, I was gripped by the extraordinary language used to discuss
nuclear war. What hit me first was the elaborate use of abstraction and euphemism, of
words so bland that they never forced the speaker or enabled the listener to touch the
realities of nuclear holocaust that lay behind the words.
Cohn, Carol. Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals, Exposing
Nuclear Phallacies, edited by Diana E.H. Russell, 1987, pp. 136-137
Virginity also made frequent, arresting appearances in nuclear discourse. In the
summer program, one professor spoke of Indias explosion of a nuclear bomb as losing
her virginity; the question of how the United States should react was posed as whether or
not we should throw her away. It is a complicated metaphor. Initiation into the nuclear
world involves being deflowered, losing ones innocence, knowing sin, all wrapped up
into one.
Some criticize realists and nuclear policy authors such as Jonathan Schell who use terms like man,
mankind, and men, in addition to using other numbing language concerning the impact of nuclear
policy. For more information, see Russell, Sexism, Violence, and the Nuclear Mentality, Exposing
Nuclear Phallacies, edited by Diana E.H. Russell, 1989, pp. 63-64 and p. 72.
93

By fractionating knowledge, as Reardon sometimes defines it 3 , the patriarchy continues the games that
socialize males into rivalry and prevent communication that is necessary to understand our enemies and
work through differences. So, you ask
Whats the Impact?
Rape culture is a horrific mentality in which men assume their superiority by forcing women to submit to
their sexual advances. Reardon has argued that realisms cutthroat frame of mind has spilled into a quest
for sexual dominance once foreign states are conquered. Rape culture is therefore justified because
threatsas in the case of nuclear deterrenceare okay to satisfy the aggressive drive of leaders. The
psychological connections are chilling.
Rape in various forms has been a traditional war system device used for symbolic
or deterrent purposes as well as the basic intimidating mechanism to maintain
submission. A secretary of state who talks about a demonstration use of a nuclear
weapon displays the same underlying motives as the right-wing terrorists who rape and
murder women missionaries working for people the right-wingers see as involved in a
left-wing or communist struggle. The system, however, obscures the evidence that nuke
rattling and politically motivated sexual assault are aspects of the same phenomenon.
Russell, Diana E.H., Sexism, Violence, and the Nuclear Mentality, Exposing Nuclear
Phallacies, edited by Diana E.H. Russell, 1989, pp. 69-70
My assumption that there is a connection between mens propensity to commit
personal acts of violence and the nuclear mentality is supported by a finding by
psychologists Neil Malamuth, John Briere, and James Check. In an experience using 367
male psychology students, they found that subjects who endorsed the use of nuclear
weapons were significantly more likely to report being sexually aroused by forcing a
female to do something she didnt want to.
War preparations are wasteful and the perpetuators of war, seemingly male military leaders, show little
regard for the environmental consequences of war. Nuclear weapons can leak, investment in armaments
can cause developing nations to divert necessary resources away from development, and battleground
ends up looking like a wasteland. The ecological welfare of the world is linked to feminist values
because of the view of nature as mother, linked to the nurturing socialization of females.
Reardon, Betty, Sexism and the War System, 1985, pp. 31-32
The threat to ecological balance, more than the other world order issues,
demonstrates the destructive consequences of the dichotomy between man and nature,
through which the human species has been led to wage literal war against the natural
environment. Also shown is the degree to which the war system itself has been sustained
through the matricide of Mother Earth, in the exhaustion of resources and the pollution of
the atmosphere resulting from the production and testing of weapons. Ecological
destruction is, at its base, misogynist.
The tradeoff between holism and fractionated knowledge is useful when analyzing foreign policy
issues in debate, and it is a central difference between males and females, per Reardon, Sexism and the
War System, 1985, pp. 79-80.
94

Finally, of course, since war is an aggressive extension of a patriarchal competition, the adoption of a
more inclusive outlook would mean an appreciable decrease and, perhaps, the end of war.
If indeed the terrifier is within us, the healing process requires us truly to love
ourselves with all our complexity and weaknesses, and both our feminine and masculine
sides. This extension, this attribution of humanity to the enemy (the other), is the
essential requirement needed to transcend sexism, liberate women from the ever-present
possibility of rape, and free the human family from its thralldom to the war system and
from the threat annihilation posed by the nuclear arms race.
What Do We Do?
We know whats been wrong in the international scene, and now we know what the atrocious impact is.
Reardon presented the solution that I found most persuasive and it is illustrated best by using a continuum
as a way to visualize the differences between males and females. For too long, we have taken an
unbalanced approach toward foreign policy. The endorsement of feminist ideals (via a debate ballot) is a
movement toward the other end of such a spectrum so as to be more balanced in our worldview.
PATRIARCHY-----? -------? ------------EQUILIBRIUM------------------------------FEMINISM
Through recognition and celebration of the different characteristics that we possess, we can avoid the
imbalance to which the world has been subjected. Therefore, this philosophy is not a hatred for all
patriarchal characteristics or beliefs; it is a call for open-minded equilibrium.
As women in the process of liberation have come to acknowledge the masculine
in themselves (both as a positive and negative force), some men have acknowledged,
even embraced, the feminine in themselves. Such acknowledgment of the other in
ourselves is essential to the healing of the primal wound and to the concomitant process
of humanization.
The present language used to communicate misogynist policy must be rejected. We can do this by
accepting the human consequences of international diplomacy. A ballot should be viewed as a value
system with which the judge is associating himself or herself. Therefore, if the language dehumanizes by
decreasing the graphic nature of an action, or if it actively discriminates, it should not be endorsed by the
judge. In general, however, we have a duty in this world to revamp the system of communication to be
ironicallymore communicative.
Reardon, Betty, Women and Peace: Feminist Visions of Global Security, 1993, pp. 27
Demystification of this language and dispelling the secrecy of security policy that
contributes to the continuation of the arms race and the exclusion of most of the public
from participation in security policy making, as we shall see, has been a particular
characteristic of specifically feminist peace efforts. Such change is absolutely essential if
those who are affected by a policy are to even understand it, much less participate in its
development.
95

Cohn, Carol, Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals, Exposing
Nuclear Phallacies, edited by Diana E.H. Russell, 1987, pp. 159
I believe that feminists, and others who seek a more just and peaceful world,
have a dual task before usa deconstructive project and a reconstructive project that are
intimately linked. Our deconstructive task requires close attention to, and the dismantling
of, technostrategic discourse. The dominant voice of militarized masculinity and
decontextualized rationality speaks so loudly in our culture, it will remain difficult for
any other voices to be heard until that voice loses some of its power to define what we
hear and how we name the worlduntil that voice is deligitimated.
One Final Caveat
This philosophy does not sit well with some judges who have a fetish for realism as the best way to
analyze foreign policy. It may not always be in your best interest to be brave and deliver your feminism
constructive; have another case prepared, just in case. Although I have found this school of thought to be
fascinating, it is a controversial topic. As such, the controversy may distract purists from the persuasive
message you are trying to send. Nevertheless, these cases have won numerous debate rounds and to those
you know are willing to listen to interesting and innovative concepts, please research these ideas further.
You will not be disappointed with the intellectual challenge and fun of thinking outside the concrete box
that is traditional L-D philosophy. Best of luck!
For More Information
Any questions regarding the ideas discussed here should be directed via e-mail to
dvivero@victorybriefs.com. If you are interested in getting the full story by reading the texts, which I
strongly recommend, please check out the following books:
Friedan, Betty. The Feminine Mystique. New York: Norton, 2001.
-----. Women and Peace: Feminist Visions of Global Stability. Albany: SUNY Press, 1993.
Whitworth, Sandra. Feminism and International Relations: Towards a Political Economy of Gender in
Interstate and Non-governmental Institutions. New York: St. Martins, 1994.
Footnotes:
Russell, Diana E. H., ed. Exposing Nuclear Phallacies. New York: Pergamon, 1989, pp. 116
Russell, Diana E. H., ed. Exposing Nuclear Phallacies. New York: Pergamon, 1989, pp. 63-64 and 72
Reardon, Betty. Sexism and the War System. Syracuse: SU Press, 1985, pp. 79-80
96

Walzer (Amy Moffett)
MICHAEL WALZER
by Amy Moffett
Warfare has been fraught with violence and injustice for centuries, even coming out of the state of nature
Hobbes would likely suggest was a nasty endeavor. Although pleasant thoughts of war do not enter the
mind of any reasonable person, wars still exist and must in some sense be justified. Michael Walzer
concentrates on an updated version of the just war theory in his work, as well as a variety of other things.
As The Oxford Companion of Philosophy notes, [Walzer is an] American political philosopher who has
specialized in the study of democracy, justice, and ethical relativism. As for biographical information,
Walzer was born in 1935 and works today as a professor at the Institute for Advanced Studies in
Princeton as well as the editor of a magazine called Dissent <www.dissentmagazine.com>. In order to
understand and use Walzer in a debate round it is necessary to look at his work from various perspectives;
initially analyzing the just war theory and his new twists; then moral relativism and minimal ethics; and
finally his broad scope of justice and other interesting points of philosophy.
Just War
The just war doctrine as it has developed over the ages comes down to two clear theories: jus ad bello or
the morality of going to war and jus in bello or morality inside of war. Augustine had provided six
criteria: the idea of last resort, just cause, just intention, prior declaration of war, reasonable chance of
success, non-combatant immunity and due proportionality (or dont do more wrong than right in
fighting). Walzer concerns himself primarily with just conduct and who soldiers can kill, saying:
Just and Unjust Wars, pg. 41-42
That is, how those victims of war who can be attacked and killed are to be
distinguished from those who cannot. I dont believe that this question must be answered
in this or that specific way if war is to be a moral condition. It is necessary, however, that
at any particular moment there be an answer. War is distinguishable from murder and
massacre only when restrictions are established on the reach of battle.
Non-combatant immunity is thus very important since Walzer believes that while soldiers have already
been forced to fight out of duty or force from the state, any attacks on them are not to be considered
separate acts of aggression which must then be reciprocated. Walzer delves into the details of what a
solider is and how far the delineation of what a non-combatant runs. He is very clear on the start of war as
aggression, noting:
Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 52,53
Every violation of the territorial integrity or political sovereignty of an
independent state is called aggressionAggression is a singular and undifferentiated
crime because, in all its forms, it challenges rights that are worth dying for.
There is thus at the heart of every conflict an attack of some kind made on the integrity of another state or
group of people if not in physical land than in the political sense of being able to do what it wants as far
as sovereignty is concerned. Nations, of course, have subjective decisions about what exactly infringes
on their sovereignty in the international community and at that point the justice argument can be taken
many ways (especially given the upcoming thoughts on relativism). Yet all nations get the source of their
thinking and tight clutching of power from the same place, the faithful social contract that draws on the
basic Lockean theory of Natural Rights of life, liberty, and property to give states the power of protection
in the same sense. Walzer argues:
97

Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 54

Given a genuine contract, it makes sense to say that territorial integrity and
political sovereignty can de defended in the exact same way as individual life and liberty.
and thus
Aggressive acts on the part of whoever begins themjustify forceful resistance
as their equivalents would in the homes and streets of domestic society.
And yet how far a nation can go to protect that sovereignty is limited by just war, coming short of the
total war of Karl von Clausewitz. How far a nation can go to protect the sovereignty of another nation is
limited almost to nothing, and when it comes to intervention Walzer has virtually no justification. He
seems to support John Stuart Mill on the theory of interventionism, suggesting that intervening should be
done only rarely by a foreign government and doing so should be preceded by an argument for the true
extremity of the situation that should be different from most cases. The best thing outside countries can do
while watching a nation harm itself internally? Walzers answer is to offer moral support only, for he
states:
Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 87, 90
A state is self-determining even if its citizens struggle and fail to establish free
institutions, but it has been deprived of self-determination if such institutions are
established by an intrusive neighborWe need to establish a priori respect for state
boundaries; they are, as I have argued before, the only boundaries communities ever
have.
This is completely unconventional for someone supposedly so supportive of both human rights and a
minimal morality that denies the harm of these non-combatants. He does however, make exceptions in
cases of gross rights abuses, and it is true that in order for these nations to claim their true boundaries
and sovereignty they need to complete these struggles on their own. However, they are still making
moral choices getting into acts of aggression either to keep a state alive or to keep it free do have those
necessary moral implications. Walzer states:
The assignment of responsibility is the critical test for the argument of justice.
For if war is fought not under the aegis of necessity but, most often, of freedom, then
soldiers and statesman have to make choices that are sometimes moral choices.
This obviously is a perfect set-up for the argument of governmental legitimacy; tying in contractual
obligations or social welfare or just about anything depending on the nature and structure of the
argumentation. The leaders making the choice for war or conflict must be doing so for just causes and not
at the expense of their people, and of course their end goal should be peace. Wars are fought to gain
something that can be used in peacetime and Walzer especially looks forward to the point at which that
happens, but when expressing the need for non-violence he also realizes the need for restrained warfare as
he notes:
98

Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 329, 335

The dream of a war to end war, the myth of Armageddon (the last battle), the
vision of the lion lying down with the lamb all these point toward an age definitively
peaceful, a distant age that lies across some unknown time-break, without armed struggle
and systematic killingIf we are to aim at that transformation [to non-violence], as we
should, we must begin by insisting upon the rules of war and by holding soldiers rigidly
to the norms they set. The restraint of war is the beginning of peace.
Most of these cards are just trying to get you a feel for the piece; one of the best things about Walzers
work in this book is that he tries to match up every piece of theory with a concrete historical example.
This gives a debater ample room to have good theory for an experienced judge and an understandable
example for a lay judge. Walzers theory of justice even in its distributive properties is tied into his theory
of a just war, and it has far-reaching applications for even a conflict resolution.
Moral Relativism
Many theorists contend that in Thick and Thin Walzer merely continues and adapts his previous work
from Spheres of Justice; so it is from there we will take our cards and analysis. As it is a very short work
(a little over a hundred pages), it would be an excellent quick read to kick start a topic with, and it
includes passages on distributive justice, morality in international politics, social criticism, the theory of
minimalism and maximalism, etc. To begin the understanding of moral relativism, Walzer recalls
watching a demonstration in Prague in 1989 in which citizens were protesting with some signs that read
only Truth and Justice among other things. At the point that Walzer and others from a half dozen
different moralities can sympathize with their cause, we must realize that there is an integral minimal idea
of justice. He goes on to explain:
Through Thick and Thin, pp. 2
These citizens of Prague were not marching in defense of utilitarian equality or
John Rawlss difference principle or any philosophical theory of desert or merit or
entitlement. Nor were they moved by some historical vision of justice with roots, say, in
Hussite religious radicalism. Undoubtedly, they would have argued, if pressed, for
different distributive programs; they would have described a just society in different
ways.What they meant by the justice inscribed on their signs, however, was simple
enough: an end to arbitrary arrests, equal and impartial law enforcement, the abolition of
the privileges and prerogatives of the party elite common, garden variety justice.
What Walzer meant in this extended example was that no matter what type of justice you support (in life
or in a round) and no matter how many tenets or intricacies it has, some internal minimal meaning with
almost universal appeal can be found in most theories of justice if you can find that and uphold that in a
round while your opponent has some specific view that does not hold that same appeal (and is too thick
for the group or groups specified in the resolution) then you have a surefire claim that your value is better
simply because it is more acceptable to the world at large. Walzer asserts that while you start with a
minimalist meaning of a concept like truth or justice, that meaning does and should grow. He states:
Moral terms have minimal and maximal meanings; we can standardly give thin
and thick accounts of them, and the two accounts are appropriate in different contexts,
serve different purposes.
99

To establish a proceduralist minimalism however is a very tricky business. Proceduralist means one
thin theory from which most other thick theories stem. Walzer says that in order for it to work there
must be a neutral starting point from which a very many legitimate moral cultures must develop. He
mentions Stuart Hampshire when giving an example of when this works and also adds that defining a
thickness for something is an evolutionary process:
Social meanings are not just there, agreed on once and for all. Meanings change
over time as a result of internal tension and external example; hence, they are always
subject to dispute.
Progress and adaptation are thus primary forces in moving towards a true understanding not only of the
general minimal principles of things such as justice but also their current meaning in any legitimately
moral society. All things that we do or are involved with bring out an underlying sense of values and what
we ought to do (as debaters well know). He remarks:
Through Thick and Thin, pp.15
The practice of governmentbrings with it ideas about the responsibility of
governors towards the governed. The practice of war brings with it ideas about combat
between combatants, the exclusion of non-combatants, civilian immunity. The practice of
commerce brings with it ideas about honesty, fair-dealing and fraud.
Ideas that come with all sorts of practices become our values and criteria in the round. They have a
minimal application; which may not be the best application towards a particular subject. Debaters should
feel free to argue for thickness where it is required by the resolution to say that Walzer agrees that
certain moralities must be thick at certain times and for certain people. Nothing, not even the philosophy
of Walzer is absolute.
Towards the future
Another great read on Walzers viewpoint is Michael Walzer on War and Justice by Brian Orend, a
philosophy professor at the University of Waterloo. Reviewer Terry Nardin, author of Law, Morality and
The Relations of States, and professor at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, comments that this
book is the first comprehensive examination of Michael Walzers political philosophy, including his
views on such vital issues as war and peace, distributive justice, and global governance. This is a book
about justice: the justice of a nations major institutions and the justice of the interaction of nations on the
world stage. Brian Orend offers acomprehensive look at Walzers entire body of work. This book just
came out February of 2001 so it is very recent and should be able to give you a great handle on all things
Walzer.
Further Reading
??
??
??
??
??
??
Just and Unjust Wars by Michael Walzer

Through Thick and Thin by Michael Walzer
Spheres of Justice by Michael Walzer
Interpretation of Social Criticism by Michael Walzer
Michael Walzer on War and Justice by Brian Orend
Innocence and Experience by Stuart Hampshire
100

Bibliography
?? Elrod, Mark Alan. The Churches of Christ and the War Question: The Influence of
Church
Journals. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1995.
?? Honderich, Ted, ed., The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995.
?? http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/j/justwar.htm
?? http://www.mqup.mcgill.ca/2001/orend.htm
?? http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/philosophy/ugpage/spplec13.html
?? Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. United
States of America: Basic Books, 1977.
?? Walzer, Michael. Through Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad. Notre Dame,
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994.
101

Arendt (Andrew Rothschild)
HANNAH ARENDT
by Andrew Rothschild
Hannah Arendt was so stubbornly free-thinking that its nearly impossible to locate the paradigm in
which she thought freely; that is, she was neither a historian nor a political scientist nor a sociologist nor a
philosopher. She wrote about history for the sake of the present; the present for the sake of philosophy;
philosophy for the sake of understanding history; and sociology for the sake of condemning that very
field of study. She helped coin the term political theorist; had international relations theorist been an
established title in her day and age, she might have been classified under its generous umbrella as well.
Its hard to say. What is clear, obvious, and apparent is that her work bubbles over with insight, freshness,
relevance, clarity, and beautiful prose.
Before proceeding, Ive got to pause to assert my enthusiasm: Arendt is a brilliantly relevant philosopher
for Lincoln Douglas debaters. She develops a philosophical system which is relatively easy to explain,
very difficult to refute, and highly applicable to a number of topics. She supports her arguments with both
historical and philosophical data, and she makes educated prophecies in no uncertain terms. Arendt fairly
bluntly says, for instance, that if we allow individuals to become alienated or if persons are discouraged
from vibrantly active participation in the political process, totalitarianism will result as some point in
some place on the world stage. She says that encouraging the pursuit of social welfare both degrades
man and has similar totalitarian ends. And thats not all she says.
Hannah Arendts magnum opus is The Human Condition, which was first published in 1958, seven years
after Arendt was officially granted American citizenship (she was born a German Jew). It comprises the
core of Arendts thought and in many ways forms an essential component of every argument she ever
madeincluding those presented in her earlier major work, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951).
The Human Condition proposes to study the vita activa, or the active life of man (as opposed to the vita
contemplative, the contemplative life, which serves as the object of study in her last major work, The Life
of the Mind, published posthumously in 1973). The vita activa is comprised, according to Arendt (who is
drawing on Marx), of labor, work, and action.
Labor, for Arendt, relates to earth; it consists of those most basic tasks necessary for man (conceived as
an animal laborans or laboring creature) to survive. Man must retrieve water, gather food, find or
construct shelter. Labor is cyclical, as each of its fruits are consumed and again required, and thus, man
never ceases to be an animal laborans, never receives a promotion; however, his life can develop
additional facets.
Arendt scholar Peter Baehr, Professor of Social and Political Theory at the Memorial University of
Newfoundland, explains Arendts concept of work:
The Portable Hannah Arendt, 2000, pp. xxviii
[W]orkwhose paradigmatic figure is the craftsman [as being] oriented to
utility, rather than mere survival, to production, rather than consumption, to the
transformation of mans environment, rather than simple adaptation to it. Or to put it
another way, it is work, the activity of man in his capacity as homo faber, that through
tools of various kinds creates the world: a multiplicity of cultural, technological, and
political artifacts that lends human existence a degree of permanence denied to mortals
Baehr notes that the artificial world both binds men through institutions and culture and separates us from
each other via laws and common practices so that were neither isolated nor at a loss for individual
102

distinctiveness. The world, then, is, in itself, a good thing which, if it functions properly, prevents
totalitarianism; this contention will be better explained below.
Action, for Arendt, involves asserting individualityspontaneouslyin a sociopolitical context.
Throughout the entire body of her work, she stresses her hope for mankind due to our unlimited capacity
to change the system, to think independently of anything: time and again she writes that each baby born
is a new beginning. No woman or man has to follow a prescribed course; a man can change course based
on his own, unpredictable ideas. We have autonomy, not always in the legal sense, but unquestionably in
the natural sense: besides the force of men, we are bound by nothing. Here, Arendt reflects Sartre and
Heidegger, but her meaning is political rather than existential: any man can change the world in
unpredictable ways, not by altering his paradigmatic perceptions, but through initiating positive political
change.
The Human Condition recognizes the necessity of man as animal laborans and homo faber. The laboring
life is the home life, the pre-social life, where man can experience true virtue or vice. Its interesting to
note that Arendt considers virtue to be corrupted when it is perceived by anyoneeven by its author;
whoever sees himself performing a good work is no longer good, but at best a useful member of society
or a dutiful member of the Church; in Sartrean terms, only private action is authentic (Condition 77).
The homo faber is similarly useful because it is through work that we can construct the sphere in which
action can take place. But Arendt places both labor and work well below action, which is understood to
take place within the political arena, a public space of thought which recognizes each man as an equal
due to his status as a citizen (not as a man) and provides him with the freedom to speak his mind. It is
action which, to simplify things quite a bit, separates man from the animals. It also separates a man from
other men. It is the foundation of pluralism. It supports mans status as a moral agent. It is the bedrock of
humanness. If men and women cannot act, we are nothing.
Arendt proceeds to identify labor with a private realm, work with a social realm, and action with a
political realm. The former is associated with the household; its mans retreat from public life, and as
such, it offers a den for reflection and for man to live the life of his design. It is here that he cultivates
distinction. The household is therefore essential to mans participation in public life. The Greeks
recognized this, as did Americas founding fathers: men who owned no property werent allowed to
engage in politics in either case because non-owners didnt possess that privacy essential to the enabling
of politics. The social realm is culturethe division of labor, group conventions, etc. It is indeed a
dangerous realm because it perceives men as a mass, a Blob. For it to function efficiently, it lays down
rules and establishes cultural norms and practices, and as such, it encourages behavior rather than action,
conformity rather than the distinction which makes a man truly human. Nevertheless, it is an essential
realm, because it produces the space in which the public realm can exist; but we ought to be careful not to
perceive it as too important. The public realm or political realm is that place where individual
distinction is valuedwhere citizens can debate with other citizens, where different ideas and opinions
are considered. In the public realm, a communitys power (which is not the same as strength) is realized:
everyone is honest with everyone else, relationships are formed, there is no deceit, and individuality is
valued. Power, for Arendt, is human efficacy, the ability to be oneself and to be taken seriously. It
exists only the political realm, that arena which serves as permanent home to the artist, the academic, and
the activists. The public realm ought to serve as at least a second residence for everyonefor it is here
and only here that persons as persons are realized. Only here can ends can be discussed and goals
changed. Freedom is exclusively located in the political realm (Baehr, 187) because everything else is
concerned only with the perspiration, both intellectual and physical, required for visions borne in the
public realm to be actualized.
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And yet the political and social realms are all too often lumped together. One might distinguish the
functions of those arenas by imagining which portions of the vita activa might exist outside the presence
of others.
Hannah Arendt. The Human Condition, 1958. Reprinted in The Portable Hannah Arendt,
edited by Peter Baehr, 2000, pp. 182-3
[I]t is only action that cannot even be imagined outside the society of men. The
activity of labor does not need the presence of others Man working and fabricating and
building a world inhabited only by himself would still be a fabricator [though] he would
have lost his specifically human quality and, rather, be a god Action alone is the
exclusive prerogative of man; neither a beast nor a god is capable of it, and only action is
entirely dependent upon the constant presence of others.
Thus Arendt concurs with Aristotle in viewing man as a political animal; she distinguishes mans political
nature, however, from a social natureAristotle is frequently mistranslated (starting with Aquinas
translation) as indicating that man is inherently social. Arendt notes that Aristotle and the contemporary
Greeks knew only of the polis or city-state to define a colle ction of common men; men was understood
in the context of political action. Society derives instead from the Latin societas, which even to Romans
meant only an alliance between people for a specific purpose (Condition 183). Society as such is a
modern invention.
The Human Condition uses insights concerning the vita activa to launch an enormous critique of social
thinking: Arendt maintains that asserting the value of social welfare, societal good, anything
utilitarian flagrantly perverts humanity because it deifies the social realm, where man can only be a
worker and not a human being. Statistics are a perfect example of this sort of thinking, as they assign the
Blob significance unto itself, and in so doing specifically overlook genuine human activity. Patricia
Altenbernd Johnson, a professor at the University of Dayton, excellently explains Arendts analysis:
Patricia Altenbernd Johnson, On Arendt, 2001, pp. 34
The laws of statistics are valid only where large numbers or periods are involved,
and acts or events can statistically appear only as deviations or fluxuations.. When we
understand ourselves through statistics we find meaning in patterns of behavior for large
groups over extended time, not in individual events. Yet, Arendt maintains that the
meaningfulness of everyday relationships is disclosed not in everyday life but in rare
deeds, just as the significance of a historical period shows itself only in the few events
that illuminate it (42). If we lose sight of the importance of those unique events that
illuminate human life, we risk losing the most fully human aspects of our world.
Arendt further explains the result of the social on individual human behavior:
edited by Peter Baehr, 2000, pp. 193
Society, on all its levels, excludes the possibility of action, which formerly was
excluded from the household. Instead, society expects from each of its members a certain
kind of behavior, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to
normalize its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or
outstanding achievement.
Ill reiterate: conceiving of humans as a mass, as a society, degrades us and robs us of the very thing that
makes us humanindividual difference. To value the social good is to value the machinery of society
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and to attach conceptual significance to that machine. As such, he who lauds social welfare elevates
workwhich has as its only valuable non-primordial function its ability to forge a public space and to
give the political realm practical importanceto end-in-itself significance. The Greeks knew that
society and labor exist only to make action and the subsequent realization of humanness possible;
society, therefore, ought to serve the political. Modern life has skewed that structure beyond recognition.
The final evidence of our degradation is our relegation of politics to experts, and our conception of it as
work; the politician makes laws the same way that a carpenter might make a table. The distinction
has been erased. Worst of all, both the carpenter and the politicianhorrificallyare seen as means to
perpetuate and better society.
How did societya degrading machinebecome for us the ultimate end? Arendt attempts to answer that
question by tracing the evolution of the Greek polis into the modern world. The Greek word for a private,
apolitical man was idion, from which we derive the word idiot (the Greeks also used the word to mean
simple-minded, although for them there would have been no distinction between the stupid man and the
apolitical man). Today, through a long historical process involving the Catholic Church and Marxism,
privacy isnt seen as deprivation. But equally perverting is our growing fondness for utilitarianism.
Utilitarianism, as most readers will know, is a philosophy most famously articulated by Jeremy Bentham
which suggests that the worth of an act may be determined by a pleasure/pain ratio: concisely put, utility
recommends that action which provides the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Arendt deplores
the emphasis on happiness, as Baehr explains:
Peter Baehr, The Portable Hannah Arendt, 2000, pp. xxxi
The standards of means-ends, so appropriate for work, are illegitimately
extrapolated into and colonize the moral arena with the consequence that ends themselves
lose any intrinsic worth; instead, they become part of a process, a chain, to be forever
converted into new means whose value consists in the contribution made to the
happiness of the greatest number. But not only does a utilitarian ethic appear to be
circularthe principle of utility is to be justified by its usefulnessit also, insofar as
happiness is its goal, seems to collapse into the earthly condition of the body:
happiness is a fluctuating emotion, a subjective mood, not a created object or an action.
The vita activa, though not articulated as such, is heavily foreshadowed in Arendts 1951 work The
Origins of Totalitarianism. In Origins, Arendt sets out to isolate those factors which are necessary
preconditions of a totalitarian state. Three emerge most prominently: anti-Semitism, imperialism, and the
emergence of mass society. Arendts account of anti-Semitism is fascinating but far too specific to be
relevant for our purposes. Her accounts of imperialism and mass society, however, feature broad-based
criticism of controversial international and domestic issues.
Imperialism mobilizes the populous while melding it into a singular entity. It, the Blob, called the
country expands. But what does it mean for a country to expand? Assuming the conclusions of The
Human Condition to be true, society has become separate from politics and most citizens have become
apolitical; its not enough, then, to suggest that an entire polis has, in all realms, enlarged itself via
imperialism. On the contrary, the primary evidence of imperialism is that the victorious aggressor
government, that specialized group of workers not unlike Shipleys donuts or Columbia Pictures,
rules more people. But that can surely not be what people mean when they say the country expands.
The country, after all, is the Blob. Are the subjugated masses simply swallowed up by the Blob? Perhaps
they would be if the prevailing society were not to draw a distinction between conquerors and conquered.
But, says Arendt, citing European expansion into India or Africa as examples, imperialism tends to
assume the quality of racism: the Englishman, the Spaniard, the Germanthe conqueror is the oberman,
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whereas the subjugated is barely human. Racism tends to take the form of the White Mans Burden
(translated into the Frenchmans burden or the Germans burden) and thus both insults an orientalized
Other and serves to inflate the conquering race. Said inflation is a component of the groundwork for
fascismfanatic nationalismwhich then results, sometimes, in totalitarianism; more on that in a
moment.
Arendt would caution us against any act of imperialism, be it cultural, political, or military, (though her
style is entirely descriptive), for imperialism almost always takes the above-mentioned racism
(nationalism) as its corollaryeven when its trying specifically not to. Arendt provides multiple
examples of this relationship:
edited by Peter Baehr, 2000, pp. 109-110
The French tried in recent times to combine ius with imperium and to build an
empire in the old Roman sense. They alone at least attempted to develop the body politic
of the nation into an imperial political structure, believed that the French nation was
marching to spread the benefits of French civilization; they wanted to incorporate
overseas possessions into the national body by treating the conquered peoples as both
brothers and subjectsbrothers in the fraternity of a common French civilization, and
subjects in that they are the disciples of French light and followers of French leading.
The British, tried to escape the dangerous inconsistency inherent in the nations attempt
at empire building by leaving the conquered peoples to their own devices as far as
culture, religion, and law were concerned They did not prevent the natives from
developing national consciousness and from clamoring for sovereignty and
independence But it has strengthened tremendously the new imperialist consciousness
of a fundamental, and not just a temporary, superiority of man over man, of higher over
the lower breeds.
A world in which imperialism is the norm, in which even the incorruptible [are] convinced that
imperialism [is] the only way to conduct world politics (Baehr, 112) is a world in which totalitarianism
can easily arisethough not in every or even many imperialist countries. Just somewhere. Because
everyone sees nationalistic fervor as right and acceptable, it goes unchecked. (Neither Britain nor France
was totalitarian, but their practices helped make Nazism and Stalinism possible.)
What remains unanswered in this analysis is the query where does imperialism come from? Arendt
maintains that what we now call the military-industrial complex (she never uses that rhetoric) motivates
expansionism. Imperialism, and subsequent totalitarianism, is the first harm of the political being made to
serve the social:
edited by Peter Baehr, 2000, pp. 107
Imperialism was born when the ruling class in capitalist production came up
against national limitations to its economic expansion. The bourgeoisie turned to politics
out of economic necessity: for if it did not want to give up the capitalist system whose
inherent law is constant economic growth, it had to impose this law upon its home
governments and to proclaim expansion to be an ultimate political goal of foreign policy.
The second harm of the political/social distinctions collapse is the development of mass society. The
breakdown of class structures in Europe, Arendt suggests, which was not unlike the breakdown of small
communities in the United States, led to a disappearance of common interests between persons and
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distinctions between groups. Without sub-cultures and sub-communities featuring distinct motives and
political purposes, everyone became like everyone else, but in a sort of parallel fashionnothing touched,
nothing intersected, group obligations disappeared; men became atomized while remaining non-distinct.
Naturally, political neutrality ensued and power collapsedbut not absent a social competitive spirit.
People became desperate for leadersany leadersto carry the banner of the nation. They acquired the
appetite for political organization (Origins 311). As people retreated into the unthinking, apolitical
machinery of the social realm, they yearned for government but no particular government. As elements of
the machine, they were capable of being mobilized or organized. When any emergent government would
find willing machinery at its disposal, fascism was fertilized. In Spain, in Italy, in Germany, even in Italy,
the pattern fit. Machinery without a purpose, without ideology, is the fascist dream:
Hannah Arendt. The Origins of Totalitarianism, 1958. Reprint, 1979, pp. 326
The practical goal of [totalitarianism] is to organize as many people as possible
within its framework and to set and keep them in motion; a political goal that would
constitute the end of the movement simply does not exist.
In other words, if people see government existing for a purposesay, to support the elderly and to secure
our rightsits limited by that purpose. Using our example, once programs were in place to punish
thieves and murders and to provide money to senior citizens, governmental expansion would be expected
to stop. When ideology is absent from the public, government knows no bounds.
When pluralism and politics break down, the result is a society in which the violence necessary to support
a totalitarian regime is acceptable. Violence is impossible, of course, in a healthy political realmfor, as
previously discussed, the power of that realm depends upon honesty, openness, and respect for
distinction. The fear instilled by violence would destroy unabashed expression. When the political realm
collapses, however, power gives way to tyranny and politics yield to oppression and violence.
Using Hannah Arendt in Lincoln Douglas Debate
Due to space restrictions, Ive only been able to skim the surface of Hannah Arendts philosophy.
Nevertheless, astute readers will discern multitudinous LD-relevant positions discussed in the overview.
Among them: Arendt offers a unique critique of utilitarianism; her arguments refute value premises which
incorporate social well-being; she despises, for obvious reasons, obsessions with the economy; shes a
communitarian of sorts, since she recognizes that freedom can only truly exist amidst the presence of
others; she supports little -populated autonomous groups where political interaction can really exist (in
other words, she supports decentralized government power); she has an undeveloped but imaginative
virtue theory indicating that true goodness can only exist when the actor doesnt perceive his deed; she
draws a direct link between imperialism and totalitarianism; and her emphasis on honesty in the political
realm provides a brand new, entirely a-Kantian critique of the dangers of dishonesty.
Arendt makes many, many other arguments in the course of her writing. On Revolution presents
arguments supporting a federal system of government, civil disobedience, all anti-violence causes,
including the anti-death penalty movement, and it fleshes out her critique of lying. The Life of the Mind
analyzes not only the question what is thinking? but also what is thinking good for? It provides an
answer to the existentialist question: If the universe is absurd, what is the point of acting?
I have yet to see the LD topic upon which a brilliant case could not be written relying heavily on the
political theories of Hannah Arendt. That she hasnt entered the LD lexicon is stunning. Those who
discover her first, I firmly believe, are in for smooth rides through an awful lot of rounds.
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Further Reading
Youll note that many of the cards Ive used were taken from The Portable Hannah Arendt (PHA), edited
by the also-quoted Peter Baehr. Reading this bookcover to cover, less than 600 pagesis the best way
I know to get familiar with Arendt. Of course, for fuller understanding, all of the texts mentioned in this
article could and should be read.
If your interest in Arendts thinking goes beyond debate, youre in luck: her best, most enjoyable books,
in my opinion, are the LD-irrelevant Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil and Men in
Dark Times. The former is about the trial of SS Official Adolf Eichmann, who was kidnapped from
Argentina in 1960 by the state of Israel and forced to stand trial for the murder of six million people. The
latter is a series of essays highlighting integrity in the face of adversity (but which arent half as cheesy as
the theme sounds).
But the best Hannah Arendt to readagain, if youre interested in debate-irrelevant readingis a book,
some 700+ pages long, of her complete correspondence with her best friend and mentor, the famous
existentialist Karl Jaspers. They discuss business and philosophy, but their personal lives as well. Its both
intellectually engaging and heart-warming. Hallmark for intellectuals.
Suggested Reading
Hannah Arendt studied under and participated in a lengthy love affair with Martin Heidegger when she
was a student; at one point, either by her choice or Heideggers (history is unclear on this point), she
transferred to the University of Heidelberg, where she studied under Karl Jaspers. Both men are reflected
heavily in her writing, and thus, Heideggers Being and Time and Jaspers Way to Wisdom as well as his
Kant and The Atom Bomb pursue themes similar to Arendts. Equally important are the works of Arendts
friends Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre, particularly The Myth of Sisyphus and Being and Nothingness,
respectively.
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Realism (Sumon Dantiki)
REALISM
by Sumon Dantiki
In recent years, Lincoln-Douglas debate topics have often been directly drawn from issues relating to
American foreign policy or other international concerns. Recent examples include, Resolved: A lesser
developed nation's right to develop ought to take priority over its obligation to protect the environment,
and Resolved: The possession of nuclear weapons is immoral. As with all LD resolutions, debaters
frequently construct their cases about these topics through a mix of relevant philosophical and pragmatic
arguments. In the realm of international relations, however, a knowledge of Locke, Mill, Rousseau and
other classical philosophers is often less relevant than an awareness of International Relations theory and
a sense of current global problems. It is in this context that realist theory, or realism, is especially
important. In this piece, I will briefly review the main tenets of realism and advance some of its most
powerful criticisms. In doing so, this analysis will try to strike a balance between theoretical issues while
still maintaining the character of a illustrative, pragmatic, guide.
Realism: A Review
As behooves any good debater, I will begin with background and definitions. Almost without exception,
realist theory has been the dominant school of thought among students and practitioners of international
politics during the past half century. Some of its most celebrated proponents include Hans Morgenthau,
George Kennan, and Henry Kissinger. Within the wide body of realist literature, therefore, it is necessary
to focus on the core tenets of realism. In his article, The Realist School and Its Critics: Interpreting the
Postwar World, Richard Falk, Professor of International Law at Princeton University, identifies five such
features shared by all realists:
1) A focus on sovereign states as the basic units in international relations, and
especially on the leading state (or states) as the provider of international order at a given
period. Such a focus remains realist even if the emphasis is explicitly shifted to the
perception of those who act on behalf of the state, or takes into account economic and
domestic dimensions of statecraft; the crucial distinguishing mark of realist thought is its
state-centric character
2) An acceptance of the state systemof interacting statesas the only feasible
framework for international order, implying a rejection of alternative forms of world
order as utopian or chaotic.
3) An acceptance of conflict as the most essential, though not exclusive,
wellspring of political relationships among states whose interests and beliefs are mainly
antagonistic and the application of such presuppositions to East-West, Soviet-American
relations in the post-1947 period.
4) An unspoken ethical assumption (or the suppression of the ethical inquiry to
the contrary) that any side in an international conflict can be legitimately expected to
threaten unlimited destruction to the extent that doing so effectively discourages attacks
and provocative challenges by its enemies; in other words, an essentially amoral
acceptance of the security role of violence, maximized as nuclear deterrenceeven in the
form of mutual assured destruction. Reliance on deterrence is treated as an acceptable, if
unfortunate, basis for stabilizing security in the nuclear age.
5) An acknowledgement that the character of conflict is influenced by
international economic policy, by the degree to which war is perceived as a rational
instrument of statecraft, and by the domestic political culture and prevailing ideological
outlook of principal international rivals.
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In the remaining analysis, I will discuss how best to refute these five tenets and their implications.
What is Wrong with Realism? Attacks from the Left and Right
Falk has also identified three main critiques of realism that have been advanced since its rise to power in
the immediate post-WWII era: Marxism, fatalism, and idealism. Of the three, fatalism, quite frankly, has
the least credibility. It is basically the driving philosophy, in varied forms, behind religious
fundamentalistsfor whom martyrdom is a blessingand similar zealots who perceive conflict as central
to life. Astonishingly, Falk notes, Fatalists with such views are never far from the centers of power in
the United States, even if they do not exert much visible influence in the national media or in academic
life while citing examples such as Oliver North who have permeated the upper circles of U.S.
policymaking. Nevertheless, fatalism as a desirable mass philosophy is ridiculous, if for no other reason
than it creates an atmosphere of self-fulfilling violence without a respect for the sanctity of human life.
Marxism, although much more philosophically reputable than fatalism, also has little utility within an LD
debate round. In nutshell, this train of thought refutes realism on the basis that economic motivations,
specifically conflicts among economic classes, are the foundations of political behavior. Thus, in lieu of
the realist state-centric, militaristic (and sometimes capitalistic) view of international relations espoused
by many American officials during the Cold-War, Marxists displayed the Cold War in terms of capitalist
expansion, which mandated a Communist response. As Susan Strange has noted, however, in The
Problem or the solution? Capitalism and the State System, the debate, between socialism and capitalism,
has faded away and the capitalist mode of production prevailed. Thus, Marxism simply is not the
direction of future of international relations analysis. Indeed, the number and influence of nations
currently ascribing to Marxist thought--notably Cuba and North Korea--makes it a practically irrelevant
challenge to the realist consensus that has dominated American international relations thought for so long.
This leaves idealism as the main critique of realism. In a sweeping philosophical sense, idealists strive for
a more utopian global order and enshrining collective international concerns over individual national
interests. From a structural perspective, they advocate strengthened international norms and institutions;
taken to the extreme, they would support the concept of an all-powerful United Nations, or similar world
body, as a necessary global authority to trump the narrow-minded national interests of individual nationstates.
During the Cold War such discourse was readily dismissed as utopian (hence the label idealism). After
all, the two superpowers were locked in a tense confrontation which rendered international institutions
and organizations, including the UN, virtually useless without mutual agreement. Moreover, an American
realist emphasis on military force was seen as necessary not only to prevent the immediate Soviet threat,
but also to avoid the mistakes of the interwar years and try to appease a potential aggressor, a la Hitler.
Oviously, the world since then has drastically changed. With the fall of the Berlin wall, the implosion of
the former Soviet Union, and virtual worldwide collapse of Communist ideology, a new world has
emerged with a stronger mandate for a strengthened globally structured system. The foreign policy of
nation-states is no longer shaded by the black and white, capitalist versus socialist, policy planning
dominant during the Cold War era. Multilateralism and consensus based international policymaking were
hailed as the wave of the future. As former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright aptly put it: A policy
of unilateralism was simply no policy at all.
Nowhere is this more evident than the ameliorated role of the United Nations in major global affairs. For
example, in the post Cold-War era, the UN has imposed comprehensive economic sanctionsits most
crippling non-military weaponagainst nations on four different occasions for varying purposes. This
unprecedented rate of sanctions usage in a little over a decade is a stark break from the world bodys
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history: from 1945 to 1988 economic sanctions were imposed by the UN twice, and only one of them,
targeted against Southern Rhodesia, was comprehensive. Thus, the UN has clearly enjoyed a revival since
the demise of the U.S.S.R.
Oher non-state actors have also enjoyed increased influence in the international arena in recent times. In
1993, for instance, the Chemical Weapons Convention, an unprecedented arms-control agreement of 130
countries outlawing the use of chemical agents as weapons of mass destruction, was made possible only
through historic efforts of international chemical corporations. In more recent memory, spectators
applauded as Jodi Williams of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines received the 1997 Nobel
Peace Prize at the behest of a five-year battle encompassing over 1,200 nonprofit organizations across the
world. What is defies realist logic in both these examples is that the critical actors, international chemical
corporations and in international policy were non-governmental actorsa direct contradiction to the state
centric view of international relations offered by realism.
So what is the significance of these examples? Couldnt they simply be anomalies in the current system of
international relations, or are there reasons to support idealist thought that strengthened international
norms and procedures are the way of the future?
In the remainder of this piece, Ill outline some of the major features of the current international system to
which scholars pointwith growing fervor and supportthat predict the downfall of realist thought.
The Problem of the Global Commons
In his celebrated article (easily found on the reading list of any introductory American Political Science
course) Tragedy of the Commons, Garrett Hardin outlines one of the perennial problems of the subject,
with an imaginary scenario:
Picture a pasture open to all. It is expected that each herdsman will try to keep
as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably
satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the number of
both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes
the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability
become a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly
generates tragedy.
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or
implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, What is the utility to me of adding one
more animal to my herd? This utility has one negative and one positive component.
1.
The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal.
Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the
positive utility is nearly +1.
2.
The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing
created by one more animal. Since, however, the entire herdsman, the negative utility,
shares the effects of overgrazing for any particular decision making herdsman is only a
fraction of 1.
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes
that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And
another; and anotherBut this is the conclusion reached by each and every herdsman
sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that
compels him to increase his herd withoutlimit in a world that is limited.
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Hardins tragedy of the commons is increasing applicable to the international arena. Instead of each
herdsman, imagine each country vying for common international resources; instead of a pasture, imagine
the worlds oceans, oil supplies, atmosphere, rainforests, etc. Even in a global schematic was devised
wherein responsibility was divided among states to manage these common resources, unbiased
international institutions with strong powers to hold nations, especially the powerful or brutal ones,
accountable to these standards is necessary.
International Business and Civil Society
With the explosion of communications and information, non-governmental entities across borders are
becoming intertwined. Increasingly, foreign investors are becoming critical to the success, or failure, of
national economies. For example, the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 was caused largely by the
withdrawal of foreign capital due to panic. Civil society is equally transnational: globalization, for
instance, has been met with (ironically) an equally globally organized series of protests. The point here,
however, is that as the lives of people across the globe become more interdependent, two realist ideals fall
victim. 1) States lose their power as the sole decision makers of international policy. Increasingly,
multinational corporations and non-profits are wielding more influence. 2) The realist conception of
military force loses its foothold. As economic status, and success, becomes the most important mark of a
nation; military strength loses its utility. As demonstrated by the former U.S.S.R., a nuclear arsenal does
not make up for bad economic policy. Contrariwise, several nations, most notably the East Asian tigers
but also post-WWII Japan and Germany rose to first-world esque economic status in spite of a dearth of
military power.
As policymakers look to the future of international relations, it is an undeniable fact that the world is both
more interdependent and reliant on economic, rather than military, might. Unlike the nineteenth, and
much of the beginning of the twentieth century, nation-states are no longer completely selfish,
autonomous units. In such a world, the realist framework is bound to be morphed, if not entirely replaced.
The Collective Action Problem
In another famous treatise in political science, The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson outlines
another of the premier problems of modern governancethat of collective action. The basic thesis of
Olson is that: Indeed, unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small or some other special
device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to
achieve their common or group interests.
This problem could also be rephrased as the free-rider problem. Lets look at a simple example of the
situation. Suppose four roommates, John, Mary, Bob and Jill want to order cable for their common
television for a cost of $100. To do so, there are two problems: 1) Someone must volunteer to take care of
the organizational tasks (collecting money, signing up for the service, making sure its installed correctly,
etc.); 2) All the participants must chip in to make the cost as low as possible. Lets say, however, that
Bobalthough he wants cabledoesnt chip in; all he has to do is urge the other three to install the
service without him, knowing full well that there is no real way to restrict it from him (lets assume they
are not so vindictive as to cut his TV access). As a consequence, the other three pay the costs and do the
organization, while Bob gets a free-ride, that is to say, he enjoys a collective good without paying for it.
The same problem exists in national and international politics. Despite many common problemsthe
worldwide AIDS epidemic, abject poverty, war refugees, transnational terrorism, etc.that demand
international cooperation, there is a problem of collective action. No national government wants to
undertake the costs associated with organizing/fighting such battles (unless perhaps, there is another
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domestic benefit), while all could reap the benefits through free-riding. A good example is Americas
chronic lateness while paying UN dues or low foreign aid amount.
The typical way to solve such problems has either been through ad-hoc coalitions and conventions or the
centralization of some efforts to fight problems within the United Nations (i.e. the High Commissioner for
Human Refuges). Unfortunately, however, both solutions are often weak-willed measures and are only
enforced, or supported in extreme cases. In order to effectively address the global problems of the future,
a non-realist framework with increased emphasis on cooperative international institutions is needed.
The Philosophical Value of Realism
As noted numerous times throughout this article, realism has been the dominant train of though in
American academic and international policy circles since the end of the second World War. Ironically,
every major, acknowledged, U.S. foreign policy action driven by realist thinking has been garnished with
a healthy dose of idealist rhetoric to sell it to the public. Take, for example, President Trumans decision
to supply Greece and Turkey with economic aid in 1947moves clearly designed to thwart the imminent
rise of communism in those democratic statesjustified by unabashedly idealist rhetoric: I believe that it
must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by
armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own
destinies in their own way. Another, perhaps more poignant, example would be President George W.
Bushs decision to launch a military campaign in Afghanistan alongside a professed humanitarian
mission.
The point of these examples is not to judge the correctness of past U.S. foreign policy, but to illustrate a
simple point: realism, even in its heyday, still did not gain universal moral acceptance. Idealist thought
has always been a part of American foreign policy, if only as hopeless ideal which can never be reached.
In the value-oriented realm of LD debate, however, one can claim that although realism certainly had its
utility as a pragmatic approach to international relations, it was only a justified train of thought, not a just
one. The difficult times of Soviet expansion may have mandated realist thought but the mandate of curing
global problems seek to erase it.
Notable Quotables:
Richard Falk, (Professor of International Law, Princeton Univ.) Realist School and Its
Critics in Rooted Utopianism. P. 225
Perhaps the most basic charge is what might be called the Melian syndrome:
that is, the tendency of realists to reduce international relations to tests of force as
measured mainly by military capabilities, a view bolstered in realist theorizing by
selective readings of key texts and events from Thucydides onward. One doesnt have to
be a devotee of Jacques Derrida and deconstructionism to take issue with the extreme
selectivity with which realists have read past history and political thought to validate their
imagery of the present and future. In effect, the world orderist critique of realism
contends that policy-makers have been overly preoccupied with tests of force in their
interpretations of conflict and security, thereby missing both opportunities and dangers
based on other considerations.
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Richard Falk, (Professor of International Law, Princeton Univ.) Realist School and Its
Critics in Rooted Utopianism. P. 227
In this regard, realism functioned as a viable ideology for the political
democracies of the liberal West in the specific setting of one stage of international
history. But now that stage is being superceded by the new complexities of global
interdependence and by the decentering of political and economic, as well as by the
removal of the Soviet challenge. In this altered setting of the early 1990s, realism seems
far less satisfactory as an account of international relations, although it retains its utility
by its focus on relations of power and wealth and by its refusal to be blinded by
sentimental considerations in analyzing the play of forces that constitute international
relations.
Seyom Brown World Interests and the Changing Dimensions of Security, in World
Security: Challenges for New Century, P. 3.
At best, the realist model, while continuing to generate elegant theoretical
discourse, has become largely irrelevant to policy analysis because of its failure to
comprehend some of the most serious predicaments of contemporary society. At worst,
the effort to conduct statecraft-as-usual in terms of this model can jeopardize the survival
of the human species.
Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkiah. Activists Beyond Borders. (Cornell University
Press, 1998) P. 1
World politics in the twentieth century involves, alongside states, many nonstate
actors that interact with each other, with states, and with international organizations.
These interactions are structured in terms of networks, and transnational networks are
increasingly visible in international politics. Some involve economic actors and firms.
Some are networks of scientists and experts whose professional ties and shared casual
ideas underpin their efforts to influence policy.
Seyom Brown World Interests and the Changing Dimensions of Security, in World
Security: Challenges for New Century, P. 4.
Political systems owe their viability and legitimacy to their effectiveness in
service the public order, commercial, ecological, cultural, and justice needs of
communities. Where a societys highest agencies of governancethe national
governments, in the case of world societyneither adequately control, represent, nor are
accountable to the most active human groupings in these fields, the societys political
system is in crisis and the values of civil society are insecure.
J. Ann Tickner, critiquing Hans Morgenthau, the seminal realist academic, in "Hans
Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation," Millennium:
Journal Book Chapters: of International Studies, vol.17:3(1988)
In international relations the tendency to think about morality either in terms of
abstract, universal and unattainable standards or as purely instrumental, as Morgenthau
does, detracts from our ability to tolerate cultural differences and to seek potential for
building community in spite of these differences.
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George Kennan, Former U.S. diplomat, discussing the cycle of hostility between the
U.S./U.S.S.R. (One of the original proponents of rollback against the U.S.S.R. and realist
theory, later turned into a more moderate figure on realism.) The Roots of Soviet
Conduct, Foreign Affairs, July 1947.
It is an undeniable privilege of every man to prove himself in the right in the
thesis that the world is his enemy; for if he reiterates it frequently enough and makes it
the background of his conduct, he is bound to eventually be right.
George Kennan, in Human Rights and National Security: A False Dichotomy
Micheline Ishay and David Goldfischer. (1996)
Government is an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the
interests of the national sovereignty it represents, not to the moral impulses that
individual elements of that society may experience. No more than the attorney vis--vis
the client, nor the doctor vis--vis the patient, can government attempt to insert itself into
the consciences of those whose interests it represents.
(NOTE: This a PRO-REALIST quotation. It may prove useful for highlighting
the amoral/immoral nature of realism in foreign policy)
Human Rights and National Security: A False Dichotomy Micheline Ishay and David
Goldfischer. (1996) P.1
The inception of the post-Cold War era coincided with a surge of global
attentiveness to human rights. In multilateral interventions from Somalia to Haiti, Ghalis
human rights vision of universal sovereignty seemed ascendant. Debate now raged over
whether and when obligations to all humanity might transcend the particular interests
articulated by national governments.
Lord Grey, former British Foreign Secretary
Edward Grey, Twenty Five Years, vol. 1 (London: Hodder and Staughton, 1925), P. 92.
The increase of armaments, that is intended in each nation to produce
consciousness of strength, and a sense of security, does not produce these effects. On the
contrary, it produces a consciousness of the strength of other nations and a sense of fear.
Fear begets suspicion and distrust and evil imaginings of all sorts, till each Government
feels it would be criminal and a betrayal of its own country not to take every precaution,
while every Government regards ever precaution of every other Government as evidence
of hostile intent.
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Nietzsche (Reed Winegar)
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE
by Reed Winegar
Incessantly misconstrued, misinterpreted, and misquoted the nineteenth century German philosopher
Friedrich Nietzsche completely broke with the tenants of traditional Western morality, becoming one of
modern philosophys most pivotal and influential thinkers. He is unfortunately rarely used in LincolnDouglas debate, but it is impossible to understand or appreciate modern philosophy without
understanding Nietzsches influence. In the way of a brief biography Nietzsche was born near Leipzig in
1844. The son of a clergyman, he grew up a devout Lutheran before attending college in Bonn and
Leipzig. Upon graduation he was offered a post in philology at Basel University in Switzerland, despite
not having written a doctoral thesis.
Nietzsches earliest influences were Christianity and the ancient Classics. In his first major work The
Birth of Tragedy, which similarly served as his final doctoral thesis, Nietzsche penned a then ignored but
now fundamental analysis of Greek tragedy. He saw the uniqueness of Greek drama in the conflict
between what he termed Apollonian order and Dionysian passions. When true Dionysian passion
becomes forced into Apollonian order the result is dramatic tragedy. While this early work devolves
towards the end into a trite hero-ization of the German composer Richard Wagner, it lays the basic
foundation for Nietzsches chief ethical concept, The Dionysian man.
In his later writings Dionysian refers not to simply wild emotion like it does in The Birth of Tragedy but
comes closer to referring to a proper balance between self-imposed constraint and passion. In Nietzsches
most poetical and ambitious work Thus Spake Zarathustra Nietzsche used a biblically aphoristic tone to
tell the tale of a fictional prophet. Nietzsches Zarathustra is the most original voice in philosophy and
literature of the last two thousand years, and the rest of his books were written merely as further
clarifications and extensions of Zarathustras story and teachings.
So, what exactly did Nietzsche preach through Zarathustra and his subsequent writings? Put most simply
Nietzsche broke with universal morality as is summed up in Nietzsches most famous if short quotation,
God is dead. While universal moral codes and Christian ethics might have had usefulness in previous
days their time has passed and universal morality no longer has relevance to the modern ethical
predicament. Nietzsches most famous warrant for this claim is his Genealogy of Morals where he
describes the history of what is today summarily called morality. Pre-Christian eras did not have a
concept of morality. They were guided not by bounds placed upon actions but by an ethic of virtue and
heroism. Certain acts were praised because they demonstrated mental, physical, and virtuous strength not
because they were right. For instance, in Nietzsches determination, early Greek people did not scorn
murder inherently but only when it was the result of cowardice or weakness. Thus, Homer praised
horribly violent figures like Achilles and Hector because they acted nobly, not because they acted justly.
Then came along Socrates for whom Nietzsche has amazingly mixed emotions. Valuing Socratess
intelligence and mental acumen, Nietzsche scorns his Socratic method of truth seeking. Nietzsche sees
Socratess ultimate morality epitomized in Christianity. Nietzsche highly praises the Old Testament and
the Jewish people. However, he loathes Christianity and even referred to himself in writing as The AntiChrist. Nietzsche believed that before Socrates and Jesus morals did not exist in the way we use the
word today. They were created. Whereas before people created their own ethics of virtue and nobility,
with the arrival of Christianity that ancient ethic was turned on its head. Suddenly people were the slaves
of morality, held in check by the codes of priests and religion. Nietzsches describes this turn of events as
a shift from master morality to slave morality. Essentially he simply means that we can historically
document the creation of morality, and additionally we see that slave moralities like Christianity which
preach abstinence of the passions and praise concepts like belonging to a flock serve to bind us to the
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wills of others. From this Nietzsche determines that all universal codes were merely creations of a few
imposed upon the many in order to exercise power over the ignorant masses. Like Marx Nietzsche
believes religion to be an opiate of the masses.
He also determines, however, that Christianity had some utilitarian value. We learned codes of restraint
and self-control. However, its usefulness has passed. People are no longer controlling themselves but
allowing themselves to be controlled by other peoples wills and other peoples morality. If these rules
were arbitrarily created because they served the interests of the day then in Nietzsches view they can and
should be broken. Nietzsches description of exactly how to break them is highly vague, mostly because
he sees his opinions on the subject as merely suggestions. He wants all people to determine their own
codes of virtue and nobility. Nietzsche personally heavily prizes art, honor, intelligence, and mental
strength. Thus, his ideal historical figures are thinkers like Leonardo da Vinci and the German writer
Johann von Goethe, not people like Caesar de Borgia. However, he did appreciate the will of Napoleon
and even went as far as to write that the horrors of the French Revolution were justified because they
made way for the greatness of Napoleon. But exactly what determines better action from less good action
in Nietzsches worldview? The only real criterion Nietzsche offers is the presence of what he terms the
will to power. This will to power is simply the will to not be controlled by others but to be controlled
by ourselves and to discover the world anew. In Nietzsches metaphor we have been beasts of burden,
who must become lions of power, and then we will become like babies in constant wonder of the world.
So the will to power means the will to break conventions both social and moral in nature in order to
confront the world from a creative capacity and with the innocence of a child. Put simply, Nietzsche does
not believe there is any right way to live life, but he does believe there are worse ones. We should not live
bound by codes of good and evil but by our own determinations. There is no objective morality and
even beyond that there is no objective truth. Thus, we are the determiners of our own personal and
individual truths. We choose the way in which we want to see the world, and like an artist with a brush
we create our own values and worldview.
This is all pretty serious stuff. However, Nietzsche in his original German is a writer full of jokes and
puns. He values laughter and irony highly. The reason for this is simple. Since there is no objective truth,
we should not take things as seriously as we do. We should be willing to enjoy all things and all
experiences. We should be light-hearted and mirthful in nature because when we can laugh at various
moral codes we will no longer be controlled by them. Laughter is a sign of power.
Nietzsches influence on modern philosophy is rivaled only by Immanuel Kant. Not surprisingly
Nietzsche hated Kant, a highly Christian thinker who Nietzsche scorned for pursuing philosophy in order
to prove what he believed to be true rather than allowing philosophy to take him wherever it led.
Nietzsche is one of the founding fathers of existentialism, heavily influenced Freuds psychology, and
was the first cogent post-modern voice. To Nietzsche the world is a book in which we get to write the
story and the rules for storytelling. All things are possible when we are not bound by morality. This
ultimate freedom exists because we live an abyss where nothing is constantly true. This total freedom is
both liberating and terrifying as Nietzsche explained when he wrote, When you stare into the abyss, the
abyss stares back at you. Nietzsches final conclusions parallel those of the Greek philosopher Heraclitus
who believed in an eternal flux, best characterized by his belief that if we step into a river twice both
times it is a different river because different water runs past us. Nietzsche believes that Heraclituss
metaphor holds true of every aspect of life. Nothing is pre-determined. Nothing is constant. Everything is
created and can be un-created, and we live surrounded by flux and change. To Nietzsche we choose
which direction to send that change based on no universal goals but simply on our own individual virtues
and self-created beliefs.
Finally, Nietzsche is constantly misunderstood and mischaracterized. Let us begin with what Nietzsche
was not. He was not anti-Semitic. In fact he wrote letters heavily reprimanding his sisters anti-Semitism.
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He was not fascist because he believed that we should not be controlled by any will other than our own.
However, at the same time he was definitely not Christian, meaning that he did not believe in common
obligations to each other or in universal codes of morality. Nietzsche like Homer gladly praised violent
figures like Napoleon and Achilles because he saw nobility and a will to power in their actions.
However, in the violence and deceit of Caesar de Borgia he saw only cowardice and meaningless cruelty.
In fact, Nietzsche praises mercy equally to retribution and violence, believing that it too shows a distinct
will to power in its willingness to ignore the created ethical codes of justice. However, Nietzsche,
because he is willing to accept violence if undertaken nobly, does not value pity which he views as a
constraining emotion that like all emotions is fine in very small amounts but over which we should be in
control and not the other way around. In the wide array of Nietzsche mythology there is a story that the
severe mental illness that affected Nietzsche for the final decade of his life was brought on by him pitying
a horse after seeing it whipped and not being able to reconcile his emotional and intellectual perspectives.
In another story his madness resulted from him mulling over the idea that every action we take we should
be willing to take again an infinite number of times and maybe actually already have in some form of
eternal recurrence. More likely, the mental illness that left him catatonic (and during which all the famous
pictures of the mustachioed Nietzsche were taken by his sister) resulted from contracting syphilis in what
was most likely a one time visit to a brothel as a student since Nietzsche was famed for his extreme
ascetism.
Nietzsche died in 1900. His reputation was tarnished when the Nazis misrepresented him in order to help
elicit support for their views, but now Nietzsche is recognized as a key figure in the history of philosophy
and modern thought, who willfully accepted the postulate that there is no universal morality or objective
truth and gladly drew his own mental conclusions on how to best live life in a world beyond good and
evil
Nietzsches other important works are The Anti-Christ, Twilight of the Idols, and Beyond Good and Evil.
The latter is probably the clearest and most comprehensive of his works, yielding a superb perspective of
his philosophy. The best translator of Nietzsche into English is Walter Kaufman whose translations are
chiefly published by Viking Press. There is absolutely no substitute imaginable for reading the works of
such a highly refined, complex, brilliant, and poetical thinker. He is also considered one of Germanys
master prose stylists. However, he is a challenging writer who revels in paradox and subtleties, which is
easy to overlook since many of his claims are highly hyperbolic and generalized. Nietzsche hates
skimmers of books, and wrote purposefully to eliminate cursory examinations of his writings. While he is
on the surface easy, entertaining, and funny to read he is to be read very carefully with concern to not
simply each every sentence but in Nietzsches own words every syllable. However, few if any other
thinkers bring as many intellectual rewards. I highly doubt whether anyone leaves Nietzsche believing
everything that he says, but his arguments are cogent, persuasive, and fresh. They force us to clarify our
own beliefs and rationales like the arguments of no other thinker, and in many cases were written not to
convince us but simply to challenge us and jolt us into thinking for ourselves.
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Heidegger (Andrew Rothschild)
MARTIN HEIDEGGER
We would be understating the case considerably if we declared our recognition in Martin Heidegger of a
troubled soul. His thought betrays his despair somewhatthe meaninglessness he found in the world
meant, for him, unavoidable anxiety and terror of death as opposed to Camus rebellion, Kierkegaards
God, Jaspers Comprehensive, even Sartres liberation. His actions scream forth a dark nature: before the
laws, before the oppression, before any real pressure, Heidegger enthusiastically collaborated with the
Nazis; he would later deny it (though his denials were impossible to believe) but he would never
apologize for his actions. The accounts others have written of their meetings with Heidegger range from
the unsettling to the bizarre. His former student and lover Hannah Arendt wrote of him in a letter to Karl
Jaspers: Heidegger lies as often as possible to anyone who will listen.
But Heidegger the man is probably more deserving of pathos than anger. He seemed to spend his life
grasping at strawsfervently, hotly making decision after decision, attempt after attempt, telling lie after
lie, practicing manipulation after manipulation, at first in order to find something meaningful or
transcendent, and by the end, merely to stay afloat in non-transcendent, petty ways. He was not unlike the
broken-winged bird which flaps its wings hysterically, futilely until it dies: the bird at first seems noble,
honorable, then only pathetic.
But dim souls can have bright minds, and Heidegger is the penultimate example. After the publication of
his magnum opus Being and Time in 1927, world philosophy was forever changed. The attention the book
received was nearly immediate. At the age of 38, Heidegger had made one of the biggest philosophical
accomplishments of all time.
It is, perhaps, difficult for us to understand in retrospect what was so striking about Heideggers
philosophy. His appropriation of Hegels Dasein, used in Being and Time to denote each persons
presence (literally, our being-there) in the world, his understanding of Being as something ultimate and
transcendent which no man can ever confront as an object, his description of mans life as an infinite
series of choices made in haste due to our finite natureall of these seem somehow obvious, even clichd
in the modern day. In 1927, they were virtually without philosophical precedent. Nietzsche and
Kierkegaard (and Husserl) provided the only real antecedent.
Being and Time begins critically: Heidegger announces that our old ways of thinking about Being are
paradoxical and thus unsatisfying. Kierekgaard, for instance, announced that Being was undefinable, in so
far as saying anything about Beingeven that Being ispresupposes Beings existence (because to
saying something is indicates that it exists in Being). Heidegger suggests that our intuitive
understanding of Being as well as Beings seeming self-evidence are problematic bases for philosophy
because they are not grounded in logic, but instead in circularity. Man always exists on a place in that
assumptive circle: Dasein. Somehow, we must separate ourselves from Dasein and develop an
ontological (that is, factualunderstanding what is there as opposed to what is perceived) understanding
of Being.
Martin Heidegger. Founder of Existentialism and Prof. of Philosophy, University of
Freiburg. Being and Time. 1927. English edition 1996. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. 12
If the interpretation of the meaning of being is to become a task, Dasein is not
only the primary being to be interrogated; in addition to this it is the being that always
already in its being is related to what is sought in this question. But then the question of
being is nothing else than the radicalization of an essential tendency of being that belongs
to Dasein itself, namely, of the pre-ontological understanding of being.
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Heidegger proposes that an ontological understanding of Being can be discovered via a phenomenological
approach. Phenomenology is the study of how things manifest themselves; that is, it places the realm of
facts into the human mind: it discerns our la ws of consciousness and how that consciousness provides
reality to things. Because it brackets what exists outside of human perception, phenomenology has the
potential to provide us with absolutes.
A phenomenological approach which makes use of the human mind therefore makes use of Dasein. The
feelings that we have are illuminating and significant. The most significant of those emotions to Being,
Heidegger maintains, are despair and anguish.
Heideggers argument begins where Kierkegaards leaves off: we are free in the world, and thus, we feel
alone. We cannot ontologically perceive anything in Being as possessing inherent meaning, but instead,
in everyday life, we ontically assign things meaning. This gives way to what Jaspers calls the
dichotomy of subject and object: When I perceive something, that is, when I try to determine its
meaning, I posit the something as an object, and thus, I break myself and the something off from
Being. I am no longer merely a part of the world, but an isolated subject; the object is no longer a part of
the world, but an isolated object. I divorce subject and object from Being. As such, part of me remains
outside the world looking in. In a sense, thats good: from the vantage point of above or outside the
world, I can see the larger picture. I dont have to go with the flow if Im not in the flow. Rather, I can
disregard the flow, and decide independently of anything in which direction I intend to go. Thus is my
freedom revealed.
Freiburg. Being and Time. 1927. English edition 1996. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. 58.
In directing itself toward and in grasping something, Dasein is always already
outside together with some being encountered in the world already discovered [T]he
perception of what is known does not take place as a return with ones booty to the
cabinet of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it. Rather, in perceiving,
preserving, and retaining, the Dasein that knows remains outside as Dasein. In mere
knowledge about a context of the being in beings I am no less outside the world
together with beings than I am when I originally grasp them [Thus,] in knowing,
Dasein gains a new perspective of being toward the world always already discovered in
Dasein. This new possibility of being can be independently developed. It can become a
task
Heideggers phenomenology takes the combined facts of our freedom and our emotions and draws some
conclusions:
Mens inescapable feelings of guilt (founded in regret) suggest phenomenologically that there is a
virtually infinite number of selves which any man can become, but that our finitude in the world forces us
to actualize less than all of those selves. My inability to actualize all of myselvesindeed, all of myself
is upsetting, and makes me feel guilty for (to?) those selves I failed to actualize.
Similarly, our feelings of anxiety arise fromphenomenologically suggest?our status as thrown.
That is, our place in the circle of Dasein is determined by an always-unchangeable past and can never in
the future be complete because, as noted above, we cannot actualize our entire self and because even
that portion of ourselves actualizable is not actualized, is not concluded, but is stopped, abruptly, by
death. We find ourselves thrown into the middle of the circle of life. In as much, our lives take on the
characteristics of episodes which at any moment we cannot re-begin nor which at any moment have
hope of conclusion.
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Being guilty constitutes the being that we call care. Dasein stands primordially
together with itself in uncanniness. Uncanniness brings this being face to face with its
undisguised nullity, which belongs to the possibility of its ownmost potentiality-of-being.
In that Dasein as care is concerned about its being, it calls itself as a they that has
factically fallen prey, and calls itself from its uncanniness to its potentiality-of-being. The
summons calls back by calling forth: forth to the possibility of taking over in existence
the thrown being that it is, back to thrownness in order to understand it as the null ground
that it has to take up in existence. The calling back in which conscience calls forth gives
Dasein to understand that Dasein itselfas the null ground of its null project, standing in
the possibility of its beingmust bring itself back to itself from its lostness and this
means that it is guilty.
Of Angst specifically, he writes:
Freiburg. Being and Time. 1927. English edition 1996. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. 315-316.
Angst brings one back to thrownness as something to be possibly retrieved. And
thus it also reveals the possibility of an authentic potentiality-of-being that must, as
something futural in retrieving, come back to the thrown There. Bringing before the
possibility of retrieval is the specific ecstatic mode of the attunement of the having-been
that constitutes Angst.
Heidegger proposes to outline Dasein temporally, to give us some clue as to what anxiety means and how
to live in harmony with Dasein, minimizing guilt. For Heidegger, our lives, those trajectories or
temporal suspensions can be divided into attunement, entanglement, and understanding. (Also
discourse, something which is largely irrelevant for our purposes.) Attunement, mood, colors a persons
view of the past: the qualities of my reflections depend on my attunement and determine how I
remember life so far.
Only beings that in accordance with the meaning of their being are attuned
have always already been and exist in a constant mode of having-been can be affected.
Ontologically, affection presupposes making present in such a way that in it Dasein can
be brought back to itself as having-been.
Entanglement or falling prey suggests our day-to-day activities during which we become absorbed in
the world. We cease to be conscious of Dasein from our positions inside the mundane world; we cant see
the forest for the trees, so to speak. We are too connected. We risk losing our freedom. (It should be noted
that Heidegger does not consider entanglement bad, as Sartre might, but merely an objective fact.)
Entanglement, because it exists without reflection or anticipationit relates strictly to Therenessis
tied to the present.
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Thrown into being-toward-death, Dasein initially and for the most part flees from
this more or less explicitly revealed thrownness. The present arises from its authentic
future and having-been, so that it lets Dasein come to authentic existence only by taking a
detour through that present. The origin of the arising of the present, that is, of being
entangled in lostness, is the primordial, authentic temporality itself that makes possible
thrown being-toward-death.
Understanding is a less clear concept. Heidegger writes that:
Understanding constitutes the being of the There in such a way that, on the basis
of such understanding, a Dasein in existing can develop the various possibilities of sight,
of looking around, and of just looking Formulated primordially and existentially,
understanding means: to be projecting toward a potentiality-of-being for the sake of
which Dasein always exists. Understanding discloses ones own potentiality-of-being in
such a way that Dasein always somehow knows understandingly what is going on with
itself.
This seems to mean that understanding implies a knowledge of ones self and of the nature of lifes
non-narrative trajectory (that is, there is no beginning or end)but nevertheless, understanding requires
the determination of a point on Dasein which I, as an individual, choose freely (existentially) to move
toward. Its an acceptance of what Angst despairs of.
Thus Being may be defined temporally, where attunement corresponds with the past, entanglement with
the present, and understanding with the future.
What conclusions can be drawn from this lengthy association of ways of being with time? Heidegger
ties his temporal construction to a notion of authenticity. Being authentic means belonging to
myself, or having the awareness of my ability to choose Dasein and subsequently choosing it
proactively.
And because Dasein is always essentially its possibility, it can choose itself in
its being, it can win itself, it can lose itself, or it can never and only apparently win
itself. It can only have lost itself and it can only have not yet gained itself because it is
essentially possible as authentic, that is, it belongs to itself. The two kinds of being of
authenticity and inauthenticity are based on the fact that Dasein is in general
determined by always being-mine.
Heidegger notes that inauthenticity is not necessarily lower than authenticity, but he acknowledges that
the authentic life isnt plagued by anxiety and guiltit doesnt despair of the time it doesnt have
because, in being aware of the temporal structure of Dasein, it understands the possibilities life provides:
infinite possibilities in finite time.
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[T]he irresoluteness of inauthentic existence temporalizes itself in the mode of
a making present that does not await but forgets. The irresolute person understands
himself in terms of the events and accidents nearest by that are encountered in such
making present and urge themselves upon him in changing ways. Busily losing himself in
what is taken care of, the irresolute person loses his time in them, too. Hence his
characteristic way of talking: I have no time. Just as the person who exists
inauthentically constantly loses time and never has any, it is the distinction of the
temporality of authentic existence that in resoluteness it never loses time and always has
time. For the temporality of resoluteness has, in regard to its present, the nature of the
Moment. The Moments authentic making present of the situation does not itself have the
leadership, but is held in the future that has-been. The existence of the Moment
temporalizes itself as fatefully whole, stretching along in the sense of the authentic,
historical constancy of the self. This kind of temporal existence constantly has its time
for what the situation requires of it Thus, the resolute person can never encounter what
is disclosed in such a way that he could lose his time on it in an irresolute way.
Isolating, understanding, and reflecting the structure of Dasein blasts open the doors to authenticity.
Heidegger keeps what is authentic content neutral: his collaboration with the Nazis is, therefore,
strangely and disturbingly at ease with his philosophy. That, however, doesnt negate the acuity of his
insights or their importance for the entirety of modern thought.
Using Heidegger in Lincoln-Douglas Debate
I do not advocate the use of Being and Time Heidegger in LD. His philosophy is impressive
ontologically but strictly and completely metaphysically empty. Trying to find an ethical dimension to his
thought is entirely futile. And the fact the he became a convinced Nazi shatters, in the minds of most
(though not all), any attempt to discern metaphysics in Being and Time.
That said, every LDer should understand Heidegger for multiple reasons: first, it seems that his is an
increasingly popular philosophical platform for use in LD. If your opponent and your judge understand
the Heidegger case youre hitting but you dont, youll probably lose. To avoid being thus pounced upon,
keep two objections to Heidegger in mind:
1.
Heidegger specifically states, in relation to authenticity:

[T]he authenticity of Dasein does not signify a lesser being or a lower
degree of being. Rather, inauthenticity can determine Dasein even in its fullest
concretion, when it is busy, excited, interested, and capable of pleasure.
In other words, being authentic isnt objectively better than being inauthentic. Trying to find a value
judgment here (it is the only value judgment anyone is likely to deduce) is misplaced.
2.
Heideggers speeches about National Socialism (Naziism) made frequent reference to the
thoughts propounded in Being and Timetaken alone, then, the thoughts presented in Being and Time
seem to justify virtually any immorality, so long as it (the immorality in question) is approached
authentically.
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The other reason for understanding Heidegger is that everyone from Rorty to Sartre to Derrida to
Foucaulteveryone except John Rawls, it seems, was influenced on some level by Being and Time.
Understand Heidegger and youll more richly understand all other modern thinkers. But that doesnt make
Heideggers LD use direct.
Heideggers later writings about the problem of technology are slightly more applicable to a few debate
topics. He essentially contends that scientific thinking has become deified, has come to be considered
fundamental. He argues that everything in our societyeven culturehas become unnatural,
undeveloped; instead, everything is scientifically plotted, tested, and manipulated. The trouble with
scientification is that science is forever locked in the subject-object dichotomythat is, it posits itself
as a subject and its thing of study as an object, and in so doing, it removes each from Being. But it doesnt
use its new vantage point to see Being as a whole. It simply remains locked in the dichotomy. It cant
perceive Dasein but only objects. Object-thinking replaces everything else, and widespread inauthenticity
(which he seems to condemn in these later writings, differing from Being and Time) transpires. I suppose
these arguments could form the basis of a proper, reasonable, and cogent case for resolutions dealing with
science, mass culture, or technology.
One final note: I really feel that the technology writings are Heideggers only directly applicable essays
and even theyre a stretch. Dont be tempted by the title of another major Heidegger work, An
Introduction to Metaphysics. Its LD-devoid.
Suggested Reading
Tackling Being and Time is no small task, but it can be extremely rewarding. The newest translation, from
which I took all the quotations used in this article, is significantly more readable than the old
Macquarrie/Robinson translation. Frankly, I find Stambaughs Heidegger to be an easier read than
Barnes Sartre. If youre still interested in Heidegger after wading through Being, check out The Question
Concerning Technology and Other Essays and On Time and Being. If Being and Time is a little too much
for you, there are some guides to it available, among them Heidegger: An Introduction and Heidegger
For Beginners.
Further Reading
The works of Kierkegaard, Hegel, and Nietzsche are the primary influences on Heideggers work. As
such, Hegels Logic, Kierkegaards Fear and Trembling, and Nietzsches Beyond Good and Evil are
wonderful books for Heidegger-lovers. His primary disciples were Sartre and Camus, and his closestthinking contemporary was the great Karl Jaspers. For those interested in Heidegger the Man, Rudiger
Safranskis Martin Heidegger is a wonderful biography.
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Jaspers (Andrew Rothschild)
KARL JASPERS
The fact that youve probably never heard of Karl Jaspers should, I think, be the first thing addressed at
the next United Nations General Assembly. Perhaps if NATO bombs someones embassy it will solve the
problem. Im not sure. But for one of the founders of modern existentialism and its most lucid
proponenta man nearly as important as Sartre and Heidegger and at least as important as Kierkegaard
and Camusto have become obscure is baffling and inexcusable and constitutes a terrible loss for the
human race.
The uniqueness of Jaspers contribution to the history of philosophy largely results from the fact that his
training was in psychology. He was one of a few people in the world attempting to isolate the laws of
human consciousness via scientific experimentation just as Husserl and his disciples were trying to do the
same via philosophical (specifically phenomenological) inquiry. And Jaspers was the first to try to
synthesize the two approaches to the end of developing a richer philosophy.
Many of the principle works of Karl Jaspers have never been translated into English. The most
comprehensive layout of his thought can be found in his Philosophy of Existence; but his most lucid
writing, equal in breadth if not in depth to Philosophy of Existence, and certainly his most quotable work,
remains The Way to Wisdom, based on 12 radio lectures he gave in 1951.
Wisdom begins by posing the questions what is philosophy? and what motivates philosophy? Jaspers
concludes that philosophy cannot be defined because definition implies basis; that is, any good definition
of anything explains in terms of relations to other things. A good definition of a glass might be a
usually cylindrical object made from refined and melted sand which is lacking a top face in order to be
easily fillable with liquid. The definition relates a glass to cylinders, sand, a process of melting, faces
on a cylinder, and liquid. If a glass was somehow an Ultimate Glass and existed above and outside all
those things, it could not be well-defined except as something which is above cylinders, sand, etc., and
that, obviously, is no definition at all. Philosophy, like our imaginary Ultimate Glass, is a pursuit of
meaning, of knowledge, but because it encompasses all knowledge and meaning (which are, indeed,
Ultimate in a sense), it is indefinable. It is only experienceable.
Karl Jaspers. Founder of Existentialism and Professor of Philosophy, University of
Heidelberg. The Way to Wisdom. English edition published 1954. Trans: Ralph Manheim.
pp. 12-13.
There is nothing above or beside philosophy. It cannot be derived from
something else. Every philosophy defines itself by its realization. We can determine the
nature of philosophy only by actually experiencing it. Philosophy then becomes the
realization of the living idea and the reflection upon this idea, action and discourse on
action in one. Only by thus understanding philosophy for ourselves can we understand
previously formulated philosophical thought.
As to what motivates philosophy, Jaspers proposes a pattern: first, sheer wonderment at the dazzle of the
universe makes us ponder its nature. Then, doubt sets in, as we become unsure as to what we can be
certain of in regarding the nature of the universe. All philosophers become like Des Cartes, who practiced
systematic denialthat is, he refused to trust anything which was uncertain: his senses, his recollections,
even his logic, which might be mistaken. All he could state for certain was that doubt requires a doubter
and that therefore a doubter, he must exist.
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p. 18.
Wonder impels man to seek knowledge. In my wonderment I become aware of
my lack of knowledge [And] once I have satisfied my wonderment as admiration by
knowledge of what is, doubt arises
Finally, Jaspers maintains, man becomes aware of himself as doubting and considers his life, his
surroundings, from the standpoint of an Other.
p. 19.
While I concentrate my energies upon the knowledge of things in the world,
while I am engaged in doubt as a road to certainty, I am immersed in things; I do not
think of myself, of my aims, my happiness, my salvation. In forgetfulness of me self I am
content with the attainment of this knowledge. This changes when I become aware of
myself in my situation.
In our contemplation of our place in the universe, we recognize Grenzsituations, or Ultimate
Situations . These are the unchangeable facts of the universe.
pp. 19-20.
[T]here are situations which remain essentially the same even if their
momentary aspect changes and their shattering force is obscured: I must die, I must
suffer, I must struggle, I am subject to change, I involve myself inexorable in guilt. We
call these fundamental situations of our existence ultimate situations. That is to say, they
are situations which we cannot evade or change.
We try to forget the fact of ultimate situations in our day-to-day lives. We build communities and
societies to comfort us, to stand by usby societies rarely do stand by an attacked individual, Jaspers
sadly notes. There are things of comfort, for sure: family, ones county, traditionsbut these are still
insufficient because they are the work of men and God is nowhere in the world (22).
Jaspers then notes that there is no recourse to be found in ones self, in ones mind, as the Stoic suggests,
for our minds themselves are nothing; they merely process; their game is communication, not isolation.
As such, a man is at peace only in the presence of the Other (everythingespecially, everyoneoutside
of the man). Wisdom thus concludes that communicating with that Other becomes (indeed, always was)
the true purpose of philosophy.
But here, it seems, weve taken several steps backward. If we are to contemplate life with the Other, for
the Other, in terms of the Other, arent we back to contemplating nature? What happened to systematic
denialor to watching ourselves? Jaspers suggests that we dont simply view the Other as nature but as
part of Being, the same Being to which we belong.
But its tricky for us to watch the Other as part of Being, Jaspers argues, for when we do so, we become
caught up in the subject-object dichotomy. If I contemplate the Other as part of Being, I posit him as an
object and myself as a subject. That is unavoidable. But then, we both being divorced from Being. The
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bridge over that dichotomy, the type of Being which I destroy as a totality when I posit an object Jaspers
labels the Comprehensive.
p. 30.
Everything that becomes an object for me breaks away from the Comprehensive
in confronting me, while I break away from it as a subject. For the I, the object is a
determinate being. The Comprehensive remains obscure to my consciousness. It becomes
clear only through objects, and takes on greater clarity as the objects become more
conscious and more clear. The Comprehensive does not itself become an object but is
manifested in the dichotomy of I and object. It remains itself a background, it boundlessly
illuminates the phenomenon, but it is always the Comprehensive.
The Comprehensive, for Jaspers, is being itself, or transcendence (God) and the world (33). We can
determine ourselves to be part of the Comprehensive only through mystical experiencenirvanaat
which point we transcend Ego (our understanding of self as an isolated entity) or else expand it to the
point so that it encompasses the Comprehensive. But through object knowledge, that is, through keen
awareness of a-mystical limits, we can catch a glimmer of the Comprehensive. (Obviously, this cannot be
accomplished through pondering the Comprehensive itself, for were I to undertake such a project, I would
immediately posit the Comprehensive as an object, and thus become paradoxically barred from
comprehending it.)
This, of course, raises the question Limits of what? Jaspers answers this a while later in the text, though
the answer is needed immediately. Like Heidegger and Sartre, Jaspers views man as possessing absolute
freedom, as having a reflective consciousness unbridled by any natural law.
pp. 64-65.
We did not create ourselves. Each man can think that he might possibly not have
been. This we have in common with the animals. But at the same time, where in our
freedom we decide through ourselves and are not automatically subordinated to a natural
law, we are not through ourselves but by virtue of being given to ourselves in our
freedom When we decide freely and conceive of our lives as meaningful, we know that
we do not owe ourselves to ourselves. At the summit of freedom, upon which our activity
seems necessary to us, not through the outward constraint of an inexorable proves of
natural law but as the inner consent that does not will otherwise, we are aware of
ourselves as freely given to ourselves by transcendence.
Unlike Heidegger and Sartre, however, (and like Kierkegaard) Jaspers views our freedom as having the
guidance of the Comprehensive, of God.
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p. 67.
We believe that we have in the unconditional imperative an intimation of Gods
guidance [I]n men faced by critical problems, long doubt has suddenly given way to
certainty But the freer man knows himself to be in this lucid certainty, the more aware
he becomes of the transcendence through which he is The voice of God lies in the selfawareness that dawns in the individual, when he is open to everything that comes to him
from his tradition and environment.
This is hardly the sum of all Jaspers has to say about God, here conceived as the Comprehensive. God
exists, Jaspers argues, as the end of transcendence. We may proceed from Dasein, being-there, factual,
historical being to the notion of the Comprehensive, total Being, all that isbut not as all which
implies a collection of objects; Being is Onewhich disappears for us as soon as we perceive it; what
goes beyond the Comprehensive (if anything does; it is our limit, so it is impossible to say whether there
is a beyond) is Godor perhaps God goes even beyond the Beyondness which transcends the
Comprehensive. In any event, that ultimate design, that ultimate power, that center of all Being is God.
He is virtually impossible to discuss, Jaspers says; all the philosopher can do is put together words and
hope that they spark an attitude more than an understanding in the reader.
pp. 46-47.
God is. The essential in this proposition is the reality to which it points. We do
not encompass this reality in thinking the proposition; merely to think it leaves us empty.
For it means nothing to the understanding and to sensory experience. We apprehend its
meaning only as we transcend, as we pass beyond the world of objects and through it
discover authentic reality. Here the climax and goal of our life is the point at which we
ascertain authentic reality, that is, God.
Wisdom likens our understanding of God to our basis in unconditional imperativesthose things upon
which we base our life, which are neither based on anything nor further any end lest they become
conditional. Said imperatives derive from some magnificent force rooted in beingGod?and are made
existentially, with freedom, in a state of luciditybut seemingly meaninglessly for everything which is
Dasein.
p. 56.
[T]he unconditional attitude implies a decision, lucidly taken, out of an
unfathomable depth, a decision with which I myself am identical It means to partake in
the eternal, in being. Accordingly, it implies absolute reliability and loyalty which derive
not from nature but from our decision Expressed in psychological terms, the
unconditional attitude does not lie in the momentary state of any man Nor does the
unconditional decision reside in the innate character, for the character can be transformed
in rebirth. Nor does it reside in what we call in mythological terms a mans demon, for
this demon is without loyalty Thus the unconditional demands an existential decision
that has passed through reflection. This means that it does not arise from any natural state
but out of freedom, which cannot help being what it is, not because of any natural law but
because of its foundation in transcendence.
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This insight gives way to a strange project for an existentialist: Jaspers attempts a hesitant, vague
metaphysics. He echoes Kant in his description of the three forms of evil: that man in evil who has not
resolved himself to the formation of an imperative and instead is ruled by natural passions (the description
of which parallels Kants description of inclinations); that man is evil whose supposed imperative is
nothing of the sort and guides action only when it is a convenient and beneficial guide; and that man is
evil who purposefully endeavors to destroy his imperative.
Jaspers argues that until man, in his existential freedom, establishes an imperativethat is, until he ceases
going through life alternating principles or basing his actions on nothing: he is evil.
p. 61.
A man can only want one thing or the other, if he is authentic. He follows
inclination or duty, he lives in perversion or in purity of motive, he lives out of hate or
out of love. But he can fail to decide. Instead of deciding, we vacillate and stumble
through life, combine the one with the other and even accept such a state of things as a
necessary contradiction. This indecision is in itself evil. Man awakens only when he
distinguishes between good and evil. He becomes himself when he decides which way he
is going and acts accordingly.
Choosing utility is just such an example of said vacillation:
p. 54.
When I ask myself: What shall I do? I arrive at an answer by adducing finite aims
and means by which to attain them But my basis for recognizing these aims lies either
in some unquestioned practical interest or in utility. Empirical existence, however, is no
ultimate end because the questions remain: What kind of existence? and What for?
Jaspers philosophy, taken as a whole, posits a sweeping proposition: the purpose of
philosophy suggests that its activities culminate in theistic existentialism, which
subsequently affirm the Comprehensive and the essentialness of an unconditional
imperative. In a whirlwind, Jaspers permeates the barrier between Ethics and
Existentialism; he binds the two together, in such a manner that they form a bundle which
is of greater strength than that possessed by either stick alone.
Using Karl Jaspers in Lincoln-Douglas Debate
I would suggest to any debater tempted to employ Kantian analysis to consider using Jaspers instead.
Though at first the two philosophers seem wildly differentclassical ethicist versus modern
existentialisttheir views lead them to the same notion concerning imperative formation. In the English
texts (excluding his Kant, of course), Jaspers never writes explicitly about universalizability or treating
others as ends, but that analysis seems obvious enough once the import of imperatives is established.
There are several advantages to replacing Kant with Jaspers: first, running Jaspers, you will likely have to
answer no CX questions about Jews in attics or Nazis knocking on your door (although interestingly,
Jaspers actually did confront, in real life, a similar situation); second, Jaspers analysis as to why
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imperatives are essential is lucid, clear, intuitively appealing, and it involves no Latin terminology; third,
you will gain the attention of judges who, upon hearing the word Kant uttered, grudgingly write C.I.
on their flows and begin shaving time.
Other uses of Jaspers include: as an answer to utility (the vacillating and therefore evil philosophy); as
an answer to Sartres atheism or Heideggers quasi-nihilism; or, in works not covered here, to indict the
atom bomb, to postulate rules philosophers should abide by (given in an obscure section of Wisdom), or to
critique Nietzsche. There are hundreds of other topics to which the resourceful debater might apply
Jaspers existentialism.
One note of warning to those considering using Jaspers: much of his writing deals with Godby which
he means Heideggers Sein or his own Comprehensive. Though his tone and meaning are what most
would consider secular, the mere mention of God in a debate round will set some judges off. So be
sure in tagging your Jaspers cards that you explain his meaning of God. Something like Jaspers
considers the entirety of beingwhich he calls both the Comprehensive and God, interchangeablyto
provide underpinning for our most fundamental, irrational moral beliefs. That should stomp out any fires
before they start.
Further Reading
After the books mentioned at the beginning of this article, Jaspers Kant and Nietzsche are his most
significant writings.
Those who are interested in this fascinating character who stood up to Nazi pressure, who protected his
Jewish wife throughout the course of the Second World War, and who maintained a life-long friendship
with the massively important American political theorist Hannah Arendt, the Arendt/Jaspers
correspondence has, within the last few years, been translated to English and published. The duo
discusses life, politics, philosophyand they dish a lot of dirt about Heidegger. Wonderful fun.
Suggested Reading
Familiarity with the rudimentary list of basic and existential works aids greatly in understanding Jaspers
work: Platos Republic and Mena, Kierkegaards Fear and Trembling, Heideggers Being and Time, and
Sartres Being and Nothingness are essentials. Arendts The Origins of Totalitarianism and Camus The
Rebel might also be of some interest to the Jaspers scholar.
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Sartre (Andrew Rothschild)
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE
Jean-Paul Sartres was a soul elegant in misery and shadowed against the blazing sun of the world; its
manner could be shy or brazen, bookish or active, poetic or dry, juvenile or urbane. Sartre would
excitedly tell intimates, cigarette smoke emanating from his lips, that radical change was required in the
way men think and the method through which affairs are conducted. But he found the struggle hopeless as
well. He felt any future was possible and none permanent. Life was a trap of freedom for Sartre, and all
the people in it were both jailers and fellow sufferers.
Sartre wrote, Hell is other people.
There was little real point to change, Sartre felt, and yet, at age 62, carrying a placard, Sartre marched
with student protesters outside the Sorbonne. His was a life caught between intellectual conviction and
emotional passion, forces which often rushed toward intersection but whic h diverged again just as
quickly.
Like Camus, Sartres early work shows a deeper despair, a firmer resignation, and a more furrowed brow
than do his later achievements. His first major novel, Nausea, published in 1938, introduces a notion
which parallels Camus understanding of the absurd. Sartres term for the sudden rush of awareness that
washes over one when he steps outside his individual perspective and sees himself as part of the world is,
as one might suspect, nausea. Nausea is characterizedor perhaps I should say, it is conjuredby
acuity of consciousness and impersonal, dispassionate perspective. If we view the world without being in
it, its blatantly obviouseven to a foolthat everything exists for no reason at all. Everything is de
tropsuperfluous. A mans life has no meaning except that which human beings ascribe to it. And if one
watches from afar human beings arbitrarily doling out meaning, hes bound to find it pathetically comical;
knowing that were members of that charade is enough to induce sickness.
To put it another way, man lives in an absurd universe: that is, there is nothing we can possibly detect
which gives meaning to our surroundings or to our place among them. Additionally, nothing has
substantive meaning for anything else. Though two trees might co-exist, though they might affect each
other, though they might be best tree friends, they are not connected. They remain two entities that exist
arbitrarily, de trop. The only things they have in common are arbitrary and de trop. They are not unified
by any design, any plan, or any fabric. (It goes without saying that Sartre was an avowed atheist.) They
are simply both there. Sartre explains in Being and Nothingness:
Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness. English ed., 1956; translated by Hazel E.
Barnes, reprint, 1986; pp. 29
Being-in-itself is. This means that being can neither be derived from the possible
nor reduced to the necessary. Necessity concerns the connection between ideal
propositions but not that of existents. An existing phenomenon can never be derived from
another existent qua existent. This is what we shall call the contingency of being-in-itself.
But neither can being-in-itself be derived from a possibility. The possible is a structure of
the for-itself; that is, it belongs to the other region of being.* Being-in-itself is never
either possible or impossible. It is. This is what consciousness expresses in
anthropomorphic terms by saying that being is de tropthat is, that consciousness
absolutely can not derive being from anything, either from another being, or from a
possibility, or from a necessary law. Uncreated, without reason for being, without any
connection with another being, being-in-itself is de trop for eternity.
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[*Note: Sartres distinction between being-for-itself and being-in-itself will be addressed later on. AR]
Sartres next important work after Nausea, The Age of Reason, contends that absurdity and the nausea it
induces provide us with a choice concerning our modi operandi: a person can recognize that he exists as
an isolated unita pointless, unconnected alienor he can try to define himself into a group, denying his
individuality, fabricating connection, and implicitly repressing his knowledge of his atomization. The
former approach, which is nausea-inducing, Sartre labels authentic; the latter approach he calls
inauthentic. Authenticity is liberating, maintains Sartre, because it allows us to shed those shackles
which accompany connection; if we are isolated, we neednt be based on anything. Inauthenticity, by
inviting the perception of connections and thus limitations, earth-binds man.
Authenticity is closely connected to Sartres idea of the Other. The Other is other people whose presence,
whose look encourages me to perceive myself abstractly, as if from outside myselfas if I were them.
(A different justification for this reflective consciousness is presented later in Sartres works.) Viewing
myself abstractly allows me to see my life as a charadeand it allows for much more mundane things,
such as considering how my emotions or even my gestures must appear to other people. (Fascinatingly,
Sartre asserts the existence of an enormous rupture in mans ability to have serious emotions, for as soon
as a man becomes aware of his emotional state as such, that is, as soon as I realize Andrew is happy,
that emotionwhich existed only spontaneously in me, vanishes, as my brain changes gears from the
spontaneous I to the reflective consciousness, which cannot, by definition, experience any emotion; if it
did, it would become spontaneous and be immediately replaced again by a reflective consciousness.)
Perhaps discussing the major line of analysis from Sartres article La Transcendance de LEgo. Esquisse
dune description phenomenologique will clarify the nature of the Other somewhat. In La
Transcendance, Sartre argues that Des Cartes cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I am) is incorrect
because the type of consciousness that Des Cartes attempts to prove sunt is not the part that cogitat. That
is, Des Cartes is suggesting that because he can contemplate objects in the worlda wall, a glass, a
chairthen even if those objects are mere hallucinations, because Des Cartes can place them as objects in
his consciousness, Des Cartes as consciousness must exist. But, Sartre argues, when Des Cartes reflects
on his consciousness in order to think cogito ergo sum, hes posited consciousness as an object in the
same way he earlier posited the wall, the glass, and the chair as objects. He can thus be no surer of the
existence of the consciousness that perceived the glass than he can be of the existence of the glass itself.
And if he reflects on the reflective consciousness, hes posited that too as an object; clearly, this practice
is infinitely regressive. As a result, Des Cartes can never say, cogito ergo sum, but merely cogitus
sunt, or consciousness exists.
Being and Nothingness, Sartres major philosophical work, begins by distinguishing the Being of the prereflective consciousness (which is part of whats given about me, like the length of my arms or the
color of my hairits part of my Being-in-itself) from the Being of the reflective consciousness (the
self-aware consciousness which acts as if its outside of me, related to Being-for-itself). This duality of
my Being is resolved and drawn into unity by what Sartre calls Nothingness.
Understanding Sartres view of Nothingness requires that we analyze his perception of a world absent
consciousnesses. Without consciousnesses, there is Beingmatter, perhaps a cloud of thoughtbut there
are no differentiated objects. There is simply a heap of Being, an infinite overflow. Its like a compost
heap that looks as if it has unified consistency from a distance. Consciousness differentiates, categorizes,
and comprehends Being based on negation: a cup is not everything other than a cup. The world isnt
everything other than the world. As such, to call consciousness Being is a misnomer: consciousness is
Nothingness. It produces nothing positive, but simply understands things through negating. (Sartre
scholars will note that this is something of an oversimplification, but its a necessary one given the
introductory nature of the material.)
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The nature of Nothingness as negation is illustrated and supported through considering questioning,
which is only possible due to the presence of Nothingness:
Barnes, reprint, 1986; pp. 58-9
But from the very fact that we presume that an Existent can always be revealed
as nothing, every question supposes that we realize a nihilating withdrawal in relation to
the given, which becomes a simple presentation, fluctuating between being and
Nothingness. It is essential therefore that the questioner have the permanent possibility of
dissociating himself from the causal series which constitutes being and which can
produce only being. If we admitted that the question is determined in the questioner by
universal determinism, the question would thereby become unintelligible and even
inconceivable. A real cause, in fact, produces a real effect and the caused being is wholly
engaged by the cause in positivity; to the extent that its being depends on the cause, it can
not have within itself the tiniest germ of nothingness. Thus in so far as the questioner
must be able to effect in relation to the questioned a kind of nihilating withdrawal, he is
not subject to the causal order of the world; he detaches himself from Being. This
disengagement is then by definition a human process. Man presents himself at least in
this instance as a being who causes Nothingness to arise in the world, inasmuch as he
himself is affected with non-being to this end.
The Nothingness of consciousness, Sartre contends, is exposed to man in periods of anguish, during
which we realize our separation from Being, as well as the fact that said Being cannot be based on
anything except what were able to differentiate out of the mass. The absurdity of human existence is
similarly revealed: our freedom is infinite because we can perceive anything quite as we like, but our
efficacy is virtually non-existent because, as Nothingness, we cannot produce but only differentiate.
The concept of Sartrean freedom must be touched on momentarily. Being and Nothingness contends that
we are made free by our absolute ability to interpret the universe. Action, the basis of freedom, is defined
as [modifying] the shape of the world (559), and as the world is given meaning and shape only through
my consciousness, altering my consciousness will alter the shape of the world. Because virtually nothing
can stop me from altering my consciousness and thus pursuing action of a sort, I am absolutely and
unqualifiedly free. This freedom, of course, takes place in the realm of the for-itself. I am bound by my
facticity, the givens of being-in-itself, but I am not limited to it.
Following necessarily from this concept of freedom is the accompanying notion of transcendence. The
reflective consciousnessthe being-for-itselfis, or allows for, or ensures transcendence. I am always
transcendent, in that I am nothing at any given time (essentiallynaturally my facticity is present); I am
pursuing or I am re-making myself into, but, transcendentally, I am not.
This is apparent even in everyday conversation. Rarely does anyone say, I am noble; rather, we say, I
want to be noble. This does not postulate that our past is ignoble, or even that we are not presently
engaged in a noble activity. But at each indivisible unit of time, we are re-choosing our method of being,
thus making noble a series of infinite choices which will continue to unfurl as long as we are alive. The
road of nobility is always ahead. We can intend to continue traveling it, but this intention too is constantly
being re-made, so that to suggest that fundamental nobility as a quality of ones Being-for-itself is foolish
and inaccurate.
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I choose myself perpetually and can never be merely by virtue of having-beenchosen; otherwise I should fall into the pure and simple existence of the in-itself. The
necessity of perpetually choosing myself is one with the pursued-pursuit which I am. But
precisely because here we are dealing with a choice, this choice as it is made indicates in
general other choices as possibles. The possibility of these other choices is neither made
explicit nor posited, but it is lived in the feeling of unjustifiability; as it is this which is
expressed by the fact of the absurdity of my choice and consequently of my being.
What happens when we perceive our facticity to dictate our transcendence, or if we were to view
ourselves as being transcendentally? The result of either course, Sartre suggests, would be bad faith. Men
and women accomplish bad faith by confusing the relationship between transcendence and facticity.
The basic concept which is thus engendered utilizes the double property of the
human being, who is at once a facticity and a transcendence. These two aspects of human
reality are and ought to be capable of a valid coordination. But bad faith does not wish
either to coordinate them or to surmount them in a synthesis. Bad faith seeks to affirm
their identity while preserving their differences. It must affirm facticity as being
transcendence and transcendence as being facticity, in such a way that at the instant when
a person apprehends the one, he can find himself abruptly faced with the other.
Sartres translator Hazel E. Barnes, explains this point excellently in his introduction:
Hazel Barnes, Translators Introduction to Being and Nothingness, 1956, reprint, 1986.
xxii.
The study of bad faith reveals to us that whereas Being-in-itself simply is, man
is the being who is what he is not and who is not what he is. In other words man
continually makes himself. Instead of being, he has to be; his present being has
meaning only in light of the future toward which he projects himself. Thus he is not what
at any instant we might want to say that he is, and he is that toward which he projects
himself but which he is not yet. This ambiguity provides the possibility for bad faith since
man may try to interpret this evanescent is of his as though it were the is of Being-initself, or he may fluctuate between the two.
This is best understood with an example. Sartre uses the example of a gay man whose pattern of
homosexual behavior does not deter him from saying I am not gay, despite my behavior. The man is
implicitly postulating that My pattern of behavior does not define what or who I amthat is, though
each homosexual encounter was, they nevertheless dont define or predict what or who the man is. But
the man has confused the issue: hes not defined finally or totally or transcendently by his behavior, but
that does not alter the facts of his being-in-itself. When the man says, I am not gay, hes falsely
perceiving his being-in-itself, and as such, he is in bad faith.
Despite the complicated nature of his philosophy, Sartres general message is relatively simple: nothing
defines who we are except us. Sartres famous declaration that Existence precedes essence means that
who I am is something which is determined after Ive come to exist; its not concurrent with my literal
or figurative (philosophical) birth. Men often hide behind the facts of their existences (thats not my
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nature), but theirs is a course of lies. Beyond being free to define who we are, were free to view the
world however we like. But as such, we bear absolute responsibility for that world-view.
[M]an being condemned to be free carries the weight of the whole world on
his shoulders; he is responsible for the world and for himself as a way of being In this
sense the responsibility of the for-itself is overwhelming since he is the one by whom it
happens that there is a world; since he is also the one who makes himself be, then
whatever may be the situation in which he finds himself, the for-itself must wholly
assume this situation with its peculiar coefficient of adversity, even though it be
insupportable.
Sartre offers several qualifications to our freedom, the most potent of which is the Other. Ideally, perhaps,
each of us would define ourselves and our worlds a priori and then rush to greet the world. But our
perception of the Others practices and our incessant consciousness of the Others watchful eye colors
infestsall attempts at determining the world via the singular Nothingness of our own minds.
[T]he Others look as the necessary condition of my objectivity is the
destruction of all objectivity for me. The Others look touches me across the world and is
not only a transformation of myself but a total metamorphasis of the world. I am lookedat in a world which is looked-at. In particular the Others look, which is a look-looking
and not a look-looked-at, denies my distances from objects and unfolds its own distances.
This look of the Other is given immediately as that by which distance comes to the world
at the heart of a presence without distance.
In a later major work, A Critique of Dialectical Reason, which is relatively irrelevant for our purposes,
Sartre makes the wildly abstract principles set forth in Being and Nothingness a bit more concrete, and in
so doing, he changes their collective meaning a bit. He considers humanity to be the victim of its own
industrial form of bad faith. We perceive environmental problems, for instance (he uses the flooding of
Chinese farmlands as an example) as acts of fate. In the instance of the Chinese farmlands, however, he
claims that human-induced deforestation has contributed to the problem of flooding, and as such, weve
taken what is, like the for-itself, alterable, to be, like the in-itself, the inalterable, the given. We have
through negation (eliminating trees from the landscape) created a reality which weve then posited to
simply be. It provides a perfect parallel to bad faith. Sartre therefore proposes that we oughtnt view
history so much as the conflict of self-contained, unchanging opposing forces (as Hegel or Marx might)
but instead to understand the Dialectic, or the confrontation of opposing forces in history as having a
more intricate relationship: each is changed for itself due to the opposition of the Other.
Using Jean-Paul Sartre in LD
There are a number of dangers associated with running Sartre in LD; I enumerate them not to discourage
anyone, but to help prepare anyone whos considering running a Sartre case:
First, Sartre is difficult to understand. His concepts are intricate and his language is obscure. Trying to
find easily understandable cards for use in this article was a huge challenge, and Im not at all prepared to
suggest that I succeeded. If youre looking for more specific cards about a more specific point, you might
have to search long and hard. The best place to look is not Being and Nothingness (which I felt obligated
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to use, as it constitutes the only full explanation of Sartres philosophy). Rather, theres a short book of
essays entitled Existentialism and Human Emotions; the first essay in the book is, I believe, Sartres most
famous public address. Given that he was speaking to a less sophisticated audience, he chose an easier
phraseology and clearer examples. The trouble is that its hardly complete; there are a lot of postulates
asserted in the address that are inadequately defended. (The full defenses of said postulates may be found
in Being and Nothingness.)
Second, if you water-down your explanations of Sartrean existentialism (as youll be forced to in order to
insure effective communication with most opponents/judges), youll invite the contempt of a lot of
judges. Every college kid is a self-fashioned expert on Sartre. Worse, many of those wannabe experts
dont understand Sartre very well but are convinced that their misinterpretations are absolutely correct. If
youre right and theyre wrong, theyll down you for misinterpreting Sartre anyway. The best way to
avoid this is to walk into the round with a lot of Sartre cards that arent in your case. If you think youve
got a semi-scholar, read the cards at the appropriate times in your rebuttals. Use clear tags, but let Sartre
do most of the talking. They cant tell him that he misinterpreted himself. We hope.
Third, Sartre uses a number of terms slightly differently than do most thinkers. The most obvious
examples are freedom and responsibility, which Sartre means in neither a metaphysical nor a legal
context. But also the Other, authenticity, Being, and transcendence take on new meanings
altogether in Sartre. Be sure you clarify how Sartre intends the terms to be understood, or you could be
terribly misinterpreted.
Fourth, youd be surprised by which debaters command an excellent understanding of Sartre. If I were
you, I wouldnt go into a round running Sartre without having read Being and Nothingness and
Existentialism and Human Emotionsminimum! Otherwise, you might be humiliated by a better reader
than yourself. That said, Sartres brand of existentialism offers an interesting spin on almost any topic
focused on the individual. His views of how the individual is influenced by and influences the Other are
fresh, exciting, and infinitely defendable. His understanding of individual morality as resulting (mostly)
from the autonomy of the for-itself is one of the most unique I know of. Additionally, his non-traditional
understanding of freedom could take any resolution involving the word freedom or liberty (if you
define liberty as freedom) in wildly new directions unexpected by almost any opponent. And that only
skims the surface. One of the fun parts of running Sartre is trying to figure out how to make him apply.
Further Reading
For the uninitiated, Sartre: A Beginners Guide by George Myerson is without peer. After having read all
the books discussed in the article, if you still have interest in Sartre, Modern Times: Selected Non-Fiction,
translated by Robin Buss, provides an excellent account of how our communities have become
pluralities of isolations. Existential Psychoanalysis is also of some interest.
For those whod like some debate-irrelevant good reading, Sartres autobiography Words is touching,
interesting, a bit odd, and wonderfully human. Less warm but better in a strictly literary sense are his
plays, notably No Exit, although I tend to like Dirty Hands more.
In his day, Sartre The Philosopher was unmatched by any except the Martin Heidegger. Other important
contemporary existentialists include the brilliant Karl Jaspers and Albert Camus. Extremely relevant to
Sartres philosophy are the ideas of the great phenomenologist Husserl and the dialectician Hegel, as well
as those of Soren Kierkegaard, the founder of existentialist thought. The most important thing to read
after completing Being and Nothingness (or better yet, before reading Sartre) is Heideggers Being and
Time followed by Hegels Logic and Kierkegaards Fear and Trembling and Sickness Unto Death.
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Camus (Andrew Rothschild)
ALBERT CAMUS
Placing Camus under the heading existentialism in a book about philosophers has him, one can little
doubt, convulsing in his grave. For the sum of his life, Albert Camus vigorously insisted that he wasnt a
philosopher; for him, thought was an internal adventure to be expressed, perhaps, but not in the context of
philosophical discussion, and certainly not in an atmosphere of ideological clash. And he hardly even
considered that he might be an existentialist. He associated existentialism, for the first part of his short
life, with the ideas of Soren Kierkegaard, ideas he vehemently rejected; in later life, he came to associate
existentialism with Jean-Paul Sartre, whom he personally detested. The two, Sartre and Camus, went as
far as to discuss releasing a joint public statement declaring that they could not possibly belong to the
same school of thought, as each considered every idea of the other to be stupid.
Nevertheless, Camus ideas closely parallel those of existentialist thinkers: Camus despair is not unlike
Sartres nausea or Kierkegaards sickness unto death. And like Sartre, Camus tried to devise a
positive morality from a notion of the absurd, but failed, and ended up making absurdism merely a point
of departure in the search of a universal ethic.
The major philosophical works of Albert Camus are The Myth of Sisyphus and The Rebel. The former
outlines the notion of absurditythe inherent incomprehensibility and thus immateriality of the
universeand its relation to suicide. The latter proposes a guide of ethical principles which might
appropriately guide us; it is of the utmost importance to Camus, however, that those principles retain the
authority inherent in derivation from reason.
Underlying all of Camus thought is his perception of the absurd, a concept he inherited from Christian
theologians and which he first articulates via the character Meursault in his novel The Stranger. Meursault
is a French Algerian convicted of murdering an Arab (he did indeed kill the Arab, but out of confusion
more than anything else). As he lies in bed the night before his execution, he thinks to himself:
Albert Camus. Philosopher. The Stranger. Trans. Richard Kamber from Theatre, recits et
nouvelles, ed. Roger Quilliot, 1965. pp. 1208-1209.
I had lived my life in one way and I could have lived it in another way. I had
done this and I had not done that Nothing, nothing had importance, and I knew why
From the far end of my future, throughout this absurd life I had been leading, a dark wind
had been blowing against me What importance could they have for me, the deaths of
others, a mothers love? What importance could God have, or the lives people choose,
the destinies they elect, since one destiny alone must elect me, and with me billions of
privileged people who called themselves my brothers? The others would all be
condemned one day.
The meaning is clear: if our fatedeathis established, without question, without hope of alteration or
redemption, the way we live our lives is unimportant. All roads lead to the same place, so the matter of
choosing a road is, ultimately, silly, superfluous, meaningless. And if death is inevitable and
unchangeable, it too must be accepted, and thus, it becomes, like everything else, a quotidian matter.
But a question remains: in what way are life activities unimportant? What are they not important for or
to? Determining what Meursault means when he says nothing has importance serves to elucidate the
meaning of Camus absurdity.
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It is important to note that Meursault rejects all belief in the possibility of an afterlife and thus, as Richard
Kamber points out in On Camus, If what [Meursault] means by importance is short for importance for
an afterlife and we grant his assumption that there is no afterlife, then his claim is logically valid but
tautological. Perhaps Meursault, in Camus true form, makes man the measure of all things. In such an
instance, lacking importance would mean that no mans life has real, transcendental importance to
anyone else. But Meursaults casual indifference to everyone else in the novel makes him an unlikely
candidate as a purveyor of such a belief.
More likely, Meursaults claim is broader. When he suggests that mens lives are unimportant, he means
that our lives are without transcendental import. If there is anything transcendentalif anything I do
affects more than indifferent matterman is unequipped to detect it. If there is a god, a spirit, a meaning,
a force, a plan, a system to things, its of no use to humanitys inferior collection of minds. As such, a
permanent and irresolvable contradiction arises for each man between the unity, the harmony, the
singleness he desires in the universe and the raging chaos which leaves the cosmos, the planet, and all of
mankind abandoned. That conflict, that contention, is, in essence, the absurd.
The implications Camus derives from this insight are laid out clearly in The Myth of Sisyphus, his essay
concerning absurditys relation to suicide. The fundamental question the essay poses: does the realization
of lifes irreversible absurdity logically mandate, or even justify, the taking on ones own life? Before
setting out to explore his theme directly, Camus clarifies at some length the condition of the absurd man.
Myth argues first that, contrary to the thoughts of a few and the wishes of many, order cannot be
rationally located in nature. It notes the failure of philosophy to reveal a single metaphysical certainty,
and it claims that science is forced unexceptionally to appeal to metaphor for explanation. The former
claim seems, at first, unworthy of Camus; it belongs to the anti-intellectual, the arrogant, the
philosophically lethargicit belongs to the Ayn Rands. Obviously, the failure of metaphysics to
determine anything concrete could reflect on the inadequacy of the human mind and the stubborn
illusiveness of the object. This objection, however, hardly weakens Camus position: since his claims
concern the imperceptibility of a rational order, the presence of imperceptible order does nothing to
diminish the absurd.
More troubling is Camus misunderstanding of science. He writes:
Albert Camus. Philosopher. The Myth of Sisyphus. 1955. Reprint 1983. pp. 19-20.
All knowledge on earth will give me nothing to assure me that this world is mine.
You describe it to me and you teach me to classify it. You enumerate its laws and in my
thirst for knowledge I admit that they are true. You take apart its mechanism and my
hope increases. At the final stage you teach me that this wondrous and multicolored
universe can be reduced to the atom and the atom itself can be reduced to the electron.
All this is good and I wait for you to continue. But you tell me of an invisible planetary
system in which electrons gravitate around a nucleus. You explain the world to me with
an image. I realize then that you have been reduced to poetry: I shall never know So
that science that was to teach me everything ends up in a hypothesis, that lucidity
founders in metaphor, that uncertainty is resolved in a work of art.
The example, at least, is horrible. Invisible planetary systems is indeed a metaphor which is helpful for
illustrating the functioning of an (outdated model of the) atom. But complex mathematics and rigorous
experimentation provide the real proofs of atomic structure. Metaphor is merely a tool employed for ease
of explanation. Nevertheless, Camus argument isnt without foundation. Science, by its own admission,
cant explain the universe so much as it can describe the universe. And, more to the point, even its powers
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of description are inadequate; each new discovery, each layer of matter uncovered presents more
questions about the next level. Sciences answers are always troublingly incomplete. What makes matter?
Atoms. What makes atoms? Protons, neutrons, and electrons. What makes a neutron? Quarks. What
makes quarks? At some point, the answers are questionable hypotheses or, worse, No one knows.
Thus Camus lays the groundwork for the absurd. There is no reprieve, he says, so long as a man
maintains his intelligence; that is, no man who continues to question why? will ever be satisfied.
Camus virtually assumes that man desires order in the universea claim which seems reasonable until
one considers the work of writers such as Kierkegaard who ask us to simply make a leap of faith, to
believe that God gives meaning, to, in one fell swoop, erase our desire for a perceptible plan. The Myth of
Sisyphus brushes aside existentialist authors (writers who ask us to make any kind of leap), labeling
them impossible or self-deluding. Given Camus assumption, absurdity infects every insightful man.
For Camus, it is a necessary, a good, a liberating infection. As it results from insight, from keen
awareness of the truth, absurdity as a struggle must be maintained; he warns that we ought not commit
philosophical suicide by forsaking the Struggle or resolving the Contradiction.
If I see a man armed only with a sword attack a group of machine guns, I shall
consider his act to be absurd. But it is so solely by virtue of the disproportion between his
intention and the reality he will encounter, of the contradiction I notice between his true
strength and the aim he has in view [T]he magnitude of absurdity will be in direct
ratio to the distance between the two terms of comparison. In this particular case and on
the plane of intelligence, I can therefore say that the Absurd is not in man nor in the
world, but in their presence together I know what man wants, I know what the world
offers him [The absurd mans] struggle implies a total absence of hope (which has
nothing to do with despair), a continual rejection (which must not be confused with
renunciation), a conscious dissatisfaction (which must not be compared to immature
unrest). Everything that destroys, conjures away, or exorcises these requirements (and, to
begin with, consent which overthrows divorce) ruins the absurd and devaluates the
attitude that may then be proposed. The absurd has meaning only in so far as it is not
agreed to.
A portion of Myths first section, entitled An Absurd Reasoning, is dedicated to refuting those
philosophies which would attempt to resolve absurdity. Singled out for refutation are Jaspers, Chestov,
Husserl, and Kierkegaard. In each case, Camus writes that the thinker in question is simply trying to offer
man a pleasant diversion and performing, in Chestovs instance, a conjurors emotional trick (p. 35).
They are attempting to resolve the contradiction of absurdity by waving a wand; they argue that we ought
to simply stop doubting, to have faith in meaning. In effect, they seek to sooth the frustration into which
our lucidity forces us by requesting that we abandon lucidity. Camus, of course, is concerned entirely
with reason, as his object of study lives within the realm of, and results from, reason. As soon as reason
exits the stage, man as man ceases to be, and all philosophy becomes irrelevant. Thus, the absurd must be
vigorously maintained, unforgotten, unresolved; that is the true moral nobility.
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Albert Camus. Philosopher. The Myth of Sisyphus. 1955. Reprint 1983. p. 50.
The leap does not represent an extreme danger, as Kierkegaard would like it to
do. The danger, on the contrary, lies in the subtle instant that precedes the leap. Being
able to remain on that dizzying crestthat is integrity and the rest is subterfuge.
Having established both the presence and irrefutability of absurdity, Camus proceeds to draw several
conclusions: first, he notes that a commitment to rationality undercuts most moral systems. His writing
here is muddled, but he seems to be suggesting that most metaphysics begin and end with the justification
of assumptions. That is, the system works in such a way that our intuitions lead us to believe what is right
or wrong, and metaphysics are forced to conform to said intuitions or else be discarded. Camus refers to
our intuitions as nostalgia for a lost epochthey come from the notion, inherent in man, that there is a
good, that we can know that good and once did, and that there are certain things about the good which
we havent lost. The remaining bits of our knowledge of the good form our intuitions. (See The Myth of
Sisyphus, pp. 47-48 for Camus explanation; its too complex and peripheral to merit more discussion
here.)
The second conclusion Camus draws from his discussion of the absurd is that, by maintaining rationality
at all costs, by standing upright on the dizzying crest which overlooks the mountain, but not making the
leap, man is liberated by his lucidity. He is put in opposition to nature and reality. He revolts against the
illogic of the world, against its inadequacy, and through preservation of that conflict he gains constant
awareness, vitality, reflection.
Albert Camus. Philosopher. The Myth of Sisyphus. 1955. Reprint 1983.
[T]he absurd, so obvious and yet so hard to win, returns to a mans life and finds
its home there. At this moment, too, the mind can leave the arid, dried-up path of lucid
effort He has forgotten how to hope. This hell of the present is his Kingdom at last. All
problems recover their sharp edge. Abstract evidence retreats before the poetry of forms
and colors. Spiritual conflicts become embodied and return to the abject and magnificent
shelter of mans heart. None of them is settled. But all are transfigured. Is one going to
die, escape by the leap, rebuild a mansion of ideas and forms to ones own sake? Is one,
on the contrary, going to take up the heart-rending and marvelous wager of the absurd?
The body, affection, creation, action, human nobility will then resume their places in this
mad world. At last man will again find there the wine of the absurd and the bread of
indifference on which he feeds his greatness.
This conclusion has, for Camus, multiple consequences: 1) If the absurd man refuses to illogically
abandon absurdity, he is constantly renewing his doubt, constantly noting the failure of the world, and
nevertheless failing to resign himself to anything. Suicide would end or resolve absurdity just as
resignation or a Kierkegaardian leap might; but the absurd man is committed to the absurd, and thus, he
would not settle or abandon the cause via suicide.
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The theme of permanent revolution is thus carried into individual experience
[T]he absurd dies only when we turn away from it. One of the only coherent
philosophical positions is thus revolt It may be thought that suicide follows revoltbut
wrongly. For it does not represent the logical outcome of revolt. It is just the contrary by
the consent it presupposes. Suicide, like the leap, is acceptance at its extreme. Everything
is over and man returns to his essential history In its way, suicide settles the absurd. It
engulfs the absurd in the same death.
2) No man is truly free unless he is absurd. The man who sees life as having a purpose or meaning, the
man who sees fate as being in his own hands, has responsibility for his fate, and thus he finds himself
earthbound; the absurd man is free of all responsibility, and thus:
The absurd man feels released from everything outside that passionate attention
crystallizing in him. He enjoys a freedom with regard to common rules... In the same
way the slaves of antiquity knew that freedom which consists in not feeling
responsible. Death, too, has patrician hands which, while crushing, also liberate.
3) Because nothing has meaning to the absurd man, all events are equally good, making more events
better. The absurd man thus endeavors to live as long as possible so that he may experience the greatest
possible number of events.
To two men living the same number of years, the world always provides the
same sum of experiences The sole obstacle, the sole deficiency to be made good, is
constituted by premature death. Thus it is that no depth, no emotion, no passion, and no
sacrifice could render equal in the eyes of the absurd man a conscious life of forty
years and a lucidity spread over sixty years. Madness and death are his irreparables.
The Rebel represents a serious re-evaluation of the ideas set forth in The Myth of Sisyphus. Published
eight years after Myth (which was published in France in 1944), The Rebel suggests that absurd morality
is a failurefirst because it gives a contradictory view of murder (it holds life to be meaningless and
valueless while prohibiting suicide and thus affirming life on some level; what, then, are we to make of
the relative morality of homicide?), and second, because Camus feels his nihilistic absurd was the result
of World War II-inspired depression that other persons in other times wouldnt share. In other words,
Myth has meaning for Camus, but probably little for 21st century high school students.
Camus new project is thus to establish a fresh morality, a relatively objective morality, by analyzing
rebellions and revolutions throughout history. Two of his ideas stand out as having importance for us: his
affirmation of both liberalism and communitarianism, and his scathing critique of Marx.
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Camus very description of the figure of the rebel suggests a communitarianism innate to man.
Albert Camus. Philosopher. The Rebel. 1956. Reprint 1991. p. 16.
Perhaps a human nature does exist, as the Greeks believed. Why rebel if there is
nothing permanent in oneself worth preserving? It is for the sake of everyone in the world
that the slave asserts himself when he comes to the conclusion that a command has
infringed on something in him which does not belong to him alone, but which is common
ground where all meneven the man who insults and oppresses himhave a natural
community. [Footnote:] The community of victims is the same as that which unites
victim and executioner. But the executioner does not know this.
The rebel then, for Camus, acts in the name of a common humanity. That places a heavy demand on the
rebel: If a single master should, in fact, be killed, the rebel, in a certain way, is no longer justified in
using the term community of men from which he derived his justification. If the world has no higher
meaning, if man is only responsible to man, it suffices for a man to remove one single human being from
the society of the living to automatically exclude himself from it (Rebel, p. 281). Similarly, if the
rebellion results in institutionalized and codified violencesuch as the death penaltythe revolution
betrays its basis as being for all, for common humanity.
Camus proceeds to advocate a free, liberal system of government, based on the notion that when
communication is prohibited between persons, the ideal of common humanity is degraded and
suppressed, and justice, flourishing, and righteousness are the casualties.
Albert Camus. Philosopher. The Rebel. 1956. Reprint 1991. p. 291.
To kill freedom in order to establish the reign of justice comes to the same as
resuscitating the idea of grace without divine intercession and of restoring by mystifying
reaction the mystic body in its basest elements. Even when justice is not realized,
freedom preserves the power to protest and guarantees human communication. Justice in
a silent world, justice enslaved and mute, destroys mutual complicity and finally can no
longer be justice No man considers that his condition is free if it is not at the same time
just, nor just unless it is free.
A few words ought to be said about Camus reproach of Marxism. He lists several objections to
communist theory, the most important of which is his contention that Marx has never pretended to fight
for anything of value.
Camus writes that Marx hailed economic realities and disparaged metaphysics to such an extent that he
(Marx) never even tried to justify the end of history, the rise of the proletariat. He simply declared that
it was the inevitable end of things and justified every form of terrorism for that end to be achieved. For
Camus, who saw the Soviet Union as a treacherous place, Marx had, to mix metaphors, opened Pendoras
floodgates and unleashed a storm upon the world which was unrestrained by reason, justice, or morality.
Using Albert Camus in Lincoln Douglas Debate
Camus thought can be complex, difficult to explain, and at times, substantively muddled. That said, his
insights are keen and original, and hes a little -used author in LD, meaning that few debaters have 12point generic A/T: Camus blocks in their briefcases.
The Rebel endorses a fairly generic liberalism/communitarianism blend, and its not the best blend on the
market. It celebrates civil rights, freedom of expression, and total abstinence from killingbut other
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sources advocate the same things with greater clarity and insight. The Rebels most helpful observation, in
my opinion, is also its simplest: the recognition that rebels throughout history act in such a manner that
they put themselves personally at risk for others and for a concept of their role in the scheme of humanity
is invaluable to anyone running a communitarianist position. The belief in respect and equalityeven
when we ourselves dont stand to gain said respect or equalityseems to be timeless and universal: that
provides evidence of a communitarian human nature which is far more compelling than Aristotles
analysis of the same in the Politics (which many LDers fall back on). Camus critique of Marx might be
useful on certain topics, and should the capital punishment topic resurface, Camus argument against all
killingthat it betrays the commonality of manmight be useful.
The Myth of Sisyphus provides an excellent, holistic philosophical system with boundless potential for use
in LD. Its most obvious uses flow from its conclusions about the supreme value of ones quantity of life,
the importance of lucidity, and the immorality of suicide. Obvious, also, is that Myth is relevant to all
topics in which freedom is an issue, as it provides a vision of the actualization of freedom which is wildly
from that presented by any other philosophical system I know of. But the philosophy of absurdity can be
an important part of almost any case on almost any subject. Its nihilistic and celebratory of the human
spirit at the same time. I leave its fruits to the debater; use them wisely.
Further Reading
In order to fully understand Camus philosophy, a very basic understanding of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard
is essential. Nietzsches Beyond Good and Evil and Kierkegaards Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing as
well as Fear and Trembling and Sickness Unto Death are good primary sources, though all three make for
very difficult reading. Secondary sources of help include Camus: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed.
Germaine Bree, Camus: Portrait of a Moralist by Stephen Eric Bronner, and Albert Camus by Phillip H.
Rhein.
Suggested Reading List
The fundamentals of existentialist philosophy are the Kierkegaard and Nietzsche works above-mentioned
as well as Heideggers Being and Time and Sartres Being and Nothingness. The fundamentals of Camus,
besides the three works mentioned in the article, are the novels The Plague and The Fall as well as the
excellent play Caligula. For more works by existentialist authors, see the suggested reading lists at the
bottom of my articles on Heidegger, Sartre, and Jaspers.
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Derrida (Dheeraj Chand)
JACQUES DERRIDA
by Dheeraj Chand
Jacques Derrida is quite possibly one of the most maddeningly esoteric figures in contemporary thought.
His work resists simplistic analysis and application, and his behaviour and statements only serve to add to
the obscurity and complexity of his work. While many authors of the post-structuralist/modernist vein
claim to find warrants for their endeavours in Derridas work or attempt to situate his work within a poststructuralist/post-modernist environment, a close examination of both the corpus of his work and his
direct statements openly deny such claims. Derridas work is contemporaneous to, and has common roots
with, post-structuralism/post-modernism but is neither post-structuralism/post-modernism nor is it a
justification for such endeavours. (Howells, p. 2) This proximity to an already dense, tangled web of
philosophical schools only serves to further obfuscate interpretation of Derridas work. In order to
understand the goal of Derridas writings, a theoretical boundary line must be drawn between his
conceptual undertakings and his politics. Whether or not this boundary line is theoretically and
contextually justified is open to debate, but for purposes of education, it serves a valuable purpose. (Lilla,
online) Derridas deconstructionist techniques and theories are an attempt to disrupt the status quo
stability of the operations of liberal humanist oriented philosophies by exposing their metaphysical
assumptions and de-stabilising the binary oppositions that they take for granted. (Collins and Mayblin, p.
91-97) The benefits of this methodology to emancipatory politics are obvious, but it is important to
remember that deconstruction can just as easily be turned to suit establishment purposes. Any
consideration of deconstruction must be informed by its absolute lack of political loyalty. Keeping these
caveats in mind, certain tactics of deconstruction can be explored both individually and synergistically
concerning emancipatory political action. A full interrogation of deconstructionist tactics, however, is
beyond the scope of this paper.
Deconstruction can be essentially reduced to two components acting synergistically: undecidability and
derailed communication. An unholy matrix of the two is the foundation and inspiration of the Derridean
enterprise. Derrida himself has commented that, Everything that I have done is dominated by the
thought of a virus. The virus being many things. Follow two threads. One, the virus introduces disorder
into communication, even in the biological sphere a derailing of coding and re-coding. Two, a virus is
not a microbe. It is neither living nor non-living, neither alive nor dead. Follow these threads and you
have the matrix of all I have done since I started writing. (Collins & Mayblin, p. 16) To continue with
the virus analogy, deconstruction operates by infecting the operations of a liberal humanist philosophy
and by successfully contaminating it to the point of dysfunctionality. This dysfunctionality is then
supposed to force the actor to re-think their advocacy of the liberal humanist philosophy in light of the
inherent flaws within it that allowed this dysfunctionality to occur and to hopefully lead to a rejection of
this philosophy in favour of one more stable. Deconstruction is thus a powerful tool in that it makes no
direct statements itself, and carries no advocacy: all that it does is expose instability in something else.
There are only two ways to refute a deconstruction:
1. To reconstruct the text by showing how the revealed instabilities are actually rather stable, or
2. To deconstruct the deconstruction, and to show how it in turn is founded upon tenuous binary
oppositions and metaphysical assumptions that are very easily challenged.
In the face of a truly thorough deconstruction, however, neither is a very viable option. To situate
deconstruction within a historical context, it is very much so a product of the legacies of Nietzsche, and
Heidegger. (Spanos, p. 4) Nietzsche questioned everything ruthlessly, best exemplified by his The Gay
Science and On the Genealogy of Morals. In the former, he attacks the concept of History as an
objective factual entity, and proposed the existence of several micro-histories as a conceptual alternative.
Nietzsche further points out that each individual exists largely in a world determined his/her own
perspective, meaning that all interpretations of events and phenomena will be intensely personalised and
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essentially non-communicable. In the latter, he bypassed the products of morality, and instead chose to
explore the foundations of the phenomena and re-contextualise it on that level. Before Nietzsche, no such
disruptive action had been taken: philosophical utterances were either advocacies or polemics. There was
no purely apolitical disruptive analysis. (Kauffman, p. 3-19) Furthermore, Nietzsche was the first one to
properly incorporate several different means of communication into his work: fiction, poetry, declamatory
prose, usage of several languages within passages, historical referents, etc. Nietzsches legacy is wideranging and deep, affecting the work of generations of thinkers after him. (Kauffman, p. 3-19) Continuing
in the Nietzschean tradition and methodology, Martin Heidegger postulated \a radical disturbance of
traditional liberal humanist philosophy with his ontological interrogations and destructive hermeneutics.
(Dreyfus and Rabinow, p. xxi-xxiii) In Being and Time, Heidegger offers the tool of Destruktion und
Abbau, which connotatively translates to tearing down and constructing from the rubble. Heideggers
hermeneutic techniques of destroying the normal interpretation of phenomena and creating a counternarrative and interpretation from the remnants were a powerful inspiration for Derrida, as he readily
admits. (Collins and Selinas, p. 47) What differentiates Derridean deconstruction from Heideggerian
hermeneutics is as much an issue of methodology as it is an issue of ideology: Heidegger proposes that an
act of creating a multiplicity of interpretations is tied to a power struggle for the realisation of the
potentialities of Dasein, whereas Derrida immerses himself in a text and explores its undecidability as
nothing more than the creation of a differing lens from whic h to observe phenomena.
The key concept to deconstruction is the rejection of logocentrism and presence. In the case of
logocentrism, the Derridean debt to Nietzsche is obvious. Derrida calls for a rejection of metaphysics
based upon his interpretation of the field: the creation of unanswerable questions, and the subsequent
search for these answers. To justify both their questions and their searches for answers, metaphysicians
appeal to some kind of notion of Truth, which is then channelled into their various principles, axioms,
justifications, etc. This idea of a deified Truth being reduced to single, ultimate point of origin that must
be sought out at all costs is what Derrida calls logocentrism. (Collins & Mayblin, p. 46) This act of
reduction of truth to some phenomenological object then necessitates an invocation of it: a search to bring
the presence of deified Truth to an endeavour. It is the belief in logocentrism and the channelling of its
presence that must be overcome in Western thought the contamination of thought by metaphysics must
be overcome. This is easier said than it is done. The entire history of Western thought can be considered
to be metaphysics: the contagion of logocentrism and presence has taken over thought to the point where
there is nothing left save the virus and a shell of what the host formerly was. The sheer immensity of the
target can lead to despair and appearances of contradiction within the deconstructionist enterprise. The
act of deconstruction is necessarily caught up in metaphysical thinking as well. The immensity of the
target can create the perception that any action taken against it insignificant. Derrida agrees that these are
valid concerns, but even if they are true, this does not mitigate the goal of deconstruction. (Collins and
Mayblin, p. 47) To ascribe some kind of ultimate end goal to deconstruction would make it part of a
teleological political project and rob it of its critical power. Deconstruction can be used as a means of
limited engagement with liberal humanism with the goal of making movements against it without
subscribing to an onto-theological goal of immanentizing a prophesied eschaton. (Collins and Mayblin,
p. 47) Derridas concept of his work as virus leads to a further duality: deconstruction infects and disrupts
the standard operations of liberal humanist philosophy and is the vaccine for its inherent flaws.
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The foundation has been laid for another Derridean concept, the pharmakon. This is a Greek word
resonant with imagery and dual, seemingly contradictory, meanings.
Pharmakon is a Greek word which could be translated as magic potion. Other English
translations have used recipe, receipt, specific, cure and remedy. But as Derrida
notes, pharmakon is a specially ambiguous word.
In Greek, pharmakon means both cure and poison. Like the English word drug, it has
good and bad aspects. Some translations resolve the word, cutting out one of its poles.
But the pharmakon is UNDECIDABLE, inhabiting both the curative and poisonous.
(Collins and Mayblin, p. 29)
According to Derrida, too many actual un-decidable phenomena are tacitly resolved in daily practice and
accepted as such. The only way to resolve a pharmakon is to remove some of its meaning, and to then
attempt to substitute the truncated remnant for the original. This substitution is very easily
accommodated into the schema of binary oppositions that are accepted by society: good/bad,
essence/appearance, etc. To recover the multiplicity of meanings and implications of the pharmakon,
then is to displace the pharmakon from the context of these oppositions and force a re-consideration of the
pharmakon itself and the context into which it had been forced. Since the pharmakon cannot be reduced
to fit into the schema of binary oppositions, the binary oppositions must be re-thought to include the
pharmakon. From Platos Pharmacy onward, Derrida explores writing as a pharmakon that our
phonocentric culture has attempted to resolve by placing it in opposition to speech and subordinating it.
Much of his further thought can be traced back to his endeavours to de-stabilise this opposition,
specifically the ideas of trace and difference. (Howells, p. 50) In keeping with Heideggers recovery of
the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus notion of polemos, Derrida posits that the act of defining a notion
necessarily creates the potential for its antithesis to exist. Saussures structural linguistics would seem to
agree, since it rests on the idea that signifiers are heard violently against everything that they are not. In
hearing p/i/g, we hear each phoneme against a backdrop of potentiality for others to have been there.
Derrida manages to extrapolate from this the notion of trace, that each created concept carries elements of
that which it is not and that which it could be. (Collins and Mayblin, p. 70-71). This constant play of
presence of meaning is what allows for indeterminacy each signifier is not only linked to its anti-thesis
but to everything else that it is not and could have been. The trace is a powerful concept: while it IS
NOT, it undermines the stability of that which IS (in the ontological sense of the word). Derrida uses
trace to shake the foundations of not only daily, functional language but also the highly specialised
discourse of metaphysics. Philosophy necessarily depends on communicability and highly specific
meanings; without them, the whole enterprise can fall apart. The notion of difference is a direct
application of trace. The French language lacks a gerund construction of the verb to differ, but has a
noun (the difference), a verb (to differ), and a verb-adjective (the condition of differing). The root
word differ also carries implications of deferral. Given the semantic lacking of the language, Derridas
neologism of difference carries incredible power.
But in French theres a semantic deficit. Theres no noun-verb. Wed expect one a word
which lets us name the activity of putting off, or of differing with someone or
something. If difference were a French word, it might be that noun-verb. But it isnt. Not
being that, it can supply the semantic loss and cover all other absences and occlusions of
meaning across these related nouns, verbs, etc. (Collins and Mayblin, p. 75)
Difference a word that IS NOT, encompasses and surpasses the potentialities of meaning from the root
word differ.
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Derridas disruption of the very foundations of language leads to a further questioning of whether or not a
text constructed from this shaken la nguage can be stable, and whether or not any act of textual
manipulation can be stable. A reconsideration of the operations of speech is necessary. Under the status
quo liberal humanist conception of speech acts, defined by J.L. Austin, speech can function in two ways:
1. Performatively performing an act, conferring an ontological state upon a phenomena
2. Constatively asserting or declaring an ontic proposition, a statement of facticity. (Collins
and Mayblin, p. 80)
Austins focus is primarily upon performative speech acts what constitutes them, how they function,
what allows them to function, etc. When speech acts are performed in a quotational manner, e.g. as a part
of a poem, a libretto of an opera, a line in a play, etcAustin maintains that these acts are not performed
seriously, and they are etiolated: the quotation robs the original of its vitality and power by occurring
without intending to succeed. (Collins and Mayblin, p. 80-81) Derrida sees this as creating the binary
opposition of serious/non-serious speech, with writing once again being subordinated by our phonocentric
culture. He offers a radical re-conceptualisation of writing in order to undermine this binary opposition:
writing as an iterable phenomenon, depending on absence of presence for its power. (Collins and
Mayblin, p. 82-83) It must be repeatable and in its repetition subjected to re-interpretation. This
repetition allows for citation and graft: the lifting and re-contextualisation of speech. Following his logic
of the supplement, Derrida claims that the existence of a real version of a text is only possible if its
quotational version is possible the two are linked in a dance to the death. Austins communication is
effectively shaken. (Collins and Mayblin, p. 84-86) Communication is merely shaken, though, not
destroyed. Context and intention are not destroyed, just displaced. Communication is still possible, but
under conditions of massively reduced effectiveness. Actions to legitimate the communication,
signatures, are not left untouched either. Signatures are necessarily a function of writing: they must be
repeatable, and yet to have power they must rely on the absence of presence per se: they are an attempt to
be present unto themselves. A radical interpretation of this disempowerment of language would lead to
the notion that authorship is dead, while a more sceptical interpretation would be that authorship is merely
shaken. (Collins and Mayblin, p. 80-110) The goal of introducing disorder into communication by means
of celebrating uncertainty has been accomplished.
An elementary reading of Derridas enterprise and techniques can lead to the conclusion that his work is
childish, unimportant, and philosophically inconsequential. No less an institution than Cambridge came
close to rejecting the proposition of awarding Derrida an honorary degree on such grounds: the vote was
336 against 204. Hardly a majority, but a barely necessary plurality of dons agreed that his work
constitutes more than just elaborate visual puns and multiple entendres. (Collins and Mayblin, p. 5-11)
Those who opposed his candidacy for a degree claimed that his work is incomprehensible and
inapplicable: trace, difference, and so forth are purely means of engaging in ontological terrorism without
having any significant discursive, philosophical, or political implications. The very proof of this lay in
the fact that Derrida was always quick and unusually direct in his comments on deconstruction: it must
never be affiliated with any particular school of thought or politics. However, a lack of allegiance does
not equivocate to a lack of power or significance. A bullet fired from the barrel of a rifle can kill a
righteous person just as easily as it can an evil one, and the rifle can be possessed by either, or both. This
total lack of allegiance, especially when contrasted to Derridas stated leftist political beliefs, infuriated
many of those who would otherwise be sympathetic to his work. Gayatri Spivak, the translator of
Derridas Of Grammatology, remarked that she felt ferociously angry with deconstruction because
Derrida seemed not enough of a Marxist. He also seemed to be a sexist. But thats because I was wanting
deconstruction to be what it isnt, Ive realised its value by recognising its limits by not asking it to do
everything for me. (Collins and Mayblin 168-169) Many argue that a deconstructive reading is a
political act in and of itself, a performative polemic against both the text and the author who created it. In
a roundtable discussion held at the inauguration of Villanova Universitys graduate studies program in
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philosophy, Derrida openly declared that his readings of texts are based on admiration and rather than
being a trivialisation of them, they are academically rigorous celebrations of the texts:
Now at the risk of being a little over-simplifying, I would take this opportunity to reject a
commonplace, a prejudice that is widely circulated about deconstruction. That is not only
among bad journalists, but among people in the academy who behave not like good
journalists I have the deepest respect for good journalists but like bad journalists,
repeating stereotypes without reading the text. Perhaps we will come back t this later on.
This has been from the beginning a terrible problem for me, and not only for me, this
caricature, this lack of respect for reading. Because as soon as one examines my texts,
and not only mine but the texts of many people close to me, one sees that respect for the
great textsDeconstruction is something which happens and which happens inside, there
is a deconstruction at work within Platos work, for instanceSo to be true to Plato, and
this is a sign of love and respect for Plato, I have to analyse the functioning and
disfunctioning of his work. (Derrida and Caputo, p. 9)
So where does this leave the reader? Deconstruction is an apolitical methodology, but one which indicates
an admiration for its targets this is only a paradox if one holds the opinion that one who holds an
opposing view must necessarily be the target of hatred and distaste. An enemy can be respected, even
loved, while still being an opposing force. The fashion in which Derrida considers those whom he
deconstructs is very comparable to Nietzsches conception of the noble, meaningful enemy.
Derridas recent writings on politics are less about politics qua politics and more about the fashion in
which political phenomena can be experienced and deconstructed as texts. He has written on the nature
of obligations and subsequent power dynamics in friendship (The Politics of Friendship), the changing
face and identity of Europe (The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe), and several other
fascinating subjects. Perhaps his most meaningful and spectacular political work, though, is in Specters
of Marx: The State of The Debt, the Work of Mourning, & the New International. This is the work in
which he chooses to engage Marx by means of a deconstruction of Francis Fukuyamas The End of
History and The Last Man. As with many French intellectuals of his time, Derrida is a decidedly leftwing thinker, and in Specters he attempted to confront the very source of his Leftist views, Marx,
while at the same time acknowledging that Marxs philosophy of history and economics were worthless.
If Marxs political economy is gone, then what is left of Marx, and what warrant can one have for Leftist
views? He answers this question in a fashion remarkably similar to that employed in his work on
Heidegger, Of Spirit: although Marx the man had failed in his economics and his politics, he had
created a certain spirit of opposition and eternal questioning that could be of timeless value and
inspiration to future thinkers so much so that all opposition post-Marx is necessarily a product of him.
Derrida writes that,
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Let us limit ourselves, for lack of time, to certain traits, for example, of what is
deconstruction, in the figure that it initially took over the course of these last decades,
namely the deconstruction of the metaphysics of the proper, of logocentrism,
linguisticism, phonologism, the demystification or the de-sedimentation of the autonomic
hegemony of language (a deconstruction in the course of which is elaborated another
concept of the text or the trace, of their originary technization, of iterability, of the
prosthetic supplement, but also of the proper and of what was given the name
exappropriation). Such a deconstruction would have been impossible and unthinkable in
a pre-Marxist space. Deconstruction has never had any sense or interest, in my view at
least, except as a radicalisation, which is to say also in the tradition of, a certain
Marxism, in a spirit of MarxismIf this attempt has been prudent and sparing but rarely
negative in the strategy of its references to Marx, it is because the Marxist ontology, the
appellation Marx, the legitimation by way of Marx had been in a way too solidly taken
over. They appeared to be welded to an orthodoxy, to apparatuses and strategies, whose
least fault was not only they were, as such, deprived of a future, deprived of the future
itself. By welded one may understand an artificial but sold adherence whose very event
constituted the whole history of the world for the last century and a half, and the whole
history of my generation. (Derrida, p. 92)
This book was an amazing work: in an attempt to disprove the jubilant fanfare of Fukuyamas The End
of History and to recover Marx-inspired Leftist thought, Derrida re-interpreted the nature of Marx
(similar to the fashion in which Heidegger had re-interpreted Aristotle, actually) and attached the prestige
of his own name and enterprise to Marxism. And this is done in no mean fashion: Derrida undertakes this
with an initial venture into phenomenology, and performs a destructive hermeneutic upon both Marx and
Fukuyama by means of post-structuralist linguistic techniques. The very beauty of the technique of
Specters renders it timely and germane without any consideration of its subject matter. However,
once an admiration of the technicality is left behind, the claims presented are rather compelling. Derrida
reminds us that there is no such thing as an end to history, and that even though Marx has taken a beating
in the present day he can still recover so long as he as his work are not approached as the gospel truth
unto itself but leave themselves open to interpretation and internalisation on a phenomenological level.
Furthermore, he reminds us that what is right is not always what wins: might does not equate to right.
The spirit of Marx may eventually triumph, so long as we do not lose hope.
Derridas work is quite compelling and enjoyable to read, and is all the more enjoyable to a serious
student precisely because it resists condensation into dramatic sound-bites. Unlike the aphoristic style
enjoyed and employed by some of his contemporaries, most notably Guy de Bord, Derridas texts are
only truly understandable as complete entities. In yet another enjoyable paradox, the very man who
claims to be able to fragment and essentialise any text produces texts that are only capable on being
understood holistically. The goal of this paper, then, is not provide a quick summation of Derridas work
for immediate deployment, nor is it in any way an exhaustive exegesis upon his work. Rather, the goal of
this paper is to encourage a dance through Derridas texts a dance that is an endless celebration of the
potentialities of being.
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Selected Bibliography
?? Howells, Christina. Derrida: Deconstruction from Phenomenology to Ethics. Reader in French
at University of Oxford. 1999.
?? Collins, Jeff and Mayblin, Bill. Introducing Derrida. Lecturer in Art History at University of
Leeds, and Senior Partner in Information Design Workshop.
?? Derrida, Jacques. Deconstruction In A Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida. Edited by
Caputo, John D. 1994.
?? Derrida, Jacques. Specters of Marx: The State of The Debt, the Work of Mourning, & the New
International. Translated by Peggy Kamuf. 1994.
?? Kauffman, Walter. The Portable Nietzsche. 1954.
?? Lilla, Mark. The Politics of Jacques Derrida. New York Review of Books. June 25, 1998, p. 26-41.
Available http://jya.com/lilla-derrida.htm.
?? Spanos, William V. Heidegger and Criticism: Retrieving the Cultural Politics of Destruction.
1993.
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Hegel (Mahrad Almotahari)
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL

by Mahrad Almotahari
The evolution of debate has favored certain philosophical presuppositions. Questions of morality and
justice almost invariably mean that there will be an emphasis on Kantian or Rawlsian metaphysics and
that the issues discussed have to be resolved in these two systems; otherwise, the conclusion will, because
of some other presupposition, be illegitimate. This is why well often see the categorical imperative or
Rawlss principles of justice as criteria both affirming and negating any given resolution. Certainly Kant
and Rawls couldnt have been so right that all value conflicts can be conclusively resolved with these two
sister-frameworks exclusively; or so versatile that they would simultaneously advocate and oppose a
certain issue.
One system that hasnt been given enough attention because of this sort of prejudice is Hegels dialectic.
Now when the dialectic is discussed, its common to think of what I call the Hegelian trinity; that is, the
thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. But what does it all really mean; and in what way is it meant to be used?
Considering Hegel is one philosopher that has extensively critiqued Kant, with special attention given to
his imperatives, I think it would be worthwhile to find out.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, like most philosophers, developed his thoughts as a result of the social
circumstances in which he lived. And because he lived in a period where the balance of power was
essential for the preservation of continental order, Hegel believed that the consent of the governed
which is a prerequisite for a legitimate statedidnt have to be explicit. But, this type of consent-bydefault, since given without full understanding or even consciousness of the terms of contract, caused a
sense of alienation among the governed. Government, thought Hegel, is, nonetheless, a necessary
expedient for two reasons: (1) the tendency of people to act in their own interests at the expense of others
in a state of nature, and (2) the commonality of certain, more fundamental interests between large groups
of people. These two principles were very prevalent ideas during the Enlightenment. What wasnt so
common was the inherent problem Hegel saw in the formation of this expedient. The problem of the
nation-state isnt just a matter of rightful sovereignty over the people, but a much more encompassing one
that included a feeling of general confusion and estrangement from the state. Philosophy, then, is a way of
coming to terms with the self as a part in the whole of the natural worlda way of mitigating this sense
of alienation. Therefore, the subject of philosophy was the history of the human experience; and its
purpose, thought Hegel, was for humanity to come to know itself.
While this process of self-consciousness was thought to be simply an individuals awareness of his
thoughts, intentions, desires, etc., Hegel believed it was foremost an understanding that these faculties are
a reflection of complex social characteristics inherited by the individual. These characteristics, though, are
in a perpetual state of progressive evolution, caused by some external dynamo. Altogether, the effect of
this would be the manifestation of what Hegel called the Absolute Spirit, which most scholars interpret
to be some sort of extra-human transcendence, which, for our purposes isnt very relevant. But the
implication of this process of self-cognizance is.
Critics of Hegel have called him a historical determinist, because his ideas negate the belief in an
autonomous will: How can you and I be free, rational, moral agents if the sum of our thoughts, intentions,
and desires are conditioned by the sum of all thoughts, intentions, and desires preceding our birth? And if
we act on our resolve, and our resolve has been determined by centuries of historical preconditioning,
how can you or I be rightfully held responsible for our actions? These questions fundamentally impeach
any resolution, and are good for devising kritiks to help a strategically minded negative throw a
thoughtless affirmative off coarse. For example, the Nationals 2000 resolution was a question of moral
accountability when it proposed Inaction in the face of injustice makes an individual morally culpable.
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In this scenario it would be a viable argument to cla im that the resolution should be rejected just on the
premise that it asserts you and I are moral agents, and then offering a Hegelianesque theory of
determinism to warrant the kritik. This may not be a wise strategy with old school values judges, but
would work well with those that look for critical theory and thought-provoking discourse.
Hegels response to the accusations of determinism is a bit muddled, and this is why hes usually
considered a Continental Philosopher. The idea of freedom, argues Hegel, is more complex than what
Kant believed it to be. It isnt some faculty thats entirely independent of causality, neither is it purely
rational.
Marcuse, Herbert. Political philosopher and Hegel scholar. Political Philosophy.
Reason and Revolution. 1954. p. 197.
To be sure, Hegel holds that free reason governs the will and act of individuals,
but this reason seems to behave in the manner of a natural law and not as an autonomous
human activity.
Unfortunately, Hegel never concretely argues how rational human freedom is, or to what extent its
independent of external causes. So here were left with two quite contrary ideas: freedom and
determinism. Rather than offering an analysis of either a definite compatibility between these two ideas,
or the primacy of one over the other, Hegel instead tries to resolve the issue by relying on his dialectic.
Recall Hegels emphasis on the importance of history. Hegel never gives us any standard that
discriminates between the rational and irrational, or true and false. Instead, he argues that both reason and
truth are processes, and that philosophy is the study of the development of reason and truth through the
coarse of history. Now consider how prevalent certain ideas are throughout history. Justice and liberty are
two ideas that are valued in every culture, in every age. Certainly no rational person would claim injustice
to be more valuable than justice, or bondage more desirable than liberty. The difference is in how these
ideas are practically expressed. For example, some may claim that a central authority is more just than a
federal system. In this example lets assume the aim of the state is justice; Hegel calls this aim the
subject. But the opposing ways of achieving justice (that is, the establishment of either a monarchy or a
federal republic) Hegel calls predicates or theses. These theses are in opposition with regard to the
method of establishing justice. But the inherent conflict between these two conflicting theses necessarily
causes, believed Hegel, a synthesis between the two ideas that unites the best of both.
Marcuse, Herbert. The Marxian Dialectic. Reason and Revolution. p. 316.
The dialectical analysis of social reality in terms of its inherent contradictions
and their resolution shows this reality to be overpowered by objective mechanisms that
operate with the necessity of natural (physical) lawsonly thus can the contradictions
be the ultimate force that keeps society moving.
The dialectic is, then, a causal system in which each component is a necessary precondition for the overall
resolution of antagonizing ideas; a system thats set in motion by the antagonism its meant to resolve.
But how does this system resolve the compatibility of freedom in determinism? Well the answer is given
by John and Eliss McTaggart who, in their book Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic, a book I recommend
reading for a more thorough description of the dialectic argue that the dialectic asserts both opposing
theses to equally, and only partially, true. Considering the synthesis takes from both theses what are their
best attributes, this shouldnt be surprising, although its fairly counter-intuitive. So Hegels dialectic is
fundamentally premised on the limited truth of all assertions.
152

Jones, W.T. California Institute of Technology. Reactions Against Kantianism: Hegel

and Schopenhauer. Kant and the Nineteenth Century. 1975. pp. 109-110.
Hegels point may be illustrated by a trivial example: Suppose that Mr. A looks
at a colored patch and calls it red. Mr. B, looking at the same patch, replies, Oh, no;
thats blue. So far A and B are in contradictiona situation in which men too often find
themselves. Perhaps A and B continue to insist dogmatically on their original assertions;
but, if they are willing to return upon and reconsider the colored patch they have
observed, they may agree that the color is royal purple a bluish red or (if one prefers) a
reddish blue. Thus A and B may come to see that they were in contradiction only because
each was emphasizing one shade in the color and ignoring the othereach, while
affirming his part of the truth, denied the part of the truth that the other was affirming. A
more complex example is that of the dispute over United States foreign policy in
Southeast Asia. Now, it is a truism that United States policy looks different from
different points of view. But it is not immediately evident that, as Hegel claims, all
partial perspectives can be harmonized into a simple all-inclusive perspective. Yet this is
Hegels claim: (1) Every particular assertion (for example, This color is red) is only
partially true, because it is always made from a limited point of view. (2) Every particular
assertion is nevertheless partially true (the color really is red, when seen under certain
lighting conditions or in juxtaposition with that other color. (3) Because every particular
assertion (The color is red) is only partially true it tends to generate a compensatory
assertion (The color is blue). (4) These conflicting assertions are reconcilable in a more
inclusive assertion (The color is royal purple). (5) This more inclusive assertion in turn
proves to be partial and thus requires correction by a still more adequate formulation.
But how can all of this be used in debate? Thats a good question. Whenever a resolution compels one
side of the argument to advocate the merits of a seemingly polar concept or practice, the dialectic, I
believe, is a good way of centralizing the issue. For example, this years Nationals topic had the
affirmation claiming violent revolution is a just method of social change: On balance, violent revolution
is a just response to oppression. Well a classic argument claimed by most negatives was that violent
revolution is too radical a method when there are various other ways of changing an oppressive state.
There were various permutations to this argument, with a handful of different impacts, but the general
idea was that other, more moderate ways produce better results without the harms. The appeal of this
argument was its moderate nature. It didnt advocate something as rhetorically repugnant as violence. But
with a dialectical approach to the resolution, the affirmative could change this.
As the affirmative, one could claim that general historical trends show that social movements tend to shift
from radicalism (that is, violent revolution) to moderation (for our purpose lets say civil disobedience, or
grass roots political movements like Populism). To Hegel, such trends were known as the world spirit,
which is as rationale and truthful as any argument to him because history was that looking glass through
which reason and truth were seen. Several specific examples would serve to warrant this a bit better; say,
South Africa and India both prior and subsequent to Ghandi; or the Civil Rights Movement, beginning
with the black nationalism and militancy of Elijah Muhammad and ending with the nonviolence of King.
A dialectical analysis of this historical phenomena (that is, considering the radical initial response as the
thesis, and the moderate subsequent responses as the antitheses) shows that violent revolution is a
necessary antecedent to moderate progressive movements. Therefore, a syllogism could be drawn: (a)
moderate forms of social change are necessary for social welfare; (b) violent revolution necessarily causes
moderate forms of social change (remember to establish the causal relationship between a thesis and its
antithesis to warrant this); (c) therefore, violent revolution is necessary for social welfare. The conclusion
is necessarily true if the first two premises are established because if some X (in this case violent
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revolution) causes Y (moderate progressivism), then theres no differentiating between X and Y if X is

present.
Generally, though, this is to show that the dialectic is a clever way of integrating seemingly contradictory
assertions so that if ever one side of a resolution were forced to advocate something quite polar, it can be
made more moderate. In the example illustrated above, the affirmative would be able to grant the impacts
of the negative argument and claim that other means are only viable once violent revolution precedes the
civil activism. This isnt to say that the dialectic is problem free, but its tactically sound because it would
require unique analysis from the negative that normally isnt present in values debate. And the time that
the negative spends on just trying to understand the argument, means less time spent on actually
answering it. This doesnt mean that the argument should be used in every round; only in those rounds
where youre confident that the judge will understand the argument in as concise a way as possible.
One final comment: Hegels dialectic isnt a criterion. It doesnt weigh competing claims. Talking with
some debaters at Nationals, I noticed this wasnt sufficiently understood. Remember, the dialectic
assumes that all contradictory claims are partially and equally true. If this is at the core of the system, and
you were to use it as a criterion, there would be no debate. Essentially, youd be telling your judge to both
affirm and negate. That said, good luck with it, and keep an open mind when you debate your next
resolution.
i
All quotations are from Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Transl. H.J. Paton.
Harper & Row, New York: 1964.
ii
All quotations are from Scanlon, T.M. What We Owe to Each Other. Harvard Belknap Press,
Cambridge: 2000.
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Written by Mahrad Almotahari, Stephen Babb, Anthony Berryhill, Dheeraj

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ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

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JOHN STUART MILL

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