An Analysis of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil

Spill: Overview, Cause, and Responsibility

Table of Contents
Section 1:
1.
2.
3.
4.

General Overview..3
Chronology of Events4
Technical Analysis of Critical Failures.4-6
Delegation of Responsibility.7

Section 2:
1. Overview of Professional, Ethical, and Moral Responsibility..8
2. Analysis of Major Participants in Context of Responsibilities.8-9

Section 1:

1. General Overview
The following statistics and overview of the oil spill are derived from the government report
[1]. The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, also known as the BP oil spill, is considered the largest
marine oil spill in the world and the largest oil spill in United States history, spilling a total of 4.9
million barrels of oil into the sensitive Gulf of Mexico ecosystem. To put this figure into
perspective, the Ixtoc I oil spill, the second largest marine spill, totaled 3.5 million barrels of oil
and the second largest spill in US history, the Exxon Valdez, totaled 750,000 barrels of oil. The
BP oil spill started on April 20th, 2010 after two explosions rocked the Deepwater Horizon rig
killing 11 workers and causing a massive leak from the wellhead after the blowout preventer
failed to activate. The sea floor gusher spewed oil for 87 days and was officially capped on July
15th, 2010. The spill itself generated a massive government and industry response of boons,
controlled burns, oil dispersant, and skimming in order to control the oil. On the most active day,
over 6000 vessels, 82 helicopters, 20 planes, 48,000 personal, and 3.8 million feet of boon were
deployed to combat the oil spill. Despite these efforts, 500 miles of coastline in Louisiana,
Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and Texas were all impacted. The damage to marine and wildlife
habitats is still being researched today and some experts argue the impact of oil and oil
dispersants will last for generations. As a result of these negative effects, especially to
individuals involved in the fishing and tourism industry, BP was fined over $4.5 billion by the
Department of Justice and other BP settlements total over $40 billion. Despite these
compensations, the deaths of 11 workers and the damage to wildlife will never be reversed and
the BP oil spill will be recorded in history as one of the most tragic environmental disasters in
modern times.
2. Chronology of Events
The following chronology of events is based on the news report [3]. On April 20th, a methane
bubble from the well comes up the riser and causes two explosions on the rig. As a result, 11
workers die and 17 workers are injured; however, the blowout preventer fails and oil begins to
flow out of the well unhindered. On April 22nd, the rig sinks to the sea floor after burning for 2

days. On April 25th, BP attempts to manually turn on the blowout preventer using underwater
robots, but the endeavor is unsuccessful. On April 26th, oil dispersants are first used to dissipate
the surface oil. In total, a record 1.84 million gallons of dispersants were used throughout the
disaster and for the first time underwater injection of dispersants was utilized. On April 28th, the
Coast Guard estimates 5,000 barrels of oil per day are leaking and the cleanup effort begins as
controlled burns and boon are deployed. Also, BP attempts to repair the hydraulic leak on the
blowout preventer, but fails. On April 30th, President Obama issues a temporary ban on all
offshore drilling to review safety regulations. On May 2nd, a relief well begins to be drilled as a
longer term solution and fishing in the area is temporarily banned. On May 8th, BP attempts to
lower a containment dome over the leak, but the solution fails as ice crystals form which prevent
the device from collecting oil. On May 8th, a junk shot is attempted by using shredded tires and
golf balls to clog the leak, but it fails. On May 16th, BP begins to siphon 5,000 barrels of oil per
day using a tube lowered into the leak, but experts now estimate the total flow rate of oil to be
20,000 barrels of oil per day. On May 26th, a top kill is attempted where a mixture of cement
and mud is pumped into the leak, but this also fails. On June 13th, a small containment cap is now
capturing a large percentage of the leak. On July 15th, BP stops the flow of oil after 87 days with
a new containment cap. On September 19th, pressure tests indicate the well is officially dead, but
cleanup efforts still continue.
3. Technical Analysis of Critical Failures
The following technical data is sourced from reports [1,3]. In order to fully understand the
technical missteps involved in the failure of the BP oil spill it is important to understand the
basics of offshore drilling. There are many different techniques, but in the case of the BP oil spill
a semisubmersible rig called the Deepwater Horizon was utilized. The rig is the origin where the
drill protrudes down to the sea floor and also where the status of the well is monitored and
controlled. The drill is contained in a riser which is a pipe that allows drilling fluid to flow
between the rig and sea floor. As the drill burrows below the sea floor cement and metal casing is
added sequentially to add stability to the hole being drilled. At the top of this hole, a hydraulic
blowout preventer is installed to close off the pipe in case of a blowout.

BP began the majority of its drilling at the Macondo well in February 2010 leasing
Transoceans Deepwater Horizon rig and rig workers to complete the job. In this particular case,
the rig was only an exploratory rig meaning it was to find oil, drill the well, and then seal the
well so that a production rig can be used later to extract the oil. On April 9th, 2010 the drilling of
the last section had been completed 18,360 feet below sea level and 1,192 feet below the last
casing. At this point, BP was tasked with casing the last 1,192 feet of the well and they hired
Halliburton, a company in the oil industry, to complete the cement job. At this point, the critical
mistakes which played a role in the blowout and subsequent oil spill began to be made.
The first technical error was the choice of the final casing. There were two options: a
liner/tieback option where a steel tube and steel liner tube called a tieback are used (4 barriers of
protection) and a long string casing where a single string of steel casing is used (2 barriers of
protection). BP chose to use the long string casing as it was considered effective enough, but
ultimately saved time and money. The general concept casing can be seen in Figure 1 from [3].

Figure 1 - Diagram of Deepwater Horizon

Casing

The second technical error was the number of centralizers to use. These centralizers are
special brackets which provide stability to the pipe as cement is poured around it to prevent any
inconsistencies in the cement as it hardens. If there are air pockets or uneven geometries in the
hardened cement there is a risk of gas flow destabilizing the casing. Based on simulations,
Halliburton engineers strongly suggested 21 centralizers, but BP engineers decided to only use 6
as it would cost too much money and too much time to ship extra centralizers to the oil rig.
The third technical error was not circulating the mud in the well in order to remove absorbed
gas which could impact the integrity of the cement job. A full circulation requires 12 hours of
circulations, but BP and Transocean only ran it for 30 minutes.
The fourth technical error was choosing not to run a Cement Bond Log test to determine
whether the cement job was consistent and structurally sound. The BP engineers decided this test
was not needed and could be run at a later date.
The fifth technical error was the misinterpretation of a pressure test which determines the
upward pressure from the well. Transocean rig workers cited there was confusion regarding the
test results and the warning signs of high pressure were ultimately disregarded. Crew workers
also failed to recognize a kick (rise of gas) was occurring and when they finally did they failed to
begin proper procedures. If these signs were detected earlier the damage of the blowout could
have been mitigated.
The sixth technical error was the removal of mud from the riser earlier than normal. This
mud is important because it provides a safeguard against rising gas and pressure from the well.
Since BP removed this mud and began to replace it with seawater earlier than usual there was
less material to prevent a kickback.
The seventh technical error was the failure of the blowout preventer to close the well. It was
concluded the BOP had a hydraulic leak and a dead battery which should have been addressed by
BP earlier.
Despite much research and analysis of the technical aspects of the disaster there is no single
decision or error which caused the blowout and subsequent spill. Rather each one of these
mistakes played a role in the spill and eventually added up resulting in critical failure. Despite
this conclusion, one can take away that the errors involved in the disaster are centered on the
process of casing the well and the failure to properly prevent against gas flow and disruptions in
the cementing process during the casing installation.

4. Delegation of Responsibility
Ultimately, there were four major parties involved in the spill each with specific
responsibilities. BP is the major participant and shares majority of the blame for the incident. It
owned the well along with the Macondo oil prospect and was the company providing the funding
for the project. In the end, most final decisions regarding the well were made by BP engineers
and management. It was BP engineers who had the final say in the type of casing to use, the
number of centralizers, not running the cement test, not circulating the mud, and removing the
mud early. Despite these facts, Halliburton, the cement company, and Transocean, the company
who owned the rig and provided most of the crew, are also partly responsible. Halliburton
management did not stand by their simulations and also failed to properly test their cement slurry
which was used to form the casing. Transocean did not properly inform their crew of the risks
learned from past incidents and also is responsible for the poor performance by some crew
members during the start of the disaster. In addition, the US government and the MMS (Minerals
Management Service) are also responsible for their lack of regulation and oversight of the
industry. The MMS did not have requirements in place for the testing of cement, lacked
resources, and gave too much independence to the oil companies such as BP.
Section 2:
1. Overview of Professional, Ethical, and Moral Responsibility
Ethics, professionalism, and morality are very complex issues, in fact, many people in
academia dedicate their lives to the philosophy and other factors behind ethics. However, for the
purpose of this analysis, one must understand the core of ethics and morality, especially in
relation to engineering and the oil industry. At the most basic level, the dictionary definition of
ethics states, Accepted rules of behavior, right or wrong and the morality as, Right or wrong
in human behavior. In essence, the core of ethics and morality are about making decisions
which are right on a human level. Specifically, the National Society of Professional Engineers
(NSPE) provides a code of ethics for engineers which outlines six pillars of ethics including

being aware of the safety of the public, only working in your trained field, issue public
statements in an objective and truthful manner, work for employer in a faithful agent, avoid
deceptive acts, and conduct oneself honorably [4]. These pillars along with the basic definitions
enable the dissection of each responsible partys decisions and whether those decisions were
ethical or unethical.
2. Analysis of Major Participants in Context of Responsibilities
The engineers and individuals implicated in the BP oil spill are not necessarily bad people,
but their decisions were clearly unethical and in violation of what is morally correct. However,
these violations are rooted less in the individual and more of in the industry management
including communication, decision making processes, and risk analysis processes (or lack
thereof). The commission tasked with evaluating the spill concluded, It was not inevitable, but
rather a failure of management in which officials from all three firms [BP, Halliburton, and
Transocean] ignored critical warning signs and failed to take precautions [5]. This management
failure is largely attributed to the skewed perceptions of acceptable risk. An ethics analysis paper
about the BP oil spill explains, Risk itself implies a moral decision, as it by definition requires
the weighing of values against possible outcomes, but on this oil rig the value system was
misaligned and inherently unethical [6]. A majority of the decisions made by engineers at BP,
Halliburton, and Transocean were rooted in the philosophy of cost cutting and time saving rather
than risk mitigation. It is clear from the fact that the drilling was behind schedule and over
budget that management was under pressure to garner results in a cheap and fast way. This
skewed value system is also related to broader societal factors such as the large demand for fossil
fuels. Dr. Sylvia Earle, a renowned oceanographer, notes, Our appetite for fossil fuels
encourages drilling without taking into account the costs to our oceans especially involving
deep water drilling which is a relatively new and unexplored industry [7]. One can conclude the
companys lack of appreciation for the environment and thirst for profits led to unethical
decisions which failed to account for the scope of possible outcomes. For example, a
liner/tieback option for the well casing would have provided more barriers against gas, but also
would have cost another week of construction and $10 million. They violated the NSPE code of
ethics by not putting the safety of the public first. If BP, Halliburton, and Transocean were less

careless, took into account environmental risks, and put safety over cost cutting (all more ethical
approaches) this disaster could have been averted. Unfortunately, these companys acted in an
unethical manner and as a result played a major role in one of the worst environmental disasters
in American history.
In addition to the oil companies, the MMS also acted in an unethical manner. The
government agency focused more on granting access to public land and approving leases rather
than on safety regulation [5]. The service failed to initiate proper regulations and approved BPs
plans without fully investigating them, simply putting too much trust in the industry. President
Obama addresses these unethical practices in his first speech to the public by citing corruption
and inefficiency within MMS while promising reform to reform agency [8]. Again, the agency
did not have safety as its top priority and thus also played a role in the BP oil spill disaster.
To conclude, all four parties including BP, Halliburton, Transocean, and the MMS are
responsible for the oil spill. Almost every decision made by each company was made in the
context of what was the cheapest and quickest method which is clearly unethical. The companies
and regulatory agency should have been focused on the safety of the environment and risk
mitigation over profits and supplying the most amount of oil. Clearly, there are flaws in the
protocols of the offshore drilling industry and reforms at both the public and private parties must
be made in order to prevent future disasters from occurring.

Reference List
[1] United States; National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore
Drilling;2011[Online] Available:
http://www.eoearth.org/files/152501_152600/152587/full_report.pdf [Accessed: 1 Oct 2013].
[2] M Cronin Fisk (2013, Feb. 24). BP Gulf of Mexico Spill, From Disaster to Trial: Timeline.
Bloomberg [Online]. Available: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-25/bp-gulf-ofmexico-spill-from-disaster-to-trial-timeline.html [Accessed: 1 Oct 2013].
[3] Christina Ingersoll, Richard M. Locke, Cate Reavis, (2010, April 3). BP and the Deepwater
Horizon Disaster of 2010 [Online]. Available:
https://mitsloan.mit.edu/LearningEdge/CaseDocs/10%20110%20BP%20Deepwater%20Horizon
%20Locke.Review.pdf [Accessed: 19 Oct 2013].
[4] (2013). NSPE Code of Ethics for Engineers. [Online]. Available:
http://www.nspe.org/Ethics/CodeofEthics/index.html [Accessed: 19 Oct 2013].
[5] Antonia Juhasz, Black Tide: The Devastating Impact of the Gulf Oil Spill, John Wiley &
Sons, New Jersey, 2011 [Online]. Available: http://books.google.com/books?
id=4wr9zohow94C&pg=PR4&lpg=PR4&dq=Juhasz,+Antonia.+Black+Tide:
+The+Devastating+Impact+of+the+Gulf+Oil+Spill [Accessed: 19 Oct 2013].
[6] (2011, Jul. 18). Ethics Analysis. [Online]. Available:
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/focusareas/business/oil-spill.pdf [Accessed: 19 Oct 2013].
[7] J. Zelman (2011, May. 25). Sylvia Earle Talks Gulf Oil Spill Effects In Exclusive Interview.
Huffington Post [Online] Available: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/13/
sylvia-earle-gulf-oil-spill_n_808047.html [Accessed: 1 Oct 2013].
[8] (2010, Jun. 16). Full text of President Obama's BP Oil Spill speech. Reuters [Online].
Available: [Accessed: 1 Oct 2013].