John J.

Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001)
Offensive realist account of international politics, focusing on great power behavior.
While largely an explanatory theory, also prescriptive in that states should behave according to
offensive realist dictates because they outline the best way to survive.
Definition of Power
Based on material capabilities, specifically the sum of military and latent power. Not
equivalent to outcomes of conflict because tautological, and non-material factors often influence
outcome (i.e. Vietnam War). Offensive realists argue only that superior capability more likely to
result in successful outcome.
- Military Power armed forces and supporting naval/air forces. Dominance of land
power because success defined by ability to conquer and control territory. Must also
calculate inherent (geographic) limitations on power projection, particularly the
stopping power of water. Contribution of naval and airpower limited to their roles in
supporting land power. Nukes dont eliminate dominance of land power b/c great
powers still compete for security in nuclear age (supports with evidence of alliance
patterns formed during Cold War and difficulty of achieving nuclear superiority).
- Latent Power states ability to translate assets of population and wealth into
military power (mobilizable latent power). Mearsheimer focuses primarily on
wealth b/c it incorporates both demographic and economic dimensions of power.
Assumptions:
1. Anarchic international system deep cause of competition
2. Great powers [GP] inherently possess some offensive military capability
3. Uncertainty about other states intentions, and intentions can change quickly. So states
focus on and balance against offensive capabilities of potential rivals NOT intentions.
4. Survival = primary goal, especially maintaining territorial integrity and domestic
autonomy
Unit of Analysis:
Great powers = rational actors that think strategically and consider others preferences; they pay
attention to both long-term and immediate consequences.
Resulting Patterns of Behavior:
- Fear variation in distribution of power
variation in level of fear. Key relationship =
power gap between potential hegemon and second most powerful state in system.
Bipolarity generates least amount of fear. More stable than multipolarity because
fewer potential conflict dyads, and miscalculation less likely because simplicity
breeds certainty, which bolsters peace.
Unbalanced multipolarity - multipolar systems with a potential hegemon generates most fear and least stable because rival GPs assume worst, which
generates spirals of fear.
Balanced multipolarity - system without potential hegemon likely to have power
asymmetries, but less fear than unbalanced system and more fear than bipolar.
- Self-help (to survive)
- Power Maximization best way to survive; states care about relative not absolute
power.

System does not have status quo powers except for regional hegemons. This
departs from defensive realism, which holds that structure + survival pushes all
states to maintain existing BOP.
No state likely to achieve global hegemony because of stopping power of water.
Regional hegemons prefer that no other region has one great power, and so may
act as an offshore balancer.
Balancing either internal (resource mobilization) or external (alliance formation).
Buck-Passing drawbacks include the buck-catcher failing to deter aggressor, or
becoming so powerful threatens to upset BOP
Choice between balancing and buck-passing a function of structure of
international system:
o Bipolar system threatened GP balances because no other GP to
catch the buck. (Cold War scenario)
o Multipolar system amount of buck-passing depends on
magnitude of threat and geography. Passing prevalent when no
potential hegemon or when threatened states arent contiguous.
More relative power the aggressor holds, more likely that
threatened states will form a balancing coalition.
 Balanced multipolar systems balancing coalitions
unlikely to form and buck-passing widespread.
 Unbalanced multipolar system threatened states have
incentive to work together and we should see more
balancing coalitions.
Offensive realism dictates that states should avoid band-wagoning or appeasement,
though conceding power to dangerous adversary might make sense as a short-term
strategy for buying time to mobilize resources needed to contain the threat.

Evidence

Examines foreign policy behavior of 5 GPs in past 150 years:

o Japan 1868-defeat in WWII
o Germany 1862-Hitlers defeat in 1945
o Soviet Union 1917-1991 (collapse)
o United Kingdom 1792-1945
o U.S. 1800-1990
Finds that BOP and security considerations main driving forces behind
aggressive policies of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union.
Although UK and US appear to have behaved in ways contradictory to offensive
realism, Mearsheimer argues that this is not the case b/c of stopping power of
water. Instead they acted as offshore balancers.
o U.S. initially passed the buck during WWI, then reconsidered and checked aggressor/potential hegemon.
o Post-WWII, U.S. maintained forces in Europe to check
Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union
represented potential hegemon in NE Asia and Europe
against which U.S. attempted to balance.
o UK did not translate its wealth into military power
during mid-19th century or attempt to dominate Europe.
Did not seek regional hegemony b/c of stopping power
of water, though did act as offshore balancer in Europe.

Tests theory of how different distributions of power (bipolar, balanced and

unbalanced multipolar) affect likelihood of GP war in Europe from 1792-1990.
Great Powers include:
o Russia (entire period)
o Austria (1792-1918)
o UK (1792-1945)
o Germany (1792-1945)
o Italy (1861-1943)
o Excludes Japan because never major power in European
Politics
o Includes US only as an offshore balancer, never as a
potential hegemon.
 Napoleonic era I, 1792-93 (1 year) balanced multipolarity
 Napoleonic era II, 1793-1815 (22 years) unbalanced multipolarity
 Nineteenth century, 1815-1902 (88 years) balanced multipolarity
 Kaiserreich era (16 yrs) unbalanced multipolarity
 Interwar years, 1919-38 (20 yrs) balanced multipolarity
 Nazi era, 1939-45 (6 yrs) unbalanced multipolarity
 Cold War, 1945-90 (46 yrs) bipolarity
Potential complicating factor only period of bipolarity
characterized by presence of nukes. Mearsheimer concedes that
it is impossible to determine the relative influence of bipolarity
and nukes in producing stability.
21st Century
 Europe remains bipolar (US as offshore balancer and Russia)
 Northeast Asia is multipolar (China, Russia and US as offshore balancer)
but with no potential hegemon and relative weakness of China and
Russia

Critiques/Questions

Limited definition of power and overemphasis on land power how realistic is the
assumption that the aim of war is conquest and control of territory? Does conquest pay
nowadays? How might other forms of power directly contribute to goals other than
conquest? Completely overlooks non-military sources of power, i.e. Joseph Nyes notion
of soft power. Blaineys critique that objective power balance not cause of war, but
rather differing calculations of relative power.
Limited to Great Powers. Very little variation in a small number of cases. Same great
powers during period under examination. Behavioral patterns Mearsheimer identifies
could be attributable to particular relations between these states (Germany/Prussia,
France, Soviet Union/Russia, US and UK, and sometimes Japan) rather than structure of
international system. Also, consider whether he provides good case studies and
whether one could employ a quantitative test of his theory.
Cannot disaggregate effects of nuclear stability and bipolarity (which he recognizes, and
which substantially undermines his claim of bipolarity as most stable system, given that
n=1 to support this). Has Great Power war become prohibitively costly and thus less
likely?
Anarchy as deep cause of war cannot (alone) account for when security competition
results in war, b/c anarchy is a constant. Structural theories only crudely predict wars b/c
nonstructural factors sometimes play important roles in determining whether state goes to

war. What utility is the observation that bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar
systems? Does this tell us why states go to war?
Mearsheimer suggests that the structure of international system (anarchic) largely
determines how states think and act towards each other, and thus realism has dominated
international political discourse. Is there any reason to think that this discourse will
change? Do normative structures (particularly norm of sovereignty) pose a problem for
Mearsheimer? Also, Wendts critique that neo-realists privilege structure of anarchy over
process self-help and power politics are institutions (one particular culture of anarchy),
not essential features or constitutive properties of anarchy. They emerge causally from
process (state practices/interactions) in which anarchy plays only a permissive and not
determinative role.
What would evidence for not balancing look like?
No definition of a region how can we identify which region a rising power belongs to?
(i.e. Soviet Union) [NB Waltz doesnt disaggregate system into regions]
States worry less now about survival than about economic prosperity or development,
which may decrease incentives to go to war. States worry more now about nontraditional threats [SARS, terrorist attacks, etc.] than potential hegemons.
Does Mearsheimer have an underlying theory of foreign policy? For example, concern
with the stopping power of water should be evident in FP decision-making. Also, we
should see evidence of state leaders recognizing and responding to rising powers through
balancing and buck-passing. Could Herrmann and Fischerkeller provide a compatible
theory of foreign policy? (i.e. image/perception of rising power + relative power

strategy of balancing or buck-passing)/
Connections to IR Literature
Revival of structural realism. Both Waltz and Mearsheimer view bipolarity as
most stable system, but Mearsheimer is an offensive neo-realist in that he views
only regional hegemons as status quo states (whereas Waltz views all states as
status quo).
Relies on idea of prevalence of offensive strategies in this sense, Van Everas
argument about offensive warfare culture may provide domestic-level support for
this assumption.
Differs from hegemonic stability theory in that views the existence of one global
hegemon as impossible.