Dudley Knox Library Naval Postgraduate School - 411 Dyer Road - Monterey, CA 93943-5101 Phone (831) 656-7735; Fax (831) 656-2842; OCLC Symbol: AD# Odyssey 206.107.42.184 E-Mail li@nps.edu Borrower: JHS Call #: A3505 Lending String: “AD#,AAU Location: PERIODICAL Patron: Journal Title: African defence journal : military information monthly. Charge Maxcost: 0.00IFM Volume: Issue: Month/Year: Dec 1990Pages: 38- Shipping Address: ‘School of Advanced International Studies Article Author: Glickson, Roger C ILUMason Library 1740 Massachusetts Ave. NW Article Title: The Zairean Armed Forces Washington, DC 20036-1984 Phone: Imprint: [Paris, France : s.n., 1980)- Fax: 202 663-5916 Odyssey: liad library jhu.edu ILL Number: 151417246 Email: saisill@jhu.edu {AN A A NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL ILL Document Problem Notification If there is a problem with this document, please notify us within 72 hours of receipt. Simply complete this form and return to us via Odyssey, e-Mail or FAX, Date: Your OCLC Symbol: ILL Transaction Number: Please check @ and complete all that apply: 1 missing Page Number(s): 1 Edges Cut Off Page Number(s): C1 ditticutvtnable to Read Page Number(s): OD otter: Thank you! THIS MATERIAL MAY BE PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT LAW (TITLE 17, UNITED STATES CDE). IN ADDITION, pursua To THe TERMS OFTHE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL UCENSE WiTd WILEY SUBSCRIPTION SeRWCES, Ic. ("WEY") TAS [ELECTRON TRANSMISSION INCLUDES ANY MATERIALS PUBLISHED BY WILE, THE RECIPIENT UB@ARYS AUTHORED TO MAKE A INGLE HARDCOPY OFTHE "TRANSMATED MATERIAL FOR TS USER AND 5 REQUIRED IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER TO OELTE THE ELECTRONIC TRARSMITIAL.OPINION mately 51,000 personnel as of early 1 nel; the navy, 1,500 personné 25,000. Until 1988, ‘August of that y budget for 1987 was $47 million. Army Thé army consists of an Infantry division, 4 presidential guard division (DSP). two in- Sependent infantry brigades, @ commando brigade and an independent armour brig- fade, Zaire also has an alrborne infantry brigade and ig in the process of forming a second, Army units are deployed through- ‘out the country with the main concentra tions in Shaba Province (approximately half the force). The remainder of the forces are located in and around the capital, Kinshasa. “The army is equipped with a wide varioly ‘of military equipment, the majonty of which comes from the United States, France and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), “alrean Woops wil hei jepe ered ith French E> {ec AT mits during te Shabo operation of 178 Equipment maintenance status varies and epends on a unit's priority and the pres- fence of foreign advisers and technicians For example, 70-80 per cent of the 1st Ar- moured Brigade’s tanks are typically non- ‘operational. After a visit by a Chinese tech ‘leal team, however, most tanks work though this improved status does not last tong beyond the departure of the visiting team. ‘Several factors complicate maintenance in Zairean units. Maintenance personnel of- ten lack the training necessary to maintain modern military equipment. The wide va- flely of military equipment also complicates. maintenance and the staggering array of spare parts necessary {0 maintain it not only clogs the logistic network but is also expensive, Another factor is @ lack of mo- ney. The most important factor that reduces the army's maintenance capability is the low and ircegular pay. Because of this, sol- diers often steal spare parts and even basic iteme of equipment to sell to supplement their meager salaries. When not stealing spate parts and equipment, maintenance the. air force, 2,500; the FAZ was organised , President Mobutu Increased them to nine. The defence The Zairean Armed Forces ‘The Zairean Armed Forces (FAZ), headquartered in Kinshasa, consist of four services: an army, navy, air force and a gendarmerie. A logistics corps (COR- L0G) enjoyed co-equal status with the other services but was recently subordi- nated to the army. The army Is the most important force; the others are either ‘small or non-factors In the area of national defence. The FAZ totalled approxi- 389: the my consists of 22,000 person- id the gendarmerie, (0 three military regions, but in personne! must otten spend the bettor part Of thelr duty day looking for other ways to make ends. meet, American maintenance teams working in Zaire have found that pro- viding a free lunch 10 the work force is a ‘9004, i not the only, technique to motivate personnel to work atleast half ofthe day. Logistics: ‘CORLOG provides logistics support tothe army, Originally CORLOG existed as a sep- farate service headquarters, co-equal with the army, navy and ait force, until it was re ‘contly subordinated to the army. CORLOG's mission is to provide logistic support and Conduct direct, Indirect and depot level ‘maintenance for the FAZ. Due to Zaire's Tack of emphasis on maintenance and logis- ties, Inadequate funding and poor training, CORLOG is poorly staffed, underequipped ‘and generally unable to’ accomplish its mission. CORLOG.is organised into three battalions assigned-io’Mbandaka, Kisangani land Kamina. Only the battalion at Kamina is adequately statfed; the others are litle ‘more than skeleton organisations. Capability ‘The army's capability varies from unit to unit, For the most part, howover, the Zak ean army Is not a combat-effective organ- sation. The typical army brigade, such as fe ist Infantry Brigade in Lubumbashi, has virally no offensive capably and only very limited defensive capability. The problems are many: inetfective leadership negatively affects tactical and technical pro- ficiency, a8 well as morale; poor mainten- fance results In insutficient resources tor mission accomplishment, lack of funds limits the army's. abilly to purchase suf. ficient amounts of equipment and to pay soldiers a livable wage. ‘These conditions exist in all regular Zai- rean units and combine 0 keep capability {at minimum levels, The Israeli-advised OSP land the French-commanded 31st Airborne Brigade are two exceptions to this, As the presidential guard, the DSP receives higher fwages and better housing: moreover, Its personnel are paid regularly and well fed. ‘These factors, and the presence of Israeli advisers, encourage not only a better leadership environmont but also produce ‘more motivated soldiers. The situation in the 31st Alrborrie Brigade is similar. Al though paid the samo basic salary as sol- iors in other units, airborne personnel are ‘aig tee Shab operation pal regulary. French advisers also ensure that thelr soldiers are well fd, trained and clothed. Also, French command ofthe unit's Togistics battalion moans that supply and fequipment maintenance are effective. As a feouit, tase two units are capable of con fducting ooctive combat operations. The Stet Brigade domonstrated. this. during Shaba tn 1078, and during tho first Moba triste in 1954, International observers agree {hat based on traning exercises they Rave ‘mineseed, he DSP would perform capably In combat Navy Zalre's 1.500-man navy includes 600 mar- ines and operates a émall-ocean-gong force with larger river and take tots. Since Zaite's Atlantic coasts only 20 naut- cal miles, Lake Tanganyika (also bordered by Tanzania, Burund and. Zambla) the largest body of water thatthe navy patrols ‘Asa result, the navy’ primary mission isto onto! legal entry io tho county and to Conduct amismuggiing patrols. The navy fa bases’ at Bonan, Boma, Kaleml fai and Kinshasa. A dry dock at Boma is Used to repair the Navy's Shanghal parol rat. According to "The Proceedings” of the US Naval Insitute, the navy has seven ships that can operate for short periods in the ocean. These Include four Chinese 127 Zairan Navy 1135" ve launches delered by Pr ‘Shon occa ay e198 38 ‘AFRICAN DEFENCE - DECEMBER 1990OPINION foot Shanghai I patrol craft and three ex: North Korean 62 foot P-4 torpedo boats (without torpedo tubes}; the North Korean craft are only marginally operational. In ad- dition, six US 65 foot Swittsips, along with fas many as 25 French-bult small craft pa trol the lakes and rivers. Naval personnel receive basie taining at the Banana naval base but generally go to the United States, France or Belgium for intermediate and ad- vanced training. Despite some maintenance problems and only a marginal level of traine Ing, the Zaicean navy accomplishes its missions in an adequate manner. Although maintenance is poor by Western standards, ‘eauipment has a much higher level of onal readiness. than equipment in the other services. Air Force ‘The air force consists of approximately 2,500 personnel and provides close alt sup- port, aerial reconnaissance and transport Support for the other services. To accomp- Tish this mission, the airforce Is organised Imo a fightor squadron, two counterinsur- ‘gency squadrons, one transport wing, a he- Tieopter squadron and a training element The air force has had litle recent opp tunity fo demonstrate its capability. How: fever, during the 1977 Shaba invasion, the air force's combat performance was appar- tently inept. Western observers reported that the Zairean pilots flying the Italian trainers {5 ighter-bombers. were particularly Inot- fective; thelr munitions usually landed harmlessly wide of the targets. Also, during Shaba il, the elements of the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC) de stroyed four Aermacchi jots, an Alouette fand a Puma helicopter on the ground when they captuted Kolwozi airport. The Zaireans attempted to use their Mirage jets the rebels, but to litle effect. More rec Transport plane behind an Rermacct! (tly) ME-326 rth dasroyed a Kelwes port n 1878 four Zaitean airforce pilots died when their jets collided in midair while returning from military exercises at Karina in 1988, ‘Several factors affect airforce capability. Pilots are often inadequately trained to fly their aircraft and, when trained, funding is ‘ormally insufficient to provide an adequate fhumber of flying hours for the pilots to maintain their proficiency. Also, poor main- fonance often results in excess of 75 per ‘cont of the aircraft being non-operational Gendarmerie ‘Although primarily a police force, the gendarmerie (GN) actually has another mission to form the first line of defence fgainst an external threat. To accomplish these missions, the GN Is organised into two forces: a Territorial Force (GT) and a ‘Mobile Force (GM). The GT functions as the police component and the GM functions as 4 paramiltary organisation. ‘The GN is lightly armed with individual weapons and machine guns and is trans ported in jeeps and trucks. Although most of this equipment Is otten in disrepair, GN ‘nits In some parts of the country are often better equipped than army units which must ‘often borrow GN equipment to train or de~ ploy, Nevertheless, the GN is normally not {33 well trained as army units and even loss capable. The GN is organised into batta- Tions which are deployed to all of Zaire's regions. These unite normally come under the contrat of the provincial administration, ‘although during periods of crisis, the army mee operational control aver them. Conditions of service The conditions of service for most Za rean soldiers and officers are dismal. nad equate and irregular pay for the majority of personnel means that they require some Source of outside income. This can come from a variety of interests ranging from legitimate business enterprises to stealing ‘and. reselling government supplies and equipment, This hasan obvious effect on soldiers’ morale and motivation but also se~ Fiously affects capability and readiness by forcing eoldiers to spend much of their duty day attempting to make ends meet. Many FAZ members also prey on the local com- munity in an effort to support themselves. This does litle to facilitate trust between the military and the Zairean community and further erodes military eapablity. itis worth noting, however, that these actions. result, from real need rather from any coordinated attempt to terrorise civilians. "The situation for eome mid- and most se- riot-ranking officers tends to be better Starting with the rank of major or lieutenant colonel, some Zairean officers are able to Secure outside sources of income which permit them to support their families. By the time an officer becomes a colonel he has usually guaranteed himself an ad: equate income either through involvement inva legitimate business, by exploiting his iilitary position, of both ‘General officers are by far in the best ‘nancial position of all Zairean military per ‘sonnel. First, they are in an excellent pos ition to profit from their duty assignments by skimming funds Intended forthe soldiers in their organisations, but they are also well-placed to capitalise on contacts they make to establish business connections, For example, General Kikunda Ombala, un- Ail recently the ait force chi of sta, is ro- portedly one of the woalthiest men in Zaire Pore Epc manure fe well as one of the shrewdest businessmen, He owns several companies, many of which do business with the air force and other government agencies. All these business interests, however, leave Ki- kunda lite time to run the air force, which reflects this neglect. ‘Aside from pay, other conditions of ser- vice are also deplorable. Zairean units ar lucky to receive two meats a day and most only receive one. The presence of foreign {advisers and the extent of their involvement Can improve this situation, For example, at the Belgian-run Group of Senior Miltary Schools, personne! receive three meals Gaily. This fs, however, an exception. Many father benetits designed to offset low sal- fries either do not exist or are sporadic. Free medical care, for example, olten de- pends on the presence of foreign advisers, fand free medicine is authorised but rarely available. Housing is. also usually inade- uate to meet the basic needs of the sol- iors. Most enlisted personnel are forced t0 live in squalor and the situation, even for ‘company-grade officers, is often not much better. Conclusion Although the FAZ is, at best, only @ mar- sinally effective force, it has on occasion Performed in a competent manner. During the 1978 Shaba invasion by the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC), for ‘example, some FAZ units fought effectively ‘Atthough the insurgents easily routed reg tlar FAZ units, a battalion of the then fledg- ling French-tvained airborne brigade was. able to retake the Kolwezi airlield from the Insurgents, Despite FLNC claims to the con= trary, this unit was not commanded by its ch advisers, nor were they present dur- ing the combat operations. Also, Western military experts who have observed Zai lite Presidential Security Division and 31st Airborne Brigade in training have been impressed by their level of professionalism. These units would most likely perform fectively in combat against any of Zaira neighbours or against insurgent forces. ‘Also, itis worth noting that many Zairean officers are dedicated professionals who Would like to see the FAZ develop into a truly effective military organisation. Nev theless, the problems of low and irregul pay, corruption and low morale continue to iague the force and undermine its effec- tiveness. As a result, these officers are una ble to have much Impact. Roger C. Glickson AFRICAN DEFENCE - DECEMBER 1990