THE PHILOSOPHY

F SHANKARA
r\]

BRIEF

BL
0064916
M.

A.

Buch

Presented to the

LIBRARY of the
UNIVERSITY OF

TORONTO

by

Professor R. F, McRae

in

TIIK

IMIII,()SUPiiV(t|\<IIANKAlL\

PiinV'-d
.mrl

;it

tlio

ViilvM Vil:i< Pre^^.

piibii^lu'd l>y A.

the

(i.

College. Baroda.
'M-?r~ 1921

P.:iio<l.-i.

Widgors'.

THE
PniLOSOPIIYOFSHAiNKARA
The

5ujna

Qokuiji

Zaia

V'edanta Prize Essay

By
Magaiilal A. Buch,
AutliOi'I'lie

ol

Spirit

'

lilhics

Zoroasliiaii

of

Ancient

M. A.

Hindu

BARODA.

'

and

(Jiiliure.

{All

rigJitd

LIBRARY

|\

ijCT
'f>

Bil

reserved by the Author

t>

(^^

^^ /
/f ,y^
/

to,

His Excellency fMfinubhcii Nandshankcr

Mehta, C.

5.

M. A. LL. B.

I.,

The Diwan, baroda 5tatc.

luimbly

book

us

rcs[)t'<.'i

whom

<ie<lic*ale

uiurk

:i

one

i'ui;

i'jCLp'jlsc tr

ilii>

wt'

liiv iir

c>i

to
*:

the :^tud7 cf

our HiaduPiiilosophy.

M. A.

BUCH.

CONTENTS.
Prpface

Ahhrevir/fionfi

...

Introflurtion

...

Chapter

sophy
oris,

I,
:

...

...

,.,

...

Easiern

...

Shankara's

IfJ.

17-40

...

attUude

other opposed systems

Chapter

Pliilo-

Starting-pointP. Metli-

Tlieir

IT,

I-IG

...

Western

and

and Results

Chapter

pp

Metapliysi<-.s

towards

...

4'[-(]?t

...

(54-107

Chapier IT. The Doptrine o ^fnyn 10S-L28

Chapter V. Ethical

((^nf-eprions

waitisni

Chapter VI.

Ch.apter

...

...

System
sense of

raology

fur

Philosophy

i.he

lerm

...

...

How

\'ll.

Ad129-174

(."ompjirisoaof Shankara's

wirh some Modern

System
phies

in

...

Is

Philoso-

170-217

Shankara's
ihe

modern

Shankara's

Episie-

iu

218-276

prkfaoj:.
The

present volume

popular

chenp,

Philosopher of

nim>

Indin.

it

by

memory

countrymen.

real est

on

nil

highlv

is

therefore.

I,

necessary to systematise his teachings

make his thono-ht

The greatest
reader.

and

li,

It is admitterl

following in India and his

Coimd

the

Shnnkaracharya has the greatest

hands that

cherished

J^iipplying a

nr

of

exposition

accessible to

to

undonbtedly

subject

thorough goi no* book.

on

atithoriiy

Dr.

is

a lay
tne

Deiissen's

Rut his work

is

eostiv

and bulky, and hence not so easily accessible

us

ii

viction
failed

shonld
that
to

be.

iMirrher.

the great

do

jnstice

Shankara's teachings,
of knowledge.

it

frcnnnn
to

is

scliolar

certain

especially

mv
parts

his

con-

has
of

theory

This was due to the fact thai

he was too much obsessed by Kantian teaching.

It

was

also

necessary to bring out the signi=

ficance of Shaukara's teaching in the History

done by

of Philosophy, and this can be best

detailed

comparison

o his

some modern philosophies.

ever remains tha'

'*

the last

The

this

fact,

how-

word on Shanka-

ra's philosophy is not said as

if

theory with

yet.

''

Hence

volume proves a stimulus to other

thinkers to appreciate Shankara, the author's

labour will be

Baroda

March, I9^n

amply rewarded.

MAGANLAL

A.

RUCK

ABBREVTATTONS.

B. B.

Shankara Blmshya.

Bg. C. Commentary on
Br. C.

tiie

Gita.

CommentHry on Brihadaranyaka.

H. C, Commentary on Hastamalkiya.
Ma. C. Commentary on Mandnkya,
Ai, C. Commentar}^ on Aitareya.

Ta. C. Commentary on Taittiriya.

Kath. Up. Katha Upanishad.

Ch. Up. Chandon;ya Upanishad.

Mn.

Up Mundaka

Upanishad.

INTRODUCTION.
Adwaita doctrine

Theearlier^t oerins of the

found in the

to be

fire

Heers boldly grasped the

and gave

it

hymns.

" Of the

JTW^f^f

philosophic

the Yedic

one existence,

the sages

Kg.

hymn marks

speculation

everything. "

we

substantial justice to

*'

2. 2,

these

there.

The human

flights in

spirit

anticipated

the
is

as

may

following

th

The

time, do

The

to be found
its

boldest

the Upnishads.

Shankara's theory are

by the Upnishadic

the Adwaita

1. ).

first

takes

the speculation of

All the main ideas of

In

of

This soul

thoughts.

germs of the highest idealism are

The

).

dawn

the

read:

Br.

( S.

164

I,

India.

in

however, for the

Upnishads,

of unity

in

Shatapatha Brahmana
is

ancient

conception

diverse expression

speak in diverse ways. "

famous

The

Yedas.

Now

summarised

be briefly

propositions

seers.

'

( 1 )

in

Brahman

) Atman is the same

The empirical world is

the only Reality; ( 2

Brahman;

unreal or illusory;

4 ) There are

two kinds

i
of Brahman set
lower,

this

forib;

higher

ihe

correspouds

the

to

anfl

ihe

distutction

between Brahman and Ishwara or God of the

Now we

consciousness.

religious

see

quotations in the Upni-

that there are ample

shads to support

will

all these

contentions.

" In

the beginning, Dear, there was Sat (Existence,

Reality
(

"
only-One only withotit a second.

Ch. Up.

When

).

the

referred to, sometimes

Braliman

No

is

spoken

reality;

of.

exists

not-Brahman

all

last distinction

is

Atman and sometimes

Other

duality, no

ultimate Reality

which

in

unreal.

is

seems

the final

to

be

The

ultimate

in consciousness, between the subject and the

The knower

cannot

be

object

vanishes.

known.

Atman is the one goal of philosophy;

" Atman is
reality par excellence.

it is

the

to be seen, heard, understood,

Maitreyi; by seeing,

meditated,

hearing, understanding,
"

andTealizing Atman, all this world

( Br. Up. II.

1.

self-consciousness

oC Reality;

it

).

is

Atman

known.

or the ultimate

the key to

being known,

is

the structure

all else

becomes

making

all else

possible;

sensation, all

all

Atman

known,

necessarily

it

is

thought,

all

one

the

if=;

the

faot,

source of

knowledge.

All these passages irresistibly point to the

Atman

that

conclusion

and that Atman

only

the

is

Brahman.

is

reality,

" Self below,

above, behind, right and left-Self

is all this,''

He who

dwells in

Ch. Up. YII. 25.

and within

all beings,

thy
(

and who rules

Self, the ruler

Br.

one

Up.

TIL

God,

pervading,

all

15

hidden

in

the

waiching ovar

all

beings

all

"

).

He
all

all-

beino-s,

works, dwelling in

beings, the witness, the perceiver, the

one, free from

qualities. "

These quotations are

Ch. Up. Vi.

sufficient

"

the

is

beings,

all

is

Immortal.

the

within

Self

all

beings within; he

within,
7,

whom

beings

all

whose body

beings do not know,

are,

'*

2. ).

all

only
II.

to establish

the Upnishadic origin of the highest idealism

of the

Adwita-Vada, which boldly

that the Self

is

the only Reality, that the Self

and the Absolute are

From

these

declares

identical.

positions

it

follows that

^U

ihe empirical

ledge of

mere Maya, mere

one ball of earth everything of the

the nature
(

is

good one, by (the know-

As

''

illusion.

existence

earth

of

or modificacion )

known; the change

is

an extension of words,

is

a mere name; only the earth

Up. VI.

fore belongs

to

Ch.

reality there-

the One;

the Absolute,

all

shadow, mere appearance, mere name.

else is
*'

The supreme

I. 4. ).

"

is true.

Only by the mind

The word %^ as

it

who

death

to

multiplicity-here. "

be obtained;

here whatsoever; he

there is no multiplicity

soes from death

to

this is

Kath. Up.

any

sees

II. 4.

11

).

often used in

tvere^ is so

connection with the realities extraneous to the

Self,

thereby

"Where

that.

^^

were;
were; " "
it

as

"

it

implying the

"

there

where

is

unreality of

something

there

else,

dtialiiy,

is

a^

all

as
it

Atman thinks as it ivere, moves

were. " Even Dr Thibeaut has to say
:

am

these

writer

'

ready to admit

that

not impossibly

Iva's indicate that the

thought of the

who employed them was

darkly labour-

ing with a coucepciouakiu

although

much

less explicit

The

than the

Maya

o Shankara.

distinction between the lower

para and

higher Brahman, the

"

and the

apara

the

vidyay the esoteric metaphysics, and exoteric

doctrine, o

which Shankara made so much

use in unifying the texts

the

of

Upnishads

was no mere invention of that philosopher,

but was a part of the

l-pnishadic

doctrine.

There are frequent references to two types of

existence, the transcendental
cal in the

Upnishads

and the empiri-

variously mentioned as

Bhuman and Alpa

and

suuu.

'*

That

is

Brahman which you know thus, not this

which you thus worship." *' In the beginning
Dear, there was Sat ( Reality ) only-One
only without a second* "

Now corresponding

to this distinction of existences is the distinc-

tion between

Para

Vidya or

transcendental philosophy

leads to Ulceration; the

all

Apara

empirical knowledge. (

The

tciicliing of

Reality, on God,
etaniially the

The

two types of knowledge.

Vidya covers

Mu. Up.

the Gita

T.

4. 5. )

on the highest

man, and nature

Adwaita teaching.

All

is

sub-

other

The
elements are completely sub-ordiiiate.
fact, therefore, that there is an a<lmixiure
of

Sankhya and Yoga

hi

importance.

The

little

a matter

it, is

support

different theories are enlisted in the

of the

main doctrines

the Gitakar
the

is

oi'

these

of

services?

hut

Gilukar;

lIic

of

very far from par licipa ting in

views of

the

and Yoga as

Sankhya

regards their views on the uUima'.e problems

of

metaphysics.

whether Karma or Bhakti or

essential part of

the

Gnana

teaching

of

the

is

meta-

the

The unity

subject.

harmony

of the piiilosophical theory

Crjtakar

remains

therefore

tlie

Giu

the

of

belongs rather lo the ethics than

physics

question

the

Similarly,

an<l

of

tlie

unaffected

l)y

these controversies.

Take
Gita.

iirst

the conception

this conception

is

correspond

tlie

Brahman
cented

Which

(iod

uf

There are two main aspects

to

to

Saguna

of Shankara.

as o^^^,
lo

revealed

(iod

These

Nirguna

uoav

and now represen Led as

the higher

atpeci;

of

ihe

in wiiich

us.

and
is

in

these

repre3Tc2|tw.

two

Shankara believes thai the religious demands

an unevolved

of

humanity requires

there should be the conception o

nal

God.

'

'

that
perso-

But from the point of view of

the Absolute,

it

same view.

maintains the

The Gita

has no existence.

says that there are two

The Gitakar

ways

of approaching

the Deity; the worship of the

Avyakta God

is

very

is

a clear asserdon of the superiority

ordinary people.

difficult for

Avyakta aspect

of

God.

only the stupi<I consider

they

fail

to

aspect which
(

is

factors

does

man and

It

due to

universe

may

two

the other

affect

First,

^n^ or

variously called Maya,

bhava, Kshe'ra.

is

).

God

the

very often

God

personal

us take the conception of

It is

be Vyakta;

to

repeated

It is

).

Bg. Vil. 25.

Now how

said that

is

beyond the Vyakta aspect.

that the iriea of a

Maya

God

the

His highest Avyakta

perceive

Bg. VII. 24

It

There
of

let

the world.

Prakriti,

Swa-

be rendered into

English as the objective aspect of existence.

To

translate Frakriii

by matter

is

to

create

s
confusion.

Prakriti

but includes

matter,

mere

not

is

the

all

lifeless

intellectual,

emotional and volitional phenomena as well.

The great elements, Ahankara ( egoism ),

Buddhi ( willing ) and the Avyakta ( the
''

Buddhi ), the ten

and the one mind, and the five objects

principle counected with

senses,

of
sense; desire
and
and pain, the aggregate,
ness;

here described

this

Kshctra with
Xlll. G-7

its

is

for

in

brief,

modifications. "

aot
a

la

life,

of

in

mere

own

principle

instruments

man.

He

called
is

the

all

Kshetragna or
subject,

the

and knowledge,

the one permanent, changeless

all

having no

riijht.
is

central source of all activity

midst of

Bg.

intelligence,

through which the soul works,

the soul

the

them; they are mere

subject;

exis-ictice in their

The inner

is

and outer, are thus gross

matter; the principle o

objects

firm-

All the paraphernalia of con-

;.

sciousness, inner

of activity

pleasure

hatred,

intelligence,

factor

in the

change and destruction.

Now,

experience,

all

knovrledgs,

all

existenct

9
presupposes the operation of these two factors

and the

the subject

either the subject or the object

vanishes.

''

and the world

The object has no existence at

apart from the subject; the

empirical

away

Take

object.

apart from

existence

Whatever

is

subject

the

all

has no
object.

whether unmoving or

born,

moving, know that to be from a commingUng

uf Kshetra

27.

and Kshetragna. "

The subjeci-aspect and

aspect of experience arc tiicre

Bg. XIII.
object-

tlie

eternally; the

former rendering possible the pleas ure-i)ain

experiences of
latter

rendering possible

cause

and

Now

the Gita

iwo

effect,

sides; it is

agent

the conative

the

succession of

XIII.

Bg,

20-21

recognises that the

subject

ignorance, of pleasure and

pain, uf

or passivity with reference to

worhl or the object;

in

itself It

becomes entangled

in

the

and

activity

the .empirical

is-above

appearance, thought and change. (Bg.

It

).

soul has

knowlelge

of

the

iin<]

all

II.

25)

empirical

life

ancTer the iuflu^ce of the illusion of Prakriti,

(Bg. Xlil. 2z).

Wl
The investigation of the essential nature of
Atman or Kshetragna leads us to^the relation
it

The following

and God.

Atman makes
cendental

it

clear

reality.

" It

that

description

a trans-

is

it

ever-lasting, all

is

-pervading, stable, firm, and eternal.

said to be

unperceived,
unchangeable. "

be

to

Now
one

by

there

of

seers

is

no

is

truth.

no existence

non-existence

both

of

nature

are

unreal;

out

Bg.

16).

All

"'

has no absolute,

it

cendental existence.
beint'

timeless; or

Now

is real.

the soul
tence of

is

in

in

it is

exist in

that
is,

djcreforc,

ultimate,

timeless,

expressly laid

man.

all

11.

But the soul

nothing but the

God

to be Me,

it is

the

found

Prakriti

unreal.

of

has been

reality is time-less; all things

time

of the Real

be only one Infinite,

the unreal there

Ileal

true

25

23.

II.

one transcendental existence,

Keality,

Ot

the

Bg

It is

unthinkable,

according to the definition

in the Gita, there can

'*

to be
(

of

*
'

is

real

because

down

immanent

Know

trans-

ii

that

exis-

Kshetragna

Kbbetraj. " ( Bg. XII.

,3 ).

tl
The

identity of the individual

supreme soul
"

is

This undecaying supreme

beginningless and

void

of

seated in body, neither acts,

by

acts. "

and the

soul

emphatically asserLed.

quite

being

soul,

Gunas,

though

nor

defiled

(Bg. XIII. 31).

is

Prakriti

really responsible for aclions. (Bg. XII. 29).

The Kshetragna
Kshetragna; in

is

not supremely real as

essence

it

is

real.

individual soul, as a subject,

it

has

its

sided, abstract existence;

*'

reality.

hence

Since I transcend the

and also the Being, in the

ii

1 am proclaimed tiie supreme

XV.
16-18 ). The Absokue
Bg.

in
all

which

all partialities,

all

oneno

has

Becoming

worW and

Veda,

As an

the
"

in

spirit
is

that

onc-sMcJness,

incoherences are cojTcctcd and unilied in a

final,

synthetic Reality; in which the subject

relation
relation.

object,

is

as

much

manifestations of
Prakriti

transcended as the object

Of course, both the subject and

Kshetra and Kshetragna are mere
hai

the

Absolute:

no exibteuce and

Maya

or

mdividual

M
soul also has

no existence apart from

The unreality
bound up with the

Maya

man.

of

is

unreality of

the Gita

in

God;

vidual soul as well as

Brah-

the

indi-

are

these

all

but as absolute beings

alike objectively real;

they have no reality.

The one thinker who

greatest teachers

He

and be deserves the

fyuig himseir with

credit of

ilic

all

other

doctrine

boldly

identi-

Advaiia tradition

the I pnishads completely,

of

one of the

is

Advai.tu

the

of

Shankara

influenced

most was Gaudapada.

lo

exclusion

liiu

lew

Hitherto

sy^item.^.

of

had

cared to disengage the Advaita theory from

Upnishads;

the mass of i^peculations in the

few had tried to follow the logic of thought

implicit in
laid

down

the

scattered

Adwaita theories

in the previous

This

writings.

bold step was taken by Gaudapada.

Gaudapada maintains
reality in the

waking

ences of dreams.

second is internal;

life

The
but

is

no more

tlie

experi-

that there

than

first

is

both

external; the

agree

in

one

point, their capability of being seen or being

18
Both are

preseuterl as objects.

he real on this ground; buL

over; so also

the

capacity

The

test of reality is

of

and

is

Now

dreams

satisfied in the

as

facts;

here

means

for

tangible

two.
a

But

such

other

mirage;

hence

like

or

than the

pragmatic

waking

things
ends;

(II.

latter.

test

life inas-

verified

by

used

as

are

we

get

from food and drink.

main

time.

have bott

life

actual

This test

not operative in the case of dreams.

5i3fl5i^r is the

of

all

persistence.

case of

tangible

but

subject;

our experiences are

satisfaction
is

real

the capabi-

for

said that the

it is

much

its

end,

they are no more

).

for

waking

the experiences of

as

not

is

persistence

the

are

cri-

becoming objects

illusions

they

The true

life.

terion of reality therefore

beginning

dream-

the

must be the case with

experiences of waking

lity of

as

prove ilhisory after

experiences

to

believeil

The

difference between the

Gaudapada

replies that the experiences

man who

has quenched

hunger

afe

siuUified

when

his thirst or

he

enters

Xi

man

as

regards

reality

particular

no

is

be

state,

both

in

as

both

In

side.

it

rlifference

waking or

of
lies

merely in

What

the instruments of cognition.

Atman

vice

no existence beyond

has

the substrate behind

appears*

advantage

on either

The

dreaming.

ofien

appetite and

satiated

5i2n^3Rc!r

cases the

that

of

Hence there

versa.

man

liungry

dream-life;

these illusions.

Aiman

cases.

It is

posits

the

and the object

illusion lK)th of the subject

through the power of

then

is

The whole

Maya.

cosmos is a result of this illusion. Virtually,

" there is no dissolution, no creation, none
bondage, no pupilage, none desirous of

in

none

liberation,

This

No

is

the

final

and diversity

Every individual
ponsible

fo.T

his

his imagination.
like

the

an

32. )

it

with

all

involves,

cosmos.

the

exists.
is res-

His world

is

Really speaking, the world

illusion, a

air (11.

( II.

every monad

soul,

own

*'

about the universe.

truth

such thing as the universe,

variety

is

liberated.

iil ).

dream, or a
It

has no

castle in

existence,

n
<lepeu(lent or independent.

llealiiy is defined as tiiat

which

The

able.

nature of a

true

21

( ITI.

which

or reality.

we

If

there will be

is

the

a category

is

absolute

to the

the

once grant

distinction, anything

).

unchange-

thing

Evolution

).

inapplicable

is

is

immutable element in

constant, permanent,
jr.

'M

TI.

truth

reality of

becomes anything, and

Hence

chaos.

which

that

is

immortal can never pass into birth and death.

( ITI.
all

19-22

causality

All

).

is

becoming,

all

change,

an illusion valid only in the

,

empirical world and not in the transcendental

sphere.

( III.

world

empirical

concept

is

the world,

all

activity,

is

).

The

reality of the

mind-dependent;

responsible for our

the

experience of

38 ). The philosophy
which thus asks us to surr-

(illl. 31.

of the Absolute

ender

25, 27

individual existence,

experience,

demands of us very heavy

the complete freedom from

all

relations, all

conditions, all limitations which

staggers the imagination of

robust of U8. ( III. 39

),

all

sacrifices;

it

but

promises,
tl\e

most

THE
PHILOSOPHY

SHANKARA

OF

CHAPTER

EASTERN AND WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

Their Standpoints, Methods and Results

It

has been said by one of

savants,

who was

very

the

Western

successful in placing

himself in a kind of deep, sympathetic touch

with the best thought of the East,

Hindus were,

above

all,

a nation

that
of

the

Philo-

sophers. This dictum - very remote from the

absurd talk of Macaulay - has a significance

which requires to be brought out a

little.

The point of the compliment does not lie sd

much in the extensiveness and range, or the
subtlety

and depth

peculation,

which

as

in

philosophic

of

the

native philosophic

enormous influence

thought has

upon the Hindu mind.

Some

exercised

other nations

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKAKA

18

have

prodiicerl plnlosopliers of

liave

produced equally

equal calibre,
analyses

brilliant

of

mind and soul and equally profound theories

about the Infinite and the

man

an<l

much an
did

it

little

an academic

actual living force

tinge so

The

people.

much

life

all

will here

Hindu

of the
lie

developed by
briefly bring

out these peculiarities which give

guishing colour to

else

phenomenon

in certain special characteristics

We

and so

nowhere

tlvis

was

else

affair

the everyday

reasons for

Hindu thought.

about God,

But nowhere

nature.

philosophy so

finite,

distin-

theories of life

and conduct.

The Hindu mind, under

the Eastern

climate

the

influences of

and environment has

always shown an enormous fascination for

abstract, mystical speculation

about

mensities, eternities and infinities,

Hhidu

confront-

Hence the bixuriant growth of

ing us.
ligions

the im-

and philosophies
is

in the finite,

in

home in the
more at home in

more

at

paceless world of

pure

spirit

the

East.

Infinite

the

re-

A
than

timeless,

than in

tha

tHE EASTERN STANDPOINT

'

cribbed, cabined and confin'd

lies

The

about us.

centre of energy,

source

his

spatial are of

man
any
is

be

can
'

state, of

of

his

is

inspiration

reality for him.

All

branded as temporal or

the earth, earthy

indeed rest

world which
alone

Infinite

and the fount ainhea*! of

facts that

'

19

How

'.

can

contentedly

peacefully,

in

whose existence and nature he

not assured from day to day or even from

century to century

Thus we are
fundamental

brought

differences

Oriental philosophy.

to
in

one

of

the

Western and

The impulse

propelling

different philosophies is often very different.

The

secret spring of the inner

movement

tliought in every case largely explains a

deal in subsequent developments.

important, therefore, to

know

It is

the

of

good
very

ultimate

spring, the fundamental impetus of the philo-

sophic

mind

once unify

in ancient India.

the

different

This

will

at

systems^ of philo-

sophy in India and will serve to differentiate

them broadly from the

originated elsewhere.

rival

systems which

It will also

give us the

1'IIILUS(J)/I1Y (^F bllAtS'KARA

20

staudpoint of our system-the principle which

helps to explain everything peculiar in
Aristotle says that
in

wonrler.

wonders

own

man no

lie

being

W hen man

existence.

becomes conscious

first

philosophy begins

all

" Apart from

at its

ir.

himself for

takes

granted as something needing no explanation.

But not

with the

for long, for,

first reflexion,

that

wonder begins which

the mother of metaphysics and

Aristotle say that
to philosophise

metaphysics
offspring of

Upanishads

ment and

am

so on.

But

men now and always

seek

".^

All

extent

an

because

is tluis

wonder

of

wonder

to a certahi

and the sages of the

often asked in

Whence came
this is not

sheer

bewilder-

this

world

a complete

Who
"and

explana-

Hindu philosophy.

tion of the origin of the

The Hindu

philosophers

did

not

turn

philosophic speculaiion merely to satisfy

metaphysical itclung of
1.

asking the

" The World

Schopenhauer
Appendix 17.
:

Id^a. "

is

which made

curiosity such questions as "

I ? " "

the

of

rise

why

as Will

to

the
of

and

THE EASTERN STANDPOINT

tliiugs.

The metaphysical

21

Hindus

impultJe of

had a deeper origin than the mere

intellect-

ual curiosity which seeks the ultimate

of things

and

Nor was

peep "behind the veil".

tries to

in

it

words

of

"sentiment of ralionali'y
ing to find satisfaction in
is to

roots

",

AV. James,

which was

the

striv-

That

philosophy.

Hindu philosophy did not come

say,

some philosophies

to birth as

in

the AVest

did, to satisfy the passion for order, system,

consistency,

cohel'ence,

thouglits about

things.

share in the business,

mental.

wholeness in

our

This had

fair

Ijut it

The passion

for

its

was not fundaunification,

for

systeraatisation

was keen among the Pandits

of the East, as

among

West, but

this

the

Pandits of the

does not give us the

clue

we

want.

some

Again,

philosophers

physics to provide a safe

moral
is

life

l^asis

seek

of conduct for

in such cases the ethical

ultimate and metaphysics

ary product of
ethical need.

is

meta-

motive

but a second-

what may be prhnarily an

Such

was

die case with Lotze.

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

22

But the Hindus did not attach

so

much im-

portance to ethical problems

of

man's

life

driving forces of

his

as to

make

whole

these the

Nor was

life.

response

to

the

stirring

Hindu system

need of

providing

secure foundations for sciences and

hii:;

reconcil-

the conflict of science and religion. Kant's

great system was largely a product of such a

Modern western philosophy

with doubt - doubt about everything

began

need.

Hence

and nature.
emological

its

character.

The

it

the

man

epist-

Greek

ancient

philosophy went straight to

healthily took

in

predominantly

object and

human
know the

for granted that the

reason

was quite competent

truth.

But the

to

of

the

modern world questioned everything

and

above

all, it

searching

spirit

questioned the capacity of

reason to grasp

adequately

the

human

final

truth

about the fundamental constitution of reality.

We therefore

find philosophy

turning

into an inquiry into the limits

of

human knowledge

in

the

and

great

itself

validity
idealistic

philosophies shice the time of Berkeley.

The

THE EASTEBN STANDPOINT

Hindu

seers

were different from

had not complete confidence

of reason

to

13

lx)th

in

know everything

they

power

the*

they

l^ut

were not quite so much obsessed by

epistc-

modern

philo-

mological difficulties, as the

sophers.
It

was

need that

in response to a practical

Hindu philosophy
powerful

arose.

was the

It

all-

seek

deliverance,

from the pettinesses, troubles,

sufferings of

necessity

to

which drove the Eastern

this finite existence,

sages to devise theories

permanent,
finiteness

escape

final

of

from the

and a lasting place

misery-stricken souls

the

is

which demands

satisfaction.

to rise

'

an innermost neel for rest

It

is

need
'

all

doubleness

'

change and opposition, from

and difference.
change,

entails suffering,

suffering and unrest

better conditions

more

for

world.

the

above the struggle

DO for existence, to

be freed from
all

a
of

taint

refuge

of

of

Within us there

'*

offering

life,

cause

but

unrest,

man

those

Difference

and
to

this

aim

at

ivttained, still

cruel diBappuiutmeuts await him.

This

24

PHILOSOPHY OK SHANKARA

whole process o

oscillation

checked and suspended.

must therefore be

Only

and immutable

state after

can this cease.

But

in the eternal

which we long,

since all

ideas arise

the world of experience, so unrestful

much

mercy

at the

sion of ours

eternal and

can

of

in

and so

no expres-

difference,

characterise positively the

immutable

state after

which we

And since all change and movement,

when once we have attained this state is seen
to be an illusion, we sliall see that the longino"
long.

for

it is

also an illusion.

be freed frDm

all

We

striving. "2

must cease to
Such

is

the

fundamental impulse of the oriental mind

seeking rest,-

final,

absolute rest in the

of the changeless and the eternal.

3T5r:

s^

fl^fcT lirc^T

fr

^^\%^ R

Tr

nfrcT^

^f^

*'

nt

^i^f

^m^^ r^

gwr-

ff

2Tr^^ ^^I*T5Trc^r?rcqW^I%Rr2T?ci I^132T^

fki^^ ^^r^rI ^^^

t3.

Hoffcling

Philosophy of Religion,

H. Introduction.

"* This passage sets forth

the essentially transitory and painful

2.

bosom

nature
p.

127.

THE EASTERN STANDPOLVT

and the couseciueut

of ull worldly pleasures

necessity of

"

^m^\ ^t m^^

5T

shadow

of liappiness

striving

Philosophy

all

is

not rooted out.*

unrest

the very

us,

in

"

within.

out

root

seeks to

3?^^^

ir^q"

^M ^^^^m ^R'^^^

aff^irq

i^\:

of

movement

Not

possible as long as the

is

India

in

"

W'^^\^W'^^^^^

the desire in us

the very source

cause of

worldly impulses.

out-

rootini!;

25

"^

Here

the philosophy of the East offers a very great

contrast to the philosopliy of the Greeks.

The

Greeks took the world

rest

and happiness and

that

he

life

who

was

lo he a place

not think

did

essentially

enjoys the day of

of

seriously

"

luiserabie,
life

with

For

childlike

Hellenic simplicity, however iiigh a flight his

genius

may

take hi other respects,

only

will

tlie

last

and the highest

problems of being, as

did

the

touch in passing

seize

them

fully

(ireeks

and clearly requires a

feeling of the vanity and nothingness

this life

to

deep
of

all

and a corresponding longing to pass

from the non-existent

4.

Bg, C.

2.

00,

to to
5.

IS.

the

existent,

B. Introduction.

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

26

ftcm darkness
mortality,

'

from death

to light,

by wliicn the

a longing

were inspired even

in

m-

to

Indians

and

ancient times,

which remained the true motive principle of

their philosophy.

''^

From this fundamental standpoint follow

Eastern
many other characteristics of
philosophy. Hegel has remarked that among
Hindus,

and

religion

were

philosophy

largely mixed up together, so that Hindu

philosophies

were rather

theologies

systems of

metaphysics.

This

contains an element of
place, such a

marked

statement

In

truth.

than

the

differentiation

first

of

the

divergent departments of thought which has

known

taken place in recent times was not

Secondly,

to the people in ancient India.

fundamental motive of religion and

sophy

is

the same,

which each seeks

the pioneers cf

it

6.

philo-

although the ways by

are different.

religion

Thirdlv,

and philosophy

India were generally the same

Raman j^ija,

p. 82.

in

Shankara or

unlike Kiiut or Hegel are a&

Di . Deusbcn

tlie

much

37^

THE EASTERN {STANDPOINT

truth as philosophers.

religious

of

teachers

Hindu philosophers did not

Fourthly, the

question the authority of the Vedris^ but took

revelation

thought.

more or less
But above

as the basis

the

for

all,

of

their

Hindus,

philosophy was not a luxury of speculation,

an outgrowth of wild hitellectual activity, an

efflorescence of the searching spirit of
its

highest form,

Ijut

an

affair of

life.

man

in

Like

Rudolf Eucken, the Hindu thinkers thought

of the

of

fundamental importance of the problem

and

life,

philosophy

Hindu philosophy
philosophy of
of which

man.
of

is,

Hindu

depend

religion
it is

to all

of

its

handmaid.

on the right understanding

the

eternal

Hence the Vedanta

thought
ance

life,

as

therefore, essentially a

interests

of

much a part
and Hindu life, as of Hindu
is

hnmense

Hindus.

as

practical import-

This explains the theo-

logic character of nuich of

Hindu

speculation.

The general conclusions to which the

movement of thought led the most characteristic

Eastern philosophers

remarkable contrast

to

the

presents
results

also

of the

PHILOSOPHY OE SHANK AUA

i8-

thcmght

inoderji philosophic

The most

West.

the

in

hes

fuiiilameiital difference

the

in

attitude towards the world or empirical existence.

Modern

philosophy,

is

ihought,

much under

very

'

make room

in a

mind laboured equally hard

manently the

reality

difference of

attitud.e

of

The Eastern

permanent

the

persists in

importance

is

essence of ourselves
personality

the

conscious existence.

to
it

Absolute

Western
be
is

the

in

is

l)raiu.

highest

therefore

and hence our

must survive

ultimate re"lcmj)Lion.

philo-

preserving

of

conceived
to us

other

tlie

veritable abomination to the

category known

Tliis

many

maintaining

idea of aljsorption in the

Personality

per-

Infinite.

Modern

separate identity of^our

The

to establish

explains

characteristics.

sophy insistingly

strives

it

system of metaphysics for

the reality of the finite world.

minor

tyranny

the

Hence

o the view-point of science.

to

modern

hence

the

distinct

any scheme of

The Eastern

consider this stage as a very

Terbonality implies limitation,

imperfect
its

sages
one.

limitation

HE EASTERN STANDPOINT

by

Other

per?oiialities,

29

by

nu'l

external

environment, l^ersonality implies difference

any union short

external,

o identity

more or

is

perfection, a complete

The essence

tions.
lies

more or

less

Hence

it is

less imperfect.

incampatible with the idea

an

of

all-roimd

freedom from limita-

of the personality in fact

Hindu philosophers

for

the one supreme Self, ibe

essence of the personality

in

soul-

the

Absolute.
is

placed

The
by

modern psychology in consciousness - in

thinking, feeling, and willing. But all that
is

mana^i

manas

is

according

merely a product

soul is above

all

Vedanta

to the

ordinary

of

Maya.

processes

of

and

The
con-

sciousness, because these as we ordinarily

experience them imply many imperfections -

such as capacity of growth and decay, capacity

more and less, duality of subject and object,

of

and so on. The soul

as perfection, as Reality,

must be above all these categories of thinking.

But to the Western philosopher, the soul
apart from
willing

is

its life in

an

thought,

abstraction

feeling

mere

which we can have no idea whatever.

and
X, of

PHILOSOPHY OK SHANKARA

30

It is the

same with the personality of God.

has no place in the sclieme of purely Abso-

It

lutist

metaphysics.

thought

is

mostly

Modern

theistic

and

Western
attempt to

its

8ave differences, to save concretcness in pliilo-

sophy goes often so

finite being,

a spatial

some systems.
Eastern

of

far

In the

make God a
and temporal God in
same way in the eyes
as

time

thinkers,

image of eternity " and

*'

to

"is

moving

it,

Like a dome of many-coloured glass

Stains the white radiance of eternity."

or as Bergson puts

it:

" Eternity

no longer

hovers over time as an abstraction;

lies time as a reality. "^

philosophers

explaining
find that

B^t the Western

do not altogether

away

of

an increasing

effort

conceive time as a part of the

stitution of Reality.

or
(

eternal

substance

this

relish

time and

all

under-

it

hence

is

made

conceived

static

unity

negatively

the Eastern philosophers has to give

Creative Evolution,

p. 335.

to

essential con-

Even the

from the point of view of the world

7.

we

of

way

to

THE EASTERN STANDPOINT

31

A unity dynamically conceived; and even the

Absolute
ing

thought of as essentially a grow-

is

The

Absolute.

Bergsonian

takes the place of the block

ancient
plurality

universe of

Change,

thinkers.

universe
the

concreteness,

these are held to be the most vital

characteristics of Ideality.

Perception and

its

data are more powerful sources of knowledge

than conception and

ulum

elaborations.

its

swung
swung

of thought in the ancient world

from senses

to thought;

back from

thought to

theories and

it

has

again

senses.

Pluralistic

pragmatic philosophies

The

these tendencies.
collective
their

The pend-

ideas

typify

of progress, of

humanity, of morality are asserting

prominence

modern thought

in

metaphysical systems are so modelled

explain

these

facts

which

are

and

as

to

considered

fundamental.

Eastern
matters
tried

to

into the
its

as

thought

has

of

soar

the

above

timeless,

ignored

earth,

the

spaceless

metaphysical imagination.

all

earthy,

here

'

these

and

and now,

empyreans of

An

individual

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

32

ihe

accident,

is ail

Maya,

brain, causality
vision, the
is

universe

time and space are

whole world of

our narrow

of

and

facts

a mere cosmic illusion, and art

ture, science and

pliilosophy.

and

Christ the Easiern sage declares

not of this world. "

view of

life

and

Eastern thinkers,
tators

of

all

is

"

Like

''.

My

kino-

transcendental

dominates the

try to think as

and

time

contrast, therefore,

reality,

who

and

baby "who

straw or frightened with a bugbear

is

litera-

and tickled with a

pleased with a rattle

dom

tlioujrhts

morality

religion are sim})le playthings of a

ie

of our

crenrnros

a product

is

freak, of

is

'*

existence. "

almost complete.

spec-

The

It is

an

eternal fight between changeless and change,

between absolute and relative thinking,

ween the One

idealism and

and, the

realism,

bet-

Many, between pure

abstractness

and con-

creteness, between the Infinite anii the finite,

between complete harmony and identity and

differences and discord. s.

Metapliysically the

former tendencies are more powerful

istically, the latter

real-

must decide the situation.

THE KASTERN STANDPOIM

And

as

arcordiiig

one

the

tendency predominates,

may

wards what
tian or

tlie

notice here

miserable,
ordinarily,

is

is

the belief,

thought, that
satisfy the

^5**1.

^Ici^

life is

existence

suffering;.

to-

life.

very briefly a few

all

Hindu philosophy,

we understand

as

radically

The

Indian

conceived as essentially

and

evil

it

fraught

essence of this s^ituation

deep - rooted
the finite

l^fif^* The

oriental

hi

world

infinite spirit of

of existence is not baaed

calculus,

leans

has been said about the

pessimism. All

with

man

be called the Tndo-Chris-

fundamental points of

Mneh

or the oth^r

Greeo-Persian view of

We may
( 1 )

!>

33

can never

ours.

^r

belief in the

^jfTl

misery

upon any hedonistic

upon the excess on the whole of mis-

ery over happiness in individual or collective

The very conditioutof life, the limitations

and space, the change and movement
all existence, make It impossible for our

life.

of time

of

?plrit to find

fmsd happiness in

worldly existence

_______
$

is

it.

But

if

fundamentally an evil to

._

PHJLOSOFHV OFt^HANKAKA

34

be

eHCfi})e'l

Ijuliau

from,

view of

|>essiinrRtic.

only

U'ue

tliat

does not merti) that the

life is

uhimately dark and

Hea:el said ''[^essiinisin is the

optimism.

for

l)asis

thought offers to every soul

of emancipation, final
all finite exi=<tence

means a

and
and

<lcT:

eAc.

the

Possibility

permanent from
emancipation

this

state of boundless,

ever and ever. " ^ ^z^^J

Hindu

'

exquisite joy for

^giT^ 551*?

^^h

sni%^

is

hence

"^ The Indian view of hfe

ultimately a mairnificent optimism. (2)

doctrine of

Kar^ia

tliat

is

working

of every tliought,

through

all ages."

doctrine

of

With

*'

The

the continuous

word and deed,

this is

coupled the

Shankara-

transmigration.

charya like other Hindu thinkers, takes

it

for grained and never makes it a subject of

discussion. (4) The belief in the three gunas

{^r^, ^^^,

the

c!R;)

elements of nature.

three

Tamas

is

constituent

the tendency to

passivity, rajas is the tendency to

and sattva

is

goodness, peace,

imderstanding. (5)
9,

Bg.

6.l?2.

thni

activity,

passeth

characteristic feature of

THE EA.STRRN STANnrOlXT

Hindu

all

pbilof^ophy

the

is its belief in

in-

The Shrviis were

fallibility of the Vedcts.

repositories of

35

windom

by

acr|iured

direct

experience by the ancient Beers. Hence these

constinited an auihoriiy of no niean
(0)

The

belief in

says " the

Mokaha

IjelieC in

is

weigiit,
l)eusseii

the conier-

Ind.ia.**

Hindu philosophy

x\ll

liberaiion

stone of meta{)hysic:< in

Dr.

as

lal)uured

under one

great liniilatiun. Tiie comparative al)sence of

the <levelopiueiJt of sciences
of

tions

our

made many

philosophy mere

por-

matters of

guess-work. The whole modern philosophy

i^tands in this

way

in

ancient philosophies.

philosophy
science

is

broad contrast with

Each step

dictated

l^y

in

fresh

all

roodern
step

and thus philosophy goes on

in

l^eing

modelle<l on the existing scientiiic knowledge.

With

the progress of science, there appears a

corresponding progress in

Hindu

philosopliy

was

in

pliilosophy.
this

The

sense largely

unprogressive.
'J'liis

limiiation of the scientific

of the ancient

Hindui=i

i=

largely

knowledge
connected

PHILOSOPHY OK SHAN KARA

36

wUb
its

Philosophy according to the

Hiudns was not a sum

wisdom; nor was
It

and

the nature of the lliiKlu pbiloHopliy

method.

it

total of

a 'o-or(lination of sciences.

was a synoptic view

r.f tlie

nhimaie

view of the

of the wliole, a theory

reality.

ofifice

knowledge or

of

Indeed

in a sense

[thilosophy

Hindus furiously coincides

tlie

some extent

to

with the view of some of the

among

the

most modern

philosophers of the West. Hoffding says that

the problem of religion and philosophy alike
is

the " relation between what seems

men

the

highest value

whole/*^ ^

We do not

to

us

and existence as a
so

much

philosophy " says Windelband

*'

expect from

what

it

was

formerly supposed to give, a theoretic scheme

of the world, a syutiiesis of the results of the

separate sciences, or
linens

transcending

them on

of its own, a scheme harmoniously com-

plete in itself

what we expet from

sophy to-day

is

reflection

j)hilo-

on those perman-

ent values which have their foundation in

10. A. S. Pringlc-Pattison .-"The Idea of
p. 3i?.

God."

THE EASTERN STANDPOINT

37

higher spiritual reality above the

ef the

interests

cUarigiiig

There

timcs.^'^^

indeed

is

much

difference in the view about the values

which

may

be considered of ultimate validity,

Hindu

bui the task of

said to be fundamentally
investigation into the

the values which

the

highest

may

may be

philos-jphy

same.

It

Reality,

be conserved

in

is

anl

the

highest Ileality.

Hindu philosophy is generhigh a priori method by which we

The method
ally the

of

proceed from the whole

not the empirical one
parts

to

the

to

of

parts,

and

from the

rising

fhe

whole,

ihe

reality of

the

whole, the unity and eternity of the Absolute

and such other

and

beliefs are taken for

subsequent inquiry

all

tions of the finite

and the

But we may say that

great

modern

speculative

period.

dogmatic method
11.

is into

the rela-

Infinite

and so on.

was generally the

of the Greek philosophy

method

many

this

ibid. p. 30.

granted

and also of

systems

of

the

This deductive, a priori^

is

not (piite

palatable

to

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANiCAlU

.$$

moJern

.the

^-cientiHc brain,

eumieiitly suited

buL

the only one possible in the

often

is

it

ami

philofeophy,

to

science

of. en

the

of

Abs<j]ate.

This

is

method

the

of

Shankardcharyti.

]\IanT criticiKins are levelled ao;a,inst

The Absolute

procedure.
**

said

is

shot out of a pistol " in a system

Experience
plained

by a priori

to

be

like this.

and reality

neglected

is

such

is

ex-

Unity whicli

notions.

philosophy seeks vshould be not the prlus

all

inquiry,

it is

its first

the end to

l)e

but rather

assumption,

ultimately

last goal of all speculation.

attained,

It

of

the

should not be

merely ])ostulaiBd at the outset as 'Shankava

to be

does, )>ut dcmons;rate*l

the possible

knowledge and being

ideal towarls

which

are moving.

Otherwise, philosophy

all

churced with beinir domnalic and

entiilei to
1:

argued by Wartl

essential

colierCnce';

il

of

that,

philosophy

cann*-!,

so

to

independent gr-.m'iDg points

be

hence not

the attention of scientific

tirther, it is

fir,st

may

people.
*'

The

organic

is

say

bave

and

tjo

two

long

ae;

THE EASTERN STANDPOiNt

experience

On

experience

develops the idea of the pure

it

may rise

to perish never

not discernible at
its full

meaning

This

first

is

but

ineffable

cridcism

not

is

inediod of metaphysics

is

method

reason

certainly

present now,

if

still.

"^'

quite

The

fair.

not the same as the

method of science. But none the

propriate

was

it

and

less it is

for philosophy.

does not ignore experience.

an ap-

Philofc^ophy

our ordinary

It is

coinmonsense view of things which comes

and when we
it

is

find on

and

partial

any

cannot be

tiiere

about philosophy

finality

as

the one

is

3l>

deeper

ina^leijuate,

first;

reflection that

we

are led

to

move fundamental views about the universe.

Experience,

is

the

therefore,

starting-point

of Shankara's system as well as that of other

In fact,

systems.

starting-point for
as

well
says

is

it

all

people, philosophers as

non-philosophers.

Metaphysics

does

create the world out of

still less

12.

to supersede

Ward

the only possilile

its

the

The Realm

Edward Caird
proceed

not

own

cateu;ories,

special

of Knds.

to

\).

work
22-3.

of

IS

PHILOSOPHY OF SflANKAftA

science*

Ou

lUfccovery

the contrary,
the

of

it 18

partial

throtgli

ami

the

inadequate

explanation of things which the categories of

science furnish that

deeper
tioii
i

feali*t'action

of the world

ttaiuB that

given by

but

is

led to

by higher

it

then

pruicipleH,

inter}_)retation

a principle which rests

its

seek after

for ihought, au interpre'La-

final

seen bv

process,

it is

own

lij?hr.

seeks to

till

which

is

on none higher,
Keversin;

show how

all

the
the

previous stages of knowledge from the higliest

to the lowest, beeonie transformed in the light

of the
all

first pruici[ile

of

knowledge, or

things are seen in their rcaliiy only

regarded rb

its

expressions

tions. "^3
13.

Caird

Spinoza, p, 132-3,

or

how

when

manifesta-

CHAPTER

II

suankaka's Ainruukt iowakds other

OPPOSED SYS 'EMS

We

give,

shall

work occupies a
writings,

larj^e

Shankara

fication of this

bri-ol:,

various

the

futation of

in

bhankara's reviews.

rival

amount

This

of space in his

hhnself gives a justi-

polemic in his work

**

An

opponent might come forward and say that

we

are indeed entitled

position, so as
wliicli is tlie

ous of

it,

to establish

means

of release to those

but that no use

is

a use,

dau2;er of nien

upon the
recpiisiie

we
ol'

S'jLmJch(/a

for

and

perfect

thcoo wyfetemij have

a proceeding

hate

reply. \\jv

infcrinr

desir-

apparent of a

opiiiians,

product i\'e of nothiug but

is

own

define ierfect knowledge

to

refutation of other

There

our

and anger.

thwe

i.utt'lli!''ence

similar

some

lookin*

systems as

knowictigc,

weighty

is

because

appearance,

PHILOSOPHY OF SHAKKARA

42

have been

a(lop!.ed

and profess to

Aud
cal

lejul to

we

further,

by

otlierj^.

of the. Saiukhya^.

maintain

the

that

The Sam-

non-uitelligent
.

Ihe

The pradhana

it

has

its

And

^x^

),

one of

omniscience means

is

capacity

because otherwise

active cognition of everything

Were permanent,

the

It

as
(

il'

if

for

all

well

as

it

means

cognition

Brahmua would

dependent upon the aciivity of knowing

1.

S. B. II.2.

2. S.

B.

( I.

( II. J. I

;->

be
if

I.

5-li

i.

is

an attribute
constituents.

its

knowledge for the Brahman

pradhana

posi-

because

objects.

omniscient, because knowledge

of goodness

this

omnipotent

is

for

all the effects

is

Veda?iia pas-

sages can be con-itrued lo support

tion.

own

three elements,

consisiing of

the cause of the world,

the

bclween his

thought and that of

khyas

criti-

own system by

<^riiW:5

pradJoaiui

more

arc able to get a

contract ho himself

kuowle-lge,''

perfect

knowledge of his

Ref'i.Uaiioh

perRons

auilioritiitive

),

( II. 2,

I. 4.

1-10.

l~ia

).

( 1. 1. 1>

SkANKARA ON OTHER SYriTEHS

cease along with

43

Brahman would

were non-permanent, the

it

Moreover, previously

it.

Brahman is without any

And
action or knowledge.

to the Creation, the

inftrumentp of

funher, ilm 'prad^'AW"'^ us consisting of vari'ous elements,

may

modifications and
(

undergoing

of

CLtjrablc

is

therefore

material ) cause like clay

while the uncom-

homogenous Brahman

pounded

as

act

is

unable

to do sc.

The

refutation

unscriptural
to

the

tlic

agahi,

because of

guna

"

lias

iu

^^

%i^\

it,

of the

The

presence

the presence of the rajas and

pradhana

is

act

<'>f

and

any reference

but

A"ain, the

Brahman must

permanent. Like ihe sun,

heat are perhianent

knowledTe

principle,

nnu-inteHigent.

cognitional aciivity of the

C'f

etc.

than little-knowing,

tdways requires a Avitnessing

peu'lenr

''

no more right to be

tamas gunas, Furdier, au

ih^i

is

shrutis ascribe intelligence

culled all-knowing, because

of the sattva

This view

as follows.

cause.

first

pradhana,

is

Vvhn^e

^\hicl) is

!o

lio-ht
still

be

and
inde-

outwanl object

PtlLOSOPHY OF SHAN^AkA

44

(when we say
also

may

said

of

agent without

lUe

ihoiight,

namea and

orin

Creation.

Brahman

any need

stand, in

or instruments.

the Vedanta

And

there

authorities

the

Still,

an object of thought

that

volved, before the

vie^7 that

Brahmau

any object of knowledge.

necessary for

think

tlic

),

be spoken of as ao

reference to
if it l^e

the suu sliiues

intelligent

Brahman
which

Xor

in

tan

are in^

does the

any organs

of

is a.

is

consensus

favour of

Brahman

of
the

the

is

cause of the worhi.

In the second part of the second Book of

the Brahma-Sutras,
tion

is

attempted.

follows :- Ju5<t

a:?

an independent refuta-

The Samkhyds argue

jars, dibhes

ducts which possess the

and other pro-

common

quality

consisting of clay are seen \^ liave for

cause clay in general, so

of

their

we must suppose

the inanimate

and animate objects

endowed with the

characteristics of plea-

that
are

as

all

sure, pain and dullness in general. Pleasure,

pain and dullness in their generality together

constitute the tlireofoll yradhaiuh. This non-

SHAN'KARA UN OIUKR SVSTJiMS

intelligent

prodliond

ously into

muhirorm modifications

Hponiane-

evolve-^ itFelf

order

in

the

thus to effect the purpos.es of

4^

irr.ellicrent

soul

Now if the Samkhya

theory

is

thus based

on observation merely, Shankara rejoins on

?uch a wonder-

the basis of observation that

ful

organization as the universe requires an

intelligent

and not a non-intolligent cause.

Clay

does not shape

it

itself

requires potters to

and

dis^hes.

itself into

mould

it

the jars

into

Again, the presence of

in the world requires

activity

an intelligent agent.

Chariots indeed move, but that

intelligent driver.

pots etc,

is

due to the

indeed

Activity

to non-intelligent things, but

it

belongs

results

from

an intelligent principle. True, the nature of

is pure intelligence, still it can move

the soul

the universe although

a

magnet moves

iron

itself
).

rmmoving,

( as

The pure Brahman

does not move, but motion

is still

explained

intelligently within the empirical splicro.

If the

prauhand works

has no reference to a

spontanea. >usly,

purpose,

it

purpose

PHILOSOPHY OF SH\.NRARA

46

would be

Were a'lmitted,

ii

or release. But

vlie

aoul

enjoyment

either

by

is
( 3^.7 )

its

very

nature incapable of any accretion of pleasure

or pain
lease.

an<l it is

Neither

i?i

the,

a state of

like a

said tliat the soul

lame man guiding the pradhanay a blind

man, or that
as

It is

re-

the pure

nor

pro.dh'nia

soul can feel ajiv dt^Hire.

perpetual

tlie

Koid

the magnei moves

moves the pradhana,

iron, liut this would

contradict the previous position, according to

which the pradhana

is

movuig of

itself

and

the inactive soul i^ssesses no moving power.

moves the pradhana by^meaiis of

proximity, permanency of motion would
If the soul

follow from the permanency

and the

proximity

of

possibility of final release will be- cut

off.

Refutation

of

thr,

Atomists

The Vaisheshih maintain

originates

take place at

impact

is

that the

from atoms, through

of an unseen principle.
all ?

"^^i'^

).">

universe

tlie o})erati)n

But how did motion

Neither endeavour nor

possible at the time of the

riolnal

SHANKARA OX OTHEU SYSTE\j[,-'

The nnseen

motion.

principle

An

explain the phciiomeHOii.

principle cannot of itself

of

action.

Samlihjas

Vide

(
).

ram\nt

also

nmriteJligeiit

act ov be the caure

rerntation

the

unseen

ihe

If

47

the

of

principle

is

snp|X)sed to inhere in the soul lo be connected

with

there would

atoms, then

tlie

coniinuity of action ( because soul

vading
action

Thus

).

is all-per-

no original cause of

t,here is

original action cannot

result

take place in

the atoms.

The notion

of conjunction

atoms also

of

Conjmiction takes place

presented if ficul lies.

The

only between substances liaving parts.

activity

essential

themselves

atoms

For

further.

pralaya

non-activity

or

does not take

also

on the

destruction

latter belief, the

former

) is

Creation

first

of

argtm:ent

cause

that

us

on the

unaccountable.

is
.

to

atoms are not

is

the

hypothesis,

impossible

The arguments advanced

permanency

of

establish

the

vnlid.

The

the atoms

hence they are permanent.

lave no

But

the

PHILOSOtHV OF 3HA^'KARA

48

atom*

the (jualities of colour ere

|K)sess

aiKl

they are therefore gross and noii-j)ermanent,

compared

to

uhimate

their

second argument

The

cauRe.

that the ppecial nef^tion

is

implied in the word non-eternal implies that

an

there

is

thing

may

And we

Brahman.
words to

Well, that ecernal

eternr.l thing.

may

not be an atom, but

cannot

The

tilings.

from

argue

argument

third

that the impossibility of conceiving a

reason of the de^-iruction of

effect^!,

tion to the division o the

causal

into

its

and the

parts

the

]:>e

i*

third

in addi-

substance

desiniction of the

causal substance, involves the permanency of

the atoms.
is

This

i?

correct,

produced only

by

may

the

several causal substances.

stance

if

originate a

new substance

conjunction

a causal sul)-

Ikil,

new

substance

passing over into a qualified state,

effected object

dissolution of

Further,

if

its

may

be destroyed

by

and the
by the

yjner relations.

the atoms have the

ties as the eienaents,

gome

of

same

quali-

whose causes thev

will have greater

number

of

are,

cjualities

SHANKABA 0\ OTHRR SVSjTEMS

than

and hcuee

orfaers

other atoms.

If all

only, the element^'

also.

(3r if all

qnalities, then

mnst have

The

greater

40

than

size

aroms have one

qnalirv

have one

qnalitv

rnni^t

the atoms have

water must

fonr

the

all

have smell,

air

taste, oolonr, smell an^l so on.

Vaishesh.iJ, s

maintain that

categories are absolutely different

their

six

from each

other and yet assnme that they depend upon

substance.

Again,

if

This account

the

quali*

etc.

contradictory.

is

depend upon sub-

Smoke indeed

stance, substance alone exists.

is

different

it.

from

fire

But smoke and

The

and yet dependent u]ton

fire are

apperceived.

relation of conjikiction is not possible

between the soul and

trhe

internal organ and

the atoms, because these do

parts.

alone

and

The Samaraya
is

not

inhet-ence

possible between that

that which

consist
)

of

relation

which abides

forms the abode.

But

this

would involve the vice of mutual dependence,

for only

when

the separaieness of

cause and

effect is established, the relation of the

and that which abides can be

abode

esrablishe*!

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

50

and only when the

ed,

the reason of sepnrateness can be proved.

It thus

is

latter relation is esLal:>lisli-

appears

the atomic

tliat

supported by weak arguments,

ed to scriptural i)assages and

ed by any oi the

it is

oppos-

not accept-

it is

taking

authorities

stand on scripture, such

doctrine

their

Mann and

as

the

others.

Refutation of the Realist

Banddhas

The

:-

??iirRclc^^rR^)4

Bauddlias

of

realisiic

ten<lencies maintain that' everything external

as well as internal,
is

element or elemental

internal

is

niiud

AtT

What

is real.

v?a%^

is

external

what

or mental (%^).

elements are earLh, water etc

is

The

elemental are

colour etc, on the one hand, and the eye and

the other sense-organs on

other

the

The inward world consists of

five

hand.

groups-

sensation, feeling, knowledge, verbal

know-

ledge, impressions.

Now how

these

two

classes of

aggregates

(material and skandhas) (bodies and minds)

can be brought about

iTsTBTcll.

2.

18-27

).

is

not

clear.

The

SHANKAP.A OX

B.'mddhas

<lo

uot

0TriE4^' SY>TK.\Iv

any permanent

lieliexe in

God.

intelligent heing, soul or

51

move

iliey

If

themselves, they will never cense to be active.

Nor can

the cause lie in

cog-nitions

permanent and then

same

as

momeniiu'y

this

if

fen*

self-

from a single self-cogni;ion,

it is

but the soul.of the Ft'cteiw

the

of

train

( <^^J^^(^^TilH^]^ )

train is different
it is

the

single

and

nothing

and

else

if

it

is

self-cognition,

it

is

hence

Avithout

influence.

Nescience cannc^t account for their existence,

because

it

presupposes their

And

existence.

an eternal chain of aggregates means

own

aggregates produce their

aggregates. If the former

be a god or an animal
in the

next

latter

case,

life into

is

as there

man

these existences

man might

no permanent

cannot

cannot transmigrate

in

an

turned into an elephant or a god.

is

or unlike

like

true,

tliat

Self,

); in

the

instant

he

Further,

no being

desir-

ous of release can be assumed.

The

doctrine

of

momentariness renders

causality an impossibility.
is.

But

to say that

We may say A is; B

follows A, would

mean

'

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

62

connection between the two

in the

moment and

first

with B.

If

it is

luis

but

periheK

nothing to do

said that an effect

may

arise in

the absence of a cause, then anything miglit

.

originate from anything.

The

fact of

remembrance

also refutes

the

doctrine of universal raomentariness for

re-

membrance

the

person.

Nor

implies
will

the

continuity

of

do to say that the

it

re-

cognition takes place owing to the similarity

of the different self-cognitions
tion of similarity

for the cogni-

on two things.

based

is

judgment of similarity cannot be quite

a new act the expression, ' this is similar

Tlie

to that

',

contradicts

we are conscious of
may arise as regards
of outward things

it.

We

it

being

alway

feel

that

Doubts

that.

the identity of similarity

but no doubts

r^re

pos-

sible regarding the continuity of the person,

of the conscious subject.

The absence
leads to the

from

of

belief

non-entity.

permanent,
that

sta})le

causes

can

spring

entity

But such a position

entirely unacceptable. It

is

would run counter

SttANKARA ON OTHER SYSTEMS

to otlr normal experience

in

But such

foi*

the husbandman,

even

if

true, rice

the potter did not

and so on.

No

would grow

he did not cultivate

if

would shape themselves,

vessels

all

not the case. If the theory

is

Bauddhas were

his field

If

has causal

emanate from

efficiency, all thuigs will

things.

effects.

non-existence

undifferentiated

of the

which we see

producing special

special causes

6$

fashion

wouW

effort

the

clay

be necessary for

any object whatsoever.

Refutation of
(

%ft^^^*T^lf^.

Subjective

lite

Idealists

These philosophers main-

tain that external things

do not

exist,

they

muet be either atoms or aggregates of atoms.

But Buch minute things as atoms cannot be
apprehended

an<J

be tliuught of as
identical

aggregates of atoms cannot

ditt'erent

with them

not

they are composed of

for they

different

atoms nor

because
identical

would not be then observed in

their parts ).
5.

from atoms, nor as

S. B.

What

( II. 2.

exists

2^\-d27)

is

therefore

all

the

PHILOSOPHY

ii

mental

proces^s

ul'

01-

SHANKAKA
wiih

kiiowle<lge coiuiected

form

the mind. Further, ideas have the same

object

as

tiie

the

object

is

that

by

detenniued

Hence these are

form

the

is

the

identical.

ideas.

we

Again,

of

are

shnuUaneoiibly conscious oi the fact of knuwItv

Ige

and the object of knowledge

proves

the

identity

of

the

this also

and the

idea

object. Perception is similar to

ii

dream. The

variety of idejis

is

due

to the impressions left

by the previous

ideas.

In the Ijeghiningless

^amsara

ideas and impressions succeed each

other as causes an<l effects.

The Vcdanliu
is

re}>lics that

reasoning

this

not correct. External things exist,

we

are

conscious

of

TCobody when

them,

perceiving a post or a wall,

his perce})iion only,

of posts, walls, and

their perceptions.

knnwledgc

but
the

All

all

is

as

objects

of

instrimients

of

like
tlie

Again,

if

objects, i'leas cannot iiave the

the uijjccts,

conscious of

tnen are conscious

the

truth

of

there

were

no

same form

as

( v^^\^\. ) testify to

this consciousness.

because

and objecta uru

uciuully

appre-

SHANKARA ON OTHER SYSTEMS

external. Things

lieiided as

perceived simultaneously

and ideas are

because

they

related as cause and effect, not because

are

they

are identical.

To say

that ideas are self-luminous while

external things are not

The idea
to a

is

and existence of Self

proved. This Self

ideas ( of the

is

quite

Bauddhas

away,

distinct

self-

is

from the

the latter origi-

are manifold

while

the

one and permanent.

Self is

It is idle to

dreams. The

are not

are acts

our

say that
latter are

sciousness of our

brance

not reasonable.

apprehended only as belongino-

Self,

nate, pass

so, is

ideas

are

like

negated by the con-

waking

the

former

the latter are the results of

remem-

while
of

tiie

state

ideas of

iumiediate

the

active

state

consciousness.

The

results of the ingenious sophistries of the so-

called philosophers cannot

lief in

ness.

wipe out our

be-

the data of our immediate conscious-

The

the waking

common

dreams and ideas of

have some attributes in

fact that the

state

does not

mean anything.

Fire

has

PHILOSOPHY OF SHAXKARA

56

commuii

certain atiributcs in

but

not follow that

it tloe*!

it is

water

wiili

cold.

Further, the variety of mental impresbiuna

is

caused altoji'ethor by the variety

perceived

tilings

hence the Bauddhas cannot

count lur theui.

Ali

whicii

subtratuni

a(huit, because

it

seli"-eognition

iniprer;>ions

cannot

be

Trlf^|iriT )

ac-

re4[uire

Bauddhas

the

The

be

cannot

because

do nut

cognised.

abode of Jie mental itupress>ions

i??

ul:

the
it

momentary.

The Shunya Vdda

( or

nihilism

iloes not

need special refutation. The apparent world,

whose existence
ot:

is <^uarant0e<l

by

all

the meanss

right knowledge, cannot be denied, unlest

some one should hnd

out

which

he

the

basis

of

some new truth on

may

impugn

its

existence.

Refutation of the Juinns :-^

apply the following reasonhig to

somehow
and

it i?,

s'ltmehow

is

is

iudescril>al)lc
6.

a. B.

ii

U.

2.

not

Jaina*^

all

things :-

somehow

somehow it is and
somehow it is not nnd

not;

i^

it

it is

The

33-a6.

bHAN'KARA ON OTHER SYSTEMS

'

indescribable

ia

all J

not

de>otriiie

bundle of

somehow

is

iiidescribublc.

of

relativity

long at one

the same thing

it is

siuch

but a

iiuthiiig

Such contradictory

and non-being cannot

the same

an1

Well,

is

ooiitra<iiclioiis.

attributes as being

and

is

it

57

time to one and

observation

just as

be-*

teaches

us that a thing cannot be hut and cold at the

same

The

lime.

unsettling

\vhole

the result

reasoning

vagueness and con-

is

fusion.

No

we

landeii in agnosticism

lire

Furtber
theories

deliuite assertion

it is
;

impossible

the

of

no

upon

act

such

and

teachiu"*

avail.

size as the

that the soul has the

body. This makes the

limited a^d

perishable.

soul cannot

accommodate

sizes. It

may

Furthei:,
itself to

dilution.

the

soul

game

bodies of

be said that the infinite

particles of souls are capable of

aud

and

scepticism.

Hence the practical

The Jainas maintain

varying

or

Jainas about bondage and release

will be of

same

to

possible

is

because of their contradictory

chaotic nature.

very

ife

Well, then,

if

compression

particles

cauuot

PlilLOSOPHY OK SHANKAKA

68

occupy the same space,

number

finite

of particles cannot be contained

in a limited body.

If

same

position, the

size.

The hypothesis

soul

changable,

will

be of minute

aUo not

particles is

the

that

soul

about

final release.

views

Again, these panicles are

either material or non-material. In the

mer

case they cannot be

body

in the

is

Hence

and hence uon-eiernal.

view will contradict the Jainas

this

the

of the successive acces-

would mean

It

can occupy

they

and withdrawal of

sion

tenable.

follows that an in-

it

latter

But we do not know

must be a

there

case

of

from

distinguished

reservoir of soul-particles

for-

whence they come.

any such reservoir.

Lastly the Jainas believe in the permanency

of the final size of the soul

from

follow that the size in previous

this

would

conditions

is

also permanent.

Refutation of the

Pashupatas

main

position to be rebutted here

Lord

is

is

The

that the

merely the operative cause of the

world and not the material cause.

tTs.

13. II. 2.

ol-ii.

lu that

SHAXKARl ON OTHER SYSTEMS

case

God

5i

will be responsible for the inequal-

the

argues

some

Thirdly, the

Secondly,

world.

ities in

imperfection

Lord cannot be

theory, because he
kintl of soul.

is

in

activity

all

agent.

the

active

on

this

represented as a special

no reasonable con-

Fourthly,

nection can be established on this hypothesis

between God. and the

Lord, like

tlie

souls.

Fifthly,

the

ruler of a country must have

a body; but previous to the Creation there are

And

no bodies.

still if

we suppose

a material

be subject to the

substratum for him, he

Avill

sensations of ordinary

transmigratory

and

Lord.

will cease to ])e the

Lord either defines the

souls

Sixthly, the

measure of

the

2)radhana, the souls and himself, or not. If the

former

these will have an end, and conse-

all

quently a beginning. This will lead us to the

And

if the meaLord himself, the pradhana, and

is not defined by the Lord, he is

doctrine of a general void.

sure of the

the souls

not omniscient,

Rejviation of the
S. S.

B.

II. 2.

i2-45.

BUagvatas
9.

S. B. IIL a.

The

Ji-jJ,"

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKAkA

60.

Bbagvatas

are

whose uaiure
eelf

four-fold

opinion

uf

VaHudeva, the highest

^ankar.shaiia, the iudi\idLi*al sold

and Aniruddlia,

the mind,
egoity.

Vabudeva

that

knowledge divides him-

is piii-e

Yasude\ a

is

the

the causal

Self

Pradumna

principle of

essence

three others are an effect, otherwise

the

he will

be non-peunianent. Release will become impossible

for the effect is

entering into its cause.

ment such
spring

Further, an instru-

as a hatchet

from an

only by

ajj^orbed

is

agent

never

such

observed

as

to

Devadatta.

But the Bhagvatas teach that mind springs

from the individual
If it is s^aid

that

perfect Lords, then

soul.
all

these four are equally

we

rejoin

there

that

is

no necessity of assmuing four ultimate causes,

when one is sufficient. Again from the one
A'asudeva cannot
beings.

cause

spring

mui

equally powerful

have

ority over the effect. In fact,

is

manifestation

d(x.'lrine is also full

ICefutntiijH

of

one

some
all

superi-

tiie

world

Vasudeva.

The

of contradictions.

of the Maicrialists

The

SHAXKARA 0\ OTHER SYSTEMS

raaterialitfi

deny the existence of

body.

Self

apart

^^

;i

CoDsr^iowFness

is

springs from

power of intoxication

menting matter

).

The body

the conscious being

a conscious

intelle<^r,

from

fer-

alone, therefore,

and the

from the

form of

external elements, in the

just as the

body and

tbe

in

St^lf

tliti

fc^e

6t

because

Self,

being only continues as long as

the body, a separate

abode

is

not

proved

hence the Self cannot persist beyond the body.

But

this is not true

Self is not dependent

the l)ody.

rialists

upon the existence of

The very argument

of the materi-

argue that the qualities of the

qualities

of the

body,

the

that

(pialities

qualhies

do not

the

of

We may
Self

body

tl.o

slate

of

persists.

I'eath.

they
rejoin

are

because

but motion, remembranse

not persist in
tlie

the

body,

persist while the

etc. persist,

while

of

Self

because

persist as long as the body.

the

of the

can be turned against them, Th^ mater-

alists

are

the existence

not

they

Shape
etc.

do

Further,

former are perceived by others, the

latter are not perceived.

The

qualities of the

PHILOSOPHY OK SHANKARA

61

Self

may

persist

by entering

into

another

bofly.

Form and

colour and other

the elements

qualities

( of

do not make thsir own form

or colour or the form and colour of somethintT

But consciousness can

elements and their products
its
objects.

their

else

render

hence

objects

body.

Because

cannot

it

latter.

a qimlity of any

consciousness

material world known

consciousness

l)e

must be separate

This consciousness

nature of the

makes

from the

c-onstitutes

And we may

Self.

the

and not vice versa)

infer

the

from

the fact of the identity of ike conscious agent

in such

mental acts as recollection that con-

sciousness
sciousness

of the Self

and

its

From the unity of

therefore we may argue the

is

one.

and

con-

unity

independence of the lx)dy

its

consequent eternity.

Moreover, perceptive consciousness takes

place

where there are certain

as lamps and the

like,

from their absence.

bute of lamp or the

auxiliaries such

and does not

an

attri-

In th same

way.

Still it is

like.

arise

not

SIIANKARA ON OThKR SYSTEMS

the

body

is

used by

tlie

Self as au auxiliary.

Further, in the state of dream,

ceptious, while the

the Self

is

body

63

is

we have

uioliouless.

separate from the body.

per-

Heuce

CHAPTER

III

METAPHYSICS

Brahman

or the Absolute has

appearance in the

now
it

Vedanta sysiem.

described in terms of

mentioned

'''Brahman
in the

fir^

conditions
evolutions

is

as

It

pure

is

now

pbeiiomena,

iioumeuon,

apprehended uuder two forms;

place

as

qualified

by

limiiixrg

owing to the multiformity of the

of name and form ; in the secnud

place as being the opposite of this

from

twofold

all limitincf

i.

e.

conditions whatever.'"^
is to

reason for this distinction

the different levels of

addressing themselves

out and the. same Self

to

personal

God. " Although

hi<lden in all beings

movable as well as immovable, yet owing

the gradual rise of excellence of

the

wluHi form the limiting conditions

Mf ) ( 3qif^f%^^cTr<^Tff^,

The

be sought in

culture of the

is

free

),

to

Diin<1
(

of

tlie

Scrjipturc declares

METArHYSICf?

65

that the Self,* although eternally

and nniEorm, reveals

peries of beings,

in

itHell

down

graduated

and so appears

various dignity and power." 2

therefore lay

uiichan<2;hi,!v

forms of

in

The S'lnstras

instructions as regards

all

the goal to be attained and the special means

to be

adopted for

the varieties

it

with special reference to

temperaments and talents

of

among men.^
iVietaphysics is concerned maiidy

undifferentiated
It is

mainly described

by a reference
it is.

Brahman,

to

what

is

it

It is frequently said

Brahman

for

denote a thing

way,

not than

what

is

it

stands

above

to reason

cannot be expressed in words

such as Sat and Asat

existing

negative

that

speech and thought.* " It

that

the pure Absolute.

a

in

with the

existing

and non-

every v/ord

employed

denotes

thing - when

that

monads-each one realown. point of view with

Leibniz's conception of

ising Reality

more or

from

less distinctness-is a parallel.

1.

S. B.

3.

Br. C. II

its

I. 2.

14.
1.

20.

to

2.

S. B.

4.

Br, C. II.

I.

1.

U.
3. 1.

PHILOSOPHY OF SHAKKARA

66

heard by another - as associated

tain

genus or a certain

Brahman

...It

certain

relation... But

of

actionless

is

at all."^

neither being

It

be

can

it

Tt

is

not

it

is

buc

denoted by no

therefore

is

(^^)

...

else... Hence

anything

right to say that

word

belongs to no genu?... It possesses

no qualities
related to

or

act,

mode

r^WiVy, or a certain

with a cer-

nor non-being

Shaiikara explains this

neither the object of consciousness

be understood by this negative

exis-

it is

be-

must not

It

way

Brahman

is

it

of

tence, nor of non-existence, because

pressing the nature of

3i^ ).

by saying that

yond the reach of the senses.^

as

described

of

that

ex-

it is

mere abstraction or negation. Nothing can be

more remote from

*

not 60, not so

Brahman
trates

the

this

'

truth.

'

After the clause

has given information about

clause

teaching

next

following

by saying

illus-

There

is

nothing l^eyond nor separate from Brahmcin

therefore Brahman is expressed by ' not so,
Bg. C. XIII.
C. Xill.
Bg.
6

5.

12. Br. C. II. 3. 6.

'Z,

METAPHYSICS
not so

'

whinh

Brahman

latter

words do not mean {hM

The implied

does n^t exist.

itnelf

menning rather

i^j

that differoni

thing else, there exists the

Brahman.

67

'

fr.:

has,

'

general fact about

we understand

an idea or a physical

is

it

we mnst

Here, however,

ic

some

however,

positive characteristics ascribed

ence as

evevx-

"'^

The pure Brahman,

first

non-negatived

to

The

it.

existenc-e.

its

discriminate. Exist-

ordinarily

fact.

is

either

Snch attributes

as existence, non-existence are derived

our notions of chansre,

absence

of

from

chancre,

combination of both or absolute negation.

These attributes therefore far from

express-

ing the nature of Reality only serve to delu'le

In

us.^

tlie

commentary on the Gita, an

opponent says everytliing must

comprised

))e

under one of the two categories existence or

non-existence. Shankara

replies

that this

is

correct as regards objects of sense-perception.

But

Brahman

being supersensible

need not be an
7.

ol)ject

8. B. III. 2. 22,

of
8.

( 3T?f[i'^?? )

consciousness
Karikas IV. 3.

of

PHILOSOPHY OF STIANKARA

OS

But because

non-existence.^

existence

or

empirical

existence

does

Brahman^ we cannot deny oi

On the otlier hand, Brahman
is

from

defined

as

it all

there

it

is

The second

is

pure

is

described

etc.

12

^<

verv nature as heat and

very nature
cussion

intelligence

and hence
site

9.

is

nr^,

be

hence

eternal,

or

it is

its

constitute the
dis-

throws mudi
It is,

is

the

is

or

effect

by an oppo-

not eternal.

and hence

Bg. C. XIII. 12.

as

is

knowledge

stultified

knowledge

11. T. C. Br. valli.

variously

Brahman,

of

ordinary

liable to

as

its

The following

because the latter

impression

Brahman
fR. All

aspect

this

from

different

licrht

the i^m^^T^r^ri^'T

in

on

light

of

It is

is

Intelligence

heat. "

or

).

Brahman^

of

It

%^?^,

it

which also forms

the very nature

f^ci;,

it

described

existence in general

characteristic

Intelligence.

outside

no existence.

Existence.i^ It

WrRf5^ y^

to

existence.

alone exists

the same thing as Existence

different

belong

not

it is

But

%cT^ not

an object

10. S. B. II. 1. 6.
I,

12. S. B.

U.

3. 13.

of

METAPHYSICS

knowldlge

Whatever

is

be

hence

then

hence

AVhat

known

the

world

knowledge

Hence

unintelligent.
is

essence

is

an object of insight.

because

it is

question
)

the Self.

it

Now

Brahman

non-different from

In

to intelliuence ?

must be

either different

same as or both

Brahmin,

not possible, because

contradiction.

itself

that

established

whether

arises

that case intelligence

the

it

Not

is

stands in the relation of a sub-

stance and an attribute

is

Everybody

this ?

throus^Ii the lidit of

( or the Self

from,

Brahman,

of

the source of this illumination

is

).

knowledge

ordinary

the proof of

is

knovi'S that the

ordinary

sr?

an object of experience cannot

subject

cannot belong to the

What

uniiuelligeiit

is

it

S9

Nor does

it

The

involves

the

and

different

last case

us in

alternative

first

hold good. Because the relation of conjunction

is

not possible

sul)stanee
(

because intelligence

and the

relation

of

is

not a

inherence

^^^\^ ) involves a recjressus ad wjinltum.

And

if

they are not the

same,

there

possibility of the relation of a iiuulity

is

no

and a

PHILOSOPHY OF SfiANKARA

70

substance between the SeK and

Intelligtnce.

AVliiieness cannot be the quality of whiteness.

Hence the

Self does not possess the attribute

of intelligence

i%^iT )

intelHgence

f^c^^^T

is

we can

but

).

same truth

i-

viz. existence

expressed in the

the sutras. " The

nature

In the sanie

reason as to the other

pure JJrahman.

\ery

its

way

attributes

of

and joy.^^ The

commentary on

Self has neither inside nor

outside any characteristic form but intellig-

ence

simple non-differentiated intelligence

constituted

its

nature

just

as

salt has inside as well as outside

same
*'

saltish taste,

The question

not

arises

lump

of

one and the

any other taste."

Brahman

is

whether

to be defined as that

which

thouglitj or as both...

How

is

can

?i^)

or

as

Brahman^

if

devoid of intelligence, be said to be the Self

of the intelli2;ent individual soul

could

Xur
these

we admit

can

it

thouglifc apart

be said that

chaj'arLeristit.'s,

Brahman

since

x\nd

how

from existence

that

has

lx)th

would coa'

13. H. C. 2. also sae T. Br. vail. C,

I.

METAPHYSICS

trudict

something already admitted. For be

who would

maintain that

and

stence,

maintain

same

the

at

there

that

Brahman. - But as
( viz. that

cha-

is

from exi-

by

time

exist-

from thought, would virtu-

ence different

possesses

Brahman

by thought different

racterised

ally

71

a plurality

is

scripture

Brahman

in

both

teaches

one only and that

is

more than one

it

characteristic ) there

can be no objection to such a doctrine. There

is

we

reply,

more than one nature. And

possess
it

one being cannot possibly

for

should be said that existence

is

thought existence and that the

exclude each other
case there is no

Brahman
both."

we remark

reason

that

is

which

if finally,

thought and

two do

liot

that in

that

for doubt whether

is

or intelligence or

15

Shankara did not

him?elf

whether

nature of joy
says that

it

fjuite

esoteric

^\^^

clearly

Brahman

also.

express
is

of the

.In 1. 1. 10.

he

forms a part of the definition o

the qualified

Brahman,

'*

If

by the

Self

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

72

consistinf'

of

we were

bliss

Brahman^ we should have

Brahman meant

the

by

tiiiguished

joy

qualities

differ

etc.

Brahman, on

i^

the purpose of teaching

Brahman

are to

Ije

e.

i.

to be taught,

is

one.

Brahman

or ^rqfrf^^

3^

which
(

of our theology.
L;rd

and

their

nature

is

knowledge only,

is

other

the

known

a?

aspects

^^ ur ^\^^^

Brahman. )
the God ( ij^< )

the ditterentiared

Brahman

This

for

all

i"

describe

will

for

Those attributes are

inentioned with a view to

Now wc

nature of

viev.ed as valid
to

not to meditation."

as

sets forth for

the true

Brahnan
Brahman whose

referring

i>assages

of

next passage

In the

Other attributes, however, such

'

purport

body,

individual

and so on which scripture

bliss

dirs-

the other hand, does not differ

according to bodies."

he says

Brahman

^^ )... Moreover aB

each

in

assume that

to

the

is

uuderstand

to

is

the same as

' Tlie

Lord depends

( a^

upon the limiiing adjuncts of names

ffjrms, the

io. s.

products of nescience

B.irrTyy

ItTs.

b. Ill,

just us

3.

M-ETAPHYSICS

78

the universal ether depends (as Umited ether

such as the ether

of

jar

upon the

etc.)

limiting adjuncts in the shape of

&c.

He

Lord) stands in the realm of the

(the

phenomenal

in the relation of a ruler

so-called jhr-fs ( individual souls

tioiial selves (r^r^Ticflfj^)

This

Brahman

is

defined

as

*'

omnipotent cause from

omniscient,

the

which indeed are one

proceed the origin, subsistence, and

tion of this world-which world

ated by

to

or cogni-

Self. " ^^

own

with his

pots,

jars,

is

That

which

dissolu-

differenti-

names and forms, contains many

agents and

enjoyers,

fruits of actions,

definite places,

the

is

these

abode of the

havmg

fruits

their

times, and causes, and the

nature of whose arrauu;ements cannot be even

conceived by the mind-that cause,

Brahman,''
ing

Brahman which

^^

and endowed with

ef^sential

nature

and freedom,
derivation

is

say, is

all-know-

whose

powers

eternal purity, intelligence

exists. For,

of the

all

is

we

word

it
*

we

consider, the

Brahman

'

from

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

U.
the root

'

brih

understand
belong to

The
tiated

'

to

'

that

be great

*^'^

conceiving a differen-

justification of

religious

once

at

and so on

eternal purity,

Brahman

Brahman

we

'

lies

our

needs of

the

in

Popular religious consci-

nature.

ousness reijuires for the purposes of worship

God ( or a personal God ).

The (iuulitied Brahman is the personal God
Perof Christian, Hindu and other theisms.
the existence of

sonality is not

because
in

fact,

it is

attributed

more than

personal. Personality

low a determiiiation of

too

is,

Absolute,

the

to

Brahman, Our ordinary

conception of jierson-

aliiy

requires an outward environment upon

which

it

acts

with which

and

in conflict or

develops

it

co-operation

broaden our idea of personality,

by

a unity of

it

consciousness,

intelligence wliich complete!

and fidly controls

\-

we
we mean

But

itself.

if

centre

Infinite.

all lis aotiNities,

The

Al)solute,
'

20.

is.

B,

I,

I, 1.

of

po:>>csses itself

say witli Lotze that true personality

the

if

we jnay
is

with

therefore,

is,
'

M1ETAPHY8ICS
super-personal,

as

it

The

super-rational.

78.

super-moral and

is

idea

Vedanta, however, fully meets

long as
there

Brahman

ar

is

applied

devotee, object

the object
to

our

ull

different results,

some

the-

As

'"

nescience

of

categories

and the

devotion,

of

modes

different

the

it

the

in

requirements of a personal God.

istic

The

God

of

of

like.

of devotion

lead

to

to exaltation,

some

to

gradual emancijmtion, some to success in the

works

these

modes are

of the distinction

and limiting

distinct

on account

of the different

In diis

conditions.''^!

qualities

way

the

most abstract and highly impersonal theories

way

of the Absolute give

sonal Goil but to other

well, for the

not only to a per-

forms of

purposes of the

worship as

less

advanced

people.

Shankara in his esoteric metaphysics maintains that the pure

nioQstrated. But

existence cf

The

Brohnan
is

1, 1.

is

11.

cannot be

de-

to infer

the

pos><ible

God from eenain

hrt proof

21, b. B.

it

empirical facts.

psychological

" The exist"

Philosophy of shankara

ence of

Brahman

demons trated by the

is

fact that it is the Self

assumes

of

existence

the

cannot say, " 1

am

not

all.

himself,

of

For

".

For everyone

if

the existence

of the Self were not

demonstrated,

the world could say

Self

Brahman

is

am

not

epistemological proof.

then

And

'.

The

".22

he

for

all

the

second

is

Because the Self

*'

is

the basis of the action of proving,

and con-

sequently

action

proving.
is

evident before the

it is

And

since

it is

therefore impossible

third proof

of this

to

deny

of

character
it.

teleological. ( a ) Presence

is

order in the world argues

intelligence in its

the

presence

authorship. " Look

it

The

''

of

of

at this

entire world

which appears, on the one hand

as exLcnial (

i.

e.

inanimate

in the

form of

earth and the other elements enabling

souls ) to enjoy the fruits
actions,

iu the

of

their

the

various

and on the other hand, as animate

form of bodies which

beloni'

to

the

different classes of beings, possess a definite

arrani!;ement of

or<jfans,

and are therefore

'

22. S. B,

I.

1. I,

'

METAPHYSICS

77

capable of constituting the abodes o fruition;

look

we say

most insenions
ception in

world of which even

tlie

workman cannot form a

con-

at this

tlie

mind, and

tlien say if

intelligent principle is able to

(

belongs

gence. It indeed
things in

from an

when
when

which

it is

it."

^"*

of intelli-

to non-intelligent

observed, but

'*

it

results

intelligent principle, l^ecause it exists

the latter

is

present and does not exist

the latter

is

absent." Pure intelligence

is itself

devoid

nevertheless

fourth

which

fashion

means the work

Activity also

non-

proof
is

motion

of

move
is

other

but

2*

things.

cosmological,

may

it

"

The

Brahman

mere Being cannot spring from mere

being, since the relation of cause

and

effect

cannot exist without a relation of superiority

(

on the part of the cause

Brahman

).

Nor again can

spring from that which

is

some-

thing particular, since this would be contrary

to experience. For

we observe

that particular

forms of experience are produced from what

is

general, as for instance, jars and pots from

23. S. B. II. 2. 2. 1.

24. S. B.

II. 2.

2.

PHli-OSOPHY OF SHANKARA

7R

what

clay, but not

o-eneral

is

prorlucerl

i"

spring from that

Kor again can Brahman

which is not ( ami ) for

thai which

is

from

particulars.

not

is

without a

eelf... Farther,

fundamental causal

the non-admission of a

substance would drive us to a

in hifinitwn"

God

retrogressus

- ^

above time, above space, and above

is

causality. Infinity belongs to the very essence

Atman

of His nature.

because

has existence and

it

just like

its

pramanas
laid dowa

feels that

cause

in the

shriitis

the shrutis.'^^'

*'

and

Ahasha

for

Al^sha

is

has no

all

nor

is it

and because

it is

the three worlds

Brahman

tliree resi)ects-in respect of

of space

It

of knowledge

stated to be the cause of

in

because

exists,

I exist

no cause,

not perceived by ordinary

is

means

'

( f^faf )

it lias

Atman

an atom.

every-body
cause

eternal

is

infinite in

is

time, in

respect

in respect of things respectively.

example,

is infinite

in space.

not infinite either in

time or in respect of things.

Why

But

respect of
?

-Because
^

35. S. B.

U.

3. i.

2^.

H. C.

2,

UETAPHYSICS
it is

an

even

unlimited

is

cause

it

in respect

not an

is

Akasha,

I'lilike

effect.

79

of

Wliat

effect.

Brahman
forms an

by time... so,

eflect is alone limited

respect of things.-llow

is it

pect of things ? Because

it is

be-

time,

too,

infinite in

In

res-

inseparable from

That thing indeed which is separate from

another, forms the limits of that other
for

all.

when
is

the

mind

engaged in the former,

is

withdrawn from the

latter.

There

is

such separation in the case of Brahman,

is

therefore unlimited in respect

of

it

no

He

things.

Here one may ask How is .^r^Awia/nnseparable from all ? Listen, Because it is the
:

Akasha and so on.

limited by other thino-e,

cati?e of all things, time,

Then Brahman
and so

is

far as there are

effects, (

Answer

spoken of

effects

cause, there

is

other

No

things

because

the

called
thino-s

are unreal. Apart from the

no such thing

indeed

as

an

which the idea of the

and shruti says (Ail)

effect really existing at

cause

may

terminate

changing form
of speech,

f^%K

Bo in the

) is

a name, a

first place,

creation

^% the c^uae

?HILOS0PHY OF SIIANKARA

80

Brahman

o AJcasha etc.
for

ir

admitted by

is

infinite iu space

that

all

Ahtsha

And Brahman

limitP'l space.
.<1/:'7.s/ir/...

is

the can=e of

is

Indeed an nll-psrvading thing

never found to arise froni that w.brh

infinitude as concerns

time,

space.

Atman

effect,

"Similarly

is infinite

things.

Hence

Brahman
proceed

its

the

**

anytliing
resj^ect of

sustention

origination,

both the material and

from which

that

retractation of the world ."-^^

that

not

absolute reality."-"

defined as

is

in

infinite

is

it, it

not

as concerns

and owing to absence of

separate from

is

is

Atmnn's absolute

all-pervading. Hence the

being an

uii-

is

and

It is therefore

efficient cause, Ijecause

from which some other thing springs and

into which

it

returns

w^ell-known to be the

is

material cause of that other

because

operalpive cause

ruling principle and

gence. ^^

This view

29, S. B.

I.

is

vail. I.

4,

is

because of

23-27.

It is the

no other
it:-^

intelli-

open to certain objec-

tions. First, the w^orld as

27. T. C. Br.

thing.

there

an

effect is differ-

28. S. B.

I.

1. 2.

METAPHYSICS

Brahman

from

ent

objection

who

cause. ^^

its

it is replietl

tliat

acknowledged

to be

is

81

To this
(a) from man

intelligent,

non-

intelligent things such as hair, nail, originate.

(
(

) if

in case of

were

equality

absolute

(which after

between the two

2.

If

Brahman

gent world,
be

it

considered

all

requires

and

the cause of non-intelli-

is

follows that the effect

as

non-existing

has

before

to
its

But the consequence can-

not be acceptable to the Vedantin

tains that the effect exists in

ready. This objection

effect

distinction

would be annihilated.

actual origination.

as the

of

effect

another ) the relation of material cause

effect

on

insisted

one thing being the

exists

is

the

who maincause

al-

not valid. In so

far

through

its

participa-

tion in the nature of the cause, its existence

the

same before the

is

beginning of the

actua-l

effect. ( as after it.)^^

8.
its

The

effect

inquinates

properties at the time

No. Things

for instance,

30. S. B. II. 1. 5.

of

the cause

with

re-absorption.

made

of clay, such

31. S. B. llj 1. 7.

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

8i

as pots

etc.,

which in

of separate

state

this

existence are of various descriptions, do not

when

they are re-absorped into their original

matter

i.

e. )

clay,

impart

And

their individual qualities.

cian

is

as

the

latter

magi-

not affected at any time by the magi-

cal illusion
it is

the

to

produced by

himself,

unreal, so the highest Self

is

because

not affect-

ed by the world-illusion.-^^
4.
( at

If

we assume

all

distinctions

the time of re-absori)tion

pass

to

into the state

of non-distinction, there

would

reason for the origin of a

new world

no special

l)e

with distinctions. This objection

is

affected
also

futed by the parallel instances of deep

and
5.

sleep

trance.33

The doctrine

must be abandoned,
tion of

the

of

as

Brahman
it

causality

leads to the

well-established

.subla-

(iis.inction

enjoyers and the oljjects of enjoyment.

this

re-

it is

replied

tliat

ordinary experience.

"It may

We

exist

as

of

To
in

see,

for instance,

that waves, foam, bubbles, and

clier modi-

32. s, B.

u.

1, y.

aa. a.

b. u,

i. 9,

MBTAPHYSJCS

although they really are

ficatinna of the

Bej\,

not

from the

different

83

sea water,

exist,

sometimes in the state of mutual separation,

in the state of conjunction. ''^^

sometimes
6.

faults, as

i. e.

here to

Brahman

avoided by

How

there

work with

is

nor

it,

can

nothing

itself

adis

beneficial to

to

act

as

be

Creator

with insirumenl^ to

absolutely complete

power

does not require to be supple-

Brahman which

parts cannot undergo

As

faults

non-beneficial

Brahman

The

Brahman

effects.

not

Brahman

self.

mented by any extraneous

8.

is

intelligent

it.35

without providing

of

the embodied

be done by

to ihe

No, these

).

certain

what

doine^

attach

will

eternally free

7.

accepted,

is

instance,

for

beneficial,

cause

doctrine

the

If

help.^^

is

the

not

change into

partial modification

a modification of the entire

composed of

is

its

impossible,

Brahman

has to

be assumed. But that involves a cuttino- off

34.

S.B.

36. 3. B.

II. 1. 18.

U.

1.

24-2^.

35. S. B. II. 1.

22 23"

PHILOSOPHY OF SHAXKARA

84

of

Brahman

from

its

very

basis.

Sliruii.

make us understand what

contradictory.

changes in

9.
is

Brahman

If

entirety.

its

due

is

is

without parts,

i^

does not undergo a change at

change

of

But the opponent says that the holy

texts cannot

it

evidence

the

refutes these ol)jectioiis l)y

Shankara

or

all,

it

Shankara says that

to illusion

only.-'*'^

Brahman cannot act without organs. It

Brahman possesses all possible

replied that

capacities.

some purpose

10. If the Creation serves

of the intelligent highest Self,

ciency

is

destroyed

of motive

on

also.

may

And
its

we assume

it

omniscience

is

if

the activity of the Lord

be supposed to be a mere sport, proceed-

ing from His

to

self-suffi-

you must assume

mad man,

affected.-We reply,

its

you assume absence

part,

its

absence of activity
to act like a

if

own

nature, without reference

any purpose.^^

11.

The Lord cannot be the cause

world because on that

37. S. b. II. 1.

'ZiQ,

2h

hypothesis,
-66.

S.

B.

of

the

the

re-

11. 1.

32.-33.

METAPHYSICS
proach

of

inequality

As

and demerit.

and

dispensation

of

cnieltv Avould attach to

bound by regards

8S

him-But the Lord

is

he has to look

to merit

Samsara

without

the

is

beginning, merit and inequality are like seed

and sprout, caused as well as causes.^^

Now

Brahmctn

if

whole World,

is

Some
But

it IS

of

the

of

the soul

it

creator

creator

No,

indi-

it

only

appears

reo'ard the soul to be of atomic

not of atomic size.

vading or

un-

the

is

limiting adjuncts.4o

its

Brahman, and

the

cannot; be a product.

noo in itself divide

divided owing to

with

Brahman

modified
It is

the

it

vidual souls also

the

is

as

It

Brahman

size.

identical

is

all-per-

is

infinite the soul is infinite likewise.

All statements contradicting this fundamental

fact
(

about the soul

nescience

The

are

due

Avidya

to

).4i

intelligence of the soul is adventitious

according to Kanada and others

it

duced by the conjunction of the

self

~~39. S. B.

B.

il S. B.

11. 1.

31-3G,

II. 3.

19-32.

40. S.

is

pro-

with the

II. 3. 17,

PHILOSOPHY OK SHANkARA

86

min'l, jubt as the quality of redness

duced
with

in a jar

continue to work even in deep sleep,

or passion. This

nature of

the

it is

The

not valid.

is

soul

is

eternal

swoon

essential

intelligence,

one with the highest soul, and

the highest soul

eternal

is

intelligence.

sleep etc. also the intelligence

absence of actual

is

intelligising

due

is

telligence, just as

the

light

not apparent owing

is

In

but the

alive,

to the

absence of objects, not to the absence oi

space

jar

Otherwise consciousness would

fire.

because

pro-

is

by the conjunction of the

in-

pervading the
absence

to the

of things to be illuminated, not to the absence

of its

own

Two
soul

nature.*''^

features particularly charuclerise

and

unity

doctrine hinges

between

tiie

the fundamental

theory of the

Shankara's system.
philosopher
are

only,

Bauddhas and
that

to

n.

3. 16.

" The
things

extend

person also
'

"

all

would have

that doctrine to the perceiving

i2. S. B.

the
this

difference

Shankara says

who maintains

momentary

Upon

continuity.

'

METAPHYSICS
that
I

however, uot possible, on account of

is,

he reuieinljrance which

lake place only

who

persons

perienced

man."

We

the

to

made the

whedier

to that

admit that sometimes with

ing what

lies

may

it is itself

lias

be

made

concern-

But the

never any doubt whether

conscious that

it

is

it rat.her

the one and

same subject which yesterday had a

tain sensation and

tinuous

i^fi-nciple

and

absolutely unchangable

we

remembrance,

ia

s. B.

II. 2.

exists

one

con-

equally connected with the

past, the present,

nises everything,

cer-

to-day remembers that

sensation."*^ ''Unless there

for

merely similar

or only similar to itself

is distinctly

may

is

outside our minds.

conscious subject

.the

that or

it is

for mistakes

remembered by another

regard to an external thing a doubt

arise

same

perception

what one man has ex-

that

not

is

"

l)elongs

it

if

previously

we observe

consequent on the

is

That remembrance can

original perception.

for

87

25.

the future,
(

or an

Self) which cog-

are unable

recognition,

to

account

and so on,

PHILOSOPHY OF SH ANKARA

88

which are subj^pt

to

mental

de-

iuii^essioiis

pendent on place, time, and cause."^*

The Supreme
the

minate

own

is

while

itself,

their

soul-from

intelligence-the

spiritual

material objects,

by

which distinguishes

criterion,

that the former can

tlie

aid of an

intelligent principle. Matter as such is

"

the soul.

ceived

is

moon and

is

whatever

for

it,

not

Brahman

moon

etc,

can

be

own

said

while Brahmiut as self-lumi-

by

perceived

an} utiier light.

manifests every tiling eUe^

and colour and other

else their

per-

is

Brahman

not manifested by anything e^se."^^

their

the

so on witli

perceived with the light of

only, so that the sun,

nous,

deny

possible to

It is (juite

Brahman

to shine in

dark-

knowability depends upon

its

shining of the sun, the

regard to

illu-

latter cannot shine

light but require the

ness-negation

all

(jualities

the

''

do not

colour or the colour of

oljjects

hut

is

Form
make

somsthin*''

elements and

their

products on the other hand whether external

or belonging

U.

S.

B.

to

the

II. 2. 31.

self

organism

""45. S. B.

I.

3 22.

arc
"

MBTAPHYSICS

<9

%
The

by consciousness."*^

rendered objects

Self or Intelligence or Reality, therefore, constitutes the ultimate principle

knowledge of
shines in its

things possible, which itself

all

own

which renders

light.

from and superior

TIic Self

distinct

is

to ideas, because the ideas

require an ultimate

principle

which unites

and connects them, while the soul

is itself

ultimate principle whicli renders

the

and the idea are

may

ent nature, and

of an essentially differ-

therefore stand

oilier in the relation of

object known.

ing Self

is

of the witness-

self-proved and cannot

the idea, lamplike

if

to each

knowing subject and

The existence

be denietl. Moreover

cogni-

" The witnessing

tion of the ideas possible.

Self

the

therefore

you maintain that

manifests

itself

without

skuiding in need of a further principle,

you

maintain thereby that ideas exist which

are

not apprehended by any of the other means

of

knowledge, and which

knowing

which

are

without a

no better than to
assert that a thousand lamps burning inside
l^eing

46. S. B. Ill, 3. oi.

is

PfilLOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

90

9
some

mass of rocks manifest

iiiipeuetrable

themselves... As the lamp in order to become

manifest

ivgent furnished

eye,

some

requires

other

intellectual

with instruments such as the

and that therefore

idea

the

also

as

equally being a thing to be illuminated,

be-

comes manifest only through an

in-

ulterior

telligent principle. "^7

It is

argued by some people that the soul

is active.

But the

limiting adjuncts

Self's activity is due' to its

and not to

its

own funda-

mental nature. For if activity were the nature

of the soul,

soul to

)3e

bility of

essentially

it

would be impossible

free

from

final

finite.

There

is

the highest soul

because activity

llelease

depend upon actions

the

which means impossi-

it,

release,

painful,

for

otherwise

is

does not

also
it

will

be

no individual soul apart from

;

and

tlie

conditions of acti-

vity belong only to the realm of Maya.^^

The individual

soul has

no

reality,

no

existence apart from the highest soul.

"That

same highest Brahman

as

47 S. B. U.

2. 26.

constitutes

i6. S. B.

II.

we

3, 33-10,

'

METAPHYSICS

know from such

passages aB

Jj

'

that art thou

-the real ualure of the individual soul, while

second nature

its

depends on
not

i.

that aspect of

e,

nature. "49 In

its real

gives the view

of

Ashmarathya, known as

The Bhamati puts

the Bhedahhedavada.

thus "

As

they participate

on

hi

other hand,

from the

ditt'erent

it

from the fire

from fire, because

the sparks issuing

are not absolutely different

tlie

Shankara

4. 20,

I.

which

conditions, is

limiting

fictitious

it

nature

the

of

fire,

are not absolutely

fire,

and

non-

because in that

case

they could neither be distinguished from the

fire,

nor from each other

which are

souls also,

so the

effects of

would mean

Brahman

are

from Brahman^

neither absolutely different

for that

individual

that they are not of the

nature of intelligence

nor absolutely

non-

different

from Brahman, because

case they

would not be distinguished from

each other and because

cal
it
I

with

Brahman and

would be
,

.1

i9. S. B.

if

..

1. 3.

19.

that

they were indenti-

therefore omniscient,

useless to give
.

in

them any
'I

II

u.

iustrucnum

i*i

PHILOSOPHY OF SHAMkAI^A

92

Hence the individual souls are somehow

from Brahman and somehow nou-

tion.

different

Audulomi advocates what is

Satyahhedavada, "The individual

different."^^

known

as

soul

is

abeolutely different from the

Self

inquhiated by the contact with

it is

different limiting adjuncts.

of in the

highest

Upnishads

But

it is

its

spoken

as non-different

from

the highest Self, because after having purified

itself
it

by means

may

of

with the highest

ever, holds

else.

is

body and become one

Self."5i

Kashakritsna, how-

non-modified

the

tliat

Lord himself
thing

knowledge and meditation,

pass out of the

hij^hest

the individual soul, not any-

" Only on the opinion of KaBha-

kritsna immortality can

result of the

be

viewed as the

knowledge of the soul

while

same view

it

would be impossible

if

the soul were a modificatiou ( product

to hold the

the Self and as such liable to lose

ence by being merged

in

the

of

its exist-

causal sub-

stance."^2
50. Thibccuit vol.
51. thibe.iut, vol.

I.

p. 277.

I. p.

27^.

52. S. B.

I.

4. 22.

METAPHYSICS

From
unity

(;

the Self. "

only,

it

for

oneness of the two

some do) on a

the

therefore

iiidivi-

name

Self differ in

from the highest

senseless

it is

to

plurality of selves,

insist

and to

different

is

and the highest

Self

from the individual

indeed called

absolute

the

o]>ject

ils

maintain that the individual soul

it is

the

follows

also

being a settled matter that perfect

knowledge has

(as

As

and the highest

soul

ikiLil

view

alDove

the

9S

For the

soul.

by many

Self

Self

different names,

is

but

one only. "53

Various objections are raised against these

views. " It
is

may

be

said

that

omnipresent like ether,

Brahman
sure,

it is

nature.
false

Brahman

follows

that

same fruition of

plea-

it

pain, and so on (as the individual

The same
this

also has the

as

'*

from

result follows

replied that there

For there

is

is

soul).

unity."

its

difference of

difference

between

knowledge and perfect knowledge,

tion being the

while the unity

To

frui-

figment of false

knowledge

( of the Self ) is

revealed by

perfect knowledge."^^

The same

objection

is
"

53.

B.

I.

4, 22.

54, S. B.

I. 2.

8,

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

" If

expressed lifferently.

we

ailmit

the souls are the parts of the Lord,

Lord also whose part

that the

by

its

soul

is,

to

the

experience of the Samsara-state

...Herefrom
obtain

tlie

follows

by the pain caused

will be affected

soul

it

that

would follow that

it

Brahman

obtain

who

they

greater pain

that the former 5^amsa?'a-condition

^o

would be

preferable and complete knowledge devoid of

purpose."^
is

due

from

To

this

Again,

if

Self of all beings,

permissions and
as Tedic
tions

To

replied that all pain

and hence the Lord

to illusion

it.^^

it is

there

is

only

what room

is free

oie intirnal
is

there

for

prohibitions, worldly as well

this

it is

replied that "injunc-

and prohibitions are based on

connection with the bo.ly."7

the admission of

the

the Self's

Further, from

unity of

the

Self

it

follows that there must be a confusion of the

fruits of actions, there

" This

is

not so

soul depends on

its

( a )

I'or the

individual

adjunrts, and owing to

55. S. B. n. 3745^
57. S. B. II. 3.

being only one master.

47-4.

56.

S. iT"}!.

:)

IJ.

METAPHYSICS
the non-extension of

95

adjuncts there

tliis

Hence there

also non-ex(ension of the soul.

is

no

confusion of actions.

is

And

that in-

be considered a

mere

appearance of the higlicst Self, like the

refle-

dividual soul

to

is

xion of the sun in the water

neither

is

it

diretly that nor a different thing.

therefore,

There
no confusion of actions and

is

re-

suUs.''S

The individual

soul, in fact,

is

identical

with the highest soul. But owing to connection with

upadhis-Mmiting adjuncts

connection however
to act. These

illusory

is

upadhis are

)^

of the elements

solved at death

changing
( ^Rt^^f

part,

its

moral

the

pose the seed of the body

a n.

3.

ccvirse

this is

dis-

determination

unchanguig part which

49-51.

of

subtle

subtle portions of the elements

58. 8.

appears

transmigrations (A) a

disappears only at the time

this consists of (a)

which

other parts accompany

viz.

an

( 1 ) tlie

body consisting

the soul through

it

liberation

body,

" the

which com-

;" (b) the lif

oro-ans

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

9S

tbese are divided into conscious and

( limv. );

unconscious (1) the organs of the conscious

are

life

;he

( gsn^^qif^

sight,

),

organs of

five

(a)

hearing,

sense

tlie

smell,

taste,

touch (11) five organs of actions ( ^iTi'tRrm )

hands,

functions of speech, of the

the organs of

and

generation

the

evacuation

(III) the manas, the central organ

scious

organ of unconscious

We

shall not elaborate

note a few
place,

is

separated from

^fR

it is

mind

non-spiritual.

'

is

is

made on

the only

other

appa-

all

ma-

are merelv

JTJ?^sr<r^3T^i'-4ifcfi-

self-evident

the principle that

sciu'co of
it

intelligence

shines in

But these organs derive

59.

all

<'Mind, eyes etc. are material." This

discrimination
the soul

first

spiritual principle

other factors includino;

"60.

but

furtiier,

whole diameter of being."

soul is the only

terial or

(breath).^^

pokits. Ih the

interesting

ratus " by the

The

this

(b) the

to be observed in this system that

it is

the soul

prdna

life is

con-

of

directing the ten organs,

life,

feet,

Dr. Deussen, p. 325-6.

its

their
60.

own

light.

jirinciple of

H. C.

2.

METAPHYSICS
activity

and

life

from the

they are inert and

S7

soul;

by tlieiuselves

Hence the soul

lifeless.

is

manas

always a subject and never an object;

can be an object o the soul.

And

it is

cardinal principle of this system

that

what-

etc.

ever exists for something else, whatever

be an object for a subject

(5Ts).6i

Even the principle

( ^Tfsic^i'fi'^^c^ )
it

its

non-intelligent

is

is

non-intelligent,

own

its aniaceilent

principle

ness
(

is

belongs

an

soul.

to
)

object

the appe.reeivi'n^

of

What

f^percepticJli
p.u'r:e>

then

is

is

I.

'

It

61.

and the

not a mere verbal difference.

self-consciousness
a^qjjf^cf^

feolate;^,

the differ-

ence between the self-consciousness

soul ? It

Xon-

for -selT-concioift-

on th part of the g^s'f-t^

intelligent Self )"63

"

self-consciousness for

( ^Tsss^-soul

itself

It is the

right.

object of apperception to the

agentship which has

can

of self-consciousness

or ^i^iiK

does not exist in

( oT^^r^C ) is

The

expressly ( ari-

) an object of the consciousness viz.

is

H. C.

the
2.

narrow, circumscribed ego,

62. S. B. II. 3. 40.

PHILOSOPHY OF S.HANKARA

^8

within us. This ego

the final key, the

not

is

master clue to the interpretation of Reality

hence

We

cannot be

it

can supplant

ultimate

broadening and deepening

us

of the Self within

takes

place,

arrive at the identity of the

common

this bed-rock of

son, is the soul

'

individual

the final form which

can attain
it

can

but

is

While

our

all

things,
per-

This

is

self-consciousness

things, even

itself

and

self-con-

thing or

we cannot

it

all

it

in

Hence

go.

our narrow

can be supplanted by

In this sense

Shankara

emphasis

upon the

persistent

soul

beyond

supplant

egoisms
none.

'

TWc5l^3Tr^q^.

it is

in each

'

'

we

till

cosmic consciousness. This cosmic

sciousness, this

principle.

a higher ego, the ego

by

it

of the universe.

the

insists

with

fact that the

always a subject and never an object.

it

remains

impossible

comes an

for

object,

identical with

it
it

to

tht :dl, it is

be an object

if it

ceases to be a subject.

he-

But

an object without a subject is an impossibility;

hence a pure self-consfiousness,

ic.-^iiig itself

in complete identity with ihe soul of the uni-

METAPHYSICS

99

Verse

is

the

being

of

conceive.

of itself

by

but then for that

not pure subject,

it is

original state of pure

far

not the

it is

only by a

It is

become an

time that object

something

is

than the

less

self-consciousness

so

pure ultimate atman.

mystery of the

this act lies the

fiorm

a voluntary act of self

that the subject can

-limitation
;

and the most uliimate

we can

narrowing

object

Ifist

Creatioti

In
;

the

subject surrendering by some mysterious act

(

called

Maya

of pure subject-ness
i<s

own

object

were of
universe

its

VedarUa

in the

) its

state

and becoming apparently

and thus losing

In this

reality.

( aj^icJi^,

own

way

-the non-ego

pan

as

it

the whole

arises

maintains

but

the pure self-consciousness

still

role gf the Being-in- itself

or the Absolute

it

keeps up

its

own

identity as a

or witnessing principle, above

pure

its
;

gf%^

thought, out-

Bid& activity, beyond appearance and yet the

only ciuiceiYable source of

vity

and appearance.

kara

tin is ap))roacl!fis

Plotinus

there

is

thought and

The Vedanta
closely

ihe

gradual

acti-

of Shan-

theory

of

degradation

PHILOSOPHY OF SHA1?KARA

100

( apparent indeed

reme
Self

"

principle.

is

for

the sup-

) o

can be shown that the

extremely pure, extremely clear and

extremely subtle.
pure

as

It

Shankara

etc. as

And Buddhi
the

Self,

it

(reason) being

can put on the

semblance of that aspect of the Self which

Manas

manifested as consciousness.

Buddhi,

semblance of

is

puts on

the sense-organs

put on a semblance of manaSy and the physi-

body puts on

cal

common

organs. Wherefore
the

semblance of the sense-

mere physical body

It

has

been ofien

people look upon

as the Self.

that

.said

thinkers place knowing

for tiiem

lies

intellect rather than in will.

we

self is as

ordinarily

much

conceive

raised

as

in

But these ex-

pressions are rather misleading.

man's

Indian

the

above willing, that

the essence of personality

of

""^

The essence
above what

intellec ion

or

The
Buddhi

thinking, as above conation or willing.

above quotation clearly shows that

is

higher

Manas.

faculty

Buddhi,

63. Bg. C.

in

psychology

fact,

is

XVIII, 50; Br. C. IV.

the
3. 7.

than
nearest

METAPHYSICS

101

approximation to the core of our self-consci-

The following quotation also bears

" Beyond the senses are the
fact.

ousness.

out this

beyond sense-objects

sense-objects,

is

he great

the

is

bacause

senses

graspers

and

ifr: ;

to the graspers (

again

is

senses

the

arfcisr^i: ).

mind

the

Tlie

The mind
,

( jt^t^^ )

because

Buddhi

because

called

the

and their objects

senses

based on the mind.

are

the objects are superior

superior to the objects

relation of the

than

manas;

is

Buddhi and beyond Buddhi

soul. "^4 The objects are beyond

beyond manas

higher

is

the

is

objects

of

enjoyment are conveyed to the soul by means

Now

of the Budd/iiJ^s

means the faculty

Buddhi

of

faculty

the

si^^I^^riT ).^^

Hence

by manas, Shankara

in

reflection

of

decision.

lligence

principle

it is

also

R^q",

more ultimate and

essential part of self than reflection.

highefit,

is

tlie

And

6(3.

S.

I.

source of

all activity.

65. S. B. I, 4. 1^

4. 1.

B.II,

3,

32, S.

if

the source of all inte-

~
64. S. B.

by

Shankara's paychology,

willing is considered a

the

and

B.LiE,!.

PHILOSOPHY OV SHANKARA

102

In fact

it is

sciousness and

the source

is

and knowing.

feeling

ordinary

raised above all

of

This
but

convey

organ

adopts
of

all states

manOiS has

all

it is

tions. "^7
**

of

hence

intellectualist

is

variously called,

the

term manas to
" The

consciousness.

things

extends to the past

future

for

the

its

objects

and

and

the

present

one only but has various

The

we have

soul
to

a voluntarist.

is

internal

Shankara

all

Shankara, therefore,

cannot be characterised as an

any more than he

con-

willing

is

constant

funcfactor

acknowledge the existente

an intrnal organ through whose attention

and non-attention perception takes

place.

''^^

In the commentary on the Brihachiranyaka

Shankara gives two proofs of the existence

the one is that it is manaH wlji( h
of Quanas
:

renders
It

is

all

knowledge through senses

called

^^^'^i%'?2r^rfr.

[wssible.

Another proof

the capacity of judgment which we possess.

Somebody whom we cannot see touches us
and we infer the person. Now mere touch

is

67. s. B. II. 4. 6.

es7s, h. n7a.li5r

MEtAtHYSiCS
cannot

103

make ub aware of tliis fact. The

which we make such an inference

facully by
is

^'^

miuuis.

Here
the

it is

convenient

Adwaita theory

hi brief to

refer

to

of perception.

It is

the

soul ov the

Chaitanya within us that makes

perception

possible.

"As

the

existence of

the elements and their products

from the

drawn

that this per-

from them

different

is

concluded

they are perceived; so the

fact that

conclusion must also be

ception

is

perception

makes the material world known and not

and perception is just the nature
of the sold. " 70
The Chetana within us
vice verod

);

unites witli the

the result

is

follow that

Chetana, in

perception.

mind and

justification of the

The

ready given.
adaptation

of

It

senses are useless.

The

mind

is al-

existence
senses

69. Bi. C. I. 5.

are
to

of

necessary for
their

" From the sours

nature being intelligence,

senses

object -and

does not therefore

perception

ximate things.

that the

the

are

it

approessential

does not follow

useless,

for they serve

70. B. B, III. 3. 51,

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKAKA

104

the purpose of determining the special object

of each sense such as smell and so on. " 7i
All errors arise

throuo-h

these

intermediate

processes.

The immortality
cally

from

of AdivnifM,

of the

soul follows logi-

fundamental

tiie

idealistic position

Moral Argumod.

(1)

*'

If the

individual soul perishes after the body, there

would be no sense

hi the religious injunctions

and prohibitions referring

to the

enjoyment

and avoidance of pleasant and unpleasant

body. "

things in another
gical

Argument

7*

(1) P.sycholo-

(a) Apperception is different

from the things apperceived; and apperception

is

*'

the nature of the soul.

Thus

the inde-

pendenee of the scul from the body and

eternity follow from
tion. "73

(b)

the

sell,

that

different

71

follows

state,

recognises

Vi, S. B.

H.
in.

3.

3.

IS.

H.

fact

with

itself as the

con-

Metaphysical Arcjument;

identity of the Self with

S.

from the

connected

aliliough

scious agent. 74 ^2)

The

unity of appercep-

the

also

It

its

Brahman

12. S. B. II. 3. 1G6;

n.

S.

B, IlL

3.

54.

I.

im-

2, 19.

METAPHYSICS

165

plies that transcendental existence ( indepen-

dent of time,
to

Negative arguments are

essence. 75

its

adduced to show that the Self

such as form and so

movement

etc,

exist even

on,

may

when

the

body

not so the

exists, viz. in the

AVe can

on

existence

cannot
the

of the Self,

remembnuit

ascertain

tho qualities of the Self so

we
when

the

and so

presence of

long as the body

body

does not exist.

(d)

Elements and

their

consciousness

and that hence the

products are objects

cannot be a quality of them,

(e)

as

anything should

act

are

certain

auxiliaries

on

such

latter

contra-

it is

Perceptive consciousness takes place

there

non-

ascertain Jicir

of

dictory that

body

are perceived

qualities

such as consciousness,

but

life,

(b) the qualities of the

again such as form and so

exists;

be viewed as

on the other hand, do not

state of death,

(c)

separate

long as the body exists

existing as

on.

is

(a) the qualities of the body^

from the body:

by others

) belongs

and causality

space

itself.

when

as

the
'

"

75. S. B. II. 3. XT^

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

I0

lamps

and does not take place

unci the like,

where thoe are absent, without

ing therefrom that perception

lamp and the

of the

is

follow-

its

an attribute

like.

Analogously, the

fact tiiat perception takes

plaee where there

and does not take place where

a body,

is

there

none, does

is

attribute of the

body

mere auxiliary,

the body

is

we have manifold
lies motionless.

ed

(f)

Nor

by the

is it

au

Self ) as

even true

tliat

as an auxi-

required

dream

for in the state of

body

perceptions while the

76

state of final liberation is not concei\

in a negative

way.

means disappearance of
sion of subject

and

mental.

all

duality,

divi-

all

But existence

remain fundaAs Hoffding puts it :- " In the

bliss

mystical concept of God, as

well

Buddhist concept of Nirvana

inexhaustible

76. S.

Moksha no doubt

object.

and consciousness and

the

is

it

lamps and so

for like

absolutely

liary of perception

The

imply that

body may be used

on, the
a

not

B.

positivity

III. 3. 53. 54.

as

it is

which

in

the

precisely

bursts

METAPHYSICS
through every

conceptual

107

form and

turns

every determination into an impossibility. "77

Names

and

forms

vanish

c^'nsciousness disappears
is

not a mere negation

existence

fulness

fulness of bliss.

77

^'

of

but

but

individual

what remains
the

fulness

cunsciousness
"

q^q5|[^r%3j^

of

and

Quoted by \\Vard. Pluralism and Theism

p, 35,

CHAPTER

IV.

THE DOCTRINE OP MAYA

The doctrine
landmark

Maya

of

is

a very important

in the history af philosophic specu-

lation in India.

the

It lies at

root of

the

sublime structure of the Adicaita philosophy.

theory

Tlie

of

Maya

rendered possible a

One without

monistic system; and the

was then
sty

a second

able to stand aloft in classic

maje-

and to become the principle of explana-

tion of the

The Hindu

whole world.

sages

were convinced from the beginning that the

ultimate Reality nmst be one

be above
Ihgit it

all birth

growth

must? be infinite

that

decay and death;

eternal, changeless.

Nothing disconcerted them

more than the

all-pervasive influence oi change.

was a

verse

petual wJiirl

dust

sort of Heraclitean
,

an

eternal

where nothing,

must

it

Hux

tihif ting

is^

but

The
of

uni^

a per-

cosmic

everytliing

THE DOCTRINE OP MAYA

This essentially

becomes.

most valuable creates a

the

and

transitory

things

perishable nature of all

109

even those

disgust in

sort of

minds and in proportion to the depth

this reaction from
and subtlety of nature
the world works more or less powerfully in
all

the

bosom of every individual or nation.

irresistible feeling rises

up that the

finite

never satisfy the Infinite within us

changing and the perishable

An
can

that the

cannot

satisfy

the changeless and deathless nature of ours.

This

is

psychological

the

doctrine of Mctya
ther

it

and

genesis

in one Ffhap oc smo-

has^obtained a very great hold over

humanity.

It is the

all

of

all

philosophy

relations of the Infinite

appearance,

is.

said to lie in

and the

the Absolute and the relative

the

the

all

change.

The crux
tlie

hj

passed

verdict

Adwaita philosophy upon

upon

of the

many.

the

finite

One and

Keligious and metaphysical con-

sciousness in us

demands the

former, the ethical and

reality

of

the

scientific conscious-

ness demands the reality of the

latter.

Can

PHILOSOPHY OF SHAXKARA

tee

be

both

preserved

or

should

swallowed up by the other

To

reconcile

be

apparent

tiie^ie

one

conflicts

Shankara

introluces the conception of grades

of reality

and truth.

Corresponding to the

highest Reality there

The

ledge.

highest know-

the

is

science of this Reality

Meta-

is

physics. Corresponding to the lower Reality,

there

is

rience.
(

our ordinary knowledge and

The

science of this Reality

very broadly understood

).

is

The great

Ues in his realizing clearly

physics

In fact, there is

a fundamental difference between

poiuts of view.

expe

neurit

vhese

of

two

Shankara

and acutely

that

the empirical view of tilings can never explain

the ultimate Reality and hciire
unsatisfactory.

knowledge

and

is

The sphere

it is

absolutely

of this empirical

the would with all itx differences

distinctions.

Rirt, if einj)irical

knowledore

metaphysics was
were our only knowledge
impossible, and with ii mU higher religion
and all knowledge of Itealiiy. The resulr
,

agnosticism
or
would be
inMr,5:'rialiRa.
however
after sharply pointing
Shankara ,
,

THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

out the relative nature of

ordinary

on

we have

nary experience

This

truths.

very

established

experience,

the possibility

knowledge based

all

firmly the foundations of

III

metaphysics in

all

of transcending ordi-

and realizing the highest

standpoints

of

distinction

the empirical and the transcendental view of

things

is

Shankara

fundamental

in the

and

him

it

helps

philosophy of

to

solve

many

difficult problems in his metaphysics.

The

first

assumption

kara's philosophy

is

therefore

that

tliere

of Shan-

only one

is

Reality rooted ia our self-consciousness

other

that all

The confusion

unreal.

the root
(

\k^^

experience

of

all

our

and subject

is

the not-I ) and the

comparatively

of this distinction

mPi^ )
'

'

I,

having as their

of the

light. If

that the being of the one

is

the

more

other

it

in the other.

it is

certain

incompatible with
follows

that the qualities of

do not exist

Thou

are of a nature as

opposed as darkness and

the being of the

is

" Object

experience.

province, the presentation

(

and

so

Hence

much

one also

the
it

follows

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

.nl

transfer

the

that

^"^^m

of

object,

the

subject and

con-

versely, that the transfer of the subject

and

and

qualities

its

its qualities to the

yet in

mankind

false

knowledge

the

t(^

object

pairing

of

true and the untrue ( that

objective

) is

inborn

so

separating

not

and

transfer

tliey

one

tlie

object and

on
the

subjective

is

of

resting

together

that

the being and qualities

other

logically false,-

is

this procedure

the

to

subject

although they are absolutely different and so

saying for example
I

" This

'.

am

This

'

passage with

begins his great Bhashya

portance inasmuch as

it

is

under

This

is

the

illusion that

not^I

That

am

down

the root

and thus points

metaphysics.

the fundamental fact about the world

of experience
is

of very great im-

indirectly to the proper goal of

Thus

which Shankara

lays

of all worldly distinctions

we

its

illusory

operation

character.

an

of

posit the outer

9{^m^.

Tt is define

eternal

world
world

in opposition to the inner

is called

It

us :-

( the
( I ).
**

the

transference of the attributes of one thing to

THE DOCTRfXE OF MAYA

aijother. "^

'*

llS

Extra-personal attribules

superimposed on the Self

man

if

are

considers

himself somid and entire, or the contrary, as

wife

Ions: as his

children

sound and entire or not.

and

body are superimposed on the

thinks of himself ( his self
fair

as

standing

attributes of the
I

am mute,

attributes

Self,

sense-organs,

or deaf

of the

or

if

as stout

walking

on are

so

the

Attributes of

man

lean

or

jumping;

if

he thinks

one-eyed or blind;

internal

organ

when he

considers himself subject to desire, intention,

doubt

producer of the notion of the

internal organ )
interior Self

Thus

and so on.

determination

Ego

i.

e.

the

the

super-imposed on the

is

which in reality

is

the witness

of all the modifications of the internal organ,

and

vice versa the interior Self

witness of everything
the internal organ

The opposite

of this

S. B. I. 1. 1.

1.

2. S. B.

I.

is

which

is

the

super-imposed on

the senses and so on, "

Adhyasa
also ( III.

Introduction.

is

right

3. 9. )

know-

( I. 3.

2 )

PHILOSOPHY OFSHANKARA

lU

- the

^^^^^^Tr^^Roi

ledge;

determination

of the being in itself of things.

There are two grounds

view

of things

is

why
to

relegate'!

sphere of ignorance.

Firstly

the

it is

what

seek

is

undesirable.

Avidya

l)ecause

effects

If there

who

apart

is

is

from
its

(^f

tlieir

Many.4

the

causes,

the

underlying substance,

The instance of clay is cited.

known a lump of clay which

and truly

which agree

nature.

also

differences

all

is

nothing
likewise

but clay,

tliere

thini^s

made

all

of clay, such as jars, dishes, pails an

all

as

and avoid what

the source

It is

known thereby

are

and body

of animals

creates all variety,

are all unreal.

really

im-

it

and secondly because

desirable

manifold apart from

''

tlie

in the world.

Hence

same as that

Avidi/'Jb

plies belief in the sense-organs

belonging to the Self

empirical

the

in

so on,

having clay for their true

For these modifications or

effects

are names only, and exist througli or originate

from speech only,

3.

S, B.

I.

while

Introduction.

in

rdaliiy

4. I3g.

there

C. 13. 13.

THE DOCTRINE OP MAYA

116

exists

no such thing as a modification.

so

as they are

fill'

names

by names

distinguished

in so far as they are

individual effects

they are untrue

they are true.

clay,

In the same way, the

In

body

entire

of effects

The

Brahman.

has no existence apart from

""^

foUoAving reasoning proves the above conten-

" The

fact of the

its self in

Brahman

tion.

ing

embodied soul havself-established,

is

This

not to be accomplished by endeavour.

doctrine of
self

Brahman

in

doctrine of the

accepted

once

if

Veda^

having

soul

the intlividual

its

as the

away with the

does

independent existence of the individual soul,

does

just as the idea of the rope

And

the idea of the snake.

existence

dual soul has to be

set aside,

world -which

])henomenal

indi\idiial soul

tence

is

view

is

started

5. S.

B. U,

by
1.

of

doctrine

the indivi-

than the entire

is

based on the

-having an independent exisbe

likewise to

open

the

if

of the independent

away with

t(^

the

the

set aside.

This

following objections

pluralists

14; Bg. C.

"'^

II. 1

).

6. 6.

(a)
S. B.

"If we
II. 1.

14.

PHILOSOPHY OP SHANKARA

118

acquiesce in the

Absohite

the

of

ordinary means of

the

unity,

doctrine

know-

right

ledge, percepiion etc become invalid, because

manifold ness deprives them

the absence of

'*

of their objects.

(b)

'*

embo-

All the texts

dying injunctions and prohibitions will

purport

their

the

if

lose

on which

distinction

their validity depends does not really exist.*'

*'

(c)

And

doctrine

which refers

collapse,

if

the

pupil on which
if

it

distinction

of

teacher and

depends

not real.

of

the

and

at the

to

release

maintain the truth

"

the

release will

we

Self,

of

final

the doctrine of

doctrine

body

further the entire

is
is

untrue,

And
how can

of the absolute unity

which forms an item of that

Shankara refutes these objections

same time vindicates the compa-

rative reality of the empirical view. " These

objections do not

damage our

the entire complex of

is

considered

ledge of

as

Brahman

not arisen

to

phenomenal existence

true as long as the know-

being the Self of

just as the

are considered

position 'oecause

bs

])hantoms
true

all

has

dream

until the sleeper

THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

wakes... Hence,

does

not

why

present

true knowledge

long as

as

there

itself,

the ordinary course of

can

The Vedanta
unreal

truth

dreams,

as

prognosticate

often

the

of

Self,

nothinii;

remains to be desired

after

realised.

And

is

consciousness

this

because

erroneous

useless nor

and

rooting out nescience;

lated Ijy

any other

It is witii

nature of Acidya

it

is

the potentiality

"^

ingenuity that the

defined.

It is

nature

(
*'

of action.

potentiality is of the

it is

neither

cannot be sub-

it

cedent condition of the world.

is

hence

results in

kin<l of evidence.

very great

real

as regards

is finality

unity

of the

reli-

although untrue

texts

events. Moreover, there

the

and

on undisturb-

con\ey true information

although

no reason

is

secular

gious activity should not hold

ed. "

II7

the ante-

5?m^^Tr

).

It

That causal

of nescience;

it

is

rightly denoted by the term 'undeveloped';

it

has the highest Lord

it

is

of the

nature

of

universal sleep in which

LS.

B.

II. 1.

U.

for its

substratum

an illusion

it is

are lying the trans-

PHILOSOPHY OF SMANKARA

118

migrating souls destitute for the time o the

consciousness of their individual character."^
It is variously

*Maya\

called

'

Akasha

It is rightly called

non-manifested, because
either as ihat which
'*

Belonging to the

omniscient Lord,
the figments of
as either being

ent

from

of the

^qr

manifests
5??T^i^rm

form^.

"

itself

and/orm,

nor as

entire

),

differ-

expanse

called in

m^]

precise

neither

Ki^iruti

power

(511%)

as

naiure nothing
real

nor

unreal.

names and forma

^m

" Let me, evolve names and

is

Kannan.

sation embraces the

is

were, of the

third factor wiiich goes to consti-

tute the world

and

not.

of the omniscient Lord.""

its

it is

}.

it

is

not to be defined

phenomenal world,

said

which

Brahman)

or nature ( 5ifi%

It

as

germs of the

illusion

cannot be defined

there are 7iam<i

(i. e.

Thus as regards

Akshara

unde\'eloped or

that

self,

and- Smriti the

can be

it

or

nescience,

the

it,

is

'

',

The law

thus an essential feature of

8. S.

B.

y. b.

B.

II. 1.

4. 3.

U.

of cau-

whole empiricid realm

iis

consli-

THE bOoTRINE OF MAYA

''

tutioiijo

Maya

without beginning

is

end

also without

the

i,

cations and

It is the

emanations

the

physical

body

source of

"

and

In

all

qualities,

3T=^cTfr; it

it

such
plea-

aRlcfl^lL

has no

Brahman and

<Ji*

the

one

activity,

the

Maya

is

called

therefore

for

Br. C.I.

4.

10.

action

darkness,

has no princip'e of light or

10. Br. C. Introd.

is

^^^'I. ( not-sel

capacity

frequently

is

of

now- Brahman )}- Avidya

It

to

we deduct from

Hence Avidya or

Maya.

uften defined as

12.

thou that

down

Maya composed

source of all illumination

because

modifi*

all

Know

fact, if

exis.ence, the factor of

itself. *3

to

indi*

delusion and other mental states

the three (junat^.

called

an

to

Buddhi

from

spring from Prakriti or

or

and

reference

which manifest tliemselves as

pain

rest is

^^ Jim

( arirrf^ )

With regard

qualities.

all

all

sure

^r

5i?T

definitely terminates with the rise

of knowledge.

as those

'

with

ar^cf ),

"^^

.'?r/>>ib'^n/.

vicinal

^i 53fr^^-

tTcf\q 15

119

intelli-

11. S. B. Introduction.
13. S. B. 111.2.36,

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

120

The manifestation of
world, consisting of names and

gence within
this entire

forms

acts

has for

itself. ^4

agents and fruits ( of action

Brahman^

just as the existence of

of the sun is the cause of the

of

nil

form and

The

cnl(jiir.

manifestation

"^5

have a substratum

it

to God.

It

It

is

it

it

must

cannot hang in

2\v}^ It has no independence with

the self as

and

remain to be cleared

frankly acknowledged that

It is

light

tlie

God and Avidya

relations of

Brahman and Avidya

up.

),

cause the existence of the light of

its

mM>^l\vm\.

i7

It

the

reference

belongs

to

were of the omniscient Lord.^s

But

has sprung from the highest Lord.^?

Maya upon God or its

emanation from Him is true only in the
exoteric metaphysics.
The pure Brahman
this

is

dependence of

Avidya, " As

not in the least affected by

the magician

is

not at any time

the magical illusion

produced

affected

by himself
""

14.-15. S. B.

I.

3.

22.

16. Br. C. II. 3. 6.

17.

V6, S. B. II.

Vd. S.

I.

14.

by

S. B.

B.

I. 4. 3.
I.

4. .

THE DOUTRINB OF MAYA

because

unreal

it is

so

121

Self

highest

tlie

not affected by the workl-illusiou. "^

the point of view
close

not exist at

of

it

^^Maya

all.

does not exist. "

Absolute

the

-^

The

is

From

Maya

not a reality

is

adopts

Adtoaita

the theory of absolute non- evolution (arsrrm),

which

the entire nei^ntion of causality.

is

Nor

is

Avidya inherent
"

And Avidya
I am
own experience

tlie soul.

cannot

understanding

Firfya

Tlierefure
(

ignorance

ignorant

and ray

discriminate
)

an

Avidya

brought under the

name and

categories of

of

cognised by one's

knowledge

should be

the nature

in

is

^^

form.

Name and

form are certainly not the attributes of the

Atman.
also

"^3

In the commentarj on ihe Gita

Shankara lays down that Avidya inheres

in the

organ

perception etc

the Self
of fire
at

not in the
)

were

as the heat

**

If

( false

essential properties
is

of

an essential property

there could be no getting rid of them

any time

and

20. S. B. II. 1. 9.
32.

Self.

Ma. C. IV.

59.

it

is

impossible
21.

for

Ma. C. IV.

the

58.

23. Ta. C. Vall, Br. VIII. 5.

'PHILOSOPHY OF BHANKARA

122

immutable and formless Self

Akasha

like the

How

then the explanation of Avidya

is

does

it

originate

From

" This entire

which good and

a

mere

tion of

actions are

evil

on,

so

name and form,

at

Brahman

Absolute.

is

which spring from mere

the presentations of nescience

It

exist at

all.

"25

The

cannot send forth the illusion

Maya

Hence

all.

done,

to the non-discrimina-

and does in reality not

pure

in

Self's ) limiting adjuncts, viz. a

( tiie

body and

mean-

phenomenal world

owing

illusion,

the standpoint

of the Absolute, such a question has no

ing.

with

part

or

"^^

anything whatever.

What

unite

to

all-pervading

no basis in

has

tl)e

does not originate by mean:? of

a principle of difference in the nature of the

Absolute
whatever,

dream

pure

purest

monism was

it

even as

nor

for the

that the

In fact,

itself.

spirit.

no existence

has

an

illusion

or

It is in this

way

and most rigorous type of

reached.

Maya

or

Avidya has

no existence independent or dependent in a

'^L

Bg. c. xin.

2.

j^o.

a. b. ii,

\.

32,

lU

THE DOOTRINE OF MAYA

scheaie of pure metaphysics.
fore

Adivaita philosophy.
;

and how can he who

of pure light perceive

the atmosphere

in

is

darkness at

all

illumination puts

sudden stroke of mystic

[in

end to

existence altogether, and

remembrance of such a
of ours
spirit

the narrow

or
in

this

the nature of

It is of

darkness or nes:ation

the

character of

monistic

the

affect

cannot there-

It

all

our empirical

the

very idea or
as this world

thinsj

individuality

world, absolutely

of the

leaves the

Self.

True, illusion even as an

Hence from

accounted

for.

point

view we

of

The

orighi and nature.

the

mind

of

tlie

must be

Vyahavariha
explain

try to

Avldya

seat of

The explanation

man.

must be sought

concept

empirical

may

illuslvju

its

is

in

of the
in

the

nature of our cognitive faculty. Shankara, to

a certain extent, explains
It is

called m^*\^

faculty.

Avidya

mmd.

and knowledge
It is

in this

way.

innate in our mental

It is m^-JTiifr^RrR^,

knowledge
of the

it is

based on wrong
a

is

iflf^^Tfiic^r^j^T,

it

function

cousistb ia

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

124

-human
ent,

entities

are

birth,

of

" All jiwas

wrong conception.

the form of a

really non-exist-

-which are

with

concomitant appearance

all

death etc

mere

the

of

results

mind and noth" The whole experience i. e.

objectivising tendency, of the

ing

else. '"26

duality
is

pure

made up

of

perceiver and perceived,

imagination. "^^

"There

apart from the mind... on

is

destroyed

appearance.

its

its activity is

no Avidya

is

destruction

all

cause of

i\\\

the

"^^^

Avidya works through

g:qr[%s ( attributes,

adjuncts

determinations, limiting

).

by Avtdya

special apparatus required

the

All

consti-

Mind

tute the UpCtdhis

of

Upadhi, huddhi

an L^padhi, ahamkdi a

is

the

soul.

is

an
is

an Upctdkiy and so on Lpadhi, therefore, is

" The limithig adthe product of Avidya.
juncts are presented by nescience only. "^9

Such
of

is

Maya

the account of the famous doctrine

as elaborated

by

Shankara.

The

verdict which this theory passes u])on idl our

'
"

26.

Ma.

C. IV. 70.

28. V. 171.

27.

Ma. C. IV.

72.

29, S. B. III. 2. 11.

THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

very dear things, upon our
tions

upon

worldly

our literary

all

12S

ambi-

scientific,

and

philosophical activities, upon our ethical and

religious aspirations
social ideals,

upon our

political

upon our inmost loves

upon our God

and

in short

nature and our very existence

as individuals

among

other individuals

ruthless and sweeping

One stroke

one.

is

of

the pen of the Vedantin seems to be effectual

in sending to the gallows the

There

whole existence.

something very sublime

is

indeed

in

these flights of our metaphysical imagination,

in

which we leave behind

all

our illusions -

illusions

which we hug to our bosoms and

illusions

which we

and painful - the

fly

from, illusions pleasant

illusion of the outer world,

the illusion of thought

and the
till

we

illusion of

reach

the

the illusion of

our individual existence

Absolute

It

face all these ordeals.

thinking

the roots af

mentals of

all
all

Hard thinking

clear thinking

problems

situations

to the

requires a

very robust metaphysical capacity in

tent

God

man
,

to

persis-

thinking to

very funda-

to the very

presu-

PHILOSOPHY OF SHAXKARA

12

ppositions of

thought and being

all

He who

very essence of metaphysics.

courage to face the results

to

of

the

is

has no

thinking,

his

swallow the conclusions of his thought

may mean

whatever they

him personally

to

should never take the trouble to philosopliise.

An

demands

absolutist philosophy indeed

very heavy

sacrifices.

But

happiness

we

is limitless

But

get.

conclusion

The end

proportionately splendid.

the means. It

its

existence

after

justifies

limiiless

even this

all,

world dose not disappear as absolutely

Thus Ward says

supposed.

sphere of empirical fact by which

is

too diffused

their

many
or to

summit

is

to

the atmo-

it is
,

sustained

and when

the particular

the

of actual experience, tend to disappear

Ije

explained away. "^^

cannot be denied
ceases to

exist.
It

annihilation.

changes
30.

be detected

reached

as is

" In the flights

up to the Absolute

of pure thought

is

its

The tendency

empirical world

But

this

in fact

does not mean

merely means

form and colour as

"Ward

tliat
it

existence

were

Pluralism and Theism, p. 23.

for

THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA

the Absolute.

not

Reality

empirical existence and

It is

which

all existence

timeless

and spaceless

things must change

difference
,

aspect.
,

in

the
inte-

an abso-

Thus externality has

to go,

between subject and object has to

and temporal views of thino-s

spatial

must

s;o

causal determinatioa of

by another must go
oneness must go.

This

tb3 universe with all

change

its

Nothing

form

its reality will

It

horizon

an

merely

will

however

will

erroneous

Fact

remain

Reality
as

as ever.

But the view-point

This

the

is

not go,

meaning, and significance.

circumscribed vision.
,

Vedantu claims

radical
to

But

inevitable.

is

will disappear except a false

limited

tence

one thino-

maniness as well as

even for the liberated soul.

All

perception

and willing cannot inhere

lute intelligence.

go

essentially

is

temporal and spatial

their

limitations of our sensation

lligence

forms

limited

its

which

For a nature

vanish.

Existence

vanislies.

But

remains.

19>

work

change
in

view
idea
,

Exis-

fundamental
will

chano-e.

which

the

our intelligence.

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANK

128

\.RA

Our highest knowledge must suffer an

preserentire transformation if - while
*'

ving:

value

its

into the highest

tha':

we can

it

most all-embracing

conceive. "3i It

affect Reality at all*

away

never means

to

only means to take

It

it

wears

the

then will

revolution in the standpoint of

;

Reality

it

without any limiting adjuncts.

greatest of all revolutions

32

will

about the downfall of plienomena

installation of

noumena

31. Hofifding

The

be

human

and that revolution

appearance

assumes and substitute for

it

in itself

gence

totality

the form which Reality puts on for us

the garment which

which

absorbed

be

to

is

the

intelli-

bring

and the

in their stead.

Philosophy of Rcligicn.

p. HG.

CHAPTER V
ETHICAL CONCEPTIONS IN ADWAITISM.
J'he predominant idea
losophy

metaphysical.

is

what a man
which
pulse

interests
is

mean

man should do
The original im-

him most.

practical

nature of

It is the

not what a

is,

Shankara's phi-

of

indeed

but this does not

that the philosophy primarily refers to

either ordinary experience or to the interests

or to ethical

of scieqce,

meaDB

existence

lutimate philosophy.
^ubjordinate

Ethics

department in

Shankara. Metaphysics
ethics is

Reality

purely
is

is

at;

has value so far as

ledge of Reality.

ouly

for deliver-

than

any

for

is,

the

therefore, a

system of

the primary affair

secondary.

mainly aimed

It

wholeness in his

or

epeculative consistency

more

that Shankara cares

ance from worldly

rality

interests.

it

Knowledge
practice

leads to

Ethics, therefore,

of

of

mo-

kcowhas no

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANILARA

130

fundamental significance;

has instrumental

it

value only.

The attainment
from

empirical existence

all

human
{Mohhd)

of

(Sternal

Moksha, the

of

It is

life.

the

in

true

auy

undergoing

without

the main end

is

thus defined: " But this

eternal

is

lil)eration

omnipresent as ether, free from

all

sense

e.

i.

changes,
modifica-,

tions, absolutely self-sufficient, not

composed

of parts, of self-luminous nature.

That bo-

diless

consequences and three-

their

fold time

do not apply

In

it is

brief,

which merit ami'

to

fact

in

entity,

demerit with

called release.

is

"^

nothing but the identification

Brahman. ( "
sumum honum in

with

3^nq^^U3'- "

the

this philosophy.

The very nature

of

the

goal to

"^ii'h is

a certain

extent determines the means to be followed.

Liberation

or a
not

thing

not a staie lo
to

Bomething

i7s. B.
2.

is

The

I.

be
10

obtained
Ixi

be
.2

acc Hiplished

(1) iJelease

accomplished.

is

Oiher-

3.4

jiKiin argunin.t=:ai^'

duction to B B.

laken from uie Intro

ETHICAL CONCEPTIONS
wise

131

would depend on the action of mind,

it

Nor

or body.

speech

mere

ii})eration

is

" Non-eternality of release

modification.

is

the certain consequence of these twoophiions;

for

we

observe

common

Iti

such

which are modifications,

and the

like,

such as

Brahman

be

certain

is

acknowledged by

(2) Release

at all.

obtained, because
Self,

that

it is

and

it is

nature that

it

something to be

constitutes

person's

Brahman

if

from

omnipresent,

it is

just as ether

is.

person's

were
Self,

it is

by some

its

every one,

(?>) If it is said

that release

which

is

merely liidden

becomes manifest on the

purified

pare of

ever-present to

a quality of Self

and

somethinn;

would not be something to be obtain-

ed, for as

is

is

who admit

all

not

And even

different

altogether

release as

something to be obtained by

not

person.

still it

is
it

Hence

considered as supple-

Actions

there effect. Because that release

eternal

effects,

are non-eternal. "

cannot

to

as sour milk

and the things which are

jars etc.

mentary

that thiutja

life

actions

Self

beino-

iust as quality of

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

lU

clearness becomes manifest in a mirror

This objection

rubbing.

the Self cannot be

it

But

abides.

therefrom,

and

it

stands

in

something.

no

if

texts

such

to

(4) Liberation

purified

would

the Self be puri-

that extraneous
is

not attainable

For

by (moral) purification (?*r).

provement takes place

the

as

something else as

in

relation

the Self were

is called,'

Kor can

by actions abiding

fied

action.

non-eternity would

its

following 'Unchan2:eable he

thus be stultified.

because

exist without modifyinf^

modified by an action,
result

invalid,

is

abode of any

tlie

For action cannot

that in which

when

by means of the action o

rairyor is cleansed

in

him who

im-

all

is

to be

by the addition of virtues or the

diminution of faults.

Liberation does not

come about by the addition of virUies for

it consists in identity with Brahman, who is
;

incapable of svny augmentation of perfection;

just

as

little

Brahman
be an
3.

is

by diminution of
eternally pure.3

effect of meditation.

Dr. Deussen^

p. 403.

faults

for

(5) It cannot

" That which

is

ETHICAL CONCEPTIONS
not proclaimed by
is

by which speech

speech,

proclaimed, that only

know to

not ihat on which people

a*i

this. "

(6) It cannob

activity of

knowing

be an object o the

The kno^y ledge

man, but

of

different

is

above the un-

Brahman

does

on the active energy

analogous to the knowledge

is

which are the objects of per-

of those things

ception etc. and this

of

devoutly meditate

again

not therefore, depend

of

Brahman,

Idc

because "it

from the known and

known. "

I33

knowledge only,

depends on the object

follows im-

(7) llelease

mediately on the cognition of Brahinan; no

effect intervenes

know^
There

between the two, "

Brahman becomes Brahman,

is

From

Brahrnan.

sure and pain

liberated

and pain.

"

(8)

fundamental difference between

the results of actions and of the

of

He who

the former accrue plea-

these are

man becomes
Hence

of

religious

to

liberation,

knowledge
But a

transitory.

free

from

all

pleasure

release cannot be the effect

merit.

(9)

because

Works cannot

they lead

quences good or bad in

to

lead

conse-

the next existence.

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

tS4

Hence they take us back

delieveraiice
it

'*

from

works, would
(

owing

to the

\aUie

if it

be (1) transitory

consumption of the works

because of their

),

different

both of which contradict the concep-

);

tion of liberation as

condition. "* (10)

an eternal and paramount

The

from the

different
is

upon

were dependent

necessarily

graduated

{'2)

not

As Dr. Deussen puts

it.

Liberation,

Samsara and

to

knowlerlge

fruit of

fruit of

work

is

the former

produced simultaneously with knowledge

while the latter

future.

such as these

it is

mere works can never lead

in putting an

end

knowledge, nor
philosopliic

soul and

its

ledge alone

scientific

sufficient
is

e?J?^H

effective

knowledge, but true

tlie

identity with
is

is

Moksha.

Samsara^ not ordinary

knowledge of

cause hberation
ledge.

to

established
to

(knowledge) alone which

It is ^rf

4.

produced

often

On grounds
that

is

the

in

unity of

the

Brahman. Know-

without

works

be-

nothing but perfect know-

).

'

75^5

Pr. D^'uscitu, p. 403.

fl^ieTis

Xb.

r^grwii%^r

"

aiiiT^Tisr

ETHICAL CONOEPTIONS
".Liber.ition
3iR?iror
'''

cL^,

''

ij^^H^TRKUr^rc^:

Jguoraiice of Uie nature of

'

Uundage

^ It is

a kiiowlclge of His nature

"

is

leads

some object

latter,

it is

be

to

is

But

become known.

fact,

iy>t ivlone

effort of

is

doth

know

it.

all

(ignorance

soon

The question then

6.

Br. Up. C.

is

The

He who
Self in

outside activity,

will,

as

itself.

No

no scriptural

the

disappears, the

cally reveals itself.

"

towards

understanding or

As

''

ineffectual.

pursuits,

Absolute.

discovered

The knower has

iuBtruction can take us into

tjae

the

to achieve this, ordi-

must be turned from

empirical

Vill

in

which posits a dualism of

subject and object

l^ioWN

as

all

the eternal subject that

the object of investigati<jn.

iiary experience

unlike

It is

inasmuch

knowledge,

Ayjiereas here

to

Brahman

true thai the kuovvle Ige of

unlike all other knowledge.

empirical

(tod

liberation.

tQi

is

"'^

igiiorauec.

removal of

but the

is nothiiij;

185

kingdom

avidya

the
Self

automati*

arises as to the

- g ^

of

siguifi-

iwr<i.ij.

PHILOSOPHY OF SCAftl^ARA

13^

cance of ethics in Sliankara's sj-stem. Morality is iiot

an end in

here does not end

itself
ifa

man's

making
Morality

ethically perfect being.

a direct means to the end

biisiiilRS^

him an

of

is riot

eteh

knowledg'e of th6

Mokshd,
morality then a complete superHuiiy Self is the

one essential

existence or absence ol

which should

matter of no account to us

we

are apt to

knowledge

for

The

too

modern psychology,

^r^ or

towards Keality.

It is

conundrums

the

has

that

of

light

of

is

not H

its

hhsi%

an attitude of the 6oul

very remote from A

It is

verbal superficial insight into

of the Vedanta.

it

Ir

knowledge

purely intellectual cognition

in will, as well.

the

in

tli^

bfe

fact is

understand the term

abstractly

Is

A man may

the

laiiguagfe'

delight in th^

of V'edanta,

may

rev^l td

these speculations as intellectual luxuries bii^

he

may

be a complete ignoramus

all

the samd.

In the commentary on the Gita, Shankara

<^.

erTCr^gHf^.

133-

distingushes between a

Mud

^ifTOTr (one

ftt^

r%%^r%

c!f

who has

^^fe: l(^ "

for liberation

not

is

view of things.

the truth)

realised

What is necessary

mere change

in the

turning of the eye

It is the

dt the soul that

(one wlio knows)

fiTJfr

necessary: the very funda-

is

mental attitude of one's knowing, feeling,

Tfc'iHihg

Self that

is

to

be revolutionised, ur^

Gt knowledge includes willing as an important

element in
ft

it

it

includes ?i% or devotion as

substantial part of

it

it is

in Bergson's pre-

gnant language ^Hntegral expmrience."

all-round realization involving in

It is

it,

an

com-

plete conversion of the wliole consciousness.

secure this right and

To
of the

soul,

it is

firm

necessary

to

attitude of

go through

hot only intellectual training, but moral disfeiplitt^

as well.

gioHS dutieB have

The eUueal

as

well as reli-

thus an auxiliary value.

Ih the words of Dr. Deussen " Their role in

the scheme of salvation
ritdrious as ascetic. " ^^
9.

Bg. C. IV. 3i.

10.

is

not so

They

much me-

are not

Dr. Deussen

absop.

4U.

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

138

they have some vahie

" Knowledge has regard for

lutely necessary, but

all the same.

works enjoined on the ashramas, and

all

there

is

no absolute non-regard... know ledge

having once sprung up requires no help

wards the accomplishment

of

its

fruit,

does stand in need of something

it

a view to its origination,

the
of

object

moral

possible.

""

else

to-

but

with

Purification

is

actions; with the attainment

of

becomes

knowledge

purification

'2

For people who cannot go through aah'a-

mm through

lack

of

means, these

may

ha

dispensed with.

In the beginning of the Bhashya,

qualifications are laid
of

this

it is

not

in all

pcjssible

to

knowledge. Religious duties

the

for

highest philosophy.

essential prerequisites

which

down

certain
stu'lent

These are the

cases,

get the

may

without
highest

be ignored;

buftjhesc factors must be taken into account.

j

11. 8. B. III. 4. 26.

12.

Vivekach^dama^i,

ethioAl COKCBPTIONS

f^irT%3

mi

\^^^^ "

=^ *T

13*

The

(I.I.I.)

essen-

first

tial is

the knowledge of the Vedas. "Scripture

is tlie

source of cause

e.

i.

the means of right

through which we understand

knowk'/lTe

nature of BraUman.''

the

Accordingly Shtfdras

are (lebarrcl from the study of the Vedanta.

"The Sliudras
also that

are disqualified for that reason

Smriti prohibits their hearing the

Vedas and

rlieir

understanding and perfor-

ming the Yedic mantras. " (^

Still
is

even

in their cases

produced

in

^j?r<f

fruit

of

drawn up
I.

discrimination
eternal things.

chiidamani
This

is

the

consciousness

for

knowledge

the

cannot be withheld. Further, a

philosophy,

i)

consequence of atier etTects of

former deeds, ihc

fications is

^r^

J?^

once knowledge

if

list

the

f5T?2rit%^^?3r%t*:

of quali-

u^lynts

of

sense

of

between eternal and

It is defined in the

non-

Viveka"

"^ ^ ^Tii?t^^^ ^^ I'^A^q-:"

dawn
in

of

man,

the

metaphysical

II >^|T35fr4?rTf^?ri:

renunciation of the enjoyment

here and hereafter,

A mau

of

muse

reward
fetl

tijf

PrtlLOSOPHY

141)

profoundly
finite

unsatisfactory

enjoyments, before

teachings of the

character

sacrifice

demanded

is

of

of

order

in

to attain a pure, lofty, unprejudiced

the

all

can profit by the

hfe

Vedayita,

personal longings

all

SrtANEARA

01^

view of

VII ^m^Rlf^rfi^Rtt.:

ultimate essence.

These comprehend together complete peace of

mind

freedom from external and internal

agitation.
3TU%: is defined as " complete
;

renunciation of all desires. "

as

"

Endurance

sufferings.

" v(^\

without
is

''^3

^^35=TF^qTliT

of the mind.i*

55I;t

abstraction

cannot

till

r3.~Ib7d.

from
sense,

on

inward

all

superficial

Such a hard system

gymnastic exercises
"

of

Tiie voice of the pure

be heard

organs cease to speak.

of

fondling

metaphysical

for

and concentration

things are demanded.

spirit

rnmR:

complete detachment

capacity

the

in

and gurus;

\^^^

all

^m^ 3W^^

the outward things, the manifold

together with

of

general faith

teachings of scriptures
concentration and not

protest

"

faith

defiinerl

f^fcT8jr is

U.

is

required

of
'

'

Ibid.

'

an

V""

ETHICAL CONCEPTIONS

ean^st seeker
is

after truth. IV. Lastly

55?J^-a keen sense of the

vanity of

world and eagerness to be free from

The

practice of duties in the

considered

^n

as

indirect

whil^ fCalmnese of mind etc

means

there

ihe

it.

ashramas

means,

( ^I8i )

are

is

the

direct

The

to the realisation of knowledge.

practice of religious duties t^elps one

by remo-

ving such obstructions as passions

^d

Jijj^e 15

Further, a childlike state

thp

enjoined

is

on a Brahmin who has done with learnino*.

" He whom nobody knows either a nol^le or
igjiqhle, as

ignorant or learned,

ducted, or ill-conducted, he

is

a,s

well-qoii-

brahmin.

Quietly devoted to his

duly,

man

unknown

pass

through

sleep on earth as

if

life

the

let

wise

let

him

he were blind, unconscjious,

d)eaf."*^The result of these

works may appear

now

When

or in

the next

of knowledge which

life.

is

operative

structed by some other work, the

the i)ae^s
is

not

results of

wiiich are just then reaching maturity,

ledge already

attains

qI^-

^iiioys-

maf-urity in thi?

lifce;

~~
15. B. B.

ni.

4. 35.

ho. 8. B. III. 4. 50.

PSitOSOPHY OF

143

when such an

but

then in the next

NKARA

obstrucrion

And

life.

takes

place

work's reach-

depends on

maturity

ing

SET^

time and

place,

i7

operative cause presenting themselvas.

The question

gtill

remains

passage' from the finite to the

ble

The works

this

are

How

Infinite possi-

Shastras can only remove hind-

the

knowledge

to rhe

Rut ultimately even

of Reality.

the

ledge derived from Shastrafi with

and

ary polarization into subject

itself

to break these
?

From

we

causality.

leave

object

the

of view

jx)int

behind

is

ugh

made

Samsnra

in

ir ( tlie

solved.

soul) appears as agent and enjoyer

about through the permif^sion

~^^

thie

r/

the

conception

tlie

is

whicii

of

category of

the

of orace that the problem

in

is

question cannot

us

Bur an answer

exoteric sphere. It is ihr-

state

then are

hedges and peep into the

esoteric metaphysics such a

arise

knownecess-

its

How

a delusion and a sni#e.

Absolute

the

important as regards

rances and attune the soul

we

is

'

The

individual

brought

is

///.^

Lord...

~"
17. S. B.

m.

'.

4. 51.

ETHICAL CONCEPTIONS
aiul

we must

lease

also

assume that

therefore

through

effected

is

caused hy the grace of

final re-

knowledge
" In the

the Lord.^'^^

who

case of some persons indeed

meditate on the Lord and

rance being dispelled at
the favour

l43

strenuously

who, their ignoobtain through

last,

of the Lord extraordinary powers

and insight- just as through the action

strong medicines

man becomes
on its own account

manifest

blind

men.

power

the

reveal

of

of sight of a

but

it

does not

itself throua;h nil

" ^9

We

have discussed so far the role of know-

ledge and works

which

Vedanta

thie

in

scheme of salvation,

We will

offers.

more minutely the nature and

morality

the

in

absolutist

now

see

significance of

metaphysics of

Shankara. All morality as well as immorality

originate in an erroneous view of the would.
'*

l^assages

such

as

'He

is to

wife at the proper time' and 'He

roach the wife of his Guru' are

approach his
is

not to app-

examples of

permissions (or injunctions) and prohibitions;

18. 8. B.

n.

3. 40.

19. S, B. HI. 2. 5.

'

PHILOSOPHY Pf SHAXKARA

144

or again, such passages as 'He

to

is

the

kill

animal devoted to Afpii and ^orna and *He

is

not to hurt any being.' ( orrespoujling exam-

*4 friend

ples froin ordinary life are;

served'

'Eiiemies a^e

an<l

are

one

is

what

in

then

various

that

is

^thpugli

bqdies- of

.cpnnectjon ?

the origination in the

the erroneous notion

kind

tins

S^lf

tl\e

with

connected

^iTi,d

consists

because

that

be

be shiinned'.

to

Permissions and prohibitions of

possible,

is to

the

It

Self

Self

o|

the

is

aggregate consisting of the body and so oi^

This erroneous notion

beings, and finds

such as the
f

am

'

erroneous notion

l^tit,er

am

go,

and

thoughts

'I come,

confused.

and

ijerfect kno\yl9,dge

beings.

'

all

'

Jhi?

cannot be removed by ainyr

to be

by

its

the

^iAQi|g

although ^he

o^e only, injunc-

prohibit^ions are possible

di)B^ereiice effected

be|pr,e

spread

A|kI thus,

must be admitted

tions

the

'

supervenes, it rewnins

all living
Sielf

'

prevail in

expression in

following.

blind,

thing but

its

to

is

owing ^^

connection

bodies, and other limiting adjuncts, the

^^itl^

pro-

fiTHICAL CONCEPTIONS

ducts of nescience, "

-^

148

commentary

In the

on the Gifa aUo Shankara lays bare the

egoistic basis of all morality
*'

^^^if silTTrfrmf^

m\ ^mR^i^m^i^] aim:

mk^W ^

Or^'i'^'j^'l^

and immorality.

*Rr%

men under worldly

" Even

"-'
i

qiair-

if

they

devoted

delusions ) are

to the performance of 'luty, their conduct

speech, thought and deed

prompted by a longing

is

for reward."

knows the truth does not think

does he long for the results,

The problem

sophies generally have a

mates

is

necessarily above

Evil like the good

of the

world,

an

Absolutist philo-

all

of

ulti

good and

accident of

view of ours.

deny

tendency to

evil.

only a temporary pliase

is

existence, an outcome
of

prove very

The Ultimate

the reality of Evil.

nor

'
;

"

of evil does not

troublesome to vSbankara.

is

"He who

I act

'

in,

and

egoistic

It

our empirical

of a very limited point

has no place

in

the

Absolute.
''

The

soul being

identifies iiself as

it

engrossed

were with the body and

'

20. S. B.

10

II. 3.

48.

by nescience

21.

Bg. 0.

II. 1 10.

PHILOSOPHY OF sSHANKARA

146

SO on and imagineB itself to

experience

the

nescience.

body

the
also

by

'...

not

is

pain

of

am

affected

The pain

real,

be

affected

by

due

lo

which

is

by the pain due

but imaginary only,

the error consisting in

nation of ( the Self from

name and form,

And

the

the body,

of

effects

senses,

due

are

nescience.

as a person feels the pain of a

cut which

caused

nnn-discrimi-

'.the

and other limiting adjuncts, which

to

to

of the individual soul'

burn or

body by erroneously

affects his

identifying himself with the latter, so also he

feels also the

pain affecting

sons and friends

himself with

others,

am

them entering

the

into

them

friend.

'

wherefore

merely to the error of

false

we

sons,
IC

friends

feel

due

At
on the ground

of

whon

whil"

orhers

each

etc..

the

Let us consider the

of negative instances.

many men,

is

it

imagination.

same conclusion we arrive

case of

as

am

with certainty that the feeling of pain

the

as

by erroneously identifying

were through love, and imagining

son, I

such

possesses

dd

not.

then somebody calls out 'the son has died',

ETHICAL CONCEPTIONS
the

minds

produced

died', orief is

'frieiifl litis

who

of tliose

are under

in;

the

the imafrina-

of being connected with sons

tioii

147

and friends,

but not in the minds of religious mendicants

who have
nation.

nature of

Xhe same

Introduction.

tliat

and so on,
to fear

tliat

by means
mcin

over

lo ronstitute the

and pain,

assume

but

the same

vSelf,

we have no
person,

subject

same way we

see a rich

n.

having

of

his wealth

that ihe

him

a. 46.

Bi^ah.-

in the

still

and

householder
is

fear,

In the
puffed

grieved

from him; but

loss of

his

wealth

after he has once retired

from the world and put

22- S. B.

right to

after

to pain

Ins possessions are taken

equally grieves

subject

wrong knowledge.

is

up by the conceit

body

and having thus got

whose cause

not see

the

Self, is

former imaginings, will

same manner be

when
we do

brought

is

For we indeed

Veda, comprehended

of the

to be the
hi?:

'*

who imagines

a person

iraao"i-

point, viz, the illusory

and suffering

pain

all

out in the
obser\e

themselves from the

freed

''^^

off

the

conceit of

H8

PniLOSOPHY OF SH ANKARA

And

his riches.

we

again

see that a person

possessing a pair o beautiful earrings derives

pleasure from the proud

ship

but after he has

conceit

lost the

of owner-

earrhigs and

the conceit established thereon, the

derived from thein

also says "

When

he

touches him. "^3

neither pleasure, nor pain

Now we may
God

is

are given

problem

ask

responsible

is

difficulty

in

the
for

one

the

from the body,

free

is

pleasure

Thus Shruti

vanishes.

question,

liow far

Two

answers

evil ?

solution

tlie

of tlie

given up as presenting no special

in the other,

men

are lield partly

responsible for evil. In the pure metaphysics,

however

as

wc

existence of evil

liave
is

seen

denied.

the former position hrst.

that

the

We will

Tliis solution igno-

res completely wha*: constitutes in the

eyes, the sting of the prolJem.

minerals, which are

all

very

take up

modern

"As among

mere manifestations

of earth, nevertiieless great vai-iety

is

observ-

ed, some being i)reoious gems, such as diamonds, eic. Others such r.s crystals and the
2a.~S. B.I, 1.4. (also IV.

1.2)

TH1CAL CONOEPTtONS
beuig the

like,

stonefii

only

fit

medium

size,

1<9

and others again

to be flung on dogs or crows;

and as from seeds which

are

placed on one

and the same ground various plants are seen

to spring, sucli as sandal woods and cucumbers,

which show the greatest difference

in

their leaves, blossoms, fruits, fragrance, juice

and the same food pro-

and as the one

etc.

duces various effects such as blood and hair;

Brahman may

su the one

ous

ett'ects.

idso produce vari-

"^^

In the following quota lions from

Go'l

irq

is

plaiidy

r-;r:;g

made

qjq

the

^R^jfcT

author

d ^^^\

ShrutiSf
of

evil

\Mi(\^^ "

He

makes him whona he wishes to lead up from

these worlds do a good deed, and the same
makes him whom he wishes to lead down
from these worlds
" ^

JT

^i^iTF

^nVi

to

do a bad deed.^S Also

^mh

v%my^m ^jtrr^"

In another passage, Shankara attempts

24. S. B. II. 1. 23.
25. S. B. III. 2.
26. S.

B.

I.

3.

41
43.

11. 1. 31.

^6

to

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

150

free
evil,
rily,

God from

the

responsibility

of creatiug

inasmuch as he does not work arbitrabut apportions

happiness

and misery

according to the merits and demerits of man.

" The Lord,

it is

of the world,

the

And

reproach of
cruelty

him.

cannot be the cause

on that

inequality

" |^kt^v|dzt "

Some

said,

because,

of

would attach to

as for instance,

To

the

others, as for instance

animals, eminently unhappy

position.

dispensation

beings, viz. the gods he renders

eminently happy

hypothesis,

he

allots

to

an

Lord bringing

.an unequal condition of things,

some again,
intermediate

about

such

passion

and

malice would have to be ascribed, just as

to

any common person acting similarly; which

would be contrary to the essential

attributes

goodness of the Lord affirmed by Shruti and

Smriti,

and the

Moreover, as the

infliction oi

pain

final destruction of all creatures

would

form part of
to

his dispensation,

he would have

be taxed with great cruelty,

qtiality

abhorred by low people even.

The Lord, we

reply, cannot be reproached

ETHICAL CONCEPTIONS
with

cruelty,
,lt'

ioequality

ilie

tlie

because he

'

Lord on

creation, he

wouM

but the fact

is,

by

is

he has

e.

i.

the

of

The
on

position of the

as

analogotis

the

rice, barley,

difference

cause

Lord
is

to

that

of

For as

is

between the

of gods,

men

common

the

etc.

the

of

various

potentialities

lying hidden in the respective seeds, so

the Lord

to

and other plants,

due to the various

species is

Lord
to

rain.

common

the

is

production of
whil'w

look

creatures

living

Parjanya, the gi\er of the

Parjanya

to

bound

is

not a fault for which the

is

to blame.

looked

unequal

this

that in creating he

merit and demerit

.be

account, without any

produced

expose himself to blame

certain regards,

created. It

'

bound by regards.

own

his

uxLraneous regards

and

dispensation

of
is

181

that

cause of the creation

While

the

differences

between these classes of beings are due to the

different merits belonging to
souls.

An

'

the

individual

27

objection

27. S. B.

U.

I.

is

raised as to

34.

how God

is

PHILOSOPHY OFSflANKAKA

IM

when

guided at the time o creation,

was uo merit and demerit

the world

lied thut as

To

this

it is

rep*

without beginning,

is

merit and inequality are

taused

there

and sprout,

like seed

as well as causes.^ti

The problem whether

to act or are absolutely

individuals are free

bound hand and foot

to circumstances has in Shankara's systems,

problems,

other

like

Activity

two-fold

not a characteristic of the ultimate

is

and

It is essentially painful

Reality.

aspect.

finite.

" The Self being an agent cannot be founded

un
.

because

nature,

its real

the impossibility of final release

For

if

nature,

were so

( if it

will follow.

being an agent belongs to

it

can never

more than

fire

as long as

man

activiiy he

free

has ^ot

cannot

the soul's

from

itself

can divest

itself of

freed

obtain

it

- no

heat,

and

himself from

his

highest end,

since activity is essentially painful.

"-^9

Ano-

ther argument

is

finite object.

Activity depends on the emp-

that

activity

belongs to a

loyment of means and >Yhatever

~'^'8.

II.

T'd5.

i^TBTB.

depends on
iT. 3,

40,

ETHICAL Conceptions

means

employed

be

to

AcUvity

nature.3^

thing

imperfection.

The
parts

the purposes of some-

changeless

Self- is

because

whatever has no

for

changeless,

J^cflfi:

3TirJir^

tability of the Self

lias

^~^^h

immu-

u;i

the

reason

If it

should be

^i^*?^:

Moreover,

become an agent
intimate

into

ttcj

( 3Tfi

said

relation to

the Self

that

in the

same

as kings and other great people are

(who

iriay be'

way

ilie

g^^Rr%Hq':firwr%f(q: )33

cannot enter

actions.

f^i^^^^m\

;^-

gi\en

" die Self can impossibly

it

has no

Because the Self

for the absence of all actions.

as

it

parLs; is never

unchangeable.

it is

arf^^l^: 9!^q^

3TRi%3Tc#

by some

to action

"'^^

foimrlto underii'o chan^'c.

is

active for their

Ijc

impelled

are

else,

for

or

[>ui'poses

argues imperfec-

" Experience shows that

agents, wiiether they

own

a noii-eteniftl

ol'

fiirth(5f

tion in the tigent.

all

is

iS3

without

considered as an

acting

make

agent

others

act

by

tiieir

~^
30: 3. B;

II. 3.

32. Bg, 2. 25.

40.

31. S.
33.

B.

Bg.

2.

II. 2. 37,

21.

IM

PH ILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

presence
instance

we deny
for

the appositeuess of this

may become agents

whom they

kiffgs

through their relations to servants

procure by giving
it is

gous

to

While

between the Self as

body and

the soul

anything analocould be the cause of

money, which

a connection
the

them wages, &c.

impossible to imagine

movement

- pervading; and

all

is

possible in

is

"'

5rJTi^f<T^

Lord and

so on (as servants)."^* Further

f[cr

^^

it

or of

such no

as

it.

" ^f^ f^4r

Movement

'

im-

is

possible in the case of all-pervading being."

Lastly, a ihing cannot

activity, as fire

of
*

be

the

cannot burn

Activity, therefore,

is

not a

Brahman

is

due

Wherefore

but

it

"

of its

36

characteristic

Avidya.

to

works are enjoined

ignorant, not on the wise.

of

object

itself.

on

Before the

wisdon nescience presents

the

dawn

various

itself in

forms - as actions, means and

results

becomes the source of

'

From
U.

8. B.

36. B. B.
38.

all action.

the standpoint of
I. 1. 4.

U.

Bg. C.

2. 28,

2. 69.

35. S. B.

and

^^

Avidya

o7. S. B.

^7

therefore

II. 3.

11.

3.

19.

40,

ISTHIOAL CONCEPTIONS

good or bad

activity aud its results

How

11*

exist.

can the activity of individual soul be

reconciled with

omnipotence of God

the

The ultimate dependence

God

of all

the soul has

its

own

For although

**

clearly recognised.

is

activity upon

imperfections such

as

passion and so on for motives, and

although

ordinary experience does not show

that

Lord

is

cause

ploughing and the

like,

yet

scriptures that the

Lord

is

we

whom

a causal agent

he wishes to lead

these worlds to do a good deed

to

from these good worlds, do a

ba'l

Scripture

represents

as the giver of all

causal

agent

evil. "*^

the

cause of

all

actions,

He

from

n\)

lead

but

down

deel. "

also

with reference to

whether good or

in

^9

Lord not only

the

fruits

**

and the same

makes him whom he wishes

*'

as

from

ascertain

For the scripture says

all activity.

makes him

such

occupations

in

the

But

if

the

undergo consequences for what

all

it

the

soul

as

the

actions

Lord

is

has to

has not done.

*'The Lord makes the soul act, having regard

;ji.

s, B.

u.

i).

a,

40. 9. 9, UI. 2. il.

PHILOSOPHY OP SHANKARA

Its

to the efforts

made by

whetlier uieuiiorious

it,

or iioii-mericurious...The Lord acts us

mere

occasional cause... He arranges favourable

unfavourable

circumstances

the

for

or

suute

with a view to their former effort^... Althougli

the activity of the soul

The Lord indeed causes

but

former

it

independent.
act

( ^r^jfcT ),

Moreover the Lord

now has

regurd

and the caused

act in a

to act

effects,

to

it

it acts ( "^(ii^ ) itself.

in causing

not

is

to

itf>

former

existence, having regard to its efforts previous

to tluit existence

a regrcssus against which,

considering the eternity of the Samsara,

objections can be raised. But

Lord has regard

to

( in former existences

) ?

that

from the purportlessness

how

the

is it

efforts

The Sutra
etc.

of

no

known
made
replies

injunctions

and prohibitions... On the other alternative

they would be without purport, and the Lord
in fact

would be enjoinel

in

injunctions and prohibitions,

the

would be absolutely dependent.

Lord might

recjuite

with

place

since the

of

soul

And, the

evil those

who

according to the iu junctions, and with

act

good.

EtHICAL CONCEPTIONS
miBn daing wliat

is

forbidden

which would

subvert the authorilativeuess, of

Aloreover

if

purport

would follow that

it

efforts

of

men

are

and so likewise the

and

tions of the place, time,

fully

is

world

the

the

condi-

special

cause. "

^l

that

otit

conscious of three facts.;

(i) religious consciousness

should be

also

without any

This discussion clearly brings

Shankara

Veda,

the

the Lord were absolutely without

any regard,
ordinary

157

author

of

rerjuires that

actions

all

Go^

in the

His omnipotence must he preserved.

as

(2) Science

well as

ordinary

experience

require that causation must have unrestricted

sway over

the

whole world.

requires that freedom of

sibility

(3) Morality

man and

should be recognised.

his respon-

Law and

ethics

upon this postulate. Lidividual

be retained, and yet the reign
must
freedom
of Law must be recognised. Omnipotence of
are based

God must

exist side})y side with these.

coiicile these

somewhat contradictory

of the situation, the

^1.

8.

dogma

Toreas{>ects

of the begimiing-

B^LlJ^~.'~Z7r.7'^,

,rj

^~"h

PftlLOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

IW

of the

lessness

Samsara

The

invoked.

is

solutionp of the problems

of free will and of

made

this

are

evil

depend upon

to

basis.

Men's actions indeed are subject to the law

of

His actions form a sort of

causation.

o-eometrical series in

the

preceding ones

cessity.

of a

which each one follows

pistol'

mathematical ne-

with

man's action
it is

not an

never

is

'sliot

inexplicable

out

whim

of a mysterious freedom of will. It is merely

a link

in

chain of causes and

the

Every action

of

man

procession of events

such

has

its

is

effects.

a part of the eternal

Samsm^a and

called

place there determined

as

by the

laws of the Samsara. The great law of

Samsara is the law of Karma. It is Ihe one

bond which regulates the evolution or devolution of the universe as a whole or its indi^'

vidual items.

As

of a seed so also the

the

**

world

of the

operation

tures. "

the iree

Man

in

is

is

Karman
the

evolved out

evolved under

state

of all creaof

Avidya

(nescience) is subject to ihis la and as such

42. Br, Q.

\.

Jotroductiou.

ETHICAL COKCEPTIONS
be

is

material world.

a part of the

cannot act independently of

as

'*

that

those that

repre-

^3

qjurjif

do not move

comes into being

ing on of day and

law in the

beings comprising tho?e

of

as well as

...involuntarily

A man

often

is

form of bondage.

The mjltitude

move

this

Karma

phenomenal world.
sented

169

dissolved

is

com-

at the

again at the

close of the day."*"^ ^

How

then can the independence of

preserved

Is

man no autonomy
of Avidya.,

complete

it

whatsoever

we

wliut

call

actions which

we

do.

natural nescience leaves

life

ncti(n ?
?

be

Has

In the realm

freedom of

consists in attributing to our

"

man

will

own agency

the

That the primeval

room

for all practical

or activity-whether worldly or that based

on the Vedor- we have explained more than

once."44 All individuality which we attribute
ourselves

to

The
43.

sense

of

is

due

to

Avidya,

individuality in us

Mahabharata.

4i. a. B. ni. 2. 15.

is

45

called

43. A. Bg. c. 4. 4. 2.

45. S. B. \\\. 4. S.

PHILOSOPHY OF SITAXKARA

160

AhamJcara, and tlijs is the root of all actions;

" ^i^^i TTq" u ^^^ a^iTTifR li im. " 4^'
This
consciousness o

aiitoiioniy

nn

jiowever

is

illusion even in empirical sphere.

"

gunas

Frakriti,

or

the

morlilirations

manifestino' themselves as the

that

senses,

of

body and

our actions,

all

tj^e

conducive

temporal and spiritual ends, are

done.

man whose mind

divided

AhamJcara,

by

is

variously

egoism,

the Self

i, e.

who

attributes of the

by

and

nescience, sees actions in

doer

Bni:

cation of ihe

who

he

energies

ff^mas

respective functions hold^ that

as sense-organs

move ami

sensjB-objects, but not

Shankara

somehow
46.

is

the

and

them-

himself
'

versed in the

is

the

with

the nenses

reorards every action, he thinks

'.

by

all

thus thoroughly identifies himself with

he,

The

senses

tlie

ascribes to himself

body

to

identifyhig

aggregate of the body and

by

It is

am

the

energies

Bg.C. VII.

4.

as

" 47

fully alive to the necessity

establishing

the

tlieir

the energies

lie l^elf.

as

classifi-

and

man's freedom
47. Bg.

to

of

c7Ill727-287

ETHICAL CONCEPTIONS
extent.

certain

man were

morality will

all

denied

all

he be a mere tool in the hands of

initiative, if

nature,

If

161

man were swallowed up

be at an end.
either in

nature there would be an end to

God
all

If

or in
respon-

The whole science of ethics with

" Thou shale " and " Thou shalt not "

sible life.
its

will lose all its validity.

"

^W^ri^

Human

( '' cicT^

siiam

%^^?Tr-

effort will lose all signi-

ficance, because arbitrary fiats

God and

of

nature will take place of moral sanctions,

and

moral rewards
RTf^ 3^^^i?^
a

5[^^2f

punishments.
"

<s

The

'

csiP**

result will be

Hence man's responsiaud freedom of will must be preserved.

complete chaos.

bility

Man

can

acr. (

WAm

does not mean

).

Freedom

nation by previous

antecedents.

these previous antecedents

causes

agency
ous

))irth

they are his

;

and

4H. S. B. II.

11

are

they do not belong

of his actions

the absence of their

:V

own

to

determi-

But then

not

external

any outside

actions in a previ-

these are due to actions

42;

more

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKAKA

162

previous
there

is

What

still

and so on

ad wfinitum,

no commencement
is

in this series.

God

the scope for

because

clearly

It is

recognised that everything, every acrion,

ultimately due to the agency of
is

God

is

there

His omnipo-

nothing outside the scope of

tence. ("r^'i^^ 5ii%^q>^rT f3*^i% ^^^^^'r?i?t")49

The whole

arise

effects is

from any

act

makes a particular
cular cause.

but then

it is

result spring

God who

from

parti-

God is, therefore, not an immediate

or accidental cause

particular

in

under-lies the whole

is

and

God it has its ultimate ground

God
God.
indeed cannot make any result

contrived by
in

of causes

series

cases.

He

His causality

series.

not occasional or accidental, but immanent.

He works
prakriti;

evolves

jada;

it

through
it is

the

laws of nature, of

prahriti or Swabhaua which

But prakriti

by

its

nature

has no life, no activity. Only an

intelli-

itself.

is

gent being can be a source of activity. There

cannot be any motion on the part of bodies

destitute of souls.^^
49. S. B. II. 3. 41.

Pure intelligence indeed

50. 8. B. IV. 4. 15.

ETHICAL CONOEHTIONS
is

as

not aciive

but

magnet moves

who

it

other objecLs

Self of all, all -know-

tlie

although

ing and all-powerful,

moving, moves

move

" So the Lord also

iron.

all-present,

is

can

163

liimself un-

the universe. "3'

Such a statement of the problem

from being
leaves

much

and adequate one.

full

to be accounted for.

far
It

Shankara

extent the

saves to a great

in fact

is

law of

causation and the ultimate agency of God.

But plainly speaking, there

freedom of

will,

is tied

the series

of

events,

to

PraJzriti.

To invoke

ihe

sara
it is

to take

is

not to

fact in

Not

kei'c

our ethical

only

but in

all

in

his

his

in

down

helplessly to

the

operations of

eternity

of

Sam-

ihe problem back infinitely

explain

freedom to act

no place for

self-determination

for

Man

this theory.

is

it.

And even

then the

and noiv -the most

vital

life-is practically denied.

sufferings and

actions,

man

upon his own previous deeds.

happiness,

dependent

is

The present

comes helplessly out of the past and the

51. s.

aTiT^gT

lU

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

future from
is

the

Freedom

present.

of will

openly sacrificed at the altar of causality.

But

only in the empirical

all this isvali<l

human

Here

sphere.

actions

phenomena and the laws

causality

phenomena are paramount

man's

maUj

pure

hindrances,

But

spirit,

restrictions

case of

man

free.

is

All

disappear.

therefore

disappears

features,

as

soul indeed

time,
is

tions of our

empirical

along
space,

owhig

conceptual

powers of expression.
reference

to

but what in

this
itself

mean

does not

in our

it,

is

existence,

it

with

its

other

causality.

Tlie

free ( g^rr ); but this

tion is negative,

of the

Because activity

the

of

It

we understand

as

discussions.

feature only

understanding,

Avidya.

of

activity,

ethical

the

in

all

freedom only means freedom from

this

the categories of the

free

governing

determhiations

all

and

In the realm of Brah-

activities also.

ot

purely

of time, space

^raf^5i[%R^ " )

'*

are

to the

concep-

very limita-

faculty
It is free

and of our
only Avith

empirical world of ours

it is,

no eye can

see,

no

ETHICAL CONCEPTIONS

1C9

ear can hear, nor any heart can conceive.

Whatever may be the significance of the

rule of morality from the point of view of
the Absolute,

its sinnificance in

Avidya cannot be

ignored.

the realm of

must be said

It

to the credit of the

moral consciousness of

the Hindus that for

from explaining away

morality as an accident in the

society, it took

of

very essence,

be the

to

it

evolution

the vere source of creation. In fact, the uni-

verse

was conceived only

and bad deeds

of creatures

defined." It

is

forms, contains
is

''^^

\i jg

the

responsible for

ness,

its

agents

fruits

Karma of

its

and enjoyers,
actions,

these

When

various

evil tendencies

dulges in evil deeds,

S. B.

a being which

happiness and unhappi-

" ^^mrf^^^i^f ^R^c^rci;^ "

52.

of

transmigration into

of bodies.
(

many

by names and

having their definite places, times and

causes.
is

and consequently

differentiated

the abode of the

fruits

good

and unhappiness. Here ^^^

their happiness
is

as a theatre of

I. 1. 2.

it

forms

predominate

and a being

in-

has to descend to

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKAKa

166

forms

lower

When

before.

supreme
rises into

*'

than

being

liigiier

reign

being

5TT^^^^^^l2T^c^lc!^" )

and

occupied

tendencies

Wheu

higher worlds.

forces, evil

it

the two

counterbalance each

good,

other, a being assumes the form of a

human

being. 53

Every individual

carries

journey of Samsara a JSarma-ashraya,

in his

a moral substratum,

which determines

character and desiiny.

yaJca Upanishad,

accompany a soul
and

along with him

his

factor

said that three factors

his knowledge, his actions

previous experience.

takes

behintl in

\i is

the

^^

This

last

iorm of impressions

left

by

the soul

previous deeds.

his

In the Briliadaran-

the

experiences of

This vasana influences a

man's new actions and the residts of actions

already done.
either to start

It is

iuipossible

any notion or

for

to

enjoy

fruit of

any previous action without

factor.

Jt is to its

or less power that

53.

Br. C. IV.

1. G.

presence aud
all

its

man
the
this

greater

the different de<>Tces

54. Br.

IV/lT?.

ETHICAL CONOBPTIONS
of skill aiiJ

talents

ments of

are due.

life

the

in

This principle

the different depart-

in
55

The previous deeds

pany a man

167

of a

man's

used by Jaimhii

is

clear that a deed

accom-

life

form of an apurvam.

cannot

effect

"

It

is

result at

some future time, unless before passing away,

it

gives birdi

( therefore

result

may

to

some unseen

result

we

assume that there exists some

which we

and

apiirva,

call

be reviewed either as an

which

imperceptible

after-state of the deed or as an imparceptible

antecedent state of the result. "

adopts this idea with this

in

theory

his

cannot of
it is

itself

this

moditication

give rise to any fruit, because

The agency

necessary to bring about the

of

results

God
of

is

all

58

Tlic next

liberated

nected

that

supersenuous principle

unintelligent. 57

deeds.

Shankara

^6

problem

souls

with

55. Br. C.

is

before

this
IV. 2;

57. 8. B. III. 2. 38.

is

the

they
Lhe

attitmle of the
die

and con-

place of morality

56, S. B. III. 2. 39.

58. S. B. III. 2. 40,

tHILOSOPHVOFSHANkAkA

18

from the point

view of the Absolut*.

of

Here the Vedanta

of Shaiikara maintains the

Morality

super-moral attitude.

strictly

factor of

ed when

wc

it is

lenve

necessarily transcend-

empirical

all

attain the beatific vision.

between the good and

Such

is

The very

evil,

and immorality belongs

of view.

to

views and
distinction

between morality
our limited point

the super-moral attitude.

man, who has attained the absolute

fore,

in a similar

Karma

He

him.
their

ceases

have any

can do deeds but

consequences.
lies

in

rewards

"; in

our Avidya.

" egotism

that actions should pollute

who

are

there-

validity

of
for

not bound by

Because the power of

Karma

world,

is

is,

The law

predicament.

to

value in one state of

considerable

our existence, but

is

attached

and desire
"

It is

those
Lo

of

but right

men

of the

their actions,

thinking themselves to be the authors thereof,

and longing

for the fruits of such actions;

as 1 have none of these (viz. desire and attach-

ment

actions

cannot bind mc.

Any

other

10

feXHICAL CONCEPTIONS

pergon, too,

who

thinks

who knows me to be his

'I am no agent, I have no

Self,

long-

ing for the fruits of actions.' -his actions

"^^
will not necessitate incarnation.
it

follows that as soon

his

of

above

highest

all

laws

places

existence,

into

.when
out

their
for

menced

whv

will

effects

those

their

the

this

bodv

come

an end only

to

have been fully worked

effects,

ak'oady com-

liave

Such

^^

is

the reason

a liberated sag-e continues

knowledge

'^

Brahman.
The

But the

also.

to exist even after he realizes the

of

all

body has been brought

actions

of

same way

In the

good works are destroyed

by which

virtue

himself

prakriti^ his former sins

of

also lose their force.^^

actions

Again,

man by

as

knowledge

txx)

liberated sage enters the super-moral

and super-religious stage of

life.

Neither

moral nor religious injunctions have any

" It is our ornament and
validity for him.
pride that as soon as

we comprehend Brah^
'

59. Bg.

61.

(J.

IV.

U.

60. S. B. IV, 1, 13.

Bg. C. IV. 37. b. B. IV.

I.

15.

PHILOSOPHY OF SH ANKARA

170

man

all

our duties come

our work

over."^'

is

to an

end and

" Xor does

it

all

result

from the absence of obligation, that be who

knowledge can

has arrived at perfect

he

likes, for in all cases it is

imagination

the

( of

self's

only the wrong

connection

absent in the case of

is

free action (

for

as

2T?r?rrJic^ )

we know

it

the

him who
" As to

has reached perfect knowledge."^^

quite unnatural in

with

the actions, and that

the body ) that impels

imagination

act as

one likes

case o a

it, it is

wise man;

who is
when even

to be proper to one

tremely ignorant.

To

explain

by the

action prescribed

SJiastrCts is

the

regarded

as a heavy burden and unnatural to one

how can

ex-

who

knows
by extreme thoughtlessness be ragarded as
the Self,

appropriate to

him

effect of the tleluded

wilful action caused

thing seen under the

or diseased sight

certainly not remain the same even

the delusion or
it

has

its

62. S. B.
6;5.

disease has disappeared;

source
I.

will

after

1. 4.

S. B. II. a, 16.

in

these alone.

Br. IV.

3. 22.

Thus

for
it

Hi

ETHICAL CONOEPTIONS
is

proved

he who knows the Self has

that

no action incumbent on hun, nor can he

The

Adivaita

supposed

be

to

humanity.
as

mere

to the

fatal

Thus

extent,

to a certain

of

it

problems

the ethical

that

importance

for the ethical

they possess

life

immorality appear

und

fundamental

that

ethical

be

from the standpoint of

illusions

must be confessed

may

Shankara

of

>.Ior:iHt}'

the Absolute.

lose

will. " ^4

own sweet

act at his

which

theisms of the

West. Tht: centre of gravity is s'lifted for

tlie
kiugslom of
sages from
the eastern
actions to ihe

the

sphere

of pure

kingdom

of c(nsciousness to

gnosis or

few exalted

who have

spirits,

within

fire

themselves

at a stroke

with

moral

ai)prcciations

world of pure

spirit,

proviuri.'d

(he

sphere

The

kindled

themselves,

from

the

the
raise

empirical

thought distinctions and

world

all iis

and from

superconsciou>iiess.

immortal

and

of thought

to

the

transcendental

where human judgments

valuations

64. Ai. c, Introductioa.

of

our

planet

PHILOSOPHY OF BMANKAHA

1^2

and

disappear

absolute

freedom,

glimpsy

here.

among
kingdom of

moving

essences, in the

formless

men

Spencer's perfect

following

the rules

gods

Epicurus

of

philosophers

the

are

Republic

Plato's

or

happiness of

nearest (but very rough) approximations

such an ideal

to

that

possess

absolute

ha\'e only a

which they can

The

again

these

of

of

pure,
Ideas

perfect societies

in

Absolute

enjoying

Ethics or

in

perfect

tranquillity the highest of pleasures.

In practical
the influence
is

of

life

(Plato's world of shadows)

of the teaching

and

purest

the
of

life,

humanity

is

of

loftiest

deprived

Adwaitiam
Moral

type.

of one great

support and supplied with another but

powerful one.

Tlie very foundation

ordinary righteousness
egoistic

basis

morality
cial

is

and

ajrainst

taken away

necessarily

sectarian;

narrow,
sets

av?

its

provin-

against

against nations.
the

individuals,

communities

nations

worbhips individual

it

our

This egoistic

disappears.

individuals

communities,

is

more

of

highest

It

product

ETHICAL CONCEPTIONS
of

over-emphasizes

It

rivilization.

173

the

hnportance of personal consideratioDs. Rut

rightly divhied

Plato

world will
philosophers
possessed

things

disappear

not

individual

down

it

kings.

and

fundamentally,

Adiraitisra extends
aiid lays

were
( i. e.

vision of the Whole, seeing

tlie

the narrow,

of the

ills

kings

till

philosophers

or

of

the

that

taking

The

idea one step further

the,

that

not

standpoint )

men must

be philoso-

phers and pliilosophors men and then will

come the promised

with milk and
spiritual peace

The

land, not

honey

but flowing

with

and liarinony and happiness.

an individual

Self of

flowmg indeed

is

the

Self of

the universe;

and

being must

regulated by what constitutes

conduct

every

of

This language
only a paraphrase of Kant's dictum: '^Act

the
is

good

])e

tlie

in such

law

to

a
all

of the

way

universe.

that your conduct

beings; " of

Jesus

may

Christ

lie
*'

Do

towards others as you would wish them to

do towards you; " of Plato,

must be ruled by the Idea

''

The

of the

society

Good,

PHILOROPHY OFSHAiVRaRA
happiness and

ihe

There

a good of

ihe very

not

roots

hut

not

only

of

iheir

narrow

virtues

and

Christ

supplied

the

great

ideal

not

is

only men's miseries,

of ibeir miseries,

immorality but

rheir

which

The l^edanta proposes

the whole.

remove

10

whole."

of the

greatno,>j-

no good of a pan

is

174

when he

seeds

ihe

luirrow

.iesus

vices,

moral

bas^is

placed

ihe

to

this

essence of

rhe Self in willing not in knowing; (Jautama

Buddha founded
heart

of

man,

this

idenl

in his lo\'e,

the

in

nnd

hrnad

very
dis-

interested for all life; Shaukara representing

ihe

Hindu thought

placed

its proper intellectual basis

ideal

on

and thus secured

true philosophic fcuridation

(ti;

fundamental

for

the ideal

unity of mankind by boldly

procliiimina:

that

intrinsically

the

universe.

this

the

individual

same as the

Self

soul of

is

the

CHAPTER

VI

A COMPARISON OF SHANKARA'S SYSTEM WITH SOME

MODERN

PHILOSOPHIES.

THE IDEAL OF PHILOSOPHY: Two

momentous
the one
is

is

facts confront us at the outset:-

flux, change, becoming; the other

the imperishable.

the unchangeable,

of

these two, which

Some

philosophy

emphasis

two

are

due

to

on the one

factors.

more fundamental

is

most radical differences

the

of

the

difference

or the other

Attempts are

Some

reconcile these two.

were foredoomed to

two

What

is

explains
their

deeper

sides

required

both

harmony
unity.

is

sides

a
of

in

of

to

of these attempts

failure.

of nature

of these

made

also

mechanical

juxtaposition or an external unity

these

Now

is

between

entirely useless.

philosophy

which

Reality, finds out

and reconciles
Philosophy

is

them

in a

largely

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANK A RA

17

question

of Reality

system;

it

things

dogmatic, one-

moments

these

Comprehensiveness

is suicidal.

the very essence

all

Any

of proportion.

emphasis on one of

Bided

of

great

must he capable

is

philosophical
of explaining

from the great Absolute

to

blade of grass.

Such a system of philosophy

must be both

idealistic

in

ideas

it

and outer

and receive

tion

pluralistic,

due recogni-

proper

place in

one; but in

the altar of the

one and the

many become

each

with

other.

brutal materialism,

and

ignores

neglects

many

it

both

the

must

whicli

be

not

worships

idolizes

and

science,

and morality;

facts

must

nor

be predominantly a pliilosophy of values,

which goes on
connection
itself

of

it

perfectly reconciled

It

values,

religion

does not sacrifice the

it

one at the altar of the many, nor the

at

for

must be both monistic

It

for

realistic;

facts get

their

broader synthesis.

and

and

all

with

evading and
facts

a magnificent
possible

reach

and

ignoring

all

up

for

Ijuilds

Art\

out

humanity.

But

'Palace of
for

COMrAKATiVL
it

appreciates fully

sign iKcu ice

tlie

fads and values and

system of philo-

something very remote from

is

licism, a mechanical

elements,

union of

charar'terislic sirticU^re of

elements fmd iheir appointeil

get their

meaning and

these

of

hold,

ihniip'lu

eclec-

diverse

these

harmony

superficial

fundamental discords, but a

all

lx>th

inielli-

one to the other.

At the same time a great

sophy

of

tries to explain

relation oi the

fj;ihly tlie

177

orlg^inal,

which

in

place, an<l

significance

in

the

light of theAVhole.

Such

is

a brief outline of

the ideal of uni-

towards which the philosophic world

But it is an ideal only, and
steering.

fication
is

there

is

hardly any system of thought which

satisfies all these

conditions.

the

standard by which

all

the

be judged.

We

phies

is

only

measuring rod, the

the extreme limit,

may

This

existing
shall

philoso-

now compare

mir philosopher's system with other systems

and thus by the light which the

latter will throw iij^on the former, we will J>e
^h\e to elucidate more clearly some of the

of thought

essential eleracnis o iis diought.

12

COMPARATIVE
8HANKARA AND MODERN IDEALISM.
founder

Tlie

He

Descartes.

down

in

'

of

I think,

the enunciation

of

was taken

in

of

all

the East realised with

proposition

therefore I

philosophy.

the Self,

Self.

proof

it is

) in

first

clearness

"

.lust

not possible

For one cannot

'.

Self-

time

Shankara

reality.

equal

am

proposition a

this

cardinal fact of all i<lealism.

it is

modern

all

consciousness was conceived for the

to be the basis

is

laying

of

celebrated

his

cogito ergo sum.

great step

idealism

deserves the credit

the fundamental basis

philosophy,

With

modern

of

to

in

this

l^ecause

doubt the
(

by

the case of any one, because in

it-

self it is already

establish the

known. For the

demonstrated by proof of

itself.

Self

Self is not

The

Self

is

the basis of the action of proving, and conse-

quently

it

is

evident

before

the

action

of

COMfAKATlVh

And

proving.
i?i

since

it is

ny

of this

character,

it

therefore impossible to <lenyit." Shankara.

therefore, in
lists

common with

makes the

Self the

all

modern

idea-

one supreme, ineradi-

cable assumption, which

makes

all

knowledge,

possible.

all reality

Another great step forward was taken by

Berkeley. Berkeley's great merit consisted in
the fact that he proved
all

convincingly

it

lime ihe absurdity of

the

conception of

matter

as

an

siance.

He

asks the very relevant

"

is

What

independent

absolutely

meant by

for

sub-

question

the term Exist ivhen app-

"^
lied to Mendhle. tilings ?

And he answers

"JTAe absolute existence of

')m thinking

any

without

Their

essi is

to

relation,

ceived, that is to

me

things

being 'per-

their

'perfectly iminfeUigible,

perci2n, nor

is

it

conceivable

that they should have any existence

out

of

the minds of thinking things which perceive

them."
lookino-

And
into

his proof

is this

your own

t.-2. Selections

'

It is

thoughts,

from Berkeley,

p. 84.

and

but
so

PHITOPOPHY OF .^HAXKARA

180

trying whether you can conceive

for a souiul, or figure or motion,
to exist without the miiirl

To make
conceive

ght

of,

out

this, it is

possible

it

or

colour

or uiiperceived...

necessary

you

that

them existing unconceived or unthou-

which

manifest

is

repugnancy."

Berkeley's position therefore comes to

no object w^ithout a

subject.

ment

truth

of permanent

For Shankara

also

Tins

in

this

the ele-

is

Berkeleanism,

refutation of materia-

tlie

lism consists essentially in the imposibility of

concci\ing an ab,solulc,indepcuclcnl existence

of all material things.
is this

subject
is

Shankara's position

Whatever can be the

is

matter

or

object

we may put

it

that which can only exist as an

for

Matter

object for

); whatever cannot be an object for

a subject ( that is whatever is eternally sub-

a subject

ject ) is spirit.

The former

has,

therefore,

secondary existence, dependent on the perceiving mind, the latter alone has an inde-

pendent existence, an absolute

3.

realitv

Selections from Berkeley p. 48-9.

an

COMPARAriVB

existence

iiot

derivative, nor

existence

in

their

secondary but

" Shapes

itselF.

own shape

|8l

or anotlier as

cannot have

while

object,

on the other hand, consciousness has as object

elements

the

without

and

products,

their

As

or Avithin the Self.

of elements an<l products

whether

the existence

concluded from

is

the fact that they are perceived, so that

must

conclusion
ception

is

also be

drawn

that this per-

from them

different

the

perception

makes the material world known and not

vice versa )

and perception

nature

what we

of

commentary on
and

the

call

that miiteriid existence

because

it is

and absent
it

present

of

In

argues

Sliankara

is

clear

min< Idependent,

when mind
to

the

Gaudapada

is

present

at the time of deep sleep

equally

is

souU"*

Karikas

Vivclachudcvmani,

just the proper

is

lx)th

).

And

Berkeley and

Shankara that ideas also have no independent reality; they have reality so far

belong to some person

puts
i.

it ).

Ideas

or spirit as Berkeley

according to

B. lU. 3. 54.

tr.

as they

Berkeley are

Dr. Deussen

269.

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKXRA

i'ga

unthinking things.^ and the very existence

of an unthinking thing consists in being per-

resolved

The Avhole existence of reality is

by Berkeley into spirits and ideas.

" The

former are active,

ceived.^

stances

sub-

indivisible

the latter arc inert,

fleeting

or de-

pendent beings, which subsist not by thembur

selves,

minds

are

view of the

relaiiou of

by

apprehended
idea (

is

iJie

self

conscious

results no regressus

witnessing

ideas to

" As the

same as Berkeley's.

the

by or exist

supported

or spiritual substances. "7

sell'

ad

of

Shankara's
soul,

is

the

idea only

is

which witnesses
ihe

idea ) there

And

infinitum.

and ihe idea are uf an

enlially differeni naiurc,

in,

and

niiiy

the
ess-

therefore

siund 10 each other in the relation of knowhi"'

subject and object
eley's
soul,
.

r>.
f).

7,

view of

spirit

have nuich in

known.

"

And Berk-

and Shankara's \icw of

common. For budi, tLe

Selections from Berkeley, p. 91.

Selection I'loin Berkeley, p. 93.
Selections troni Berkeley,

. S.

B. II. 2

2;>.

p. 94.

O'CMPAKAl'IVK

supreme reality consists in

both,

the

is

it

spirit or soul, for

source of activity,

sole

intelligence; for both, it cannot be

by means of an

"

idea.

simple, undivided active being

can be no idea formed of

ideas whatever

all

nature of

-Hence

the effects
:

"

it

may

urged

comprehensible,

it

Such

illusionist

may

from

the whole
9.

of

it

by

ever in-

effects as

infer the existence

effects such

forms

e(c.

visible effects such as the birth of

to infer

the

that

is

see its

about by existent worker of the

absolutely real

image

be something unreal.

for

pro<luctiou of different;

must lead us

inert

is

acts,

Atman

if

we
Thic camuKU
plahi as anything. As we
be

of the

of

Shankara says

""?

produceth.

1)C

and

way

be perceived, Imt Only

itself
it

there

spirit; for

being passive

or that which

spirit,

of

one

spirit is

or likeness, that which acts....

cannot

apprehended

soul or

cannot represent unto us by

all

the

Atmaii,
illusion as

as

l)rought

illusion,

worlds

existence

the

the

so
etc.

of the

substratum of

spread out

Selections from Berkeley, p. 52.

in the

PHILOSOPHY OP 8HANKAKA

Hi

of

vai-iety

two philosophers

l>etween these
great.

But differences

etc/'o

foi'ins

Berkeley

has

very

'are also

his

in

ol^sciire

let

system the relations between God and

spirits.

And

he has invoked (vod^s agency to establish

the

contieo^^eVlness of

fdct,

Berkeley's main

sophy

in

lies

of an object without a

ndent and

-subjecl

with

he

transition

very

movement

Bauddha6
kara.

for

ds

bccilme a

we have

seen on

fundamental agreement

from Berkeley and

apt

irom
to

parallel

the

Berkeley

Kankas

to

the

C. III. 27

Hume
the

i.he

human

to

Kant

philosophic
position

position

dissolved

The

analysis.

sceptical

ibe idealist

of certain

system and showed

deeper

matter into ideas of

10.

matter.

teachini^-

ni Berkcloy's

necessity

iu

of

sliuvc<l ilic uiiicuUbiliiy

assumpiions

is

Is

an indepe-

ul"

iSljankara id>o.

Hume
a

absolute existence

And 'this kernel of his

pan of all idealism; and
this point,

In

dogma

the

of

refutation

liis

world.

the outer

contribution to philo-

of

world
or

bf

!^haii-

di\

of
iiie

GdifPAlUllVli;

Hume

lM*aiii.

finished

idea

Matter
exifet;

or

!*oul

unrelated

as

we

because

work of

tiie

same

truction by applying the

the

185

criticism

subject does

to

form an

cannot

to

substance.

or

spirit

des-

not

intelli-

gible idei of an independent material world.

Well, says

Hume,

itii])i'eSsioij.-

aOul

unknown

an

our experience

is

denied

atad

also

the

the

Vignanavadins
for

whom

of ideas

point

of

of

sub-

which

In tbis way,

u^.

existence

the

as absolu-

is

material

rcsohed

existence

series

somewliat

sensation?, a dance of ideas.

also

idea

buhind them

produces the scn^^ations, in

all

feel, is a

a^ the idea of a

tiily illtt^ory,

slraLum,

we

ideas; the

;iu"l

ttr sitb>?tuiiL'L;

have we got an

neither

All that

idea of spirit.

inn> a flux

of

The Bauddhas
of

oi^er

the

world

soul.

were subjective

The

idealists,

the sole reality consisted

in series

which were self-conscious. Another

coimnou

nio\cmenls was
ordhiarj basis

wiih
that

boih
the}

of causality

tecure anv other ba^ib.

these

sceptical

took

away

the

and

could

not

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKAKA

186

with regard

Shaiikara's position

much

Bauddhas very

the

to

resembles

Kwiit's

position with regard to Berkeley and Hume.

In both these great philosophies the

man becomes

experience owing to

by

revealed

scepticism ( Shankara used

was an

style

to

the

Both

scepticism.

Kant were convinced

and

Shankara

of

conscious of the necessity of a

deeper analysis of
difficulties

.spirit

that

it

5T^-

^^5^iT.

mind,

Kant absorbed Berkeley's teaching

impossible

attitude

so far as to deny the existence of

of

unrelated

matter

Shankara

similarly

to

with

ol:

world

the

all

intelligence.

the

Bauddhas

could not conceive of the outer or inner world

of reality not

here they part

theory.

Kant

dependent

upon mind.

company with the

tries to

reality of the outer

preser\e the empirical

world against

For Berkeley the outer world

lved

absolutely

completely

But

melts

Bui,

sceptical

into

away

ideas;

into

Berkeley.

was
the
the

l^ant maintains that the inner

no uijre meaning except

with

disso-

object
subject.
life

reference

has
to

COMPARATIVE

i87

an outer life. Berkeley points ont that

" for a sensitive subject such a world can

own
be known

exist only through its

therefore cannot

from

to

apart

exist

The Kantian answer

them.

and

affections,

that

is

while for snch a subject there vrould be no

wuuld

there

sensations as

states

external world as such, neither

be any consciousness of

The

of the self.
beiuGf

is

not for

of a purely

life

it

an

'mner

sensitive

consciousness of a series of states of

being,

any more than

it

On

life
is

which

it

which refer

*'

from the outer

presupposes.

Its

ii;ncr

life

not the consciousness of a series of sensa-

but

tions as snch,

is

it

other

the

which has an

liand, the self-conscious being

separate

own

its

consciousness

is

of an outer world of objects.

inner life cannot

not a

life. i. e.

to

of

perceptions

oxLcrjial

Shankara's reply

The nonexistence

to

of external Lhings.

U, Caird

the

of External

not be muiuiained l;ccausc

or ideas

objects, "^i

we

Here

BavMhas:
things

arc

can-

conscious

in every act of percep-

Philosophy of Kant. Vol.

I.

Gi2.

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

188

tion

we

same

are conscious of the

thing, corresponding to the

exterual

whether

idea

be a post or a wall or a piece of cloth or a

and

of

thiit

jar,

which we are conscious cannot but

That the outer world

exist....

it

exists apart

from consciousness has necessarily to be expected on the ground of the nature of consciousness

all

Nobody when

itself.

a wall

is

men

and the

conscious of

its

preceiving a post or
perception only, but

are conscious of the

jx)st8

and walls

perception. "^-

like as objects of the

Both Kant and Shankara base

their refuta-

tion of sensationalism on a proper analysis of

consciousness, which reveals

inner and outer states,

and objective

of

oui-

both our subject In c

feelings are conditioned

In this sense mind

another.

that both

by

(>ne

the correlate

i?

matter, and matter the correlate of mind.

" The inner and outer

objective

factors are

effect to one another. "

Further,

while

states,

related

subjective and
as cause

Hume

had resolved the

world of inner experience into a

X2. B. B.

II. 2.

28,

and

'^

13.

mere string

Karikas C.

2j 16.

COMPARATIVE
of unrelated

ideas,

tries

to reinstate

by making

original position

the self lo ils

it

Kant

189

the fundamental condition of

experience.

all

Empiricism states that knowledge

imprint-

is

ed npon our minds from without.

tahula rasa, experience

making
leian

itself felt

white sheet. Berketo

of experience

But the

system.

make

this

principle

role of

self

account

as a selective,

working spontaneously

Hume

of empiricism;

for

an orderly

as

the subjective world of experience

dark to him,

is

merely the object

idealism invokes (jod

liie ]>ossiblity

active

on

is

]\Iind

to

was

worked on the premisses

and hence his failure to

acc-

ount for order and unity in our experience.

Kant took a wider and deeper view

nature; he found
of all experience

do not hang
personal.

ropriated

imagined

that the

cardinal

the idea

is

of

in the air; they

An

self.

idea unrelated to

^exist.

feature

Ideas

are essentially
self,

by a personality can
to

human

of

" All

unapp-

never be

the

manifold

determinations of perception must necessarily

be related

to the

thfifik

in

the

subject

PHILOsiOHHV Oh MHAXKAUA

190

that
'I

think' cannot

must
of

conscious of

is

tlie

^roceerl

l)e

^ponifuioons activity

It is cftllerl pv,re

or pure self-conseinusnesR,
universal form

pposed in
ever.

It

all
is,

empirical

coiifciouaness

given lo ihe snbject, but

from the

subject.

The

it.

whicli

modes

of

It is also

ception, because

the

as

the

sense

to

original

called

it is

from

inasmuch

latter involves a particular relation

or feeling.

what-

consciousness
distinguished

consciousness,

the

necessarily presu-

is

therefore

apperception

hecau?-e it is

apper-

primary condition

without which there can be no self-consciouRness

whatever, and

our experience.
only

idea

which

And

this

cccupies

'

I think

the

'

position

is

absolutely

necessary to render the ideas conscious.

maintain that the idea,

fests itself

withouts

**

If

lamplike, mani-

standinsi; in

further principle to illuminate

14.

of

form of consciousness. "'4 Shankara

similarly maintains that the self

you

the

is

or implicitly,

being presupposed, explicitly

in every

no unity in

therefore,

it,

need of a

you main-

^yatson; Philosophy of Ka^nt explained,

p.. 1^6

COMPARATIVE

I91

which

tain thereby that ideas exist

apprehended by any

means

of the

is

no better than

penetrable mass
lves... And

of

yon

if

when advancing

to

burning

lamps

thousand

that

some imthemse-

object

that we,

finally

the witnessing

refute

know-

rocks manifest

tenet that the

we

fested,

assert

in-^ide

proven merely express in

Bauddha

of

not

knowing being;

ledge, and wliich are withfnr

which

are

Self as self-

words the

other
idea

is

self-mani-

yon by remarking that

your ideas have the attributes of originating,

being manifold

passing" away,
(

while our

we

self

is

permanent

thus have proved that an idea

render
it is

it

manifest. "^*

said that

exists,

'

It is

it is I,

past,

15.

the

effect

B. n.

2.

when

the past,

it is T,

is

who

after

and what
shall

know

the future,

by these words that

implied

8.

lamp

who know what at present

what

the future and

when

I,

'*And further,

who knew

was before the

is

like

),-

an ulterior intelligent principle to

requires

it

one and

and so on

of

28.

knowledge

alters,

'

evan
the

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKAkA

19?

does not

knowei*
the

future

past,

essence

aii<1

'^

Kant

and

in

is

for

preseiil,

eternally present.

is

which

in

he

beruiise

alter,

hi:^

Another point

Shank:u*a

ninke

ti

considerable advance upon their ])redeces>ors

must be
at

noticed.

consciousness

which

But Kant

in

the

them

tlio

object

individual

and

of analysis

the sphere

failed to arrive

AVas

was some one

ousness.

this

laltcr

because

soluiion

right

analysi.s

The

of

consci-

Shankara

wiilen

when they make

not

or that consciousness, but consciousness

the object of their uivesligf>tion>^.

in general

It is this which Shankara means hy the distinction between er^'acq^f^^^r and aj^HcHc^^ifqwf

(S. p. I. 1.
same way,
vindiCfite

1. I. 4. I.

Kant

as

the empirical

J I.

Shankara

validity

of the huy

o
it

a category of

causality

f^or it

I indjvi<lual

Shankara
soul

says:

"

Itiie

It

conditioned by

whose very nature

is

by making

uiiderstaiijding.

has no validiiy in

noumena.

38.) In Uie
as

well

causation. Kant accounts

our

:;.

bouu,(,i

But

sphere of
is

Jiwa

vpndhis

),

up w>th the

COMPARATIVE

and

idea of cause

as

happiness or that misery

Atman

like.

idea,

'

do

this

mine

is

is

prana

things,

The cause

subjective and objective.

ideation

ideas

or act, as the ground of

various

the

division,

in

Througli

by constituting the

actor

action,

this

Uke the snakes

seen,

is

it

are evolve^,

of

and the

',

place of the rope, the idea of Jiiva.

it

'

absohitely free from any such

is

but in

as evidenced by

effect,

such daily experience

193

The

thus explained.

etc.

of this

self-evolved

Jiwa having power to give shape to any

idea, has its memory guided by its inherent
That

knowledge.

knowledge of

knowledge of

memory

the

to

is

the

idea

two;

the

of

form of

of

from

cause

tlie

follows

idea of effect; then follows

tlie

knowledge and the

in the

say,

variety

arises

knowledge,

and

of

again

the

knowledge

From
memory and from memory
act

actor,

knowledge

then

i;his

and

actions.

endless series continues

without end, giving rise to various subjective

and objective things.

16. Karikas. C. il. 16.

1^

"

^^

Shankara

has

PITILOSOPIIY

194

OFSHANKAIJA

Hume,

clearly grasped the fact, long before

of

the

essentially

subjective

character of

In the commentary

the category of causality.

on the Sutras, he expresses the same

in

a different

hand

is

way.

'

As

fact

the matter

in

known through

not one which can be

inferential reasoning, our ordinary experience

cannot be used to
of

matter

ihar

Scripture

settle

it.

we

and

only has to be appealed

distinction

and noumena in
brings

it

i'^

between phenomena
philosophy

with

contact

which

Shankara's

This distinction of the stand-

metaphysics.
pointr. is

on

hence Scripture

to. "

Kant's

into real

depend

rar.her

altogetlier,

It is the

For the knowledge

fundamental in both these systems.

Shankara distinguishes between Vyavaharika

( realistic )

and parmartlm

Kant

standpoints.

transcendental

and

Both are thus

able

reality of the

ideality.

metaphysical

empirical
to unite

world with

its

between

distinguishes

knowledge.

the

empirical

transcendental

All knowledge, says K:int,

is

only

ODMPAUATIVE
phenoiueuu; Ijecuuse

of

essentially

object as

and

it is

enters,

tivity

ledge,

An

element

therefore, into

but

Reality

as

it

spectacles of our

tlie

and understanding.
tive validity only.

realm, in

of

our know-

appears

to us

human

senses

But then

in the empirical

sphere of our existence as

the

categories

of

limitations,

understanding

are

But beyond these spheres,

to

noumena,

if

everywhere by relativity
doctrine

taken

away

as

the

have

But how can we pass from

no application.

phenomena

all

fully

in

transcendental realm, these categories

his

rela-

has a compira-

it

conditioned by our human

the

all

senses

Hence our knowledge

has not absolute validity,

valid.

our

and hence we do not know pure

Reftlity,

through

pure object

the

knowledge of the

the

refracted through

understanding.

is

our understanding.

to

but

it is in itself,

knowledge

all

not the knowledge of

It is

as

relative

195

of

we

Here Kant brings

practical

knowledge

are envelope* I

is

reason;

what

is

restored as faith.

Shankara viraialiy takes up an

identical

PHILOSOPHY OF 3R ANKARA

:f6

position.

"The whole of experience i. e. duality

made up

and perceived

of perceiver

pure

is

imagination-a fiction of the mind which, in

absolute truth
in relation

from

says

relation.

perfectly free from

fore absolute, "i^

"

all
Tt

pheuomenon

<f

imagination

of a snake

is

blished

mind

'

falls

this

in

this

is

with

duality

the mind, even

in

what

asked

is

is
it

that

'

sense.

that
(

nought, when

ir

mind
it is

All

the

of

rope.

^^trengtli

of an

duality

When

no mind,

esta-

of th

such

for

( duality )

ginings being withdrawn into

Bnake in the rope,

is

The reason

).

like

place

and the conclusion to be

is

conclusion

that

shown on the

here

inference

be

external

and there-

relation

may

the ground for sayino;

This

always

is

Tliat alone relates itself

'

but the soul, having nothing

itself;

is

pnrusha

the

'

which has any objects without

to objects

is

as such not

is,

with objects, eternal and absolute.

The Shncti
free

Atman, and

is

stands or
the

all

mind

its

itself like

by the constant

imathe

exercise
'~

18 Karikas~C, IV. 72,

COMPARATIVE
discrimination

of

even in

and non-attachment, or

duality

sleep,

117

experienced.

not

is

Hence from an accomit

of

duality in experience,

follows that

not exist. "^9

coincides

The idea
both

in

nature whatever

real-must

is

From

itself.

is

is,

that

by

within

and

This

is

of

what

Reason.

''-

distinguished

expands

thib

of a thing

is

all
is

else.

reason

clearly

which contains

predicates

relations

is

exclude from

individual

itself all positive

exclusion

must be

anything

this reality all contradiction,

demand an

obvious

is

admit that which

self-complete to be real

will

words

in other

view it

independent of all relation to

only

very

its

or complete in

real

this point of

thought can

does

" Kant's

that everything conceived to be real

if

it

of

of ultimate Reality

positive

be

absence

systems.

the

conception of thought

what

it

the

and

meant by the Ideal

Gaudajjada defines

to

the

negations.
of

Pure

Reality as

from appearance ( Shankara

definition ), " By the nature
understood

19 Karikcis C. Hi, ul.

tlia-t

iiO.

which
Watsou

is

com266.

PHILOSOPHY

198

SHANKARA

OP'

very

plcle in itaclf, that which is its

which

tion, that

artificial

is

inborn, that which

itsel."2i

Now

that

( is

fails.

Hence

'*-^'

relative reality,
to our limited

all

fails,

reality

powers

relegates

realm of Maya^
means change is in-

to the

names and forms

Maya

<luc to

in

all

which has reference

compatible with the absolute reality.

and

which our consciousness

Shankara

because relativity whicli

.universe of

not

said to be) real, of

which our consciousness never

that to be unreal of

is

cease to be

or that which does not

t

concli-

Kant's

All the
therefore

is

language

it

is

phenomenon \

Shankara and ^^pinoza

sideration of the

systems of a

detailed

con-

few philoso-

pliers will not be out of place here. Spinoita's

system

is

an

impressive

attempt,

like

the

Vedanta of Shankara, which captivates by

grandeur the human

its

initial

tjon

imagination.

impulse which led Spinoza tu

was

movement

sj)ecula-

the tame which prompted the

of philosophic

tlu/ight

of

""'

:;i.

The

KariU3.

22,

Bg. C.

II. IG.

the

COMPARATIVE
Eastern

sages.2-^

It

was

spiritual

Spinoza went after and his

directed to secure

There

to

him

perishable

Spinoza's system.

the

is

ignorance

the

is

of the

is

due

a false

view

root

knowledge

evil in the world,

The attainment

source of

unhappiness

all

ultimately to ignorance, error,

If

and

finite

Therefore Spinoza thinks

with Shankara that

of things.

satisfaction.

in the

This

things.

rest

philosophy was
this

no satisfaction

is

199

all

salvation.

is

right point

as regards all existence is

of

of

view

one end of

the

philosophy.

The
is

the

metlioil jjy

same

Spinoza

is

proceeds

The existence

as Shankara's.'*

the Absolute
It is

whicli

of

assumed rather than proved.

the beginning of

inquiry not the end.

all

" What Spinoza aimed

at

was a system of

knowle'lge in which everything should follow

by

strict

necessity of thought

from

principle with which

it

penetrate to the

ground or

tion of
'Jo.

all

first

SpiuOoa

p. 0.

'21.

first

It seeks to

starts

presupposi-

thought and being, to

Caiicl

the

grasp that

See Chapter

J.

paiLOBO^flY OK dHANKAHA

'sbb

ideti

which represents the

and so

nature,
it

that

it

to develop all onr

shall appear

other ideas

"^^

'

This

de( hieing

Brahman,

from

all

way

the very

is

in

beginning like
Absolute, and

the

the rest of the world.

it all

of

ideas from

source of

as the

which Shankara proceeds,

Spinoza, with

and sum

origift

'-6

The Absolute was conceived by Spinoza

as substance.

and

is

conceived

Brahman^
but

it is

in itself

is

itself. "^^

through

the

Like Bra-

explanation.

of

totality

Brahman

the idea of

proved, because

all

existence.

this

idea

proof implies

no attributes.^s

notion

it.

Brahman

in

pure

Brahman.

has no attributes not at least the

attributes which
25. Caird

we

conceive with regard to

Spinoza p. lUi-i.

26. S. B. Introduction.
^8,

has

corresponds to the

It

Nirguna

of

Like

cannot be

Further, the substance of Spinoza

itself

Like

co-extensive with reality; rather,

it is

it is itself

that which

the source of all explanation,

itself defies all

kman

'*

It is

Caud

l5piuo.:a.

i'66.

27.

Caiid

Spinoza.

COMPARATIVE

201

Yet Brahman becomes

it.

Saguna Bfahmaiif and

some

attributes of

as such

The

it.

cribe to

We

predicate

attributes of the

substance are also not inherent

stance

us at once

for

in

the sub-

they are the differences which

Thus

it.

Brahman do

them,

" in

not cha-

They simply

one or the other.

imply that Substance or

to possess

as-

the attributes of substance

like the attributes of

racterise the

we

Brahman

relation to

appears

the

finite

which contemplates it. Another

resemblance between the two sysems is to

intelligence"

be found in the fact that

anions

the attri-

butes predicated of God, two are emphasised

as possessing special Worth

'and Spinoza. These are

by both Shankara

"Thought and Exten-

sion " in the language of Spinoza;

*

they are

Existence and Thought " in the words of

Shankara.
auxl

And

these

two

really

the same thing; substance

pomt

of

is

mean one
from one

view Thought, and from another

point of view Extension.

Shankara Would

pay that the very nature of

Brahman

telhgttocfc;

and

mtellxii,eDufc ib

is in-

not couceivabk

PHILOSOPHY OK SHANKABA

,803

without existence.

The crux

of both philosophies lies

relation of the finite to

the

Here

Infinite.

movement of thoudit
both cases.
The Absolute in
also the

same

the

is

itself

the

in

in

pure,

is

The very

indeterminate, colourless imity.

idea of an attribute, determination or differ-

ence in
Reality
tity,

it,

is

fatal

is

to its unity or reality.

conceived as pure unity, pure iden-

Shankara,

pure being.

therefore,

two parts-

solves the fact of experience into

The former

the change and the changeless.

Maya,
comes to the same
he

the latter

calls

Spinoza

reality.

We

conclusion.

come

the idea of the Infinite by removing

limitations which

His view
in us.

maked

thing

hnite

is illustrated l^y the idea

This presents

a,

re-

all

to

the

finite.

of

space

resemblance to

close

Skankara's system, in which also the notions

about

Brahman

are modelled

Akaslia^\)\\VQ sjuicc.

Space

tinuous; and any division of

tious.

This

conception

iiuile oubolan'JCo.

upon those of
is

one and con-

it is

is

The onlv

purely

applied
rcalitv

ficti-

to

all

which

-9^

COMfARATlVE
tliey possess is

the

Any

Substance.

they possess

is

of the

reality

the highest point of view, even

But

which

Hence from

purely fictitious.

logy becomes an

Infinite

individual reality

God

of theo-

illusion. 29

to say that the universe

with

variety and multiplicity of beings

illusion is not to explain

There

it.

all

its

mere

is

is

ano-

ther aspect of the question for us- the reality

which we have got

if

we

are to live at

pure being
nation.

to ascribe to

An

all.

human imagi-

too ethereal for

is

When

Spinoza

world,

the

atmosphere of

and Shankara there-

descend from the pure heights of the

fore

Aljsolute to

the particidars

they allow

things.

Hence

measure of
tlie

of

movement

from the idea of pure

our world,

reality
in

ti

both cases

being, the undifferen-

tiated unity whicli negates the reality

time and space, of

all

real

Caird

all

Saguna

a qualified Absolute, which is the

ground of the whole universe,

*!y,

of

individual distinctions,

to the idea of a determinate Being, a

Brahman^

these

Spmo^a-, Ho.

its

centre

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKAKA

Ml
ami

its soui-ce.

from the point

course

gative. of

Absolute

negative

of

( ue-

view

of the world ) changes at once into a positive

Man and

Gfod.

nature, which were spirited

away by the magic

of a transcendental logic

again appear and assume reality.

In the moral theory of Spinoza

there arc

two points which resemble the corresponding

the

identification

intellect

and

ing.

position

is

of

The ultimate

root of

all

wrong

willing, but

for

stage

first

and determined

among

This corresponds

man

as a

hither and
30, Caird

world

is

The second
freedom of

man

is

that

of

conditioned

of

tlie

man
on man

passions. 30

to the idea of the

part of

thither
.*

of

know-

from without, and

infiuence

the

real

Eternal things act

the rest.

through

of

finite things are

All

bondage.

the

all sufferings.

the absence

The

will.

that

extent

Error or false view of

responsible

first is

a 'certain

to

will.

wrong

evil is not

The

Shankara.

ethical positions of

Spinoza

Prakriti

is

Vedanta

swaywd

by the power of
p.

ii64.

the

COMPARATIVE

But

three Gunas.
is free

20S

as

intelligence,

Atman

Shankara's

in

system the

The human ego by

as such is free.

identifying itself with the universal

becomes

two aspects

also there are

a sort of

elementary concept

and Spinoza say that

<^Iod

world.

tion

whn he proceeds

ftman

all

the cause
:

*'

God

things that

intellect. "

of

for

the

cause of

the

can

fall

their

liow

Bra-

world.

Spinoza

efficient

cause of

the

under an
of

any

cause.

by the ideal causal concept.

:

Shankara

is

elementary causal concept

31. Caird

Ix^th

prove

to

is

The modes

have God

we

means an un-

liave seen Shankara's posi-

the

also says

it

Thus

conditional succession.

is

problem.

which we ascribe

have to take for granted;

We

Here

case.

the

of

feality

This

to this fact.

either

in

almost

receives

of causality

treatment

identical

is

essence

free.

The concept

There

man

in vSpinoza's system,

from the point of view of the highest

Spinoza, p. 167.

is

infinite

given being
3^

soon

But

this

replaced

Ordinary

cau-

Sll.WlCvRA

PH]L,<'Si)VIl^ f'F

10$.

satioii is evidcijllj

a cuLOgor\

It implies the succession or

its

members.

die

oi'

liiiiie.

co-existence o

In the former case, the cause

loses itself partially or

In the latter case

wholly in the

we have

to take

effect.

things as

external to and also affected by each

Thought, therefore, works down

elementary

idea of

causation

concept in which tliere

of cause and

effecl:.

from

32

The

relation

between

cause

identity
Shiinkara,

J^il^e

iberefore, Spinoza says " (iod is

the

an ideal

to

complete

is

other.

omne

and

esae. ".

effect

is

conceived ultimately as one of identity.

SHANKARA AND BERGSON.

comparison of some philosophical posi-

tions of Shankara witli those

sure to be

because

very

Bergson

of Bergson

instructive.

claims

to

emphasise just

those aspects of experience which

gated

into

background

neglects the importance

is

Particularly

were

rele-

Shankafa,

and

of those which

were

liy

fundamental for Shankara.

Being

is

the one

central fact in Shankara's philosopliy;

becom-

32.

Hoffding

Probjems of Philosophy,

p. 98.

'

roMPARATIVF.

uig

it*

the central

word

Bergson's philoso-

of:

Shankara's philosophy

phy.
of the

207

is

changeless;

existence of time; to the other

of

stuff

reality.

time

fundamental, Bergson's thought

very

respects,

the

is

Notwithstanding

such abrupt contrasts in matters

is

The one denies the

philosophy of change.

very

a philosophy

system

Bergson's

useful

is,

the

most

in

some

commentary

on

contribution

of

Shankara's speculation.

What

the

is

specific

Bergson to philosophic thought

this.

almost

Philosophic
to

Descitrtes,

deadlock.

many

speculation

Since

attempts

It

lay in

had come
the time of

were made to

overcome the dualism of subject and object,

mind and matter.

Descartes posited the

dualism and then tried to overcome it by

Spinoza sees these two as
bringing in God.
mere parallel expressions of Substance.
Berkeley also brings in the teriimn quid of

God.

It

was

the

same with Leibniz.

went much further.

He

standing creates nature,

said

that

that

mind

Kant
underinstead

PHILOSOPHY OF 3HAXRARA

208

beiqg merely

of

itself

fold

recepieni of

oulsidc

the

the cause of the ordering of

by means
:

passive

the

impressions from

of its forms.

We

is ?

is

know

it

this

matter as

in

it is

itself
is

known and unknowable

or

so far as it

as

it

is

Hence
is

for a

something quite un-

to us. It is the thing

noumenon.

in-itself-the

its

matter

refracted through our understanding.

perfect understanding

two-

Mind imposes

form on matter. But what then,

is

the world

l']:vperience

matter and form.

ultimately

world,

Thus

the world

was sundered into two parts-phenomena; and

noumena

the former are withiu the spiiere

of our knowledge,

This means

tl)t

relative and

we

knowing

are debarred

reality.

system

If reality is

It

was

thus

mainspring of

are beyond

our knowledge

which philosopliy
the

ihe latter

all

is

for ever

from

was a sorry pass

tlnis

brought.

became an

it.

always

to

Hence

unconcious

the latest agnostic systems.

unknowable, we must

take to

either agnosticism or scepticism.

Bergson claims

to (leliver

philosophy from

COMPAKAnVK

know

that

Shankara think reality

to be

impasse.

tlu!^

anrl

Bergwn
as

We

it

is

is,

incapable

sliown that intellect

as

Wiiy

is

Bergson

chapter.

unknowable.
Intellect

explained

disquali-

an instrument of knowing

But

change.

by a natural

nature

very

Because the

intellect

inability to

ui

brilliantly

lias

essentially

is

Kant

comprehending

of

Shankara's position

the next

fied

both

agrees with this position.

reality.

is

i!*)l

reality.

of

reality

characterized

is

comprehend

life.

^".

There is the brand of relai vity on all our know i

There are two ways of knowing a thing:

ledge.
**

The

first

object,

The

the

first

we move round the

that we enter into it.

implies that

second

depends on the point of view

which are placed and

which we
neither
relies

express

on

ihe

point

on any symbol.

The

knowledge may be said to stop

of

14

view, nor

first

kind of

at the relative;

the second in those cases where

33. Creative Evolution. 174,

symbols by

The second

ourselves.

depends on

at

it is

possible,

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANK ARA

no

the

attain

to

problem as

tries to solve the

possible

us

for

Thus Bergson

"'^^

absolute.

kuo^v

to

how

to

the

it is

the

reality,

noumenon, the thing-in-itself or Brahman.

His absolute knowledge is caller! intuitive
knowledge,

which

in

all

subject and object disappears.

laborious; intuition
is

from

represent

Shastras
hitellect;

they

cation of the
will
still

of view

the point

may

we

labour

points

shall

the Absolute.

of
of

thought,

hence

view;

of

greater

be outside

we

the

catx^h its

its

very centre. As

life,

very

experience,

spirit;

W.

iM.

An

35.

observe

heart of

it

it;

from

Jam.es says: " llcality,

concreteness,

use what words you

overflows

we

and

Absolute.

become one with

therein

we

there

conflict;

Intuition alone can take us into the

the object;

of

merely mean multipli-

greater and

be

is

This

study of Shastras,

the

of

fact.

Shankara's criticism of

the very point of

the uselessness

Analysis

a simple

is

even of

duality,

will,

and surrounds

immediacy-

exceeds

our logic,

''**^

Bergson,

it.

Introduction to Metaphysics,

Pluralistic Universe, 5il2.

i.

COMPARATIVE
introduced

tlierefore,

into

211

philosophy., this

novel point of view and worked

Shankara lays

well.

that

intuition;

orasp

it is

points

to

the

which

is

makes

The very word DavRhana

Hindu

to

Bergson,

knowledge of the

Absolute,

Keality possible.
applied

out very

it

like

metaphysics

of

intuition alone

the

of

down,

method

true

the

it

systems of

fact

that

sight or insight, intuition,

it

philosophy
ultimately

is

immediate experi-

ence, direct realisation of the Absolute, they

aim

at.

There

some resemblance between two

is

philosophers in otlier respects also.

Shankara

thinks that although the study

Shaatras

cannot bring us

int<?

they can point the

way

to

us away from irrelevant

that a

also tl\inks
of this type

is

of

touch with the Absolute,

it;

they can

pursuits,

preliminary

necessary.

" For

obtain an intuition from reality,

intellectual

Bergson

preparation

we do
that

is,

not

an

sympathy with the most intimate

part of it-unless

by

turn

long

we have won

fellowship

with

its

confidence

its

superficial

J^HILOSOPMY

212

"^^

manifesiations.

OFSHANKAUA
Roth

Shankara

Bergson think that intuition

different

from

not radically

is

by saying

that

both

in

the object speaks and not the subject;

and

in

and diver-

both, therefore, error, hesitation,

sity of views

com-

Shankara

perception.

the two

pares

and

have not much scope.

Bergson

distinguishes between these two, callmg per-

the former; hence his

of

poRsiblity

feature,

Bergson,

is

failure

experiencing

we may

not sufficient.

It

iiidifJhyaaa

Both

much

emphasis

c^i

in the

same
the

and lay down

practice

as

the

it.

The above resemblances

Introduction

nay a

emphasize

difficulty of the effort

prerequisites of attaining

An

habit,

point

ih inkers

extensive study and

says

must be systema-

Shflnkara's

direction.

Absolute.

more common

must be a

manan and

36.

the

the

reach

of intuition,

single effort

very part of us.

extreme

to

point out one

tically practised, it

intuition,

Kant recognised only

supra-intellectual.

Lastly,

and

infra-intellectual,

ception,

are ratlior obvious.

to Metaphysics. 77-78.

COMPARATIVE

But we can trace even

213

in the other aspects of

the philosophy, which seem to be at the very

opposite pole to Shankara's system,

subtle identity with the
is

many ways

in

Brahman-ii

Reality.

Brahman

latter.

same

the

is

But

duration.

is

rue-is above time,

of

pure

it, is

this is largely a difference oE

and not of thought. Pure duration

from our ordinary no-

entirely different

tion

Bergson^s

as

the Reality as Bergson conceives

of phrase,

very

time,

a succession of states."^7

viz.

Bergson identities duration wiih the sense

of )ilc

and activity within

nothing to

do with our ordiuary idea of

time, which involves the

past,

the

This has

us.

Thus

and the future.

present

practically Bergson approaches

in

his

ception of pure duration the timeless

Both are above

ute of Shankara.

nary limitations of time; both

by pure

intuition;

and both are

are

the

of

distinction

all

con-

Absolordi-

revealed

at the centre

of our free activity.

Bergson says that Reality

dV.

Wildon Carr

is

Ber^on. 76,

time,

dura-

Hi

PHILOSOPHY OF BMANKAKA

tioD, life, consciousness.

The cosmic life

same as spirit.

is

cosmic elan.

is

It

the same as duration,

the

It is the

It is the Reality.

universal force operating everywhere.

God.

In man, as well as

Bergson,

this.

believe in

separate

from

'

individuality,

"

all

Shankara

like

The theory

other

divine.

nature,

in

is

is

as

distinct

human

exactly

which

original life-impetus,
of all life, activity,

is

self

radically

individualities

Brahman

force

does not

the

of

It is

freedom."

It is "incessant life, action,

like

and
this

the one source

dyanamics.

Thus Dr. Deussen defines Brahman

" Meanwhile.... the spiritual (Chaitanyani)
:

is,

in

our system a potency which

the

motion end change in nature,

root of

all

which

therefore, for

is

lies at

plants, and

example ascribed

means rather

the

capacity

to

of

reaction to outer inHuenccs, a potency which

ui its highest

liuman
of

intellect, as

this
06.

development,

cosmic

spirit,

Di. DcUjOCii. p.

reveals

spirit, "

iJ'J.

like

''^^

the

itself

as

The nature
nalure of

Brahman
The
"

OOMFAl^ATlVE

our

inscruLable to

ib

force

ulliiiiait;

tit

the

in

ib

iutelligeiice.

resorL

last

inexpressible, something ineal-

soiiietliiiig

Both

eulable, witlistuuding all analysis. "3v

of

we

tner<e

comprehend

can

the \ery

is

One

life

is

his accuuul uf matter.

otliei"

which

force

cs>;ence of

than mind.

produces

consciousness or

the inversion

interruption. It

sion or matter

In our

own

is

is

of

Matter
the

It is

both.

The

freedom,

life is

Matter

creation, action, growdi.

l>ut

force

of our individuality.

stuil"

not something

same

life

o the interesting features of Bergson's

philosophy
is

by

only

intuition, because Brahtna/i or the

is

nothing

movement,

this

its

the arrest of spirit. Exten-

the de-tension

individuality

consciousness ofoes on

of

tension.

we observe

that our

elaborating-

something

new, but as soon as a thing becomes liabitual

and our attention ceases

it

of

accompany

to

it,

becomes something material, some deposit

spirit.

Matter

movement, a
o9.

J.

is

thus "

\\

<lescending

degradation

dispersion, a

M'kilLi Blewart.

88

of

PHILOSOPHY OP SHANKARA

3I6

energy, and

movement.

ilms neither the matter of

the Prakriti of Shankara

The

j>endent entity.
is

involved in

dualism.

ness,
in

genesis of

arcou'iits

some

great

life

or

there

is

of

same

the

of

and conscious-

life

matter

for

the

of

matter

the

nature

The operation

which accounts for

spirit

a positive, inde-

is

very

the

Bergson, nor

Therefore in either system,

spirit*

no

ascending

an

contrast

life is in

"4^

Further,

also.

systems,

idealistic

intellect accotaits for the world, but intellect

itself

like

remains unaccounted

Maya

intellect

is

same
or

prakriti;

reality,

Bergson

is

There

is
is

between niaticr and

an

also

W ilcion

the

intellect, as

Can-, p. 86.

life

it

that

march.

negation of

matter

neifation

ontological

ontological affinity betweeii

10.

its

lience its particular sphere is

Mavu,

realit}'.

says

the de])osit of spirit on

which

inte-

Shankara traces

source;

In both theories intellect

or

But Bergsou,

Shankara traces the genesis of the

llect to the

to

for.

of

afliniiy

there

is

or spirit

uu
or

COMPARATIVE
coussciousiiess or

iutuiiion (

which

duration

or

817

Brahmdn and

is in fact life itself ).

CHAPTER. VU.
HOW FAK
IN

IS bHANKARAS SYSTEM A PHILOSOPHY

THE MODERN SENSE OF THE I'EBM
?

WHAT

I.

Philosophy

is

PHILOSOPHY

IS

and has

a very vague term

apparently undergone considerable variation

in

But

meaning.

unity

of

beneath

content
these

same,

the

all

implications

appear to be

philosophies.

"

is

conceived

dealing

1 )

as

with

impartial spirit.

some

rality
it

specific

It is tluis

( 3 )

all

philosophy

set of

the

whole or

the

catholic

marked

which limit

just because

manifests

in

as ( subjectively

be pursued in

the special sciences

to

common

comprehensive view, as

objectively )

to

The following

Totality

universe, and accordingly

requiring

certain

discernible

clearly

is

variations.

facts...

view

is

or

off

from

their

view

(2)Genea

whole,

itself in universals, in principles.

Applicaliun,..

The gcntral truthb do

'

EPibTEMOLOGY
not remain inert or

relevant details.

a certain

make

"^

reasonable

whose

marked

off,

has

ourselves, philosophy

any

stand

longer for

begun

to

The name does

knowledge,

all

Encyclopoedic knowledge

divine.

now an
possible now
is

and

Ijoundaries

acquire a definite meaning.

not

than a

rather

will,

exact

contents can be neatly

human and

the

Philosophy expresses

conjoined intellect and

With

carried

are

purpose, and temper of

attitude,

discipline

bub

sterile,

over to illuminate and

2l*

Nor

impossibility.
to confound

the

Avill

it

be

provinces of

The scholastic
was rather a theology than a
philosophy, it was absolutely depeu'lent for
and philosophy.

theology

philosophy

its

upon outside authority.

data

philosophy

from the

takes

fact that

its
it

characteristic

was

a protest

the subordination of reason

agency whatever.

Its

to

Modern
colour
against

any outside

main note

is

freedom,

freedom from the weight of authority in

its

shapes

and

forms.

Hence no system

1-2. Prof. Dewey

Philo;iophy
Dictionary of Fhilobophy ).
.

all

Baldwin's

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

220

will be entitled to
in the

name

the

modern sense

of die term, which takes

dogmas

for granted a series of

rates these bodily into

was

with

the case

middle ages and

may

tion for certain

it

be to

it

a suflicient

it

like

reason

is

None of
Thomas
day use

The Jewish philosophy was

reconcile

Judaism with the

It

is

to

is

which

the ingenious

Aquinas can

they arc not, therefore philo-

sophies ui the present

to

justifica-

But philosophy

dogmas.

men

test;

an attempt

Hence

the jews.

also of

tiltimately appeals.

stand this

the

philosophy of

the

to be critical;

structures of

Such

organism.

its

Theology may be dogmatic;

philosophies.

bound

and incorpo-

were rather theologies than

these systems

revelation

philosophy,

of

therefore

of

the

term.

also nothing but

the

teachings

of

results of secular sciences.

better

to

characterise

the

systems of these thinkers as theologies rather

than philosophies.
tance

is

the

attitude

point of some
of

the

impor-

modern mhid

towards the respective provinces of philoso-

phy and

sciences,

d^tiue philobophy

^ien like Herbert Spencer

afc

the

bum

of

tht

resulu

KFI-M'KMOl.OOt

of pciences.

Every science

conclusions;

these

221

reaches certain

upon

based

are

Now

fundamental principles.

some

science

these ultimate principles will be an

attempt

towards unifying these generalisations by

means

some ultimate law.

of

This work of

unification will be the province of a philoso-

But Spencer

pher.

account;

makes
this

it

lie

posits

consistent in his

Unknowable

the

be, it is

certainly not a Philosophy,

after all an attempt to seek

is

and

Whatever

the object of thelogy.

may

which

not

is

unity;

and to sunder science and theology in

way

is

uniting

up even the

give

to

them.

an appendix to
but

ihe

sciences.

It is

lakes

of

sciences,

all

life

the

and the

various sciences, which

upon

Sciences take portions of

but a study of

then

sciences or

not the results,

our everyday

assumptions of our
philosopliy

cannot

science of

presuppositions

assiunptions of

possibility of

Philosophy

afford to be merely a

this

itself

to

reality

the parts

is

not

thing as the study of the whole.

consider.

for

the

study,

same

The whole

PHILOSOPHY OF SnANKARA

222

has a character of

own;

its

it is

is

one fact, nor a series of

fart

facis,

which the philosopher

iioL

lias

and
to

it is

the whole,

asks

it

about the ultimate thmgs, the

general features of Reality.

questions

last

view of the

God; according as

subject or the object, or

is

syste-

and most
The whole may

be attacked from the point of

the one or the other

emphasized, philosophy

becomes predominantly an epistemology

Kant-a theory of experience

with

cosmology
a theory

with
is

( as

world

medieval

or

theology

philosophers

always an independent

an organized whole, as a
latest

).

as

nr a

( as

But

investigation

the cliaracier of TJeality taken as a

The

with the Greek philosophers;

the

of

the

this

consider.

Pliilosophy, therefore, tries lo take a

matic view of

sum

The universe

of the cliaracters of the parts.

it

into

Fnit, as

totality.

phase of speculation in the West

tends to bring out the importance of values

along with

facts.

Prof,

Sidgwick defines

the final and most important lask of philoso-

phy

as the problem

of "connex^iing fact

^i\d

EPISTEMOLOGY
ideal

some

in

"3

manner.

whole. "4

not so
it

thus

and

value

says

supposed

formerly

theoretic schem:^ of

tlie

harmoneously

in

from

expect

xion on

complete

itself;

permanent

those

their foundation in

reality above the changing

times."

what
a

or trans-

own, a scheme

to-day

philosophy

do

a synthesis of

the results of the >epar.ite s(Mences,

its

give

to

world,

cending them on lines of

have

aa

We

*'

much expect from philosophy

was

men

to us

existence

AVindelband

"the

out the

find

to

is

satisfactory

it

what seems

between

highest

the

and

rational

Hoffding puts

probleiu of philosophy
relation

J23

what we
is

values

refle-

which

higher spiritual
interests

of

the

This view comes very near to the

view of the

office of

philosophy of the Hindu

we have

philosophers, as

introductory chapter.

pointed out

in

the

Philosophy gives up,

therefore the hopeless task of co-ordinating

3.

Sidgwick

H.

Philosophy,

its

Scope and

Relations, p. 30
4-5,

Quoted

Idea of God.

A. Seth ) 39.

tU

FHILOSOPHY Ob SHANKAUA

the resnliB

of.

various science?^;

meaning and vahie

to the

most fundamental

it

inquires in-

ahonr

beliefs

our.-elves,

God and the world and liieirmuiuidrelai

from theology

It differs
it is

reason to which

not authority.

much
ity,

as

it

thus

differs

as

whole

It is,

it.

from

distujguished

haphazard or authoritative

ihat

and

from sciences inasReal-

however

reasoned system;

is

it

of

ions.

itself

deals not with a portion of

but the

scientiiie,

It

in ihis respect,

addresses

it

and

of r.nr fleepest

all

it is

traditional,

beliefs,

among other sciences.

The quesiion with regard to the

but

it

is

not a science

place

of

Shaukara in the history of philosophy

is

simply this

Is

Shankara a mere theologian

or a philosopher in the scholastic sense of the

term

The answer

to this question requires

a detailed investigation into the epistemology

of Shankara.
II.

SHANKARA'S POSITION CONSIDERED WITH

REFERENCK TO STATEMENIS IX HIS WRITINGS.

How
ledge

do we account

What

are

its

for the fact of

sources

know-

And what

KPISTEMOLOGV
is its

How

validity ?

we

can

between truth and error

225

(listinguish

These

some

are

of the vital questions

which every

philoso-

pher has to answer.

It is true that

the con-

sciousness of the

ledge

is

limitations

a late growth in

earliest philosophies

of

our know-

The

philosophy.

were pure

inqiiiries into

the objective reality. Dr. Deussen points out

that the " Indian philosophy did

most

as for the

part, the Grecian

not

start,

from

did,

an investigation free of assumptions into

'

existent

the

philosophy
testing

of

',

from

but
the

rather

like

of knowledge,

tion

great

This was known as

sensuously
6, Dr.

15

in

the

canjons

Shankara as well as other

philosophers

the one

and

complex of knowledge handed

down ( through the Veda ).''^

The criteria of truth are known
Hindu thought as pramanas or
Hindu

Inodern

analysis

critical

recognise
source

that

percep-

knowledge.

pratyaksha

perceptible;

Deussen. 82.

of

in

or

the

knowledge

226

rillLOSO! I!V

in Avhich

we come

produces

the

realised that

necessary

it is

the

ledge for the luunan

for animals.

our

direct

in

is

will.

It

main source
and the

thing tlirough

does not

know-

of

sole source

inevit-

has a measure of reality wliich

We

cannot accept

him who while perceiving a

his sense

perceive

knowledge

is

dependent upon

least

the

is

says

still

that

he

outward thi^g and

that no such thing exists.^

of

It

Perception takes place

can never be taken away.

the words of

object

conviction.

):)eino-s

not in the

with

contact

A contact of the sense with the

reality.

aly and

OF SHANK AP.A

anumdn

Another source
inference

).

In-

ference either takes place from a cause to an

effect or vice versa; or

it

takes place

one object to another analogous to

based upon perception and derives

from

ity partly at least

such

as,

consistency

contradictions, the

the authority of
7.

8. B.

of

truth

or freedom

from

tesdmony

tests

of

commn-sense,

recognized men.

U.T'ssi

It is

its valid-

it.

Shaukara recognises other

also;

it.

from

He

fre-

EPISTEMOLOGY
qucntly

presence

of the

says

the

ground

On

tions.

ou ihe ground

discrepancies

of

refuted

Yedanta view may be exposed. Hence

fact,

he

made

is

to

clear

of

passages

Nobody

pillar

the

against

or

You

Similarly,

of

when he

the

Thus

world.

subjective

feels that

confli-

sense

the

of

the

idealists

perceives

outward object that he

an

perceives the perception

Ao"ain. "

the

Shrutis.

the

view

commonsense
that "

"'^

throughout his writings trying

is

argues

these

off

he recognizes the valirlity in a

he

on

they are full of contradic-

tliat

to establish the connectedness of

cting

therein.

the same ground the untenability

an attempt
In

theories,

" Other views are

He

of the

mauy

rejectrj

327

not the

object. "^

common
that we are

refuse torecoo-nize the

and altogether rational opinion

conscious of the external thing 'by means of

the idea different
a proof

of

from the thing.

extraordinary

thority of great people

8.

S. B. II.

371

;0. S. B. II. 2. 28.

is

9.

Indeed

insiglit. "^"

Au-

not indeed entitled

8. B.

II. 2. 28,

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKAF.A

228

to

mucli weight,

men

sometimes great

because

^i

contradict each other,

has some

atomism

is

is

statement of theory

is

be judged

by the difference
accept

it

or

reject

in

by

practice.

us

to

Many

it.

Truth

consequences,

its

makes

it

test of truth.

true in pro])ortion as

works successfully
thus to

Furtlier,

it.^^

Shankara accepts the pragmatic

it

no

entirely unacceptable because

person of weight has accepted

authority

Still

Shankara says that

title to belief.

when we

positions

are

attacked on the ground that they would lead

to the unsettling of the
( r^52f^5itixw^5i^iT: )

Bauddhas.

of

This

of the

is

Jainas

the

the argument

and

ao-ainst

Shankara argues that

doctrine of momentariness
be

consequence will

people.

the vague and confused

advanced agahist
reasonincf

minds

the

the

if

be accepted

weakening

the

of

the
the

people's faith in the doctrine of causality and

consequent chaos.

Similarly,

all

reason-

ings or theories which render the attainment

of salvation improbable or impossible
11. S.

B.U.I.

11,

12. S. B.

n.

are to
2. 17.

EPISTEMOLOGY
be rejected.

Hindus
from

The

meanino- of

some

positive

some

evil.

who

he

It is said that

their ring.

sentences

good or

following

pragmatic

almost

are

sentences

Hence we can

of

that

they

lead

avoid

see that particular

to

the

when we
attainment

good things; and judge that they are

wrong when they

who

takes

lead to evil

wrong things

pillar, foe as friend,

is

accepts

can

least

at

in

either gets

conclusions are correct or truthful,

know

the

of

the deliverance

is

it

states.i^

finite

all

the riecht

philosophy

practical;

is

The funda-

( srf^^'r^si^T: )

motive o

mental

229

identified with

as right,

good and error

origin in procuring for

the finite world,

ijyso

man

as

with

fact

evil.

had

its

man, freedom from

and hence any jview which

differred fundamentally

was

in

Here truth

suffers.!^

The whole Vedanta view

He

results.

from

this position,

facto erroneous.

Reasoning plays a role oC no mean character in deciding the questions of truth

13. S. B. I. i. 23.

U.

Br. C.

and error
I. 3. 1.

PHlLObOPHY OF SMANKAKA

230

In a passage put into

Sliaiikara's system.

ill

the inoulh of the opponent, 8hankara

out the importance of reasoning as

of truth.
(

It

may

Reasoning

1 )

i^

We

is

human

activity

tliere

of

also.

Even

if it in

any higher source

in

be chaos.

shall

based

is

if all

upon

faith is shaken

powers of our mind,

o

agreement

must have a healthy confidence

conclusions; and

not only a prhiciple

our reaon, otherwise

All

an organ

be summarized thus

difference, but a principle of

(

points

certain
in

the

society will collapse.

meant

to say that

there

is

of truth, ihe fact

that

it

the
is a higher source must be justified at
bar of reason. Hence reason in this case too

becomes an ultimate

arbiter.

Pve\ela-

tion re({uires the assisl:ance of oar

reasoning

meaning,

harmonis-

power

hi elucidating its

ing

teachings and so

its

on.

Because

some theories established by reasoning are

false, it

does not follow

be

^^

false.

tliat all

are and will

Tliere are a few passages in which Shankara

Ts".

i. B.

il.

Til.

EPiS>EMOL0GY
says

reasoning

that

alone

231

adequate to

is

establish the foundation of his system.

*'

asked whether the

Adwaita

is

to

be taken as proved only on the evidence

of

It is

the Shruti,

and whether no reason can

bly demonstrate

possi-

This chapter therefore

it.

shows how the Adwaita can be demonstrate'!

by

"Duality has been shown to be

reason.''

mere

the

illusion in

dream,

illustrations of

the-air

etc.,

and

such

grounds

preceding

also

as

chapter,

by

castle-in-

illusion,

by reasoning based on

the

capability

being

of

seen. "i7

Again, at the opening of the second chapter

Mandukya, Shankara says

of the

"
(

has

It

gnosis

exist,

and

been

this

This however

word

also to

said,

knowledge

having arisen, duality does not

ShruLis such as

of the

already

show

has been
'

the unit

borne out
is

is estalilished

of holy writ.

ever

one

Ma. C.

III. 1.

if,

Ma. C

iU.l

'

etc.

on the authority

But

it is

the unsubstautiahty of

16.

by the

possible
tlie

ob-

PHILOSOPHY OF SHAN KARA

23S

jective

from pure reasoning, and

chapter

is

undertaken for

that

" This Adwaita philosophy

because

it

is

this second

purpose. "^^

one,

Shruti

as

every other system must

be

has the support of the

well as reason

true

the

imperfect having no such authority. "^9

Kev elation and reason are often considered

two indispensable

factors for

the establish-

ment of the Adwaita.

" The Madhu Kanda was based primarily
on the authority of the Shruti; the Yagnava-

Kanda

Ikiya

is

based on reasoning, hence

the knowledge of the self

the

scriptures

conclusions

and

is

the

based on both

Reason become completely

arrived

by

both

reasoning.... The

Kevelation
reliable,

and

because

no objection can be taken lo theui. " 20

" Now wj3 are going to refute the arguments
(

of the

Sankhyas

in

an independent manner

without any reference to the Vedanta-texts."^^

As

a subsidiary factor, the value

18.
10.

Ma.
Ma.

C.

II. 1.

cm; 17.

.20.

Br. V. Introduction.

21.

S.B.I 1.

2.1.

of

reason-

EPISTEMOLOGY
ing

is N'ery

233

of ten recognised; " while

the Vedanta passages primarily

however
the

declare

cause of the origrin &c. of the world, inference also being an instrument

ledge,

is

not to be excluded

of right knowas

means of

confirming the meaning ascertained.

ture

itself,

"And

if it

scriptural

BrdJiman

passage
) in

thought (on

enjoining

addition to

treating

of

mere hearing

Brahman

that reasoning also is to be allowe

reply that the passage

fully

sent reasoning

and

deceit-

independent
to repre-

" Our

final position,

on the ground of scripture

that

of reasoning

the intelligent

shows

as a subordinate auxiliary of

the holy tradition, "^3

is

( of

its place,

must be understood

ratiocination but

must not be

taken as enjoining bare

therefore,

"^^

has been maintained above that the

sacred texts

we

Scrip-

however, allows argumentation,

subordinate to

Brahman

is

scripture,

to be considered

the cause and substance of the world, "^^

"

22. S. B.

I. 2.

23. 8. B. 11. 1.

24. S. B.

II. 1.

6.

11.

234

PHILOSOPHY OF BHANKARA

Very important indeed

is

the contribution

made by reason towards

obtaining a

factory, ultimate view of

the

Shankara

satis-

But

Reality.

very clearly perceives that an

in-

dependent exercise of our dialectical faculties

cannot take us into the heart of the Absolute.
In a brilliant passage, he exposes the
tions of intelligence

things )

limita-

or conceptual yfiew

organ of the knowledge

as the

Brahman,
" The true

nature

world on which

tinal

of

the

cause of

its

excessive

it

it

does not possess qualities

of characteristic signs,

it

knowledge.

Perfect

characteristic

mark

of

the b'dmt uuturb

ib

devoid
itself

means

right

knowledge

depends on actually
tiling is

it is

does not lend

to inference and the other

whatever

help of

cannot be object of

such as form and the hke, and us

it

the

abstruse-

ness, even be thought of without the

perception because

of

emancipation depends

cannot, on account of

the holy texts; for

of

uniformity,
existing

of

has

the

because

things,

for

permanently of one end

acknowle'lgetl to

be true

EFISTEMOLOGY
or

about such
for

proposition

knowledge embodied

fire is

the

in

mutual

knowledge, as

perfect

called

is

instance,

that

and knowledge conversant

thing,

real

23B

case

conflict of

hot

Now

'.

perfect

oi"

is

it

the

in

clear

knowledge a

men's opinions

is

impossible.

But that conclusions founded on reasoning

do not

conflict is

generally known:

endeavours

for

we

what one logician

continually observe that

to establish as

perfect

knowledge

is

demolished by another, who in his turn,

is

treate

alike

spot all the

Nor can we
third.
moment and on a given

by the

given

collect at a

logicians

of

and future time, so as

agi'eement

that

to

their

some uniform object

perfect knowledge.

the past,
settle

present

by

their

opinion

rygardino-

be

considered

is

to

"2'''

Other passages also

cKicicJate

the

same

point.

" As
senses,

means

Brahman
it

is

not

an object of the

has no connection with those other

of

right

knowledge.

If

Brahman
"

25.

iTb.

II. 1. li.

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

236

were an

object

of

Brahman

is

it

we might

sense,

connected with

is

as its effect; but as

perceived,

is

the

world

perceive that the

only

effect

the;

impossible

decide

to

whether

it is

connected with BrahmB.n or something

else.

through

perception etc.

Therefore the Sutra under discussion

meant

means
set

propound inference

to

of

knowing Brahman

forth

not

as

the

but rather to

"

''^^

Yedanta-text.

is

has

It

indeed been maintained by the purvapakshin

that the other

means

of proof also

merely sacred tradition

on account of
(

not

its

something

to

gratuitous.

entirely

being devoid of

form

become an object
are in

its

case

accomplished as

be

of

For

and

26, S, B.

I.

an

assertion

Brahman^
so

on,

perception;

etc

it;

1. 2.

but... it

means
is

to

as

cannot

and there
(

might be based

inference also and the other

Brahman

apply to

no characteristic marks

which conclusions

do not apply to

and not

being an accomplished entity

religious duties are ), but such

is

of

be

on
),

proof

known

"~

EPISTEMOLOGY
grouud of holy

solely on the

23;

tradition.

commentary on Brihadaranyaka,

In the

Shankara repudiates the position

of

sophis-

pure reasoners.

ters or
*'

"-^^

The

rationalists

who do

not

believe in

the scripture, have rendered the meaning of

very uncertain, by applying

Shastras

the

reasonings

contradictiry

maintaining that
'

and

it

'

the

to

and

Brahman

it

mean-

who

not active

But those modest follow-

follow the holy traditions absolutely

as they realise the objects of

',

not possible to arrive at definite

it is

'

God

can as easily realise the subject of

"

not

^is

Hence

active

'

ings in this way.

ers

is

'.

it is

it is

argued that

It is further

above

all

proofs

perception. "^8

Atman

on the ground

conception of s^^m^ requires

it is

by ordinary
"277srB.

criteria of truth. "29

I.

4. 6.

29. Br. C. IV. 4. 20.

srs^^f

tliat

Atman

not capable of being

II. 1. 7.

28. Br. C.

is

the

two things-the

measure and the measured. But

one, hence

etc.,

is

judged

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKAKA

238

On grounds

such

iis

Uiese

established

it is

that dialectic cannt grasp wichin its net

the

all-elusive Absolute.

The A'edas

matters

authority in

importance

of

to

such

oi"

our only

I)e

fundamental

Atman^ Brahman and

as

the

Througii Scripture only as a means

"

like.

plaimed

are

knowledge Hrahman

cause of the origin

known

is

The higher authority

be the
world. "30

to

of. the

etc.,

the

of

Shriitif*?

is

vindicated on various grounds.

They

( I )

Brahman
forth

source

by
i.

e.

are

itself;

emanation

an

they

have been breathed

Brahman.

''

the cause of

Scripture, consisting of

other branches, which

is

Brahman

the

great

were,

i^

is

the

body of

Rig-Yeda and
supported by varithe

ous disciplines; which lamp-like

all things, which

from

is iiself

illuminates

all-knowing as

it

or the origin of a body of scriptures

possessing the quality of omniscience cannot

be

sought

itself. "3^

30.

elsewhere

but

in

omniscience

Elsewhere they are called

s. B.

1.

1. 3.

31. s.

Brrira^

ar'ft^-

F.nSTEMOLOfiY

t'T

superhuman origin )J^

of

(2)
of the

239

The Vedas are

word

"The

eternal.

of the Ye' las has to be

eternity

assumed

for this very reason, that the world with

its

gods and

so

definite eiernal species, such as

"^3

on originates

from

world of things

was copied from the Platonic

world of Ideas

it.

( in the

gods,

and

according

to

men

so

distinctions

were

regulated

mentioned

species

the

all

),

and conditions of

of all the different classes

aiiimals

as the

system of Plato

Shankara

also according to

Just

the

Vedas.

The Shrutis were possessed of

special

authority because they were based on

direct

3 )

perception

Even

of

Itihases

as based

the

ancient

Rishis

seers

).

and Puranas were ^considered

on perception.

accessible to our

" For what

perception

is

may have

within the range of the perception of

been

people

Smritis also declare

in ancient times.

not

that

Vyasa and others conversed with the gods

face to face.

person maintaining that the

32. S. 3. 1. 2. 2.

3^. S. B.

I, 3.

29.

PHILOSOPHY OF SHAN'KAKA

310

no more able

people of ancient times were

gods than people are

to converse with the

wouM

at present,

thereby deny

incon-

the

He might

testable variety o the world.

well maintain that because there

as

present

is at

no prince ruling our the whole earth, there

were no such princes ruling over
earth in former
(

*'

The

whole

the

times. "3*

authoritativeness of the

with regard to the matters stated by

Veda

it, is

an

independent and direct means of our knowledge; the

authoritativeness of

on the other hand,

ent

as

kind,

basis ( viz.

it

the

is

human

dicta,

of an altogether differ-

depends on

Veda

and

an
is

extraneous

mediated by

a chain of teachers and tradition. "35

(

5 ) "

Release

only

is

perfect knowledge.

Perfect

obtained

from

knowledge has

the characteristic

mark

whatever thing

permanently of one and

the same

is

nature

is

34. S. B.

I. 3.

is

uniformity,

knowledge

called perfect

133.

for

acknowledged to be a

true and real thing, and

sant about such

of

conver-

knowledge.

35. S. B. II. 1. 2.

"

RPISIKMOLOGV

Nowii

is^

clear that in

241

case

liie

of

perfect

knnwledo;e a mutunl conflict of men's opiiiions

is

impossible.

have

iiiings,

lor

-and

hence

raiinoi be deniel

it

he allowe.l

firmly estabUshed
perfection

louuded

i>

"^"

Brahman

shonld he

( 6 )

ihe

of

thai

Veda

on the

Similarly
is

the

is

by any logician of the

innire.

ihar while

of

object

its

knowled^-e wliich

present or

may

knowledge,

eternal .<onrce of
\o

"The Veda which

"^^'

one. ihe

past,

said

is

it

knowledge

(^ne also. 3^

Mere reasoning cannot fathom

depths of the knowledge of such

cal realities as

God and

'

sonl,

the

metaphysiTt

is

im-

possible lo guess even the real nature of snch

a transcendental object

which depends
the holy

Brahman upon

as

liberation without the help of

tradition.

"^9

which rests exclusively on

and regarding which

For Brahman

'

the

the

holy texts

are authoritative-not the senses

36. S.

B.

II. 1. 11.

38.8. B, in.
Iti

3. 1.

holy

and

37. S. B. II.
39.

S.

B.

II.

1.

1.

texts,

alone
so on,
11.
11.

PHILOSOPHY OF

must be accepted
it

bliAI^^KAKA

sucii us the texts

proclaim

to be... Even certain ordinary things

as gems, herbs and the like

'which

owing

tion

is

able to find out

number

place and

on, produce various

and nobody unaided by

site effects

powers

possess

to difference of time,

occasion, and so

by mere

such

oppo-

insiruo-

reflexion the

of these powers, their favouring r^?\-

how

dition, their objects, their purposes etc.,

much more

impossible

out the aid of scripture the

Brahman

with

conceive with-

is it to

true

nature of

powers unfadiomable

its

"*^

by thought.
our only
( 7 ) The Shrutis are

?:ource

knowledge regarding transcendental

All access

to

the

noumenal

of

tilings.

reality

being

we have
Shrutis.
Do

denied to perception and reasoning,

necessarily recourse to the

not apply reasoning to what

The mark
all

'

is

of unthinkable is that

what

is

supersensuous

holy texts only. "41

40. S. B. Il.tl. 27.

unthinkable.
it

is

above

Therefore the cogni-

material causes.

tion of

'

is

based on the

Nor can we assume

41. S. B. II.

1. 27.

EPTSTEMOLOGY
that

some perceptions are able

matter

super3eiisuoii>i
I

?43

here exisls no efficient cause

ception,
(^

only

"-t-

'

Shrnii,

gnch

fni-

statement

auihority in the origination

knowledge
''

Scriptnrjil

perceive

lo

withont

supersensiions

of

object of

perception etc.,

Shankara's metaphysics has

metaphysics or the

tion

Truth

is

the

ihe
'^^

the

only

he

two aspects-

Tn

ihe

esoteric

becomes

criierion

in this respect

resembles

of

pure philosophy of the

Absolute, the quest of

impossible,

our

"4*

cognised by the texts of the Vedas.

the esoteric and exoteric.

is

not

is

can

it

per-

ihin<Ts.

Such a transcendental reality

as

Shankara's posiof

position

one, absolute; lience

Arisioile.

there

are

no

degrees of truth, there are degrees of error

only.45

But the

the point

of

position

is

different

from

view of ordinary experience.

Shankara recognised that the nature and the

validity of the

tests of

truth

depend upon

42. 8. B.

n.

43. a. B.

H.

45. Prof.

Ranade; Indian Philosophical Review

1.

.1.

3. II. a. 1.

14. Br.

C.

I.

3. 1.

Pini.OROPHY OF SHANK ARA

244

the appropriateness of the spheres in which

Thus we

they are employer!.

one criterion

that

offhanci

another absobitely; in

is

superior

there

fact,

terion of truth; there are

cannot assert

no

is

truth.

of

criteria

to
cri-

Shankara has grasped a very important truth

inasmuch as he perceives the

and all

quest after one ultimate, absolute

compreliensive

which

it

may

test,

by the

the

of

failure

application

be quite easy to draw

off

of

the

exact line of demarkation between truth and

From

the point of

view

of

action,

thoFe Shrutis which prescribe moral

injunc-

error.

tionSt

hut

or proliibitions, acquire special validity,

if

we adopt

the standpoint of philosophy,

the parts of Shruti which describe

mate

unity

Therefore,

unity of

tlie

acquire
V'edanta

Brahman

the

ulti-

weight.

special

which teaches the

does not stultify

tlie

ordi-

nary Shastra; nor will the science of conduct

be renderel

useless.

of conduct with

its

Nor does

the

science

division of the agent etc.

refute the authority of the Upanishads

their

doctriue

of

llie

Unity

of

with

Jhah-

EFISTBMOLOGY

2i

hame way, the Shrutiscan never

inan.^^ In the

shake our faith

in the

evidence of our senses.

**TheShrutisare not authoritative with regard

Thus we

to the objects of other criteria.

not say that

*'

cold on any authority. "47

fire is

maintain by

It is not possible to

a hundred instances that tire

be

reality will

is

means
or

cold

one source of

of

that

Because

light.

known by other

No

knowledge.

give

not

does

sun

the

can-

sources

knowledge

of
is

contradicted by another source of knowledge.

Every source
which
of

is

knowledge reveals the truch

of

not the province of some other sphere

knowledge.

ifF^rK^ci, "

are

The

^^,

within

The

to

aqiorrr^

^^r^^^T^T^lffoi

of

knowledge

their

respective

sources

only operative

provinces.

"

that

conclusion

Jie

Thus Shankara comes

*".

application

of

criterion

must be justihed by the appropriateness of

its

sphere.

If,

however,

the sphere of senses in the

neither can

we

we cannot attack
name of ShruLie,

bring in ol).^er\'au:n

i'^

lofute

46. Br. C. 1I[. 3. Inlr.

ir. Br.

C.ll.

1. 2.

48 Br.

C. II. 1.20.

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKAKA

246

tion uor

Neither observa-

Shrutis.

the Bcuse of the

reasouing

matter pertaining

any

of

are
to

avail

in

To

Shrutis.

the

the

objection that inteUigent agency belongs

eflicicnt

cause as in the case of potters

not

to

material

that

**

hand

can be known through

is

not one which

inferential reasouing,

ordinary experience cannot be used

For the knowledge

it.

to settle

matter

of that

hence scripture only has to be appealed

that scripture teaches

reflects before

time the

the

tiiat

creation

material cause

is

of

the
at
it.

position can be taken up by the

because he believes in the

Shrutis, but not l)y those
in revelation.

wc

on scripture altogether and

rather depend

And

and

Shankara replies

<:ause^.

as die matter in

to

*'

the

and so on, on

basis

tlie

therefore not obliged

the same
"-^^

This

A'^edantin,

authority of the

who do not

The adherent

moreover, defines

Lc.

Lord who

of

believe

BraJtman

nature of the cause,

to

of

scripture

render

liis

and

is

tenets

throughtouL conformable to observation. Our

49.

i. 5?7.

EPISTEMOLOGY
adversary on the

other

24f

who

hand,

dejGnes

the nature of the cause and the like, according

to

furnished

instances

by experience, may

be expected to maintain only such

doctrines

as agree with experience. "5^

To

the above contention that the Vedanta

not consult

nee^I

Scripture

own

is

world,

the

authoritative with

special subject

the causality of
to

regards

as

an objection is
" Although
based on reasoning.

the causality of
raised,

experience

matter

Brahman

regar.l to its

as for

), still it

instance,

may

have

he taken in a secondary sense in those

cases where the subject matter

of iio grasp b}-

other means

taken out

is

of right

know-

ledge... A.naloj>ouslv, reasoning istobeconsi-

dered invalid outside

instance, in the
its

its

case of

opposite... The

own

religious

docirine

causality uiuf: therefore be

would lead

sphere;

as for

dutv and

Brahman^s

of

abandoned

to the sublation of the

as

it

well-esta-

blished distinction of enjoycrs and objects of

enjoyment. "

^^

To

this it

is

51. S.

replied that

B.

II. 1, IJ.

PHILOSOPHY OK SHANkARA

248'

*'

Even on our philosophic view, the

nction

may

furnif^hes

We

with

iifs

see,

tor

bubbles,

and

:6ea.

as

exist

instance,

other

although

ihcy

disti-

ordinary

experience

auaogouB

instances.

waves, foams,

that

modifications
really are not

of the
differeni

from the ^ea-water, exist, someiimes

state of nuitual separation,

state of conjunction.

The

recourse to

proper

sonic

the

compels us

the

ihose

scientific investigation.

ha^c

to

organ

ci

means of know-

ledge usually employed in every-day

of

'\v

matter

subject

extra-ordinary

than

cognition, other

sometimes

"^*

special nature of

of metaphysics

in th;

All ordinary

or in

life

methods

knowing must necessarily break

down

when we want to conceive the inconceivable,

to know the unknowable. Atman or Brahman
is

the goal of our

Atman cannot

be grasped by senses.

not be an object of perception,

is

views

a conflict of
52. a. B. II.
53. Br. C.

I,

Now

investigation here.
It

can-

because there

regarding Atman.

U.

Introduction.

53

EriSTKMOLOGY
It

cannot be an object of

tlicre

Nor can
because

"

an

%^ ^

dualiiy

implies

object; there

But

distinctions

exist

iii

liio

kingdom

fact, all speech, all

to

make

Absolute.

as

us

of

the

aware

of

f^f )

Absolute.

by

its

the

Shastras

is to

created by nescience.

not to

In
fail

the

Even the Shrutis cannot therefore

cannot possibly be

is

cannot

nature of

the

tha*.

an object (of speech, mind

of the

hence

i>ne,

reasoning absjluiely

should be objected

objection

and

known and

is

be the source of the knowledge of

If it

know-

subject

fR,

fig,

cannot

because

of

reali

nil

S4

one; and
It

the knower., the

is

knowledge.
such

".

objeci of knowledi^e,

ledge

is

it

r%:jT[^r3Tr?i;

nature.

any Pramana,

object of

Apraraeya;

is

it

lioucc
iMi

be an

it

by

attributes

presence or

it^

because

inference,

marks or

arc no special

which wc can infer

34d

rcpL'esen.t

j4. Br. C. II.

1.

20.

Brahman

etc.),

source,

remark
discard

The

Brahmdu.
not

the Shastras

we
that

all

is

refute this

the

aim

disttinctions

Shastra's purport

Bralundn

as

definitely

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

250

purpose

this or thai object, iis

show that Brahman

is

as the

knowledge

created by

which

etc.

nescience.

knowers,
fictitiously

is

The Shrutis do

55

not introduce us into the positive

Bralmmny

external

they

ii.

men

For

activity.

Ijave

from the

when

objects of his aversion

desirous

of attaining

one quoted divert him

his natural activity

his thoughis

and

55. S. B.

I.

to

it;

of

aitain

eschew the

to

man

although

such texts as the

from ihc

Sjiruiis,

object

of

is,

Self.

5<'

therefore

they destroy the obstacles

and the point

1.

on

and turn the stream of

of the

one;

a negative

on the road

intent

ucts

on the inward (highest)

The function

of

and does not thereby

highest aim

the

purport

anxious

only

things,

the

o))jects of natural

a itmn

the objects of his desire

reach

nature of

ihey cau only remove our illusions

regarding
diverting

remove

to

the distinction of objects known,

acts of

subject

eternal

and thereby

an object,

licver

rather to

is

56. 8.

the

way

eTTTri

to

it.

EFISTEMOLOUY

They have

iiu

validity

when

and

it is

sed.

"

the

useless

Absolute

when

Revelation,

to a ceriaui oxtcnt

as

tions
itself in

from the point of view

"The study

of the Absolute.

useless

251

rcas(>ii.

of Shastras

known;

not

is

the Absolute

is

reali-

is

therefore, labours

too,

under

same

llic

It luis

to

limita-

communicate

worU; but no worJs can adequately

describe

uegaiive attributes used

regard to

but

any degree

of

the Shrutis with

Brahman

are frail

do not express with

these

adequacy

Brahman.

nature of

the

convey some notions of the

to

Absolute:

])y

nature of

tlie

attempL.-:)

Even

supreme Reality.

the

the existence

" That

and

which cannot

be grasped in words, which cannor, be expressed, cannot possibly be

or that, having this

analysed

or \\vm

into

this

attribute,

per-

manent or impermancjut... Thai

the

abstract

Adwaita-thought should appear as describable

in words,

nothing

is

real. "57

epithets as
or.

only a

3{jf

mZ 6.

feat
It is

mind, and

stated

that

(unborn) as applied to
"

vi.

of the

such

Atmau
^"

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANkARA

352

are as

"

much an outcome of

illusum, as 'born'.

unborn only through such unagination

It is

in absolute reality

as teachinjj an'l the like:

not even

it is

unborn.

''58

means

sitatingly declares that all

ledge and

all

scriptures

ration as well as

and
'

soul

is

hose 'levoLed to

true nature of the

the
Self

of

any

ousness
(

Veda

lias

Tlic

teaches that the

junctions

illusion.^*

organs of

been

attained,

nor objcc'>
to

Self

i.

e.

as a result

of that

'>f

consci-

authority

linal

in

is

no percepient of objects, and while so

ing

libe-

knowledge of the

themselves

longer.

ii^

all

neither organs of knowlclge

of knowledge present

know-

with

upon an

the terminus

When

knowledge.

of

dealing

prohibitions) arc based

The

Shankara unhe-

teaching

realif\

deny),

the

Veda itself ceases to be authority, just as

dream [)crcepiion ( cease to be an authority
iu a

waking

If the

state "*"

very nature of ihe supreme Reality

disqualifies us
58.

from

Ma, C. IV.

59. B. B.

I.

1.

]iee|)ing into it

by means

74.
1.

60.

Bg. C.

II. 69.

RPISTEMOLOGV

253

how

of either Shruti or reasoning,

know
or

Brahman

Brahmnn

will then

to

cism or

perh!i])s

become

The only tenable

theory of metapliysics will then

be

agnosti-

But Shankara

sceiUicisni.

not want to take us into such an absurd

Reality

situation.

is

figment of an idle

uor abracadabra,

brain.

knowable but knowable

It is

we

the existence of such a tiling as Atnrian

an impossible conception.

floes

are

the

It

in a

not

is

only

supreme sense.

knowledge ^^'7?' excellence.

It is

the

only ground, the fundamenial presupposition

of

knowledge.

all

objects of

from
all

ail

All existing

all

ihoughi receive their meaning

(qi'^^rw^r^^}

it.

things,

light, without

With

few very remarkable passages

down

there

is

Here are

it

darkness.

it all

which Shan-

in

no ambiguous terms that

kara lays

ji

Atman

the only reliable, the only available,

is

ihe only
of

in

iiiielligible

knowledge and

basis

action.

an unknown quaniity,

even
exibt

ihiu
",

ii

'

is

it

exists

of
'

our world

of all

Far from

being

which we cannot say

or thai

ihe very core,

'

ihe

it

does

not

very centre

l'HiLo?r>pr.iv 01-

254

ftHWKAUA

and source of all existence

" The existence ol
ledge.
on the

knoAvn

the

existence

thinks

think
to
it

'

is

he

is

(liis)

If the

the

by the

of
fac!

the Upanishads treat

of

that (

ousness,

i.

e.

viz.

the

that

tlie

jiwatm.m

whicli,

61. S. B.

i1ie

it

is

of which

the

witness

of

self-consci-

).

For neither

which enjoins
anybody appre-

N'cda

from the

different

it...

Hence ircm

nor be represenied

soul

^hc

the objerr of >clf-consciousness,

witnesses

be denied

I,

soid

merely

is

hends that soul

merely

tlia

self-consciousness,

reas'>nin<^,

is

denies

possible objection that

from that
works nor from

])art of

agent that

who

he

the object

of

would

I'panishads only, since

tlie

f'bjecL

never

impossible

is

Ti

no reason to maintain

known from

and

existence of the

because

The

\^

Self

coM'-cion?

everyone
'

^"^

tlie

\<

Self,

known,

Self,

Self.

is

refuted

oi
'.

not \ "

am

nor

not

deny the

ihere
is

am

were

Self

Brahman

of iis beinu*

For evevvone

f'vervone.

of
of

jri-onnd

know-

all

;in(]

as

neither

iht*

mere

EPISTEMOLOGY

255

compliment of injunctions; for of that very

who might deny

person
as

it is

the

being

itself

estnblishe

And

to

indeed,

sucii

An

refuted

An

i.

Self
acts

knowledge,

is

to that energy.

self-established

bo refuted, but not that which

the refutation

him who

The

'*

adventitious thing,

is the essential nature ( of

of

And

neither be

energy that

of right

impossible.

may

can

previously

refuio

is

ir,

abode of

through the meanw

entity

all,

the Self.

nor avoided. " ^-

after

striven
as

Self of

the

it, ic is

);

for

refutes
e.

it is
it.

him who attempts

the essential nature

Tiie heat of fire is not

sublated

by

itself. "63

fire

unalysis of rhe contents of our ordinary

consciousness shows us that the deepest, the

most ineradicable, the most constant element in

Everyone feels thai the
it is the idea of Self,

most intimate part of his

nature,

centre of his bein^- lies in this

idea

the

very

of

Self.

The consciousness of Self is, in fact, the one

thing, of which we are absolutely sure.
Ir
is

the very rock of our certitude.

No

reason-

PHILOSOPHY OF SF.WKARA

2.516

ing

however

awuv

explain
nature,

beinj^, the

innermosr

one

Roljd faoi

and unshakable

in

of our

fact

of

our

whicli stands

firm

recesses

midst of

the

can

j)eneirating

fundamental

this

the

in

or

sulnle

all

storms,

which gives us the very sure guarantee that

is

We may

required.

go on doubting

existence and validity of every

pan

liie

of mind

and nature, but we cannot doubt the doubter

Such propositions a

nway.

existence of

my being,

within themselves
fact

presupposed

tlietr

henri

sufficient

is

Even

own

the

exist' carry

refutation.

Thf

self-consciousnesss

single

is

Tn fact,
is

thought, a

has very ably proved

nothingness
very naiuve

destroy

iliiii

the

a pseudo- iden

is
ii

i<>

is

piciure

absoluie

dmnb, speechless scepi icism

attitude of mind.

an impossible

either

do not

doubt

word, a single movement of head or

scepticism.
is

charm away the l-ness

to

foredoome'l to failuresino'le

'

'

either proposition.

in

any attempt

or

of

I-^ess,

cf

an absurdity.
ir conceive

Bergson

idea of pure
thai

in

its

We. cannov

^^urh a

thing as

EPISTEMOLOriY
ahsolute

annihilation,

ahsoliite

An

absolute nothingness.

mum

consciousness

of

permanently
leap

beyond

tliwarting

be

never

onr

endeavonrs to
our

of

philosophy takes

and

his position

thus

from

Tluis

any

by

this

fact of

reality,

and

an impregnable one

and

bedrock

is

of

any quarter can

no attacks from
it

upon

reality

Shankara's

logic.

stand

its

eternal

this

facts,

ot*

thought.

away

conjured

legerdemain, any trick

or

mini-

persiscntly remains,

This residue of consciousness

can

void

irreducible

shadow

the

2B.7

dislodge

this.

we

see that

Shankara

is

right in main-

taining that no proof can demonstrate the exis-

tence of the Absolute.

all

The Absolute

frustrates

attempts of logic to deduce or to refute

fact that it is out-side

But the

beinji'.

above reason does not mean that

to reason.

absurd.
that
trate
17

It is

is

neither

being.

catch

Yet

it

and

contrary

contradictf-ry

above reason in

reason cannot
its

it is

its secret
is

not

its

the

nor

sense

or peneirrational,

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA

i58

because

ii is

ilie

very ground of

of knowledge,

tion
tion

very source of reason, the

the very

logic,

which makes reason,

possible.

It cannot be

upon

It is

proof

is

The

in

the

must be very

the

Self

such

to all

thus

self-consciousness

fact

whole structure of

hence

established previous

knowledge

assume its existence.

Self that the

based;

logic,

demonstrated by any

proof, because all proof s

*'

presupposi-

one supreme condi-

the

is

itself

proofs.

the

is
"***

central

epistemology of Shankara and

and firmly grasped,

clearly

for

finy tolerably adequate understanding of las

Here

-system.

at

inconceivability

any

establish

the

it is

the

of

test

opposite

of tlie

appropriate and so
to

rate

is

vigorously

the

quite

applied

fundamental position of

Shankara's system.

But

it

that the

would be a

supreme Keality

merely on the

The
good

feeble conclusion to say

is

known

above epistemological

inconceivability of the opposite

is

to

us

basis.

a very

test to establisli the existence of Reality.

KPISTEMOL.OGY

Bur

after

i^

\i

permanently

cannnt

merely to suy

is,

which makes

all

of

refutation

Again, there

iha,t

and any

possible

impossible

logicjilly

the above

But the idea

all

notations namely,

of

Wliar

is

is

ilii^-!

nature

to conceive its

kara rises above

i|

everybody

thai,

without content.

we

Are we

us.

the psychological proof given

is

the consciousness

he exists.

It

the one condition

it is

is

\eM.

we can know about

thought

it

in the first of

are

satisfy
all

tliat

the Absolute

lagickn's

ihe

all

269

that

feels

mere form

ego

How

Here Shan-

the logical, the psycholo-

gical an<l the epistemological proofs. It is not

sufficient to conceive

the

Absolute or to tlnnk
of

presupposition
conceive

as pure

it

possibility

of ^it

Absolute

It

as

is

of

the

supreme
or

to

self-consciousness, the

possible

fully as

thing in the world; or

fuller

the

knowledge,

all

which accompanies every

speech.

as

to

act of

thonght or

comprehend the

we comprehend any
further, we may liave a

and more concrete view of Reality than

we can have

of

any item

in the Realitv.

We

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKAKA

260

have got in intuition the possibility of hav-

view of Reality, of seeing

ing a first-hand

the Absolute face to face, or realising

all

the fulness of which our nature

In this

way we have

we have

ground upon which

Keality

is

This

thence.

the highest

is

our knowledge of

all

We

based.

capacity

of being and

of penetrating the very centre

it

capable.

not merely an outside

glimpse into the Reality;

graspsing

is

with

it

can have immediate

experience, direct realization of the Absolute.

The

intuition

of

Absolute resembles

the

perception rather than

conception.

It is as

inevitable, as direct, as absolute as perception.

It forces itself

ness.

Tliere

irresistibly

hesitation, option

of realization.
into
it

be no

can
'

this or that

Reality

view carries

its

lays hold upon our

violence.

on our consciousscope

as

'

for doubt,
this

in

soon as

conviction

act

it

ri'^es

about

itself;

nature with

It is objective certainty

absolute

we

attain

and not subjective assurance, or rather

it is

absolute certitude, and neither subjective nor

objective assurance which

we

get.

lu fact,

EHSTliMOLoGY

much

Reality overwhelms us so

no

possibility o

escaping

its

our resisting

Even the

sway.

361

that there

is

influence or

its

and thou, the

subject and object of our ordinary experience

completely vanish and such terms

Thus

in strict truth,

intuition

the

we

such language though

For

from the standpoint of thought, loses

meaning when wc try

point of view of Reality

to

view

sets forth the

Brahman.
Lite

means

Scripture

enquiry into
of

appro-

knowledge of

priateness of intuition for the

'*

from the

it

itself.

The following passage

iti

even say in

cannot

possess an organ of experiencing

Absolute.

definite
its

we

know-

as

become meaningless.

ledge or even intuition

texts

etc. are

Brahman,

the

knowledge as they are

not,

only

in the

enquiry into active duty; but scriptural texts

on

the

one hand, and

intuition

other hand, are to be had recourse

ing to the occasion;

is

to accord-

because intuition

firstly,

the final result of the

on the

enquiry into Bra-

hman', secondly,

because the object of the

enquiry

existing,

ib

an

accomplibheil

PHILOSOPHY OF 6HANKARA

262

substance. "^5

hman
there

And

the

kuowledue

perception

are

gious duties

''^7

ained.

result of

says

complete

).

'*

up

at

the

is

att-

intuition;

"^^

Tfie

"'

ir.

experi-

for the iShruti

is

present

to

Intuition is thus

aspirants after release; as ion""

all

not reached,

ctive,*'^

'

fruit

knowledge

The Brakruan which

it is

The

^4

intuition; not hidden.

by

effects of reli-

^^

aTg^^r^ 3 3TR'?59iq
knowledge of Brahman

the goal of
as

but the

nut seen

enced by means of
^

Shrutis.

Biahimu),

intuition of

tumpleie knowledge springs

momeni when

means

of iJraAwian... terminates

seen

are

of

than

knowledge other

Its effects

of

employment

fur tlie

is scu[)e

BrA-

that

stated

is

it

an actoniplisbed entity and hence

right

of

in

is

A^aiii

f^fR

is

Shankara

in

all

knowledge

is ineffe-

often paraphrased
hi.-,

by

dT3*Tf

rommentary on

the

Gita.7^

'

do. S. B.

1. 2.

1.

K6. 8. D.

II.

OS. 8. B.

1.

70, B^.

1.4.
1.

11.

VI. 3.;VII.

r.7.

S. B. II. J. 4.

60 s. B.
2. etc.

m.

a.

Zt

EPtSTEMOLOGY

86^

much

Intuition resembles perception in as

have to deal with

both

as

object

^ci^^ or

cases contact
criteria

there

other than

scope

is

the

Shrutis;
is

the subjective factor

inoperative

makes

is

itself

no scope

thus or thus,

option depends upon the notions of

with regard to a post-'this

or something else 'is not

two

tlje

else
is

'

ideas,

'

it is

man, but
thing

For the idea

a post or a

is

knowledge

man

All

be.

nature of a

depends only on the thing itself.

or

falUnji'

',

somethin'j*

which depends on the thing

'

it

itself,

under the head of true knowledire

Thus true knowledge of

depends on the

knowledge of
ther on

man

of truth;

being false and only the third idea,

a post

is

to be

is

not to

or

the knowledge of the real

and the

''No option

felt,

be

is to

is

for doubt;

whether a substance

possible as to

for

result

immediately seen; there

object

both

in

qf^f^'^q??^^^ );

direct;

is

accomplished

things

Brahman

the thing

71.S. B.I. 1.2,

i. e.

III.

existing

all

things

themselves and
also

Brahman

2.21.

the

depends altoge-

clc.

itself. "7i

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKABA

264

'*

fund am til tal

Tlie

Brahmnn

texts about

merely instruct man, instruction being their

immediate

The

result.

case

analogous to

is

that of information regarding objects of sentie

which ensues as soon as objects are approxi-

mated
in

to the senses.

some

Intuition resembles

reasoning

respects

more than

something

consequence of

not actually perceived in

having a certain equality

its

what

of attributes with

actually perceived,

is

stands nearer to intuition than

conveys

its

often

recommended

Brahman.
a

beatific

Yoga

vision

is directei]

should

mind
7iV S.

afc

to bring about intuition of

13. 1.

is

to be practised

upon the

flashes

means

Brahman.

''

the

activity

speech etc.

f>iily:

lie

sliuuld

1.

till

soul.'*

of uttaining

The wise man

of

the

outer

and abide within

further restrain

7U. S. B.

1. I

71. J.B. IV. 1.

only. "^^

Bhakti are

or

to be the

restrain

or'jans such

Shruti whicii

tradition

Yoga

Meditation

the cognition of

the

by

sense

excerises of

Practical

the

"Kea>ouing which enables us

holy tradition.
to infer

'"^'-^

II.

l.T

EPtSTEkOLOGY
the iiiind which

iuteut on doubtful external

is

whose characteris-

objects within intelligence,

tic

mark

cision

decision recognising

is

he should

evil;

is

within

intelligence

individuul

shouM

great Self on the calin

Self.
is

The value

Seif

Self, free

ecstatic \ision

mind

before the
in

effected

slate

"which

"

iri'cf

i.

all

cessation

from

duality ceases,
)

the

fix

It

"At

sees the

By

all plurality.

the

presentation
Self )

mediiaiioii,
is

"'

the

the highest

Yogin

of the highest

through

^ iWcf

e.

e.

i.

connection.

this

we mean

intuiiiun

of

iri

'

inde-

uf the factor of devotion

also recognised in

unevolved

Self

finally

the time of ecstatic vision the

that

further restrain

great

the

he

soul;

''7^

265

'

is

The

unio mystica
"

which

"7^'

'

in

f^<^rTHti^nSHJ5^;

charju.'terised

'*

by

of intellectual doubts, or emotional

agitation;

it

is

state

of ecstatic

peace,

delightful repose.*
~

"^"^sTb.

I. 4. 1.

76. S. B. III. 2. 24.

PHILOSOPHY OF 8HANKAHA

266

We

have discussed che

fact of iutuition

the inaiu feature? which characterise

how

possible

is it

super> eusuuus

the

Self,

necessity

or

by

own

its

nature.

Its

only

sef- evidence. Its very nature

frequently

iv,

illuminates

merges

in

knowledge merges

AVell

This

being;

It is

like

of all

Thus,

ontology;

the

the

odier

aii;

and centre

episthc(^ry

theory of being;

real is rational; there is

ledge, one

is

^cT^^f^q or

the two become entirely identical;

is real, all

shines

evidence

itself;

as

in the

of

is light.

or

illumination, knowledge.

temology
of

itself

It is the source,

objects.
light,

^^jt^t^fut:

The Atnian knows

^^f^^.
sun,

called

sub-

organ

Brahman

or

no

is

either

superconscious

The iVtman

].>erception.

here

the

cognise

Xo; there

invokinf^

of

conscious

we

faculty that

Reality

it.

by means of some

Is it

and

But

all

rational

one know-

epistemologically,

it

may

the characteristic difterence between

is

the intuition of Bcrgson and Shankara. There

is

no

religious emotion present in the former at all; while

in the latter

jt

\i

that

which colour^

all

vitwj.

EPISTBMOLOGY
be knowledge; ontologically

But iwo
one;

[actors

may

it

be being.

knowledge aud being become

down;

externality drops

all

idj

all

duality

*'

dibappcarsf.

*'

9(^

claims

iLequciioii Hui^es a^

down

with regard to

at.

respective

or Shruti
of

right

view we

depends the repu-

it,

Shankara as a philosopher. He

as a

know-

\ery great impor-

is of

tance inasmuch as upon the

arrive

ihtj

in Shankara's theta-y

This question

tation of

i<.>

reasoning and authority

ol'

or rmelatiou
lodge.

f f^?m

CONCLUSION'.

111.

Now

|cT

is

run

mere iheologian by muny writers

Eastern and Western, on the ground that he

is

guided throughout his works by the Vedas.

Theology

no

doubt

services to us but

it is

docs not examine

its

renders

own

to appeal

to

the

pendent

world

its

which wants

large

conckisions on

investigation

reality in the

at

into

must be
an inde-

kncnvledge and

dry light of reason.

uotbai^ for granted and

It

presuppositions.

Philosophy, on the other hand,

prepared to base

important

largely dogmatic.

adopts

It

takes

aL-aumptioriB

PHILOSOPHY OF SHANkAfeA

268

only afier proving

assumptions.
tially

indespeuisability aa

their

Philosophy

in

Shankaracharya's

rational.

essen-

is

i'act,

title

to

being a great philosopher, nay, a philosopher

at

all,

must depend upon

his taking his stand

upon reason ultimately, and not on authority.

It

must be admitted

the

at

outset

that

with all orthodox schools o[ Hindu philosophy,

the authority

great extent the

this

Shrutis

and further

to a

with

be taken
it

was

In ^the

disadvantage.

is

very

But

\cry basis of truth.

statement must

cations;

qualifi-

not altogclhcr a
place,

first

Hindu thiuker

it

was

to

show himself

fundamental agreement with

the Shrutis,

necessary for a
in

the

of

because the faith of the masses

anchored upon this

fact.

It

advisable in those days to

was

tirinly

was altogether

in-

unsettle the very

foundations of religion and philosophy of the

people.

philosopher in India, therefore,

could hope to obtain the ear of the people, only

by appealing to the Shrutis and it was also by

this means that he could secure the organic
coherence of phiioiiophic

speculation, from

RPISTRMOLOGY

2ft^

Another advantage which

times immemorial.
this

procedure secured for the Hindu thought

was

that very

happy blending of

philosophy, of metaphysics and

one

ancient

Hindu

life.

human thought and

was a

double

remain an academic

activity

conditions.

developed

its

many

of

its

anthropomorphic

Religion
side,

bigoted

traits;

the few;

of

all

in its turn
it

threw

off

superstitions,

became

it

it

tradition, a

people

the

speculative

narrow,

of

mighty

among

ranks and

result

Philosophy did not

force, a

leaven

universal

was

departments of

vital

conduct, and the

one.

became a living

features of

reciprocal influence

by these two

eTjercised

and

which was

life,

most attractive

the

of

religion

in

the

Hindus one of the

hands of the educated

most refined and

finished

joint operation

thought and feeling, of

speculation

phical

and

thouglit

of

life.

of

products of the

Again,
the

the

philoso-

Upanishads, which

became the source of the streams of metaphysical influences of varied type, was a body
of the finest speculations ever

known

to

man.

PHILOrOPHY OF S ANKARA

270

Dr. Deussen

An

'

says:

consists in moflern

essential flifferonoe

philosopliy

np

mental character, even

in its

lo <]ay-heing a

toilsome struggle, ami a gTailual

of the

fett-ers

while

the

of

me liaes'al

Indian

time has been the

through

more

the

he has adhered to the basis laid

But

Vedic Upanishads.
is

shaking

off

scholasticiRm,-

philosopher
better,

funrla-

cloeely

down

in truth,

all

in the

this basi^i

also of on eminently philosophic character."

Another point of

very great

this connection is

that

Hindu

metaphysics
solute,

by

is

its

the

in

metaphysicians,

importance in
eyes of ihe

the

subject

The

of a unique lype.

very

nature,

could

not

of

Abbe an

object of either sense perception or of intellection.

The

ultimate

Reality

transcended our powers

most completely.
of intuition

to

It

the

accomplished sages

rf

Brahman

thought ami speech

could only be an object

\ery highest

anl

and philosophers.

experience must be of a very Vare type.

seers of the I panisliads

of

the

greatest

came

most
This
Tlie

lo a recognition

metaphysical

iruths

not.

ICPISTRMOl.OGY

27

ihrcugli reasoning merely, bur ihroiigli direct

L'panishads,
The
therefore,
symposium of the revelations of the

experience.

formed a
direct

immediate experiences of the Absolute,

arrived at by the laborious

and places.
can

assistance

be

Hence

body of

conceived

in a

must be the

it

experience

of

various

working independently

in

different

tessence

of

places and limes,

type as

exist

to

contained the quin-

literature whicii

human

any human

if

matter of such a unique type,

saints,

the

and most cultured Rishis of many

highest
times

processes of

God ami

of Existence,

f)U

subjects of such

Soul,

reality

and so on.

fore no less absurd for a

It

unique

or unreality

would be there-

Hindu Metaphysician

to discard altogether the basis of

the Upani-

shads than for a modern philosophy to ignore

a})8olutely

and completely the whole course

of philosophic development

To Hegel.
tjie

the

exercise

human

passion
of

for

from Plato down

originality or for

unfettered

intellect

Yfisdoin altogether

independence of

which ignores

and

all

the old

tries to creat a philo'

PHILOSOPHY OF SHAX'KARA

Zn

sophy de novo
or rather a

a very shori sighted passion

is

We

sniciflal one.

do not know

apy great philosopher who entirely cut

of

himself

from the old moorinsrs and

adrift

started an entirely

system.

original

Origi-

nality or freedom of reason does not exist in

an independence of the past.

In ihis respecr,

Plato and Aristotle, Kant and Hegel were

no more original philosophers than Shankara

Ramanuja.

and
very

()n

other

the

these

greatness of

giants

intellect consists in the fact

milate

iheir whole

than anyone
the

past

else did.

they

hand, the
of

human

could assi-

more successfully
The dependence of

Hindu philosophers upon

the Shriitis

to a great extent a dependence of this

was

type.

Shankara did not take bodily into his system

everything thar
shads, no

more

is

to be

found

ihat Plain

r>r

in

the Upani-

Kant copied

in

their systems the features of the preceding

The Shrutis

philosophies only.
collective

wisdom

of the

in fact

most varied

were
type;

various theories and

views were found there

lying side by

It

side.

was

thus necessarv

BPIBTEMOLOGV
for philosophers like

Ijt

Shankara and Rainanuja

or for Kapila and Badarayana to typify those

features of the

seemed

up

them fundamental and work them

to

rounded harmonious whole.

into

this

Upanishadic though: which

In

way, these men could at once incorporate

thought and the

the

spirit

wisdom, and yet maintain

of the

thuir

ancient

position as

completely independent and origiuui thinkers.

Our

conclusion,

therefore, is

that judged

from the externals, Shankara's system appears

to be

more

like the

Jewish systems.

mediaeval schools ur the

But a detailed study of the

fundamental positions of
dissolves such an illusion.
of his

position

which

Shankara's
It

system

was a necessity

compelled

him

to

support his system with ilicolugic buttresses.

But

bi?^

systeTu

any support.

dors not stand

in

uccd

of

few fundamental assumptiouE

indeed, he inherited from previous thought.

But these were not taken merely on the

ground they were a part of the Shrutis.

a antler

of

fact,

the

UDnnishiiis

As

form a

PHILOSOPHY 6F SHANKARA

274

symposium

perfect
^support

may

speculation,

Shankara took

views.

many

be found for

which

in

conflicting

stand on certain

his

fnndamental positions, because these appeared

him eminently

to

eminent reasonableness he

From

fully.

From

sopher, he

bring out

is

concerned to show that

ao^reemeut with the thouc^ht of the

is in full

Shrutis.

tries to

this

point of view of the strictly

tlie

orthodox Hindu, he
he

and

reasonable;

is

the point of view of a philo-

equally concerned to

show thai

he addresses himself not to man's instinct for

authority, but to

liis

reason and to his deeper

habitual belief

the fiction of u Tixjre

and

Hume, he exposes

Like

mystical experience.

Like Kant, he

cH'ccl.

in

is coiivincc'l

cause
thai

phenomena arc mere appcarcinces, that Ueality

nnknowable

is

Ber;^son,
.

lie

for

Irie^ to sliow the

of our highebt

knowledge.

sees that the subject

the

real is

real,

hi;-

intblligence.

the

that ;ihankaru haj

lirui
u^s

intuilive 'jubii

Like

Hegel, ht

and object are one, thai

rational

t'ur

Like

and the rational

conviction,

much

is

iherefort,

tide to tbo

name

of

.WflSTEMOLOeY

175

phflosopher as any of these brilliant thinkers.

Deussen

l>r.

say

" Of

agrees witli

also

He

this.

sug;^ested of

the possibility here

bringing in reflexion as an aid, our author

makes a

more extensive use than might

far

appear from

expressions.

these

Since this

side of Shankara's work, has for us the chief

interest,

we

will, as far as possible,

pass over

his endless quotations

from the Veda, but on

the other hand, bend

our whole attention to

the philosophic reflexion.

the

as

latter,

it

commentary may
that

we have

The

perfection of

meets us in
itself

Shankara's

speak for the fact

here to do with a

monument

of

Indian iVntiquity uol mei'cly theological, but

altio Id

tho highest degree philosophical.

bhankara,

we

"

belitvc, rcprc:;Oiit,o a certain

type of thought,

certain

philosophical

temperament which will continue to interest

liundredsof thinkers of a similar cast.

He has

given to the world one of (he greatest structures

of thought ever reared
it lo a bold

attempt

&^8'.em, grasping

by human

intellect,

at c;oustructii!^ a brilliant
ita

wide swe<jp

all reality

PHILOSO?Hf OF SHAKKARA

376

and

all

knowledge. Elements of

the greatest

metaphysical value are there; elements whose

worth will not

die, as

imagination of

man

long as the metaphysical

The system

will live.

attempts to penetrate the very secret o being,

to explain the iilllmate nature of thought, to

grasp the very kernel

of

brilliant analysis of the

Self,

Keality.

It is a

u the

Self as

the centre of man's cognitions,

volitions,

and of the

intellii]jiblitv of

man
and

in

Self as the source of the

the outer world.

God and God

nature in

and

feelings,

soul,

in

It discovers

man, soul in nature

subject in

object in subject, and above

all

object

and

the Real

the Rational and the Rational in the

ReaL

in

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Buddhist Literature in Pali with translations,

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