Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2011 PreBar Notes in Consitutional Law
2011 PreBar Notes in Consitutional Law
IN POLITICAL LAW
(Prepared by Judge ESTELA ALMA A. SINGCO)
ARTICLE I
NATIONAL TERRITORY
- Archipelago as defined by Article 46 of UNCLOS:
A group of islands, including parts of the islands,
interconnecting waters and other natural features which are
closely interrelated that such islands, waters, and other
natural resources form an intensive geographical, economic,
political entity or to have historically regarded as an
archipelago.
- Archipelagic State- means a State constituted wholly by
one or more archipelagos and may include other islands.
- Archipelagic Baselines- basis: UNCLOS: how to treat
Kalayaan Group of Islands (KIG) and Scarborough
shaol: whether to include or to exclude them from the
baselines; and/or consider as part of the regime of
islands.
- Kalayaan Islands (constituted under RA 1596)- part of
Region IV-B, Province of Palawan but under the custody of
DND. Found some 380 miles west of the southern end of
Palawan.
- Scarborough shaol (Bajo de Masinloc)- also known as
scarborough reef, panatag shoal and Huangyan Dao. Found
in the South China Sea, part of the province of Zambales. A
shaol is a traingle shaped chain of reefs and islands (but
mostly rocks. 55 kilometers around with an area of 150
square kilometer. Its 123 miles west of Subic Bay. Basis:
terra nullius; 200 EEZ
- Spratly Archipelago- international reference to the entire
archipelago wherein the Kalayaan chain of islands is located.
The Philippines essentially claims only the western section
of Spratlys, which is nearest to Palawan.
- RA 9552 (March 10, 2009)- It defines the general
configuration of the archipelago, including the extended
continental shelf and exclusive economic zone to make it
more compliant with the UNCLOS.
ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES
- Republicanism
- Separation of Powers
- Principles of Blending of Powers and Checks & Balances
- under the principle of separation of powers, courts cannot
interfere with the exercise by the legislature of its authority to
conduct investigations in aid of legislation (Senate Blue
Ribbon vs Majaducon, GR # 136760, July 29, 2003;
Executive privilege -Neri vs. Senate Committee, GR. No.
180643, Mach 25, 2008)
-
vs. Jalandoni
- Mijares, et al. vs. Javier, et al., April 12, 2005- There is no
obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that
requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or
allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However,
generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of
the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the
laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. The classical formulation in international law
sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from
the combination two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States;
and a psychological element known as the opinion juris
sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in
the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring
it.
- Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the
Philippines, vs. Duque, et al., GR No. 1703034, October 9,
2007- Customary international law is deemed incorporated
into our domestic system. A mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
- Lim vs. Exec. Sec., April 11, 2002 generally accepted
principles of International Law, the provisions of a treaty are
always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent
law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State.
- The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever
municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a
rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution
or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to
harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be
presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard
for the generally accepted principles of international law in
observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited
constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996
ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is
irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule
of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence
dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
[1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re:
Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts
are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it
in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact
that international law has been made part of the law of the
5
ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP
- Valles vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543- Having a Filipino
father at the time of birth makes one a Filipino. Having an
Australian passport and an alien certificate of registration
does not constitute an effective renunciation of citizenship
and does not militate against the claim of Filipino citizenship.
- Co vs. HRET, 199 SCRA 692- An attack on a persons
citizenship may be done through a direct action for its nullity.
- Re: Vicente Ching, 316 SCRA 1- There are two conditions
in order that the election of Philippine citizenship is
effective:
1. the mother of the person making the
election must be citizen of the
Philippines; and
2. said election must be made upon
reaching the age of majority.
- Ma v. Fernandez, July 26, 2010, GR No. 183133 - the
evolvement from election of Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority under the 1935 Philippine Constitution to
dispensing with the election requirement under the 1973 Philippine
Constitution to express classification of these children as naturalborn citizens under the 1987 Constitution towards the conclusion
that the omission of the 1941 statutory requirement of registration
11
- Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 148; Velez vs. Poe and
Fornier vs. COMELEC, March 3, 2004- Under the Philippine
Bill of 1902, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an
inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day
of April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a
native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of
Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish
papers on or before 11 April 1899. Whether or not respondent
FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether
or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself
been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the
alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after
the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on
the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from
the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo
would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine
Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if
acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether
such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
- As Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not
distinguish between legitimate child and illegitimate child of a
Filipino father, we should not make a distinction. The civil
1
ARTICLE V
1
(SUFFRAGE)
- READ: RA 9225 and RA 9189 (Absentee Voting)
- AKBAYAN-Youth vs. COMELEC, March 26, 2001- where it is
both impractical and illegal to conduct a two-day special
registration for new voters, the COMELEC cannot be compelled to
do so.
- The right of suffrage is not absolute. The exercise of the right is
subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements
embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories
of law.
- The right of citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon
certain procedural requirements he must undergo, among others
the process of registration under RA 8189 (Voters Registration Act
of 1996).
- Makalintal vs. COMELEC, July 10, 2003- The interpretation of
residence is synonymous to domicile. An absentee remains
attached to his residence in the Philippines, as residence is
considered synonymous with domicile. Domicile means an
individuals permanent home or a place to which, whenever absent
for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on
facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.
- Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC- Three basic rules on domicile:
1) a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2)
domicile, once established, remains until a new one is validly
acquired; (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at any
given time.
- Absentee voting under Section 2 of RA 9189 is an exception
to the six-month/one-year residency requirement.
- Lewis vs. COMELEC, August 4, 2006- There is no provision in
the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to
actually establish residence and physically stay in the
Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On
the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals
are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the
same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under
R.A. 9189 (election for president, v-pres., senators). It cannot be
overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise
as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the
residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under
ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.
ARTICLE VI
(LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
- Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 178413, March 13,
2008- in elections for President, V-President, Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives, the general rule
still is that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of
election returns or certificates of canvass are prohibited. As
with other general rules, there are recognized exceptions to he
prohibition namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2)
questions affecting the composition of proceeding of the
board of canvassers; and (3) determination of the authenticity
and the due execution of certificates of canvass as provided in
Section 30 of RA 7166, as amended by RA No. 9369.
- Non delegation of legislative power
- Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17, 2007 - Under
the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running
riot. The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in
its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its
essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient
standards. xxx In the past, accepted as sufficient standards the
following: "interest of law and order;" "adequate and efficient
instruction;" "public interest;" "justice and equity;" "public
convenience and welfare;" "simplicity, economy and
efficiency;" "standardization and regulation of medical
education;" and "fair and equitable employment practices."
Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure
the total electrification of the country and the quality,
reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric
power and watershed rehabilitation and management meet
the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the
limitations on the ERCs power to formulate the IRR. These
are sufficient standards.
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice- Being a mere
constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of
Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not
bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the
Rank
Party
Votes
(B)
Addition
Applyin
Garnere Guarante
plus
al
g the
d over
ed Seat
(C), in
Seats
three
Total
whole
seat
Votes
intege
cap
Votes
for
rs
Garnere
Party
d
List, in
%
(First
(Second
Round)
Round)
(B)
(C)
(A)
(E)
(D)
BUHAY
1,169,23
4
7.33%
2.79
N.A.
BAYAN
MUNA
979,039
6.14%
2.33
N.A.
CIBAC
755,686
4.74%
1.80
N.A.
GABRIELA
621,171
3.89%
1.48
N.A.
APEC
619,657
3.88%
1.48
N.A.
A Teacher
490,379
3.07%
1.17
N.A.
AKBAYAN
466,112
2.92%
1.11
N.A.
ALAGAD
423,149
2.65%
1.01
N.A.
91[31]
COOPNATCCO
409,883
2.57%
N.A.
10
BUTIL
409,160
2.57%
N.A.
11
BATAS
385,810
2.42%
N.A.
12
ARC
374,288
2.35%
N.A.
13
ANAKPAWI
S
370,261
2.32%
N.A.
14
ABONO
339,990
2.13%
N.A.
15
AMIN
338,185
2.12%
N.A.
16
AGAP
328,724
2.06%
N.A.
17
AN WARAY
321,503
2.02%
N.A.
18
YACAP
310,889
1.95%
N.A.
19
FPJPM
300,923
1.89%
N.A.
20
UNI-MAD
245,382
1.54%
N.A.
21
ABS
235,086
1.47%
N.A.
22
KAKUSA
228,999
1.44%
N.A.
23
KABATAAN
228,637
1.43%
N.A.
24
ABA-AKO
218,818
1.37%
N.A.
25
ALIF
217,822
1.37%
N.A.
26
SENIOR
CITIZENS
213,058
1.34%
N.A.
27
AT
197,872
1.24%
N.A.
28
VFP
196,266
1.23%
N.A.
29
ANAD
188,521
1.18%
N.A.
30
BANAT
177,028
1.11%
N.A.
31
ANG
KASANGG
A
170,531
1.07%
N.A.
32
BANTAY
169,801
1.06%
N.A.
33
ABAKADA
166,747
1.05%
N.A.
34
1-UTAK
164,980
1.03%
N.A.
35
TUCP
162,647
1.02%
N.A.
36
COCOFED
155,920
0.98%
N.A.
Total
17
55
- The Court said that Ang Ladlad has shown that the LGBT sector
has been historically disadvantaged and discriminated against
because of negative public perception, and has even alleged acts of
violence perpetrated against members of the LGBT community by
reason of their sexual orientation and gender identity. It added
that the magnitude of opposition against petitioners participation
in the party list system is, by itself, demonstrative of the sectors
lack of political power; so, too, is the fact that proposed
legislations seeking to prohibit discriminatory treatment against
LGBTs have been languishing in Congress.
- LEGISLATIVE PERKS (PP vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689)
The history of the provision granting Senators and
Congressmen immunity from arrest and detention shows
that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive
sense.
- Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, June 27, 2008- presumption of
innocence does not necessarily carry with it the full
enjoyment of civil and politicsl rights.
- Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete
freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible
in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. However, it does not
protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the
2
ARTICLE VII
(PRESIDENT)
- PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY- The immunity enjoyed by a
sitting president evolved through case law.
Soliven vs. Makasiar- The privilege pertains to the President
by virtue of the office. There is nothing in our laws that
would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. The
choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is
solely the Presidents prerogative.
Estrada vs. Desierto- There is no basis in the contention that
the immunity of the President extends to the end of the term
to which he was elected notwithstanding his resignation. It is
clear that the immunity of the President from suit is
concurrent only with his tenure (representing the period
during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his
term (the time during which the officer may claim to hold
office as a matter of right).
Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371- Executive
immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President.
David, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006 It is not
proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is
the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or
actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal
case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution
or law.
- SUPREME COURT AS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL- Lopez vs. Roxas, 17 SCRA 755- When the
law grants the Supreme Court the power to resolve an election
- Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers,
may contest the election. By this express enumeration, the
3
- PARDONING POWER- Drilon vs. CA, 202 SCRA 370The pardoning power of the President is final and
unappealable.
- AMNESTY- Kapunan, Jr. vs. CA, 51 SCRA 42, March 13,
2009.- The text of Proclamation No. 347 then issued by
President Fidel V. Ramos covered the members of the AFP- it
extends to all persons who committed the particular acts
described in the provision, and not just rebels or insurgents.
- TREATY MAKING POWER- Bayan vs. Zamora, 342
SCRA 449-It is inconsequential whether the United States
treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a
treaty. (Also read USAFFE Veterans Ass. v. Treasurer 105
4
Administrative Code). Laurel vs. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797The President may not convey valuable real property of the
government on her sole will. Conveyance must be authorized
by a law enacted by Congress.
- POWER
OF
SUPERVISION
OVER
LOCAL
GOVERNMENTSto ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law. xxx Insofar as existing
legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of
Local Government) to proceed against local officials
administratively.
ARTICLE VIII
(JUDICIAL)
- JUDICIAL REVIEW- Joya vs. PCGG; Kilosbayan vs.
Guingona; Oposa vs. Factoran (petitioners-children);
Kilosbayan vs. Morato; IBP vs. Zamora (IBP not proper
party); Gonzales vs. Narvasa (private citizen not proper
party).
- Garcia v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 157584, April 2,
2009- The immediate implementation of full deregulation of
the local downstream oil industry is a policy determination by
Congress which this Court cannot overturn without offending
the Constitution and the principle of separation of powers.
That the law failed in its objectives because its adoption
spawned the evils petitioner Garcia alludes to does not
warrant its nullification. In the words of Mr. Justice Leonardo
A. Quisumbing in the 1999 Garcia case, [a] calculus of fear
and pessimism xxx does not justify the remedy petitioner
seeks: that we overturn a law enacted by Congress and
approved by the Chief Executive.
- The Secretary of Justice vs. Koruga, GR No. 166199, April
24, 2009- Although the courts are without power to directly
decide matters over which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government and are not empowered to execute absolutely
their own judgment from that of Congress or of the President,
the Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or
not such judgment has been made with grave abuse of
discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive
department is contrary to the constitution, the law or
jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.
(a)
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated
makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code;
or
(b)
the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated
does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised
Penal Code.
to fully explain the Courts denial since, for one thing, the
facts and the law are already mentioned in the CA decision.
- German Machineries Corporation vs. Endaya, 444 SCRA
329- The mandate under Section 14, Article VIII of the
constitution is applicable only in cases submitted for
decision, i.e, given due course and after the filing of the
briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where a
resolution is issued denying due course to a petition and
stating the legal basis thereof.
- Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Laserna, 550 SCRA 613- The
constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is bases, does not preclude the
validity of memorandum decisions, which adopt by
reference the finding of fact and conclusions of law contained
in the decisions of inferior tribunals.
- Joaquin-Agregado v. Yama, March 20, 2009, GR No.
181107- The Supreme Court stressed that it has the discretion
to decide whether a minute resolution should be used in lieu
of a full-blown decision in any particular case. Further, the
Supreme Court explained that the grant of due course to a
petition for review is not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion. When it fails to find any reversible error
committed by the CA, there is no need to fully explain the
Courts denial as it means that the Supreme Court agrees
with or adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA. There
is no point in reproducing or restating in the resolution of
denial the conclusions of the appellate court affirmed.The
constitutional requirement of sec. 14, Art. VIII of a clear
presentation of facts and laws applies to decisions, where
the petition is given due course, but not where the petition
is denied due course, with the resolution stating the legal
basis for the dismissal.
- Oil & National Gas Com. vs. CA, 293 SCRA 26- Section 14
does not preclude the validity of Memorandum Decision
which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions
of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. It is
intended to avoid cumbersome reproduction of the decision
(or portions thereof) of the lower court.
ARTICLE IX
(CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS)
5
ARTICLE X
(LOCAL GOVERNMENTS)
- TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL
OFFICIALS- Socrates vs. COMELEC, November 12,
2002, What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms.
6
The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not
immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A
recall election mid-way in the term following the third
consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an
immediate re-election after the third term.
- Aldovino, Jr. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 184836, December
23, 2009- The preventive suspension of public officials does
not interrupt their term for purposes the three-term limit rule
under the Constitution and the Local Government Code.
Preventive suspension, by its nature does not involve an
effective interruption of service within a term and should
therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation.
- The interruption of a term exempting an elective official from
the three-term limit is one that involves no less than
involuntary loss of the title to office. In all cases of preventive
suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing
the functions of his office and does not vacate and lose title to
his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results
upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.
- Bolos, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 581 SCRA 786, March 18, 2009Bolos was serving his third term as punong barangay when he
ran for Sangguniang Bayan member and upon winning,
assumed the position of SB member, thus, voluntarily
relinquishing his office as punong barangay which the court
deems as voluntary renunciation of said office.
- Adormeo vs. COMELEC, February 4, 2002- The winner in
the recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full
term of three years for purposes of counting the
consecutiveness of an elective officials terms in office. Thus,
in a situation where a candidate loses in an election to gain a
third consecutive term but later wins in the recall election, the
recall term cannot be stitched with his previous two
consecutive terms. The period of time prior to the recall term,
when another elective official holds office, constitutes an
interruption in the continuity of service.
- Lonzanida vs COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602- Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in
the computation of the three-term limit. Conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short
of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few
months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary
6
ARTICLE XI
(ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS)
- IMPEACHMENT- Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3,
2001Section 3(7) of Article XI provides for the limit and the
consequence of an impeachment judgment. Conviction in the
impeachment proceeding is not required before the public
officer subject of impeachment may be prosecuted, tried
and punished for criminal offenses committed.
- READ: Francisco, et al. vs. House of Representatives,
November 10, 2003definition of TO INITIATE
IMPEACHMENT- proceeding is initiated or begins,
when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice.
- Gutierrez vs. The House of Representatives Committee on
Justice, GR No. 193459, February 15, 2011- The
proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is
filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action.
This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps
that follow.
- A vote of 1/3 of all the members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the
Articles of Impeachment of the Committee or override its
contrary resolution, De Castro vs. Committee on Justice,
Batasan Pambansa, September 3, 1995.
ARTICLE XII
(NATIONAL ECONOMY & PATRIMONY)
7
0
-
ARTICLE XIII
(SOCIAL JUSTICE & HUMAN RIGHTS)
ARTICLE XIV
(ESTACS)
- Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita,
GR No. 180046, April 2, 2009- A review center is not an
institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722
[i]t does not offer a degree-granting program that would put it
under the jurisdiction of the CHED. Moreover, [a] review
course is only intended to refresh and enhance the
knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees, and it
does not require enrollment, attendance, a grade or
submission of a thesis in order to complete the review center
course requirements or take the licensure examination.
- ACADEMIC FREEDOM- from standpoint of the
educational institution and the members of the academe. The
Supreme Court sustained the primacy of academic freedom
over Civil service rules on AWOL, stressing when UP opted
to retain private petitioner and even promoted him
despite
his absence, the University was exercising its freedom to
choose who may teach or who may continue to teach its
faculty (UP, et al. vs. CSC, April 3, 2001).
- Letter of the UP LAW: AM 10-10-4 SC; March 8, 2011The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with
respondnets academic freedom as it does not dictat upon the
law professors the subject matter they can teach and the
manner of their instruction. They are free to determine what
they will teach their students and how they will teach.
Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academic
freedom for the Supreme Court to subject lawyers who teach
law to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and
speech, coupled with undue intervention in favor of a party in
a pending case, without observing proper procedure, even if
purportedly done in their capacity as teachers. The right to
freedom expression of members of the BAR may be
circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due
respect to the courts and to uphold the publics faith in the
legal profession and the justice system.
- Morales vs. UP Board of Regents, December 13, 2004- As
enunciated by this Court in the case of University of San
Carlos v. Court of Appeals, the discretion of schools of
learning to formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of
honors for purposes of graduation forms part of academic
freedom. And such discretion may not be disturbed much less
controlled by the courts, unless there is grave abuse of
discretion in its exercise. Therefore, absent any showing of
grave abuse of discretion, the courts may not disturb the
Universitys decision not to confer honors to petitioner.
- Lacuesta vs. Ateneo, December 9, 2005- Consistent with
academic freedom and constitutional autonomy, an institution
of higher learning has the prerogative to provide standards for
its teachers and determine whether these standards have been
met. At the end of the probation period, the decision to rehire an employee on probation, belongs to the university as
the employer alone.
- UP vs. CSC, April 3, 2001- the University has the academic
freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds who
may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and
who may be admitted to study. Clearly, this freedom
encompasses the autonomy to choose who should teach and,
concomitant therewith, who should be retained in its rolls of
professors and other academic personnel.
This Court
declared in Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong: As
corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning
are inherently endowed with the right to establish their
ARTICLE XVI
(GENERAL PROVISIONS)
- IMMUNITY OF THE STATE FROM SUIT (Read general
principles; Phil Agila Satellite, Inc. vs. Lichauco, May 3,
2006)- The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the
performance of official functions against an officer of the
government by a private citizen which would result in a
charge against or financial liability to the government must be
regarded as a suit against the State itself, although it has not
been formally impleaded. However, government immunity
from suit will not shield the public official being sued if the
government no longer has an interest to protect in the
outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer is personal
ARTICLE XVII
(AMENDMENTS)
- The Province of North Cotabato v. Republic, GR Nos.
183591, 183572, 183893, and 183951, October 14, 2008The Court noted that inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD
establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and
the Central Government is itself a violation of the
Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated March
1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover,
it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to
the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in
place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself
is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an
act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the
constituent powers vested only in Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves
through the process of initiative, for the only way that the
Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment
process is through an undue influence or interference with
that process.
- IMBONG VS. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28- Congress when
acting as a Constituent Assembly has full and plenary powers
to propose amendments or to call a convention. The grant to
Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority
includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication,
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ARTICLE XVIII
(TRANSITORY PROVISIONS)
- LIM VS. EXEC SEC., April11, 2002- Section 25 of the
Transitory Provisions show a marked antipathy towards
foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign
influence in general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry
into the Philippines only be way of direct exception.
- Under the Constitution, the US forces are prohibited from
engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory. The
Supreme Court, however, cannot accept the bare allegations
that the Arroyo administration is engaged in double speak in
trying to pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive
effort by foreign troops on native soil.
- Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342
SCRA 449-the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine
Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as
attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the
United States government. The fact that the VFA was not
submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate does
not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or
treaty recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal
United States law. Notice can be taken of the internationally
known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate for
advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in nature,
whereas those that carry out or further implement these
policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under
the provisions of the so-called CaseZablocki Act, within sixty
days from ratification. The second reason has to do with the
relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty
of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly
ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the
United States Senate.
- AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN), et al.,
Petitioners - versus - THOMAS G. AQUINO, et al., No.
170516, July 16, 2008- While Article VII, Section 21 provides for
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ARTICLE III
(BILL OF RIGHTS)
- Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., GR No. 156052,
February 13, 2008- Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for
their right to property. They allege that they stand to lose billions
of pesos if forced [to] relocate. However, based on the hierarchy
of constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys
precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life
is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or [local
government unit] LGUs exercise of police power clashes with a
few individuals right to property, the former should prevail,.
- Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. DSWD,et al., GR No. 166494, June
29, 2007 (Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003)- When
conditions so demand, as determined by the legislature, property
rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property
rights, though sheltered by due process clause, must yield to the
general welfare.
- Yrasuegi vs. PAL, Inc., 565 SCRA 467- In the absence of
governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
constitution cannot be invoked. The Bill of Rights is not meant to
be invoked against acts of private individuals.
- Procedural Due Process- Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca
Serano vs NLRC, 323 SCRA 445- Due process clause of the
constitution is a limitation on government powers. It does not
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- It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban
of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the
time, place and manner of the assemblies.
-
- Content based and content neutral regulationsRegulations of speech may either be content-based (the
subject of the speech or utterance is sought to be regulated)
and content-neutral (it regulates only the conduct associated
with speech, such as the time, place and manner). To pass
constitutional muster, any content-based regulation must
show that the government has a compeling or overiding
interest in the subject regulation. A content neutral
restriction, on the other hand, need only show an important
government interest, as long as it leaves open alternative
channels of communication.
- Chavez vs. Secretary Gonzales, GR No. 168338, February
15, 2008- The acts of the Secretary of Justice and the NTC in
warning television stations against playing the Garci tapes
under pain of revocation of their licenses, were content-based
restrictions and should be subjected to the clear and present
and danger test.
- Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc., et al. vs. Dy, et
al., GR No. 170270/GR No. 179411, April 2, 2009- The
immediate implication of the application of the strict
scrutiny test is that the burden falls upon respondents as
agents of the government to prove that their actions do not
infringe upon petitioners constitutional rights. As content
regulation cannot be done in the absence of compelling
reason to infringe the right to free expression.
- The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special
application only to free-speech cases, and are not appropriate
for testing the validity of penal statutes. The doctrines of strict
scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech
cases or, as they are called in American law,
- A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[57] The
overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms.
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- Tiongson vs. NHA, 558 SCRA 56- Where the initial taking of a
property subject to expropriation was by virtue of a law which was
subsequently declared unconstitutional, just compensation is to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint, and not the
earlier taking.
- MCWD vs. J. King and Sons Co., Inc., GR No. 175983, April
16, 2009 - For MCWD to exercise its power of eminent domain,
two requirements should be met, namely: first, its board of
directors passed a resolution authorizing the expropriation, and
second, the exercise of the power of eminent domain was subjected
to review by the LWUA.
- Republic vs. Lim, June 29, 2005- Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting
function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights
against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the
detriment of the individuals rights. Given this function, the
provision should therefore be strictly interpreted against the
expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the property
owner.
- While the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just
compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover
possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the
government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years
from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation
proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover
possession of their property. This is in consonance with the
principle that the government cannot keep the property and
dishonor the judgment. To be sure, the five-year period limitation
will encourage the government to pay just compensation
punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it
is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from
private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just
compensation.
- Local government units possessed the delegated power of eminent
domain, subject to judicial review (City of Manila vs. Chinese
Community).
- Any property owned by a municipal corporation in its private
capacity (patrimonial), in any expropriation proceeding, must
be paid just compensation. If the property owned is public or
otherwise held in trust then no compensation need be paid (City of
Baguio vs. NAWASA).
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