90 Theoretical Writings bluntly in the Demonstration for Proposition 19 of the same Book: ‘The ‘human mind does not know the human body.’** ‘Note the complexity of this approach: ontologically the mind is an idea, the idea of the body. But this does not mean that it knows its object. Forthe relation of coupling between the idea and its object admits of degrees; it can bbe more or less subject to the norm of agreement. All the mote so if itis a complex idea, related to the body’s multiple composition. Ultimately, itis by appealing to the third relation, the relation of inclusion, that the ontology of the finite intellect is able to account for all the themes broached in Book V: since we are a part of the infinite intellect, we experi- ‘ence ourselves as eternal. Moreover, it is by appealing to the second relation of coupling that the theory of the operations of this finite intellect is ables to illuminate the themes of Books III and IV: we do not immediately have an adequate idea of what our own intellect actually is, ‘The relation hetween these two relations is certainly not straightforward. In fact, the difficulty can be formulated as follows: if the finite intellect is defined as en ideal coupling with the body, yet one which is without cige of its object, how do we account for the possibility of true i Although the relation of inclusion explains it, the latter is no more global metaphor. What is the local operation of truths? ‘The problem is not that of knowing how we can have true ideas im extrinsic sense governed by the norm of agreement, for we experience fact that we do. The true dea is its own verification, even in those in where it is validated through coupling, agreement. This femous theme is cout in the Scholium to Book Il, Proposition 43: ‘[How can a man know hie has an idea that ageces with its object [idearwm)? T have just shown, than sufficiently, that this arises solely from his having an idea which agree with its object [ideatum] ~ or that truth is its own standard.’ At juncture, Spinoza wishes 10 unify the operational approach that ‘coupling with the properly ontological approach that uses inclusion. ‘much is clear from the continuation of the argument: ‘Add to this that mind, in so far as it peresives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect God. Thus, the existence of true ideas is guaranteed at the global level the finite intellects inclusion in the infinite intellect, and at the local level the self-evident exposition of the agreement ofa coupling. “The real problem is: How? How does the finite intellect come to have ideas, given that it does not even have knowledge of the body-objects which itis the idea? “The solution to this problem, which is strictly operational since it is existential is set out in Propositions 38 to 40 of Book IT. These Propositi establish that every idea referring back to a property common to all bod