A New International Politics?

Diplomacy in Complex Interdependence

Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition by Robert O. Keohane; Joseph S.
Nye
Review by: Kal J. Holsti
International Organization, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Spring, 1978), pp. 513-530
Published by: The MIT Press
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A new internationalpolitics? Diplomacy

in complex interdependence
Kal J. Holsti

Robert0. KeohaneandJoseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence:WorldPolitics

in Transition, Boston and Toronto:Little, Brown and Company, 1977, 273 pp.

One of the prominentcliches of contemporarydiplomaticrhetoricis that the world

is becoming increasingly interdependent.This view reveals a certain Western
myopia about who affects whom by what means in internationalrelations, but it
does contain enough truthin certain contexts to merit serious analysis. While it is
ludicrousto thinkthat shortof massive civil war or externalaggression, Paraguayor
Benin can have an important impact on industrial societies, it is obvious that
significantevents and technological innovationsin some of the most powerful states
do have serious consequences in other areas of the world. Interdependenceis a
prominentcharacteristicof the relations between the industrialcountries, and be-

Editor's Note. To avoid any conflicts of interest, this essay was solicited, reviewed, and edited by the
Chairmanof the Board of Editors. The Editordid not read the essay until after it had been set in type.
Kal J. Holsti is a professor of political science at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver.

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tween them and some developing countries (particularlyOPEC members). Dependence, however, remainsthe reality for a majorityof the new states, but that fact is
seldom acknowledged in the speeches of Western politicians. The leaders of the
industrialpowers generally use the condition of interdependenceto lecture to the
rest of the world thatonly "responsible" foreignpolicy behaviorand "international
cooperation" can resolve global issues. They stoutly maintain-with good reason-that confrontations,cartels, and autarkicpolicies can only lead to a worsening of the world's difficulties. Yet, it is hardto see how these forms of behaviorby
small, vulnerable states could really have much impact elsewhere. The policies
requiredfor global cooperationare essential for the majorpowers and many other
states as well, but in some cases they might be a luxurythat highly dependentstates
cannot afford. If there is growing interdependence,it is neitheruniversalnor symmetrical. Until more equitable relations between developed and developing states
are achieved, we cannot expect the latter to jump enthusiasticallyon the international cooperation bandwagon, particularlyin those issues-areas (e.g., pollution)
where they are not major contributorsto the problem. This essay will explore the
relationshipbetween analyses of dependency and interdependence,and assess the
Keohane-Nye volume as a contributionto these competing views of contemporary
internationalrelations.
Formulatorsof dependency theory' have an unabashedlyeconomic view of
internationalpolitics. The distributionof economic goods in the world is distinctly
inequitable, and doomed to remain in that pattern. The present world economic
order grew out of the world-wide expansion of capitalism, via colonialism; the
centers of production expropriated surplus capital from the peripheries and
constructed the economics of the latter in such a manner as to preclude selfcontained, indigenous development. The present internationaleconomic order of
free trade perpetuatesbasic structurescreated centuries ago, and results in the
exploitationof the poor by the rich. Dependencytheory, at least as developed by its
"grand designers" such as Frank and Galtung2seeks to explain how exchange
relationshipsbetween center and peripheryresult in inequitabledistributionof re-

'There are many versions of dependency theory. Various writers emphasize different facets of the
problem, and use different arenas for investigation. It is not the purpose of this essay to present a
comprehensivereview of the vast literatureon the subject. For a critical analysis of many of the main
propositionsin this body of literature,see Benjamin Cohen, The Question of Imperialism (New York:
Basic Books, 1973). For refinements and attemptsto operationalizesome of the key concepts in the
dependencyliterature,see Tom Travis, "Toward a ComparativeStudy of Imperialism,"paperpresented
to the 16th AnnualMeeting of the InternationalStudies Association, Washington,D.C., February1975,
and James Kurthand Steven Rosen, eds., TestingEconomic Theoriesof Imperialism(Lexington, Mass.:
Lexington Books, 1974).
2I select these two authorsprimarilybecause of the comprehensivecharacterof their analysis. While
Frank's theses apply primarilyto the Latin Americanexperience, it is clear that he is writing about all
ThirdWorldcountries. Galtung's model of center-peripheryrelationsis also universalin its application.
See AndreGunderFrank,LatinAmerica: Underdevelopmentor Revolution (New York:MonthlyReview
Press, 1969), esp. Chapter1. JohanGaltung, "A StructuralTheory of Imperialism,"Journal of Peace
Research No. 2 (1971): 81-117.

A new international politics?

515

wards and advantages,and hence in perpetualinternationalhierarchy.These dependent variables in their studies are mostly taken for granted, while their analyses
concentrateprimarilyon explaining how that exchange of commodities for manufacturedgoods is inherentlyunequalbecause the productionof primarygoods results
in few technological or labor spinoffs. The essential mechanism explaining internationalinequalityis thus operationof the Ricardianlaw of comparativeadvantage
and internationalspecialization. Power or capabilities, bargainingskills, and idiosyncraticvariables are basically irrelevantin diplomacy between the weak and the
strong;inequalityand hierarchyresult from the economic imperativesof the internationalcapitalistsystem, and are sustainedtoday by implicit and formal alliances
between manufacturersin the industrialcountriesand the "compradorbourgeoisie"
in the periphery areas; the latter have a strong interest in maintainingtrade and
investmentlinks with the centereconomies, althoughthey occupy highly dependent
economic roles.
To both Frank and Galtung, genuine development is impossible so long as
these alliances continue. Foreign aid programs,culturalexchanges, and occasional
subversion or intervention by the metropolitan governments-what we call the
internationalpolitics of industrialand developing countries-are designed to perpetuate the essential linkages between dominantand dependenteconomic actors.
Dependency models of internationalrelations are dynamic in the sense that
they seek to show how economic and internationalinstitutionalmechanisms perpetuate inequality over time. But they are static because they fail to measure
changes in the the dependentvariables. The descriptionsof the internationalsystem
are made at t1, but there is no predictionthat at t2 inequality might decline or the
distributionof rewardsin any bilateralrelationshipmight shift in favor of the poor.
Theoristsof dependencygenerally ignore the evidence, documentedfor example by
Moran,3 in his study of the copper corporationsin Chile, that governments of
developing countrieslearn how to maximize their bargainingadvantagesand eventually develop the intellectual, technical, and bureaucraticskills to manage their
resources in such a way as to avoid exploitation. The theorists also ignore the
examples provided by some countries which have successfully overcome neocolonial economic relationshipsto promote genuine indigenous development. The
strategies range from isolation (Burma) to export-generated industrialization
(Taiwan and South Korea), to the formation of producer cartels. Nationalism,
regionalvariations,problemsposed by populationgrowth, and lack of resourcesare
also irrelevantto the theories of dependency. Reacting to the conventional wisdom
of the 1950s and 1960s that most of the "barriersto growth" were internal,dependency theorieshave gone to the otherextreme:only exogenous variablesexplain the
"development of underdevelopment."Hence, if one wants to overcome perpetual
exploitation and inequality, revolution aimed at destroying the economic links between the developing countries and the metropolitan centers is the appropriate

3TheodoreMoran, MultinationalCorporationsand the Politics of Dependence (Princeton:Princeton

University Press, 1974).

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strategy. Interdependencewith the Western industrial nations is only a fig leaf

covering relationshipsthat are basically exploitative.
If the source of internationalinequality, exploitation, and hierarchyis located
in the exchange of primaryfor manufacturedgoods, it follows that there cannot be
dependencybetween any pair of states which exchanges both primarycommodities
and manufactureditems with each other. Yet, any Finn, Swiss, or Canadianwould
quickly point out that dependent relationshipscan exist even where the types of
commodities being exchanged are roughly similar. Dependencycan referto a situation between any pair of states in which there are asymmetricalvulnerabilities.No
elaborate theory is needed to identify vulnerabilityand the conditions which give
rise to it. MarshallSinger's4accountof internationalinequalityis a good example of
an analysis which explores dependency conceived as vulnerabilityratherthan exploitation. Unlike the dependency theorists who predict only perpetualhierarchy
and exploitation, Singer's comparativedata demonstratefairly steady movement
toward lesser vulnerability, if not greaterequality, between former colonial areas
and the industrialworld.
What are the hallmarksof vulnerability,particularlyin the tradeand economic
dimensions?The most obvious are: (1) high exportproductconcentration;(2) a high
ratioof exportsto GNP; (3) geographicconcentrationof exports;and (4) geographic
concentrationin sources of supply. Under these conditions, price fluctuations, loss
of markets,or shutdownof supplies can bringeconomic catastropheto the vulnerable state. Most, but not all, countriesin the ThirdWorld sharethese conditions, but
so do several countries which are a part of the "center."
Moreover, if we regarddependencyas an empiricalquestion between pairs of
states ratherthan as a near-universalmodel, we must examine the actualdistribution
of rewards in bargainingrelationships and not foreclose this importantissue by
arguingthat an exchange of primaryfor manufacturedgoods is inherentlyunequal.
Bargainingskills, personalities,knowledge, world demand, andproductionpatterns
are always relevant to outcomes, and should be the object of inquiry. As OPEC
members have shown, it is certainlypossible for the rewardsin an exchange relationship to be dramaticallyreversed. Governmentsare concerned with these matters, not with the intellectual adequacy of this or that model. They are also concerned with the degrees of vulnerabilitythey face when they become involved in
bilateraland multilateralrelationships.Dependency-as-vulnerabilityis a pervasive
condition in internationalrelations but it is not distributedequally. Capacities to
harm, to disrupt, and to coerce by economic means, are not distributedequally
either. The diplomats who speak of global interdependenceignore these facts;
dependencytheoristswrongly assume thatonly developing countriesare vulnerable;
and academic writerson interdependencedo not seem interestedin the implications
of dependency, wherever it may be found.
If dependency can be viewed as asymmetricalvulnerability,then presumably
interdependenceimplies approximateequality of vulnerability, or mutual depen-

4WeakStates in a Worldof Powers (New York: The Free Press, 1972).

A new internationalpolitics?

517

dence. But is this how interdependencehas been conceived in the literature?The

major preoccupationof scholars has not been to develop a theory of interdependence, but ratherto describethe extent of interdependence.The debatehas revolved
aroundthe questionwhetheror not interdependencebetween the industrialcountries
has increasedduringthe twentiethcentury.5The argumentwas launchedby Deutsch
and Eckstein,6and subsequentwork by Deutsch purportedto demonstratethat the
ratio of intersocietal transactions to internal transactions had actually declined
among EEC countries.7 Waltz8 argued the same point. Cooper,9 Morse,10 and
Rosecranceand Stein,1 have presenteddata to emphasize the opposite point: interdependence has grown dramatically. Most recently, Rosecrance and his colleagues12have demonstratedthat interdependencehas actually followed a cyclical
history since the late nineteenthcentury. This is not the place to discuss the relative
merits of the various bodies of data and the measuringtechniquesused to establish
degrees of interdependence.The critical issue, afterall, is not the rateof transaction
growth or the similarity in economic behavior between nations, but their consequences.
This questionhas been largely evaded: most authorsseem to imply that greater
transactionlevels lead to greater impact and sensitivity, and presumably, to an
increasedneed for policy coordination.Unlike the dependencytheorists, who outline the consequencesof economic exchange in terms of exploitationand hierarchy
in the system, the works on interdependency-as-transactiondemonstrate little
concern for the effects of interdependenceon the structureof the international
system, on the distributionof capabilities (hierarchy), or on the distributionof
benefits from all the transactions. If the dependency theorists can be faulted for
assuming a fixed outcome from internationalexchange (exploitation), much of the
literatureon interdependencecan be criticizedfor ignoringthe questionof outcomes
altogether.

5A good review of the debate is in Richard Rosecrance, A. Alexandroff, W. Koehler, J. Kroll, S.

Lacquer, and J. Stocker, "Whither Interdependence?"International Organization Vol. 31 (Summer
1977): 425-72. There are, of course, many other studies of interdependencein the literaturethat are not
germaneto this debate. Many of them offer definitions of interdependenceor advice on how to "manage" it. The present review does not evaluate these contributions,partly because of space limitations,
and also because most of them do not assess the consequences of interdependence.
6KarlW. Deutsch and AlexanderEckstein, "National Industrializationand the Declining Share of the
InternationalEconomic Sector, 1890-1959," WorldPolitics Vol. 13 (January1961): 267-99.
7KarlW. Deutsch, Lewis Edinger, Roy C. Macridis, and RichardL. Merritt,France, Germanyand the
WesternAlliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and WorldPolitics (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), Chapter 13.
8KennethN. Waltz, "The Myth of National Interdependence,"in CharlesP. Kindelberger,ed., The
InternationalCorporation:A Symposium(Cambridge,Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1970), pp. 205-26.
9RichardN. Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968).
10EdwardL. Morse, "Transnational Economic Processes," International Organization, Vol. 25
(Summer 1971): 373-97.
Rosecranceand ArthurStein, "Interdependence:Myth or Reality?" WorldPolitics Vol. 26
"1Richard
(October 1973): 1-27.
12Rosecranceet al., "Whither Interdependence?"

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Studies by Waltz, Morse, Haas, Scott, and the volume underreview have dealt
in different ways with this shortcoming.Waltz' well-known essay, "The Myth of
National Interdependence"is really a foray into the question of vulnerabilityand
dependency. He argues that large industrialpowers are neitherdependentnor vulnerable and introducesthe importantnotion that a hallmarkof dependency is the
high cost of establishing alternativemarketsand sources of supply ("The low cost
of disentanglementis a measure of low dependence").'3 Dependence-and presumably interdependence- is more than just sensitivity to transactions;what matters is when the transactionpatternsare seriouslydisturbed.Outcomesin bargaining
will reflect degrees of vulnerability.Waltz thus implies that an internationalhierarchy of vulnerabilityperpetuatesa hierarchyof diplomatic influence. He also emphasizes the rhetoricalaspects of the common usage of interdependenceand adds
that "the word 'interdependence' subtly obscures the inequalities of national
capabilities,pleasinglypoints to a reciprocaldependency, and stronglysuggests that
all states areplaying the same game."'"4Here Waltz is more realisticthanthose who
believe thatthe consequencesof increasedtransactionsare more or less equal to all
parties.
Haas is among the first to relate increased interdependenceboth to consequences in the system and to certainpolicy options of state actors.'5Rejecting the
conventional wisdom that increased interdependencecreates more stability and a
greaterlikelihood for peace, he argues that greaterinterconnectednesscan predict
neitherconflict nor cooperation.It does predict system change, however. As problems become more complex, strategies designed to cope with them will appear
increasingly inadequate;yet desires to deal with them will involve increasedintervention by states and internationalorganizations in each other's affairs. Haas
suggests that "the kinds of systems change associated with rising interdependence
do imply a tendencytowardstrengtheningweaker actors againststrong states as the
web of relationshipsincreases perceived sensitivities, vulnerabilitiesand opportunity costs for the stronger"(p. 860). The remainderof Haas' analysis focuses on the
conditionsunderwhich state actorsmay be willing to establishregimes and particular forms of organizationalproblem-solving. But he is concerned with the consequences of interdependenceas well as its origins. And in contrastto dependency
theorists who would predict increased hierarchyfrom greaterinterdependencebetween center and periphery,Haas forecasts the opposite.
Andrew Scott's recent essay on interdependencealso concentrateson consequences ratherthanquantities.'6His analysis explicitly employs a systems perspective; he is concernedprimarilywith the problemof the unanticipatedconsequences

3Waltz, "The Myth of National Interdependence,"p. 212.

'4Ibid., p. 220.
15ErnstB. Haas, "Is There a Hole in the Whole? Knowledge, Technology, Interdependence,and the
Constructionof InternationalRegimes," InternationalOrganization Vol. 29 (Summer 1975): 827-76.
16Andrew M. Scott, "The Logic of InternationalInteraction,"InternationalStudies QuarterlyVol. 21
(September 1977): 429-60.

A new internationalpolitics?

519

of national(andinternational)decisions and actions for the system, and the system's

capacityto regulateor control those consequences. Given the vastly increasedflow
of transactions,what are some of the problemsthat arise?Among others, Scott lists
the following as particularlyimportant:
1. Undirectedand partiallydirectedprocesses produce surprisesand inadvertent consequences;
2. Inadvertentconsequences are becoming more common and more important;
3. As the internationalsystem becomes more elaborate,the numberof system
and structuralrequisites increases;
4. Internationalproblems will become broader in scope and more closely
linked;
5. As the numberof requisites and problems increases, the internationalsystem will become increasingly fragile and the costs of keeping the system
operatingwill escalate sharply.
Scott also suggests that actors in the system will find it increasinglydifficult to
control events and pursuetheir interestseffectively. Althoughhe does not elaborate
on the forecast, he suggests thatthe majorpowers may be particularlyvulnerableto
impotence as they try to deal with a "continuing flow of system-generatedcrises"
(p. 458). Like Haas, then, Scott also suggests decreasing hierarchyin the international system as far as ability to influence other actors or solve internationalproblems are concerned. While Haas' and Scott's analyses are speculative ratherthan
data-based,they have taken an importantstep in directingour attentionaway from
description of transactionflows. To map transactionsis an importantdescriptive
enterprise,but from the perspectiveof internationalrelationstheory, it is important
to know as well how changes in patternsof interaction,whetherlinear or cyclical,
affect other processes and structuresin the internationalsystem.
Morse17is among the first to focus attentionexplicitly on the consequences of
interdependenceto policy making. If the fact of interdependencehas been wellestablished, what difference does it make to how governmentsconducttheir mutual
affairs? Does interdependencein one issue-area spill over into bargainingin other
issues-areas?Does the fact of interdependencecreate any imperativesfor specific
types of diplomaticeconomic policy? Morse does not supply answers to all these
questions, but his analysis clearly shifts attentionto a varietyof dependentvariables
at the national and systems levels. Indeed, to Morse, interdependenceis really an
interveningvariablebetwen basic socio-economic trendsanddiplomaticbargaining.
Its sources are found in increased sensitivity to industrial societies to external
phenomena,exacerbatedby technologicalchanges, and in the efforts on the partof
governments to lower barriersto internationalexchanges. Taken together, these

17Edward L. Morse, "Crisis Diplomacy, Interdependence,and the Politics of InternationalEconomic

Relations," in Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman, eds., Theory and Policy in International
Relations (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1972), pp. 123-50.

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factors have increased mutually contingent behavior, or interdependence.In turn,

interdependencehas increased (1) the incompatibilityof governments'foreign policy objectives, and (2) the frequency of internationalcrises between industrial
states; it has decreased (1) governmentallatitude of choice in both domestic and
foreign policies, (2) government control over transnationalactivities, and (3) the
number of instrumentalities(e.g., tax and fiscal policies) available to cope with
domestic economic problems. Morse does not demonstrateempiricallythat all these
variables are linked in the ways specified, nor does he explore the question of the
relationship between distribution of capabilities or vulnerabilities to bargaining
outcomes. In two brief case studies, however, he shows how governmentsin interdependentrelationshipscan manipulatecrises to maximize their national advantage. How this diverges from diplomacy in a non-interdependentsituation is not
entirely clear, but Morse is on the verge of saying that interdependencecreates a
new type of internationalpolitics and bargaining.
Thereis a levels-of-analysis problemin this work, however. Like Scott, Morse
implies that there has been an increase of interdependencein the system which has
given rise to certain systemic consequences such as an increased numberof diplomatic crises between industrialstates. But we do not know how variationsin interdependencebetweenspecificpairs of states affect bargainingbetween those particular states. Like the dependencytheorists, attributionof certaincharacteristicsequally
throughoutthe system precludes statements about particularsituations. We may
legitimately make claims for the prevalence of dependency or interdependenceas
modal characteristicsof the internationalsystem, but we must not commit the
ecological fallacy and argue that those characteristicsdeterminethe natureof relations between any given pair of states. Thus, while Morse is awareof distributional
problems, he does not really explore them, and cannot explore them unless he
establishes empirically that interdependence exists in any bargaining group.
KeohaneandNye's Power and Interdependencealso concentrateson dependent
variables, that is, on the consequences of interdependence.It is not concernedwith
measuring transaction flows, nor does it assume as do dependency theorists,
dependency-as-vulnerabilityresearchers, and many traditionalinternationalrelations scholars that disparities in economic capabilities or vulnerabilitynecessarily
lead to inequitable bargaining outcomes, much less to permanent international
hierarchy. Outcomes are an empirical problem: the question is, how does interdependence affect bargainingstyles and distributionof rewards?
Following Morse, Keohane and Nye are concerned also with demonstrating
that interdependenceis more than a quality or condition that can be measuredby
looking at transactionflows. Interdependenceinvolves a new type of international
politics that cannotbe understoodor describedby using the concepts and categories
of traditionalinternationalrelations analysis.
The realistparadigm,where only nation-statesare actors, and where outcomes
of internationalconflicts are predicted from the relative power position of those
states (or, as dependency theorists would have it, from the economic power of
states), does not help us understandproblems as complex as the law of the sea
negotiations, Canadian-Americanrelations, or internationalmonetaryaffairs.

A new international politics?

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The authors' earlier work on transnationalrelations18had already made this

point-perhaps too strongly, because the transnationalrelations "approach" provided no criteria to distinguish the important from the routine in international
politics. As long as any actors use resources to influence the behavior of other
actors, across nationalboundaries,they become a legitimate subject of inquiry. It
may be interestingto explore how provincial and state bureaucratsin Canadaand
the United States influence each other (transgovernmentalrelations)'9 but it is
difficult to arguethatcomparedto detente, SALT, or the MiddleEast problem, such
researchis of equal theoreticalor practicalimportance.As a guide to research,then,
the authors' previous contributionextended the boundariesof the field almost to
infinity. While the realist paradigmcontains many shortcomings,at least it has the
virtue of directing attention to what is truly importantin internationalpolitics,
namely the actors, policies, trends, and issues that are potentially or actually the
source of war and peace.
The purpose of Power and Interdependence, however, is not to replace the
realist paradigm, but rather to demonstratethat it, along with other models of
internationalprocesses, is insufficient for describing and explaining the politics of
relationshipscharacterizedby "complex interdependence."The authorspresentthis
concept as an ideal type. Its hallmarks are (1) multiple channels of diplomatic
interaction, by all types of actors, (2) absence of hierarchy on issues (that is,
securityissues do not dominatethe global or bilateralagenda, and many issues arise
from domestic sources), and (3) irrelevance of military force in determiningthe
outcomes of bargainingand conflicts. The political processes found in a condition
of complex interdependencealso differ significantly from those of traditionaldiplomacy. There is, they suggest, an absence of linkage between issue-areas when
bargainingtakes place, agendas are frequently determinedby domestic pressure
groups and other non-state actors (e.g., MNCs), and internationalorganizations
often play an importantand independentrole in bargaining, at least on areas of
global concern.
The realist (and other) models do not help us understandthese processes
adequately.A criticalquestion, "why do internationalregimes persist or change?"
is not even raised in the traditionalliterature,they contend. (It could be argued,
however, that balanceof power theories are eminently concernedwith the problem
of change in the internationalorder.) And a standardclaim of the realists and
dependency theorists that bargainingoutcomes can be predictedfrom the relative
power position of nationalactors, is patentlyfalse when we look at many contemporary internationalrelationships.
Keohane and Nye consistentlyoutline their methods and develop their findings

18JosephS. Nye andRobertO. Keohane, eds., TransnationalRelationsand WorldPolitics (Cambridge,

Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press, 1972).
19KalJ. Holsti and Thomas A. Levy, "Bilateral Institutionsand TransgovernmentalRelations Between
Canadaand the United States," InternationalOrganization Vol. 28 (Autumn 1974): 283-309.

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clearly. Their approachis to describe first the various regimes in the oceans and
monetary issue-areas, and in Canadian-Americanand Australian-Americanrelations, and subsequentlyto measure to what extent the relationshipsin those cases
conform to the three essential characteristicsof the complex interdependenceideal
type. Next, they explain regime change or persistence, or the outcomes of conflicts,
using four differentmodels: (1) the economic process model (economic growthand
technological innovationcreate demandsfor regime change), (2) the overall power
structuremodel (changes in relative military strength determine bargaining outcomes and regime change), (3) the issue-structuremodel (change and outcomes can
be predictedfrom the relative strengthof the actors within each issue area), and (4)
the internationalorganizationmodel (change and outcomes derive from "organizationally dependent variables," such as voting power, ability to form coalitions,
control of elite networks, and the like). The authorsstart with the simplest model
(overall structure),and add complexity from other models until a satisfactoryexplanation of regime change or bargainingoutcomes is achieved. For example, the
overall structuremodel would have predictedthe United States to play a majorrole
in constructingthe internationalmonetaryregimes of the 1920s, but it was Great
Britain, a declining militarypower, which neverthelessset the rules of the monetary
game in that decade. Similarly, because the United States has remainedmilitarily
the most powerful countryin the world, the overall structuremodel could not have
predictedor explained the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, and the
declining ability of the United States to determine the rules of a new monetary
regime. Satisfactoryexplanations of regime change can be derived by combining
elements of the othermodels, however. A majortask of the book is to illustratehow
this can be done.
Keohane and Nye are generally very judicious in assessing the utility of the
four models, when applied to the four cases, and in a few instances confess that
regime change or persistence cannot be explained sufficiently using any combination of the models. And where facts fit only imperfectly with the predictions, no
exaggeratedclaims of satisfactoryexplanationsof their own internationalorganization model are put forward.
The two case studies of bilateralrelationshipsare supportedwith impressive
evidence. The Australian-Americanrelationship,examined back to 1920, contains
few of the characteristicsof complex interdependence;hence, the outcomes of
conflicts are largely dependentupon the relative power position of the two statesjust as the overall power structuremodel would predict. In the Canadian-American
case, also studiedback to the 1920s, the characteristicsof complex interdependence
become increasingly evident; and as they develop, outcomes of conflict tend to
favor Canadamore frequently-a finding obviously at odds with the overall power
structuremodel, but reasonablyconsistent with the authors'internationalorganization model. Canadian-Americanrelations demonstratehow multiple channels of
access, non-state actors, transgovernmentalrelations, non-linkage of issues, economic vulnerability and other features of complex interdependencecombine to
produce a relationship where traditionalpower factors and military capacity are
almost totally irrelevant.

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523

It is importantin evaluating this study to recall what the authorsare, and are
not, doing. Keohane and Nye do not claim that this volume presents a general
theory of internationalpolitics, or even a formal theory of the politics of complex
interdependence. Since they examine their subject primarily from a systems
perspective, the role of domestic politics and personalities is not covered
thoroughly.These variables, of course, would be essential componentsof a formal
theory.
Nor is the book intendedto replace other views of, or approachesto, international politics but ratherto demonstratethat in certain types of relationshipsthe
relatively parsimonious overall structureand economic process models (and by
implicationthe dependencymodel) fail at the levels of description,explanation,and
prediction. This is not to argue, then, that the more complex and novel models
introduced in the book would be useful for studying, for example, Sino-Soviet
relations. But they are necessary tools for understandingother types of relationships, particularlythose which contain the characteristicsof complex interdependence.
The book does not identify all those relationshipsin the world where complex
interdependenceprevails. This is a theoreticalbook, not a foray into measurement.
Emphasis is on the relationship between complex interdependenceand regime
change, not on the causes of interdependenceor vulnerability. Although observations on these mattersare offered, they are not developed systematically. Yet, the
authorsare convinced that interdependenceis increasing. But they do not admit-as
some have-that the "high politics" of security are being replaced by economic,
resource, andecological problems. Whatis happening,of course, is thatthe international agenda is becoming increasinglylengthy; the additionof each new item does
not mean that the others are being resolved, nor that welfare-orientedproblems are
displacing security problems. There is nothing wrong with looking at the world
throughMorgenthau-coloredglasses so long as we understandthatit is intellectually
fruitful to do so only for certain types of relationships. As long as we have the
rivalries of the great powers, to say nothing of the activities of the Libyas,
Ethiopias, Somalias, and others, we are a long way from achieving complex interdependenceuniversally.
The authorspropose, nevertheless, that the conditions for furtherdevelopment
of complex interdependenceare propitious. The hierarchicorderingof states in the
system, where hegemons like Great Britain establish and maintain international
regimes unilaterally,is rapidlydeclining. (The presentinabilityof the United States
to controlthe outcomes in a variety of global and bilateralrelationshipsis evidence
of this proposition.) This importantpredictionabout the long-rangestructuralconsequences of complex interdependencecontradicts Scott's analysis of increased
system instability, the forecasts of dependency theorists, and the predictions of
realists who emphasize the mammothgap in military capabilities between the nuclear powers and other states. The latter groups visualize the world in terms of
ever-increasingstatus and power distances; Keohane and Nye offer a much more
egalitarianassessment.
In a system where power and influence are becoming more equitably distrib-

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uted, new types of leadership (unilateral "example-setting," or collective

problem-solving) have to be employed. These types of leadershipnot only result
from complex interdependence, but contribute to its development as well. The
authors,in their normativechapter, applaudsuch developments,thoughthey do not
suggest any inevitabilityto them. Clearly, attemptsto re-institutehegemonic leadership styles, or individual government initiatives that set off conflict spirals, remain strong possibilities. Note, for example, the unilateral actions to establish
200-mile economic zones.
Power and Interdependenceis a closely reasonedpiece of scholarship.It may
well prove to be one of the most significantwritingsin internationalrelationstheory
of the past two decades. It does contain, however, a few difficulties that should be
confrontedin futureresearch.The authorscorrectlyemphasize thatin a conditionof
complex interdependence,intemationalconflict does not disappear.It is the irrelevance of military force that helps distinguish conflict behavior in complex interdependencerelationshipsfrom others. This may be correct in the sense that threats
of militaryaction are not made while bargaining,let us say, on monetaryissues. But
what if there is a roughequivalent to militaryforce thatis used to threatenor inflict
punishments?For example, isn't a unilateralthreatdrasticallyto devalue currency
an equivalent to a threatto use militaryforce in a territorialconflict? Are not trade
wars equivalentto certainforms of militarycoercion?Is it possible to approximatea
condition of complex interdependencewhen such "wars" are going on, or threaten
to break out at any moment?20The authorsmight consider reformulatingthis one
characteristicof complex interdependence-the minor role of military force-and
substitutefor it a broadercategory, such as the absence of grossly harmfulthreats.
Such a category would be difficult to operationalize, but its use would at least
indicate that a genuinely new type of international relationship has not been
achieved so long as any extremely harmfulactions are threatenedor taken by any
members of an interdependentsystem.
Interdependencemight indeed give rise to new types of internationalpolitics
and leadershippatterns, but Keohane and Nye could have speculated more on the
problem of costs it creates for small states. Increased interdependencebetween
unequal partners, for example, may lead to the greater loss of domestic policymaking capacity among the weak, so that incentives for disintegratingfrom the
system begin to emerge. Witness Canada's recent attempts to reduce American
penetrationof the society and economy, and to build counterweightswith Japanand
Europe. Complex interdependencemight be a desirable condition to achieve for

20UsingKeohane and Nye's criteria, the Iceland-Britaindyad would not approximatecomplex interdependence because force was threatenedand used-albeit carefully-during the "Cod War." Yet, in
1971, the United States imposed a 10 percent surchargeon all imports which, combined with devaluations, harmedthe economic interests of America's major trading partners.While such punitive action
was not technicallythe same as a display of militarypower, it certainlyhad few of the characteristicsof a
"new diplomacy." According to the authors' formulations, the American action would be consistent
with a condition of complex interdependence.

A new international politics?

525

some, but it has not been adequatelydemonstratedthat in such a systemjoint gains

necessarilyincrease as comparedto more traditionaldiplomaticrelationships.And,
as Haas points out, if one unit "blows up," destructiveescalationin interdependent
systems is more probablethan in relationshipsof lower interconnectedness.21
It is debatablewhether Keohane and Nye have done full justice to the realist
view of internationalpolitics. For example, they argue that this model predicts
outcomesof conflict or regime change solely on the basis of militarycapacity. But if
there is any one problemthat has bedevilled the realists, it is how to combine the
various "sources of power" to come up with a valid world power ranking. The
classical texts emphasizethat population,territory,economic level, and technology
are just as importantas military strength.
Moreover, Keohane and Nye claim that the realist (overall structure)model is
also inadequatebecause it fails to explain regime change and bargainingoutcomes
in economic and social areas. But, in my opinion, the realists, unlike dependency
theorists, would never claim that militarypower is directly relevantto issues other
than security. They are interestedprimarilyin the classical issues of war, peace, and
the balanceof power, leaving othermattersto experts on internationalorganization
or law. And while they might not be interestedin regime change in the oceansexcept where such changes impinge on security interests-they are vitally concerned with changes in the internationalpolitical system, the causes of those
changes, and their predictedresults. The subtitle of this volume, WorldPolitics in
Transition, in which the transitionis implied to be a result of growing interdependence, is thus misleading. Worldpolitics has always been in transition,which is not
to deny the authors' major point that new types of relationshipsdo exist and that
new models are needed to describeand understandthem. But in attemptingto apply
old approachesor models to areas for which they were never intended, they are
setting up straw men.
Finally, by defining interdependencein terms of behavioralattributesin bargaining and playing down the question of vulnerabilities, the authors may have
difficulty identifyingpairs of states which really are interdependent.Multiplechannels of diplomaticinteraction,absence of hierarchyor linkage on issues, and irrelevance of military force are probably characteristicof the relations between Japan
and Bhutan, Canadaand the Bahamas, and India and Finland. But are these states
really interdependent?Withoutsome specified thresholdsof impactor vulnerability,
or at least some minimumflow of transactions,interdependencecannot exist, even
if the otherthree conditions are met. In short, Keohane and Nye may have outlined
some necessary conditions for interdependence,but they are not sufficient conditions.
None of these comments points to any critical flaw in Power and Interdependence. On the contrary,the book is a measured,but very importantstep in pointing
-the way to more satisfactory analyses of a complex world. As with the authors'
previous work, it should stimulateresearchand provide guidelines for exploration

21"IsThere a Hole in the Whole?. . . " p. 857.

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of the political aspectsof global economic and social issues. While perhapscomplicated for the beginning undergraduate,it will command a leading place in the
readinglists of advancedstudents. Aside from the substantivemeritsof the book, it
is also a model of the blending of theory with empirical work.
But what of dependency?In their preface, Keohane and Nye dismiss the body
of literatureon dependencytheoryas irrelevantto theirconcernwith regime change.
But their analysis has some implicationsfor the relationsbetween the industrialand
developing countries. For one thing, the dependency theorists, like Keohane and
Nye, emphasize the importance of non-state actors and transnationalrelations.
Wherethey could disagreeis on the connectionbetween such actors and diplomatic
activity. To Frankand others, for example, diplomatswork to preserveand develop
a basic world economic superstructure;Keohane and Nye would reject such a
deterministicstance.
On the question of bargaining outcomes, their analysis would partially
support-at least by implication-the predictionsof dependencytheorists. Where
complex interdependencedoes not exist-as is presumablythe case in the relations
between most LDCs and the industrialcountries-power and coercion appearmore
frequentlyandoutcomes of conflict do reflect capabilitydifferentials.If this was the
case between the United States and Australia,then it shouldbe trueeven more so in
America's relationswith Thailand, GreatBritain's connection with Sri Lanka, and
France's diplomacy toward Chad or Niger. Keohane and Nye would not agree,
however, thatthe outcomes necessarilyconstituteexploitation. Yet, where the three
conditionsof complex interdependencearepresent-and these might very well exist
in the relations between some industrialcountries and a few developing nationsthen it follows that bargainingoutcomes between them, as in the Canada-United
States case, would be roughlyequal-a propositionthatdependencytheoristswould
never accept.
But all of this is by way of speculation. The fact remains that writers on
interdependenceand dependencytheoristshave had very little to say to each other.
Whatever similarities appear in their work is more fortuitous than the result of
academic interchange.The lack of dialogue can be attributedboth to the different
intellectualmotivationsin their work and to fundamentaldifferences on conceptual
problems.
Dependency theory developed initially in Latin America among economists
and sociologists who were frustratedby the lack of internationalequality and the
continuedproblemsfaced in organizingsuccessful developmentstrategies.Many of
the analyses owe a greaterdebt to Marxismthanto traditionalinternationalrelations
theory. Their driving force has been moral concern and their approachhas emphasized theory on a grand scale ratherthan empirical work.22In contrast, writers
on interdependencehave been motivatedby intellectualcuriosity, predominatelya
22Thisis not to imply that all of the literaturegrouped under the dependency category is devoid of
empirical work. Some of the writing takes off from the careful investigations of Latin American
economists who soughtto demonstratethatprimarycommodityproducerswere sufferingfrom worsening
termsof trade. Raul Prebisch'swork for ECLA is particularlythorough.AndreGunderFrank'stheoreti-

A new internationalpolitics?

527

desire to describeand measureratherthanto explain. Most have played down policy

implications of their analyses. The call for cooperation and policy coordination
appearsrepeatedlyin the literature,but only a few have explorednationalautonomy
and other strategies as a possible solution to the problems posed by interdependence.
The subjectof inquiryalso differs. Writerson dependency-even dependencyas-vulnerability23-are concerned solely with the relations between the world's
center and its peripheries. Without really asking the question why, writers on
interdependencehave confined their studies to the relations between industrial
states. Although Keohane and Nye point to the possibility of coalition-makingby
developing states in internationalorganization,as well as the power of the weak in
such issue-areasas the Law of the Sea, the other issue-areasand bilateralrelations
they explore lie predominatelyin the domains of the industrialstates. Are these
writersimplying, then, thatinterdependenceas a conditionexists only between such
states?Or has the easy availabilityof tradeand investmentdata between the industrial states determinedthe focus of inquiry?
We can summarizeschematically some of the major substantivedifferences
between five of the approachesto internationalrelationsdiscussed in this essay: (1)
dependencytheory, (2) vulnerabilityanalysis, (3) transactionanalysis, (4) realism,
and (5) complex interdependence.
This list is by no means exhaustive, but it does help us evaluatethe possibilities
of, or barriersto, intellectual consolidation. It appearsthat on substantiveissues
there are few insurmountableimpedimentsto building bridges between the various
approaches.The realistparadigm,for example, does not precludeconsiderationsof
non-state actors in diplomacy, nor is there any particularreason why those interested in measuring changes in internationaltransactions should confine their
investigations to the relations between industrial states. Dependency theorists
should certainly acknowledge that not all issues can be reducedto economics and
that some foreign policy actions are undertakenfor militarysecuritypurposes. And
Keohane and Nye might be urged to explore the advantagesof more autonomous
policies for states enmeshed in systems of complex interdependence.Using the list,
readersmay wish to speculate on other areas where collaborationmight be undertaken.
The major problems preventingsynthesis appearto be epistemologicalrather
than substantive.While dependencytheory may tell us something about the lot of
the average developing country in an internationaleconomy that does contain

cal statementshave been based on case histories of Chile and Brazil. It is interestingthat portions of
dependencytheoryhave been subjectedto empiricaltesting primarilyby NorthAmericanscholars. See in
particularRobertR. Kaufmanet al., "A PreliminaryTest of the Theory of Dependency," Comparative
Politics Vol. 7 (April 1975): 303-30, and LawrencyR. Alschuler, "Satellizationand Stagnationin Latin
America," InternationalStudies QuarterlyVol. 20 (March 1976): 39-82, and the Kurth-Rosenvolume
cited in fn. 1.
23Singer's

Weak States in a World of Powers concentrates on the relations between the major powers

and their former dependencies.

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528

Table 1 Similarities and differences on substantive issues in

Dependency

Vulnerability

Scope of Inquiry

North-South
(center-periphery)

mostly NorthSouth

Focus on independent or dependent

variabks

independent

independent

Types of essential
actors

non-state

state

Inquiryfocused on
characteristicsof
system, actors, or
pairs of actors?

system

pairs of actors

Major instruments
of bargaining

economic coercion,
backed by threatsof
military force or
subversion

economic coercion

What determinesbargaininglconflict
outcomes?

economic exchange
relationships

comparativedegree
of vulnerabilityin
dyads

Results on system of
bargainingand
conflicts

exploitation and
systemic hierarchy

probablehierarchy

Policy implications;
appropriateresponses to national
or systemic
characteristics

isolation/autarchy

diversify markets
and sourcesof supply

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A new internationalpolitics?

analyses of dependency and interdependence

Realists

Transactionalists

Complex
Interdependence

Western industrial
nations

universal

mostly Western industrialnations

independent

both

both

non-state (societies

state

state and non-state

system

all

all

not analyzed

military and
economic coercion;
diplomacy

diplomacy;transnational & transgovernmentalalliances; exploitation

of vulnerabilitiesin
issue areas

not analyzed

military/economic
power

issue areavulnerability; non-state actor

roles, etc.

not analyzed

imbalance/balanceof
power

more equitablerewards than in noninterdependent

systems; less
hierarchy

coordinatepolicies
to maximizejoint
gains

varied

policy coordination
with appropriate
forms of leadership

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InternationalOrganization

inequitable characteristics, its economic determinism, disregard for measuring

changes in dependentvariables, and casual treatmentof empiricalmaterialscannot
be reconciled easily with the canons of inquiry extant among non-Marxistsocial
scientists. The transactionalistscan be faulted for a generally atheoreticalconcern
with measurementand for confining their inquiryto an unnecessarilynarrowgeographic domain. Dependency theorists no doubt would look with strong disfavor
upon an academic exercise that studies externalities-quantifies transactions-but
avoids examining the nature or consequences of those transactions. And realists
might quarrelwith the developersof the complex interdependenceviewpoint on the
groundsthatthe latterhave become overly enamoredwith relativelytrivial items on
the internationalagenda.
However, are there any majorpayoffs to a synthesis of these approaches?Is
bridge-buildinga worthwhileexercise? In my opinion, it is, because each of these
approachesor bodies of literaturetells us something aboutthe truthof international
relationships,but not all the truthaboutit. Each should help correctthe substantive
and theoretical shortcomings of the other. Those who promote the rhetoric of
interdependence,assumingthatit is a qualityor characteristicspreadequally around
the globe, should be made aware of the vulnerabilities-and frustrations-of the
weak. Those who see interdependenceas an inexorabletrendbringingbenefits to all
should understandthat interdependencealso has its costs. Policies of disintegration,
autarky,and isolation are often responsesto too much dependenceor asymmetrical
integration.We shouldattemptto appreciatethe fearsandperceptionsthatgive rise to
them. The weak and the vulnerablestates, many of which are inundatedby foreign
advisors, buffeted by wild fluctuationsin commodity prices and currency values,
and the object of vast flows of foreign culturalpenetration,should not be expected
to look upon interdependencein the same light as those who have strongcapabilities
and who are the actors in internationalrelations, not merely the objects. Dependency theorists, on the other hand, should recognize that not all internationaleconomic relations are zero-sum; collaborative enterprises between industrial and
developing countriescan bring importantadvantagesto the poor and enhance their
possibilities for indigenouseconomic and culturaldevelopment. And if they would
stop assuming that all countries must develop simultaneouslyalong a single path,
their conclusions might not be so pessimistic.
A debate between the proponentsof the various approachesto the study of
types of relationshipsin internationallife is long overdue. Analyses of interdependence and dependencerepresentdifferentworld views; these are sharedin large part
by government officials in the industrial and developing nations. If they are to
engage in fruitfuldialogue, it would serve all of us well if they could learn, through
the productsof scholars, to distinguish the facts and fantasies of each view.