Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Donations-First Part (Ada)
Donations-First Part (Ada)
1. LIGUEZ V. CA
Facts: Petitioner-appellant Conchita Liguez filed a complaint against the
widow and heirs of the late Salvador P. Lopez to recover a parcel of land.
Liguez averred to be its legal owner, pursuant to a deed of donation of
said land, executed in her favor by the late owner, Salvador P. Lopez. The
defense interposed was that the donation was null and void for having an
illicit causa or consideration, which was the plaintiffs entering into marital
relations with Salvador P. Lopez, a married man; and that the property had
been adjudicated to the appellees as heirs of Lopez by the court of First
Instance.
Issue: WON the motive may be regarded as causa when it predetermines
the purpose of the contract.
Held: Yes. In the present case, it is scarcely disputable that Lopez would
not have conveyed the property in question had he known that appellant
would refuse to cohabit with him; so that the cohabitation was an implied
condition to the donation, and being unlawful, necessarily tainted the
donation itself.
2. REPUBLIC V. AFP
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the lands in question
are alienable and disposable lands?
HELD: The Court grants the Petition.
FACTS:
Lots X, Y-1 and Y-2 were lands of the public domain pursuant to
Proclamation No. 168 (Proc. 168). In 1983, Proclamation No. 2273 (Proc.
2273) was issued which removed and segregated Lots Y-1 and Y-2 from
the reservation and declaring them open for disposition to qualified
applicants. As a result, only Lot X which consists of 15,020 square meters
remained part of the reservation now known as Magsaysay Park.
The record discloses that the heirs of CabaloKusop and Atty. Flaviano
petitioned the President to have Lots Y-1 and Y-2 taken out of the
reservation for the reason that through their predecessor CabaloKusop
(Kusop), they have acquired vested private rights over these lots. This
campaign resulted in Proc. 2273, which re-classified and returned Lots Y-1
and Y-2 to their original alienable and disposable state.
In 1997, the heirs and Flaviano filed applications for the issuance of
individual miscellaneous sales patents over the whole of Lot X.
The heirs did not question Proc. 2273, precisely because they were the
beneficiaries thereof; nor did they object to the retention of Lot X as part
of the park reserve. Instead, in 1997, they applied for, and were granted,
sales patents over Lot X.
Evidently, the sales patents over Lot X are null and void, for at the time
the sales patents were applied for and granted, the land had lost its
alienable and disposable character. It was set aside and was being utilized
for a public purpose, that is, as a recreational park. And under the present
Constitution, national parks are declared part of the public domain, and
shall be conserved and may not be increased nor diminished, except by
law.
The government, as the agent of the State, is possessed of the plenary
power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored
recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be
granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way
of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.
The heirs and Flavianos actions betray their claim of ownership to Lot X.
When Proc. 168 was issued, they did not institute action to question its
validity, using as cause of action their claimed ownership and title over
the land. The same is true when Proc. 2273 came out. They did not file
suit to invalidate it because it contravenes their claimed ownership over
Lot X. They simply sat and waited for the good graces of the government
to fall on their laps. They simply waited for the State to declare them
beneficiaries of the land.
The principle of estoppel bars one from denying the truth of a fact which
has, in the contemplation of law, become settled by the acts and
proceedings of judicial or legislative officers or by the act of the party
himself, either by conventional writing or by representations, express or
implied or in pais.
Finally, as regards AFP-RSBS rights, the Court sustains the petitioners view
that any title issued covering non-disposable lots even in the hands of an
alleged innocent purchaser for value shall be cancelled.
The Court cannot ignore the basic principle that a spring cannot rise
higher than its source; as successor-in-interest, AFP-RSBS cannot acquire a
better title than its predecessor, the herein respondents-intervenors.
3. REPUBLIC V. GUZMAN
Three essential elements of a donation:
1. Reduction in the patrimony of the donor;
2. Increase in the patrimony of the done;
3. Intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi.
It is also required that the donation be made in a public document and
that its acceptance be made in the same deed of donation or in a
separate public document, which has to be recorded as well.
FACTS:
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the
spouses Simeon Guzman (naturalized American) and Helen Meyers
Guzman (American citizen). In 1968, Simeon died leaving to his heirs,
Helen and David, an estate consisting of several parcels of land in
Bulacan.
In 1970, Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
the Estate, dividing and adjudicating to themselves all of the property,
and registered it to the RD a year after.
In 1981, Helen executed a Deed of Quitclaim, assigning, transferring and
conveying her share of the properties to David. But since it was not
registered, she executed another Deed of Quitclaim to confirm the first.
In 1994, Atty. Batongbacal wrote the OSG andfurnished it with documents
showing that Davids ownership of of the estate was defective. He
argued that Art. XII of the Constitution only allows Filipinos to acquire
private lands in the country. The only instances when a foreigner may
acquire private property are by hereditary succession and if he was
formerly a natural-born citizen who lost his Filipino citizenship. Moreover,
it contends that the Deeds of Quitclaim executed by Helen were really
donations inter vivos.
Republic filed with RTC a Petition for Escheat praying that of Davids
interest be forfeited in its favor. RTC dismissed. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a donation inter vivos
HELD: NO.
Not all the elements of a donation are present. The transfer of the
properties by virtue of a Deed of Quitclaim resulted in the (1) reduction of
her patrimony as donor and the (2) consequent increase in the patrimony
of David as donee. However, Helens (3) intention to perform an act of
liberality in favor of David was not sufficiently established. The 2
Quitclaims reveal that Helen intended to convey to her son certain parcels
of land and to re-affirm it, she executed a waiver and renunciation of her
rights over these properties. It is clear that Helen merely contemplated a
waiver of her rights, title, interest over the lands in favor of David, not a
donation. She was also aware that donation was not possible.
Moreover, the essential element of acceptance in the proper form and
registration to make the donation valid is lacking. The SPA executed by
David in favor of Atty. Abela was not his acceptance, but an
acknowledgment that David owns the property referred to and that he
authorizes Atty. Abela to sell the same in his name. Further, there was
nothing in the SPA to show that he indeed accept the donation.
However, the inexistence of a donation does not make the repudiation of
Helen in favor David valid. There is NO valid repudiation of inheritance as
Helen had already accepted her share of the inheritance when she,
together with David, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate, dividing and adjudicating between them all the properties. By
virtue of that settlement, the properties were registered in their names
and for 11 years, they possessed the land in the concept of owner. Thus,
the 2 Quitclaims have no legal force and effect. Helen still owns of the
property.
4. GRONIFILIO V. CA
5. BETTS V. CA
FACTS:
2. Whether testator Don Jesus can or cannot revoke his previous will.
Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doa Tinay, together with all their living
children, entered into a duly notarized agreement, (escritura de particion
HELD:
HELD:
1. NO. At the outset, let us differentiate between a simple donation and an
onerous one. A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure
liberality (no strings attached), while an onerous donation is one which is
subject to burdens, charges or future services equal to or more in value
than the thing donated. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with
an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts; hence, the
formalities required for a valid simple donation are not applicable.
We rule that the donation was simple, not onerous. Even conceding that
petitioners full payment of the purchase price of the lot might have been
a burden to him, such payment was not however imposed by the donor as
a condition for the donation.
It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge
petitioner as the donee. The words in the deed are in fact typical of a
pure donation. We agree with Respondent Court that the payments made
by petitioner were merely his voluntary acts. This much can be gathered
from his testimony in court, in which he never even claimed that a burden
or charge had been imposed by his grandmother.
The payments even seem to have been made pursuant to the power of
attorney executed by Catalina Reyes in favor of petitioner, her grandson,
authorizing him to execute acts necessary for the fulfillment of her
obligations. Nothing in the records shows that such acts were meant to be
a burden in the donation.
2. NO. As a pure or simple donation, the provisions of the civil code apply.
The donation, following the theory of cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code),
is perfected only upon the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by
the donee. Furthermore, [i]f the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and
this step shall be noted in both instruments.
Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable; its
absence makes the donation null and void.