The End of the Cold Year - 25 Years On

Cold War History

General Introduction by Michael Cox

No single event after World War II was to generate as much controversy
amongst historians as the origins of the Cold War. But it was not until the
1960s that many in the West began to question the hitherto unchallenged
notion that the key reason for the conflict was that decidedly expansionist,
distinctly totalitarian anti-body known as the Soviet Union. Then something
rather extraordinary happened. The old consensus gave way to an altogether
different narrative not because of any new archival discovery but quite
simply because the world had changed: in part because of Americas
increasingly contested intervention into Vietnam; in part because of the growth
of a distinct counter-culture in the West; and in part because the old idea of a
monolithic and unified communist threat to the great globe itself no longer
made much sense. And inevitably, as the world changed, so too did the way
that many historians wrote about the Cold War. Indeed, something now
defined as revisionism became all the rage, to such a degree that by the
end of the 1960s a new generation of critical Americans were insisting that
it was not the aggressive ambitions of the USSR which had caused the
tensions, but rather those of an altogether more powerful and purposeful
United States. In search of new markets to conquer, self-confident in its
position of preponderance, and equipped with an ideology of liberal
exceptionalism that could countenance no opposition, America it was now
argued had not only caused the conflict. It had kept it alive thereafter with a
series of provocations all designed to ensure its primacy in the new bipolar
world.
But nothing in history stays the same forever, and over time the revisionists
themselves came under attack during what has now come to be referred to by
some writers as the long 1970s. This did not lead to a complete counterrevolution. Few now championed the old line of an ideologically driven USSR
seeking world domination. Rather historians now adopted a more balanced post-revisionist - position that was neither right-wing nor radical but instead
measured and moderate. Gone too was the blame game, its place now being
taken by an analysis of the Cold War that viewed it less and less as a

competition between two missionary superpowers guided by clearly defined

master plans, and more as a tragedy or dilemma in which policy-makers on
both sides unintentionally fed insecurities on the other.
Indeed, as the historical debate shifted, so too did the way in which analysts
viewed the meaning of the Cold War. Should we now be viewing it as a
dangerous, zero-sum conflict, they asked? Hadnt the Cold War in fact
introduced a certain kind of stability to great power relations? And if it had as
it seemed have done in the era of superpower dtente and Ostpolitik in the
1970s should we not be thinking of the Cold War in perhaps more benign
terms? Many clearly thought so, and a spate of books and articles now began
to appear suggesting one of two things: either that the real Cold War with its
intense ideological rivalries had, in effect, come to an end; or that we should
now regard the Cold War less as something war causing and more as a
system that had brought some degree of stability to a once war-prone world.
This did not mean the Cold War was entirely without risk. What it did mean
though was that the world was less unstable after the war than it had been
before it. Certainly, when compared to the extraordinarily conflict-ridden
period that had opened up in 1914 and closed in 1945 the Cold War looked to
have created a world order in which great power differences could now be
managed without resort to war.
Two developments put paid to this way of thinking: the election in 1980 of an
American president who announced in very Cold War terms that the United
States would soon be consigning the USSR into that proverbial dustbin of
history; and the emergence of a novel kind of Soviet leader who started to
talk quite openly about constructing a new kind of relationship with the
capitalist West. The rise of both leaders was of enormous significance of
course, for both in their very different ways posed a serious challenge to the
normal way of thinking about the Cold War relationship. Nonetheless, the bulk
of writers and the overwhelming majority of policy-makers continued to think
that the old order would persist. Reagan might have sounded radical and
Gorbachev more user-friendly to western ears. But the structures in which
both operated were not likely to change any time soon. Nor was there much
chance of serious change occurring anyway. The two superpowers may have
had their fair share of problems. In fact, a minor industry had arisen in the
1980s predicting the decline of at least one of them (the United States). But
neither the US nor the Soviet Union showed serious signs of failing altogether.

Bipolarity and the long peace which some claimed the Cold War had
produced looked as secure as ever.
There is now a voluminous literature about how this apparently secure world
collapsed in 1989 and no doubt much more will be written in the future. But
at least two things can be said about the end of the Cold War with certainty.
One is that hardly anybody of significance saw it coming; and the other is that
once it had ended writers once more began to man their various theoretical
and political barricades in what turned into yet another deeply divisive debate
about the Cold War - though this time not about its meaning but about why it
had come to an unexpected end! Thus on one side stood those of a more
conservative persuasion who thought that it was the tough policies of Ronald
Reagan that had made the decisive difference. Meanwhile, on the other, there
was an equally vocal group that maintained Reagans get tough policies had if
anything extended the Cold War. Indeed, if one wished to explain 1989 one
should look less at the Reagan factor and more at Soviet economic problems
and the ways in which these compelled a Soviet retreat. This however did not
satisfy the members of at least two other camps: one which pointed to the
central role played by at least one very remarkable individual namely Mikhail
Gorbachev in bringing about change; and another (later sailing under the
banner of constructivism) which assigned an equally special place to ideas
in making 1989 possible. Nor did the debate end there. As the archives
opened and we were able to look in more detail at the diplomacy of the period,
other writers began to look beyond the superpowers, suggesting that it was
not so much what was being said or done in Moscow and Washington that
shaped the course of history but rather the diplomatic interventions of key
European leaders like Mitterrand, Thatcher, and Kohl.
Whether or not one sees the end of the Cold War as the result of US
pressure, Soviet economic decline, Gorbachevs new thinking, or even the
unintended consequence of poorly thought out policies emanating from
Moscow, there is little doubting how much academic excitement has been
generated by the end of the Cold War. Hopefully this collection of essays will
convey some of that excitement. Published in the journal Cold War History
over the better part of a decade, together the articles here provide what we
think is a fascinating guide to at least some of the key issues. In the first
section, four lively pieces by senior academics discuss one of the most
controversial of questions: namely, not how did the Cold War end or what
caused it to end, but instead who ended the Cold War. Stated bluntly - was it

Gorbachev or Reagan? In the second section, articles by two leading

historians one Russian, the other Norwegian look at the end of the Cold
War and suggest interesting and very different ways of thinking about the
forces that led to Gorbachev taking the decisions he did in 1989. Of one thing
we can be certain, however. The question as to whether it was Soviet imperial
overstretch or Gorbachev that was the critical factor in determining what
happened in 1989 will be debated for many years to come.
Diplomacy also played a crucial role during 1989 and 1990 and the central
importance of diplomacy is brought home in two detailed pieces published in
section three of this collection. Finally, in sections four and five we look at the
often ignored part played by Europeans in bringing the Cold War in Europe to
an end. Indeed, in the fifth and last section, two writers, including myself,
attempt to show that triumphalism of any sort - in this case of the American
variety has no place in the way historians should be thinking about 1989.
The West may have been the winner in 1989. Liberal democracy may have
been the outcome. But that is not the same thing as suggesting (as some
have done, unfortunately) that only one country in the West helped bring
about this transformational change. Europe may have remained dependent on
American protection; and the USA can legitimately lay claim to having helped
overcome Europes division in 1989. But without the attractive pull of Europe
and the active part played by certain key Europeans, the process may have
been more drawn out and the outcome less favourable to peace. Europe was
very much present at its own recreation in 1989.