KOL KINUYEL CHAPTER ONE Chapter One Misfinnaft fa person wishes to deprive himself ofthe benefit ofa particular object, he ean make it forbiddan tohimself Biblically by means of ap, neder (pl. nedarim ). Thisis a type of vow, recognized by the ‘Torah as binding, that imparts a prohibited status to an article. For example, if person says, “The benefit ofthis bread is forbidden to me,” he has effected a neder under which the bread is indeed forbidden to him Biblically. The ‘Torah states in this regard: yy? Pap xYWI-bz9 NYT dM XD, he shall not desecrate his word; according to whatever comes from his mouth shall he do." ‘A vower may render either his own or his fellow’s property forbidden to himself. He can also employ a neder to prohibit his own property to others, but not to prohibit another person's property to anyone besides himself. ‘A full neder declaration consists of a statement such as, “This bread is forbidden to me,” or, “This bread is like an offering to me.’"*! However, there are alternative formulas through which one can invoke a neder. These are the “equivalent terms” for nedarim and “partial declarations” of nedarim.'” The ‘Mishnah discusses these formulas. The Mishnah also touches upon alternative formulas for other Biblically binding declarations, such as oaths: ‘TED TH MN 4p — All equivalent terms for nedarim are effective like genuine nedarim, 0%) ‘em yne — and for charamim are effective like genuine charamim,* — miyrawa nays — and for oaths are NEDARIM 2a! ‘NOTES 1. Numbers 30:3 This is one eategory of neder, and is the eategory that is the focus of our tractate. There is, however, an additional way in ‘which an article ean be affected by a neder. Ifa person designates his personal object for Temple use, or his animal as an offering, itis ‘sutomatically consecrated by virtue of his declaration, which has the status of a neder. Nedarim in the latter category are known as “3 ‘apn, vows of consecration, These are discussed in Seder Kodashim. ‘The nedarim that are the subject of this tractate are known a8 "73 “Hox, vows of prohibition (Ran; see General Introduction for further Aiseussion ofthe various categories of nedarim) 2, Meaning, “It is forbidden to me just as an offering is forbid den.” {One may not benefit from an offering or other consecrated object] Tn the first example, the person explicitly declared the bread forbidden, but did not associate it with any previously vowed item, In the second example, the person did not explicitly declare it forbidden, but linked the status of the bread to that of an offering. Since an offering becomes consecrated — and thereby prohibited for benefit — through a neder (i. a vow of eanseration saying "This bread is like fan offering to me” is itself valid formula for a neder. (See Mareh Kohen.) ‘The basic neder does not require linkage of the subject of the vow (eg. the bread) to previously forbidden item (eg. an offering). The simple declaration “This bread is forbidden to me” is considered a full hneder, However, if one does link the subject of the vow toa previously forbidden item, he must link it to an item that became prohibited through a previous vow, not one that is inherently forbidden. Thus, ‘whereas “This breads ike an offering to me” isa binding neder, “This bread is like pork to me” is not a neder. The bread can be like an offering, sinee the offering itself became forbidden through a neder; however, it cannot be like pork, since pork is inherently forbidden, ‘The statement that it should bo like pork is therefore meaningless (Ran, citing Shevuos 20b; Ran below, 4a xp x ny; Rambar ibid, 47-9; see Rosh and Rashash). (A neder made by linking a permitted ‘object to a vowed objec is called “a neder through association” (geno, hatfasah), For discussion of whether this is merely another way of expressing the prohibition, or actually takes effect differently than the basic neder, see Ran to Shevuos 20a (fol. 8 in Rif); Mishneh LaMelech, Hil, Me'lah 49; Chidushei R’ Shimon §3; Mishnas R’ ‘Aharon ED.) {The preceding is the opinion of Ran here. Others maintain that the ‘baie neder doce require linkage ofthe subject ofthe neder to an item forbidden through a previous declaration, In their opinion, if one merely states “This bread is forbidden to me,” his neder is effective ‘under the law stated below) that even a partial declaration ofa neder is sufficient (Tosefos, Rosh et al). Ran bimeelf, in his elucidation of Rif to Shevuos 20a, adopts this latter view. See Mishneh LaMelech, Hil [Nedarim 11. CE. Chasam Sofer belo, 128.) 8. Equivalent terms are known as 2, kinagim (sing, kinay). Partial ‘declarations are known a 1, yados (sng. jad) ~ literally, handles. Partial declarations are described as yados (handles) because just as one ‘who grasps the handle ofa vessel is able to move the entire vesel, 20 too, one who bogins to declare a neder is able to effect fully on the basis of his partial declaration — as if ho expreseed the neder in its entirety (Ran, Rosh). 4. IF instead of saying “This bread isa horban (offering) to me,” one says “This bread is Ronan to me,” be has effected a neder. The term ‘honam is a kinuy (equivalent) of horban. Similarly, honach and Ronas fare equivalents of horban (Ran, from Mishnah 10a). "The Gemara (38, 10a) cites a dispute concerning the ergin ofthese Feinuyinn (equivalent terms). R’ Yockanan says that honam, konach and ‘honas mean korban (offering) in foreign languages. Reith Lakish says ‘that these terms were conceived by the Sages forthe purpose of being ‘used instead of horban by people wishing to effect nedari. (ee 10a for the reason the Sages sought to dissuade people from using the word heordon.) Certainly, according to R’ Yochanan, a vow using a Kinay is filly effective by Biblical la, since it is simply a vow in a foreign language. Even according to Reish Lakish, however, the vow is fully ctfectve Biblically. Every foroign language is considered a language by virtue of a public consensus to converse in a speifie manner. The concensus of the Sages that certain torms should have the same teaning as Forban is no less signfieant than the consensus of foreign rations to converse in their languages. Thus, a vow with any of these terms is fully valid Biblically (Ran), {Ron wonders why, according to R’ Yochanan, the Mishnah (on 108) lists specifically honam, honach and konas as kinuyim, rather than stating simply that aneder in any language is effetive.Ran’s answer to this question is cited below, 10a note 82. C. Tosafos 229". 5. Charamim (sing. cheirem) are vows that are similar nedarim. As in the ease of nedarim, there are two categories of charamim. One category consists of vows designating property as beloaging to either the Temple treasury or the Kohanim serving in the Temple. fa person says, “This article is cheirem,” it becomes designated as ether Terple property if he s0 specifies), or Kohanim’s property ambam, Hil ‘Arachin VaCharamim 6:1; soe Arachin 28b). The second category of ‘haramimn consists of prohibitive vows. If one says to his fellow, “I am ‘heirem to yoo,” the fellow is forbidden to benefit from the vower, for it i as though he has said, “My property is forbidden to you lke Teraple property.” Conversely, ifhe says, “You ae cheirer tome," the vower is forbidden to benefit from his fellow, as if he sui, ‘Your property is forbidden to me like Temple property” (Mishnah below, 7b, with Ran), In tis context, cheirem is actually another way of expressing a rneder. This the eategory Uo which the Mishnalh refers as it is related to the subject of our tractate (Ran; see Rashash; ef. Tosafos, Rosh, Rito) ‘The Mishnah teaches that kinuyim (equivalent terms) for cheirem are effective like the word cheirem itself. The equivalent terms are Cheirek, cheirech and cheirf (Mishnah 103). Thus, if one says, ‘These articles are cheireh to mo,” itis as fhe sai, “They are cheirem ‘to me,” and their benefit hecomes forbidden to him (Ran).NOTE 6 Ifinstoad of saying, “A sheowah (oath) that Iwill not eat this bread,” fone says, “A shebusah ete,” he becomes bound by an oath to refrain from eating it. Shevusah isa kinuy (equivalent term) for shevuah (Ran: see Mishnah 10a for additional kimi) (Ran notes thatthe Mishnah must be dealing with a case where the person did not include the Name of Godin his oath. That is, he did not say “A shevusak by God ete," but merely “A shevusah ets” If he had included God's Name, his declaration would be effective as an oath even without the rue of “equivalent terms” ~ ie. even if “shevusah” was meaningless — since “By God” itself is considered an oath! Obviously, then, the Mishnah means that “shevusah" is effective in its ‘awn right And since the Mishnah validates the oath on the basis of “shevusch” alone, we learn in passing that an oath need not include a reference to the Name in order to be effective, See Ran for Rabbein ‘Tam’s variant view, and for a lengthy discussion of this subject. Cf Tosafos. 1. Nezirus is the state of being a nazi. I'someone says, “Iam hereby nazi,” it inthe equivalent of his saying “Tam hereby a nazir,” and he fnters the state of nesirus (Ron; see Mishneh 10a for additional inuyim), 8, Ander never takes effect without a valid declaration, even though the person intends for ander. As the Gemara states (Shevuos 260): If ‘one resolved in his mind {to swear, he must (till utter [the oath] with Ais tips [and the same rule applies to nedarim } (Rash). Not every partial declaration is considered a yad and abl to effect a neder; it must be sufficiently clear to convey the vower's intent (see 4b note 15). The Gemara (5b-6a) discusses what degree of clarity is required in order for 1 partial declaration to be effective. Our Mishnah provides several ‘examples of effective ones 9. The Gemara (4b) explains this as meaning thatthe vower sid. “Tam ‘vowed fFom you i that which Teatof yours,” or, “Tam vowed frm you in that which I taste of yours." The same applies to the statements “I ‘am separated from you” and “T am distanced from you.” All of these statements are considered partial ~ rather than full ~ declarations, ‘because the vower neither declared that his fellow’ fod shall be “ike ‘an offering,” nor stated explicitly that it shall be forbidden (Ran However, since the vower's intent is evident through his partial declaration, the declaration is valid yod and effects the neder. [See Ran and Tosofoe for an alternative reading ofthe Mishnah, See also Ritoa at length} 10. ry, menudeh, has two meanings ~ excommunicated and dtoched (see Ta note 20). Ione says, “Tam menudeh to you" (and adds “in that which [eat of yours” Ritua; Ran to Ta; Tosofos there) itis possible to construe his words as a neder, but this is not necessarily their ‘meaning (see Gemara 7a). LR’ Akiva was uncertain whether “I am menudeh to you" constitutes ‘aneder and, unable to determine the halacha, he was forced te adopt ‘the stringent view. The phrase 21 m3 means literally: would ru. This describes a struggle, since its the manner of one pondering an elusive {ave to rub (his brow) (Ran to Ta aa 1"). Alternatively, ypin is related to 77x, palate. According to this, interpretation, R” Akiva found it more “palatable” to consider this a rneder, and was inclined to rule stringently (Ran bid; see Rosh therefor yet another explanation), ‘The Sages, howover, dispute R’ Akiva and rule that “I am manudeh to-you" is definitely nota neder (Gemara 73).| | 2b! KOL KINUYEL Gemiara The Mishnah hegins: vrs Br mwa 2 — ALL RQUIVALENT TERMS FORNEDARI ARE effective LIKE genuine NEDARIM. The Mishnah then states this law regarding charamim, oaths and nezirus ‘The Gemara asks: ‘av "33 x30 — What is the difference between the context ofnazir, wiptsy m9 ung xb7 — where [the Tanna] does not teach the principle of “equivalent terms” regarding all of these subjects)” ory73 33 x99 2401 — and the context of nedarim, wnpiab ungy — where he does teach the principle of “equivalent terms” regarding all of these subjects? ‘The Gemara answers: yn 3a pnp nyse 1777 DWH — Since the laws of aneder and anoath are written together inthe Torah,” Paya 2p ~ [the ‘Tanna] teaches the principle of “equivalent terms” regarding ‘these two subjects together in our Mishnah, even though the subject of our tractate is primarily nedarim; ‘ap pRANMDTY} wisp — and once he taught this principle regarding two subjects, he taught it regarding all [the other subjects] to which it applies, as well ‘The Gemara counters: x73} 103 ninaw nwa any — Then let [the Tanna] teach the principle of equivalent terms for oaths immediately after that of equivalent terms for nedarim! Why does he interrupt with ‘equivalent terms for charamim? ‘The Gemara responds: Bip KIDT MPH — Since he taught the principle regarding nedarim, ry xxon 7927 — whieh is a case of someone's prohibiting an article upon himself,®" omy mm xan — he immediately taught it also regarding charamim, ony rby xypq — which is similarly a case of someone's prohibiting CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM. ‘an article upon himself — _nyxay ypisx> — to the of oaths, xyn [2 TYR) WWSPT — which is = case af prohibiting himself from an article." ‘The Gemara tums to another difficulty in the Misha: yeog rng ~ [The Tanna] opens with the law of terms, D773 "3 5p — stating, “ALL PQUIVALENT. ‘NEDARIM are effective like genuine nedarim,” nz == and he then illustrates the law of partial declarations, sya tas 77M YVAN? ~ stating, “ONE WHO SAYS 7AM VORED: ‘YOU; et.” He proceeds to explain equivalent terms only i= me Mishnah, on 10a! Why does he not first illustrate the lw equivalent terms, with which he began? wn) — And farthen more, w3*x n17t — [the Tanna] apparently forgot to en the law of partial declarations! How can he explain tis Sex ‘without ever having taught it?® ‘The Gemara responds to the latter question: m3 vy — [The Tanna] does deal with [partial decane tions), 92 930) pO "HOM — and itis as if (the Misia text] is deficient, and this is how it should read: > == Bev OTT) — ALL EQUIVALENT TERMS FOR NEDARI ax effective LIKE genuine NEDARI, DYy33> 09} NYT — AND al PARTIAL DECLARATIONS OF NEDARIM ARE effective LIKE Sl _NEDARIM, On this note, the Tanna proceeds to illustrate the law at partial delarations. ‘The Gemara reiterates its first question: xr pina wip) — But let [the Tannal illustrate the ex valent terms first, since this is the law he taught first!” — > — ‘The Gemara responds: xymg Ups Aint MIND propT HIND — It is the method of she ‘Tanna that the most recently mentioned [subject] is the ome NOTES 1 The opening Mishnah of Tractate Nazir states: All equivalent terms for nezirus are (efetve) lke (genuine vows of] nezirus I does not add that this also applies to nedarim, charamim and oaths (Ran). 2, Numbers 80:3 reads: ny yay 79-1} THD WK, Ifa man vows @ zader to Hashem or swears an ath ete. (Ran). 3. The text of a neder is “This object is forbidden to me for consump- tion” (Ran), 4, {The text of cheirem is “This object is cheirem to me."] 65, The text ofan oath is “I swear that 1 will not ent this food” (Ran). ‘The textual difference between the declaration of a neder [or cheirem | and that of sn oath is indicative ofa fundamental difference between their prohibitions. A neder by definition takes effect on an object (xypn] ~ it causes the benefit of a specific objct to become prohibited [to cither one individual or all people). An oath onthe other ‘hand, takes hold on a person (x732] — it eauses the person to become prohibited from performing a certain act that he swore to avoid [orto ‘become obligated to perform an act that he swore to dol. For this reaton, nedarim can take effect only on tangible items, whereas oaths can take effect even regarding intangible things. For example, if one ‘says, “Let sleep be honam to me today,” he has not effected a neder, since sleep is intangible. If he wishes to make an effective neder rogarding slop, he must say, “Let my eyes be konam regarding sleep today” — thereby effectuating the neder upon a tangible item (the eyes) tnd rendering his eyes forbidden to him with reepect to the benefit of sleep. By contrast, an oath in the style of “I swear that Iwill not sloop today” — without any mention of the eyes — does take effet; the _person becomes hound by it to refrain from sleeping that day (Gemara {ab with Ran; Ramban to Numbers 80:3). (Similarly, one who says, "T ‘swear that I will endeavor to sleep today” is obligated to abide by his ‘ath, since he placed this commitment upon his person. However, there sno such thing as aneder that onewil! do something, since a neder (Le 1 vow of prohibition) can take effect only upon an object (Ran to Se, second yawns nom n°x; se Chashek Shlomo).) CCharamim are similar to nedarim in that they take effect on objects rather than people. Therefore, the Mishnah mentions the law of charamim before digressing to oaths. It mentions nezirus after oaths, however, because neirus is similar to an oath insofar as the we renders the pers a nasr (se Rosh; ef Shitah Mekubtes). (For = fuller discussion of whether neirus takes hold onthe person [== the objet (eyor, see Teshuwos Mohan §69-54 and Teshuvos Some ‘Miluim 15,22. See also Ranbi in Shitah Mokubetzs to Va, Rize ‘Shevuos 22, and the wealth of souros cited by Binayim LaMistow ‘This mate is elaborated below, 17b not 13.1 {Since itis evident from our Gemara that nedarim are expose differently than oaths, numerous commentators infer that if soem declares neder with language appropriate to an oath, or vice vers. ae neder or oath is ineffective. That is, ifone says, Tam hereky baum ‘nader no to eat this bread” (i. he declared his person bound by Se rede o, Pia bred is forbidden vo me by an oath he dene the abject prohibited bythe oath) his words have no effect (Rabie (Chanarel etal, cited by Hon). Others maintain thet althougs Same declarations donot fit ito the eatogris ofthe basieneder or oa they are effective under the law of “patal declarations." Sine se ‘erton intended to effect a neder (or oath) and made a satemens Sa ‘conveys his intent, the statement i considered a yd, and the nei~ ath) takes effect despite the deficiency fits wording (Rambo, mz by Ran; see Tosaos to 18 11 and to Shewuos 25a 727; see Yoreh Deoh 2065 with Beur HaGra $10) 6. The elucidation follows Ran and Toso, though Ran's as slightly different here. See also Rosh. (Roch notes that Unroughow: Se ‘Talmud this type of question is typically phrased as wo 7299 —= = "Who mentioned partial declarations?" However, Rh comm ape org) Ne, The language of (ractte] Nedarim is unconvensonse See the Gener Introduction for discussion of this phenomense 7. Le, even according to your explanation that the Mishnah tex = dicient ts opening clause deals with equivalent terms and its ome clause with paral declarations. You dd nat propose that the Tax ‘meant to tach the nw of partial declarations before that of equa terms, singe you concede itis unlikely that he omitted something == the very beginning of his teat! Now, since the Tanna taught equim terms fis, he should have illustrated them fist (Ran, Tosofs 8 Literal: the one he (ust) et.2b? KOL KINUYEI 1nW20 — THESE REQUIRE BRINGING NEAR but not waving ete In this Mishnah, too, the frst law is explained frst! ‘Afift such instance: ia) to5 py rim? Wa3 wr — We learned in the Mishnah* THERE 15 a Grstbom who is considered a AECHOR REGARDING [INHERITANCE BUT NOT considered a NECHOR REGARDING redemp- tion from A KOHEN, Ana) 3133 px) 139 71393 — one who is considered A BECHOR REGARDING redemption from A KOHEN RUT NT considered A BECHOR REGARDING INHERITANCE...®° YIP) m2 "933 py rmsd 33 — WHICH IS THE ONE WHOIS considered |ABECHOR REGARDING INHERITANCE BUTNOT considered ARECHOR REGARDING redemption from A KOHEN? Again, the fist law is explained first! Thus, we have five instances in which the Mishnalb deviates from the style of “ast mentioned, first explained,” — ? — (CHAPTER ONE ‘The Gemara respon mp rwny7 own phn — In those instances, because there are ‘many clauses in each Mishnah for (the Tanna to explain .xprng napy xin7 B7pB — he explains the one that he opened ‘with first, and proceeds in order.” ‘The Gemara finds a case where this explanation does not fit- yyy mpc meat ayn 7mn3 793 x) — But there is the Mishnah that states: WITH WHAT accessories MAY AN ANIMAL GO OUTSIDE fon the Sabbath AND WITH WHAT accessories MAY IT NOT Go oursine! —xyns x57 — which does not contain many clauses, but only the two just mentioned, pg xx v3npy — yet in his explanation {the Tanna] teaches first: CAMEL MAY Go our ete. Thus, we see that even a Mishnah containing only two clauses may explain the opening subject frst. ~ 2 — NOTES see Leviticus 7:90, 412; Deuteronomy 26:4 with Rashi), the Torah requires “waving.” That is, the Koben places his hands under the owner's hands, and they lift the offering and wave it in the different directions (Ran; eee Menachos 61a) ‘Thus, there are some offerings that require “bringing near” but not “waving,” and some offerings that require waving” but not “bringing near.” (The Mishnah goes onto teach that there are also offerings that require both bringing near and waving (eg. the Omer), and offerings ‘that require neither bringing near nor waving (eg. the libation ‘minchah that accompanies an olah or ehelamim).) 25, Bechoros 46a, 26, Aman’s firstborn son receives a double portion of inheritance upon the father’s death (Deuteronamy 21:17). woman's Gratborn son must be redeemed from a Kohen forthe sum of five selaim (Exodus 18:13, ‘Numbers 18:16). If 2 man marries a woran who has ehildren from a previous marriage and she bears him a firstborn son, that son is ‘bechor in regard to inheritance (since he i hs father's frsthorn), but not in regard to requiring redemption (since he is not the mother's firstborn). Conversely, if @ man who has a child from a previous marriage marries a childless woman and she gives birth to a soa, that ‘son is @bechor in regard to redemption but notin regard to inheritance (an on 3a; see Ran and Mishnah ibid. for further examples) [The Mishnah goes on to teach that there is alo a firstborn who = bechor in oth respects (ie. one who isthe firstborn to both parents — see Mishnah there, 47b, and a firstborn who isnot a bechor in ei respect (Le. one born by Caesarean section.) 27, Bach ofthe five cited Mishnayos dseusses four different cetezome (Rosh). (Inthe first Mishnab, for example, it states, “There aze thom ‘who inherit and bequeath, those who inkerit but do not bequeath, cam who bequeath but do not inherit, and those who neither inher: so Dequesth.”] Ifthe Tanna hed explained them in the reverse order Se would have invited confusion! Therefore, he chose to fellow the orser = ‘which he listed them originally. Where this reason does not sozie however (i.e. where there are only two entegories), the Tanna sie follows the style of “last mentioned, fist explained" (Ran on 2a) 28. Shabbos 51D. 29, Le. which accessories are considered the animal's “apparel” (ex = collar), and which are considered ‘a burden” (eg. a saddle; see Soe ‘5. The owner ofan animal may not allow itto carry a burden = se ppublie domain on the Sabbath, beeause he is commanded not to k= = perform melachah ie. any act that is classified as labor, and earrynee burden in the pubic domain is a melachah (Rashi ad loc).KOL KINUYEL ‘The Gemara concedes and revises its explanation of the order followed by our Mishnah: xpi ix? xx — Rather, the Tanna is not particular about the order of his explanation. xw/7a MNT XW wpm pm — ‘Sometimes he explains that subject with which he opened first, xyr73. W79n p"9p7 xvTT PIN — and sometimes it is the ‘most recently mentioned subject that he explains first." In our -Mishnab, he chooses to explain fist the subject that he mentioned last, and as we have seen this is not unusual. ‘The Gemara offers an alternative explanation for our Mishnah, ‘ceording to which the Tanna had a specific reason for explaining partial declarations first ‘xpi BIg) — Or, if you prefer, say: nr — Regarding partial declarations, “xyy72 piney "7x — since [their effectiveness] is derived through an exposition of Scripture and would not otherwise be obvious, gra yw wipH ~ [the ‘Tanna] explains them first.” ‘The Gemara counters: xyrya pay nn) — Then let [the Tanna] open the Mishnah by actually teaching this one [the law of partial declarations} first!" — 2 — ‘The Gemara responds: sxyrna xpeaticy ans nnp nba — In opening his presenta- tion of the laws, [the Tanna] opens with equivalent terms, which is a self-evident Biblical concept, and teaches about them first," xyy7a > PNT ATT wIpR TN — but then, in clarifying the laws, he explains first partial declarations, which he derives through an exposition." ‘The Gemara analyzes this answer in light ofa dispute below, on 10a, as to the nature ofthe equivalent terms, which are listed in the Mishnah there: (CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM 3a! ‘yaist pee? x27 — This fits well according to the one who said that qn ama wd wa — the equivalent terms are actually foreign-language terms for vows.” It is indeed self evident, according to this opinion, that nedarim can be effected through equivalentterms. x7 1429 xbx ~ But according to the one who said that 13-713 APN BMD TAP MIB Tw? — the equivalent terms are expressions that the Sages conceived for people tovow with,” yrab x3rx 1x} ~ what is there to say? ‘The effectiveness of these termsiisless obviousthan that of partial declarations, as these are Rabbinical innovations whereas the validity of partial declarations is atleast derived through Scrip- tural exposition! Accordingly, the Tanna should have taught the law of partial declarations first, ~ ? — ‘Unable to rebut this argument, the Gemara responds: ‘nit «ung 1% — Does [the Mishnah] actually teach the law of partial declarations explicitly? It does not! xg "00 1x51 rn nap — Rather, do you not consider [its text] deficient and insert on your own the clause regarding partial declara- tions? You do! tmz 12m ma avypx — Accordingly, you should also advance and teach the clause regarding partial declara- tions before that of equivalent terms. Thus, the text of the Mishnah will read as follows: oa 59) BBS MV nT 53 yya oH — “All partial declarations of nedarim are effective like full nedarim, and all equivalent terms for nedarim are effective like genuine nedarim. ni 7 15%) yronb wixy — And these are examples of partial declara- tions: One who says to his fellow, ‘I am vowed from you’ etc. ‘tp map asp pons wbx — And these are equivalent terms: Ikonam, konach and konas.”* Thus, the Mishnah teaches the basic law of partial declarations first, and als explains this law first! NOTES 1. "The reason the Tanna alternates his tye isto demonstrate that one ‘may teach in either fashion, asthe dictum (Job 15:5) awry Ww >097, {you shall choose the language ofthe clever, is not applicable regarding this matter (Ran). 2. The Gemara does not retract the concession that the Tanna alternates his style arbitrarily, as that point has been proven by the ‘earlier citation of various stylistically disparate Mishnayos. However, ‘the Gemara suggest that in our case there isa specific reason why the ‘Tanna chose the order that he did (Ran). 8. The exposition upon which the law of yados is based is cited below] Unlike the law of yados, however, the law of kinuyim is self-evident on ‘the basis of logis; there is no need for @ Seriptural exposition (see note 5), Sinee the law that yados are effective is more novel than the law that ‘hinuyim are effective, the Tanna gives precedence to its clarification (an below v2 orp 77; see also Yevamos 2b). 44. The emended text of the Mishnah reads: “All equivalent terms for redarim are effective like nedarim, and all partial declarations of rnedarim are effective like nedarim.” Thus, the basic law of kinuyin is taught before the basic law of yados (see 20 note 7). But since the latter ‘more novel, the Tanna should have presented even the base law of| ‘yados ~ and not merely its explanation —~ before that of kinuyim! 5, Noexposition ie needed for the law of kinuyim, since obvious that nedarim can be made in any language (Tosafos ses ny Ran to 2a ‘5, cited thore in note 8) ts tho style of the Tanna to begin with the ‘a obvious law a hen proceed Uv ie mre nove tes (Rar). (Tis is the general Mishnaie style of 3 1 x9, not ony this but ever hat. [The Gemara employs the term “Biblical” to connote the fundamen tal nature of the concept of kinuyim, but actualy, the law of yados is also Biblical. Itis, however, more novel than the aw of hinuyin: because it could not be derived without Scriptural exegesis (Rashash; see Ran ibid. and Gemara below.) 6 [After stating the basic laws in ascending order of novelty, the Tanna fesxplains first the one most in need of clarification. The style of discussing the most nove law first applies to explanation rather than presentation] 1 Literally: foreigners’ terms. 8, As the Gemara on 10a explains this opinion, the Sages sought to climinate the use ofthe word Rorban (offering) in vows (eg. “Lat this be like a korban to me"), because vowing in this style would leed people to say “foréan to God,” in accordance with the common Seriptural expression (eg, Leviticus 12). This in turn could lead to someone's saying “to God” and omitting Rorban, thus expressing the Name in vain! The Sages therefore coined the alternative terms konam, konach and konas, in the expectation that people using these expressions would not say “to God!” (Ran, Rosh). 9. Although once the Sages composed these kinuyim they are effective Biblically (see 2a note 4), the fact of their effectiveness is a greater novelty than that of the effectiveness of yados [since they could not Ihave been effective without the Sages’ creating them} (Ran) 10, The Gemara is forced to retract its initial assumption that the ‘Tanna would not have omitted something from the very beginning of his text (see 2b note 7). It concedes that, according to the opinion that the kinuyim were composed by the Sages, we must explain our ‘Mishnah as being deficient at the very beginning (Ran; see note 12), 1. [This ast clause represents the teaching ofthe Mishnah on 10a] 12. The Gemara has retreated from its assertion that the more novel law is explained first, Rather, it states, the expanstory part of the ‘Mishnah follows the same order as the introductory part. The laws are introduced in asoending order of novelty — first yados (which are derived through exegesis) and then kinuyim (which Were composed by the Sages) ~ and are explained in the same order. “However, this applies only according to the opinion that the kuin ‘were composed by the Sages. According to the oninion that they are {oreign-anguage terms, the previous explanation stands: The Tanna introduced the basic law of kinuyim first because this law is the ‘more obvious one, but he explained the law of yudos first because it is the more novel one. Thus, it emergos that although all gree with the statement that our Tanna had a specific reason for explaining the law of yas first, there is disagreement as to what his reason was an.KOL KINUYEL Having stated that the law of partial declarations is derived through an exposition of Seripture, the Gemara pursues the source: aya xpi ntyy — And where is the law of partial declarations written? on comb yyy v7 Typ xb 1... WK, — Serip- ture states: Aman ... who shall dissociate himself by vowing @ neder as a nazir to abstain for [the sake of} Hashem." en) — And it was taught in a Baraisa: mia 17y,, ~ The phrase AS A NAZIR TO ABSTAIN comes nim] "ID Tey? .RInm}3 — TO MAKE PQUIVALENT TERMS FOR NEZRUS effective LUKE genuine vows of N&ZIRUS, nNRD NIT" MYM — AND to ‘make PARTIAL DECLARATIONS OF NEZIRUS effective LIKE full vows of Nazimus.% nrmya xpi YX — THAVE thus far derived the law of partial declarations ONLY REGARDING the vow of NEZIRUS. ym BTYS — FROM WHERE do I derive it REGARDING other NeDARIW? {> Tw) — (SCRIPTURE) THEREFORE STATES: vein yma INT TRY XGND. «WIN, — AMAN. ., WHO SHALL DDISSOCIATS HIMSELF BY VOWING A NEDER AS A NAZIR TO ABSTAIN [FOR(THESAKE OFIHASHEM, YY} NING WIP — By stating “a nneder as @ nazir,” (SCRIPTURE) COMPARES NEZIRUS TO other [NEDARIM, RY MAD DIY" — AND other NEDARIAUTO NEZIRUS."" ‘The hekeish teaches: nvm new ATT ta nigy MIM TD — JUST AS REGARDING NEZIRUS, [SCRIPTURE] MADE PARTIAL DECLA- RATIONS OF NEZIRUS effective LIKE full vows of NEZIRUS, 9X8 DyBBENTY AMM BNE py Br — SO TOO, REGARDING all other NEDARIM, [SCRIPTURE] MADE PARTIAL DECLARATIONS OF NEDARIM effective LIKE full NEDARIM. DYY]} THY — AND conversely," JUST AS regarding other NEDARIM, ‘9m? 733 7319 singn $931 — ONE who violates the terms of his neder or who ‘unduly postpones its fulfillment TRANSGRESSES either the eom- ‘mandment NOT TO DESECRATE OR the commandment NOT TO DELAY!!! nya A — $000, regarding NEZIRUS, 433 731 ‘singn baz Sot — ONE who violates the terms of his nezirus ‘or unduly postpones its fulfillment TRANSGRESSES either the CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM 3a? commandment NOT TO DESECRATE OR the commandment NOTTO DELAY‘) BYYyB Mal — AND furthermore, JUST AS regarding other NEDARDG, 173 *Y73 BY ANT — A FATHER CAN REVOKE HIS DAUGHTER'S NEDARIE YY "733 7% SYR) — ANDAHUS- [BAND CAN REVOKE HIS WIFE'S NEDARIM, nV} ~ SOTOO, regarding NEZIRUS, na TW BY 34 — A FATHER CAN [REVOKE HIS DAUGHTER'S NEZIRUS, 1nVX BY] TBM SYS) — [AND AHUSBAND CAN REVOKE HIS WIFE'S NAZIEUS. At any rate, we leam from the hekeish of nedarim to nezirus that partial declarations of nedarim are effective like fll nedarims. ‘The Gemara wonders why we must resort to the hekeish: nim 123 xyy ox» — What is special about the verse regarding nezirus that makes it a souree forthe law of partial declarations? ‘yyy, 30739 — Itis that the double expression as a nazir to abstain (nazir lehazir) is written there, ard the redundancy is expounded as coming to include partial declarations as effective. voy Bry — With respect to other medarim, too, Ican say: 7 ‘agg 7, 303 — “Why, by vowing a neder (lindor neder) is written regarding them, and this redundancy ean be expounded in the same manner!® v9 me xwoprm — Thus, why do Ineed the hekeish of nedarim to nezirus to teach that partial declara- tions of nedarim are effective?” The Gemara answers: syub 1 an3 x — If [Scripture] had written “a neder by owing” (neder lindor), with the noun preceding the verb, sania? a1, ang — as it wrote “as a nazir to abstain” (nazir lchazir), mypxpy> — then it would beasyousaid - pny x> xprp ~ the hekeish of nedarim to nezirus would be unneces- ‘sary, for we would expound the repetition itself, 3937 XBW ay ub,, — However, now that by vowing a neder is actually written, there is no significance in this repetition, for 737 ‘gt jteyartin — the Torah spoke in the common language used by men." NOTES 13, Numbers 6:2. (Our translation of the verse follows Rashi. Cf. ‘Targum Onkelo, cited below, 5 note 12.) Tho nazir’s vow of nezirus ‘requires him to abstain from wine and all products ofthe grapevine [as ‘well as to avoid contamination with fumah of «corpse, and to refrain {rom cutting his hair. When his intentions ae virtuous] he undertakes this vow “forthe sake of Hashem” (Rashi ad loc; see below, 9b). 14, Ran deletes the clause “to make equivalent terms for nesirus effective like genuine vows ofneirus,” because as stated above the law of hinuyime is not derived through Scriptural exposition, If kimuyim: are foreign-language terms, it is slf-ovident that they are elective; and if they are terms that the Sagea invented, the verse obviously does not allude to them! Ran's emendation is borne out by the fact thatthe next segment of the Baraisa mentions only yados. (Tosajos and Rosh, hhowever, while agreeing thatthe law ofkinuytm is nt derived from the verse, avoid emending the text. Rather, they explain that the Baraisa ‘mentions kinuyim in passing (because it parallels the law of yao, ‘which is in fact derived from the verso).] ‘At any rate, the expression ‘739 7%, 08 @ nazir to abstain, comes to include yados of nezirus as effective. The exposition shall bo clarified below. 15. (This constitutes a ekeish, which indicates that the laws taught in ‘one context apply to tho other as well} 16, [The hekeish does not merely teach that nedarim are like vows of nesirus; it aloo teaches that vows of neirus are like other nedarim. The ‘Baraisn proceeds to explain the ramification of this pint.) 17. I one makes a neder prohibiting something upon himself and violates it, he transgresses the commandment (Numbers * ‘nay bn x}... ae BIT, If|e man vows @ neder to Hashem... he shall not desecrate his word. And if one makes a neder to bring an offering and tarie i.e. he does not bring it before three festivals pass ‘by; see Rosh Hashanah 4s], he transgresses the commandment (Deuteronomy 23:22): yeh nash x9 IE TE TA TAN, When you vow « neder to Hashem, your God, do not be late in paying it (Rn). (See further, Rambam in Sefer HaMitevos, Lo Saaseh i157; Ramban thereto ‘Assi §94; Chidushei R? Reuven 43.) 18. The Gemara will later (Sb-4a) diseuss the circumstances in which these prohibitions apply to nevus 19. The Torah grants the husband and father the right to cancel the rnedarim of wile or daughter in some circumstances, as stated in ‘Numbers Ch. 80, This subject is elaborated below in Chapters 10-1 20, (Concerning the source ofthe rule that yados are also effective for charamim and oaths, ee Riva, cited by Shitah Mekubetzs.) Ttseoms unusual that we need a Scriptural hebosh to extend the laws ‘of nezirus to nedarim and vice versa. Why, nezus is itself a form of rede, and thus, simple analogy should tell us that whatever applies in ‘one context appies inthe other as wel! This matter i discussed on 4b; ‘see note 10 there. See further, Chidushei R” Akiva Eiger and Rashosh here, and Kovet: Shiurim, Kiddushin §16. Meanwhile, the Gemara ‘questions the necessity for the hekeish from a different perspective. 21, Numbers 6:2 reads: nia MyM) Tye Kop D...W A man ‘who shall dissociate himself by vowing a neder as @ nazr to abstain for [the eake of) Hashem. Although the phrase 77) 77, by vowing @ heder, appears in the verso dealing with nesirus, it is actually tuperfloue in uhat context, The verse could have tated bref, “If a man will dissociate himself by becoming a nazir for the sake of Hashem.” The phrase by vowing a neder is therefore understood as referring to the entire category of nedarim, of which necirus is subcategory (Rite, in Shitah Mebubetces). 2, Seripture often employs repetitive terms to reflect spoken language, However, the convention is for the verb to precede the noun, as in (Numbers 30:3): "9x ox, to forbid a prohibition, and (Ruth 7): 2? ‘ap7b3 to validate any matter. The phrase “7332, by vowing a neder, follows this convention, and the repetition is therefore insignificant. In ‘the phrase a? "7, a @ nazir fo abstain, however, the noun precedesKOL KINUYEL ‘The Gemara notes that this answer is subject to dispute: yg mp probs main myaT mM mv ped aT — This fits well, according to the one who holds that the Torah generally spoke in the common language used by men.®! mb m7 twa xox. yg 1p pba NIN 737 — But as for the one who does not hold that the Torah spoke in the common language used by ‘men,2") rrp sPay 1x9 "739 77H, xT — what does he do with (Ge, how does he expound) that redundant phrase by vowing a neder (lindor neder)? ‘The Gemara responds thatthe one who holds this opinion has a different approach to expounding the passage: CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM 3a piss vay nin mibyd mb way — He expounds [by vowing a neder] as coming to make partial declarations of nedarim effective like fullnedarim, yy739 ni: wepE — and he then ‘compares vows of nezirus to ordinary nedarim through the hhekeish, to derive that partial declarations of nezirus are effective like full declarations." ‘According to this approach, the redundant phrase as a nazir to abstain is superfluous. The Gemara proceeds to exolan ts purpose: ‘rama -mmy,, — As for the phrase as a nazir to abstain (nazir Iehazir), 798] — he expoundsit asfollows an ~ This teaches NOTES ‘the verb, counter to the Scriptural convention. Ths indicates thet the ‘redundancy is meant tobe expounded, and we interpret it as coming to include partial declarations of nezirus as effective. We then extend this law to all other nedarim on the basis ofthe hekeish (see Ran, Rosh and. Tosafes). 28, Le. we do not expound redundant phrases when their style accords ‘with common usage, even though there is a law that could be ‘expounded from the repetition (Ran; soo Bava Metzia 81). 24, Le. we expound redundancies oven when they refleet common ‘usage. Tissue is a matter of Tennaic dispute (sce Bava Metzia ibid) 2, Since we can derive from the hokeish that yados of nedarim are effective — just like yados of nezirus ~ what is the purpose of the rudundaney in by vowing @ neder? (Interestingly, the Gemara previ- ‘ously asked the opposite question ~ since Scripture states by vowing a rader, why do we need the hekeish! Ran explains that previously the ‘question was directed at the Tanna of the Barase, who relies upon the hhekeish to extend the law of yados from nezirus to nedarim. The Gomara asked why the Tanna needed to resort to the hekeish when there isa source in the context of nedarim itself. Here, however, the ‘question is directed at the Tanna who holds that “The Torah did not speak in the common language used by men.” Since we have no evidence whether this Tanna derives the law from tke hekeish or from the verse itself, the Gemara asks: Being thatthe hetesh is available, why did Seripaure need to write, redundantly, by vowing @ neder?), 26, (Le. in contrast to the Tanna of the Baraise, who expounds as razr fo abstain as teaching that yados of neirus are effective, and then ‘extends ths to other nedarim through the hekeish, this Tanna does the ‘opposite. He expounds by vowing a neder as teaching that yados of ‘ordinary nedarim are effective and relies upon the hekeish to extend ‘this to nezirus vows]3b! KOL KINUYEI — CHAPTERONE =—-NEDARIM. nrvnan Sy Sp aroun — that a vow ofnezirus can take effect —’mey? nap x7 5e(3),, ~ and there is from the verse, according fo whatever c rst shall he do.3b? KOL KINUYEI ‘The Gemara answers: xq3 vy — Rava said: oraya vy stay? — Its purpose is to rake the nazir transgress two prohibitions for violating (his vom ‘The Gemara turns to the second part ofthe Baraisa’s statement: nb nngwn "7 m7"77 WEN bg — How can the commandment, not to delay be found to apply regarding nezirus? “ax 1P2 297 — Once one says, “Tam hereby anazir,” m9 my my = he is automatically a nazir; 52x — if he then eats products of the grapevine 59x33 m np — he is subject to ‘the commandment not to eat such products, and if he drinks ‘them he is subject to the commandment not to drink such products," —? — ‘The Gemara anticipates a response and rejects it: yy xn AY oS wa — You might contend that the ‘commandment applies where one says, “When I desire, I shall CHAPTER ONE be a nazir."*! myx Dx 1%) — But if he said, “When I desire,” nxn ba x99 — there is no commandment not to delay, since he stipulated that the matter is subject to his whim! ‘What, then, is the case of nezirus to which this commandment applies? ‘The Gemara answers 297 Tos — Rava said: w ob yo wer xb wey 2 ‘yn Ny — It is @ case where one said, “I shall not depart this world without first being a nazir,” mq xnyy X°M0 127 ‘yy — where from that moment onward he is obligated tobe anazir.0 Rava cites a proof to his explanation: snvx wuz prt v2 — This is analogous to the case of ‘one who tells his wife, while handing her aget, 12.1715 — “Thisishereby your bill of divorce, sngyETIP ANNTYY — to take effect one moment before my death," Stax? nyros ‘syanpyana — where the law is thatthe husband is@ Kohen she ‘NOTES UL Le. the commandment not to desecrate his word in addition to th ‘commandment not to eat or drink products of the grapevine. Rava “answers that there isin fact no instance in which the nazir violates only ‘the commandment against desecrating is word. Rather, the hekeish comes to teach that, bsides the specific nezirus prohibitions, a nazi is ‘also subject tothe standard prohibition applicable to all nedarim (Ran, ‘Tosojos; see Ran for an alternative explanation of the Gemara’s (question and answer). [ian raises a question: Just as the hekeish extends the nedarim prohibition to nerirus, it should extend the nezirus prohibition to nedarim. Thus, ifone forbids bread upon himself with a neder and then tats it, be should be subject to he shall not eat as well as he shall not desecrate his word! Why does he violate ony the later commandment? ‘Ran answers that since he shall not eat i written specifically regarding grape product (ee note 9), despite the hekeish,itcannot be understood ‘as applying tonedarim, since nedarim: are not limited to grape product, ‘and.an prohibit other things besides eating. By contrast, the command ‘ment not to deseerate one's word isnot specific, and ean apply tonezirus just as to nedarim.} 12, (One cannot answer as above that he is subject to two prohibitions, for once the nezirus takes effet, the commandment not to delay is inapplicable! This commandment pertains only to one who unduly postpones fulfilling his wow] Tt would seem, however, that the probibition does apply in a case ‘where one says, “I hereby undertake to become a nazir.” In the pars Tel case of one who vows, “I hereby undertake to bring an offering” [which i the source of the commandment not to delay; see 38 note 17) if the vower tarres beyond three festivals (Le. Pesach, Shavuos and Suceos), he violates the commandment (see Rosh Hashanah 43+). Presumably, the same should apply to a vow of nesirus. However, this actually not so. When one says, ‘Thereby undertake to bring an offering," the vow is not sel fulfilling it ean be fulfilled only through the vower's act of bringing the offering, and accordingly, the vower is commanded not to delay this act. By contrast, when one says, “Thereby undertake to become a nozir,” the vow is selfulfiling, for since it does not require any action, the nezirus takes effect im- mediately! Consequently, the commandment not to delay is not appli ble Ran), 13 In this case the nezirus does not take effect immediatly, sine the ‘ower stipulated “when I desire.” Perhaps he is subject to the com- ‘mandment not to delay.) 1M, [And if he does not become a nazir immediately he transgrosses ‘the commandment not to delay.] The declaration “TI shall not depart this world without first being a nazir” implies thatthe vower under- takes to become a nazir under condition that guarantee {tothe extent possible (Shalmei Nedarin)} that he will complet the torm of nezirus before his death, While ths doesnot render him a nazir automaticaly = because the wording of the declaration makes clear that he is not invoking the state of nezirus itself through it — it does impose upon him the responsibility to commence his nezirus at once, lest he soon die. Therefore, he is subject to the commandment not to delay, and ifhe taries at all he immesiately transgresses this commandment, [See Tosofoe reganding the statement: “I horeby undertake to under take nezirus.”] ‘One might argue: Since the source of the commandment not to delay is the context of offerings, the case of nezirus should be no more stringent than that of offerings. Just as one who vows to bring an offering isnot in violation until three festivals have passed, so too, one ‘who vows to be a nasir should not be in violation for a period of three festivalal Why is he deemed to immediately violate the commandmen: against delaying? The answer is that inthe case of offerings itself, the three-festival period applies only to one who says simply, “T hereby undertake to bring an offering.” without imposing a deedline. If coe says, “I hereby undertake to bring an offering immediatly,” his slightest procrastination is a violation of the commandment not to delay, since the terms of the vow render even the momentary delzy ‘unacceptable. In our ease, the vower did not say simply, “T herebs ‘undertake to be « nazr,” (as explained above). Rather, he stated, shall not depart this word without first being a nazr.” Since he migh= die at any moment, thisis the equivalent of saying, “Thereby undertake ‘to bring an offering immediately," and requires him not to delay at (an). (CE Rosh, who explains that in our case as well the vower is ‘alation only after three festivals have passed. See also Rashba, and so Einayim LaMishpat fora thorough discussion of these views.) [Ran concedes that thee is aeaso in which the three festival period applies toa vow of nezius.Ifone says, for example, “Thereby undertake tobe a nazir within two year,” he is ubject to the same law as ane >= makes a standard vow to bring an offering, and if he tarries beyont three festivals he violates the commandment against delaying. (A- though he alloted himself two years, he may not wait that long, for the ‘Torah does not tolerate any delay beyond three festivals; see Kere= Orch and Chidushei R’ Naftali Trop.) Accordingly, Rava’ could have answered that the commandment not to delay is applicable in a case where the vower says, “I hereby undertake to be a nazir within tw years.” However, since in any event Rava needed to find case in whic= ‘the vower made some unusual stipulation (as explained above), he chose the case of" shall not depart this world without frst being a naz’ inform us the added novelty that inthis instance the commandment act to delay applios immediately (Ram 15, A man might divorce his wife in this unusual manner for the following reason. The Torah requires the wife of man who dies childless to undergo the ydbum process (soo 2b note 18). That is, bs ‘paternal brother either marries her or performs chalitzah to permit her ‘tw marry someone else. However, this applies only toa childless man's ‘widow, not to his divoreee A childless man might be concored thet his wife will require yibum or chalitzah upon his death. (The brothers ‘whereabouts might be unknown; should the wife become subject chalitsah, she would remain forbidden forever to remarry.] Therefore the husband isues her a get with the stipulation that it take effect oni> ‘2 moment before his death. He thus accomplishes that she will not be ‘subject to yibum or chalteah upon his death, and that he will romsi= married to her until a moment prior to his death. He could als sccomplish th by issuing her a get on his deathbed; however, he = concerned that he might die suddenly or while away from home (Rast: to Suocah 286).3b KOL KINUYEL is forbidden to eat ferumah immediately upon receiving the ‘get, because we are concerned that the husband may die the ‘moment after she eats ferumah.'"! xnyy be PRK Xpb _nmp xpbr7 xno) — Thus, we see that at every moment we say, (CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM “Perhaps the husband! will now die” “yyy anh} m2 79 — Here, in our case, too, [the vower] is obligated to be a nazir immediately, n/p xpi x97 [P7987 — because we say that perhaps he will now die." NOTES 16. {Terumah (the portion separated from and given to a ‘Kohen) may be eaten only by a Kohen and his household, A Kohen's Inraelite wife may eat erumah, but his widow or divorese may not, ‘unless she has offspring from him.) In our ease, should the husband die immediately after the wife eats terumah, the divorce will take effect rutroactively from the previous moment — when she was esting the ‘terumah, Thus, she will retroactively be considered a non-Koheness and will have eaten the terumah ileglly! ‘To prevent this, we forbid her to ‘ent terumah from the time she rocsives the get, out of concorn that her hhusband might die at any moment (Ran). 17, We see from the case of divoree that whenever something is depen- ddent upon a person's death one must concern himself with the possbil ity that oath is imminent, Nevertheless, the law pertaining to nase ‘is not exactly the same as that pertaining to divorce, In the case = divoree, ifthe woman eats ferumah and her husband does not de Se ‘next moment, it emerges that she has not violated any (Bisbal ‘prohibition (though she violated the Rabbinic injunction describes = the provious note In our case, however, even ifthe vower does not ie ‘the next moment, he has violated the [Biblical] commandment nats ‘delay the fulfillment of his vow. The very fact that he can die at any Se requires him to commence his term of nezirus immediately (since Se ‘possibilty of imminent death infuses his vow with the meaning “! sta commence nezirus immediately”) (Ran, as explained by Keren Orsi = ‘Rashba; see Rosh and Magen Avraham 568:13)KOL KINUYEL ‘The Gemara presents an alternative explanation of where the commandment not to delay is applicable regarding neziru ‘os apy 12 xp 29 — Rav Acha bar Yaakov said: 97782 rn/igg3 793 x) — It applies in a ease where one made the ‘vow of nezirus while he was in a graveyard. "The Gemara analyzes this answer in light ofa dispute recorded elsewhere regarding the status of one who makes the vow of nezirus while in a graveyards ‘wnbay nism mby Xp x5 aN Toe Acpay — This fits well according to the one who says that the state of nesirus does not take effect upon [the vower] immediately! yea xbx iby xbnn ans Wax] — But according to the one who says that it takes effect upon him immediately, "nxn ba xx v2 ~ is there any possibility of his violating the commandment not to delay?" ‘The Gemara asks further: sw) — And furthermore, *wx37 73 79 Voey - Mar barRav Ashi has said: nao my noma kyr — Actually, all agree that the state of nezirus takes effect upon [the vower] ‘immediately, 13%9913) - and when do they disagree? 334 vvba mipho ~ It is regarding the vower’s liability to lashes that they disagree." Since the vow takes effect immediately, how ean there be a commandment not to delay?” ‘The Gemara responds: CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM 4a! angn baa mb pp 127 tne — Nevertheless, ie. although the nezirus takes effect immediately, the vower] is subject to the commandment not to delay, 7997 AI" 7s XT BWA — because if he tarries in the graveyard he delays the nezirus of taharah.” ‘An inference is drawn from this answer: sux 37 vy — Rav Ashi said: 13) 7 — Since itis so, that the commandment not to delay applies even where the vow has taken effect, as long as it has not been fulfilled in a state of taharak, "mos vayy xovy wm — if a genuine nazir contami- nates himself with tumch intentionally, 1X73 B12 7319 mygy mmm — he transgresses the commaniment not to delay, with respect to the nezirus of taharah." ‘The Gemara offers an additional explanation of the applicabil- ity ofthe commandment not to delay regarding nezirus: ‘Dy NXDTTAN| NOS 2 — Rav Acha the son of Rav Ika said: snnian ann 533 731 — [A nazir | transgresses the command- ‘ment not to delay in regard to his shaving, if he postpones this rite” Rav Acha elaborates: rnazy nnban “x7 px) 9% x — And it isnot necessary to say this according tothe one who says thatthe nair’s shaving is essential; certainly, if this rite is essential the commandment NOTES 1, He is required to leave the graveyard immediately, purify himselt of the tumah he acquired there, and accept the nezirus upon himself. [fhe tarries in the graveyard, he transgresses the commandment not to delay the falfllment of his vow (Ran, Tosaos; ef. Rosh; see Chidushei R” “Ahiva Biger to 3b), (A nazris forbidden to contaminate himself through ‘a corpee, If he becomes contaminated ofter commencing the term of nezirus, he forfeits the days of the term that he previously counted. He ‘must purify himeelf ofthe twmah, bring a special offering to atone for ‘becoming tami, and begin his term of nezirus anew (Numbers 6:9-12). Concerning our ease, where the vower is contaminated with corpseu- ‘mah atthe time of his vow, the Gemara assumes that the nezirus does ‘ot take effet immediately: Rather, the vower i obligated vo commence nezirus as soon as he ean purify himself (se further. 2, R’ Yochanan and Reish Lakish debate this issue in Tractate Nazi, 16b, The bass oftheir dispute isthe ruling ofthe Mishnah there that if ‘one makes the vow ofnezius while in a graveyard, the time he spends in the graveyard does not count toward his term, and he isnot required to Dring the special tumah offering. R' Yochanan understands this as excluding the vower only from the offering requirement, ut not from all the laws of nezirue. Thus, the vow takes effect immediately, and the nnasir may not drink wine nor shave his head even while inside the fraveyard. If he violates either of these restrictions he incurs lashes, Reish Lakish understands the Mishnah as meaning that the state of nezirus doesnot take effect atthe time ofthe vow. Thus, when the vower Teaves the graveyard he must declare that he accepts the nezirus upon. himself, and only then do the restrictions become effective (Ran). 8. (Since according to Reish Laksh the nezirusdoos not take effect a the time of the vow, itis reasonable to say thatthe vower is subject to @ commandment not to delay its implementation.] 4, Since acording to R’ Yochanan the neirus takes effet atthe time of the vow ~ inthe graveyard — the vower cannot possibly delay its imple- ‘mentation, and the commandment not to delay isnot applicable (Ran). 5. Le. Reish Lakish eoncovios thatthe vow takes effect immediately in the regard that when the vower purifies himself of tumah his term of recirus commences automatically. Reish Lakish disputes R’ Yochanan. ‘only insofar as holding thatthe vower is not liable to lashes for drinking ‘wine for shaving hie head] while in the graveyard (Ran; cf. Tosafs, Rosh). [Mar bar Rav Ashi states this in Nazir (7a) in response to a challenge to Reish Lakish's opinion.) 6, Since the nezirus takes effect automatically when the vower is ‘purified, and he does not need to accept it upon himeelf again {it has in tec already been implemented, and) there is no bass fora command- tment not to delay its implementation (Ran; ef. Tosofos, Rosh). 7. The vow of nezinus is primarily fulfilled by the nazis observing his term ina state of taharah (i. purity from contamination with eorpse- tumah), As mentioned in note I, if a nazir becomes fume during his ‘term, he forfeits the period that he observed and must begin his term ‘anew upon attaining purification, Thus, even if we say that one who makes the vow while in a graveyard enters a state of nezirus {immediately this snot the true nezirus that he undertok to observe = for itis not & necirus of taharah. The commandment against delaying ‘requires him to fulfil the vow in a state of taharah as soon as possible.] 8. (Le. ifan ordinary nazir, who made the vow and bogan to observe his ‘term, intentionally contaminates himself) he is lisble to lashes on ‘count of violating the prohibition not to delay ~ sine he thereby postpones the observance of his complete term in tasarah. Although Scripture (Numbers 6:7) forbids the nazir from tumah with two explicit prohibitions — he shall not come near a dead person, and he ‘shall not contaminate himself and these prokbitions are punishable by lashes) — and Seripture states further (bid. v. 12) that the days he ‘observed before contracting umah are forfeit, this doesnot preclude the hazir from being subject to another penalty. Rather, fhe contaminates himself intentionally, he incurs an additional set of lashes for delaying his observance of the nezirus in taharah (Ran; ef. Rosh; see Turei Bven, Rosh Hashanah 4a pws 3). {Accordingly the commandment against delaying applies not only to the umusual ease of one who makes the vow of neziras while inside & graveyard, but also to any nazir who contaminates himself (see Rambom, Hil. Necirus 5:20] 19, At the conclusion of his term of nezirus, a nazi is required to bring a ‘set of offering (an alah, chafas and shelamim and toperform a rite in fad and burns the hair in the fire over which the rite at all after the completion of his torm, ho immediately violates the ‘commandment not to delay (based on Ran below vmaxp wn a7 cf ‘Rosh). This applies to every nazir who concludes his term, itis not limited to any specifi ercumstances (see Tosaos). TRav Acha introduces a novel point. Although the vow of nezirus primarily engenders restrictions on the nazi (ee Rashi, Temurah Mb [prvi kat "2077, sine it also requires him to perform the concluding rite the prohibition agsinst delaying — which pertsinsto the falfillment of vows ~ spplies evento that rite 10. After desribing the nazr’s entre concluding rite ~ ie. the bringing of his offerings and the shaving ete. — Seripture states (bid. . 21): and ‘Reward the nazir may drink wine [ie the nezirus restrictions are lied) There is a Tennaie dispute (cited in Nazir 46a) concerning the ‘meaning of “oflerward.”"R’ Elazar understandsittorean “afterall theKOL KINUYEL not to delay applies to it, pat nrfpan -uay xo nay rage — But even according to the one who says that the nazir’s shaving is not essential, the commandment not to delay applies, aypya xb apa mina mye ~ for if he delayed it [the nazir has in any event not fulfilled the mitzvah of shaving. ‘Yet another explanation is presented: ‘yoy 779 277 ANB IPT Iw — Mar Zutea the son of Rav Mari said: yoayp wen 533 stv — [A nazir] transgresses the ‘commandment not to delay in regard to his offerings, if he postpones bringing them." ‘This explanation is challenged: sp xpos x99 pot — But sit from here that this (the prohibition ‘against delaying the nezirus offerings) is derived? p72 ‘ib xppa — It is derived from there, ie. this other verse, as taught ina Baraisa: “angyp w77"3,, — When Scripture states: {FOR Hashem, your God, WILL DEMAND 17," rwayx) MXyD YP ‘= Tas 18 a reference to the CHATAS AND ASHAM OFFERINGS, a5, ‘well as obligatory olak and shelamim offerings. Since the nazir's offerings are included in the category of obligatory offerings he is automatically subject to the commandment not to delay. Why do we need to derive through the hekeish of nezirus to nedarim that this commandment applies to necirus offerings? ‘The Gemara responds: npn sma — Were it not for the hekeish, you might have said CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM 4a thet mga nyin mye sen veo ~ there is a novel (law) that the Torah innovated regarding a nazir, and therefore, the prohibition against delaying does not apply here" ‘The Gemara seeks a clarification: ‘vrrnnxn — What is thenovel [law] regarding ezirus? ptr sya mg nxyD Ab vB xby — If you say it is the rule that fone eannot assume!” an obligation for the nazir's chatas offering through an ordinary neder, I will respond: 35m nxyy — Consider the obligation for the chatas offering that one brings for eating eheiles,*® 4 ApEND THE — which one cannot assume through a neder," 933 73 ‘niin — yet if one who became obligated to bring it tarries in fulfilling this obligation he transgresses the commandment not to delay.) Why should the nazir not be subject to this commandment?” ‘The Gemara offers a clarification of its statement: yyy nsp xox — Rather, what is the novel [law] of [nezirus) that would have led us to think the commandment not to delay is inapplicable here? —xyvsx R47 xp>9 — It might have entered ‘your mind to say that 74} "7g "ey Bx) brat — since if fone says, “I am hereby a nazir,”” 1370 pe tex — even if falls Strom grapesced,™ bl "mj Ny — he is a nazir forall the necirus restrictions = 93 pwwramzy Way) xb ans ‘mx — I might say that if he postpones his offerings he should not transgress the commandment not to delay. Ty a0 xp NOTES components” ofthe rte have been performed. Thus, it is exsential for the nozir to bring his offerings and shave his head in order for the necirus restrictions to be lifted. The Sages understand the verse as meaning “after even a single component” of the rite has been per formed, Thus, ithe nazir brought (even one of hisfferings but did not shave his hed, he is nevertheless free ofthe nezirus restrictions (Rn). 11 Le.even fthe shavings not essential tothe dissolution of thenezirus ‘restrictions it isan integral eomponent of nezirus! Therefore, it stands to reason that ifthe nasir postpones ithe isin violation of the pro- hibition against delaying the fulfillment of [any component of his Vow. 12. (This, too refers to an ordinary nazir who completed his term. If he {aries before bringing his required offerings, he violates the command ‘ment not to delay According to this explanation, however, the violation ‘curs only if the nazi allows throe festivals to pass by between the ‘conclusion of his term and the bringing of his offerings (for as a rule tfferings are subject to a three-festival grace period; see 3b note 12) (Ran; se Parashas Nedarim and Yonas Eilem $4 for discussion of this point; see also R Akiva Kiger to Ran above nxn 37) 1 According to Mar Zutra, when the Barasa on 3a derived through the hebeish of neciras to nedarim that a nazir i subject tothe commandment not to delay, it meant that he may not delay his offerings. The Gemara ‘wonders why we must resort tothe Rekeish asthe source ofthis law. MM. Deuteronomy 29:22. This is part of the verse containing the ‘commandment not to delay the fulfilment of a vow. It reads in its htirey. ypom aq nae wy Wade ROTI AY NT ‘xo sp nny, When you vow @ neder fo Hashem, your God, do not be late in eying it, or Hashem, your God, will demand it of you and there willbe fo sin in you. The phrase 317, When you vou (alternatively: If you ‘vow), would seem to imply that the commandment applies only to voluntary vows. However, a Baraisa (ited fully in Rosh Hashanck Sb) ‘expounds each additional phrase inthis verse as referring to a specific typeof offering, including mandatory ones (Tosafos), Our Gemara cites fone segment of the Barasa 15. The words will demand it allude to obligatory offerings, which Hashem “demands” of a person. This estegory includes the chatos, ‘which generally comes to atone for definite transgressions, and theash- ‘am, which generally comes to atone for acts involving possible trans- tgressions, Te alao includes obligatory olah and shelamim offerings, such {8 those that every individual must bring on the three festivals. The ‘commandment not to delay applies to all these offerings (Rashi to Rosh “Hashanah ibid; ee Rosh; see also Rashash . Presumably, this category includes the nazir’s offerings (since they are obligatory] (Ran; see the full text ofthe Baraisa in Rosh Hashanah ibid; see also Rashash 16. Lethe epeifc teaching regarding nzirus ~ as derived through the Iekeish-~ is necessary, because we might not haveappliedtonezirus the general rule that is derived from for Hashem, your God, wil! demand it 117 Literally: attach, 1B. Le, ifone who isnot a nazir says, “I hereby undertake to bring the hazr'schatas,” no obligation takes effect; ony wnazir can be liable to {this offering. Since the nazi's offerings are more lenient than other offerings in this respect, one might have thought that they are also more Tenient in the respect that they are excluded from the commandment not to delay (Ran), (One can also not obligate himeelf to bring the nezr's lah or shelamin, bit since one can undertake to bring avoluntary ola ‘or shelamim, the Gemara mentions specifically the chatas.) 19 (Cheilevis the term fr fats whose consumpion the Torah forbade. One who eats cheileo unintentionally incurs the obligation to bring « chatas,| The Gemara uses chee a8 a prototype of the violation for ‘which one incurs achatas, employing the expression “chata for chetleo” fat a reference to the general category of chatas offerings brought for ‘etonement (Ran). Cheilev is used as the prototype because eating cheileo was the most common reason for which chatas liability was incurred, since the forbidden fats of slaughtered animals were fre- ‘quently found in homes (Roh; f, Rashi to Sotoh 15a 397 nxn 7) 20, (Le. if one who did not commit a transgression says, "I am hereby ‘obligated to bring a chates for atonement,” no obligation takes effet) ‘Thus, the chatas shares this lenieney with the aezrus offerings (Ran 21 Le. if one who ate cheilev doos not bring his chatas in a timely fashion, he has violated the probibition against delaying, as taught = the Baraisa segment just cited 22. Le. he specifies that he means to undertake anly one aspect ofneziras thet of abstaining from grape-seed [and not the aspects of avoiding other grape products, tunah and hair shaving] (see Nazir 3b). 28, Despite his qualifiation of is vow, the dedaration “Iam hereby = nazr" brings the full slate of nesirus into effect (Ram). The Gomara in [Nazir (3b) cites a Seriptural source fr this novel rule, 24. Le since nesirus ia subject to one novelty insofar as it takes effect fully on the basis ofa qualified vow, perhaps itissubjectto the additional novelty of being excluded from the commandment not to delay. The Gemara wil challenge this reasoning shorty. {Note that the declaration “Tam hereby a nazir from grape-seed” is ‘not aad (partial delaration) for nezirus. Rather, itis full declaration “ofpartal nezirus| Nevertheless, we derive from Scripture (see Nazir 38) ‘hat it effets the state of nezirus in full.)KOL KINUYEL = [Seripture] therefore informs us by means ofthe hekeish that the nazir is subject to this commandment. ‘The Gemara notes that this answer is qualified: ‘vas7 po? xIr37 ~ This fits well according to the one who says that 93)" Ny Ty9H pa 7772 — when one makes the vow of nezirus specifically in regard to abstaining from grape- seed he is automatically a nazir for all the nezirus restrc- tions!” yt AV a1) xbx — But according to R’ Shimon, ‘who says that 1913p -yw Ty > — one isnot anazir until ‘he makes the vow of nezirus in regard to abstaining from all [the restricted categories)" oma) xprx 1x — what is there to say? Since nezirus is no different than any other obligation in regard to its vow, why should it be different in regard to the commandment not ta delay? ‘CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM 4a ‘The Gemara continues, challenging the basic premise of the previous clarification: ‘0) — And furthermore, xin xypiny wron 1x9 — that ale ‘you cited is a novel [law] in which nezirus is more stringent than other contexts!” Why should it lend us to think that the rnaziris treated more leniently than other vowers insofar as being exempt from the commandment not to delay bs offerings? ‘The Gemara concedes and offers another explanation of the novelty mmyrTn xn xbx — Rather, what is the novel [law] of [nezi- rus] that would have led us to think the commandment not to delay is inapplicable here? —xpay yyy xzho7 — It might have entered your mind to say that Syn — since the law ‘NOTES 25, A dispute regarding this issue is cited in Nosir (iid). The Rabbis ‘maintain thatthe qualified vow effects a full state of nezirus, 26, Le, he must say, "I am hereby a nazir," without specifying any particular category of the necirus restrictions (Rosh). And if he 0 into specifics, he must mention all the categories, as follows: “T am hereby a nazir from grape products and from haireuts and from tumah” (Rosh vo Nazir 3). 27. [According to the Rabbis who rule that the declaration “Iam hereby ‘anazir regarding grape-seed” brings on the full state of nezrus, the wow of nezirus is more stringent than other vows, whick do not take eect fully in an equivalent case.)mee eere Abt KOL KINUYEI xy ;wzwe ADs vy Ne OX} — that if [the nazir] shaves over one of the three [offerings] he has discharged his shaving obligation,"' ann 33 mby ‘Way xb — he should not transgress the commandment not to delay for postponement of [any of these offerings)" 1» yowy xq — [Seripture] there- fore informs us by means of the hekeish that he is subject to the commandment not to delay. ‘An alternative answer is presented: xpos nnsgix} — Or, if you prefer, say: mvrin vx» — What is ‘the novel (Iaw] of [nezirus] that would have led us to think the ‘commandment not to delay is not applicable here? x67 own ‘su tonne ~ It is as proposed originally ~ because one cannot assume an obligation for [the nazir’s chatas offering] through an ordinary neder." bn nxva 7 XW x27 XT} ~ And as for that which you asked from the ease of the chatas offering brought for eating eheileo,' I can respond: symp a9 RXBD 111939 — The chatas that is brought for eating cheilev comes to cffec atonement for the sin. Since one is commanded to achieve ‘atonement, it stands to reason that he may not delay the offering." ‘eqns xp “9 NBT — By contrast, for what necessity does the chatas offering of anazir come?" Since it isnot analogous to the chatas for eating cheilev, if not for the hekeisk we might have thought that it is excluded from the commandment not to delay. CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM. ‘The Gemara counters nibh nxpn vm — But consider the chatas of a woman who hhas given birth, 939 x07 x57 — which does not come to effect atonement,” nxn 3 aww ney Tay) yet for postpon- ing it one transgresses the commandment not to delay." — ? — ‘The Gemara answers: mrupa barb np wry xp x0ng — That [chatas] renders [the ‘woman who has given birth] permitted to eat kodashim. ” ‘The Gemara returns to a segment of the Baraisa quoted on $2, which derives various laws from the hekeish between nedarin: and nezirus ‘ip vox — The master said: oy mm — AND JUST AS regarding NEDARIM, RB 7772 MD 3X] — A FATHER CAN REVOKE HIS DAUGHTER'S NEDARIN SRX™Y]3 70% 231 ~ AND [AMUSBAND CAN REVOKE HIS WIFE'S NBDARIM, TN AX ~ SO ‘Too, regarding NEZIRUS, RB NIM} 7p! BHT — A FATHER CAN REVOKE HIS DAUGHTER'S NEZIRUS, nw. MIN} "MD Syst — AND A HUSBAND CAN REVOKE HIS WIFE'S NEZIRUS. ‘The Gemara wonders _xyprn mp ~ Why do I need the hekeish asa source for this law? oryqm wma m3 1nrn — Let it be derived through tbe method of mah matzinu, from the context of nedarim.'* ~ ? — NOTES 1L Although the nazir must ofer an ola, chatas and shelamim as part ‘ot his concluding rite, if e offers only one of them and shaves his head the nezirus restrictions ae lifted (eee Mishna Nazir 45a), 2, Since the offerings are subject to the leniency that the nezirus ‘estrictions ean be lifted even if only one of them is brought, if not for the Aekeish we might heve thought that they are subject to the ‘additional leniency of being excluded from the prohibition against delaying (Ran, on 4) 3, See da note 18 4. Le. the obligation fo this chats also cannot be assumed through an. ‘ordinary neder, yet we know that one who became lable to itis subject tothe commandment not to delay. Why should the nezirus offerings be different? (ace a notes 19-21). 65, That is although the chatas is lenient inthe sense that one cannot ‘assume an obligation for it through an ordinary neder, it stands to reason that ane who became obligated is subject to the prohibition ‘agnnst delaying it ~ for he is commanded to bring it in order to effect the atonement that he needs! (Zan, on 4a) 6. The nazir does not need the chatas for atonement. Even the Tanna ‘who says (below, 10a) that a nasir is called a “sinner” (because he distressed himself by abstaining from wine) concedes that he did not ‘commit a ral sin that ealls for penance; accordingly, that chafas does hot come primarily to effect atonement! And although offering the Chatas serves to lift the nesirue restrictions and permit the nazir to drink wine, he is not commanded to lift these restrictions; itis simply his prerogative to da so ance he completes his term ofnezrus. Thus, the bringing of the chatas does not produce a result that the nazir was commanded to bring about [t simply represents the fulfillment of his concluding rive, Therefore, the nazr’schatas is not analogous to the ‘hatas for eating chile. | And since the nazir’s chatas is subject to the leniency that its obligation cannot be assumed through an ordinary rneder, we might have thought thet the goneral commandment not to ‘elay is inapplicable to this offering (Ran, on 4a; see there for further discussion; se also Rashash on 4a). 17, Seripture decrees (Leviticus 12:6) that every woman after childbirth ‘ust bring an olah and achatas — although she has not committed any transgression! [Now actualy, there is an opinion (ae Niddah 3tb) that the woman who has given birth is considered a “sinner” because when in the throes of labor the sears that she will nver again cohabit with hher husband, and this is flse oath. However, this isnot the primary ‘reason forthe ehatas, since even & woman who knows that she did not entertain such a thought is obligated to offer it (Ran, on 4.1 8. [Let us therefore say that the nazr’schatas is also included in this category] It is unclear why the Gemara assumes that the chatas of the ‘woman who has given birth is included inthe general category of chotoe offerings to which the prohibition against delaying applies. One cout ‘seemingly argue (at this point) that sine the chatas ofthe woman mh has given birth does not come for atonement, itis no different thas t= nazir's chatas ~ and both are excluded from the prohibition (To Yeshanim, Gilyon HaShas, Tosafs as emended by Keren Orah). For = resolution of tis dificult, soe Keren Orah. 9, Le, sacred foods, such as the meat of an offering. Scripture sistas (ibid v. 8): may) HED Ty 79>} the Koken shall provide atonement f= hher and she shall be purified, meaning that onco the chatas is Tet the woman is permitted to eat Rodashim — which she had previously ‘been forbidden to eat. Now, eating kodashim isa mitzvah, since ew person ~ whether man or woman ~ is obligated to bring the peso bffering annually and partake of it (Ran; see also Tosafos). Thus, Se ‘hatos ofthe woman who has given birth causes er to attain a dese of purity that she is commanded to reach. tis therefore anslogo=s the chatas for eating cheilev, which effects atonement that one = commanded to achieve. That is why the prohibition against delerne applies to this offering, By contrast, the nazir's chatas does not Sp him attain anything that is commanded. Therefore, if not for Sue hekeish, we might have thought that on account of ite leniency = = ‘excluded from the prohibition against delaying (see note 6) 10, Moh matsinu ("What do we find?" i an analogy which teaches a a law known tobe true in one contoxt applies to every similar conte Once the Torah taught that a father or husband may revoke Sa nnedarim of his daughter or wife, it follows automaticaly thst Sax ‘applies to vows of nezirus as well. Why do I need the hekeish to mass this? (See Rosh. ‘Ran wonders why the Gemara asks this question only regarding Sie law of revocation, and not regarding the law of yados (pa declarations). Le. one could just as well ask why the Baraise, in ts Se tlause, must derive from the hekeisk that just as yados are eactn= Se nezirus, 0 too, they are valid for all nedarim. This, too, may be Gera through the method of mah matzinu! Ran answers that if we wea derive the law of yados through mah matzinu then one wo vila nneder that he effected through a jad would not bo liable to lashes — ‘because there is principle that punishment may never be meted este ‘the bass of analogy [77772 po79 Ps) The Baraisa therefore derive law of yodos through the hebeish, because laws derived throws Se method of exegesis are punishable (soe 7a note 19). Repsoding revocation, however, itis proper to ask why the Baraisa needs to m= to the hekelsh when the matter may be derived through simple aia {since no punishment is involved). See also Tosofos. See fers Mishneh LaMelech, Hil. Nezirus 2:17, and Chidushei R’ Akiva Eager ‘a, and Kovetz Shiurim, Kiddushin $16.4b? KOL KINUYEI ‘The Gemara responds: syprey nin my "at xpOPT — Ifnot for the hekeish, Tight have said: Perhaps it is only in the case of nedarim that [a father or hhusband] may revoke the vow, _xptnp my mvc xo mina — because [an unspecified neder] does not have a time limit." nya 133 99x — But in the case of nezirus, xmwwip m2 RT = which has atime limit, ph ow nivmy N97 — since the ‘term of an unspecified nezirus is thirty days!” xo xprx — I might say that they may not revoke the wow." yp maw xp — [Scripture] therefore informs us through the hekeish that revocation i posible even for vows of nezrus.! ‘The Mishnah stated: saan ny 17h TaN WIRY — ONE WHO SAYS TO HIS FELLOW: “IAM. ‘vows from you,” ete, [or “I am separated from you," oF “Tam distanced from you,” .is forbidden by the terms of his neder]." ‘The Mishnah’s ruling is qualified: ‘xm vax - Shmuel said: yp723 — In all these [eases], the ruling does not apply 3 BYID waxy ap Dan aRY BRIE WD — ‘unless [the vower] also says: “in that which Teat of yours,” or “in that which I taste of yours." CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM ‘Shmuel’s interpretation of the Mishnah is challenged: vain — They challenged Shmuel on the basis of the following Baraisa: 38138 719 — If one says, “TAM VOWED FROM YOU,” ‘yee MoM — oF “IAMSEPARATEDFROMYOU." "2a ~NV4 — Or TAM DISTANCED FROM YOU," "IDX HT Y771 — HE IS FOR: BuppeN by the terms of his neder. 3 barx vay — Ifone says, “That WHICHTEAT OF YOURS,” 37 BEY TAY — or “That WHICH TASTE OF YOURS,” “Wo FY 777] — HE 18 FORBIDDEN by the terms of his neder. Thus, we see that each of these statements itself is suficiont to engender a prohibition.!” — ? — ‘The Gemara defends Shmuel's interpretation: vung 139 — This is what (the Baraisa] means to teach in its latter clause: yyvax 57737 199 — When was this matter of the first clause stated, i. that one who says, “Tam vowed from you,” ete, is forbidden by his neder? aye vx Bix 3p pro xy 4p — Its regarding a case where he also says, “in that which I eat of yours,” or “in that which I taste of yours." "The Gemara counters: .xqbvx x70) — But another Baraisa was taught in the opposite fashion, as follows: 49 531x "usw — If one says, “That WHICEE NOTES ‘1 When one says, “Let this thing be forbidden to me like an offering,” ‘and does not specify a time limit, it becomes forbidden to him forever (sh), Perhaps the Torah allowed revocation in order to spare (a ‘daughter or wife the felon distress of abtinence from that which she forbade upon herself (Ran; see Tosafos, Rosh and Keren Orah) 12. This is derived from Scripture in Nasir 5a. Thus, nesirus is not ‘analogous to an ordinary neder in rogard to the distress it causes. 13, Even if a woman specified that she should be a nazi for life, her father or husband would be unable to revoke the vow, for sinee the standard term of nezirus is only thirty days perhaps the Torah did not provide the mechanism of revocation at all for nezrus. By contrast, in {he ease of an ordinary neder, even ifthe woman specified tha it should be elfectve for only thirty days it would be subject to revocation, for ‘since the Torah did provide this mechanism it may be employed even in the ease ofa limited neder (Keren Orah 14, (When two subjects ae linked through a hekesh, we learn that the laws pertaining to one apply to the other ~ even though they are not analogous.) Tan asks; Why do we not derive from the hekish that ust as unspeci= ‘ied nezirus lasts only thirty days, so too the prohibition engendered by ‘any unspeciiedneder lasts only ciety days? Ran answers that this ism possible because the term neder includes two categories of vows — vows, btprohibition [ne “7: and vows of consecration [xy "pI. Vows of tonsecration effet a permanent state of sanctity, for once an animal is designated as an offering it remains consecrated forever. Therefore, ‘vows of probibition also take effect permanently [unless the vower specifies otherwise, bocause we compare the two categories of nedarim ‘to each other [rather than comparing one of them to vows of nezirus]. 15. These are partial declarations (yodos) of nedarim. The Gemare’s following discussion is based on the premise that there are three types, of partial declarations: (a) Partial declarations that are so incomplete as to be meaningless. A declaration in this category is not eonsidered a yad a all. (b) Partial declarations that are inconclusive [mst yxy orn, ie. that can be interpreted as prohibitive nedarim — or even tend towards this interpretation — but also allow for alternative interpretations. tis ‘a matter of dispute whether an inconclusive yd is effective (as we shall, learn on 5b. ©) Partial declarations that are conclusive [nirot or, i. that early indicate the vower's intent. Those are certsinly effective, for we derived the validity of yados from Scripture above (Sa). [This reflects the view of Ran; see, especially, Ran to end of Ba ‘yon "37 05x, Others explain the distinction between these categories Aiferentiy; see Rosh to end of Sa and to Nazir 2h peraw 7a0p xo 7. Fitea (to 2a 179 9979) asterts that even a conclusive yd is vid ifthe ‘yower says he did not truly intond for a neder. Ct. Kehilos Yaakoo, Hosajos $1.1 16. The Mishnal reads: “One who says to his fellow: ‘Lam vowed fox you,’ or ‘Tam separated from you,’ or Tam distanced from you, — ‘that which Tet of your that which I taste of yours is forbids by the terms of is neder.” Shmuel informs us that the Mishnah i= stating one law: A nader i effected ifthe vower combines one of the Statements in the first group with one of those inthe second group — for example, he says, "I am vowed from you in that which I est of yours.” The statement “Tam vowed from you,” or “I am separsint from you,” or “T am distanced from you” itself is ineffective, (The ‘Gemara initially understands the reason as being that] none of these statements by itself connotes that the vower means to probs ‘anything, and thus, these are not even considered partial delarstions fot nedarim, ie. they are not yados at all (Ran). (Perhaps the reason = because “Tam vowed (or ‘ceparated’, or ‘distanced’ from you" = understood as an expression of displeasure, meaning “I will baw ‘nothing to do with you, a if was under vow" (se Meir) However, Shmuel concedes thatthe statement “That which xt yours” ot “That which I taste of yours” itself is @ valid yad fora made One who declares, “That which I eat of yours,” is understood = alluding that his fllow's food shall be subject toa certain rule, na ‘assumed to mean that it “shall be forbidden to me like an offen ‘Shmel means only that the statoments in the Mishnah's first oe ‘are ineffective in their own right (Toso, Rosh; see Ran below === ‘tae prand Rashbe at length; soe further, Tosofos to Sb ars ane Rosh (Pesahis] 82 with Korban Nesanel 97 and Keren Orah)) 17, (We learn from the Baraisa that “I am vowed (or ‘sepersied = ‘distanced’ from you" does imply that the declarer means to ins nneder | Unlike the Mishnah, which states “is forbidden” only athe listing all the declarations the Barisa state it twice. Thus, whee is possible to interpret the Mishnah as meaning that statement Som the latter clause must be added to one from the former clause i= =e to make it a yad, the Baraisa clearly implies that a declaration Som cither clause is effective — contrary to Shmuel’ interpretation am {Presumably, the Barasa means thatthe declarations inthe rst muse ‘ender the vower prohibited to derive any benefit from his fellow, sm these delarations are unqualified. The declarations in the latter sm ‘which refer specifically to eating or tasting, would prohibit xy Se specified benefit (Rashba).] 18. Le. the later clause qualifies the former clause, tesching thas ie ‘vower is in fact forbidden by his neder only if he adds “in thst was ‘eat of yours” ete, Thus, both clauses together deal with a ner ase ‘esting or tasting ofthe fllow's food. ‘Note, however, that this explanation resolves ony the messin wie phrase “is forbidden” atthe end of the frst clause. We ar sil == to understand why the Baraisa repeats is forbidden” after the See clause — if indeed the latter clause is merely a qualification af former! The Gemara will point this out below. Meanie, = =m different objection to the answer (Ran).